Bulletin of the German Historical Institute

Features:
Redefining the Transatlantic Relationship
Joschka Fischer

America Among Empires?
Charles Maier

Comparing U.S. and German Capitalism
Colleen Dunlavy and Thomas Welskopp
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KATHERINE AASLESTAD is Associate Professor of History and currently Woodburn Professor at West Virginia University. She is the author of Place and Politics: Local Identity, Civic Culture, and German Nationalism in North Germany during the Revolutionary Era (Boston and Leiden, 2005).

MIRIAM CZOCK is a Ph.D. candidate at Ruhr-Universität Bochum and currently teaches in the Department of Medieval History at Universität Dortmund. Her article “Gott schenkte ihm die Märtyrerpalme. Einige Überlegungen zur Funktion der Heiligkeit Karls des Guten im Werk Galberts von Brügge” is forthcoming in Recht, Religion, Gesellschaft und Kultur im Wandel der Geschichte, edited by Iris Kwiatkowski and Michael Oberweis (Hamburg, 2007).

MARION DESHMUKH is Chair, Department of History and Art History at George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia. Her research interests center on the relationships between nineteenth- and twentieth-century German painters and their reception through the lens of politics. Her most recent publication was an exhibition catalogue, Max Liebermann: Works on Paper.

SONJA DÜMPELMANN is Assistant Professor of Landscape Architecture at the University of Maryland. She has published a book on the life and work of the Italian landscape designer Maria Teresa Parpagliolo Shephard (1903–1974). Her research interests include the transatlantic transfer of ideas in landscape architecture and planning.


ULRIKE VON HIRSCHHAUSEN, currently substituting in the Chair for Modern History at the University of Bielefeld, has published Die Grenzen der Gemeinsamkeit: Deutsche, Letten, Russen und Juden in Riga 1860–1914 (Göttingen, 2006).

MARKUS HÜNEMÖRDER held the Postdoc Stipendium für Nordamerikanische Geschichte at the GHI in 2006–2007. He teaches American History at the University of Munich and is the author of The Society of the Cincinnati: Conspiracy and Distrust in Early America (New York, 2006).
WALTER D. KAMPHOEFLNER is Professor of History and Director of Graduate Studies at Texas A&M University. His latest book, co-edited with Wolfgang Helbich, is Germans in the Civil War: The Letters they Wrote Home (Chapel Hill, 2006).


CHARLES S. MAIER is the Leverett Saltonstall Professor of History at Harvard. His most recent book is Among Empires: American Ascendancy and its Predecessors (Cambridge MA, 2006).

JUDITH A. MILLER is Associate Professor in the Department of History at Emory University. She is the author of Mastering the Market: The State and the Grain Trade in Northern France, 1700–1860 (Cambridge/New York, 1998). Her present book project is “The Political Uses of Fear in the Late French Revolution, 1794–1815.”

ROBERT MOELLER teaches modern European history at the University of California, Irvine, where he is also faculty advisor for a professional development project for middle and high school history teachers in Orange County. He has written widely on the history of Germany in the twentieth century, and his publications include War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany (Berkeley, 2001).

MAREN MÖHRING held a NEH-GHI Fellowship at the GHI in 2007. Lecturer of modern and contemporary history at the University of Cologne, she is currently a Humboldt Fellow at the University of Zurich, working on a book project on foreign cuisine in West Germany. Her publications include Marmorleiber: Körperbildung in der deutschen Nacktkultur (1890–1930) (Cologne/Vienna/Weimar, 2004) and several articles on the history of the body, gender history, and consumerism.

STEVEN PFRAFF is Associate Professor of Sociology and Director of the Center for West European Studies at the University of Washington in Seattle. He is the author of Exit-Voice Dynamics and the Collapse of East Germany: The Crisis of Leninism and the Revolution of 1989 (Durham NC, 2006).


TOM ROBERTSON teaches history at Worcester Polytechnic Institute. He is working on a book about the American environmental movement and concerns about population growth.

THOMAS WELSKOPP is Professor for the History of Modern Societies at Bielefeld University. He is the author of Das Banner der Brüderlichkeit: Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie vom Vormärz bis zum Sozialistengesetz (Bonn, 2000).
The past has figured prominently in political debates of recent years. At the outset of the Iraq War, there was much discussion of the potential lessons that the American experiences in Germany and Japan after 1945 might offer for the remaking of Iraq’s political order. More recently, observers on the left and right alike have drawn parallels—very different parallels, to say the least—between America’s interventions in Vietnam and Iraq. Another group of frequent allusions to the past in contemporary political discourse is tied to the concept of “empire.” Is the United States a new Rome? Should the West reexamine the British Empire and the pax Britannica as it searches for responses to the international political challenges of the early twenty-first century? The wide interest in the concept of empire was one of the main reasons the GHI dedicated its Spring 2007 Lecture Series to the topic “Empire in German and American History.” In his lecture in this series Charles S. Maier of Harvard University explored the criteria for defining empire and their potential applicability to the United States today. This issue of the Bulletin presents his essay “America Among Empires? Imperial Analogues and Imperial Syndrome.”

Shortly after Professor Maier offered the GHI’s audience a theoretical framework for thinking about America’s role on the international stage, former German foreign minister Joschka Fischer presented his reading of the course of European-American relations since the end of the Cold War on the occasion of the Eighth Gerd Bucerius Lecture, jointly organized by the GHI and the Ebelin and Gerd Bucerius ZEIT Foundation. Drawing a contrast to the close transatlantic cooperation that was crucial in ending the Balkan crisis, Fischer gave a frank assessment of the current state of the Western alliance. “Europe is weak and the United States is blind,” he declared bluntly. Uncertainty and lack of unity on the part of the Europeans, he went on to explain, and the United States’ increasingly unilateralist instincts are hobbling an often effective and still very necessary partnership. The text of Fischer’s Bucerius Lecture appears in this issue of the Bulletin.

Fischer’s analysis rests on a comparison of the differing European and American responses to post-Cold War developments, and in his hands, historical comparison serves as a means to challenge conventional wisdom and ready-made opinions. In similar fashion, Colleen A. Dunlavy and Thomas Welskopp provocatively reexamine the striking differences between the German and American economic systems in their essay “Myths and Peculiarities: Comparing US and German Capitalism” in
this issue of the Bulletin. Dunlavy and Welskopp’s study was prepared in conjunction with the project “Competing Modernities,” jointly organized by the GHI and the Humboldt University, Berlin, with the support of the Robert Bosch Foundation. Each of the fourteen two-person teams of scholars participating in the “Competing Modernities” project is exploring a key facet of twentieth-century life and comparing the German and American experiences of change. More information on “Competing Modernities” is available online at www.ghi-dc.org/competingmodernities.

The driving force behind “Competing Modernities” at the GHI was Christof Mauch, who stepped down as director this past spring. Christof Mauch had come to Washington as the GHI’s deputy director in 1998. He took over as acting director the following year and was appointed director in 2001. All who had the pleasure of working with Christof Mauch in his decade at the GHI can attest to his tremendous energy, imagination, and creativity; and also, I should stress, his openness, collegiality, and good nature. All of us at the GHI wish Christof Mauch great happiness and success in his new position as professor of North American history at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität in Munich.

On April 1, 2008, Hartmut Berghoff will assume the position of director of the GHI. Professor Berghoff is currently director of the Institute for Economic and Social History at the University of Göttingen. Having served as acting director for six months, I know how demanding the position awaiting Professor Berghoff is. I also know that he will be able to draw upon a tremendous store of goodwill toward the GHI built up over the past twenty years by my predecessors.

My brief tenure in the director’s office will be coming to an end as this issue of the Bulletin goes to press. I have depended heavily on the experience and knowledge of the entire staff of the GHI: to all of them, I extend my deepest thanks. I owe a particular debt of gratitude to Sabine Fix, the GHI’s administrative director, and to Anke Ortlepp, our deputy director. Anke and I were hired as GHI research fellows on the same day, and we learned together that we were to be appointed acting director and deputy director. I have relied on her as both friend and colleague throughout my time in Washington, and I wish her all the best as she takes on still greater responsibilities at the GHI.

Gisela Mettele
Acting Director (April–September 2007)
European-American relations are a subject on which there is both good and bad news to report. The good news is that NATO still exists. There is an old European saying that military alliances disappear when the reasons for which they were built disappear. When the Cold War ended, everybody thought that there might be a danger that NATO would disappear; today we know that this did not happen. Regarding the economic side of the transatlantic relationship, there also is good news to report: Although everybody is talking about trade with China, a look at direct investments shows that Europe is the most important investor in the United States, and the US is by far the biggest investor in Europe, in all parts of the European Union. Europeans and Americans have their disputes, but if we look at basic principles, we will understand immediately how close we are. This is the good news.

If we look at the transatlantic relationship with the cold eyes of the political realist, however, there also is bad news to report. On the one hand, the EU has been in a very complicated situation ever since the French and the Dutch voted to reject the European constitution. On the other hand, the United States, the indispensable leader of the free world, is also in a difficult situation. If I wanted to put it more provocatively, I would say: Europe is weak and the United States is blind. This is not a good perspective for the transatlantic relationship.

Let me outline how we arrived at this situation, and let me also outline what I think must be done. Both sides of the Atlantic are still struggling with the end of a historical period. It all started with the collapse of the Soviet empire. November 9, 1989, when the Berlin Wall came down, was an unforgettable moment of joy. I don’t believe that I will ever again experience as positive a political emotion as I did then. The Wall came down: a military border where people were shot when
they tried to cross it. Dictatorial regimes disappeared almost overnight. The velvet revolution in Prague, the round table in Warsaw, the Solidarity movement: all this was a great success story with a happy ending. It was the spring of freedom. One year after the dramatic changes of 1989, the Soviet Union disappeared. The collapse of an empire in so short a time—in a historical second—was unprecedented. Usually, the foundation for historical changes is laid by major tragedies: the American Civil War, the First World War, the Second World War. Such events make seemingly unchangeable historical structures fluid, so that they can be formed in a new direction.

The end of the Cold War presented a completely different situation. The Western Europeans had built a house whose back wall was the iron curtain. Thanks to the American security guarantee and the presence of American troops, we felt safe. We were used to living with the nuclear threat of the Cold War. Germany had its own civil war between West Germany and East Germany, embedded in the larger Cold War. And suddenly the back wall of the house was gone. There were big emotions when the other part of the family suddenly appeared. There was waving. The new relatives did not have to knock at the door because the back wall of the house had disappeared. It was a big feast, with hugs, kisses, and tears. But as often happens in families when relatives arrive and stay too long, problems arose: There is only one bathroom. What’s going on in the fridge? Where is my food? In short, practical issues. This was exactly what happened in Europe. It was not a shared experience because the experience of the Eastern Europeans differed from that of the Western Europeans, just as the East German experience was completely different from the West German one.

At the very moment of joy when the old world order of the Cold War disappeared, new threats arose and old threats returned. The beginning of the 1990s was the moment of Saddam Hussein’s aggression against Kuwait and of the breaking up of Yugoslavia. I don’t want to enter the historical debate about whether it was wise to move forward with the breaking up of Yugoslavia or whether there was an option for a new constitution based on international guarantees that might have avoided bloodshed; historians will have to resolve these issues. What matters for the history of the transatlantic relationship is that the US and the Europeans had different perspectives on the Yugoslav crisis. While the Europeans thought this crisis was important, the US was much more concerned about the Middle East and Saddam Hussein. So the US essentially said: “The Balkan crisis is a European problem: Take care of it on your own.” The result was not good. I was the deputy leader of the Green parliamentary group in the state parliament of Hessen at the time. I will never forget how surprised I was that “the West” seemed to suddenly
cease to exist. Instead, a confrontation along the lines of 1914 emerged: Britain and France supported Belgrade; Germany and Austria supported Zagreb. I asked myself: Where is the West? Was it a big illusion created by the Cold War, preserved only by the deterrence of the two superpowers? I couldn’t believe it. The result was devastating.

Paradoxically, with the “spring of freedom” of 1989, war returned to Europe in the most horrible way. History opened its Pandora’s box and the most terrible disease of modern Europe—nationalism—once again defined the agenda in a part of Europe. What was the intention of Greater Serbia? The situation closely resembled that of the 1930s. Once again, territorial claims were to be implemented by the use of force, mass rape, mass killing, and by making people flee in order to change a territory’s ethnic composition. The intentional destruction of cultural heritage, including churches and mosques, was part of the program. The ghosts of Europe’s past returned, and neither Europe nor “the West” had a common understanding of how to respond. We paid a high price for that: 250,000 people died in Bosnia; millions of people became refugees; cities, villages, and numerous cultural heritage sites were destroyed—until America became fed up with Europe’s weakness and told the Europeans: “You are not able to take care of your own business.” The bloodshed was only ended thanks to the intervention of American troops, who led the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia. The next step led to Dayton. Dayton is an Air Force base in Ohio. I think it was wise to choose an Air Force base: It’s not very comfortable. In Dayton, peace for Bosnia was achieved under complicated circumstances. But the broader problems of the region—the challenge of nationalism, not only in Bosnia, but in the former Yugoslavia as a whole—were not addressed in a sustained way.

After Dayton, it was clear that the oppressed Kosovo-Albanian minority would abandon the nonviolent strategy it had used since the Milosevic government had dismantled their autonomy. There was a direct road from Dayton to Kosovo. At this juncture, one of the defining moments in the post-Cold War history of Europe and the United States occurred: We were able to learn. We understood that if we did not draw a red line and tell Milosevic, “You can’t cross this red line without risking that we will use force against you,” Milosevic would have continued. My impression was that he was not a nationalist. I don’t know whether he had any political convictions except one: He believed in his power. Therefore he tried to ride Serbia’s nationalist tiger. I doubt that he could have stopped the tiger without getting slain. We tried everything to convince him. There was a pilgrimage of European and American politicians and generals to the White Palace, on the outskirts of Belgrade, sitting on the famous sofa that many of you will have seen on television. But Milosevic could not be stopped. As a result, for the first time ever, NATO went to
war to protect human rights—the human rights of a mostly Muslim population in the western Balkans.

The challenge presented by this war was quite clear: How can we create a new order so that this part of Europe would have the same opportunities as the rest of Europe. All the other so-called post-Soviet democracies turned away from their authoritarian past and followed the path of the rule of law, democracy, strong civil societies, and integration into “the West.” The Czechs and Slovaks, for example, decided not to live together any longer and divorced in an orderly and civilized manner. Only the former Yugoslavia took a different path. Our common understanding was that if we wanted to overcome that region’s nationalism and end the tragedy that took place there, the only way was to repeat the success story of European integration. We had to bring these nations into the Europe of integration. The Kosovo conflict was a confrontation between an old nationalism, based on war and atrocities and harking back to the 1930s and 1940s, and the new Europe, based on integration, common institutions, negotiation, and finding peaceful solutions in a framework of common security and a shared economic and political future.

At the time of the Kosovo conflict, the issue of Jihad terrorism did not loom as large as it would after September 11, 2001; it was simply absent from the decision-making. Just think about the situation we would face if a young Muslim population of Kosovo-Albanian refugees sat in refugee camps today. In hindsight, it was an important consequence of the Kosovo war that any linkage between the western Balkan crisis belt and the Middle East was severed. The Kosovo intervention also created remarkable cooperation between Europe and the United States. I will never understand why it ended with the new US administration. During the Kosovo war, there was close coordination between the European five-power “Quintet” and the United States, represented by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. This group was not a formal decision-making body, but during the war, we had informal discussions about the issues almost every night. I think this close cooperation demonstrates the possibilities that are available for the future of the transatlantic relationship.

Both sides of the Atlantic agreed that the enlargement of NATO and the EU was key. The Balkan wars had a clear lesson: A return to a balance-of-power system—rather than European integration—would lead to a revival of nationalism, which carried a great risk of serious instability. To me at least, it was quite clear that we could not have lasting peace in Europe if the EU remained Western European. After all, the division of Europe, like the division of Germany, was an artificial one resulting from the Second World War. Therefore, Western Europe had to open up. And indeed, European enlargement and NATO enlargement have been great achievements. Europe’s move toward a supranational
structure was a crucial element in the resolution of the Balkan conflicts. Europe will never become a United States of Europe on the model of the United States of America. Europe will always reflect a balance of common European institutions and strong nation-states. We will have our different languages, histories, and traditions—bright and dark sides. As we say farewell to the old model of nationalism, we should be proud of our diversity; in a globalized world, this diversity might in fact be a real asset. Unlike the United States, we will not be one nation. We will be many nations, from the Russian border to the western coast. This was the message of the Balkan wars, and it worked. Two or three years after the end of the Kosovo war, I was invited to a meeting of foreign ministers from Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, Serbia, and Macedonia. One year earlier, such a meeting would have been impossible. But the framework of the stability pact—the prospect that one day these countries will all belong to NATO and the European Union—completely changed the mindset of the actors on the ground. This is a great achievement, not only for humanitarian or security reasons, but because it will guarantee lasting peace in Europe.

At the end of the Kosovo war, there was still a strong common understanding between the United States and Europe. The differences began in another area, and they didn’t start with the second President Bush, but much earlier. They began in the final period of the Cold War, when American administrations began to feel that America was like Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver: tied down by dwarfs—by international law, by treaties, by all those issues that would reduce the power of the United States. Allow me to be frank here, as a friend of your country who admires your country and thinks that America is the world’s indispensable leader because the alternative is a vacuum with very negative consequences for world politics. Frankly, then: As the Cold War wound down, America began to have unilateralist inclinations. It was not yet the beginning of unilateralism, but it was the feeling that America would be better off doing things alone.

Let’s go back a bit in history. During the Second World War and the Cold War, America—your “great generation”—created the world system we still rely on today. This is true not only of NATO, but also of the UN. The UN is an American child even if nowadays it seems to be orphaned. The same can be said of the international financial institutions that were created at Bretton Woods in 1944. At the end of the Second World War, America was more powerful than at the end of the First World War. You had a nuclear monopoly, millions of men under arms, and by far the most powerful economy. But America seized that moment not to pursue unilateral politics, but to create a new world order based on alliances—on freedom, democracy, and consent. And it turned out that this was the best
thing America could have done for its own national interests. By contrast, at the outset of the post-Cold War period, the United States had a government that no longer believed in multilateralism.

And then came the terrible day nobody will ever forget, September 11, 2001. This created a great opportunity because across the globe everybody felt, “The US is under attack, so we must join our friends and help.” Even in the Muslim and Arab world, there was this strong feeling. In Berlin, there was a huge demonstration in front of the Brandenburg Gate. I think only during the Berlin blockade and when the Berlin Wall was erected in 1961 had Berlin seen bigger demonstrations. The famous words of a French politician expressed everyone’s feelings: “Today we are all Americans.” This was a great opportunity to unite the world and achieve great things. Everybody in NATO understood that the situation was serious, that our friend and protector was under attack. NATO decided to invoke Article 5 of the NATO treaty. All of us understood immediately that we had to join. In Germany, we put our government on the line: The German chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, called for a vote of confidence in the parliament, and the Germans joined the Americans in going into Afghanistan. This was a clear-cut case because Afghanistan had sheltered the terrorist organization; it was the place where the decisions had been made that killed so many people in the Twin Towers and in Arlington. There was a broad highway of facts proving the responsibility of the Taliban and Osama Bin Laden and his gang for the attacks. It was not seriously questioned that Afghanistan was a must. The UN resolutions were passed very fast, and we went into Afghanistan. Let’s remember, by the way, that Afghanistan had been a humanitarian problem for some time; but after the Russian disaster, nobody was interested in sending troops in for a humanitarian action. The lesson of Afghanistan we have to learn is that the belle étage of the First World, where the rich societies live, will not live in peace if we do not address the issue of a new world order that offers a balanced compromise between North and South, rich and poor, between different cultures and religions.

Despite the groundswell of worldwide support after September 11, the US acted unilaterally, perhaps because America drew the wrong conclusions from the Kosovo war. A coalition war is always more complicated than if you go it alone. As long as you are on the road toward victory, going it alone is fine, but when things get rough, a coalition is a good thing—even for the most powerful nation on the globe. The Europeans also failed to understand the dimensions of the challenge posed by the 9/11 attacks. After 9/11, the Europeans held no special summit of the heads of state or government. Everybody reacted separately, bilaterally, because the EU was not designed for such a challenge. This was a big mistake. If the European leaders had met and deliberated together, this
would have contributed to a more positive development in the following months and years. Yet the reaction was understandable. For all of us, our relationship to the United States is key, and in a moment of crisis, the Europeans reacted, as they were accustomed to, on a bilateral level. The second problem was that the Europeans never explored the strategic consequences of the 9/11 attacks and failed to realize that the Americans were engaging in a focused strategic debate about these consequences. On September 18–19, 2001, just a few days after 9/11, I was sent to Washington DC by the chancellor. I spoke with the president and visited the Pentagon and the State Department. On the way back, I was seriously depressed because I understood from my conversations that there was going to be a sort of new world war. Sixty or more states were said to be harboring, supporting, or financing terrorism, and America was going to go after each of them, one by one; and these states were around the world. I knew a little bit about American domestic policy and thought that Osama Bin Laden would not be enough to convince the American public to go in that direction. So I raised the question whether, after Afghanistan, we would end up in Iraq. And from the very beginning, my position was that this was a very bad idea.

I fully shared the immediate reaction of calls for going into Afghanistan. Then, I thought, let’s form an international alliance to bring those who are responsible directly or indirectly to justice. There was and still is a worldwide alliance to fight terrorist structures. If you look at the successes in fighting terrorism, they have mostly been achieved within the framework of this global alliance. But this is not a military alliance, it is one based on exchanging information—old-fashioned intelligence—through the cooperation of many nations around the world. I never understood why the step into Iraq should be taken. I understood that after 9/11, accepting the status quo in the Middle East was no longer an option. I understood that this meant a transformation of the Middle East. To create an environment where terrorists could be contained and their structures effectively destroyed meant modernizing and democratizing the Middle East. But if you point the barrel of a gun at a person and tell him, “Now you are a democrat,” you are not creating a democrat, but an enemy. This was the difference of approach between part of Europe and the US administration.

At the beginning of these debates, I carefully read the autobiography of my friend Colin Powell, as well as the book by the elder President Bush and his national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft, because I asked myself: Why didn’t they go into Baghdad in 1991? The road was open; it was almost a free ride into Baghdad. One concern was that this would have meant the end of the coalition with the Arabs. But the major issue was that once the United States was in, it would have to take over responsi-
bility for the entire Middle East. And if the US ended up having to get out without a new Middle East, this would create a vacuum that would lead to chaos engulfing the whole region. This was the accepted wisdom, not of a European radical, but of America’s elected leaders and their advisers—Bush, Baker, Scowcroft—in a Republican administration, which, by the way, did a terrific job in foreign policy. So from my assessment, it was quite clear that the United States would get itself into a very—I will use a diplomatic word—challenging situation. Dominique de Villepin, the French Foreign Minister, said at the time that the French shared the same analysis: Iraq would end in a disaster that would weaken the United States, which would be bad for everyone. If Schroeder and Chirac had joined the coalition, by the way, it would have changed nothing militarily. Maybe it is a benefit of my radical decade, which was an ideological decade, that, like a child who has burned his fingers once, I can recognize ideologically driven politics immediately. And what I sensed in Washington after 9/11, during the run-up to Iraq, was an ideological politics that denied historical facts and cultural realities.

We tried, as did some in the United States, to engage our friends in the administration, the Congress, and the Senate to get answers to our questions: “How will you get out again? Do you believe that the American people will back a war that will last more than a decade with high losses in order to impose a new order on the Middle East? Saddam Hussein is an awful dictator, but there is no imminent threat from weapons of mass destruction (it turned out there was definitely no threat) and there is no imminent threat of another attempt at genocide like the one that targeted the Kurds or the Shiites in 1991. If you go into Iraq, democratization will mean that the Iraqis will vote: The Kurds will vote for Kurdish parties, the Shiites for Shiites, the Sunnis for Sunnis—this won’t be a democracy. Iran will get the biggest gift in its history: a dominant position in Iraq. How will you deal with Iran?” All these questions were raised before the war. And to be honest, they were never answered because these concerns would have gone against the ideology at the time. Therefore, if Schroeder and Chirac had joined, it would have changed nothing. But if some of our European friends had said, “Let’s develop a common European position; without that, we can’t join,” maybe this would have made a difference. Historians will have that discussion. For the future, we must learn that a divided West is a weak West. In the Balkans, we were united. In the Middle East, where our common security is at stake, we are divided. This is a very negative lesson.

Turning to the future, we face a whole set of common challenges. China will be a big challenge. Even if China behaves peacefully, the success of the Western economic model in China will present a huge challenge. On this issue, too, the West is divided. But I think Europe is in
a better position. If you look at the trade figures between China and the United States, and between Europe and China, you will understand how important developments in China are. If I had said twenty years ago that the leading capitalist power, the United States, would open its market to the leading Communist power, China, so that China could develop its economy based on the American model, and that China in return would finance the US budget, including the defense budget, through loans, you would have said: Fischer is crazy. But all this is fact today.

We also need to address the worldwide fight against poverty. United Nations figures show that many Third World nations are experiencing enormous development, which means increased consumption of energy and raw materials, as well as increased pollution. We cannot say to the Chinese, Africans, Indians, or Indonesians: Please accept our standards on energy conservation and pollution. Everybody who knows the industrial history of Europe and the United States knows perfectly well that they are in a different position. The West has the creativity, the financial resources, and the engineering intelligence necessary to address these environmental issues. Because Japan and Europe have long kept energy prices higher than the US, the pressure to be energy efficient was much stronger there. When I compare my households in Princeton and Berlin, I realize that the Germans are three steps ahead regarding energy efficiency. I am proud to say that the environmental sector plays a key role in the German business community today. It is becoming more important than the automobile and machinery sectors. This demonstrates that we are not talking about “green illusions,” but about an efficient fight against climate change and a common strategy that offers great business opportunities.

Everybody is concerned about nuclear terrorism, but without an efficient non-proliferation strategy—and this also means fresh ideas about collective disarmament—we will see that illegal proliferation networks like the one recently discovered in Pakistan will be only the beginning. We have to address this, and addressing this will be impossible without the United States. We have to address proliferation because otherwise, one day, it will be too late. Beyond that: How will we integrate the rising powers? Twenty to thirty years from now, the US will also be a small power compared to China and India, and you will rethink the importance of the transatlantic relationship.

We must also develop a common strategy with regard to Russia. To be frank, a red line must be drawn, and Russia must understand that. It was Europe, not the US, who defined that red line in the Ukrainian crisis. Europeans must never accept a Russian return to a zone-of-influence policy with regard to Eastern Europe. But we have ourselves to blame for being divided. When the Russians play games with oil and gas supplies—
which they never did during the Cold War—the European answer must be: Let’s unite our energy policy. Once Russia has to deal with Brussels, and not with Berlin, Warsaw, Paris, Athens, and so on, the situation will be completely different. We are dependent on Russia, but with a united Europe, Russia would be also dependent on Europe. The westernization of Russia is clearly in our interest.

With regard to the Middle East, let me begin by noting that the Europeans are very short-sighted in their relationship with Turkey. Turkey is like a stool resting on three legs: the Kemalists, the Islamists, and the European Union. And if you look at the reform process in Turkey, it worked. But it is crucial that the European leg—the prospect of joining the EU—remain in place. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to convince Europeans that Turkey should have this European prospect. One important argument here is that the successful modernization of a big Islamic country would serve as a strong riposte to Jihadist terrorists. If it could be demonstrated that the rule of law, women’s rights, an independent judiciary, a strong civil society, and a successful market economy are perfectly compatible with Islam, this would be the most powerful answer to the challenge of Jihadism. At present, we see that Turkey is falling back into an unstable situation, and that relations between Turkey and Russia are getting better and better. If we continue on the present path, there is a serious risk that we will alienate and perhaps one day lose Turkey. This would have negative ramifications for both sides of the Atlantic.

How to deal with Iraq? To be frank, America has to leave. The only question now is: how, and under what conditions? The only way to avoid complete disaster is to create a regional consensus. I think the leverage for this still exists because all the regional powers—Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi-Arabia, Egypt, and the Gulf states—are in danger of being sucked into the Iraq war, which none of them can win. The US has to talk to them, has to engage them. I fully agree with the Congressional Study Group. I don’t see another way, because everybody knows the domestic political agenda of the United States: You will have elections, you will elect a new president, and the new president—whether Republican or Democrat—will have to offer a way out of Iraq or he or she will not be reelected. I think it is important to understand the consequences of the American intervention in Iraq. The whole region is on the brink of destabilization: If you look at Lebanon, Israel, or the Palestinian territories, if you look at the blocked modernization in many other Arab countries, you will see a grim picture that must be addressed strategically. The core crisis is Iraq. The only solution is to engage all the relevant players and create a minimum regional consensus. It is exactly the same with Afghanistan: Talking about the Taliban without talking about Pakistan makes no sense. There wouldn’t be a Taliban without the Pakistani In-
telligence Service. And talking about Pakistan without diplomatically engaging in Indian-Pakistani relations makes no sense either. Addressing Afghanistan means achieving a new regional consensus, mostly with Pakistan, but also with Iran, but to address this, you must address Indian-Pakistani relations, and there, the core conflict is Kashmir.

In conclusion, the transatlantic relationship must be redefined. The Europeans must be more united. If a new American administration pushed the Europeans to unite, this would be in America’s self-interest. It is also in America’s and Europe’s interest that America stay committed in Europe. There can be no strong transatlantic relationship without a strong European Union, because America will get tired of Europe’s disunity and inability to act as a viable partner on the world stage. If we are to meet the big challenges of climate change, emerging powers, weapons of mass destruction, nuclear proliferation, and the rising gap between rich and poor, I think the West must have a future. We will have our differences in the future because we are different, but we are as different as members of the same family are. For the future, we need a strong transatlantic relationship, with America back in the lead in creating a new world order, a better world with a strong Europe as a partner on the global stage.
Can we justify placing the American case in a lecture series on empires? Some readers of my recent book, *Among Empires: American Ascendancy and its Predecessors*, have already taken me to task for evading a definitive answer to the question, “Is America an Empire?” Not all questions lead to unambiguous conclusions, especially when much depends upon the definition of terms. What follows is an effort to explain the facets of this inquiry in terms of what can be learned from comparative history, and to suggest a more fruitful way of addressing the question. For this publication, I have preserved the tone of a lecture rather than rewriting my text, for I wish to convey the open-ended nature of this inquiry. (For the scholarly citations and elaboration of evidence, I encourage consultation of the book.1) The empire boom, so to speak, may have already faded, as the Bush administration winds down and the certitudes of the Iraqi intervention have yielded to doubts and setbacks. The Congressional elections of 2006 suggested further that many American voters had become skeptical of the administration’s confident agenda to democratize the Middle East. Certainly most Americans today do not think they aspire to empire, although the founding generation of the Republic often used the term just to describe the vast dimensions of the country they had created. At a minimum, empires imply extensive territory, whether accumulated in one large land mass or in overseas possessions. As early as 1778, the South Carolina patriot David Ramsay had predicted that America’s “substratum for empire” would propel the country beyond the conquests of the Macedonians, Romans, and British. But the original concept of empire as size was quickly overshadowed; it became identified with conquest, and a program inimical to the Republic for some, its destiny for others. For some commentators, the idea of the United States as empire seems an absurd proposition; for others, such as my colleague Niall Ferguson, the fact of American empire seemed self-evident and not particularly disturbing, although he, too, has become skeptical of our national resolve to sustain imperial tasks.

But there are further reasons for ambivalence. Taxonomy in the social sciences is always difficult, and often unfruitful. When sociologists or...
historians identify a social or political category by induction, arguing whether the category does or does not include a particular case will often be inconclusive. Over the last half century, social scientists have had long debates about whether certain countries or individuals are “fascist”; whether or not some regimes are “totalitarian”; and whether one or another political upheaval is “revolutionary.” The discussions can strain our patience and, after a while, become familiar; but they can also advance analysis. And why should definitive answers be expected? After all, as we’ve learned from Aristotle through Weber, an ideal type will not fit any individual case exactly: It’s an abstraction from all of them.

Historians like to think that it is only sociologists or political scientists who earn their living by arguing whether typologies adequately fit particular cases. Historians supposedly tend toward philosophical nominalism: If the abstraction never really exists, and no case will fully instantiate it, why constantly argue about it? Instead, let’s take refuge in the singularity that we can readily claim for every historical phenomenon. This stance, of course, reflects the classical German historiographical tradition that stressed the development of unique entities, usually nations and states, but occasionally larger, though still one-of-a-kind sociocultural formations, such as the Western bourgeoisie for Max Weber or the medieval estatist tradition for Otto Hintze. But, in fact, despite the traditions of our guild, we historians, like policy advisers or journalists, have to play the same game as social scientists.

The problem is not that historians must search for general laws; rather, we cannot avoid describing most of the objects we study by reference to other cases. Like sociologists, historians argue that a persuasive mass of similarity is or is not present—similarity in terms of comparable structure, or function, or behavior. Underlying all these approaches is the question: What is it like?—“it” in this case being the United States’ historical role in world politics. Not every form of knowledge is analogical, but increasingly, I think, a great deal of historical argument tends to be. “Is the United States an empire?” amounts to the question of whether the US has become in some critical dimensions similar to other megastates we agree to term empires.

Still, the utility of such a question is not just one of nomenclature, although to name a phenomenon does provide a degree of intellectual satisfaction. The real objective of the question “Is the United States an empire?” is to ascertain what elements in structure or behavior resemble earlier constellations of ideology and power we have agreed to term empires. The exercise involves breaking down the properties of empire. After all, what is worth knowing is not the name for the US regime, but the elements of American behavior. The stakes are civic and practical. If we Americans can’t say exactly what we are, we can say in what ways we
are likely to act. Thus the task is to explore those aspects of society and politics we find throughout the history of empires.

The problem, of course, is that there is no one pattern or analogue. Historical interpretation remains a struggle over the appropriate basis for analogy. If empire means possessing populated colonies abroad, such as the British, French, and Dutch did, then the term makes little sense for the United States. For Chalmers Johnson, the control of about seven hundred military installations abroad constitutes an empire, although without the ambition of ruling foreign peoples, many would say it lacks a decisive attribute. If empire refers not to colonization, but rather to a less formalized search for decisive control by intervening to remove governments we dislike and installing those we prefer, i.e., engaging in so-called regime change, then the United States should be reckoned as imperial, although most American policy discourse never describes regime change as imperial.

If the analogue of empire refers to political structures at home, that is to a state where the executive is given powers of arbitrary arrest and imprisonment and the representative assembly is reduced to a rubber stamp role, then there is room for debate about whether the contemporary United States fits. Most commentators, however, probably separate temporary, wartime emergencies, where “exceptional” control may be delegated to the executive (as it has been at least since the Roman Republic), from regimes that perpetuate exceptional control in times of peace as well as war. Empires are structures that persist in peace as well as war. To pass through an episode of executive centralization and suspension of earlier civil rights does not entail becoming a different regime. Most such delegations in American history seem to have been temporary expedients, if not aberrations. They have quickly ended. That is why my current answer to the question of whether we are an empire is, “Not yet.” Of course, the provisional can be indefinitely prolonged, and when the executive claims we shall be at war for an indefinitely prolonged period, the situation is rendered more fraught. Only future historians will be able to tell us if the implausible came to pass, or just dissipated after a time.

If the analogue of empire is a historical process by which rule over an extensive territory is acquired by military expansion, then historians differ over how much a process of conquest was involved in filling the continental land mass the United States acquired beginning in the late eighteenth century. The question also remains whether a state geographically constructed, at least in part, by a process of imperial expansion must thereby remain an empire. Do the Cherokee removals and the Mexican War remain, so to speak, a sort of historical original sin?

My own preference is to seek the analogue of empire in functional and performative criteria; that is, in terms of what empires have sought
to accomplish and how they have behaved. Empires, so I suggested in my book, are best understood as a program by the elites of different national groups to stabilize their societies and their distributive norms by spatial as well as social hierarchy. Empires thus are about inequality across a spatial domain; call this horizontal domination. Empires are large enough to have differentiated territories that include a center and a perimeter, metropole and periphery. But empire is also about vertical domination. It helps keep certain groups wealthy and powerful, and it recruits others by birth or talent to become wealthy and powerful. And it helps assure this inequality within each territorial component. An empire is thus an arrangement, whether negotiated voluntarily or by force, in which elites in the so-called periphery accept the ultimate control of elites in the metropole in return for securing their own local domination. The security sought can be against outside rivals and domestic subversives, or both simultaneously. Empires thus rest on collaborators, but they are not alliances of equals, but rather structures of inequality, both inside their homeland and within the imperial structure as a whole.

Critics have objected that this functional arrangement can be better labeled merely as hegemony, a natural result of overwhelming US power and resources. I have suggested that empire can be distinguished by the fact that would-be defectors from an empire are punished, from Mitylene to Budapest and Prague. According to this model, the United States settled for a hegemonic role in much of Western Europe during the Cold War, but has tended to enforce, or try to enforce, a Caribbean empire. Ultimately, empires are about domination. Their leaders presuppose a political world in which peoples either rule or are ruled. Perhaps at advanced stages, they can be reorganized as a confederation of autonomous dominions or associated states, but this is rare.

In addition to structure and function, there is the evidence of behavior. Empires reveal certain characteristic modes of operation that I term the imperial syndrome. Some relate to the international role of empires, some to their internal procedures. I enumerate nine such traits here.

1. First, empires tend to pursue a typical spatial dynamic. They enlarge territory or influence to confirm their own new political order, and then they must defend the contested boundaries they have extended to avoid endangering the expansion just attained. Territories once occupied are hard to relinquish, sometimes for perfectly valid reasons of having taken on responsibilities toward the inhabitants, who might otherwise descend into fratricidal violence. The managers of empire need not premeditate expansion and continuing control of additional territory, although many obviously have done so. Most project managers of empire rarely have a vision of their cumulative power; but, like a ratchet, their acquisitions conduce to expanded commitments. Every time an expanded
frontier is stabilized, threats come from just across the new frontier. Retreat or retrenchment often seems catastrophic, and there is always an un pacified and menacing site of disorder just beyond the limits already reached. Every new border, every new acquisition, every new base, creates surrounding instability that often calls for further expansion. An alliance founded in 1949 to protect Western Europeans from invasion now finds itself patrolling Afghanistan at the behest of its major organizer.

2. Second, therefore, the imperial syndrome involves a particular relationship to the use of force. It lives with the possibility of force, it believes it is summoned to perpetual battle: The idea of war evolves from that of a particular conflict to a generalized state of national challenge. Empires are often at war. They often arise out of war; they maintain their domains through force or the threat of force; they collapse often in conflict. In this respect, the end of the Soviet Union was a striking exception, although Chechnya reveals that not every region might be relinquished easily. Finally, empires leave wars behind them as a legacy: Think of Ireland, Palestine, Kashmir, and Nigeria in the case of Britain, or the Congo in the case of Belgium. Of course, nation-states are frequently at war, too, but it is more difficult for the empire, with its preoccupation with frontiers and control, to forsake the military dimension of statehood. Perhaps empires bring peace to the interior of their large domains. This was Virgil’s famous description of Augustus’s task: To humble the arrogant, raise the oppressed, and impose the habits of peace. But there is always violence on some frontier, someplace, for each frontier imposed usually means violence just beyond it. The state of war becomes the normal state—there are many advantages to such a conviction. It justifies an executive politics. Empires maintain decisive reservoirs of force, and control of that force is what defines the imperial executive. The advent of the nuclear age placed that power in the hands of the American president, and according to some analysts, thus decisively transformed the constitutional weight of the executive.

3. Third, and as a consequence of the tendency toward expansion, imperial regimes are preoccupied with frontiers. Politics in the empire is often made at the frontier, and the consequences flow toward the center. Often the interventions are direct: Caesar returns from Gaul to descend on Rome; Bonaparte returns at the behest of his political allies from Egypt to seize power in Paris; Britain defines much of its politics under pressure from the challenges of Ireland and of India; Japanese soldiers in Manchuria plunge their country into the vortex of militarism; de Gaulle imposes the Fifth Republic because the Fourth cannot resolve the issue of Algeria, and indeed, military rebellion spreads from Algiers to Corsica. General MacArthur helps to poison the atmosphere in Washington as he
returns from Korea, and Senator McCarthy attributes the loss of China to the machinations of Reds at home. The claims of the frontier vie with grievances at home to shape the politics of the Republic. To be sure, US politics undergoes great convulsions because of slavery and economic depression, but it does so as well because of the lure of Cuba, Mexican possessions, our trade across the Pacific and the Atlantic, or our connections in China. Finally, frontiers are never simply frontiers. They are also portals across which the poorer populations of the controlled territories will stream to make a new life within the borders of the empire, or, in the case of overseas colonial empires, in the metropole: whether Ostrogoths, Pakistanis, Algerians, or Hispanics. The imperial syndrome entails a continuing dialogue, but often a violent one, between the interests at the frontier and those at the center.

4. Empires are thus constructed in a dialectical process with those who resist. Resistance begins where the borders end, and where the claims of rule meet the demands for autonomy. Resistance is endemic; often, it seems merely bloody-minded, petty, reactionary. It does not manifest itself everywhere, but at least somewhere. To be an empire is usually to confront at least one site of resistance, external or internal. That is one reason why anti-imperialists at home are often so ineffective: They do not like open resistance, which is messy, uncontrollable, and requires unattractive allies at home and sometimes supporting enemies abroad. The power that empire possesses can finally be contested only on the streets, and liberals shrink from that unpredictable mobilization, and thus are left often to hand-wringing after another fait accompli. Let me admit that this description of confrontation is too stark. Since I described the dialect of resistance in my book, one critic has usefully pointed out that for many colonial subjects of an empire (especially the overseas empires that prevailed until after the Second World War), the tactic is not resistance, but a sort of transaction or contestation (what Frederick Cooper terms “claims making”—a struggle within the norms allowed by the colonizers to achieve as much autonomy and influence as possible. The colonial subject carves out domains of relative independence in labor relations, local government, and the like, which can, in fact, lead to the dismantling of the colonial project.4

5. So far we have cited only the dimensions of force and power. But empires expand in pursuit of some big idea: the rule of law or “citizenship,” in the case of Rome and Britain; the Catholic Church, in the case of Spain; culture, or economic growth, or, paradoxically, even the spread of liberty and democracy. The question of whether the idea motivates the advocates of empire or merely justifies their ventures gets into non-historical issues such as the nature of sincerity. Any successful empire needs a big idea. Empires thus enlist intellectuals as their justifiers. They
support culture. These great intellectual constructs often have a common structure: They propose at one level a shared interest among rulers and ruled—whether salvation, or economic advance, or cultural, scientific, or hygienic acquisitions—and justify the (at least temporary) tutelage of those in charge. At their base lies a conviction of what postcolonial writers have termed “difference.” Only the most predatory empires, such as the Third Reich, have suggested that those conquered have no benefits to gain from being ruled by conquerors. Nonetheless, the more racially constructed such ideas of hierarchy are, the less reciprocity they will allow.

6. Empires have another potentially beneficial value: They can nurture group tolerance, granting religious pluralism or a special role for diasporas; they also allow for enclaves of autonomy within their extensive spatial domains. They often welcome immigrants, especially those from the peripheries that they dominate. North Africans, Pakistanis, and Latinos have flowed into the countries that have often dominated them. This does not mean that empires do not assign such migrants inferior roles, or that they erase racial prejudice. And where migrants achieve high status or play key socioeconomic roles within empires, as Armenians or Jews or overseas Chinese have, they sometimes face murderous backlashes from either other subject peoples or the dominant ethnicities of the empire. Still, nation-states often impose greater conformity on minority entrants than empires. Nation-states are high on indices of belonging but potentially low on tolerance. Empires can be high on official tolerance, but low on belonging.

7. All this means that the imperial syndrome is built on the confidence that somehow one’s own state is exceptional, that it cannot be called to account by the others, and thus that it should not be—that it obeys a higher law. “Trust us: We’re different.” American exceptionalism has had a long and venerable tradition, but we usually think of it as Tocquevillian exceptionalism, or that spelled out by Louis Hartz a half-century back: the absence of feudalism, the existence of religious pluralism, the welcome extended to immigrants, and the vast reserves of free and open land. But I am talking about a less appealing sort of exceptionalism—the belief that great power grants great rights. Perhaps call it the American Sonderweg. Both the British and the Germans had this confidence before 1914, as did most other large states. There was arrogance, to be sure. But what made the attitude even more dangerous was the inner reassurance of virtuousness, the belief that ultimately one’s own country’s behavior was more responsible than that of the others. So, too, the conviction that whatever abuses might be uncovered—whether Herero massacres in German Africa, or concentration camps in the Boer War, or Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo detentions—were atypical exceptions.
8. The imperial syndrome also involves a particular relationship of rulers to ruled, of those who govern to their own population. An imperial regime searches not for discussion and deliberation, but for approval and acclamation. It measures popularity. The media replace parliamentary debate, and if there is any symptom of empire, it is the attrition of representative bodies. Perhaps they are formally kept in existence: Even Hitler preserved a mock Reichstag. But even in less pathological states, government by debate loses its integrity and capacity. Granted, these tendencies afflict modern democracies in general, especially when they face complex social choices. Decisions get passed to courts as well as to legislatures. But the attrition of legislative procedures in a democracy usually arises from the complexity of issues; in a proto-imperial situation, it results as a response to alleged security dangers. Parliamentary delegates accept the executive’s diagnosis of danger rather than risk being seen as anti-patriotic. They pass blanket delegations of power. And even if they insist on legislation, the executive claims the right to interpret the laws that they might pass. Popularity becomes the ultimate measure. Now if those ruling fail in their enterprises, they can lose popularity very quickly. But until public opinion turns adverse, acclamation, photo-ops, spectacular games, and staged pageants replace debate. There are exceptions: Rule by committee or by party can continue, as it did in the French Third Republic. But even here, the issues that define empire and foreign policy are withdrawn from the arena of debate and discussion. The executive, individual or collective, reserves more and more of them. Empire, like authoritarian government more generally, involves the rule of the exception: There is always an exceptional danger that defines imperial politics; and the imperial syndrome embodies Carl Schmitt’s notion that he who controls the exception in effect controls even democratic politics.

9. The imperial syndrome involves a rampant growth of privilege and inequality that corrupts an earlier civic spirit. This does not mean that, as measured by Gini coefficients or other statistical indices, society is less equal as a whole. Empires can be democratic at home—the British expanded the suffrage as they expanded their empire; the French Third Republic was Europe’s most democratic regime, and it conquered Vietnam and Morocco—but empires cannot let their subject peoples share the same democratic ground rules. And even as they may extend formal equality, and even income equality toward the bottom, they give the top immense new opportunities for enrichment. This presents grave difficulties of judgment. If millions of middle-income families are each given a small tax rebate, while at the same time several thousand wealthy citizens can each reduce their bill by thousands or millions, the legislation may increase formal measures of equality because of the mass of less affluent citizens affected. But who can doubt which distribution has a greater
impact on civic participation, on the control of the media, or the sense of a gulf that separates ordinary citizens from those who emerge enriched? One of the curiosities of American public discourse is that growing income inequality, while often commented on (although so far hardly contested), is discussed solely as a domestic issue. Few commentators who are not considered on the radical fringe make a connection between the growth of inequality within the United States and the claims that the country has made for international primacy. However, this is the transaction that the imperial syndrome usually involves: not robbing the poor to pay the rich, although the periphery may be despoiled to pay the center, but fobbing off the humble so that privilege becomes more and more spectacular. For a while, public games, reality TV, philanthropy, and the admirable but hardly taxing (indeed often tax-exempt) charitable deeds of those enriched may counteract the emergence of populist class politics. How long that lasts is not at all clear.

Having identified these behavioral properties, which I believe the United States reveals along with empires of the past, one can take up the question again: whether America is or is not an empire. I have attempted frankly to finesse this question, which I think must always be dependent upon definition, to focus instead on structural similarities and patterns of behavior—on analogue and syndrome. Empire, for all of its variations, has been an enduring political form, a historically compelling method by which multiple political authorities can divide up the surface of the globe on which we live, given that diverse ethnic units have had vastly different levels of development. Empires have been major components of global politics since antiquity. Certainly the United States belongs among the ranks of the powerful global actors: It illustrates comparable structural and functional features, and it has behaved in some, if not all, comparable ways.

Still, commentators whom I admire have claimed that the age of empires has ended. Frederick Cooper seeks, I think, to downplay the invocations of empire in order to focus on colonialism. I would agree that the age of colonial empires is over; but while empire and colonial empire may overlap, as Cooper himself explains, they are not identical. If compelled to wager, I think that the most likely long-term organization of world politics will involve increasing levels of supranational association without imperial hierarchization, but history always vouchsafes surprises. I do not think that globalization brings with it necessarily either imperial or pluralist associations. Some would argue that the age of empire has ended because the presupposition of territory—preeminent political control within borders—has changed fundamentally due to globalization. (Exploring the evolution of territoriality has become my current research project.) Of course, powerful and wealthy states possess
influence outside bordered space. Sometimes, as was the case for Great Britain, this influence is called informal empire, and rests on monetary coordination and cultural attraction. In the American context, this capacity is merely termed soft power, to use the term Joseph Nye originated. My own view is that a stubborn component of territoriality still clings to world politics, and to American ambitions for international order. Even in the age of the Internet and all the processes lumped together as globalization, global power is always contested in specific places, whether those sites be on the perimeter of control or in the heart of the metropole’s cities.

Of course, historical structures will not be, and never were, just what they have been hitherto. Even so, we will continue to reason by analogue and similarity. Natural scientists reason and infer existence by two different research programs, according to Peter Galison’s monumental study *Image and Logic.* Deductive reasoning, expressed today in digital form, appeals to one community; mimetic representation appeals to another. Both use experimentation, but experiments and instruments designed to produce one validating sort of data or another. We historians, I think, utilize analogue procedures as a sort of image program, and tend to distrust deductive research programs such as neo-realism or rational-action paradigms. So once again I fall back on analogy when reflecting on how historians work, as well as on what they study. That is why working with the analogue of empire seems to me a fruitful approach. Does it diminish historical understanding, when asked whether the United States is an empire, to say that it has come to behave (at least in recent years and perhaps decades) like an empire and exhibits the syndrome of empire? At the end, I would also say that as a political and moral challenge, perhaps even more than an epistemological one, we must take the current analogue of empire very seriously.

Notes


2 I am not trained as a philosopher, and the philosophical problems of analogy are difficult. But for some recent discussions I found helpful, see Esa Itkonen, *Analogy as Structure and Process: Approaches in Linguistics, Cognitive Psychology and Philosophy of Science* (Amsterdam, 2005), 25–35. See also Ian Hacking, *Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science* (Cambridge, 1983), with its skepticism about the uses of explanation (53). Analogies are often constructed with a type of pictorial quality we associate with metaphor (on which there is another large literature) that can pack a rhetorical punch. By analogy I am not referring to the similarity of historical situations (e.g. whether Vietnam or Iraq should have been interpreted in terms of Munich), but to the underlying tendency to infer and describe in terms of a supposed archetype. Of course, the issue remains how we decide what repertory of models are available and relevant.
Franz Schurman, the Sinologist, advanced this analysis a generation ago. See The Logic of World Power: An Inquiry into the Origins, Currents, and Contradictions of World Politics (New York, 1974).


Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 26–32.

Myths and Peculiarities: Comparing U.S. and German Capitalism

Colleen A. Dunlavy  
*University of Wisconsin-Madison*

Thomas Welskopp  
*University of Bielefeld*

Introduction

In recent debates about the nature and future of capitalism, the United States and Germany are typically understood to represent opposing models with deep historical roots.¹ In the realm of business culture (*Unternehmenskultur*) and industrial relations, American business epitomizes a market-based, “hire-and-fire” model of capitalism in which labor unions were never very powerful and have become virtually insignificant. German enterprises—despite significant challenges in recent years—are still marked by a socially based, corporatist culture (“Rhenish capitalism”) founded on strong unions and labor participation in management (codetermination, or *Mitbestimmung*). Methods of finance and control provide a second point of contrast. Shareholdings in most large American corporations are publicly traded and widely dispersed, salaried managers seem all-powerful, and US companies resemble commodities, easily bought and sold. In Germany, a “relationship-based” system predominates, in which large shareholders are more common and more powerful, while companies enjoy close relationships with banks, creating significant barriers to takeovers by holding large stakes in each other. A third element concerns their respective strengths in manufacturing. American manufacturers still generally adhere to the style of mass production taken to its limits by Henry Ford, using specialized machines, narrowly defined skills, and closely supervised work processes. Their German counterparts excel, as they have historically, at more flexible forms of batch or customized production, relying on general-purpose machines and skilled workers.

But how far back do the historical roots of these contrasting styles of capitalism actually extend? Scholars tend to read them back into the late nineteenth century, yet knowledgeable observers at that time would surely have found them overdrawn and lacking in nuance, if not downright surprising. The paths that Americans and Germans forged to economic modernity—full of twists and turns, to be sure—require closer
scrutiny and more systematic comparison than they have received. Our goal in this essay is to show how little we actually know about German and American capitalism at the turn of the twentieth century. Fundamental to this endeavor is the comparative method. As Carl Degler wrote two decades ago, in a call to American historians, “comparison will emphasize aspects of our past that may have gone unnoticed before, just as it will call for explanations where none was thought necessary before.” By unsettling the conventional understanding, we hope to stimulate the in-depth, empirical research that is needed if we are to reach a more nuanced understanding of the histories that have shaped the modern-day American and German political economies. Reassembling the pieces into a new, coherent narrative is a task far beyond the scope of this essay, but by exposing the shaky foundations of the conventional wisdom we hope at least to clear the ground for that important work.

Given space constraints as well as a dearth of comparative research on which we might draw, it is impossible, of course, to survey all dimensions of the history of capitalism in the two countries—from business history, the history of technology, and labor history to macroeconomic history and the history of public policy, not to mention aspects of social and cultural history—or to do so in any depth. Instead, the bulk of our essay examines the empirical foundations of what turn out to be little more than myths about differences in the American and German economies at the turn of the twentieth century. In the final section, we highlight very selectively what we regard as key differences—the peculiarities—that marked the American and German political economies at the turn of the century and that have persisted, despite the trials and tribulations of the twentieth century, to our own time. These concern the finer details of the two federal political structures, especially the division of labor between the federal and state/provincial governments in the making of economic policy. In the United States, we argue, the most important fact—increasingly an anachronism, yet so familiar that it has become virtually invisible—is that a broad swath, though not all, of economic policy remained (and remains) largely in the power of the state governments, even as firms became increasingly national and then international in their geographic reach. In the German Empire, economic policymaking across most policy domains was largely nationalized from the outset and remained so throughout the twentieth century. This critical difference set the American and German political economies along very different lines of development over the twentieth century.

Myths

Underlying the contrasting models of capitalism sketched out above are stylized storylines that run as follows: Germany was a relatively late
industrializer, characterized by moderate “economic backwardness,” in Alexander Gerschenkron’s famous phrase. Its economy was boosted by protective tariffs and organized by national associations of producers, strong trade unions, and powerful universal banks. Because it lacked a large domestic market in the late nineteenth century, it became an export powerhouse. The United States, by contrast, is usually portrayed (at least implicitly and sometimes explicitly) as an early industrializer. A bastion of laissez-faire and individualism, it became an industrial power by mobilizing capital on Wall Street and by exploiting its massive domestic market.

Neither of these storylines is completely wrong, but neither are they completely right. When trends in the two countries are set side by side, as we show in this section, the differences that these stories imply between the American and German styles of capitalism at the turn of the century turn out to be much smaller than imagined, and in some instances are even turned on their heads.

First of all, the term late industrializer and all that it implies in German history—rapid growth, unprecedented demand for capital, speedy structural transformation—applies equally well to the United States. The US and Germany both faced intense international competition when they began to industrialize in the early to mid-nineteenth century, much more so than Britain and France had in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. This was largely because the British and the French had already established themselves as formidable competitors by the mid-nineteenth century, when the United States and the German states began to industrialize. Capital- and labor-rich Britain was dominant in the two industries that had formed the core of its industrial revolution—iron and cotton textile manufacturing. In 1860, for example, Britain produced almost five times as much pig iron as the United States and more than seven times as much as the German states. British textile manufacturers consumed nearly half a million metric tons of raw cotton that year, while their American counterparts used well less than half as much and their German counterparts one-seventh.³ France, meanwhile, covered the luxury or high-end market, especially in textiles. For the United States as well as Germany, the first round of industrial growth in the middle decades of the nineteenth century was, not surprisingly, centered elsewhere—in railroad construction (with a good deal of British iron), in the machine-tool industry (which produced the machines used in manufacturing), and in hard-coal mining (principally in Pennsylvania and the Ruhr region).

When the United States and Germany began to challenge British industrial power in the late nineteenth century, moreover, they both did so on the basis of the new, capital-intensive industries of the “second
industrial revolution”—steel, electrical manufacturing, and chemicals (Germany) or oil (US). In raw steel production, the United States surpassed Britain for the first time in 1886. By 1894, the American industry was led by two dominant firms, Carnegie Steel and Illinois Steel, whose combined capacity equaled three-quarters of total American output. In 1901, a broad swath of the steel industry was consolidated into a single giant firm, United States Steel, in a merger orchestrated by the private banking firm of J. P. Morgan. Meanwhile, the German steel industry, led by a larger number of smaller (though still very large) producers such as Krupp, Thyssen, and Phoenix, had overtaken Britain in output in 1893. Facing (like their American counterparts) the “cutthroat” competition endemic to capital-intensive industries and amidst falling prices, German steel producers turned to cooperation, rather than American-style consolidation, forming a nationwide, multi-product cartel called the Steel Works Federation (Stahlwerksverband) in 1904. In electrical manufacturing, two top firms quickly became dominant in each country: Siemens and AEG (Allgemeine Elektricitäts-Gesellschaft) in Germany, and General Electric and Westinghouse in the United States. In chemicals, the United States had no real counterpart to Germany’s pioneers such as BASF and Hoechst before the turn of the century, and certainly not after German producers, inspired by developments in the United States, formed two great Interessengemeinschaften (based on cartel contracts) in 1904–05. Nor did Germany—indeed, Europe as a whole—have any oil producers to rival John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil, which dominated not only the American market but world export trade as well. Facing comparatively higher costs for fuel, raw materials, and transportation, American and German manufacturers in these and other industries made early and systematic use of new, capital-intensive methods of mass production that yielded economies of scale and scope as well as impressive productivity gains. Indeed, American and German firms were at the forefront of the movement toward managerial capitalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

As befits relatively late industrializers, the American and German economies were both transformed rapidly between 1870 and 1913. Measured in terms of increase in real GDP per capita, the United States (116%) and Germany (100%) experienced faster growth in these years than France (74%) or Britain (54%), with the US modestly outpacing Germany. By the end of the period, the structure of both economies had become recognizably industrial. By the early 1910s, industrial employment (Table 1) accounted for roughly one-third of all employment in the United States and Germany, and agriculture also continued to claim about one-third. Although not identical in the details, the structure of
employment was much closer in the United States and Germany than in the United Kingdom, where agriculture claimed little more than one-tenth of all employment, and industry nearly one-half. The words with which a German scholar characterized Germany on the eve of World War I could equally well have been said of the United States: It had been transformed “from an agrarian state with a strong industrial base to an industrial state with a strong agricultural base.”

Secondly, German producers were not alone in advocating and securing protective tariffs, despite the rhetoric of laissez-faire and individualism propounded by American businessmen in the late nineteenth century. US import duties had gone up rapidly during the American Civil War (1861–1865), partly to compensate domestic producers for very heavy internal taxes. The internal taxes were quickly removed when the war ended, and tariff levels initially declined slightly, but powerful, well-organized interests waged an intense lobbying campaign that kept them at wartime levels until high levels of protection came to seem natural —and then they were raised higher still. Woolen and cotton textiles as well as steel products were special objects of attention, but the mantle of protection, in the words of the US tariff’s historian, was extended “to include almost every article, whatever its character, whose production in the country [was] possible.” Writing in 1886, English legal scholar Sir Henry Maine judged American tariffs to be “as oppressive as ever a nation has submitted to.” In the 1880s, the federal government annually collected import duties equal to about 30 percent of the value of all imported goods, or 42–48 percent of the value of dutiable imports. From 1890 through 1910, US revenue from duties fluctuated between 20 and 30 percent of the value of all imports and between 40 and 52 percent of the value of dutiable imports.

German tariff levels, set by the Zollverein, a customs union founded in 1834 that included most of the German Empire after 1871, were relatively modest by comparison. Free-trade ideology dominated the Zollverein into the 1870s, but a combination of events—the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71), the economic crisis of 1873, the scheduled elimination of the last

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tariffs on iron in 1877, and rising protectionism on the Continent—led to growing agitation for protective tariffs in the German Empire. Pressure came especially from iron and textile manufacturing interests, who gained the support of agricultural interests when foreign grain began to make substantial inroads into European markets in the 1870s. Chancellor Otto von Bismarck threw his support behind the movement, both for party-political reasons and because it would mean enhanced revenues for the federal government, which could levy only indirect taxes and otherwise depended mainly on oft-contentious contributions (Matridikularrbeiträge) from the member-states (Länder) of the empire.\textsuperscript{14} The result was the tariff law of 1879. Although direct comparisons are difficult, it seems fairly clear that German tariffs, even after successive increases in 1885 and 1887, did not match the overall level of protection granted by American tariffs. Under the 1879 law, imports of raw materials into the Zollverein remained largely duty-free, while tariffs on industrial products ran around 10 to 15 percent of value. Duties on agricultural products were also relatively low, although tariffs on grain ran as high as 30 percent. The increases in 1885 and 1887 were mainly to tariffs on grain and livestock.\textsuperscript{15} Then, while the McKinley tariff of 1890 raised American duties to new heights, the Caprivi tariff of 1891 ushered in a two-tiered system of rates in Germany that, overall, were “moderate” in the judgment of the British commercial attaché in Berlin in 1899. The Bülow tariff of 1902 raised rates on grain a bit further, and also established minimum rates for farm products that could not be negotiated downward. Industrial raw materials were generally not taxed, but the rates on finished manufactures were increased.\textsuperscript{16} By then, American rates had been raised again in 1897 to new heights that prevailed until 1909.\textsuperscript{17} In short, overall, tariff levels were, if anything, systematically higher in the United States than in Germany in the late nineteenth century.

National interest associations, thirdly, proliferated in Germany during these years, as is well known, but here, too, the parallels in the United States are unmistakable. As Alexis de Tocqueville observed in the 1830s, Americans (too) showed a special talent for forming voluntary organizations. When national-level policymaking gained strength in both countries—following the unification of Germany and the reunification of the United States in 1870 (when the last southern states returned to the Union)—organizing on a nationwide basis to defend economic interests became imperative in both countries, and national associations multiplied.\textsuperscript{18} The German Empire, a constitutional monarchy, was structured, like the United States, as a federal system (with twenty-five member states), but with a singularly important difference for the economic history of the
two countries. Like the federal government in the United States, the Reich alone was responsible for national defense and foreign policy, but unlike its American counterpart, it also quickly became responsible for achieving and maintaining, in Hans-Peter Ullmann’s words, the nation’s legal and economic unity (Rechts- und Wirtschaftseinheit).\textsuperscript{19} Thus the Reich—often under the influence of its largest state, Prussia—very quickly assumed the predominant role in economic policymaking. And once policy was centralized, the incentives to form centralized associations were in place. Following quickly on the heels of the formation of the empire, the economic crisis of 1873 prompted the first national organization of German industrialists to form. This was the \textit{Centralverband Deutscher Industrieller}, established in 1876 by regional and industry-specific associations to lobby for tariff protection. After protective tariffs were achieved in 1879, the association—in a dynamic typical of American associations as well—turned its attention to other matters of common interest to its members, while also expanding its membership (although it continued to be dominated by textile manufacturers and heavy industry). In 1895, a second national association, the \textit{Bund der Industriellen}, formed, representing the interests of manufacturers of finished goods, who were more dependent on export markets and less enamored of protection than were the increasingly cartelized heavy industrialists.\textsuperscript{20}

In the United States, power over economic policy shifted perceptibly from the states to the federal government during and after the Civil War, although not to the same degree as in unified Germany. Before the war, the opposition of slave interests had severely limited the federal government’s powers in economic matters, even though the Constitution had reserved to it certain powers akin to those of the Reich—e.g., to regulate weights and measures, to issue patents, and to establish uniform bankruptcy laws. Popular sentiment, it should be noted, evidently favored a stronger federal role as well, for Congress repeatedly passed legislation that would have given the federal government a stronger role, for example, in railroad development and banking. But presidential vetoes repeatedly put an end to such initiatives, and Congress moved slowly even on less controversial issues such as regulating weights and measures or enacting uniform bankruptcy laws. This decades-long stalemate at the national level changed abruptly when the Civil War began and Southerners left Congress. Now Congress not only imposed an array of internal taxes and raised tariff levels, as noted above, but in short order chartered several transcontinental railroads, abolished slavery, and created a system of nationally chartered banks.\textsuperscript{21}

It was the impending end to the war—and the concrete possibility that tariff levels would be lowered when internal taxes were repealed—
that prompted the first wave of national associations to form in the United States. Initially, they lobbied Congress on tariff or other issues and then, like the Centralverband Deutscher Industrieller, retooled to take up other matters of mutual interest. Among these Civil War-era associations were the United States Brewers Association, the New England Cotton Manufacturers’ Association, the American Iron and Steel Association, and the National Association of Wool Manufacturers. A second wave emerged after the war. The National Association of Planters and Cotton Manufacturers formed in 1868, for example. In 1875, the American Bankers Association was created to serve as the unified voice of this diverse sector in lobbying Congress on currency and tax issues. The National Potters Association formed the same year. The American Paper Manufacturers’ Association (later, American Paper and Pulp Association) formed in 1878. When Congress was poised to regulate interstate railroad rates, technology, and time in the 1880s, railroad men quickly took defensive action by forming the American Railway Association (1886). In the same year, the Stove Founders National Defense Association was founded. The National Association of Manufacturers was formed in 1895, initially to promote foreign trade and to lobby for protective tariffs; it then refocused its energies on combating unions. What was happening in the economic sphere was part of a larger movement in the United States. As the British observer James Bryce remarked in the 1890s, “associations are created, extended, and worked in the United States more...effectively than in any other country.” The post-Civil War years were especially fertile: Of all the large civic associations formed in the US up to 1940, the majority sprang up in the decades between the Civil War and the end of the century. By the turn of the century, an array of national interest associations riddled the political landscape of both countries. Germany was far from unique in this regard.

Nor were German workers, fourthly, more highly organized or even more politically oriented than American workers in the late nineteenth century. A comparison of the United States (1883) and Germany (1877/78) reveals that union membership in the US exceeded the German figures by a rate of five to one (with populations of roughly the same size). Iron and steelworkers, coal miners, and cigar makers made up the largest union contingents in the US, while no major industry had yet been organized in Germany. There, the cigar makers still accounted for the largest membership, and the printers claimed the highest percentage of organized workers (50 percent), with construction and metalworking slowly catching up. Yet only 1.5 percent of all artisanal and industrial workers belonged to a trade union in 1877. Party hegemony, moreover, had led to a schism along ideological lines—there were Social Democratic
“free” trade unions, liberal unions, and, later, Catholic unions (Christliche Gewerkvereine)—and this would become a long-lasting burden for the German trade union movement. Indeed, the union movement barely survived its close affiliation with Social Democracy, as both forms of organization were declared illegal and prosecuted alike under the Anti-Socialist Law (Sozialistengesetz), which remained in effect until 1890. Moreover, the welfare policies initiated by the German state (health insurance, 1883; accident insurance, 1884; old-age and disability pensions, 1889—largely financed by employers or employees) may have taken some wind out of the labor movement’s sails, although the socialist vote nearly tripled between 1884 and 1890.26

In the United States, where neither the state nor the unions were as centralized, where unions did not align themselves so closely with political parties, and where they tended to divide along racial rather than religious lines, the trade unions nonetheless pursued an explicitly political agenda—with some success—through the 1880s. For all the energy that scholars have expended in trying to answer Werner Sombart’s famous query, “Why is there no socialism in the United States?” it is worth emphasizing that there were only weak trade unions in Germany before 1890, as noted above, and that socialism was not entirely absent on American soil either. “The Noble and Holy Order of the Knights of Labor” (KOL) was a federation of local workers’ associations, trade unions, and cultural organizations that had been founded as a secret society in 1869, and by 1883 it had flourished into a mass movement “whose membership is not known publicly,” a US Senate committee reported, “but... runs into the hundreds of thousands.”27 At the height of its powers in 1886, the KOL claimed about a million supporters from the ranks mainly of white craftsmen and skilled industrial workers, but also of unskilled workers, African-Americans, and women. Except for this decidedly greater inclusiveness, the Knights became the labor organization in the United States that bore the closest resemblance to German Social Democracy. Like the Social Democrats, the KOL embraced an ideology of “associational socialism” that depicted “banks,” “monopolies,” “stockbrokers,” and “corrupt politicians” as their main adversaries, and it supported efforts to organize production on a democratic-cooperative, instead of autocratic-corporate, basis. The Knights put forward a political vision, yet the revolution that they advocated was not the political revolution that the Social Democrats envisioned—how could it be when there was no strong central state to battle?—but a cultural revolution brought about by the self-education of the workers. Even the American Federation of Labor, renowned for its conservative, “bread-and-butter” strategy, initially won a string of victories in the state legislatures, only to see its
successes gutted by American courts or the dynamics of competitive federalism. By the turn of the century, unionization rates (excluding agricultural laborers) in the United States and Germany were virtually equal at about 5 percent. This is not to say that the American and German labor movements were identical across the board at the turn of the century, but that the differences codified in opposing models of capitalism do not have as long a history as commonly supposed.

Also in need of reevaluation is the conventional emphasis on the pivotal role played by universal banks in German industrial history and on the mobilization of capital through stock markets in American industrial history. On the one side, the German “great banks” (Großbanken)—incorporated “universal” banks that offered a full range of commercial and investment services—appear to have been less deeply involved in industry than previously thought. Detailed data before 1900 are very scarce, but studies by economic historian Caroline Fohlin have done a great deal to call this bit of common wisdom into question. The records of two “great banks,” the Disconto-Gesellschaft from 1856 to 1900 and the Darmstädter Bank (later, the Bank für Handel und Industrie), in scattered years from the early 1880s to 1908, suggest that their holdings of industrial securities were minimal. The Disconto-Gesellschaft had the bulk of its holdings in three mining companies, but they amounted to 3 percent or less of its assets in 1852–1865 (when detailed data are available) and it sold off its holdings when it was able to do so in the late 1860s and early 1870s. The Darmstädter Bank’s holdings of industrial shares peaked at 1.3 percent of its assets in 1882, and they usually accounted for less than 1 percent in the 1880s and 1890s. It had “substantial holdings” in only twelve companies over the fifteen years from 1882 to 1897. This suggests, Fohlin concludes, “that the great banks invested a relatively small proportion of their portfolios in the equity of industrial firms.” Examining bank-firm relations from the opposite end in a random sample of 400 listed firms in 1905, she found that less than a quarter had an affiliation with “any joint-stock universal bank,” and of those firms, less than half had a representative of one of the “great banks” on their board. When banks did have close relationships with individual companies, moreover, it was usually because the banks were handling the companies’ stock market listing and issuing their securities (German law required that investors be lined up to take all of a company’s shares before it could take on its corporate powers), rather than monitoring or controlling the firms. Although the evidence is sketchy, bank participation in German industry does not seem to have been widespread or even typical of German corporations.

On the other side, American bankers seem to have been more deeply involved in corporate finance than commonly thought. After the Civil
War and, even more so, after the panic of 1873, private bankers with international banking connections—best known was J. Pierpont Morgan—took a leading role in investment banking in New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, while incorporated banks, such as the First National Bank of Chicago, dominated the underwriting business in other regions. They increasingly took an active role in the corporations whose securities they floated, a practice begun with railroad investment in the 1840s and 1850s, formalized after the Civil War, and extended to the large industrial corporations that formed in the Great Merger Movement, a wave of incorporations and mergers that began in the mid-1890s. Organized as partnerships, the private banking houses generally offered a full range of general and investment banking services by the turn of the century, although some specialized in one or a handful of specific services. Kidder, Peabody of Boston, for example, was well-known as a foreign banking house, supplying commercial and personal letters of credit, but it made most of its profits at the turn of the century from its securities business. Its partners, moreover, usually sat on the boards of the companies in which it had a stake. By the early twentieth century, incorporated banks such as the Mellon National Bank of Pittsburgh were also offering the full range of investment services. National banks cut back their activities somewhat or spun them off as securities affiliates when the US Comptroller of the Currency tightened up restrictions on their investment activities in 1902, but state-chartered banks and even some national banks apparently continued to offer investment services. Also growing rapidly in importance between 1890 and 1910 were state-incorporated trust companies, which operated nationwide and offered their clients an even broader range of services—not only general and investment but also legal services. By 1912, representatives of the five American “great banks”—J. P. Morgan & Co., First National Bank, National City Bank, Guaranty Trust Company, and Bankers’ Trust—sat on the boards of sixty-eight non-financial corporations. The combined assets of these “be-bankeried” corporations, as future Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis dubbed them, equaled more than half of US GNP that year.

In this light, it comes as no surprise that the Berlin stock exchange, by some measures, was as robust as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) at the turn of the twentieth century. Of course, neither the Berlin nor the New York exchange rivaled the London exchange in the value of the common stocks of domestic corporations (not to mention international companies) that they listed in 1900. And the value of domestic corporate equities listed on the New York Stock Exchange was more than twice that of similar stocks listed on the Berlin exchange. But by other measures, according to data put together by business historian Leslie Hannah, the Berlin stock exchange mobilized capital quite respectably at
the turn of the century. It listed 719 domestic common stocks in 1900, almost as many as London’s 783, but many more than the 123 listed on the NYSE. Moreover, they represented nearly equal proportions of GDP in the two countries—14 percent in Germany versus 15 percent in the United States. Nearly two-thirds of the NYSE-listed stocks were those of railroads, while this sector accounted for only 9 percent of Berlin-listed stock, since German railroads had been effectively nationalized by then. As might be expected, given that the Großbanken were incorporated and some of the most important American “great banks” were organized as partnerships, the finance sector had a much larger presence on the Berlin exchange (45 percent) than on the NYSE (7 percent). The remainder of the stock fell into a broad category of “other” sectors that included manufacturing and mining. These accounted for less than a third of the NYSE-listed stocks (30 percent) but nearly half of the stocks listed in Berlin (47 percent). In other words, only about 37 “other” corporations were listed in New York, while nearly ten times as many (about 338) were listed in Berlin. Although direct comparisons are exceedingly difficult, the tendency to identify powerful universal banks with Germany and stock markets with the United States at the turn of the century clearly needs rethinking.

The emphasis usually placed on Germany’s prowess in export markets and on the extraordinary size of the US domestic market also calls for greater nuance. To be sure, German firms (that is, those in the Zollverein, the only available source of German foreign trade statistics in this period) exported proportionally more goods than American firms did in the late nineteenth century. Zollverein products equal to 14 percent of the German Empire’s net national product (NNP) went to foreign markets in 1890, for example, while American exports represented less than 7 percent of US gross domestic product (GDP). In per capita terms, this amounted to about $16 for every German and about $14 for every American. In shares of world manufacturing exports, moreover, Germany did better than the United States—17 percent vs. 12 percent in 1899, and 20 percent vs. 14 percent in 1913 (while the British share declined from 35 to 32 percent in these years). But what is often overlooked is the other side of the balance sheet. Despite protective tariffs—or perhaps because of their relatively modest levels—Germany imported even more than it exported. In 1890, for example, Zollverein imports amounted to nearly 18 percent of German NNP, or $20 per person. And this was not unusual: The Zollverein ran a trade deficit consistently throughout the years from the 1880s through 1913. In 1890, the United States, in contrast, imported merchandise equal to little more than 6 percent of GDP (or less than $13 per capita). This was entirely consistent with its overall pattern from 1876 through the turn of the century and beyond: merchandise trade sur-
Germans were more deeply engaged in the international economy, in other words, but Americans’ more limited engagement was carried out on better terms.

The customary claim that the American domestic market was exceptionally large and the German market exceptionally small also warrants scrutiny. The size of a national market depended on a number of factors. Population, concentration in urban centers, and the average amount of money in the pockets of its inhabitants mattered a great deal, of course. But at least equally important was the degree to which the nuts-and-bolts matters that are so important in reducing the costs and risks of doing business nationwide—currency, weights and measures, transportation (and communication), and business law—were uniform throughout a “national” market. To count the population within a bounded geographic area and calculate urban concentrations and per capita wealth is not enough, in other words, to describe a “national market” as an entrepreneur would see it. A market only became “national” when the political steps had been taken to institute uniformity in the nuts-and-bolts sense across the entire geographic area that made up a nation. Geographic size was clearly in the United States’ favor, but could also have worked against it. If the nuts-and-bolts aspects of business varied dramatically over its greater expanse, for practical purposes breaking it into a multiplicity of smaller units, what would otherwise appear to be a national market was anything but. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, both countries did what the European Union has been struggling to do for decades: They took many of the political steps necessary to create uniform national markets. But, because of differences in the federal structures of the two countries, the German Empire did more in this regard than the US.

Measured by population, urban concentrations, and wealth, the American market had indeed become more extensive than the German market by the turn of the century, although the contrast was less than striking when the era of the second industrial revolution opened. In 1871, the US and German populations were virtually identical at 41.0 million each. By 1890, however, the American population had grown by more than half (to 63.1 million), partly due to a large influx of immigrants, many from Germany; this was nearly double the British population at the time. By then, the German population, its growth slowed by a wave of emigration in the 1880s (principally to the US), had reached less than 50 million: There were now 28 percent more Americans than Germans. The divergence widened over the next two decades; by 1910, the US population (92.4 million) exceeded the German by 42 percent. Americans also clustered in a larger number of larger urban areas than Germans did. Overall, the German population was more “urban” in 1871—36 percent of
Germans lived in communities of 2,000 or more, compared with only 26 percent of Americans (in communities of 2,500 or more in 1870); by 1910, the numbers were 60 and 46 percent, respectively, for Germany and the United States. But, despite its lower rate of urbanization, the US in 1910 claimed about as many cities of 100,000 or more (50) as Germany did (48), and the three largest American cities had populations of 1,000,000 or more, while only one—Berlin—was as large in Germany (although Hamburg nearly qualified). Finally, American pockets, on average, were deeper. In 1871, nominal GDP per capita in the United States was more than twice that in Germany ($183 vs. $83, or 121 percent higher in the US), and, since their economies were growing at roughly comparable rates in per-capita terms, the same was true in 1913 (now $407 vs. $186, or 118 percent higher in the U.S.). In real terms (1985 dollars), the difference was less stark but still significant: According to Angus Maddison’s estimates, American GDP per capita was 73 percent higher than the German in 1870, and 86 percent higher in 1913. In terms of people, urban markets, and average dollars per pocket, then, the American market was indeed “bigger” than the German by the early twentieth century.

But was it as uniform in the nuts-and-bolts ways that made a market truly “national?” Here, the evidence suggests that German entrepreneurs had a more fully “national” market to exploit than their American counterparts did at the turn of the century, and well beyond. The political process of creating a German national market began in 1834 with the creation of the Zollverein and accelerated on the eve of the formation of the Empire. By 1871, more than 21,000 kilometers of railroad track linked together the German states inside and outside the Zollverein. Although the members of the Empire would retain control of their own railroads, and federal ownership, despite Bismarck’s best efforts, would not become a reality until 1919, the Association of German Railroad Administrations (Verein deutscher Eisenbahnverwaltungen), founded in 1846, had achieved virtual uniformity of technology and operating procedures (though not rates) across the German states by the 1860s. With less transshipment and, therefore, lower costs, goods and people could travel nationwide—indeed, beyond the Empire—with relative ease. A degree of uniformity in business law had also been instituted from 1861, when the German Confederation enacted a general commercial law (the Handelsgesetzbuch, or HGB) that was quickly adopted by the major German states. The HGB initially left the question of how to create and regulate corporations and their securities—whether by special act (Konzessionsystem) or under general incorporation laws (Normativsystem)—to the member states, but in 1870, the North German Confederation amended the HGB to mandate general incorporation, partly in competition with and partly in emulation of Britain and France. Although not without its deficiencies, the
amended law created uniformity in the regulation of corporations and their securities across the Confederation. It, too, became the law of the German Empire.

Then, once the Empire was established in 1871, the remaining nuts-and-bolts elements of a national market quickly fell into place, for the imperial government, rather than its twenty-five member states, formulated broad areas of economic policy, from foreign and domestic trade, currency and coinage, and weights and measures to banking, insurance, incorporation, and the issuing of securities. In late 1871, the coinage of the twenty-five member states was standardized on the Mark. In 1875, the Prussian State Bank was transformed into the Reichsbank, a central, note-issuing bank with branches nationwide, effectively standardizing currency and creating a national money market. Weights and measures were also unified in 1875, and in 1877, the founding of the Physikalisch-Technische Reichsanstalt put the German Empire on the forefront of international efforts to standardize scientific weights and measures. In 1883, the Reich pushed implementation further by setting up a multilevel system for monitoring weights and measures. Meanwhile, creation of the Reichspatentamt in 1875 had instituted a national system of granting patents, abolishing the legal diversity that had prevailed in the North German Confederation and in the Empire until then. Finally, in 1884, a new general incorporation law was passed to address the deficiencies of the 1870 law. Although its requirements were stiff by American standards, its systematic and uniform rules governed the formation and operation of corporations nationwide. By 1890, the German railroad network had more than doubled to 43,000 km. In short, the German Empire had put in place the technological and legal infrastructure that made its market “national.”

On a quick reading of the US Constitution, one might think that many features of a national market existed in the United States from the outset. The Constitution prohibited the states from issuing their own currencies, and, as noted earlier, it lodged power over important aspects of business policy—foreign trade, patents, the post, interstate commerce, weights and measures, and bankruptcy law—securely in the hands of the federal government, thus dampening the tendency toward state-level Balkanization that had threatened to break apart the union under the Articles of Confederation.

But exercising even these relatively limited powers was a long and drawn-out affair, because the powers of the American federal government, as noted earlier, were more restrained, first, by the opposition of slave interests to an expansion of federal power, and then in the post-Civil War years by continuing conflict over the division of labor between the states and the federal government. Only in levying tariffs and in
creating national patent and postal systems did Congress move swiftly. Regulation of interstate commerce proceeded more slowly. Before the Civil War, Congressional power to regulate under the commerce clause was “used with peculiar caution,” in Lewis H. Haney’s words, “because of the extreme sensitiveness of the states concerning their sovereignty.” It did not begin in earnest until passage of the Interstate Commerce Act (1886), regulating interstate railroad rates. The tasks of providing national standards for currency, weights and measures, and bankruptcy law also languished for decades. Despite the Constitutional prohibition on state-issued currency, the states chartered their own note-issuing banks with abandon. Twice, Congress created national banks (in 1791 and 1816) to help stabilize postwar federal finances, but they were the objects of great political conflict, and neither survived beyond the twenty-year life prescribed in its charter. Not until the Civil War, three-quarters of a century after adoption of the Constitution, did Congress create a system of nationally chartered, note-issuing banks and tax state currencies out of circulation. For decades, moreover, Congress pursued standardization of weights and measures in piecemeal fashion. Not until 1901, when it established the National Bureau of Standards (now the National Institute of Standards and Technology), modeled on the Physikalisch-Technische Reichsanstalt, did the United States finally achieve nationwide standardization and break its dependence on Europe for technical standards. Likewise, Congress passed—but then repealed—federal bankruptcy laws in 1800/1803, 1841/1843, and 1867/1878, before finally passing a law in 1898 that proved long lasting. Those laws pertained largely to individuals, however, and it was not until 1938 that Congress passed bankruptcy legislation aimed specifically at business entities.

The Civil War and its aftermath, as noted earlier, prompted a visible expansion of federal power over the economy. Compared with German markets, however, American markets nonetheless remained fragmented for many decades, because the state governments remained more significant players in economic policymaking than their German counterparts. This aspect of the American political economy—the states’ continuing importance after the Civil War—has largely escaped the notice of historians. For economic history, this is an especially egregious error, for the division of labor spelled out in the American constitution, unlike in the German constitution of 1871, lodged extensive powers over economic policy in the hands of the state governments. In the words of legal historian Harry N. Scheiber, “property law, commercial law, corporation law, and many other aspects of law vital to the economy were left almost exclusively to the states” before the Civil War, and even after the postwar expansion of federal power, “the states were in large measure still setting their own agendas on industrial policy matters, despite centralizing ten-
encies in constitutional doctrine and in national policy.” For the businessperson seeking a truly national market, the result, instead, was still “a multiplicity of legal environments.”

Evidence of the continuing fragmentation of economic policy and, therefore, of markets is abundant. Even as Congress began chartering and regulating national banks, the states continued to charter and regulate their own banks—and all other corporations—under rules that varied from state to state. Until the Federal Reserve was established in 1913, the United States lacked the equivalent of the Reichsbank (and relied on private banker J. P. Morgan to stabilize financial markets in the Panic of 1907). Although even in Germany, centralized regulation of banking was a product of the twentieth century, policymaking was much more fragmented in the United States, and remains so to this day. Despite construction of the transcontinental railroads, a truly national system of railroads only began to take shape in the 1880s, when the threat of Congressional action on safety issues and standard time zones galvanized American railroads to form a national association, as noted earlier, and regulate such matters themselves. Only in the late 1880s were American railroad gauges finally standardized nationwide, for example, an indispensable step to building a truly national system that German railroads had taken a couple of decades earlier. Meanwhile, the states continued to wield power over most other policy areas that defined markets. During the last decades of the nineteenth century, the federal courts, prodded by long-distance railroads and vertically integrated manufacturers whose activities increasingly crossed state lines, began to curb state regulation of interstate freight rates and inter-firm relations, as well as the “subtle forms of protection” that they had long practiced, e.g., via taxes, licensing fees, and inspections. By the end of the century, federal court decisions, together with the Interstate Commerce Act (1886) and the Sherman Antitrust Act (1890), regulating the competitive behavior of firms engaged in interstate commerce, had shifted the balance of power over economic policy perceptibly further away from the states and toward the federal government. But the overall effect, at least until the New Deal and probably until after World War II, was not to bring into being a uniform national market. The reconfigured division of labor between the state and federal governments in economic policy merely added another dimension of complexity to the “mosaic” of regulation that had characterized the United States since its founding. A persistent, now two-dimensional mosaic of policymaking meant a persistent mosaic of markets.

Overall, then, what remains of the stylized storylines that highlight differences between the United States and Germany at the turn of the century? Both countries qualified as relatively “late industrializers” as
they rose to industrial power on the basis of the industries associated with the “second industrial revolution.” Tariff levels, if anything, appear to have been higher in the US than in Germany. National associations of economic interests were a salient feature of the political landscape in both countries. Trade unions were not particularly strong in either country, though for differing reasons: Where the strength of German unions was undercut by political repression, the strength of American unions was undercut, in effect, by racism and the structure of the American polity. Universal banks were probably equally powerful in the two countries, except that they took the form principally of (unregulated) partnerships in the US. Export markets were evidently more important to German producers than to their American counterparts, although not strong enough to generate the trade surpluses that the US enjoyed. From the standpoint of the late-nineteenth-century entrepreneur, finally, the American domestic market probably did not appear as “national” as the German. If anything, the similarities between the two political economies at the turn of the century are more striking than the differences.

This is not to say, of course, that there were no differences of significance, but that the conventional understanding has overstated them, if not gotten them wrong altogether. Badly needed is more in-depth, fully comparative research of the potentially transformative kind for which Carl Degler called two decades ago. Only then will we be better positioned to understand the finer differences in the German and American political economies at the turn of the twentieth century and how they may have shaped development since then.

As this survey has repeatedly hinted, however, one particular difference will surely deserve close attention: the distinctive ways in which the labor of economic policymaking was divided between the state and federal governments in Germany and the United States. As the next section suggests, this fine-grained difference inflected economic policies at the turn of the century in ways that remain with us today.

Peculiarities

Omitted from the conventional storylines outlined at the beginning of the last section is a dimension of American and German capitalism that was palpably different at the turn of the century: the two countries’ signature means of dealing with intensified competition. In the United States, the dominant business strategy to dampen increasing competition was to merge competing firms into single, giant corporations. In Germany, in contrast, the dominant strategy was cartelization—forming associations, based on contracts, among otherwise independent firms in order to dampen competition collectively by coordinating production and divid-
ing up markets. Exploring the roots of this difference—if we dig deep enough—illuminates the critical importance of the distinctive ways in which the federal and state governments divided up economic policymaking in the United States and Germany.

The divergence in American and German business strategies set in toward the end of the first “Great Depression” (1873–1896), which was marked both by cutthroat competition, endemic to the new, capital-intensive industries of the era, and by falling prices. In Germany, some eight cartels had formed by 1875. By 1887, the number of German cartels was up to seventy. Although the term “cartel” is seldom used in American history, the strategy was familiar in the United States as well in the 1870s. American manufacturers, too, as business historian Alfred Chandler notes, “set up nationwide trade associations to control price and production” across a broad range of industries. “By the 1880s,” in his words, “these federations had become part of the normal way of doing business in most American industries.” In some instances—beginning with John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil in 1882—inter-firm relations were more centralized in trusts and then in holding companies. But cartelization was a risky strategy under American common law, which did not prohibit combinations in restraint of trade but treated them as void and unenforceable. This meant that, unlike in Germany, the cartels’ contractual agreements could not be enforced in court. Then, in 1890, the US Congress prohibited cartels nationwide (at least on paper) in the Sherman Antitrust Act. In 1888, meanwhile, the state of New Jersey had passed an incorporation law that made formal consolidation much easier by permitting its corporations to hold stock in other corporations. The combined effect of federal prohibition on cartels (in competition policy) and New Jersey’s open door to holding companies (in incorporation policy) was to channel American business strategies toward outright merger and consolidation.

At the turn of the century, a wave of organization building produced giant monopolies or monopolistic combinations in many sectors of the American and German economies virtually overnight. The Great Merger Movement in the US swallowed up more than 1,800 firms between 1895 and 1904, consolidating them into 157 firms that dominated their lines of business, mainly in manufacturing. Nearly 80 percent of consolidations with a capital of $1 million or more were incorporated in New Jersey. Of the ninety-three American consolidations whose market shares economic historian Naomi Lamoreaux was able to trace, more than three-quarters controlled at least 40 percent of their industry, and close to half controlled at least 70 percent. Although mergers were carried out in Germany, too, particularly in the new electrical manufacturing industry, cartel formation continued to be the much more common strategy for dealing with
competition in Germany. By 1895, 143 cartels were in existence; by 1900, the number had reached 300; and it doubled again to 673 by 1910. The divergence hardened when the German courts affirmed the legality of cartel agreements (1897). On the eve of the Great War, the two economies had been so thoroughly transformed—each in its own way—that a German author wondered which was “the country of monopoly: America or Germany?”

This much of the story is familiar: In their pursuit of cartelization, Americans were disabled by the law, while Germans were enabled. In Chandler’s view, this difference in the legal standing of cartels in Germany and the United States expressed fundamental preferences that he sought to capture by characterizing the German style of managerial capitalism as “cooperative” and the American as “competitive.” In his words, “[t]he basic difference between the two countries was . . . that industrial leaders in the United States continued to compete functionally and strategically for market share, while in Germany they often preferred to negotiate with one another to maintain market share at home and in some cases abroad.”

But is this all of the story? The evidence suggests that preferences were not so settled in either country. For more than a decade, after all, American business leaders had pursued cartelization with great energy, so it seems reasonable to think that many would have preferred a law overturning the common law and legalizing cartel agreements. But the Sherman Antitrust Act, though initially not actively enforced against businesses (it was used more against unions), did just the opposite. It introduced enough legal uncertainty to leave American producers with little choice in the matter, whatever their preferences. On Chandler’s own evidence, moreover, at least some German business leaders would have preferred to consolidate rather than to cartelize their enterprises. After the 1901 economic downturn known simply as “The Crisis” in Germany, steel producers began negotiations for a collective solution to their competition problems. This led to formation of the Stahlwerksverband in 1904. But some steelmakers continued to advocate an American solution to their difficulties. August Thyssen, head of the largest firm among the founders of the Stahlwerksverband, for example, favored an outright merger of German steel firms on the model of United States Steel, formed in 1901 and the biggest of the giant firms to emerge from the Great Merger Movement. “Only through merger, Thyssen . . . argued, could the industry be rationalized in the American manner,” Chandler notes. But Thyssen was unsuccessful. In practice, it seems likely that industrialists’ preferences frequently differed in both countries. Even among American businessmen, two broadly divergent viewpoints were on display when participants in the Chicago Conference on Trusts (1899) and in hearings
before the US Industrial Commission on trusts and monopolies (1899–1900) sought to make sense of the rapid economic changes going on about them. On the one side were those—John D. Rockefeller among them—who regarded economic concentration as a natural and inevitable outgrowth of economic progress; on the other side were those (for example, independent oil men) who regarded the emergence of giant firms to be a direct and dangerous product of American industrial policy (in particular, the failure to eliminate railroad rate discrimination, lax regulation of corporations, or protective tariffs).75

If preferences in fact differed in both countries, or at least cannot be presumed to have leaned uniformly in one direction or the other, then how are we to understand the divergence in American and Germany strategies at the turn of the century? It seems clear that competition policy made cartelization difficult and mergers more attractive in the United States (although why American law took this stance is not so clear). But what made mergers more difficult to achieve in Germany? They were neither illegal nor unknown; the mergers in electrical manufacturing that produced the Allgemeine Elektricitäts-Gesellschaft and Siemens provide good examples. But they were far less common, even in industries such as steel, where at least some major players favored American-style mergers, and where universal banks could have been enlisted to help out with the process, as J. P. Morgan’s banking house had in organizing US Steel. The critical issue, in other words, seems to be the ability to merge. What made it possible for so many firms to merge so easily in the United States but not in Germany? This question centers not on strategic choice as such, but on the power to choose: When industrialists disagreed among themselves, whose views prevailed?

Here is where differences not in competition policies but in incorporation policies at the turn of the century surely mattered, for forming a trust or carrying out a merger required incorporation of the constituent members in advance so that they would have shares to exchange.76 The numbers suggest that this precondition of consolidation was far easier to meet in the United States than in Germany. The difference in the pace of incorporation in the two countries by the turn of the century was nothing short of astounding (and the American data, it should be stressed, are incomplete and therefore undercount American incorporations). In 1872, in the midst of the Gründerjahre, German incorporations reached a high point not exceeded again until 1920: 479 new corporations (Aktiengesellschaften) were created that year. In the United States, the seven states for which data are available (not including New York) chartered more than twice as many (924). The year 1883, another relative peak in Germany, produced 192 new corporations; in the US, for nine states (still not including New York), the number stood at 2,122.77 As interstate compe-
tition in chartering heated up in the US and the Great Merger Movement got under way, the numbers diverged dramatically (despite the fact that the American data are still incomplete): in 1890, 236 new corporations in Germany and 3,774 in the US; in 1900, 261 in Germany and 8,727 in the US; and in 1910, 186 in Germany and 22,577 in the US.78

Given their comparable levels of industrial development and, hence, of underlying demand for incorporation, this tremendous difference in incorporation rates in the United States and Germany can only be understood by paying close attention to the way that policymaking powers were divided between the state and federal governments in the two countries and its effect on incorporation policies. (Given the tendency in the US today to regard corporations as purely the products of private initiative, it is perhaps worth emphasizing that they do not come into being—that is, have legal standing—in the absence of a sovereign act. As a New York Times writer quipped in 1923, “A legislative stork in the form of a law is responsible for every corporation.”79) Although competition policy in the US, as noted earlier, was nationalized with the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, incorporation policy remained in the hands of the states. As interstate business grew in the late nineteenth century, the states engaged in a heated (and in some quarters, lamented) competition to attract corporations, both for the revenues that incorporation fees or taxes generated and for the indirect stimulus to economic growth. Known variously as a “race to the bottom” (in loosening state control over corporations) or a “race to the top” (in enhancing efficiency), the competition among states to craft attractive incorporation policies was initially won by New Jersey in the 1890s, only to be superseded by Delaware in the 1910s.80 Corporations in the United States, as a result, could be created at will and virtually without strings attached by the turn of the century.

In the German Empire, by contrast, both competition and incorporation policy were national matters from the outset. This meant that no race, whether to the bottom or the top, could set in (except in response to international competitive pressures). Moreover, German incorporation laws generally set stringent conditions on incorporation, certainly compared with American practice in the late nineteenth century. Particularly onerous was a requirement in the 1870 Confederation law that all of the company’s shares be placed with investors, and that 10 percent of the nominal value of the shares be paid in before the corporation could take on its legal powers.81 This set a high barrier, and surely dampened the pace of incorporation before 1884. Then the 1884 imperial law raised the bar even higher, requiring not only that all shares be taken by investors, but also that 25 percent of the nominal value of each share be paid in before the company could take on its legal powers. This aspect of the 1884 law remained in place well into the twentieth century.82
In short, frenzied competition among the American states, absent in Germany, made it far easier to incorporate an American than a German enterprise at the turn of the century. Since incorporation was a precondition of merger, and there were so many American incorporations even before the Great Merger Movement, this no doubt facilitated mergers in the United States and hampered them in Germany.

In a second, more complex way, the competition among the American states in the arena of incorporation policy also appears to have lowered the barriers to mergers by hastening a shift in shareholder voting rights that made it easier to buy control of a corporation. Limitations on the voting power of large shareholders were common in both the United States and Germany through the 1840s. These were embodied in so-called prudent-mean voting rights that sought a balance between persons and property. For example, a shareholder’s total votes might be capped at ten, or graduated scales might give proportionally fewer votes as holdings increased (e.g., one vote each for the first ten shares, then one vote for every ten shares up to one hundred, and one vote for every additional hundred shares). On the one hand, prudent-mean voting rights gave larger shareholders more voting power than did the American common law or the Allgemeines Landrecht in Germany, both of which granted only one vote per person in the absence of a charter provision to the contrary. But, on the other hand, they gave larger shareholders systematically less voting power than they enjoyed under the one share, one vote rules so well-known today. During the middle decades of the nineteenth century, however, as growing numbers of corporations competed to attract investment, more and more of the American states began to mandate one vote per share rules, or simply let companies decide for themselves what their voting rights should be. Scattered, firm-level evidence indicates that existing companies were also replacing prudent-mean scales with one share, one vote rules as a quid pro quo when they ran into financial trouble and needed to attract capital from large investors. By the 1880s, prudent-mean voting rights had virtually disappeared in the United States. As the author of a treatise on American corporate law noted in 1884, “by statute and bylaws, and by custom so general, as to amount to accepted law, a shareholder is entitled to as many votes as he holds shares.” Growing competition among the states surely hastened this piecemeal transformation in the US. The competitive dynamic inherent in state-level policymaking, as noted earlier, encouraged an extraordinary proliferation of corporations, which meant that an extraordinary number of corporations were competing with one another to attract investors. At the same time, competition among the states no doubt encouraged legal changes so that shareholder voting rights would not put a state’s corporations at a disadvantage in the intensifying, increasingly nationwide
competition to attract capital. By the 1880s, one share, one vote rules had become the new American norm. In Germany, by contrast, no laws mandated one vote per share in the nineteenth (or the twentieth) century. The default in the Allgemeines Landrecht (§ 209), as noted above, was one vote per person, although it could be changed in the company’s charter. In the absence of an explicit charter provision, the Handelsgesetzbuch (§ 224) did give shareholders one vote per share (Jede Aktie gewährt eine Stimme). But prudent-mean scales were very widely used in individual charters granted through 1870. This provision of the HGB was not changed by the Confederation’s 1870 incorporation law, but in the 1884 law (§§ 190, 221), its wording was altered in a way that suggests that one share, one vote rules were not the German norm, or at least not uniformly expected, as they were in the US. Now it read: “Every share grants the right to vote” (Jede Aktie gewährt das Stimmrecht). According to legal commentators, this change meant that companies could no longer set a minimum number of shares that a shareholder had to own in order to be qualified to vote (or set other restrictions on suffrage). Each and every share now gave its owner a legal and irrevocable right to vote. Voting rights were to be based on shares (nach den Aktienbeträgen ausgeübt), but that did not necessarily mean one vote per share, for the law gave companies the “freedom,” as Viktor Ring put it in 1886, to place upper limits on voting power. This provision of the law explicitly permitted the options of setting a maximum number of votes that could be cast (Höchstbeträg) or adopting a graduated scale (in Abstufungen). Although it was in the nature of joint-stock associations (unlike civil associations) that voting should be weighted according to shares, not persons, law professor Karl Lehmann explained in a 1904 comparative study, it was common to limit the power of large shareholders, “[s]ince a ruthless enforcement [radikale Durchführung] of this principle would give too much power to the largest shareholders.”

The wholesale movement to one share, one vote rules in the United States but not in Germany surely made it much easier to buy control of a corporation in the US than in Germany. And incorporating in the first place, as we have seen, was much easier in the US as well. Together, these differences—artifacts in both countries of the peculiar ways in which economic policymaking was divided between the federal and state governments—made it much easier to merge companies in the United States and much harder to do so in Germany. So the answer to the question of whose views prevailed when industrialists disagreed among themselves about appropriate strategy is different for the United States than for Germany at the turn of the century. In the US, it was generally straightforward by the turn of the century: the views of those prevailed who had the financial wherewithal to buy control of corporations, which were
rapidly proliferating at the turn of the century. In Germany, shares did not necessarily translate into control in a straightforward way, and corporations were, in any case, far fewer in number and more difficult to create. While competition policy foreclosed the option of cartelization in the US, incorporation policy made mergers much more difficult to carry out in Germany. The two countries’ signature means of dealing with competition at the turn of the century, in short, were more a product of the division of labor in economic policymaking than of business preferences.

The critical issue lay in the details of how power over economic policymaking was distributed between the states and the federal government. In the German Empire, economic policymaking was centralized in the hands of the federal government. Unlike in the United States, no race to the bottom (or top) ensued, and Germany did not depend solely on competition policy to regulate business; the federal government also controlled the conditions under which corporations were created and operated, and it exercised those powers. Economic policymaking in the United States, by contrast, was both decentralized among the states and divided between the federal and state governments. As a result, neither the states nor the federal government enjoyed the full panoply of powers at the disposal of the imperial government in Germany. On the one hand, the state governments were hamstrung by the exigencies of interstate competition and, after 1890, lost control over competition policy as well; on the other hand, the federal government, with growing powers over competition policy after 1890, was hamstrung by its lack of power over incorporation policy.

This vital difference in the structure of German and American policymaking persisted throughout the twentieth century and, it seems reasonable to think, profoundly affected the nature of the German and American economies. How many times was some version of this tale repeated? Until more comparative research is done, we will not know. But it seems likely that similar stories unfolded in other realms as well. An excellent example is social welfare and labor policies. Workplace policy was traditionally in the hands of the American state governments, and, like their European counterparts, they pursued a variety of social welfare and labor market initiatives in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. But American-style competitive federalism, as David Brian Robertson argues, made it virtually impossible for the states to follow through. From the last half of the nineteenth century through the first third of the twentieth, he writes, “[c]omplaints about the effect of labor laws on state businesses helped to defeat or eviscerate factory laws, eight-hour laws, convict labor regulation, laws requiring one day’s rest in seven, child labor laws, minimum wage laws, workers’ compensation
laws, and compulsory health insurance laws." Equally important, the American states operated in a constitutionally mandated "free-trade zone," but lacked control over tariff policy, which belonged to the federal government. As a result, unlike European governments, they had little room to bargain with employers. Controlling both tariff and labor policy, "European government officials," in Robertson's words, "could expand protections for workers and employers simultaneously with a tacit 'log-rolling' agreement, uniting employers and workers by giving advantages to both. But American states lacked similar powers, and were helpless to compensate employers when they extended worker protections."89 As with business regulation, the tenor of American—and, one suspects, German—social welfare and labor policies reflected the peculiar structure of economic policymaking rather than settled national "preferences."

Many other aspects of German and American capitalism are ripe for comparative research as well. The same policymaking dynamics may explain, for example, the impressive enthusiasm for worker participation in management in both countries in the 1920s—and its ultimate failure in the United States. Anti-chain store legislation is another intriguing candidate for comparative exploration, for more than 800 bills were proposed in the American state legislatures between 1930 and 1935, yet Germany seems ultimately to have done more to protect small business.90 Only when American and German experiences are set side by side and examined in detail will we arrive at the more nuanced understanding of American and German capitalism that we lack today.

Notes


4 These developments may be traced in Chandler, Scale and Scope.


8 For a detailed treatment of the United States, Germany, and Britain, see Chandler, *Scale and Scope*.


13 *Historical Statistics Online*, Ee429–30. See also Taussig, *Tariff History*, Appendix, Table 1.

14 W. O. Henderson, *The Rise of German Industrial Power, 1834–1914* (Berkeley, 1975), 218; Hans Jaeger, *Geschichte der Wirtschaftsordnung in Deutschland* (Frankfurt am Main, 1988), 100–101; Berghahn, *Das Kaiserreich, 1871–1914*, 300–304. The 1879 law capped federal revenue from customs at 130 million marks; any surplus was to be divided among the states according to their population. The Reich ran persistent deficits, however, and this restriction on federal revenue was eased in the first years of the twentieth century. On the long-term consequences of this fiscal division of labor, see Carsten Hefeker, “The Agony of Central Power: Fiscal Federalism in the German Reich,” *European Review of Economic History* 5 (2001): 119–42.


17 Taussig, *Tariff History*, 358, 361. As a percentage of the value of dutiable products, US duties rose from the low 40s in 1895–1897 to just under 50 percent in the first years of the new century. Taussig, *Tariff History*, 492, Table 1.


21 See Richard Franklin Bensel, *Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859–1877* (New York, 1990); Heather Cox Richardson, *The Greatest Nation on Earth: Republican Economic Policies During the Civil War* (Cambridge, 1997). As historian James McPherson observed in a review of recent works that put slavery rather than states’ rights at the heart of the Civil War, “During forty-nine of the seventy-two years from 1789 to 1861 the presidents of the United States were Southerners—all of them slaveholders. The only presidents to be re-elected were slaveholders. Two thirds of the speakers of the House, chairmen of the House Ways and Means Committee, and presidents pro tem of the Senate were Southerners. At all times before 1861 a majority of Supreme Court justices were


24 Skocpol, Ganz, and Munson, “A Nation of Organizers,” 531 (Table 2).


27 US Senate, Committee on Education and Labor, Report upon the Relations between Labor and Capital (Washington, DC, 1885), vol. 1, 316.


35 Carosso, Investment Banking, 97–98.

36 Carosso, Investment Banking, 98–100.


38 Hannah, “Divorce,” 5.

39 In 1899, the population of the Zollverein was only slightly higher (0.4 percent) than the Reich’s. Walther G. Hoffmann, Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts (Berlin, 1965), 518.

40 Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: The Americas, E1, J1; Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Europe, E1, J1. Despite the differing terminology, German NNP and US GDP appear to be comparable measures. We converted marks to dollars at an exchange rate of $0.2386 per Mark, based on Jürgen Schneider, Oscar Schwarzer, and Friedrich Zellfelder,


42 Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Europe, E1, J1. Trade surpluses did not materialize until after 1929. According to Walther G. Hoffmann, the actual value of exports to 1905 was probably about 4 percent lower than the official statistics indicated, while the value of imports may have been some 3 percent higher. See Hoffmann, Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft, 529.


45 Hoffmann, Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft, 178; Historical Statistics Online, Aa31.


47 Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Europe, A1, J1; Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: The Americas, A1, J1; HGIS Germany. We converted marks to dollars based on exchange rates given in Schneider, Schwarzer, and Zellfelder, Währungen der Welt I, Teilband I, 361, 367, 368, and in Historical Statistics Online, Ee626 (1913 only).

48 Maddison, Dynamic Forces, 6–7.


50 Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization, 169–73.


55 Lewis H. Haney, A Congressional History of Railways in the United States, vol. 2, 1850 to 1877 (1910; New York, 1968), 221, paraphrasing Senator Charles Sumner. Until the expansion of railroads in the 1840s and 1850s, the most important interstate commerce was probably connected to the internal slave trade, which has been ignored by business historians. An important recent study is Walter Johnson, Soul by Soul: Life Inside the Antebellum Slave Market (Cambridge, Mass., 1999).

56 On the impact of the Civil War on the American financial system, see Bensel, Yankee Leviathan, 238–365.


For a revealing discussion of state policies hindering interstate trade in the 1930s, see Paul T. Truitt, “Interstate Trade Barriers in the United States,” Law and Contemporary Problems 8, no. 2 (spring 1941): 209–22. One example he cited was the “striking” variation in truck regulation, which required transshipments at state boundaries and raised costs. Nationwide there were twenty-two different weight requirements at that time, he noted, and, although ten states had “a common standard, . . . no two are adjacent.” Truitt, “Interstate Trade Barriers,” 214.

Berghahn, Das Kaiserreich, 1871–1914, 75–76.

Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), 316. Although he mainly used the terms trade association or federation in The Visible Hand, he referred to them in passing as cartels (e.g., 315) and made clear in a later, comparative study that he regarded American trade associations in the 1870s to be cartels in the European sense. See Chandler, Scale and Scope, 71–72.


Berghahn, Das Kaiserreich, 1871–1914, 76. For a detailed treatment, see Ullmann, Interessenverbinde.

J. Singer, Das Land der Monopole: Amerika oder Deutschland? (Berlin, 1913).

Chandler, Scale and Scope, 11–12 (emphasis added).

Chandler, Scale and Scope, 493. Chandler’s treatment of these developments is discussed in more detail in Colleen A. Dunlavy, “Corporate Democracy: Stockholder Voting Rights in


78 See the sources cited in note 77.

79 Lindsay Russell, “Corporation Birth Control is Urged as Nation’s Need,” *New York Times*, 9 September 1923, XX5.


81 Felix Litthauer, *Allgemeines Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch: Nebst Einführung und Ergänzungs-Gesetzen unter Ausschluss des Seerechts*, Text-Ausgabe mit Anmerkungen und Sachregister (Berlin, 1871), 248, 84 (§ 209a), 86 (§ 210a); Reich, “Die Entwicklung des deutschen Aktienrechts,” 267. For insurance companies, however, the minimum paid-in capital was twenty percent. In either case, the minimum had to be paid in on each share.


84 Litthauer, *Allgemeines Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch*, 92. Provisions that were added or altered by the 1870 law were highlighted in this book in boldface and annotated; § 224 was not.

85 Only 2 percent of a sample of 207 German corporations (out of a total of 638 known corporations) had one share, one vote rules; the rest limited voting power in a variety of ways. Dunlavy, “From Citizens to Plutocrats,” 84.

86 See note 84.

(Berlin, 1893), 450–51. The phrasing in the 1884 law (§§ 190, 221) that permitted setting a maximum vote or using graduated scales was retained in the incorporation laws of 1897 (§252), 1937 (§ 114) and 1965 (§ 134).

88 Karl Lehmann, *Das Recht der Aktiengesellschaften* (Berlin, 1904), 162–63. As examples of countries that capped the total number of votes, Lehmann named Belgium and the Netherlands; of those that specified graduated scales, Italy and England (“Normalstatut”); and of those that permitted one vote per person, Germany. On Germany, see also Colleen A. Dunlavy, “Corporate Governance in Late 19th-Century Europe and the US: The Case of Shareholder Voting Rights,” in *Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and Emerging Research*, ed. Klaus J. Hopt et al. (Oxford, 1998), 32–33.


The right to privacy is among the most contentious and ambivalent issues in American politics and jurisprudence today. Take, for example, the nomination of Samuel Alito to the United States Supreme Court in 2006. During the confirmation hearings, the right to privacy was one of the main topics on which the Senate committee questioned the nominee. Alito, unlike Robert Bork nearly twenty years before him, agreed that the United States Constitution implies a right to privacy, while at the time remaining purposefully vague about just what it entailed. In fact, the right to privacy has played a key role in Supreme Court nominations since the 1970s, and has been one of the most obvious dividing lines between the justices of the high bench themselves. Legal philosopher Lloyd Weinreb argues that “the right to privacy [. . .] has been a litmus test of one’s constitutional credentials as a scholar or (would-be) judge: liberal or conservative, activist or textualist, and so forth.”

It is not immediately apparent why this should be the case. Although the word “privacy” does not appear in the US Constitution, most Americans would readily agree that privacy is a central value of American life worthy of legal protection. The problem lies in the fact that privacy is such an ambiguous, politically charged concept; there simply is no agreement on what privacy entails, or even what the word precisely means. An early advocate of privacy at the dawn of the computer age, Arthur Miller, summed it up: “[T]he concept of privacy is difficult to define because it is exasperatingly vague and evanescent, often meaning strikingly different things to different people.”

A large part of the problem is that the Supreme Court based its 1973 abortion decision Roe v. Wade on the right to privacy. Abortion is arguably the single most contentious issue in American politics; this is why privacy plays such a prominent role during Supreme Court nominations. Accordingly, when Alito confirmed the existence of a right to privacy in
the US Constitution, he meticulously avoided accepting Roe as irrevocable precedent. However, Alito’s confirmation hearings also happened at a time when another privacy issue was in the news: the Bush administration’s program of monitoring telephone conversations between the United States and foreign countries without judicial warrants. To critics, that program constituted not only an alarming excess of executive power, but also a dramatic violation of American citizens’ rights to privacy.

What, then, does “privacy” or “right to privacy” really mean? There simply is no commonly accepted definition. Translating the term into German is even more difficult: Privatheit is not a commonly used German word, whereas Privatsphäre would be too narrow. In American usage, the right to privacy has been connected to extremely diverse issues: freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, the secrecy of the mails, freedom from physical and electronic surveillance, contraception, abortion, homosexuality, the right to die, freedom of the press, identity theft, and data protection, to name just the most prominent ones.

This research project aims to examine the legal and political history of the right to privacy in the twentieth century, with a focus on the 1960s through the 1980s. Next to the statutory and constitutional development in the United States, special attention will be given to the political and public debates on privacy, as well as their impact on American political culture. The project is also transatlantic and comparative in scope: The development of privacy rights and debates in the Federal Republic of Germany will be compared to the United States. In Germany, for example, privacy rights have had little impact on the abortion debate, quite unlike in the United States. In contrast, the German census of 1982 sparked a heated struggle over the right to informational self-determination, whereas the American census has been mostly uncontroversial. Right-to-privacy issues also affect current transatlantic relations: The debates over the handling of airline passenger data between the EU and the US or the issue of biometric data in identity documents may serve as examples.

The project relies primarily on printed sources. Court decisions and statutes are obvious choices. The bulk of source material will reflect the political and public debates on privacy: newspaper and news magazine articles, congressional hearings and reports, law reviews, party platforms, and NGO publications. There is also a large body of privacy activist literature; at least since the 1950s, many books addressed the right to privacy, and typically warned of its erosion in American society. Prominent examples include The Eavesdroppers by Samuel Dash, Richard F. Schwartz, and Robert E. Knowlton (1959); The Naked Society by Vance Packard (1964); Privacy and Freedom by Alan Westin (1967); The Intruders by Senator Edward V. Long (1967); and The Assault on Privacy by Arthur

66 GHI BULLETIN NO. 41 (FALL 2007)
Especially in the 1960s and 1970s, public debate in the United States coalesced around a number of privacy issues that define the field to the present day.

The following remarks present a rough sketch of the development of the term “right to privacy” in American legal and political history in order to demonstrate the ambivalence and complexity of the concept.

Common Law Privacy

The term “right to privacy” entered American legal parlance in 1890 in a *Harvard Law Journal* article by a young lawyer named Louis Brandeis, who later rose to prominence as a Supreme Court justice. The article addressed the problem of the emergence of snapshot photography, and the intrusive new forms of journalism and advertising it introduced. Brandeis argued in favor of a “tort of privacy”: Individuals should be able to defend their “right to be let alone” in civil actions against those who used their picture against their will. The text is today considered the most influential law review article in American legal history. Even so, it took fifteen years before the Supreme Court of the state of Georgia recognized a right to privacy that gave individuals control over their own likenesses, albeit more with regard to commercial advertising than to press coverage. Other states followed suit, sometimes with a privacy statute, but more frequently through the mechanism of the common law.

By 1960, legal scholar William Prosser found that this right to privacy provided citizens some protection against the publication of embarrassing information about themselves, the publication of distorted facts about themselves, and the unauthorized use of their names and likenesses. The truthful publication of facts by the press, especially with regard to persons of public interest, remains unabridged by this specific form of privacy, which affects primarily privacy conflicts between individual citizens and commercial enterprises. Over the course of the twentieth century, however, conflicts of privacy between citizens and their government at the state and federal level emerged as the primary focus of the privacy debate.

Fourth Amendment Privacy

Unlike common law privacy, privacy as a civil right is clearly implicit (although not explicitly spelled out) in the US Constitution. In order to protect the sanctity of private homes against government intrusion, the founding fathers included the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights, which prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures,” i.e. those not authorized by a judicial warrant upon probable cause. The Supreme Court
enlarged this narrow protection of the home as early as 1878, when it deduced the secrecy of the mails (first-class mail, to be precise) from the Fourth Amendment and limited the use of personal papers as evidence in court. However, the primary Fourth Amendment protection against searches and seizures within the home was only affirmed relatively late through the adoption of the exclusionary rule. In 1914, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the use of evidence gained through illegal searches in federal court; not until the 1961 decision *Mapp v. Ohio* was this crucial rule widened to the much more significant state courts, which handle the bulk of all criminal cases. Before then, state and local police had rarely bothered to secure a warrant from a judge before conducting a search.

The key Fourth Amendment privacy issue in the twentieth century, however, revolved around electronic surveillance, especially the wiretapping of phone lines for intelligence and law enforcement purposes. The term “wiretapping” dates back to the Civil War-era practice of literally tapping the telegraph wire, which became a controversial issue after that war. Only the emergence of the telephone, however, created a widespread public debate. During the 1920s, the activities of Prohibition enforcement agents constituted the first widespread use of electronic surveillance of citizens by the federal government. Ironically, in those days, FBI director J. Edgar Hoover denounced wiretapping as a “cowardly” tool of law enforcement, probably in order to portray his own agency as morally superior to the Treasury Department’s unpopular snoops. In later decades, Hoover conveniently forgot his earlier scruples regarding listening in on private telephone conversations.

The wiretapping activities of the Prohibition agents eventually led to one of the most significant judicial defeats of privacy as a civil right. In the 1928 case *Olmstead v. United States*, the Supreme Court decided that wiretapping, even without a warrant, did not violate the Constitution, since it did not require a physical intrusion into a private home. The majority opinion, penned by Chief Justice William Howard Taft, made it clear that most justices interpreted privacy primarily as a property right (e.g. in a house or personal papers), but not as a more comprehensive civil right. Louis Brandeis, by then a member of the Supreme Court, protested vehemently: “The evil incident to invasion of the privacy of the telephone is far greater than that involved in tampering with the mails.” His dissent would become influential later on, but for the time being, the *Olmstead* decision ushered in a forty-year era of nearly unrestricted wiretapping by the federal and state governments, as well as by private investigators.

In 1937, the Supreme Court interpreted the Federal Communications Act as prohibiting the interception and divulgence of electronic communications. However, the Justice Department continued the practice any-
way, arguing that it kept the information so gained within the executive branch and thus did not “divulge” it. Therefore, while federal agents could not use wiretapped evidence in court, they could and did use such material for intelligence purposes.20

The FBI entered the wiretapping business in earnest in 1939, partly authorized by an executive order issued by Franklin Roosevelt, who was concerned about Axis subversion and espionage in the United States. While the evidence so gathered was inadmissible in court, it allowed the comprehensive surveillance of actually or allegedly subversive persons and groups in the context of World War II counterespionage, the anti-communist investigations of the 1950s, the battle against organized crime, and the infiltration and surveillance of civil rights organizations and critics of the Vietnam War. Next to the FBI, various other federal agencies relied extensively on wiretapping, including the CIA, the Treasury Department, and even the Army.21

In the late 1950s, after the repressive McCarthy era had ended, a new public debate emerged about government surveillance and wiretapping. The former district attorney Samuel Dash,22 the prominent journalist Vance Packard,23 the political scientist Alan Westin,24 Senator Edward Long,25 and many others decried the increasing violation of privacy by government snoops, law enforcement agents, and private eyes. In his State of the Union address of 1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson himself called for better protection of privacy and the comprehensive prohibition of warrantless wiretapping.26 A number of congressional committees conducted hearings on privacy and surveillance. Most importantly, the much more liberal Supreme Court under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren overturned the Olmstead decision in Katz v. United States (1967). It declared unconstitutional warrantless wiretapping not only of private homes, but also of all places where an individual had a “reasonable expectation of privacy,” which in this case included a public telephone booth.27

Congress reacted to the new legal situation by passing the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.28 Title III (popularly known as the Wiretap Act) for the first time codified rules for electronic surveillance in criminal investigations. In order to wiretap a suspect, law enforcement agencies needed to get a judge’s warrant based on the same criteria as a warrant for a physical search. However, the Omnibus Act gave the president wide discretion over cases involving national security, an area that the Supreme Court had left deliberately untouched. Because of this and other changes from the original bill, Senator Hiram Fong called Title III, which originally carried the working title “Right to Privacy Act,” an “End to Privacy Act.”29
Senator Fong’s reservations turned out to be well founded. After the death of J. Edgar Hoover and the shock of the Watergate scandal, the Senate convened one of the most influential investigative committees in its history. The Church Committee revealed, among other things, widespread abuse of government surveillance, including the FBI’s infamous Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO), as well as illegal domestic surveillance activities by the CIA. In response, Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, which required a warrant even for wiretaps in national security cases (e.g. counterespionage) and created the special Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to decide such cases. The findings of the Church Committee also led to various other restrictions of domestic surveillance activity which were only loosened by the 2001 US Patriot Act. The current controversy about NSA wiretapping and domestic surveillance is directly connected to these debates of the 1960s and 1970s.

Intimate Privacy

The arguably most controversial aspect of the right to privacy developed seemingly independently of, but almost simultaneously with, the debates on surveillance and wiretapping: personal decisions on family and intimate matters and their regulation by the government. As early as 1923 and 1925, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional two state laws prohibiting private (Catholic) schools and foreign language (German) instruction, thus giving parents broad rights to shape their children’s education. However, the key decision in terms of intimate privacy came in 1965 in the case *Griswold v. Connecticut*. At the time, a Connecticut statute (the so-called Little Comstock Act) prohibited the sale and dissemination of information about contraceptive devices, even to married couples by licensed physicians. The advocacy group Planned Parenthood deliberately established a birth control clinic in violation of the law, and Executive Director Estelle Griswold arranged for her own arrest in order to establish a precedent. The Supreme Court, in a seven-to-two decision, declared the Connecticut law unconstitutional. While the decision was relatively uncontentious among the general public, it created a major debate among legal scholars, for *Griswold* established a constitutional right to privacy for the first time.

*Griswold* was one of the most complicated and internally controversial Supreme Court decisions in history. Seven justices voted with the majority, but the sheer number of opinions in the case demonstrated the extent to which the court was divided: there were one majority, three concurring, and two dissenting opinions. The majority opinion, penned by Justice William Douglas, deduced a constitutional right to privacy
from the “penumbras and emanations” of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments to the Constitution. He also identified a right to privacy of marriage and family in natural law: “We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.”

Douglas also painted a grim, if unrealistic, picture of what full enforcement of the Connecticut law would mean: “Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”

Other justices agreed with the outcome of the decision, but not with Douglas’s reasoning, and based their concurring opinions on the Ninth Amendment, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or even fundamental principles of ordered liberty that existed independently of the Constitution.

The legal debate about Griswold was unusual in another way: Even the two dissenting justices did not defend the Connecticut anti-contraceptive law as such. Justice Potter Stewart noted in his dissent: “I think this is an uncommonly silly law.” However, the dissenters, especially Justice Hugo Black, protested against the majority’s decision to create a new civil right out of the “penumbras and emanations” of the Constitution, or worse, from the nebulous vagueness of natural law. To Black, this constituted a return to the substantive due process idea of the era of Lochner v. New York (1905). During this period, which ended only in 1936, the Supreme Court behaved as a sort of super-legislature, and routinely declared Progressive and New Deal legislation unconstitutional. The Lochner-era court justified its decisions with the freedom of contract, which, like the right to privacy, is not spelled out in the Constitution. Although Black was a New Deal liberal (appointed by Franklin D. Roosevelt in an effort to end the Lochner era), his scathing dissenting opinion became something of a manifesto of judicial conservatism in post-Griswold America. Black insisted that the Bill of Rights constituted a comprehensive list of federally guaranteed civil rights that the Supreme Court had no authority to enlarge or dilute. “I like my privacy as well as the next one,” Black conceded, “but I am nevertheless compelled to admit that government has a right to invade it unless prohibited by some specific constitutional provision.”

The mainstream press reacted to the Griswold decision with approval or, more frequently, disinterest, but the reception in legal journals was intense and ambivalent. The Michigan Law Review devoted a special issue to the decision. Most commentators applauded the introduction of a constitutional right to privacy but were somewhat bewildered by Douglas’s unwieldy “penumbras and emanations” idea. Others expressed
support for Black’s dissent and shared his dismay that Griswold seemed to resurrect the unpopular doctrine of substantive due process. Nevertheless, the issue at hand in Griswold—contraception—was largely uncontroversial. Even Catholic dignitaries and the Catholic press applauded the decision, or at least treated it with benevolent indifference. After all, many Catholics at the time expected that the Second Vatican Council would loosen the prohibition of artificial contraception: It was only after the 1968 papal encyclical Humanae Vitae that contraception became a hot issue in Catholicism again. In 1972, Eisenstadt v. Baird struck down the last prohibitions against dispensing contraceptive devices to unmarried persons without causing an uproar.

However, in Roe v. Wade (1973), the Supreme Court struck down most state laws against abortion in the first and second trimesters of a pregnancy as unconstitutional. The majority based its decision on the right to privacy established in Griswold: “This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or [...] in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” The court did not specifically refer to Douglas’s “emanations and penumbras” theory, and in fact argued more along the lines of Justice John Harlan’s concurring opinion in Griswold. Even so, the message was clear: The right to privacy established in Griswold had become a civil right that went beyond contraception to cover diverse issues of intimate and intensely personal decisions. The practical effect, of course, was to legalize abortion in the United States.

As a result, abortion and the underlying right to privacy became one of the most controversial constitutional, social, and moral controversies in American politics. For designated federal judges, their opinion on privacy and abortion assumed central importance, although most appointees tried to avoid the issue as much as possible, opposing a judicial “litmus test.” The political parties, too, had to take sides, although individual politicians sometimes diverged from their party’s majority. Even beyond abortion, the right to privacy established in Griswold and Roe continued to generate controversy. In 1987, the Supreme Court still refused to apply the right to privacy to “anti-sodomy,” i.e. anti-homosexuality, laws. However, in the 2003 decision Lawrence v. Texas, the court reversed itself and struck down state laws against homosexual practices in private homes because they violated citizens’ right to privacy. The issues of homosexual marriage and the right to die have not yet been settled by the Supreme Court, but they, too, revolve primarily around a right to privacy in intimate matters. Overall, the right to privacy has become a collective and highly contested term that defines the conflict between judicial con-
servatives and liberals. At its core lies the debate over the legislative regulation of public morality.45

**Information Privacy**

Data protection, meaning an individual’s control over his or her data stored in government and commercial databases, is also discussed under the heading of privacy in the United States. Before the 1930s, the federal government largely limited itself to conducting the constitutionally mandated census every ten years. The census remained mostly uncontroversial, even though it increasingly went beyond the constitutional necessity of counting each state’s population and came to include all sorts of statistical information about US residents. While some census questions were criticized for being too intrusive (for example, in 1890, there were protests against questions about household debt and diseases), the census retained a high degree of acceptance. In fact, the Bureau of the Census may be considered a pioneer in information privacy: “The criticism leveled against it notwithstanding, the Census Bureau has an unequaled record among federal agencies in preserving the confidentiality of personal information.”46

Information privacy became a concern on the federal level primarily due to the various welfare programs of the New Deal (especially the Social Security system) and the Great Society, as well as the emergence of a national security state after the Second World War. An increasing number of ever larger federal agencies busily gathered detailed information about American citizens and residents. The advent of computer technology made it possible to network, correlate, and search the data better than before. Obviously, it also made possible whole new forms of abuse.

Computer technology and its pitfalls gave rise to the first major American debate about information privacy. In 1966, there were efforts to create a national data center that was supposed to collect the data of all federal agencies for statistical purposes. Almost immediately, however, the project ran into resistance in the press and in Congress.47 Committees in both the Senate and the House interviewed a large number of witnesses, including critical privacy experts like Alan Westin, Vance Packard, and Arthur Miller.48 The national data center never materialized; instead, the need for a federal data protection law became evident.49

Congress reacted to that need in 1974 by passing the Privacy Act, a supplement to the Freedom of Information Act. The Privacy Act was the world’s first data protection law and was both visionary and flawed. It required all federal agencies to abide by the principles of modern data protection: Data should only be gathered for a specific and legally mandated purpose; it should not be shared among agencies, except for legally
mandated purposes; and citizens should have the right to review and correct the data stored about them. The principal weakness of the law was the lack of enforcement. Unlike in most Western European countries (which enacted similar laws in the late 1970s and 1980s), no data protection agency or ombudsman was instituted. This was largely due to the opposition of President Gerald Ford, who feared the creation of a bureaucratic behemoth and threatened to veto the law. Furthermore, the Privacy Act concerned only federal agencies. Neither state nor local governments were affected (though several states passed privacy laws of their own), and commercial data gathering and mining were left completely out of the equation.  

Enforcing the Privacy Act was left to the Office of Management and Budget, which did not receive enough funds or personnel to do its job. For all practical purposes, each federal agency had to control its own data privacy practices. The Privacy Act also created a privacy commission, which submitted a report to President Jimmy Carter in 1977. It recommended a major overhaul of the information privacy system, most importantly, the establishment of a permanent privacy agency. However, Congress did not act on the report, and under the Reagan administration, any efforts to give the Privacy Act teeth faded. To this day, information privacy practice in the United States is lax by European Union standards, creating problems in the removal of trade barriers and causing controversy about antiterrorism measures such as the exchange of airline passenger or international banking data.

Privacy: Extent and Coherence

Even the diverse concepts of common law privacy, Fourth Amendment privacy, intimate privacy, and information privacy do not cover all of the ambivalent and multi-faceted privacy debates in the United States. There are also debates about medical privacy, financial privacy, identity theft, commercial data mining, and more. However, the four concepts described here comprise the largest part of privacy issues between individual citizens and their governments. While privacy issues between individuals and third parties, especially commercial enterprises, are also highly contested and relevant, they would require a separate research project altogether.

Given the ambivalence and diversity of privacy debates, most privacy studies pick one specific aspect, such as electronic surveillance, as their field of inquiry. Also, a number of publications argue that the intimate privacy concept established by the Griswold decision is a misnomer, and personal autonomy would be a better term than privacy. The inclusion of intimate privacy certainly poses many problems: The sheer
divisiveness of the abortion issue has considerably distorted the political front lines about privacy. As late as 1969, archconservative Senator Strom Thurmond opposed the national data center on the grounds that it would have strengthened the federal government vis-à-vis the states and infringed on personal privacy. After 1973, however, privacy became an almost exclusively liberal term, largely due to Roe v. Wade.53 Ironically, many American feminists find themselves championing the concept of privacy despite its origins as a property right and even a patriarchal value (in the sense of “my home is my castle.”) At the same time, many conservatives reject privacy because of abortion, although they could use the libertarian aspects of privacy to curb the power of the federal government and roll back the welfare state. Accordingly, a number of American conservatives have made attempts to reclaim the privacy concept for their side.54

It is precisely such distorted front lines and arguments, however, that make a comprehensive study of privacy debates attractive. In public debate, no clear dividing line exists between the various aspects of privacy: The Griswold decision is often mentioned in the debate about electronic surveillance, and Louis Brandeis’s “right to be let alone” is invoked in the abortion debate. The impact of the various privacy debates on American political culture cannot easily be separated into neatly divided packages because they are constitutionally and chronologically intertwined.

The constitutional connection stems from the fact that, short of the arduous amendment process, modern civil rights can only be divined from the Constitution through the relatively free interpretation of the original text. Taken literally, the Fourth Amendment does not protect the secrecy of the mails, nor does the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee the right to have an abortion. The level of interpretation of the Constitution by the Supreme Court, however, is one of the most controversial issues in American politics, and it often revolves around the various meanings of the privacy concept. The modern front lines of constitutional interpretation between the textualist approach of Justice Antonin Scalia, for example, and the dynamic, liberal approach of the Warren court emerged principally from the debates surrounding the right to privacy.

The various meanings of that right are also intertwined chronologically, especially from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s. Intimate privacy, Fourth Amendment privacy, and information privacy did not evolve separately, but at the same time: from the Griswold decision in 1965 and the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act in 1968 to the Privacy Act of 1974 and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. In the 1960s and 1970s, technological innovations (e.g. in surveillance electronics and contraceptive devices), social changes (the welfare state and the rise of an information society), and political conflicts (Watergate and the
Vietnam War) reached a sort of critical mass that dramatically changed the relationship between individual and state. It is small wonder then that American society debated the right to privacy with special vehemence during this era.

A comprehensive analysis of the multifaceted privacy debates in the United States therefore promises to yield important insights into the development of American political culture in the post-World War II era. The right to privacy may serve as a prism to shed light on key changes in American society, law, and politics. And if privacy remains an “exasperatingly vague and evanescent” concept, the same holds true for another term that Americans cherish but find hard to define: liberty.

Notes

1 Bork was the most spectacular case of the Senate rejecting a presidential nominee to the Supreme Court in recent history. His radically conservative interpretation of the US Constitution, especially regarding the right to privacy, played a decisive role in his rejection. Philippa Strum, Privacy: The Debate in the United States since 1945 (Fort Worth, 1998), 4.
10 Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Company, 122 Ga. 190 (1905). The case concerned a man whose picture was used for a life insurance advertisement without his consent.
12 Ex parte Jackson, 96 US 727 (1878).
17 Alan LeMond and Ron Fry, No Place to Hide (New York, 1975), 6.

Olmstead v. United States, 222 US 438 (1928), Brandeis dissenting opinion.


LeMond and Fry, No Place to Hide, 8; Strum, Privacy, 141.


Packard, The Naked Society.

Westin, Privacy and Freedom.

Long, The Intruders.


Miller, Assault on Privacy, 161.

United States Senate: Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 6 vols. (Washington, 1976).

The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986, public law 99–508, widened the surveillance protection to include electronic communications. However, judicial interpretation of ECPA is still controversial; see United States v. Councilman, 385 F.3d 793 (2004). Also, the scope of the ECPA was severely limited by the USA Patriot Act of 2001.

Pierce v. Society Sisters, 268 US 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US 390 (1923). At stake were nativist laws against Catholic schools and German-language instruction passed in the wake of World War I and influenced by the Ku Klux Klan.


381 US 486 (1965).

381 US 527 (1965).

381 US 510 (1965).


In his dissenting opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, Antonin Scalia complained that such a wide interpretation of the right to privacy might mean the end of all public morality legislation, including statutes against polygamy and incest.


FOREIGN CUISINE IN WEST GERMANY

Maren Möhring
University of Cologne
NEH-GHI Fellow, 2007

When eating out, 56 percent of German customers today prefer foreign cuisine: Italian, Chinese, and Greek restaurants are the most popular among diners.¹ This is a relatively new phenomenon. Before the Second World War, eateries offering foreign food were confined to cosmopolitan cities like Berlin or Hamburg. It was only in the 1960s and 1970s that the picture started to change, and Italian, Greek, Spanish, Chinese, and Turkish restaurants and snack bars spread all over West Germany. These new places of consumption are the subject of my research project, which analyzes the role of the ausländisches Spezialitätenrestaurant in the economic, social, and cultural history of the Federal Republic. The following considerations do not aim at providing a comprehensive picture, but seek to outline the key questions, research perspectives, and analytical framework for an analysis of these new institutions.

Combining research on migration to West Germany and on postwar consumerism, I am particularly interested in transnational food migration and its impact on (re)defining ethnic identities. My attempt to empirically test some of the theoretical claims of transnational and transcultural research is guided by a historical interest in the ways in which cultural differences have been rearticulated in Germany after 1945. What does the consumption of “foreign” food mean in the context of reconfiguring German society and its relation to “the other” after the experiences of National Socialism and the Second World War?² Although in this respect the German case might be unique, the spread of ethnic food in the FRG was part of an international trend in Western consumer societies. Therefore, the foreign or ethnic³ restaurant in Germany—in itself a transnational place—will be contextualized by comparisons to ethnic restaurants in other Western countries, especially the US and the UK, but also to the GDR⁴, and thus to different cultures of consumption. The period of investigation comprises primarily the 1950s to the 1980s; the regional focus is on the metropolises Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, and Cologne, and on the cities of Leverkusen in the west, Konstanz in the south, and Flensburg in the north of the Republic. This way, I hope to grasp more precisely the processes of diffusion of foreign cuisines and different geographies of consumption.

Whereas Hasia Diner in her seminal study Hungering for America understands transnational food migration primarily in terms of the
changes in food habits occurring within the new homes of migrants, focusing on the function of food as an “agent of memory,” I am interested in the public consumption of ethnic food, by migrants and non-migrants.⁵ Therefore, the main units of analysis will be the place of consumption (the ethnic restaurant and snack bar); the social actors involved; and the commodities sold and served. They all form part of a “culinary network” that also comprises the ways food is produced and distributed.⁶ In an ethnic restaurant, globally traded foods are consumed in a highly specific context; here, the global and the local meet in ways that must be analyzed from the perspectives of socioeconomic as well as cultural history.

Drawing on evidence from a wide variety of sources—reports of the German Hotel and Restaurant Federation (DEHOGA), documents of foreign restaurateurs’ unions, contemporary newspapers and journals, cookbooks, market research, advertising, literature and film, as well as oral history interviews—my project has several aims. First, I attempt to conceptualize the ethnic restaurant as a translocal space that is characterized by intercultural transfers of foods, technologies, and information, and that functions as a nodal point in transnational networks. Second, I intend to write a socioeconomic history of ethnic restaurants that reconstructs the historical development of this branch of the West German food sector and critically investigates the concept of an “ethnic business.” Third, I strive to analyze some of the major changes in terms of an internationalization of German food consumption patterns in the postwar period. Finally, I aim to discuss the cultural meanings surrounding ethnic food, focusing on the political dimension of ethnicized commodities.

 Whereas the aspect of migration has so far been neglected in research on consumerism in Germany, the sphere of consumption has rarely been of interest in the historical research on migration, which still mainly focuses on migrants in the industrial sector. The ethnic restaurant is a good example of immigrant (small) business; moreover, it has fundamentally changed food consumption patterns in the Federal Republic. Since no historical study exists on ethnic restaurants or snack bars in West Germany, not even a satisfactory account of the restaurant culture in general, reconstructing the process of diffusion of ethnic restaurants is an important aspect of my work.⁷

I. The Ethnic Restaurant: A Transnational/Translocal Place

Taking into account the “heterotopic effect” of migrant cuisines, the ethnic restaurant has to be conceptualized as a local place of food consumption, the locality of which is translocal from the outset.⁸ Ausländische
Spezialitätenrestaurants are “microspaces of intercultural encounter and exchange,” and the social actors—migrant and non-migrant owners of the restaurant, cooks, waiters, and (illegal) kitchen workers, as well as migrant and non-migrant patrons—all participate in this transnational or translocal space of the ethnic restaurant, though with differing investments. Whereas the bourgeois restaurant of the nineteenth century presented regional cuisines as part of an emerging national cuisine, and thus can be understood as a place where “the nation” was consumed, the ethnic restaurant of the twentieth century can be regarded as a place where “the world” is consumed.

Eating out in its various forms demands further research not only because of its economic importance but also because of its social and cultural significance. Studying the restaurant is, as Joanne Finkelstein has pointed out, “tantamount to drawing an ethnography of modernity.” Furthermore, restaurants, and ethnic restaurants in particular, have played a major role in changing eating habits. But what is an ethnic restaurant? In his definition of ethnic restaurants, Wilbur Zelinsky emphasizes that “a self-consciously ethnic restaurant will show its colors in one of three places: in its name, in its inclusion under an ethnic heading in a special section of the telephone directory, or by listing the specialties of the house in a display ad.” I follow this definition in that telephone directories represent an essential part of my source material for reconstructing when and where ethnic restaurants were established in Germany. Since the distinction between German and foreign food, between here and there, is anything but self-evident, the processes of constructing these placings have to be analyzed, thus questioning and historicizing the whole concept of the ethnic restaurant and ethnic cuisine (ausländische Gastronomie). What defines an ethnic restaurant and how definitions have changed over time is part of my analysis and cannot be taken for granted.

As proposed by the editors of Orte der Moderne (spaces of modernity), I will analyze the ethnic restaurant as a material, social, and imaginary space. The material aspects of the ethnic restaurant—the style of furniture, the decoration, etc.—point to a specific “architecture of desire,” and thus to the imaginary aspects of the establishment. For the migrant restaurateur and the migrant patron, the ethnic restaurant might provide a memory of “home”; for the other patrons it is, above all, associated with vacation and/or the exotic. Eating out in an ethnic restaurant has often been described as a “substitute for travel.” The tourist experiences of an increasing part of the population, but also the informality and the mostly inexpensive food served in many ethnic restaurants, were decisive factors for the success of these enterprises.
II. Ethnic Restaurants in West Germany: Ethnic Businesses?

Whereas there is some continuity of ethnic restaurants throughout the twentieth century, with Italian restaurants functioning as a kind of door-opener for other foreign cuisines, only in postwar West Germany can a noteworthy number of ethnic restaurants be found, most of them offering Mediterranean cuisine. Most of these eateries were established by immigrants, some of them former “guest workers” who had been recruited in the years 1955 to 1974. The spread of ethnic restaurants, which started in the 1960s, accelerated in the 1970s and 1980s. Within the period 1975 to 1985, the number of ethnic restaurants doubled from around 20,000 to around 40,000. In 1985, every fourth restaurant was run by a non-German owner. In 1992, of the 55,000 foreign restaurateurs in Germany, approximately 18,000 were Italian; the second biggest group were the Turkish restaurateurs.

What were the reasons for immigrants to open up their own businesses? In the 1970s, the economic restructuring in the aftermath of the oil crisis affected immigrants in particular, and the unemployment rates of foreign residents were disproportionately high. Since non-EU nationals, i.e. until the 1980s all “guest-workers” except for the Italians, were at risk of losing their residence permits if they became dependent on social welfare (after their eligibility for unemployment benefits expired), opening up one’s own business often was the only way to make a living in Germany, for oneself as well as for family members who came to Germany in the course of family reunification.

Invoking the risk of unemployment to explain the decision of immigrants to become self-employed places me right in the middle of the discussions on the ethnic economy that dominate the field of research on immigrant self-employment. Whereas research on ethnic business in the United States tends to stress the socioeconomic opportunities and the success of self-employed immigrants, the European debate tends to see ethnic business as a reaction to discrimination in the labor market. In Germany, the job market is highly regulated, and institutional barriers make access to the formal labor market difficult for immigrants. Whereas in the United States immigrant business has been supported by the ideology of free enterprise and the myth of the “self-made man,” in Germany, an immigration country in denial with a migration regime based on rotation, ethnic business has a very different history—a history still to be written.

The concept of ethnic economy is based on the idea that co-ethnicity functions as a vital resource for the (ethnic) entrepreneur. Whereas this may be true in historically specific situations and for a certain period of time, any universal concept of ethnic business is in danger of essential-
izing the notion of ethnicity. Instead of explaining socioeconomic or cultural processes with recourse to ethnicity, it is strategies of ethnicization and self-ethnicization that have to be taken into consideration, underlining the fluidity and variability of “ethnic communities,” especially in the context of migration. The whole debate on the so-called ethnic economy itself forms part of the discourses that have to be analyzed in a study on ethnic restaurants.

III. The Internationalization of Food Consumption in West Germany

Not only in regard to the restaurant cuisines available in any city in Germany, but also with respect to the food prepared and eaten at home, an internationalization of food consumption has taken place over the last decades. Ethnic cuisines are no longer only offered in ausländische Spezialitätenrestaurants, but also in countless snack bars, in canteens, and other places of communal feeding, as well as at home. Foreign products such as olive oil or eggplants show enormous growth rates.

This differentiation and commodification of various national, but also regional and local, foodstuffs and cuisines are effects of globalizing processes in the food sector. Differentiation can be considered an answer to global standardization; both processes co-evolve with each other, so that any one-sided account of a homogenizing “McDonaldization of society” is problematic. Based on the assumptions that globalization in the food sector is best understood as a process of “glocalization,” and that stressing processes of Americanization is not sufficient when studying West German consumer cultures, in my project, I switch the focus to parallel and intertwined processes like the “Italianization” of food consumption in West Germany.

An important aspect of the internationalization of food consumption is the enormous accumulation of international culinary knowledge. Since the 1950s, the cooking columns of women’s magazines and Hausfrauenblätter (housewives’ magazines) have shown an increasing interest in “foreign” cuisines. An analysis of cookbooks of the twentieth century demonstrates that there had been a tradition of “international cooking” predating the advent of a considerable number of ethnic restaurants in Germany, but that the spread of eateries offering foreign cuisine dramatically fostered the popularity of recipes for “exotic” dishes.

Since the 1960s, not only cookbooks on “international specialties,” but also a new genre of cookbooks dedicated to only one specific “foreign” cuisine proliferated. The public and private consumption of ethnic food added to each other’s success; in both spheres, an internationalization or, to be more precise, a transnationalization and hybridiza-
tion of food consumption has taken place. Therefore, redefinitions of taste in postwar Germany were initiated not only by migrant restaurateurs, but also by (German) housewives, who were key players in these transformation processes as they were situated at the interface of public and private consumption.32

IV. Food and Identities: The Cultural Meanings of Ethnic Food

Food plays a fundamental role in processes of identity formation, on the personal as well as the social level. It serves as a “powerful metonym for national cultures”33 and has been a “source of racial stereotyping”34 for a long time. What images circulate about specific foods and the people who eat these foods? Advertising, popular magazines, literature, and film provide rich material for analyzing the cultural meanings of various ethnic foods. With the greatly increased availability of ethnic foods in the 1960s, images of “exotic” foodstuffs and narrations about their origin started to proliferate widely in the public. With the help of “cultural biographies”35 of selected ethnic food items, not only the commodity-specific characteristics,36 but also the changes of cultural meanings over time and with regard to different social contexts can be addressed. An important aspect of these biographies is the historically specific knowledge of the nutritional value of certain food items. Last but not least, it was nutritional science that contributed decisively to the success of the so-called Mediterranean diet.37

The images and narratives surrounding foreign foods in an ausländisches Spezialitätenrestaurant are characterized by processes of exoticization and authentication (especially for restaurants, in contrast to snack bars). An ethnic restaurant is viewed as authentic when it is not only frequented by Germans, but also by co-nationals of the restaurateur. Together with the staff, these guests are considered as a guarantee for the authenticity of the food served; they are believed to “imbue the food with their ethnicity,” stressing the importance of the embodiment of ethnicity and the performative character of culture.38

The ethnic restaurant can be conceptualized as a theatrical space, with the kitchen as backstage area and the dining hall as center stage, where a certain ethnic performance is expected and practiced by both sides, whether intended or not. An exceptionally complex ethnic performance takes place when, e.g., a pizzeria is managed by Turks,39 or Muslim Pakistani and Bangladeshi act as Indians.40 Ethnic drag and ethnic passing here go hand in hand, making visible the mechanisms of “normal” ethnic performances. The body as a carrier and producer of signs of
ethnicity has so far been neglected in migration studies; in the context of the ethnic restaurant, the bodily performance in its exploitative (racist and sexist) as well as subversive dimensions has to be taken into consideration to draw a complex picture of the social interactions of staff and guests.

Conclusion

Not only ethnic but also class and gender differences are articulated in the act of eating out, and this happens in sometimes conflicting ways, suggesting that food consumption practices are precariously flexible markers of identity. In the postwar German context, eating out in ethnic restaurants might have been motivated by the desire to become cosmopolitan, to internationalize German identity after 1945. After years of exclusion from global consumer culture during the Nazi period, many Germans wished to participate again in a Western lifestyle—for which eating out became more and more important. Tracing the cross-cultural consumption in ethnic restaurants is, of course, but one arena for discussing the (re)configurations of race and ethnicity in postwar Germany. The omnipresence of ethnic food, however, makes it an ideal object for studying the complex and ambivalent renegotiations of cultural differences in everyday life.

Notes


2 The history of the reconceptualizations of race or ethnicity in postwar Germany is still under-researched. For an excellent account of the transnational reconfiguration of race, see Heike Fehrenbach, Race after Hitler: Black Occupation Children in Postwar Germany and America (Princeton, 2005).

3 Since it is the most common term in the English-speaking world, I use “ethnic restaurant” as a synonym for ausländisches Spezialitätenrestaurant. On the problematic use of the term “ethnic,” especially in the German context, see the next section of this essay.

4 In the GDR, restaurants offering the cuisine of other socialist countries (the only available cuisines) were called Nationalitätengaststätten.

5 Hasia Diner, Hungering for America (Cambridge MA, 2002), 8.


7 A short survey is given by Albrecht Jenn, Die deutsche Gastronomie: Eine historische und betriebswissenschaftliche Betrachtung (Frankfurt am Main, 1993), 10–90. In the social sciences, some research on ethnic restaurants, mainly on Döner food stalls, has been undertaken in recent years. See Tim Fallenbacher, “Ethnic Business in Nürnberg: Fallstudie Dönerkebab,” Mitteilungen der Fränkischen Geographischen Gesellschaft 48 (2001): 247–272; Ayse Caglar, “Mc-


10 “They may occupy its spaces momentarily (during the consumption of a meal, for example) or for a lifetime (as members of ethnically defined transnational communities).” Peter Jackson, Philip Crang, and Claire Dwyer, “Introduction: The Spaces of Transnationality,” in Transnational Spaces, ed. Peter Jackson, Philip Crang, and Claire Dwyer (London, 2004), 3. “Translocal” might be an even more appropriate term for an ethnic restaurant, since it is not necessarily national contexts, but specific localities which merge with other localities and produce something new. See Maren Möhring, “TransLokal: Ausländische Gaststätten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” traverse 41, no. 2 (2007).

11 On the history of the genuinely modern institution of the restaurant, see Rebecca L. Spang, The Invention of the Restaurant: Paris and Modern Gastronomic Culture (Cambridge, MA, 2000). In premodern times, eating out did not belong to the experience of a considerable number of people, and the inns providing food for travelers did not offer a range of dishes from which to choose.


18 For the German case, statistical data on traveling abroad, especially to Italy, and the growing market for Italian restaurants in the 1960s seem to confirm the correlation of travel and eating out in an ethnic restaurant.


20 Horst Heinz Grimm, Das Gastgewerbe in der Bundesrepublik (dpa Hintergrund: No. 3245, 21 July 1987), 11.


Italian cuisine was the first generally available and is still the most successful of all foreign cuisines in Germany, both with regard to private and public consumption. See Köhler, “Kulurelle Vielfalt,” 331, 335.


Michael Wildt, *Vom kleinen Wohlstand: Eine Konsumgeschichte der fünfziger Jahre* (Frankfurt am Main, 1996), 177.

On the following, see Maren Möhring, “Transnational Food Migration and the Internationalization of Food Consumption: Ethnic Cuisine in West Germany,” in *Food and Globalization*, ed. Alexander Nüttzenadel and Frank Trentmann (forthcoming).

Similarly, in the US in the 1950s, more and more Americans became interested in foreign cuisines, and specialty cookbooks made “significant inroads into the cookbook market.” Jessamyn Neuhaus, *Manly Meals and Mom’s Home Cooking: Cookbooks and Gender in Modern America* (Baltimore, 2003), 165.

Implicitly or explicitly, the cookbooks of the 1950s to the 1970s mainly addressed middle-class housewives and did not refer to lower-class or migrant women’s different experiences.


Anne J. Kershen, “Introduction: Food in the Migrant Experience,” in *Food in the Migrant Experience*, ed. Anne J. Kershen (Aldershot, 2002), 8. In Germany, Italians were, and sometimes still are, called “Spaghettifresser.”


This is a typical situation, especially in eastern Germany, but not only there. See D. Soyez, “Der ’Kölsche Chinese’ und andere Hybride: Kölner Restaurants als Bühnen von Glocalisierungsprozessen,” *Kölner Geographische Arbeiten* 82 (2004): 32.

41 For the need to address the corporeal face-to-face communication in migration research, see Bernd Bröskamp, “Ethnische Grenzen des Geschmacks: Perspektiven einer praxeologischen Migrationsforschung,” in *Praxis und Ästhetik: Neue Perspektiven im Denken Pierre Bourdieu*, ed. Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf (Frankfurt am Main, 1993), 199.


Conference Reports

Histories of the Aftermath: The European “Postwar” in Comparative Perspective

Conference at the University of California, San Diego, February 16–17, 2007. Jointly organized by the GHI, the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD), the Center for German and European Studies of the University of California at Berkeley, the University of California Humanities Research Institute, as well as the Humanities Center and the Department of History of the University of California at San Diego. Conveners: Frank Biess (University of California, San Diego), Robert Moeller (University of California, Irvine), Dirk Schumann (GHI).

Participants: Elazar Barkan (Columbia University), Ruth Ben-Ghiat (New York University), Paul Betts (University of Sussex), Frank Biess (University of California, San Diego), Jane Caplan (Oxford University), William Chandler (University of California, San Diego), Choi Chatterjee (California State University, Los Angeles), John Connelly (University of California, Berkeley), Christian Delage (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris), Susan Derwin (University of California, Santa Barbara), Robert Edelman (University of California, San Diego), Geoff Eley (University of Michigan), Fatima El-Tayeb (University of California, San Diego), Kai Evers (University of California, Irvine), Sarah Farmer (University of California, Irvine), Heide Fehrenbach (Northern Illinois), Peter Gourevitch (University of California, San Diego), Jan Gross (Princeton University), Michael Hayse (Stockton College), Deborah Hertz (University of California, San Diego), Lisa Kirschenbaum (West Chester University), Anna Krylova (Duke University), Pieter Lagrou (Université de Bruxelles), Martha Lampland (University of California, San Diego), Katherine Lebow (University of Virginia), Charles Maier (Harvard University), Gisela Mettele (GHI), Robert Moeller (University of California, Irvine), Samuel Moyn (Columbia University), Norman Naimark (Stanford University), Klaus Naumann (Hamburg Institute for Social Research), Philip Nord (Princeton University), Patrick Patterson (University of California, San Diego), Paul Pickowicz (University of California, San Diego), Pamela Radcliff (University of California, San Diego), Sonya Rose (University of Michigan), Mikhail Tsypkin (Naval Postgraduate School), Dorothee Wierling (University of Hamburg), Jonathan Wiesen (Southern Illinois University), Lisa Yoneyama (University of California, San Diego), Denise Youngblood (University of Vermont).
The purpose of the conference was to search for a framework of analysis that can adequately capture the abiding aftermath and legacy of the Second World War in Europe. Until 1989/91, narratives of the post-World War II period in Europe emphasized that 1945 marked a major rupture in European history. The year 1945 was understood as the beginning of a future that would head either in a liberal democratic or communist direction. The story of the post-Second World War period was the story of the world the Cold War made. The experiences of Europeans were eclipsed by the confrontation of the superpowers and the division of Europe between East and West.

The end of the Cold War, however, has enabled us to study postwar European societies from a different perspective that centers on the concept of the “postwar,” emphasizing not only what divided but what united Europeans. From this perspective, European history after 1945 is not only exclusively or even primarily refracted through the prism of the Cold War. The purpose of this conference was to probe the usefulness of this decidedly different, novel approach to the postwar European experience. Starting from the working hypothesis that postwar European history should not be told as a story of the parallel processes of integration into competing models of liberal-democratic Americanized consumer society in the West and a Stalinist dictatorship in the East, the approach to the “postwar” emphasizes that understanding the divergent wartime experiences of European societies is essential for understanding post-1945 developments. This approach disrupts the notion of 1945 as a complete hiatus that severed the two halves of the “Age of Extremes” (Eric Hobsbawm) and instead charts the various continuities from war to postwar.

Paper presenters addressed the extent to which it is possible to identify a common post-Second World War experience that unified Europeans and the ways in which different national experiences dramatically diverged. Papers were pre-circulated, allowing participants to come to La Jolla with a clear idea of what we would discuss, and presenters were allowed only five minutes to highlight key theses. Discussions were framed by commentators—two for each session—who were allowed about fifteen minutes each. This meant that there was ample time for discussion at each session. The leavening of historians, political scientists, sociologists, and literary theorists also allowed for very interesting discussions of disciplinary and methodological differences and points of intersection.

In an opening panel, papers raised the question of when the postwar ended, and presentations suggested that the answer was quite different for Germans in East and West, Poles, and the French. No more uniform were the public and private memories of the war, addressed in the second panel, and memories ranged from those of the “Great Patriotic War” in
the Soviet Union to a Christian discourse of suffering, embodied in commemorative sites in West Germany. Memories were also anything but constant, and a paper that focused on the German attempt to murder all European Jews revealed the ways in which conceptions of the concentration camp system have shifted over time. The postwar also began at home, as the third panel revealed, and traces of the aftermath could be located in East and West German etiquette books and the attitudes toward race embodied in practices of family reconstitution and adoption. “Histories of the Aftermath” were also mass-mediated at the movies, the subject of a fourth panel that offered Soviet, West German, and Italian perspectives.

The conference’s second day began with a review of post-1945 military cultures in West Germany and the Soviet Union and a consideration of the ways in which international agreements on the conduct of armed conflict represented another embodiment of memories of partisan warfare in the Second World War. In a panel that focused on “Nation and Citizenship,” presenters suggested the ways in which the legacy of the war intersected with the legacies of colonialism and decolonization in redefinitions of who was included in the nation in Great Britain. A second paper suggested how the language of reconstruction after the war defined productivist conceptions of citizenship in socialist states. The panel’s final paper argued that the histories of a shared European experience in the Second World War have tended to eclipse, if not fully erase, the history of decolonization and the movements of large populations of people of color into Europe after 1945.

In a final panel, roundtable participants with expertise in global history and Asian studies offered perspectives from the “Outside,” suggesting the very different “aftermaths” of the war in the Pacific, and insisting on the need to bring together the sometimes divergent histories of decolonization and post-World War II recovery and reconstruction.

Robert Moeller
MAX WEBER: A PASSIONATE THINKER

Lecture and discussion at the Goethe Institute, Washington, March 21, 2007. Jointly organized by the GHI and the Goethe Institute. Speaker: Joachim Radkau (University of Bielefeld); comment: Lawrence A. Scaff (University of California, Berkeley).

Joachim Radkau took up the challenge issued by Lawrence A. Scaff in the introduction of his book on Weber, Fleeing the Iron Cage: Culture, Politics, and Modernity in the Thought of Max Weber (Berkeley, 1989): “What is needed, above all, is to encounter Weber once again from the beginning and with a sense of judgment alert to the potentials of what he actually wrote and said.” This is the approach that Radkau took in his own Weber biography: One must begin anew. For although Max Weber is regarded as the greatest social scientist in the world, no comprehensive Weber biography that meets academic standards has been written in the more than eighty years since his death on June 14, 1920. Moreover, the bulk of Weber symposia are not about the actual Weber, but about invoking an imaginary Weber in support of one side or another in the latest social scientific debate. Even though there is an ocean of literature on Weber that reaches well beyond Germany from Berkeley to Tokyo, Weber’s work continues to hold untapped potential.

Radkau’s central thesis is that Weber was not the determined enemy of Naturalismus (natural-science methods and explanatory models) in the social sciences to the extent often depicted. Instead, he offered, as Friedrich Tenbruck has recognized, “the peculiar spectacle of a passionate attack on Naturalismus from naturalist positions.” This tension, this love-hate relationship with nature, permeated his entire life and work. This point reveals particularly clearly that one can better understand Weber’s work if one views it against the backdrop of his life experiences: his suffering and his love. This, too, is a leitmotif of Radkau’s biography: that there is an intimate connection between Weber’s shifting attitude toward Naturalismus in the social sciences and his experiences of love and pain.

Radkau’s thousand-page biography, to be published in an abridged English translation by Polity Press in the spring of 2008, is divided into three parts: (1) The Ravaging of Nature; (2) Nature’s Revenge; and (3) Redemption and Inspiration. The first two titles allude to the terse comment by Weber’s wife Marianne in her Lebensbild of Max Weber (1926) regarding her husband’s 1898 nervous breakdown: “Long-ravaged nature begins her revenge.” Radkau does not believe that Max Weber broke
down due to overwork, as Marianne seems to imply, but nevertheless sees her comment as appropriate in a different way. All biographers of Weber are confronted with the problem of how to deal with Marianne Weber’s Lebensbild: Weber’s widow seems to come between them and Max Weber. Again and again, the dark joke told by Otto Gradenwitz, a lawyer from Heidelberg who knew the Webers, is retold: The Lebensbild was “historically valuable” in that it aroused sympathy for the “often misunderstood practice of burning widows on funeral pyres.” The Lebensbild, however, is an ambiguous book that requires reading between the lines. In addition, Radkau has analyzed a wealth of previously unknown correspondence, including Max Weber’s love letters to Else Jaffé of 1919–1920, which have been treated as a state secret in past Weber research, and which reveal a previously unfamiliar, even unimaginable Weber, who suffers from the fact that he feels his brain to be a “refrigerator.”

In the end, Radkau argued, one must work not merely on Max Weber, but with and through him in order to find new scholarly inspiration. For this reason, it is important not only to study Weber’s theories and concepts, but to examine his work in the vital context of his life and to investigate in detail the creative tension between his bold intellect and his changing life experiences. In light of this, Radkau started his biography with a quote from Ralf Dahrendorf: “The many fields of inquiry that have drifted apart since Max Weber’s death—a process that the occasional invocation of his name could not prevent — once constituted a unity, not in a system, but rather in a person. Whoever manages to write a biography of Max Weber that recreates this unity could also restore to the sterile landscape of modern social science some of its former charm.”

Joachim Radkau
Environmental History and the Cold War

Conference at the GHI, March 22–25, 2007. Conveners: John R. McNeill (Georgetown University), Corinna R. Unger (GHI). Participants: Greg Bankoff (University of Auckland), R. Samuel Deese (Boston University), Celia Donert (European University Institute, Florence), Matthew Farish (University of Toronto), Eagle Glassheim (University of British Columbia), Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu (Michigan State University), Jacob Hamblin (Clemson University), Kristine Harper (New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology), Ingo Heidbrink (Deutsches Schifffahrtsmuseum, Bremerhaven), Holly High (Deakin University), Toshihiro Higuchi (Georgetown University), Sabine Höhler (University of Hamburg), Kai Hünmörder (Hamburg), Paul Josephson (Colby College), Han-Rog Kang (Oxford University), Michael Lewis (Salisbury University), Uwe Lübken (GHI), Erez Manela (Harvard University), Bao Maohong (Beijing University), Mark Merlin (University of Hawaii, Manoa), Scott Moranda (SUNY Cortland), Arvid Nelson (Yale University), Joy Parr (University of Western Ontario), Joachim Radkau (University of Bielefeld), Thomas Robertson (Worcester Polytechnic Institute), Jenny Smith (Yale University), Richard Tucker (University of Michigan), Frank Uekötter (Deutsches Museum, Munich), Thomas Zeller (University of Maryland), David Zierler (Temple University).

The environmental history of the Cold War is an understudied aspect of both Cold War studies and environmental history. Assessing the Cold War’s environmental history poses a tricky interpretive challenge: how to distinguish between environmental damage caused by the Cold War and that which occurred during the Cold War years due to other factors such as industrialization and urbanization. A similar question could be asked about the environment’s impact on the Cold War: How much did environmental change—and ideas about environmental change—influence the conduct of the Cold War? A truly international group of historians, anthropologists, biologists, and geographers came together at the GHI in March to sort through these issues.

The conference’s opening session was devoted to warfare and environmental degradation. One of the themes that emerged from this session was that much of the environmental transformation caused by the Cold War came not from direct fighting, but from preparations for war. In his paper on nuclear testing in Oceania conducted by the United States, France, and Great Britain from 1946 to 1996, Mark Merlin identified three types of environmental change on the atolls brought by the tests: their
direct impact, their indirect impact through radiation, and the effect of the roads, airfields, and other infrastructure built to prepare, conduct, and assess the tests. Like many of the other papers presented at the conference, Merlin’s paper revealed that the environmental impact of the Cold War on this ecosystem and the people who live there will be playing out for years. Paul Josephson, in his paper on rivers in the Soviet Union, pointed out that war, and especially preparations for war, devastated the landscapes of the USSR on a scale comparable to problems in the West. He identified three interrelated political, economic, and ideological factors that distinguished the war on nature during the Soviet period and accelerated during the Cold War: the idea that scientific planning would enable socialist economies to avoid the costs of industrialization; the emphasis on “hero projects” (large-scale, centralized development projects, each of which acquired nearly unstoppable technological momentum); and a war against capricious nature itself. Several interesting points came up in the discussion of this paper: first, that the extent, quality, and amount of technology distinguished the post-WWII Cold War period from the prewar period; second, that there were ebbs and flows of environmental change during the Cold War period; and third, that the most distinguishing element of the Soviet system of development compared to the American system was the lack of citizen input. However, Holly High stressed that direct Cold War fighting did leave lasting environmental impacts in many places. In her paper, High examined the role that ideas about nature and technology played in the US “secret war” in Laos from 1964 until 1973; the environmental devastation wrought by that war, some of which is still evident; and some of the ways that Laotians and tourists understand those landscapes today. One might wonder whether those who describe the Cold War as a “long peace” only do so because they overlook Third World places like Laos, where fighting was covered up at the time and has been generally overlooked since.

The second panel of the conference highlighted the complicated mix of Cold War ideology, environmental change, and local politics in the communist states of Eastern Europe in the decades after World War II. Arvid Nelson argued that the history of the Cold War can be told through an analysis of environmental change in East Germany. According to Nelson, Stalin's imposition of land reform on the previously diverse economy of East Germany in 1945 and 1946, which cut off West Germany from its chief food source, signaled the growing tensions between the Soviets and the Americans. These programs also ended the century-long process of equilibrium of central Germany’s population, ecosystems, and economy to their geographic and global economic environments, and locked the landscape and population into a downward spiral that only ended with the dissolution of the GDR. Nelson pointed out that the
evidence of these decisions is still visible in the forests and fields of this part of Germany. Also relating to the GDR, Scott Moranda examined an effort to establish a national park on the eastern side of the Elbe River during the 1950s. Here, a typical clash between economic developers and hikers, landscape architects, and conservationist reformers took a new form because of the Cold War. Park supporters, Moranda explains, mobilized socialist rhetoric to justify their agenda: workers, they argued, needed the park for recreation space. The park idea was eventually defeated, but economic planners ran into continued opposition.

In other parts of Eastern Europe, critics used environmental problems in campaigns against communist rule. Focusing on regional identities and varied ideas of “place” in a part of Czechoslovakia bordering Germany, Eagle Glassheim described how the antimodern visions of both Czech intellectuals and Germans expelled from this region after World War II came together to critique communist development policies in the region. “Many on both sides of the Iron Curtain,” Glassheim writes, “envisioned a haven from ideology in the everyday and the local, in carefully tended urban and rural landscapes, harmoniously balanced between man and nature.” Celia Donert examined similar issues in the Carpathian mountain region in Slovakia, where a deeply rooted cultural preservation movement drawing energy from a vision of social and environmental decline became the basis of a strong critique of Soviet control of the area during the 1980s. These papers showed how environmental analysis can shed unusual light on the lived experiences, identities, and politics of these areas. Similarly, Joy Parr, in her examination of Gagetown, a Canadian settlement that was sacrificed for a military base, stressed the entangled relations between environment, space, and memory.

One of the best places to see the influence of the Cold War on global environments is in the Third World. In the first of several papers on this topic, Richard Tucker spoke about two of many Cold War dams, the Dez Dam in Iran and the Helmand Dam in Afghanistan. He argued that during the first two decades of the Cold War, a series of dams that were built around the periphery of the Soviet Union had critically important American participation, and that American Cold War priorities help to explain the locations, timing, beneficiaries, and social and environmental costs of these massive infrastructure projects. Kristine Harper examined another environmental modification that combined Cold War maneuverings and Third World development: a secret weather modification program run by Americans in northern India during the mid-1960s. Her presentation gave an idea of the multifaceted entanglement between “high politics,” environmental engineering mentalities and practices, and the overarching impact of the Cold War on perceptions of nature. Erez Manela offered a slightly different angle on the environmental history of
the Third World during the Cold War by examining why the Smallpox Eradication Project, a massively successful program run by UN agencies during the 1960s and 1970s, has received so little attention by historians. He suggested that diplomatic historians often overlook health stories, that environmental historians who write about disease often overlook eradication stories, and that modernization historians often overlook success stories. Together, these papers showed that, as historians begin to pay more attention to the Cold War on the global periphery, they would do well to think about the complicated environmental changes that almost always accompanied Great Power maneuverings.

The first day of the conference ended with two papers on animals that offered challenges to the declension narratives on which environmental historians often rely. They suggested that our duty to document the complexity of the past requires us to seek out and explore other environmental stories as well. After hearing about the devastation wrought to the fragile landscapes of the atolls of the South Pacific by nuclear testing, the question arose whether, alongside all of the negatives that came out of the reckless testing, there were any outcomes that could be considered positive. In the discussion that followed, Greg Bankoff suggested that we label past environmental change, even cases involving evidence of decline, not as decline or devastation but as “transformations.” Doing so might allow us to tell stories of destruction while opening space for some of the ironic and contradictory aspects of the environmental history of the Cold War.

Both Smith and Bankoff presented papers that pushed in this new direction. In “The Sable Boom: The Effects of a Cold War Mentality in Trans-Baikal Siberia,” Smith examined the curious case of the sable. Because the sable did not directly compete with American and Canadian furs and was exempt from American sanctions on trade with the Soviets, it became the center of a booming fur market during the 1950s and 1960s. More importantly, the story of the sable belies the standard declensionist story of Soviet resource exploitation as a monolithic pursuit that uniformly destroyed landscapes, people, and livelihoods. Sables, their hunters, and the markets in which they circulated, Smith noted, “have proved adaptable and sustainable over long periods of time.” In “A Curtain of Silence: The Fate of Asia’s Fauna in the Cold War,” Bankoff noted that not enough attention has been paid to how war has affected animals. Even environmental histories of war, he noted, are often anthropocentric. They have, for instance, overlooked how wars in Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan have devastated animal populations. Even more damaging, though, was the preparation for warfare, which destroyed habitat far from battlefields, and in some cases around the planet. Bankoff emphasized, however, that the story of the Cold War and animals is not one of
complete decline. During these wars, although some animal species lost out, others gained. In Vietnam, he notes, tigers, rats, and mosquitoes all increased in number and range. Moreover, because of the disruption of human activity in some areas, wars overall may not have been as destructive for animals as periods of peace, which allowed human interference with ecosystems on a much larger scale.

Several papers on the second day of the conference offered new perspectives on science and environmental planning during the Cold War. Examining early Cold War policies on radiological and biological warfare, Jacob Hamblin argued that when in the late 1940s American scientists steered clear of these forms of “environmental warfare,” they did so more for practical than for moral reasons. Indeed, Hamblin shows, US government officials showed a great deal of enthusiasm for these weapons, and seriously considered them for use in the Korean War. Matthew Farish’s presentation focused less on ethics of warfare than on the knowledge that came from war planning. Exploring the kinds of geographic knowledge that military preparedness required, Farish highlighted the elaborate simulations of extreme environments—Arctic, desert, and tropical—that the US military conducted in its research labs. In the third paper of this group, Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu probed how an international system organized around nation-states came to grips with an environmental issue that transcended nation-states—the problem of regulating fishing in the North Pacific—during the early Cold War. Guthrie-Shimizu concluded that the North Pacific Fisheries Convention, which was the first international treaty negotiated and signed by postwar Japan, accelerated the “enclosure movement” within the world’s oceans. Guthrie-Shimizu’s paper formed a pair of sorts with Ingo Heidbrink’s paper on conflicts over cod fishing in the North Atlantic during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Heidbrink’s paper showed how, because of Iceland’s strategic importance to NATO and the US, a low-level international dispute over fishing became wrapped up in Cold War geopolitics.

Finally, the conference also offered many new insights about the relationship between the Cold War and environmental politics. In “Peace with Nature and the World: Environmental and Anti-War Activism in the Two German States,” Frank Uekötter suggested that anyone interested in this relationship must ask how the environmental movement would have looked if the Cold War had never happened. He made four additional points: first, that environmentalism is more diverse and international than those who focus on Rachel Carson and pollution suggest; second, that we need to recognize that the Cold War was not just political and military, but also social and economic; third, that Cold War fear was one of the defining features of the environmental movement; and finally, that the current situation in Iraq offers many parallels to the early years of the
environmental movement, and perhaps a chance to watch many of the same ingredients reassemble. In his paper, Toshihiro Higuchi traced one of the most direct and surprisingly understudied ways that the Cold War and the environmental movement overlapped: nuclear testing. Higuchi pointed out that while historians have given industrial use of nuclear weapons a great deal of attention, they have often ignored nuclear testing. Similarly, much has been written about the nuclear disarmament movement, but not much about its environmental elements. In his paper, Higuchi addressed the campaign against above-ground nuclear testing, which came to an end with the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, and the coming-together of anti-nuclear-war activists and environmental activists in the very early 1970s, especially in opposition to the planned underground tests on Amchitka Island, Alaska. By presenting the case of the Huxley brothers, Julian and Aldous, who both acted as outspoken critics of enviromental degradation and nuclear weapons, R. Samuel Deese offered insight into different approaches to environmental protest, as well as into the literary forms (in this case, science fiction) that such protest could take.

Supplementing the attention historians have given to grassroots environmental actors, two presentations stressed how the high politics of détente focused new attention on environmental issues. In “Environmental Crisis and Soft Politics: The International Policy of Détente and the Global Environment, 1968–1975,” Kai Hünemörder argued that during the late 1960s, environmental issues gave Western and Soviet Bloc diplomats a discussion topic that was seemingly less fraught than other issues. “By stressing common problems in public,” he argues, “the foreign and security politicians of the West and the East tried to use environmental threats as a vehicle for the normalization of international relations.” For Western diplomats, these were issues with which their constituencies back home were growing increasingly concerned; for their communist counterparts, environmental issues offered a way to win political recognition. In “Against Protocol: Ecocide, Détente, and the Question of Chemical Warfare in Vietnam, 1969–1975,” David Zierler examined another aspect of détente, the effort to close loopholes in international treaties against chemical weapons. Looking for a way to ease tensions between East and West through disarmament measures, Richard Nixon resubmitted the Geneva Protocols against Chemical Warfare in November 1969. What happened next surprised him: Consideration of the treaty launched an extended investigation into the problems caused by Agent Orange in Vietnam. Zierler’s work promises to flesh out the details of the Agent Orange story and its role in the environmental movement. These two papers, together with Erez Manela’s work on smallpox eradication and Bao Maohong’s work on environmentalism in
China (see below), reveal the potential for a lot more work on the overlap of détente and environmental movements around the world.

Finally, two papers addressed environmental movements outside of the US and Western Europe. In “The Korean Green Movement during the Cold War and post-Cold War Eras,” Han-Rog Kang traced the development of environmental politics in a country where national security and economic development trumped all social and environmental issues. Only in the late 1980s, Kang points out, could South Korean environmentalists question national security projects. Interestingly, as in parts of Eastern Europe, South Korea’s environmental movement often combined with pro-democracy movements. Examining the emergence of environmental concerns in mainland China, Bao Maohong argued that until recently, international and top-down influences have driven Chinese environmentalism. Of particular importance was the UN Conference on the Environment in Stockholm in 1972, to which China sent a large delegation. According to Maohong, the Chinese delegation to the Stockholm conference did three things: first, it recognized that China had serious environmental problems; second, it established environmental protection as a guideline for policy; and third, it established the first environmental agency and first environmental standards for pollution in China’s history.

In the final panel, three scholars offered overarching reflections. Echoing Frank Uekötter’s paper, Joachim Radkau emphasized the fear of nuclear annihilation that pervaded the 1950s and 1960s. Radkau also encouraged us to approach the environmental history of the Cold War with two Weberian themes in mind. The first theme regards Weber’s ideas about rationalization. The 1950s and 1960s were very rationalized years, and environmentalism itself has its own kind of rationality. The second theme relates to Weber’s emphasis on how humans in modern societies often search for redemption and seek out refuges. The Cold War years, and especially environmentalism, seem ripe for analysis that takes Weber’s insights seriously. Sabine Höhler called on the participants to question the concepts of “environment” and “Cold War” that we take for granted when discussing the environmental history of the Cold War. Both concepts, she stressed, came into being during the postwar decades, and yet are often reified as transcendent, self-evident objects. One task for environmental historians of this period is to explain how the environment was “invented” during the Cold War years, and what role the Cold War played in this cultural construction. Höhler also reminded us that the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s were a time when global views, often focusing on the world as a closed and interconnected system with clear limits, came into their own. John McNeill offered two key questions to ask about environmentalisms: First, to what extent does the Cold War create space for environmentalisms to flourish, to what extent did it constrain discus-
sion, and conversely, to what extent did environmental movements affect the Cold War? Second, he pointed out the conflict of temporal perspectives at work in Cold War thinking and environmentalist thinking. While both were consumed with urgency and fear, Cold War culture emphasized the possibility of nuclear annihilation in the very near future, while environmentalists, adopting a longer view, worried about the collapse that would come some years down the road. The difference in these time frames, McNeill suggested, might help explain why national security priorities almost always trumped environmental concerns.

A publication of selected papers is planned.

Thomas Robertson
For the second time, the German Historical Institute’s Young Scholars Forum took place at the University of Texas in Arlington. It brought together seventeen advanced doctoral students and recent Ph.D.s for two days of lively discussion in a stimulating atmosphere.

This year’s topic, transnational aspects of US history, proved to be as challenging as it was fruitful. Instead of looking at the interrelationship between societies and cultures from the viewpoint of the nation-state, transnational analyses emphasize the myriad of connections, entanglements, and transfers that link certain elements of one society and culture to that of others.

Unsurprisingly, several papers dealt with various histories of migration, ethnicity, and identity, a field that already explored transnationalism decades before the term came into existence. Christine Hartig looked at the history of German-Jewish children who were sent to the United States before and during World War II in order to save them from persecution and, ultimately, annihilation by National Socialist Germany. These children were torn between the hopes of the families they had to leave behind, the demands of their foster parents and homes, and their own expectations. They not only had to adjust to a new language and new customs, but they also found themselves exposed to different concepts of childhood and parenthood in Germany and the United States. In her paper on migration and consular officials in the Habsburg Empire and the United States, Nicole M. Phelps showed how the process of mass migration transformed the traditional concept of territorial sovereignty. Challenged by multiple new problems, both states reacted by expanding their respective consular services, and they increasingly claimed jurisdiction over “their” citizens abroad, thus strengthening a new, body-based concept of sovereignty.
Birte Timm and Ely Janis both clarified the importance of transnational connections and entanglements in fostering nationalism and national identities, especially in those cases where a nation-state was supposed to be carved out of the realm of an empire. While Timm looked at the reciprocal influences between the ongoing black freedom struggle in the United States and the Jamaican movement for independence, with a special focus on the New York-based Jamaica Progressive League, Janis highlighted the financial and political support of Irish America for the fight against British rule in Ireland as exemplified by Charles Stewart Parnell’s 1880 American tour. On his three-month trip, Parnell tried to mobilize public opinion and raise money for famine relief in order to change the Irish land system. In Jamaica as well as in Ireland, transnational ties to the respective ethnic groups in the United States were instrumental in shaping anti-imperialist nationalism. Thus it was not just coincidence, as Birte Timm mentioned during the discussion of her paper, that Eileen Curran had been invited to give a speech at a public meeting of the Jamaica Progressive League in 1937 on “how Irish-Americans fought for Irish freedom.”

Three papers dealt with transnational aspects of the history of science and education. Christie Hanzlik-Green described the intensified international exchange of educational knowledge, policies, and techniques in the mid-nineteenth century, which resulted to a large degree from the common challenges of industrialization and urbanization. Markus Lang portrayed the life and scientific career of Karl Loewenstein, a Jewish-German legal scholar turned political scientist once he came to the United States. Katja Naumann analyzed processes of transnationalization in American higher education from 1918 to 1968. During this period, she argued, history teaching in undergraduate as well as graduate courses underwent profound changes. Paralleling the rise of the United States to world power status and the increasing experience of globalization, the geographical scope of history teaching was broadened, starting with the coverage of new geographical areas after World War I, the increasing importance of “Western Civilization” as a unit of analysis, and, finally, the introduction of World or Global History courses.

Perceptions, discourses, and representations in their various forms also easily cross national boundaries and must be seen as an important part of transnational history. This was clearly demonstrated by two papers on rather diverse topics. While Jeff Stone investigated how maps by American national news journals such as Time, US News and World Report, or Newsweek shaped and transformed the way Germany was represented during World War II and the early Cold War, Christina Oppel looked at texts by African-American intellectuals dealing with Nazi Germany.
Dwelling on Paul Gilroy’s concept of the Black Atlantic, she interpreted these writings, of which W.E.B. Du Bois’s accounts of his visit to Berlin in 1936 is the most famous, not only as reflections of racist Nazi policy, but also as a discourse on racial politics in the United States.

It became evident during the course of the seminar that non-state actors play an important role in transnational history. This is the case regardless of whether these are organizations or individuals. Daniel Roger Maul’s contribution portrayed the life and career of one such individual, David Abner Morse, a lawyer, New Deal politician, and for twenty-two years director general of the International Labor Organization (ILO). Several papers emphasized the importance of transnational networks. Jonathan Gantt, for example, pointed out that Irish terrorists were using transatlantic connections to finance their activities, both to procure arms and for operational planning. By similar means, but with rather different intentions, transnational and transatlantic networks were active in order to promote the rescue and resuscitation of victims of drowning and similar accidents, as Amanda Moniz made clear. After the first Society for the Recovery of the Drowned had been founded in Amsterdam in 1767, Humane Societies sprang up in many cities in the North Atlantic region. Over philanthropic and medical networks, information on innovations in life-saving techniques was shared and knowledge about the rescue and resuscitation of accident victims was exchanged across the ocean. The question was raised in the ensuing debate, however, of whether there could have been transnational forces at work before the concept of the nation became so powerful in the nineteenth century.

During the discussion of Derek Catsam’s paper on bus boycotts in the United States and South Africa, the question evolved of whether comparative history was or was not a transnational approach. Does the analysis of symmetrical developments and similar events in different countries constitute a departure from a nation-centered perspective? Or does the fact that the unit of analysis is still the nation-state foster and reify, rather than challenge, the concept of the nation?

Philanthropy is another field of activity that has always had strong transnational elements, as Katharina Rietzler made clear in her paper on the Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations’ support for the study of international relations in Weimar Germany. She argued, however, that the transnational, national, and international should not be regarded as separate spheres, and held that nation-states may disrupt, change, or encourage transnational relations. German government officials, for instance, tried to manipulate the workings as well as the results of the foundations’ work in Germany in order to secure their own policy aims.
The intricate relationship between nationalism and transnationalism was also pointed out by Joel Lewis in his paper on the discourse of antifascist youth during the 1930s. Focusing on the Spanish Civil War, the Young Communist Leagues (YCL) in the United States and Great Britain shied away from the strict internationalism of communist youth’s Leninist generation, adopting a flexible nationalism that allowed them to incorporate national symbols and traditions into their propaganda. Thus instead of portraying the lives of Liebknecht, Luxemburg, and Lenin over and over again or glorifying the Russian Revolution, young communists in the United States “Americanized” Popular Front propaganda and relied increasingly on the legacies of George Washington, Thomas Paine, and, most of all, Abraham Lincoln.

Ralf Richter described another, rather peculiar kind of knowledge transfer: the widespread imitation and copying of American products by the German machine tool industry. Richter portrayed in detail how German entrepreneurs read American product catalogs and journals (one company subscribed to over sixty international technical and trade journals, and went so far as to employ a translator), exchanged American patents and drawings among themselves, and regularly visited fairs and exhibitions. Some German companies even hired American experts for their factories and sent employees to the United States to study the American facilities on the spot. Sometimes, even the layout of a whole factory was reproduced in Germany. Richter also expressed the view, however, that copying as a specific kind of transnational technology transfer should not simply be dismissed as dull rebuilding, since the machines were often changed, were suited to specific tasks, and reengineered during the process.

Economic aspects also loomed large in Abou Bamba’s paper on the circulation of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) model in the United States, France, and the Ivory Coast. Bamba used a triangular approach to explain how and why the TVA model of regional development became so successful in many parts of the world long after its reputation in the United States had faded. Bamba follows one trajectory from the Tennessee Valley, where the model originated, to the Rhone in southwest France and, later on, to the Ivory Coast, where, ironically, TVA-style regional planning in the Bandama Valley was supported by the French as a means to stem US influence in Francophone Africa. Transnationalism, Bamba concluded, should be seen not only as a historiographical category but also as a truly historical force. Indeed, that conclusion could serve as a summary of this year’s Young Scholars Forum as a whole.

_Uwe Lübken_
Participants and Their Topics

ABOU BAMBA (Georgia State University, Atlanta), “Branchements Transatlantiques”: The Circulation of the “TVA Model” in the United States, France, and the Ivory Coast

DEREK CATSAM (University of Texas of the Permian Basin, Odessa, TX), From Alexandra to Montgomery and Back: Bus Boycotts in the US and South Africa and Prospects for Comparative History

JONATHAN GANTT (University of South Carolina), Irish and British Terrorism in the Atlantic Community, 1919–1921

CHRISTIE HANZLIK-GREEN (University of Wisconsin, Madison), The Educational Network: Scholarly Exchange in the Mid-Nineteenth Century

CHRISTINE HARTIG (Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung multireligiöser und multiethnischer Gesellschaften/University of Erfurt), Immigration of German-Jewish Children During World War II—Ideas of Family, Childhood, and Parenthood Between Expected Continuity and the Pressure of New Demands

ELY JANIS (Boston College), Anointing the “Uncrowned King of Ireland”: Charles Stewart Parnell’s 1880 American Tour and the Creation of a Transatlantic Land League Movement

MARKUS LANG (University of Jena), False Friends—German and American Jurisprudence and Political Science, 1920–1950

JOEL LEWIS (Central Michigan University), Lincoln, Lenin, and Spain: The Transnational Discourse of Antifascist Youth

DANIEL ROGER MAUL (University of Munich), Modernization, Democracy, and Social Justice in the American Century: The Life of David A. Morse (1906–1990)

AMANDA B. MONIZ (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor), Cosmopolitanism and the Transformation of Early American Philanthropy

KATJA NAUMANN (University of Leipzig), Transnationalization and Experiences of Globality in Higher Education: History Teaching and Research in the US from 1918 to 1968

CHRISTINA OPPEL (University of Münster/Seton Hall), Representations of Germany in African-American “Texts”—The Third Reich and Beyond

NICOLE M. PHELPS (University of Minnesota, Minneapolis), Migration, Consular Officials, and Sovereignty: The Habsburg Empire and the United States, 1880–1914

RALF RICHTER (University of Bielefeld), The Global Village of the Machine Tool Industry—The United States and Germany, 1870–1933
KATHARINA RIETZLER (University College, London), Philanthropy, Peace Research, and Revisionist Politics: Rockefeller and Carnegie Support for the Study of International Relations in Weimar Germany

JEFF STONE (University of Texas, Arlington), The Image of Germany in American News Maps from World War II to 1955

The semiannual Mid-Atlantic German History Seminar met to discuss “Epitaph for the Bonn Republic: Interpreting the Political Theory of Jürgen Habermas, 1984–1996,” presented by Matthew Specter. Specter, who received his Ph.D. from Duke University in 2006, is currently a postdoctoral Western Civilization Fellow at George Mason University. In his paper, he closely examined Habermas’s Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Democracy (1992). He attempted to historicize its composition over a critical period in German history, during which the German Democratic Republic collapsed and merged with the Federal Republic. According to Specter, Between Facts and Norms “faces backwards more than forwards . . . .[it is] a resumé of the achievements and limits of West German constitutionalism [rather] than a manifesto for the Berlin Republic. . . .”

After summarizing the essay as part of a larger book project, Specter discussed a variety of issues that emerged from Habermas’s career as an academic and public intellectual, as well as from his major writings. Specter maintained that Habermas’s “obsession” with legal theory was an ongoing interest that occupied him for decades. After Specter’s presentation, discussion centered on contextualizing the volume’s major themes. These included the role of the courts, the parliaments, and the notions of popular sovereignty and the welfare state within the chronological trajectory of events and political leadership from the 1970s to the 1990s. One question addressed Habermas’s ability to reconcile notions of popular sovereignty with the possibility of the tyranny of a majority. Others asked about Habermas’s role as an actor or a passive observer on the political stage during the Wende. Several seminar participants wished to know more about the relationship between Habermas’s notions of law and political economy; his self-characterization as left of the SPD but right of the Greens; his views on law as a medium of social integration versus social conflict; and his notion of civil disobedience as a “touchstone for the rightness of a mature political culture.” In his response to these ques-
tions, Specter drew in part on face-to-face interviews he had with Habermas as well as Habermas’s responses to written questions sent to him. In these responses, Habermas opined that “the principles of the constitution will not take root in our souls until reason has assured itself of those principles’ orientation, future-directed contents.” Specter summarized Habermas’s position by observing that “the ostensible objective of his project [Between Facts and Norms]—to dissolve tenacious antinomies in Western political thought between the rule of law and democracy, human rights and popular sovereignty, public and private autonomy—refracts lessons Habermas perceived in German and West German historical experiences with statism.”

The seminar’s discussion was fruitful for both the paper’s author and seminar participants. The next meeting, to be chaired by Peter Jelavich of Johns Hopkins University, will be held in the fall of 2007.

Marion F. Deshmukh
THE LIVES OF OTHERS: EAST GERMANY REVISITED?


Florian Henckel von Donnersmarck’s film Das Leben der Anderen [The Lives of Others] (Bayerischer Rundfunk, 2006) is set in the final years of East Germany’s decaying socialist regime. It tells the story of the clandestine relationship between a loyal artist driven to dissent and the coldly professional secret policeman assigned to his case who, provoked by disillusionment and disgust, becomes his furtive protector. The Lives of Others has proven a milestone in contemporary German cinema. Not only did it attract millions of viewers worldwide, but it was also critically acclaimed and honored with the Motion Picture Academy Award for Best Foreign Film in 2006. These distinctions alone would make the film important. However, it is also the first dramatic feature-length motion picture to treat the history of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). Unlike the comedies Goodbye Lenin! (2003) and Sonnenallee (1999), which touched on serious issues but made little claim to sustained engagement with the historical issues raised by life under the Communist dictatorship, Donnersmarck’s film deals squarely with the role of the Ministry for State Security (Stasi) in securing the regime’s hold over society. In its ambitions to portray the authentic workings of the police state, the sordid reality of Stasi surveillance and infiltration, and the grubbiness of everyday life in the GDR, the film provides an opportunity to revisit East German history. Yet the panelists questioned the extent to which the film accurately depicts the workings of the Stasi or provides a compelling interpretation of its place in GDR society, and whether it obscures as much as illuminates East German history.

The GHI’s Bernd Schaefer brought together a diverse panel, composed equally of German and American scholars, to discuss the film, its interpretation, and its public impact. Jens Gieske is an expert on the structures and personnel of the Ministry for State Security and author of Die hauptamtlichen Mitarbeiter der Staatssicherheit: Personalstruktur und Lebenswelt, 1950–1989/90 (2000) and the authoritative Der Mielke Konzern: Die Geschichte der Stasi (2006). Thomas Lindenberger, author of Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn in der Diktatur (1999) and Volkspolizei (2003), is a social historian of the former GDR. Mary Beth Stein is an expert on German Cultural
Studies. Steven Pfaff is a sociologist and author of *Exit-Voice Dynamics and the Collapse of East Germany: The Crisis of Leninism and the Revolution of 1989* (2006). The diversity of the panel was reflected in differences of interpretation, even as the panelists settled on several common themes raised by the film.

Certainly, the panelists were united in praising *The Lives of Others* as an example of historical filmmaking with wide commercial and critical appeal. They credited it with reawakening interest in the GDR and its history on both sides of the Atlantic and for its potential to enliven the debate surrounding the East German past. Just how much so was evident in both the panel’s presentations and in a well-informed and spirited question and answer session with the capacity audience of some two hundred people that followed. As historian Thomas Lindenberger rightly remarked at the outset of the panel, “movies, also movies based on a story set in the past, are not made to please historians.” Nevertheless, in its claims to being a serious and factual treatment of a complex history with numerous ambiguities, the panelists made the case that the film bears closer scrutiny before it can be accepted as a window into a vanished but still painfully present society.

Several panelists thought that the film had done well in capturing the atmosphere of the place and time. Stein observed that the preponderance of grey tones and location shots are effective in recreating the atmosphere of East Berlin in the mid-1980s. More importantly, however, the film captures the repressive political climate in the GDR, one of suspicion and mistrust that permeated nearly all levels of society. Yet Gieseke, in particular, raised the film’s shortcomings in the area of authentic historical depiction. Although Donnersmarck extensively researched the film and was lauded for its accurate detail, those details can be misleading. As much as Hauptmann Wiesler and the other Stasi agents speak in the clipped bureaucratic lingo and inhabit actual locations of the Ministry for State Security, there are several areas in which the film misrepresents the activities and everyday workings of the secret police. For one thing, Wiesler is portrayed as a sort of Stasi jack-of-all-trades, engaging in training, analysis, interrogation, technical installations, routine surveillance, etc. In reality, of course, the highly bureaucratic state security apparatus had a rational division of labor in which those functions were separated. Among other things, this would have complicated Wiesler’s efforts to protect the objects of his surveillance and would have denied him so much control over the Dreyman case. Moreover, some of the tactics that Wiesler teaches in the intelligence school and employs against the artist couple Georg Dreyman and Christa-Marie Sieland were either no longer in use in the 1980s or had different applications than those depicted in the film.
These matters of detail aside, the bigger issue is whether a character like Wiesler was possible in the Stasi apparatus. Both Gieske and Lindenberger remind us that no historical precedent exists for a figure from within the Stasi who takes the side of the internal opposition. Indeed, the employees of the Stasi were known for their socially conventional views and lifestyles, hardly identifying with the bohemian traits of the artistic-intellectual milieu or those with nonconformist views. In fact, in the last years of the regime, stalwart hard-liners that would have preferred extreme measures against dissidents were more common than liberal sympathizers. Pfaff argued that institutional factors were predominant in producing these dispositions. The Stasi proved remarkably loyal to its master, the ruling party of the GDR. Leninist norms were effectively socialized and enforced, both through vertical and horizontal monitoring. Stasi personnel were highly professionalized, with a strong technocratic ethos. They were the elite cadres of the system, and were given their organized dependence on a regime which provided little space for autonomy. The portrayal of the Wiesler character and his work offers an overly optimistic portrait of the independence afforded the Stasi’s agents. As Stein notes, not only is there no known case of an officer acting as Wiesler does, but the reconciliation between victim and perpetrator that we see at the film’s conclusion is probably just as rare. Even so, Stein contends that Donnersmarck’s film reminds us that there were tragic consequences of Stasi surveillance and political repression. To dismiss The Lives of Others as a fairy tale that never could have happened or insist on historical accuracy that corresponds to a “real GDR” that is no less contested today than it was back in 1984, is to demand too much of a film whose humanistic message and artistic merits are undeniable.

As Gieske aptly observed in his remarks, Wiesler’s transformation into a secret guardian angel of George and Christa-Marie is an artist’s fantasy of redemption. Wiesler is redeemed by his glimpses into the lifeworld of the artist and by his sharing of the beauty of the Sonata for a Good Man. Wiesler, we come to learn, becomes the good man through this process. In his flickering encounter with the sublime, Wiesler is morally awakened and comes to see his kinship with Georg (finalized over the corpse of the compromised Christa-Marie, another old artistic conceit, as Lindenberger sharply noted). In a sense, the panelists agreed, the film offers to the contemporary German public, or at least the urbane and educated section of it, a reconciliation fantasy. As Pfaff suggested, the transnational appeal of the film may lie in its optimism: The journey of Hauptmann Wiesler from orthodox technocrat to secret-sharer in the lives of Georg and Christa-Marie affirms the persistence of humanity even amidst the most soulless political conditions. Stein spoke more explicitly on this point. She noted that while the film can generically be seen
as a political thriller set in the last decade of the GDR, because the theme of goodness figures so prominently, it also operates on the level of a morality play examining human behavior and, in the final analysis, advancing the idea that goodness, categorically, overcomes the dictates of ideology. In the course of his surveillance, it is foremost poetry and music that open up new worlds of thought and feeling to Wiesler, even as he becomes painfully aware of his own isolation and emotional repression. For Stein, if the film’s message is one of resistance to power, then it is a resistance informed by and expressed through art.

The panelists emphasized that the film should be an opportunity for specialists to remind the public that the GDR cannot be reduced to the Stasi, however central it was to the operation of the regime. Certainly, the Stasi was pervasive and had a broad impact on life in East Germany. It played a central role in maintaining the regime and suppressing threats to its political control, and its institutional reach was enormous. Yet, as Lindenberger pointed out, silence, opportunism, and indifference are as much a part of the story of East German society as are the black-and-white figures of the victims and perpetrators. Donnersmarck very briefly touches on the “gray zone” between opposition and repression in his depiction of Georg’s neighbor, who helps him manage his secret of being unable to fix his necktie while keeping her own complicity with the Stasi’s intrusion into his private sphere hidden. Still, this brilliant encounter remains no more than an arresting episode in the film and thus a missed opportunity to widen the scope of the story beyond artistic dissidents and secret police cadres. Just as importantly, argues Stein, by making the motive for Stasi surveillance of Dreyman the sexual desire of a corrupt government minister, the film fails to examine how the GDR identified political nonconformity. It was the combination of ideological zeal and paranoia, rather than base personal motives, that led to the arrogance of power in the GDR.

Since the opening of the Stasi archives, Stein reminded us, we have learned more about how the Stasi infiltrated the areas of art and literature, from the main publishing houses in the GDR to the East German Writers’ Union, whose president, Hermann Kant, was revealed to be an unofficial collaborator. Even the dissident Prenzlauer Berg scene in the 1980s was largely created, organized, and undermined by the Ministry of State Security through the leading role of unofficial collaborator Sascha Anderson. The literature debate and the controversy over Christa Wolf’s brief period of collaboration with the Stasi in her student days have also illuminated the bitter disappointment of many in both East and West who realized that widely admired, even critical writers were also affected by the climate of fear and repression. Dreyman, of course, is a different sort, one who retains his integrity even as he struggles to remain loyal to the
regime. Dreyman tries to defend his friend, Albert Jerska, who has come into official disfavor and who is suffering under the Stasi technique of Zersetzung (decomposition), aimed at the systematic destruction of an individual’s professional and personal life through the dissemination of malicious rumor and creation of fear and suspicion within one’s immediate social circle. Stein argues that Jerska’s suicide functions as the catalyst for Dreyman’s transformation from loyalist to opponent. This is because to be good in the way his friend’s gift of the musical score “The Sonata of the Good Man” admonishes him to be is to use his literary talent and celebrity to publicize the problems of real existing socialism. However, because his journalistic efforts have no officially sanctioned outlet in the GDR, his only option is to publish anonymously in the West. Dreyman’s transformation, in turn, triggers Wiesler’s protective intervention based on an empathy for and identification with Dreyman that he did not initially exhibit. This can only occur if he sets aside political conviction, sees Dreyman as a fellow human being rather than an object, and acts in accordance with his emergent sense of an individual’s goodness.

Pfaff urges us to see the role of the Stasi in institutional terms, as the central organization in the wider system of social control he labels a mechanism of coercive surveillance. By this he means a system of monitoring and enforcement that insinuated itself into the private sphere and induced hundreds of thousands of people, whether by fear or by favor, to collaborate in the political policing of society. However sinister it could be, the impact of the Stasi on East German society should not be overstated. Its purpose was to suppress dissent, hinder illegal emigration, and eliminate challenges to a Marxist-Leninist regime. For their part, very few ordinary East Germans risked an escape, sympathized with dissidents, or joined the nascent church-based opposition. The Stasi very effectively infiltrated all sources of opposition—the critical intelligentsia, the churches, independent artistic milieus—but this hardly touched the lives of most East Germans directly. Above all, the Stasi was an agency for information gathering. It did not decide the policies of GDR: That was the role of the Party.

Alongside incentives for compliance that included welfare benefits and low-cost basic consumption, the system of coercive surveillance anchored Leninist one-party rule by hindering exit from the country and squelching every form of critical voice, even that inspired by loyalty (such as Dreyman’s). Given these conditions, most people publicly conformed, privately grumbled, and eschewed opposition. For Lindenberger, the key to improving historical understanding will be research and writing that provides greater insight into the everyday life of the regime and how its repressive apparatus fostered “practices of domination at the microlevel.”
Accomplishing this will mean going beyond the theaters and salons of artists and the hushed meetings of the dissidents, on the one hand, and, on the other, the interrogation rooms and prison cells of the Stasi. It will necessitate exploring the neighborhoods, housing blocks, factory floors, schools, and countless other sites where relations of power met indifference, achieved conformity, or provoked opposition.

It is questionable whether the sort of explorations endorsed by the panelists would fully succeed as cinema, but they may help indicate how public scholarship might provide a more nuanced understanding. As Gieske observed in his remarks, “The genre of historical film is doubtlessly useful for awakening curiosity. At the same time, such films can contaminate our remembrance with a flood of artistic images or with what only appears to be authentic historical narrative.” It appears from this panel discussion that Donnermarck’s film provides material to support either understanding. Yet, for all the film’s grounding in a certain time and place, the filmmaker’s ambitions in probing the human soul are universal, and The Lives of Others should be understood primarily as a work of cinematic art, and only secondarily as a window on a contested past.

Steven Pfaff
NEW EUROPEAN DYNAMICS IN PROMOTING SCIENCE AND HUMANITIES: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE

Panel discussion at the German Embassy, Washington DC, May 2, 2007. Jointly organized by the German Embassy, the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, and the GHI. Participants: Ernst Ludwig Winnacker (Secretary General, European Research Council), Michael McDonald (Assistant Chairman for Programs, National Endowment for the Humanities), Arden L. Bement, Jr. (Director, National Science Foundation). Moderator: Norman Birnbaum (Georgetown University).

On May 2, 2007, the GHI, the German Embassy, and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft organized a panel discussion on the newly founded European Research Council (ERC). With representatives from the ERC and its American corollaries, the National Endowment for the Humanities and the National Science Foundation, along with several scholars, the panel focused on the establishment of the European Research Council as a new pan-European instrument for funding scholarly research in both the sciences and the humanities. With this view of the ERC forming the background for the ensuing discussion on research policy in the European Union and the United States, the panel sought to identify not only the internal consequences and issues of a shift toward a Europeanized research policy but also the international dimensions and implications of this new entity for funding research.

The discussion began by addressing the internal European implications of the ERC. This included an in-depth appraisal of the new role and function of the ERC, as well as a critical assessment of its nature vis-à-vis older nation-centered research foundations. Seeking to identify potential changes or new developments in the funding of European scholarly research, the panel discussed what the ERC offers to the various disciplines in the sciences and humanities and, furthermore, whether and how the ERC represents a new direction in funding research, and if so, what the new message and objectives are. One of the points critically discussed here was the ERC’s increased emphasis on fostering research networks. This new focus on research networks, while encouraging international and varied research, can also subvert and divert research projects by forcing them into partnerships whose only utility is to more easily obtain funding.
Institutionally, the panel considered the structure and design of the ERC itself and what effects these could have on its work and on scholarly research in general. This included a comparison to existing national models, mainly the United States and Germany. While the German equivalent, the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, integrates both the sciences and the humanities into a single funding agency, the American counterpart actually separates the sciences and the humanities into two chief complementary agencies (NEH and NSF). As the ERC is based loosely on the German example, the panel considered the use of integrating the sciences and humanities under the umbrella of one funding organization. Conversely, the implications of separating the two branches were addressed by looking at the American model. More generally, a specific understanding of how the structure of a research foundation influences the production of knowledge at various levels was sought. Moreover, the panel analyzed which system lends itself more easily to encouraging interdisciplinary projects and innovative research.

The issue of the conjoining of the funding for the humanities and the sciences in the ERC was problematized through the questioning of the concept of “frontier” research, which, while perhaps useful in the sciences, is less significant for the humanities, where this so-called “frontier” is either not applicable or difficult to locate. Moreover, panelists questioned how the council would understand the concept of “frontier”: Will it understand it as fashionable trends or serious research? By extension, will a focus on “frontier” research encourage scholars to set themselves apart from the conventional, and if so, how will unusual ideas and risk-taking be reviewed and valued? As a point of comparison, Michael McDonald (NEH) noted that the NEH has a discretionary fund (20 percent of its funding) that is reserved for funding projects that have a high risk of failing. While it remains to be seen how the ERC itself will evaluate and choose projects, it seems essential that some focus be placed in ensuring a varied degree in type as well as “risk” of the projects taken on.

The model of the ERC within Europe, and its goal to establish international peer review and standards in Europe, will most likely serve as a model for future cooperation between international funding organizations. With this in mind, the panel turned toward the international and transatlantic implications. Here, the ERC’s potential interaction with other funding organizations was covered: specifically, how the ERC will compete/cooperate with its US equivalents (e.g., NEH, NEA, NSF) and what consequences it will have for existing internationalization strategies of other funding agencies like the American counterparts. The panel also evaluated how the ERC will affect the transnational flow of scholars. Chiefly considered was the nature of the attraction that the ERC will possess: Will the attraction of the ERC be more institutional (that is, will
it attract cooperation with institutions themselves, such as US universities) or individual (that is, will it attract individual scholars and does it have the potential to reverse the so-called “brain drain” and lure more young US researchers to Europe). With the focus on larger networks, it remains an open question how easily individual scholars could access funding from the ERC.

Questioning whether the ERC will be appropriate as a funding program for tackling the challenges posed to societies in terms of knowledge-creation, innovation, and transfer of knowledge, the panel turned toward a discussion of the future challenges of funding research in Europe. With regard to the humanities, the question was posed whether the ERC would strengthen or weaken its position vis-à-vis scientific research. As noted earlier, a potential problem for the humanities is that research will be measured by the same criteria used for the natural sciences. The central issue of measuring progress in the humanities remains an open question. Michael McDonald provocatively contended that progress is a vacuous concept in the humanities and that innovation is an overrated criterion in its research. In the final discussion, other criticisms were explored largely through a counterfactual perspective. This perspective, discussed by Norman Birnbaum, approached the function and use of the ERC by questioning whether it would have provided funding for past groundbreaking European research had it been in place at the time.

_Bryan Hart and Gisela Mettele_
The thirteenth Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar brought together sixteen doctoral students from Europe and North America to discuss their dissertation projects on German history since 1945. The first panel examined memory politics in East and West Germany. Michael Meng’s paper explored the treatment of Potsdam’s two main Jewish sites—its synagogue and Jewish cemetery—as a way to analyze broader questions about memory and German-Jewish relations in the early German Democratic Republic. In an effort to transform Potsdam into a socialist city, party officials generally disregarded demands for historic preservation and tore down buildings that did not fit easily into its antifascist interpretation of the Nazi past. It was not until the late 1970s and early 1980s, Meng argued, that this official interpretation of the past was challenged on the local level, when ordinary citizens sought to recover the few remnants of Jewish life that remained in Potsdam. Kristina Meyer examined how the postwar Social Democratic Party (SPD) dealt with the resistance and persecution of Social Democrats during the Third Reich. Although the SPD worked hard for the compensation of victims and the just punishment of perpetrators, Meyer concluded that the party also contributed to the marginalization of the Social Democratic resistance in the public consciousness of West German society. Social Democratic Vergangenheitspolitik was largely determined by efforts at postwar integration, social pressures to conform, and the necessities of pragmatic politics.

The second panel focused on the postwar occupation and reeducation efforts in the western part of Germany. Nina Verheyen analyzed Diskussionsveranstaltungen (events featuring public discussions) and discussion programs in radio and television in 1950s West Germany. She argued that the “appetite for discussion” revealed in these events and programs was closely related to American reeducation programs of the immediate postwar period. The US occupation authorities regarded discussions as a key
feature of democracy and therefore encouraged the practice of discussion in the German population. Heather Dichter’s paper investigated the role of sports in postwar reeducation. The Americans, British, and French all gave sports a prominent role in their broader public diplomacy programs. They created institutions to train instructors and developed exchange programs for sports. The Western allies, Dichter argued, included sports in their occupation policies because they believed that sports would further democratization.

The third panel explored the history of minorities in West German society. Susanne Schönborn examined the 1984/85 debate about Rainer Werner Fassbinder’s play Der Müll, die Stadt und der Tod in order to study how Jewish identities were constructed at the intersection of external and internal perceptions of Jewishness. The Fassbinder debate, she argued, changed the self-understanding of Jews living in West Germany. For the first time, the Jewish response to antisemitism was no longer one of paralysis; instead, Jews used their confrontation with antisemitism to fight for creating conditions that would allow them to continue living in West Germany. Jennifer Miller’s paper on “guest workers” in West Germany focused on the Turkish perspective to challenge the traditional narrative. Interactions between the Turkish and German employment offices, and between workers and officials, resulted in significant modifications of the “guest worker” application process. These adjustments, Miller argued, reveal breakdowns in the streamlined process portrayed by manuals, media, and politicians, and demonstrate that workers were able to maintain a sense of autonomy and ambition.

East German culture and everyday life was the subject of the fourth session, which turned from textual sources to visual culture and music. Justinian Jampol’s paper explored the integration of the Picasso Peace Dove and the slogan “Freundschaft-Druschba” into the realm of GDR folk art and handicrafts. Political symbols, he argued, evolved into expressions of cultural association that were quite removed from politics. Leonard Schmieding examined the cultural transfer of hip-hop culture into East Germany in the 1980s as an ambivalent process of Americanization. While his analysis of individual negotiating processes emphasized juvenile identity formation through hip-hop, his analysis of state responses demonstrated the state’s failure to control juvenile hip-hop actors, thus enabling them to establish small niches of personal freedom in the East German dictatorship.

The fifth panel was devoted to the history of sexuality. Erik Huneke’s paper examined the creation of a nationwide network of relationship counseling centers in the GDR during the mid-1960s. Whereas existing scholarship has focused on marital counseling’s connection to the eugenic
and demographic concerns of state population policy, Huneke argued that the expansion of such counseling also reflected the psychologization of the socialist self and the emergence of sex as a cultural language in the GDR. The population’s willingness to seek assistance in resolving sexual problems became a litmus test not only for confidence in the idea of relationship counseling, but also for trust in the state itself. Eva-Maria Silies explored the question of to what extent the birth-control pill, introduced in 1961, changed West German women’s experiences of sexuality and contraception in the 1960s and 1970s. Their experiences with the pill, she contended, led women to distance themselves from the generation of their mothers and to develop a new body consciousness and self-consciousness. These processes also led to a transformation of moral values in postwar West Germany.

The sixth panel turned from sex to recreational drugs. Kraig Larkin’s paper focused on the responses of German civilians and the American Military Government to extensive tobacco shortages in the initial postwar years. The scarcity of cigarettes and the strategies Germans employed to increase their access to tobacco products, he argued, profoundly influenced the subsequent development of West Germany’s cigarette market. Will Morris investigated West German heroin use during the 1970s, focusing on Frankfurt. He argued that the substance’s appeal to young leftists is explained by heroin’s radicalness, as evinced by its physiological kick, perceived danger, and social opprobrium. According to Morris, when they shot up, these young consumers were acting out the decade’s radical slogan: “Tu was!”

The seventh panel focused on political protest movements in West Germany. Quinn Slobodian’s paper examined the New Left’s use of graphic images as tools of protest against repressive governments, in particular the protest films of Harun Farocki and the furor around the film Africa Addio. He showed how, in their efforts to transmit a political message, members of the New Left were affected by and sometimes able to transcend the sensationalist methods of shock favored by the mainstream media. Sabine Dworog analyzed the political conflicts generated by plans to expand the Frankfurt airport from 1960 to 1980. She argued that the debates and conflicts reveal the gradual dissolution of the congruence of interests between the airport authority, the government that initiated the airport expansion, and the public that used the airport’s services. From the 1960s to the 1980s, the social framework for government action was profoundly transformed.

The eighth and final panel was devoted to the history of the media. Jürgen Kniep analyzed film censorship in West Germany. His examination of Jugendschutz—the campaign to protect youth against sexuality
and violence in the cinema—in the 1950s showed that the campaign reflected more general socio-cultural fears, which led contemporaries to give it an antimodern thrust. His study of the Sexwelle films of the early 1970s sought to demonstrate how film and film censorship produced new "mental images" of a formerly taboo topic. Hendrik Pletz investigated the relationship between innovations in media technology and changes in media content in 1980s West Germany. The introduction of home video recorders (VCRs) and the resulting change of the distribution structures for audio-visual content were accompanied by an aesthetic transformation of television. These dual processes, Pletz argued, inaugurated a gradual dissolution of the boundaries between imagination and reality, private and public, in the audiovisual media.

Reflecting on the seminar as a whole, one notes the dominance of cultural history, demonstrating the continued vigor of the "cultural turn" in German history on both sides of the Atlantic. More surprising was the small number of papers on East Germany (only four out of sixteen), which seems to indicate a waning of the post-unification boom in GDR history. Political history (especially the Cold War), transnational history, and comparative history were virtually absent. With the exception of Michael Meng’s project (comparing the GDR and Poland), none of the dissertation projects was comparative.

The discussions at the different panels were wide-ranging; nevertheless, several recurring themes emerged. The first of these dealt with the role of value judgments in historical analysis. While some participants took paper writers to task for injecting current memory politics or their own views into their work and argued that historians ought to focus on historicization, others countered that historical research is inevitably influenced by the historian’s values and concerns, so that all one can demand is transparency about the historian’s political stance. A second theme derived from the participants’ desire to connect their cultural-history projects to issues in political history. This strand in the discussion centered on the difficulties of attributing political meaning to material objects (Jampol’s GDR artifacts) or to social, cultural, or physical activities, such as sports (Dichter), sex (Huneke) or hip-hop music (Schmieding). While everyone agreed on the need to distinguish between the attribution of political meanings by the historian and by contemporaries, difficult questions remained: What kinds of evidence can the historian draw on to document the political meaning of physical artifacts? How does one demonstrate that sports acquired a “democratic” meaning? More fundamentally: If Herrschaft is always a “social practice” and all culture is political, where does one draw the boundary between culture and politics? Finally, seminar participants repeatedly pondered the question of how the historical study of marginal groups in German society (such as
Jews, Gastarbeiter, hip-hop youth, or drug users) can be used not just to add minority voices to the historical narrative, but to decenter and re-shape the narrative itself.

Richard F. Wetzell

Participants and Their Topics

HEATHER DICHTER (University of Toronto), Game-Plan for Democracy: Western Allied Public Diplomacy and Sport in Occupied Germany

SABINE DWOROG (University of Tübingen), Der Wandel von Staatsaufgaben: Die Konflikte um den Ausbau des Frankfurter Flughafens im Kontext gesellschaftlicher Umbrüche, 1960–1980

ERIC HUNEKE (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor), A Palimpsest of the Weimar Sex Reform Movement? Relationship Counseling Centers in the German Democratic Republic during the 1960s

JUSTINIAN JAMPOL (Oxford University), Volkskunst, Kulturhäuser, and Brigadenbücher: Approaching Everyday Culture in East Germany, 1961–1989 (and beyond)

JÜRGEN KNIEP (University of Freiburg), Der Film liegt auf der Grenze: Filmzensur in Westdeutschland, 1945–1990

KRAIG LARKIN (State University of New York, Stony Brook), A Few Cigarettes Will Do Wonders: Cigarettes, Consumption, and Memory in Post-1945 Western Germany

MICHAEL MENG (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill), From Destruction to Preservation: Jewish Sites in Germany and Poland after the Holocaust

KRISTINA MEYER (University of Jena), Sozialdemokratische Vergangenheitspolitik: Zum Umgang der SPD mit Widerstand, Verfolgung und Wiedergutmachung seit 1945

JENNIFER MILLER (Rutgers University), RSVP: The Application Process and the Path to Germany of the First Generation of Turkish ‘Guest Workers’

WILL MORRIS (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign), Heroin as a Radical Substance

HENDRIK PLETZ (University of Cologne), Technische Innovation und medialer Wandel in den 1980er Jahren: Zum Konsum des Imaginären in der Realität der Postmoderne

LEONARD SCHMIEDEING (University of Leipzig), Von “Windmills,” “Headsprins” und “Powermoves”: Die Jugendkultur HipHop in der DDR zwischen Anpassung und Protest
SUSANNE SCHÖNBORN (Technical University, Berlin), Jüdische Identitäten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Spiegel politischer Debatten

EVA-MARIA SILIES (University of Göttingen), Liebe, Lust und Last: Die Pille als weibliche Generationserfahrung, 1960–1980

QUINN SLOBODIAN (New York University), Corpse Polemics: The Third World and the Politics of Gore in 1960s West Germany

NINA VERHEYEN (Free University, Berlin), Die Verordnung des Diskurses: Diskussionslust und Re-education in der westdeutschen Gesellschaft der 50er Jahre
MASS MIGRATION AND URBAN GOVERNANCE:
CENTRAL EUROPEAN CITIES IN THE NINETEENTH AND
TWENTIETH CENTURIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Workshop at the GHI, May 11–12, 2007. Conveners: Marcus Gräser (University of Frankfurt/NEH-GHI Fellow), Gisela Mettele (GHI). Participants: Lars Amenda (University of Hamburg), Regula Argast (University of Zurich), Cathleen Giustino (Auburn University), Ulrike von Hirschhausen (University of Hamburg), Michael John (University of Linz), Brian McCook (Leeds Metropolitan University), Susanne Peters-Schildgen (Oberschlesisches Landesmuseum Ratingen), Peter Stachel (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften), Rolf Wörsdorfer (Technical University of Darmstadt).

After a warm welcome by Gisela Mettele, deputy director of the GHI, Marcus Gräser introduced the workshop by placing the themes of mass migration and urban governance in a broader, comparative perspective. American urbanization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has always been described as a unique experience. Yet from a comparative viewpoint, the assumption of an American urban exceptionalism may be questioned because urbanization in Central Europe was no less the result of mass migration, mostly from rural areas. While some Central European cities had an ethnic makeup that resembled the situation in a typical American city, the experience of mass migration, either mono- or multi-ethnic, had a crucial impact on urban governance in both Central Europe and in America. The aim of the workshop, as Gräser concluded, was to examine this impact and to try to differentiate the various outcomes within Central Europe and in transatlantic comparison.

Brian McCook started with a comparison of the Polish immigrant challenge in the Ruhr area and in northeastern Pennsylvania between 1870 and 1924. While Polish associations in northeastern Pennsylvania also served economic functions in the life of the migrants, this was not the case in the more nationally oriented Ruhr associations because of the existence of state-sponsored social security programs. It turns out that the Pennsylvania Poles acted more effectively as an ethnic lobby, making their voices heard on a national stage more successfully than was possible in Germany. Susanne Peters-Schildgen could bolster this observation by looking more closely at the Polish minority in certain Ruhr cities, pointing out that the state’s suppressive policy toward the Polish migrants did not lead to Germanization as hoped, but instead caused a rather nationalistic
outlook among the Polish associations. Rolf Wörsdorfer presented a case study of the mining town of Hamborn, which after heavy in-migration in the late nineteenth century became marked by an exodus of Polish workers in the early twentieth century.

Lars Amenda sketched transmigration processes and the ways the authorities dealt with them in the port city of Hamburg around the turn of the century. While in-migration and mobility on the one side were a typical feature of booming Hamburg around 1900, the local control of the migrants became even more restrictive, as the example of the Chinese showed. Although quantitatively a marginal group, their coming evoked fears and threats leading to local measures hindering permanent settlement of Chinese migrants. Turning the attention to Switzerland, Regula Argast contrasted the Hamburg case with that of Basel, where liberal municipal legislation facilitated in-migration and the local naturalization (Bürgerrecht) of both Swiss and non-Swiss migrants. Ulrike von Hirschhausen used the example of the Baltic port city of Riga to show how transfers of Western models of social politics yielded a far-fledged communal policy trying to accommodate multiethnic groups of migrants, culminating in Tsarist Russia’s first municipal social security system.

Peter Stachel opened the second day of the workshop with some notes on early sociological thought in urban Austria at the turn of the century, which applied the ideas of the Chicago School regarding its works on multiethnic groups in American cities. Cathleen Giustino brought a new scenario into the discussion by highlighting Prague’s municipal activities in tearing down the Jewish town around 1900. Although the destruction of the former ghetto brought Prague in line with Central European middle-class representations of order, the reshaping failed to secure the middle class’s hold over local power, and gave rise to ongoing lower-class discontent after World War I. Marcus Gräser introduced his comparative research on Chicago and Vienna by focusing on party formations in both cities. He was able to show that, while the American party machines, despite all their deficiencies, did not exclude any ethnic minorities, Vienna’s Christian Socialist mayor Karl Lueger built his party’s rule on ethnic and religious exclusion. In a comparison of migration patterns between Vienna, Linz, and Czernowitz, Michael John concluded that, while in Vienna and Linz, politics of assimilation, often repressive ones, dominated, Czernowitz managed to accommodate ethnic plurality to a large degree.

The lively discussions during and at the end of the workshop brought to light once more the fact that criteria for a truly comparative urban history are still lacking. Gender and memory, for example, featured only marginally in the workshop’s papers, reflecting thereby a general feature
of current urban historiography. Also, future research needs to consider processes of assimilation and acculturation more intensively. Last but not least, the question was raised whether urban history needs a new terminology as well as new conceptual modes and semantics beyond the classical social theories of urbanization. Thanks to the GHI’s workshop and the input of the conveners, problems and promises of current urban historiography could fruitfully be discussed, thereby influencing the research currently undertaken by all participants.

Ulrike von Hirschhausen

Participants: Katherine Aaslestad (West Virginia University), Matthew Brown (University of Bristol), Dirk Bönker (Duke University), Ann Campbell (US Coast Guard Academy Foundation), Thomas Cardoza (Truckee Meadows Community College), Sarah Chambers (University of Minnesota), Anna Clark (University of Minnesota), Linda Colley (Princeton University), Elizabeth Colwill (San Diego State University), Christopher Dandeker (Kings College, London), Catherine Davies (University of Nottingham), Laurent Dubois (Michigan State University), Stefan Dudink (Radboud University, Nijmegen), Kathleen DuVal (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill), David Eltis (Emory University), Alan Forrest (University of York), Barbara Harris (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill), Brian Holden Reid (Kings College, London), Lynn Hunt (University of Los Angeles), Sherry Johnson (University of Florida), Catriona Kennedy (University of York), Gregory T. Knouff (Keene State College), Richard Kohn (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill), Wolfgang Koller (Free University of Berlin), Claudia Kraft (University of Erfurt), Lloyd S. Kramer (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill), Wayne E. Lee (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill), Ruth Leiserowitz (Free University of Berlin), Patricia Lin (University of California, Berkeley), Emma V. Macleod (University of Stirling), Alexander M. Martin (University of Notre Dame), Holly A. Mayer (Duquesne University, Pittsburgh), John McGowan (Institute for Arts and Humanities), Terence V. McIntosh (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill), Judith Miller (Emory University), Cecilia Morgan (University of Toronto), Mary Beth Norton (Cornell University), David O’Brien (University of Illinois, Urbana), Karen Racine (University of Guelph), Jane Rendall (University of York), Alex Roland (Duke University), Jay Smith (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill).
This extremely successful and stimulating meeting brought together ninety scholars of different generations from four countries. These scholars, who work on war, gender, race, and national liberation during the period between 1775 and 1820, met to address how these powerful forces intersected during the revolutionary era. The rise of the modern military and modern warfare emerged as the common touchstones among all scholars as they sought to explore how wars, in particular wars associated with independence or liberation, emerged as key sites in the negotiation and construction of new gender norms and national identities. All participants probed the degree to which novel forms of mass mobilization for war contributed to increasingly rigid notions of masculinity and femininity, despite the obvious fact that women participated in the war effort in military institutions and civilian society. A collected volume of selected and revised papers is in progress.

Following a warm welcome by hosts Lloyd S. Kramer, Gisela Mettele, and Alex Roland, Karen Hagemann, the main organizational force behind the conference, presented an introductory lecture in which she discussed the state of research and developed a gendered concept for the analysis of this period of the first modern world wars. These conflicts, fought with mass armies, were variously legitimated as “revolutionary wars,” “national wars,” or “wars of liberation.” Despite exciting new scholarship on this era, she pointed out that much remains overlooked. The past dearth of collaboration between military, social, and gender historians has contributed to the general omission of the gendered dimensions of late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century warfare. Hoping that this conference would change that state of affairs, she proposed a gendered concept of “total war” of the revolutionary era that would require scholars to sharpen perceptions of the far-reaching consequences of the various modes of mass mobilization for war and mass warfare for the state, the military, the economy, society, and culture. This approach must look beyond the military and the conduct of war, to the relationship between the state and the nation, as well as to relationships between the so-called “combat front” and “home-front,” soldiers and civilians, and men and women. She pointed to the apparent paradox of revolutionary and Napoleonic warfare. On the one hand, war offered new and rich opportunities for men and women to redefine their relationship to their state and nation as combatants and civilians. At the same time, however, war seemed to strengthen an emerging and less flexible gender order that assigned all men the responsibility of defending their homes and states while defining all women as mothers and housewives regardless of their social status.

The first panel, entitled “Gender, War, and Empires,” featured the Caribbean, South America, and the Atlantic World. David Eltis com-
menced with a discussion of gender in the Atlantic slave trade and investigated how war influenced this trade. Drawing on the large database of 35,000 voyages, soon to be available on a website, he revealed that the slave trade reached its peak between 1785 and 1795, and that there were two slave trades, one in the North Atlantic and the other in the South Atlantic. While the wars brought a sharp, but temporary, halt to the northern trade, the southern trade continued relentlessly. Of importance to this conference, his team’s data showed that during the Revolutionary era, increasing numbers of women and children were forced onto slave ships. Laurent Dubois followed with an investigation into the evolving relationship between gender, race, and citizenship in the French Caribbean with a comparison of Guadeloupe and Santo Domingo. He highlighted the intersection of race and gender to redefine new legal categories during a time of war and rebellion, including possibilities for women of color to petition for citizenship based on traditional republican virtues. He also addressed the emergence of a wartime economy and how it offered women new opportunities as they struggled to preserve their homes, rights, and families. Sherry Johnson explored the highly militarized society of Cuba to underscore that both gender and racial norms could be breeched due to the demands of warfare and Cuba’s vulnerability. The maintenance of codes of military conduct and honor were expected from both genders and all social strata, just as military benefits to widows and orphans were available to free women of color and white women alike. Johnson traced the passage of Cuban gender regimes from those of the eighteenth century and the wars, which offered greater fluidity and more active roles for women, to those of the nineteenth century, which infantilized free women and brutalized slave women, while developing an exclusionary discourse of race. A significant contrast with other areas was the heavy role of the state in the construction of gender and color regimes—for instance, through military benefits and the encouragement of marriage for soldiers and civil servants. These papers, the comment by Sarah Chambers, and the discussion emphasized the diversity of the many labor, racial, and gender regimes of the Caribbean, as well as differences in the impact of the wars. In particular, the proceedings highlighted the need to consider issues of race and slavery in any discussion of the period’s evolving understandings of gender.

The second panel featured “National Masculinities and Femininities and Their Others,” and began with a very interesting discussion of Revolutionary and Napoleonic visual culture by art historian David O’Brien. He traced a transformation in history painting that highlighted the male body and the performance of gendered identities on the canvas, as artists, often with difficulty and ambivalence, sought to redefine honor away from an aristocratic privilege toward one associated with merit, and fi-
nally, with Bonaparte and the Empire. Jane Rendall then explored the world of British women poets and their diverse renderings of war and empire. Though most British reviewers did not consider it appropriate for women to write about war, that criticism did not stop women from composing poetry focused on both the horrors and glories of warfare. Rendall explored the works of two poets, Anna Barbauld and Anne Grant, in order to underscore the diversity in women’s war poetry as well as the politicization of war and empire in the public realm. Understood by the public as political commentary, these two poets asserted their rights to assess the moral and military state of Britain. Matthew Brown addressed the construction of national heroes during and after the Spanish Wars of Independence between 1810 and 1826. He argued that with masculinity under pressure during war, those who would be commemorated as heroes had to be killed at the right time, in the right way, and by the right person. He especially examined gendered notions of honor to emphasize that personal honor and morality were tied tightly to political ethos and operated within the commercial and literary networks of the Atlantic world. The discussion, spurred by comments by Anna Clark, focused on the many issues of representation that the papers had raised, especially the contested typologies of masculinity, and the ways in which the war reenergized the question of gender differences while making warfare and empire palatable to a broader public.

Linda Colley provided the conference’s keynote lecture, entitled “Grand versus Francis: Gender, Imperial Warfare, and a Wider Atlantic World.” Her lecture featured the notion of the “privilege of masculinity” absent a martial emphasis, as well as the self-fashioning opportunities for women in the “frontier community” of India. She analyzed the lawsuit between Philip Francis and George Francis Grand in late eighteenth-century British India to illustrate that the local environment initially could trump traditional notions of identity: gender, nationality, and religion. Grand sued Francis for “criminal conversation” with his sixteen-year-old French Catholic wife, Catherine Noëlle Verlee (Worlee), who had been born in the Danish colony of Tranquebar (Tarangambadi). The case showed that eighteenth-century India, with fewer, yet more visibly active women in a colonial community, which itself comprised many nationalities and religions, offered a more fluid environment than the British imperial rule of the nineteenth century. Ultimately, though, under the stress of war and intensifying British nationalism, unconventional female conduct, even on the frontier, presented too great a challenge to the emerging political order, indicating the increasingly close assignment of masculinity and politics.

The conference commenced the following day with the panel “Men at War: Masculinity and Soldiers’ War Experiences.” Alan Forrest explored
the relationship between masculinity and military qualities under the Revolution and Empire. Forrest highlighted the military’s complex situation after 1792, as new notions of revolutionary honor, morality, and selflessness redefined both civil and martial conduct. Forrest illustrated that if the military recognized women soldiers, they praised their masculine qualities, rather than the women themselves. He concluded with a fascinating description of enduring conscription rituals, the fêtes des conscrits, as celebrations of masculinity. Stefan Dudink’s paper on the relationship between masculinity, politics, and military careers continued the theme of military masculinity. Dudink drew an interesting comparison between two Dutch officers to illustrate different forms of masculinity within the military. His nuanced case study presented clear distinctions between one officer, Herman Willem Daendels, who was strongly committed to revolutionary reforms, and another, David Hendrikus Chassé, who instead championed apolitical loyalty and duty to the nation alone. Dudink pointed out that only one successfully survived after 1815 in the Netherlands: the officer who drew on politically neutral concepts of the citizen-soldier in service to the state rather than to a revolutionary ideology. Claudia Kraft likewise explored distinctive and evolving understandings of femininity and masculinity among the nobility in Poland, in particular a shift from an active military identity to an administrative bourgeois masculinity by 1815. At the same time, she traced the transformation of femininity among the Polish elites, which swung from the inclusion of noble women in military mobilization to their exclusion from later bureaucratic performances, rituals that emerged as the new qualifiers for civic engagement in a “manly self-government.” Finally, Gregory Knouff explored the intersection between race and gender among poor white, free black, and Native American men in western Pennsylvania during the American Revolution. He argued that whiteness, masculinity, and military service replaced property ownership in defining citizenship in the young republic. Moreover, he asserted that such new distinctions of citizenship emerged on the frontiers in local militias; for example, in western Pennsylvania, white settlers (regardless of their cultural or ethnic background) felt it imperative to distinguish themselves from Native Americans, and thus viewed the War for Independence also as a race war. This panel, therefore, offered a variety of important insights into the various manifestations of military masculinities and the politicized transformation of men into soldiers. With his question, “What are armies for?” commentator Brian Holden Reid spurred a lively discussion about the significance of local and national contexts in any answer to such a question.

As a pendant to the previous panel, “Women at War: Female War Experiences” explored women’s participation in war. Holly Mayer out-
lined the many areas of female activity in the American Revolution, from camp followers to national heroines such as Molly Pitcher. Despite women’s participation in the insurrection against British rule, Meyer argued that American leaders immediately sought to turn these rough women into virtuous and self-sacrificing mothers and wives in order to generate their vision of a well-ordered society. Catriona Kennedy addressed British women’s perception of warfare at the Battle of Waterloo, stressing that women experienced and recorded the war with more than one voice, and that they regarded themselves as “eye-witnesses” even though they were physically removed from the field of battle. Her work emphasized that viewing the wounded and dead as they came off the battlefield was very much a war experience, as was their fear of rape and pillage by a victorious enemy. Thomas Cardoza’s presentation featured the vital roles of women in the French military as support personnel. He explored the continuities in, as well as significant transformations of, women’s status as sutlers and laundresses in the armed services under four different regimes between 1780 and 1830. During the revolutionary and Napoleonic era, women were more aggressively constrained in their participation in combat as soldiers, in particular by the law of 30 April 1793, yet they gained legal status as holders of licenses (patentes) in the armed forces. He pointed out that many women—laundresses or sutlers—could end up in combat as their numbers grew alongside the escalating campaigns. Nevertheless, the state only recognized their participation in armed conflict as a purely defensive action, acknowledging them as such, and provided no pensions for their service or compensation for their injuries. These papers and the comments by D’Ann Campbell underscored that women did not have to be active on the field of combat to be participants in the war experience, and that, once again, the local context—religious, frontier, and national—did much to shape women’s participation and how it was understood.

The final panel of the day, “Home Fronts: The War at Home,” explored the consequences of war on domestic and civic life. Patricia Lin examined the transformation in British pension programs for the families of soldiers and sailors. She argued that the navy’s new approaches to state support for widows and orphans broadened the state’s responsibilities toward families, most interestingly by expanding the casualty payments and salary remittances to include interracial marriages and multiracial children around the globe. Alexander Martin presented a case study of “civilian masculinity” in a time of war, that of Johann Ambrosius Rosenstrauch. He pointed out that the Napoleonic wars contributed to both the spiritual awakening and financial independence necessary for the self-fashioning of this alternative masculinity. Martin’s case study identified a form of masculinity that was not martial, aristocratic, or
plebian, that crossed national and religious borders, and that appeared to contribute to the restrained and prudent bourgeois identity of the nineteenth century. Elizabeth Colwill shifted the discussion to the Caribbean and the intersection between the state and free women claiming a civic identity for themselves and their families. Colwill revealed the state’s efforts to couple productivity and matrimony through laws that sacralized marriage and banned divorce while imposing a return to plantation labor. Whereas the Republic offered new protections and legal status by encouraging marriage and rewarding large (legitimate) families, as well as allowing the registration of children in the state’s vol. civil, women’s responses reveal their nuanced and determined resistance to the new system. Even as they hastened to register their legitimate and illegitimate children to solidify the ties of kinship and to claim “social being,” they rejected both the labor codes and the state’s idea that marriage alone formed the legitimate basis of family. The discussion, sparked by comments by Gisela Mettele, probed the models, whether generated by the state or broader culture, that underlay the gendering of identities.

The last day of the conference began with the panel “Gender, Nation, and Wars: Patriotic and Revolutionary Actions and Movements,” which examined the intersection of gender and patriotism in times of war. Emma V. Macleod addressed the forms of patriotism available to British women during the revolutionary era and underscored the evidence of “independent patriotism” based on the correspondence of English blue-stockings. This “non-gendered and non-partisan engagement with the political affairs of the nation” represented women’s political involvement despite limits on their sphere of action and proscribed conduct for patriotic sentiments. Similarly, Katherine Aaslestad traced the eighteenth-century origins of a gender-neutral civic patriotism in the republican city-state of Hamburg. She outlined the decline in this patriotism and the emergence of new militarized and gendered patriotic actions and rhetoric during the Wars of Liberation in 1813. Cecilia Morgan addressed the intersection between service to the crown, patriotic language, and performances of masculinity in Upper Canada during the War of 1812. Her paper probed the gendered language of patriotism to illustrate the marginalization of women as well as both sexes of Native Americans and Afro-Canadians, though Mohawk narratives asserted their own service to the crown and masculine courage. Finally, Karen Racine addressed the gendering of nation-building in Spanish America during the Wars of Independence. Her work emphasized the impact of European rhetoric, especially British models, in the family-based and gendered discourse of the era. The image of the father, the padre, as opposed to female allegories of “Liberty,” especially, opened a means to reconceive the bonds of patriarchal authority as the revolutions progressed. She identified a shift
from a fraternal identity of “brothers-in-arms” during the 1810s to the “familial state” of the 1820s, united under the authority of the “founding fathers.” These papers demonstrated the diversity and dynamism of patriotic language and its potential for rapid transformation in times of war and national liberation. Mary Beth Norton challenged the participants by posing some broad themes that were emerging from the conference. Most important among these was the possibility that warfare allowed the consolidation of new trends, especially the creation of separate spheres and the linkage—very new—of women, the household, and “private” life.

The final panel of the conference, “Gendering War Memories,” addressed the shifting representations of masculinity and femininity in the gendering of the commemorations of these wars throughout the nineteenth century. Sarah Chambers explored the state’s process of constructing memory in Chile. She underscored how it used women, in particular widows, as tools of national reconciliation to highlight common services to the state, and presented women as gullible victims, not active resisters, in liberation movements. She revealed that once-exiled “founding fathers” were exhumed and brought back to Chile to heal the memories of suffering and internal divisions. Kathleen Duval used the story of Nicanora Ramos, wife of the Spanish commandant Cruzat, to explore the lives of forgotten women who were drawn into war against their will. Ramos was kidnapped by a Scottish trader in the dangerous Mississippi borderlands near Chickasaw Bluffs. Drawing on her captors’ notions of honor, Ramos not only negotiated housing for herself and her dependents in the leader’s quarters, but also used her position to secure information that she passed along to Spanish officials when she was released three weeks later. Like many of the women who fled invading armies or who followed soldier-husbands, Ramos coped as well as she could in a situation not of her own making. Turning our attention to the continent, Ruth Leiserowitz addressed gender images in literary representations of Russia’s 1812 Patriotic War. Leiserowitz explored fictional heroines from the middle of the nineteenth century who urged their soldier-fiancés to greater acts of sacrifice and heroism. While some renderings portrayed the young women as independent, patriotic, and courageous, with time, the representations reduced their roles to that of waiting anxiously and passively for news on a secure home front. Wolfgang Koller explored the gendered images of the War of Liberation in German feature films during the interwar years. Probing the male characters in key Ufa productions, especially those of Gerhard Lamprecht and Kurt Bernhardt, he highlighted the martial cult of the male hero and the ways in which images of femininity and masculinity revealed Weimar and Third Reich wish projections. The commentator, Judith Miller, raised the question of the impact of new genres—novels, films—coupled with new modes of rep-
representation found in state documents such as family registers in consolidating and naturalizing the emerging gender regimes. This final panel concluded that the process of commemorating, remembering, and forgetting wars remains highly politicized and gendered, and that accounts of postwar trauma, victim narratives, and nostalgia converge in the politics of commemoration and memorialization.

The conference wrapped up with a final group of distinguished scholars to pull together the many issues raised by the variety of fascinating papers. This group consisted of Christopher Dandeker, Catherine Davies, Karen Hagemann, Lynn Hunt, and Alex Roland. The group emphasized the instability of gender praxis in the era of revolutions. Moreover, concepts of masculinity and femininity were not unitary phenomena. Instead, they were profoundly shaped by local conflicts and norms, and the models themselves moved rapidly across boundaries, only to be reconfigured in their new contexts. War and revolution placed further strains on those volatile models, raising the essential question about how to channel violence and restore order when old understandings and hierarchies have been swept away. If gender lines appeared to harden during the war, that development emerged from the instability of a new gender axis, where manhood was not a given, and instead had to be performed, repeated, and naturalized. The politicization of war and the growing sense of the citizen’s “right” to comment on the moral and military state of affairs could not be monopolized by one sex, social group, or ethnicity, and this expansion of politics generated new efforts to reorder society. Historians have generally framed these processes within specific national boundaries, but this conference demonstrated that the dynamism of revolution, war, and liberation must be explored within a transnational structure that includes the very complex and rich concept of gender. The conference ended with an enormous debt of thanks to its principal organizer, Karen Hagemann, whose level of intellectual rigor and organizational energy made this highly productive and stimulating international conference possible, and to Laurence Hare, the conference assistant. The wonderful hospitality of the University of North Carolina was deeply appreciated by all participants, in particular the last night, featuring a local barbeque, Tommy Edward’s Bluegrass Experience, and dancing at the Center for the Study of the American South.

Katherine Aaslestad and Judith A. Miller
THE USES OF IMMIGRANT LETTERS

Conference at the GHI, May 18–19, 2007. Conveners: Wolfgang Helbich (Ruhr University, Bochum), Anke Ortlepp (GHI). Participants: Susannah U. Bruce (Sam Houston State University), Volker Depkat (University of Regensburg), Bruce Elliott (Carleton University, Ottawa), Stephan Elspaß (University of Augsburg), David Fitzpatrick (Trinity College, Dublin), David Gerber (University of Buffalo), Walter Kamphoefner (Texas A&M University), Ursula Lehmkuhl (Free University of Berlin), Maria Irene Moyna (Texas A&M University), Joe Salmons (University of Wisconsin, Madison), Suzanne Sinke (Florida State University).

This workshop took place against the background of two related events: the 2003 Carleton Conference “Reading the Emigrant Letter,” which was hosted by Bruce Elliott and included presentations by David Fitzpatrick, David Gerber, Wolfgang Helbich, Walter Kamphoefner, and Suzanne Sinke; and the recent publication, in English translation, of the second volume of German immigrant letters, edited by Walter Kamphoefner and Wolfgang Helbich, Germans in the Civil War: The Letters They Wrote Home (Chapel Hill, 2006). With one eye on the past and the other on the future, workshop participants set out to evaluate the editing and other work done with immigrant letters in the past, and to assess the uses that scholars—within and outside the historical profession—might make of such letters in the future.

Bruce Elliott kicked off the discussion with an assessment of the Carleton Conference: “Limits, Opportunities, and Ways Forward.” Along with the accomplishments exemplified in the conference volume he co-edited with David Gerber and Suzanne Sinke, Letters Across Borders: The Epistolary Practices of International Migrants (New York, 2006), Elliott identified a number of aspects of immigrant correspondence that deserved greater attention: intertextuality, photos and other enclosures, the impact of changing communications, media, postal and informal delivery systems, and differing archival practices between countries. In a related vein, David Fitzpatrick offered some “Utilitarian Perspectives” on the editing of immigrant letters, identifying different constituencies for such editions—family historians and other general readers, linguists, scholars of immigration and ethnicity, and other editors—and pointing up their various and sometimes conflicting demands on letter editions with respect to access, attractiveness, utility, and more. In his view, all constituencies profit from a contextualization of letters through research in local history sources, and some of the compromises necessary for attractive publi-
tion can be mitigated through web publication of full, unedited texts of all letters.

Three other papers took a narrower focus on a subset of immigrant letters of three different nationalities. Wolfgang Helbich rescued from obscurity “Karl Larsen, 1860–1931: Pioneer of Modern Immigrant Letters Editions.” This Danish writer was the first to publish both an edition of common soldier and civilian letters (from the German-Danish war of 1864) and of letters of ordinary Danish immigrants to the United States. In both instances, he followed and promoted many of the editing “best practices” that have become the consensus standards for historians of the last generation. Walter Kamphoefner argued on the basis of internal and external evidence that German immigrant letters were “The Real Guidebooks,” and that the chain migration they induced exercised a constraint on overly optimistic writings, leading most writers to offer a nuanced portrait of conditions in America rather than euphoric immigration propaganda. Susannah Bruce presented in essence highlights of her recent book and the evidence on which it was based in her paper “Exploring the Motivations of Irish Catholic Volunteers in the Union Army, 1861–1865, Through Their Letters.” Although cautioning against the tendency to “see every Irish-American soldier as a Fenian,” she finds “Irish support for Irish interests” as essential in understanding the “blended familial, cultural, and national influences that defined their identity.” Thus the Irish letters, like the German letters edited by Kamphoefner and Helbich, cast doubt on the claim that the Civil War was the great “melting pot” that promoted assimilation and eradicated nativism and ethnic prejudice.

Four papers laid out or argued for “New Approaches to Reading Immigrant Letters,” above all cultural history approaches. Suzanne Sinke, who has worked with both Dutch and German women’s letters, presented “Evaluating Gender as a Category in Nineteenth-Century Immigrant Letters.” Her work shows how cultural norms and gender expectations influenced the degree of assertiveness and homesickness expressed in men’s and women’s letters, respectively. But one of her most striking findings was the interaction of gender with age. Young, single women generally enjoyed the less restrictive women’s roles in America, and “tended to write letters that were much more akin to the letters of young, single men than to those of married, older women,” the latter being particularly prone to feelings of loneliness and isolation. Volker Depkat and Ursula Lehmkuhl presented similarly structured papers. Both began with theoretical concepts of cultural history en vogue since the “cultural turn,” and then attempted to apply these theories to an analysis of groups of letters that have come to light through Lehmkuhl’s new project collecting letters in the former East Germany (see http://www.auswandererbriefe.de). In both instances, letters loom large as re-
flections, and even as tools, of personal identity formation. And in both cases, writers continued to view and portray themselves as an integral part of the same family in spite of their separation. David Gerber took the opportunity to present both a defense of the thesis and an explanation of the methodology of his recent book, reconstructing the process by which he arrived at his conclusion that “immigrant letters are not principally about documenting the world, but instead about reconfiguring a personal relationship rendered vulnerable by long-distance, long-term separation.” In doing so, he acknowledged his intellectual debt to the pioneer of letter editing, Charlotte Erickson, but noted the different conclusions he reached on the basis of much the same evidence.

In the interest of interdisciplinary dialogue, three linguists who work with immigrant letter evidence were invited to the workshop. They presented representative examples of their work and the linguistic potential of letter evidence in three languages, nicely translated for historians. Stephan Elspaß, a pioneer of “language history from below,” demonstrated how letter texts, in contrast to texts from the educated elite, sometimes show relics of earlier language periods, while at other times anticipating tendencies now found in current spoken vernaculars. These texts were “relatively unaffected by official standards” set up by grammarians and schoolteachers in the nineteenth century. Salmons extended this approach to the English used by German immigrants, investigating how, when, and how well they learned English, as well as what kind(s). The examples he presented show evidence of the influence of non-standard German and English on the English letters written by immigrants. Some Germanisms were transitional, but he showed evidence that some survive to the present as highly distinctive forms. Maria Irene Moyna explored Spanish-English interactions in a California ranching community that had parallels to an immigrant situation, even though the Spanish speakers became a language minority without moving due to population influx in the wake of the Gold Rush and annexation by the United States. The letter evidence she presented from an ethnically mixed ranching household “questions the superimposition” of English upon the Hispanic population. Instead, there was a “complex process of drawing and redrawing of allegiance lines,” with Spanish persisting throughout the nineteenth century as the language of ranching regardless of the nationality involved.

The final section of the workshop consisted of a roundtable discussion, with comments by Stephan Elspaß, David Fitzpatrick, David Gerber, Walter Kamphoefner, and Suzanne Sinke serving as springboards for further exploration. There was general consensus between the historians and the linguists on the mutual benefits and common interests of the two disciplines in working with immigrant letters. Most of the panelists also
agreed on the value and importance of contextual information, which Fitzpatrick’s words dramatized: “The editor must temporarily become a family and local historian.” On the question of whether more collections of immigrant letters are needed, participants noted that some major immigrant nationalities are still without a published “national” anthology of letters. However, the digital revolution has opened up a range of possibilities as to the form such collections and publications might take. While the future of book-length publications might be open to question, participants generally agreed on the desirability of web publication of complete texts of letters with full search capacity, linked to digital page images of original texts. All panelists came away convinced of the importance also of reading between the lines of letters, even as they remained divided on just how to do so, or what theoretical perspectives were helpful in the process.

Walter D. Kamphoefner
EXPLORING TRANSNATIONALISM IN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY: PARK SYSTEM PLANNING, RIVER FLOODS, AND LIVESTOCK DISEASES IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC WORLD

GHI-sponsored panel at the European Society for Environmental History Conference, Amsterdam, June 5–9, 2007. Organizer: Uwe Lübken (GHI). Chair: Christof Mauch (University of Munich). Panelists: Dorothee Brantz (SUNY, Buffalo), Uwe Lübken (GHI), Sonja Dümpelmann (Auburn University).

In recent years, comparative history, understood as the analysis of developments in different but similar nation-states, has been increasingly supplanted by transcultural, cross-national, or transnational perspectives. While it is difficult to keep track of the ever-growing transnational literature on social, political, and cultural issues, environmental history is still a field where this approach has hardly been tested. The panel “Exploring Transnationalism in Environmental History,” chaired by Christof Mauch at the ESEH Conference held in June 2007, aimed to explore the problems and potential insights of a transnational project in this field of historical inquiry.

Dorothee Brantz’s paper on “Canned Pigs and Delirious Cows on the Move” examined the historical problematic of the transfer of livestock diseases across the Atlantic. Whereas many livestock diseases originally had been imported to the Americas during the colonial period, the nineteenth-century expansion of US economic markets also brought them back across the Atlantic. Focusing on the specific examples of pleuropneumonia and trichinosis, Brantz demonstrated that the threat of livestock diseases led to economic embargos and diplomatic crises in the late nineteenth century, when many European countries banned the import of American livestock and meat products. Based on these empirical examples, Brantz then addressed the question of how recent debates about transnationalism might also apply to the field of environmental history. Insisting that the notion of transfer should not be regarded as an exclusively cultural category, as is often done in contemporary debates about transnationalism, she argued that historians also need to pay attention to material and environmental circumstances, as well as to transfers across species lines. Such a broadened conception of transfer might enable historians to uncover the broad implications of local and global networks and of the unintended consequences that often grow out of transnational exchanges. As Brantz pointed out, the transfer of livestock diseases is not...
only a historical phenomenon, but is also a problem that continues in the present, as recent incidents of foot and mouth disease, BSE (mad cow disease), and avian flu indicate.

Uwe Lübken’s presentation also related to the argument for a transnational environmental history. His paper, on river floods and flood control in Germany and the United States, provided another suitable example of the analysis of transnational aspects of environmental history. Physically, river floods are the most common global hazard. Furthermore, natural forces in general, and rivers in particular, know no political boundaries. Although rivers are often used to demarcate different political entities, they easily cross state lines and ignore non-natural divisions. At the same time, floods are most often a local or regional phenomenon. If more than one region is affected, however, the problem quickly becomes a matter for international rather than national action. But floods are often turned into a question of national concern because the nation-state is generally viewed as the most appropriate “container” to deal with problems of flood control and flood relief. Furthermore, the nation-state has played a vital role in how natural catastrophes have been perceived and represented. Having outlined this framework, Lübken examined different strategies of risk management in the Rhineland and the Ohio Valley in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, analyzing the relationship between local actors and the federal governments. Using the Rhine and the Ohio Rivers as examples, he explored transatlantic connections, transfers, and entanglements in the history of river floods, such as the exchange of flood-control knowledge, the dissemination of flood-control discourses, and the flow of relief money.

In her paper on “Municipal and Metropolitan Park System Planning as an International Phenomenon,” Sonja Dümpelmann showed that the environmental aspects of city planning at the beginning of the twentieth century, such as municipal and metropolitan park system planning, were a result of the transnational transfer of planning concepts, as well as ideas of nature and the city. In the early 1900s, municipal and metropolitan park system planning as a component of city planning became increasingly relevant on both sides of the Atlantic. Using the examples of the park system plans for Chicago, Berlin, and Rome, Dümpelmann discussed how ideas concerning parks and park systems were adopted in their respective countries. Besides discussing the transfer of planning models and of subsequent parallel developments in these cities, Dümpelmann illustrated how park systems were used as a means to foster local and national identities while at the same time initiating environmental planning on larger scales. She pointed out that some of the early park system and city planners who promoted nationwide or even international programs that involved neighboring nations (and thereby crossed politi-
cal borders) anticipated current initiatives such as the Pan-European ecological network, as well as European and North American greenway associations. Thus the story of the park systems’ inception is a transnational one that still continues today.

The three conference papers used examples from the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century, when strategies were developed to bolster local, regional, and national identities, and when it became increasingly clear to political, social, cultural, and economic leaders that problems and issues concerning the natural and urban environment also had to be dealt with on larger scales that transcended political boundaries. Environmental calamities like river floods and epidemics crossed borders, while cities in different nations were dealing with similar problems, such as unsanitary conditions in overcrowded urban centers. It therefore seems that transnational approaches in environmental history could be an especially adept way to research the flows of knowledge and information concerning environmental issues in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, while at the same time providing a tool to discern local, regional, and national peculiarities.

Dorothee Brantz and Sonja Dümpelmann
TOWARD A NEW TRANSATLANTIC SPACE?
CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF IDENTITY, BELONGING, AND SPACE IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD

Conference at the University of Leipzig, Villa Tillmanns, June 21–23, 2007. Jointly organized by the GHI and the Institute for American Studies, University of Leipzig, in cooperation with the Polnisches Institut and the Zeitgeschichtliches Forum, Leipzig. Additional support provided by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation (Cologne). Conveners: Crister Garrett (University of Leipzig), Hartmut Keil (University of Leipzig), Corinna Unger (GHI).

Participants: Milos Calda (Charles University, Prague), Beverly Crawford (University of California, Berkeley), Břetislav Dančák (Masaryk University, Brno), Thomas Cieslik (Tecnológico de Monterrey, Campus Estado de México), Karin Johnston (American Institute for Contemporary German Studies), Dorota Praszałowicz (Jagiellonian University, Krakow), Helke Rausch (University of Leipzig), Adam Walaszek (Jagiellonian University, Krakow), Frank Trommler (University of Pennsylvania).

The perception and relevance of the transatlantic space—the area in which the United States and Europe observe each other, interact, cooperate, and sometimes wrangle with each other—has changed over the last years due to geopolitical, economic, and security developments. Whereas Western Europe used to be at the center of American interest in the Cold War era, and Western Europeans relied on the United States as their strongest and most reliable ally vis-à-vis the East, a rift has appeared since 1989. Lately, this rift has been widened by the second Iraq war and the United States’ turn toward unilateralism, parallel to the increasingly blunt articulation of West European positions critical of the United States. Simultaneously, some of the new EU members in Central Eastern Europe have made it clear that, in some respects, especially with regard to security considerations vis-à-vis Russia, they feel closer to the United States than to the European Union. These were some of the topics discussed at the conference’s opening roundtable, in which Milos Calda, Beverly Crawford, Hartmut Keil, and Frank Trommler participated.

The conference’s panels dealt with three complexes, which together define what the transatlantic space has been, how it is changing, and what it might become in the future: culture, media, and religion; migration; and security interests, economics, and environmental politics. Frank Trommler opened the first panel with a discussion of how Self and Other are being defined across the Atlantic. He argued that conflict and confron-
tation are essential parts of the transatlantic relationship, and that each side needs to define itself by contrasting one’s own interests with the other side. While transatlantic cooperation on the economic and technological level remains strong, national or regional identities increasingly need to be defined on the cultural level, Trommler argued. This becomes especially urgent with regard to the weakening of the formerly solid basis supplied by common Western values (Wertgemeinschaft) and the growing indifference on both sides, which is partly a result of the de-centering effects of globalization.

Beverly Crawford challenged this position by arguing that interests were more important than values in constituting the Self, thus emphasizing the conflictual rather than the integrative character of the transatlantic space. Analyzing the establishment of American practices of religious life in Germany, Crawford showed how American marketing concepts are being copied by German evangelical churches and sects. As a result of this transformation, which runs parallel to the growth of the Muslim population in Germany, religious belief as a constitutive political element is introduced into the formerly secular public domain. Thus, the formerly dominant concept of “belonging without believing” is replaced by the American concept of “believing without belonging.” Connections between German and American religious groups are strong, hinting at the continuing importance of the United States as a “role model” for parts of German society, despite all critical talk of “Americanization.”

With regard to the media, Karin Johnston showed that, although there is much debate about the “Americanization” of European media culture, the second Iraq war has led to a clear divide in the transatlantic media sphere. Whereas the American media strongly supported the war and, for a while, practiced self-censorship, the German media portrayed increasingly skeptical positions not only toward the war but also toward their colleagues in the United States, bolstering German discussions about amerikanische Verhältnisse and strengthening positions critical of the United States’ hegemonic role in the world. However, as Johnston made clear, “Americanization” is often used by Europeans as a metaphor for phenomena that are not genuinely American, but actually have their roots in globalization and modernization processes. Thus, one needs to look more closely at the dynamics between globalized and national media cultures when assessing the changes taking place in the transatlantic arena.

The problem of “Americanization” was also a topic discussed in Helke Rausch’s paper on the impact of private American foundations on Western European social sciences after 1945 as part of the effort to spread and strengthen democracy in the American sense. While the impact of
American money on Western European research was strong under the umbrella of the Cold War, funding policies were not solely defined by this overarching political constellation, Rausch emphasized. Not the end of the Cold War, but the overall shift of American attention from Europe to the non-European world in the 1970s marked the phasing out of the foundations’ engagement in Western Europe. Non-governmental players thus deserve more attention as important actors in “soft politics”—a sphere that might turn out to be decisive for the future course of transatlantic relations.

The next paper was a diachronic study of the Czech Republic’s relation to the United States. Whereas the Czech-American relationship was hardly burdened by historical conflicts, its harmonious nature became disturbed when many Czechs began to revise their idealized picture of the United States after 1989, Milos Calda stated. With the ability to travel to the US and to buy American goods, the idea of the United States as a “wonderland” gradually turned into a more critical view of America as an overly commercialized “Disneyland.” In addition to this standard critique of American mass culture, the bombing of Belgrade by the United States and the conflict over the return of Czech gold stolen by the Nazis and shipped to the US after the war began to undermine Czech sympathy for America. However, the Czech Republic’s willingness to join NATO and its self-perception as a member of the West left no doubt about its general support of and expectations toward the United States.

Brťislav Dančák took this idea further by stating that Czech support for the United States’ plan to install a defense system on Czech grounds was realistic and necessary. Arguing in terms of deterrence and defense, he stated that NATO did not guarantee the Czech Republic’s defense vis-à-vis Russia, which, he said, made it necessary for the Czechs to cooperate with the United States. As a byproduct of this cooperation, the implementation of the defense system would help to keep the United States inside Europe and would allow the Czech Republic to take on a more active role within the European Union, Dančák believed. The underlying argument thus was that strategic national interests could provide a means to strengthen, and even renew, the transatlantic alliance.

Looking at Mexico, Thomas Cieslik made a similar argument. He presented the case of TAFTA, the proposed Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement, which, if realized, could function to integrate Mexico into the transatlantic alliance more fully, he stated. With Mexico already being an established economic world power, the idea of TAFTA is based on broad political rather than narrow trade interests. Therefore TAFTA, as a political project, could help to support common Western values, stability, prosperity, and credibility across the Atlantic, according to Cieslik. He suggested that TAFTA could counter the growing socialist tendencies in
Latin America, improve the transatlantic security situation, and strengthen the relations between the United States and Europe.

The two papers that followed returned to Central Europe, dealing with migration within and across the transatlantic space. Adam Walaszek described Polish migration patterns to the United States between 1870 and 1914. He argued that Polish migration pragmatically followed the development of the labor market, whereas national borders played only a marginal role in the emigrants’ considerations. Once abroad, many Poles, afraid of losing their identity, actively began to define a national identity. As a result, many of the regional and cultural differences that had been dominant in Poland quickly became overwritten in the New World.

Dorota Praszalowicz approached the problem of Polish national identity in the context of migration on a microlevel. She analyzed the personal experiences and narratives of Polish emigrants who returned to Poland after many years abroad and who, as part of a reverse brain drain, constitute a strong international or even transnational element in Polish society today. While several generations of Poles have lived with multiple national identities for a long time, some of them feel a need for greater “authenticity,” which, they believe, can only be found in Poland. Here, globalization and its inherent potential to overcome national limitations might be seen to increase the need to stabilize one’s national or regional identity.

In the last paper, Crister Garrett presented an overview of the concept of “transatlantic space” by analyzing concepts like the “spatial turn,” the “Atlantic community,” the “West,” and “transnationalism”—concepts that all play a role in the construction of the “transatlantic space.” In a case study of environmental politics and the efforts to establish a global green regime, Garrett showed how knowledge, networks, and environmental culture have become more integrated on the transatlantic level in recent years despite the existence of strong national interests and cultures. This finding suggests that new political problems requiring multilateral efforts in order to be solved might encourage the development of new transatlantic alliances.

The final discussion made clear that the problem of the transatlantic space needs to be looked at both from a historical and a contemporary/future perspective. While the importance of the transatlantic space as a political and cultural construct seemed obvious during the Cold War, the question arises if there is the need or the willingness to keep this construct alive beyond the point of strategic urgency, although the threat of terrorism might well be regarded as a “replacement” for communism as the defining element of identity formation for the West. In this sense, the West might gain a new importance as both a political and a membership
category. However, it seems questionable whether a renewed transatlantic space should be defined exclusively in terms of negation, deterrence, and containment. A project as challenging as a new transatlantic space urgently needs positive, constructive elements to develop a coherent identity and to be able to survive internal conflicts, which it is certain to experience in a setting as politically fragmented as the current international situation. One of the most convincing aspects in this context seems to be many European countries’ success in overcoming nationalism and embracing postnationalism as their common denominator, without giving up their individual traditions and cultures. Also, the United States, in gradually turning away from unilateralism, might rediscover the advantage of cooperating with a unified Europe, especially with regard to its potential to provide a bridge to Islam. On the other hand, constructing yet another transatlantic space centered on Europe and the West seems out of the question in the twenty-first century. Without the integration of Latin and South America, and without taking into account the Asian countries both as competitors and partners, a new transatlantic space will be a product of the past even before it has come into being.

Corinna R. Unger
ARCHIVAL SUMMER SEMINAR IN GERMANY, 2007


Between June 24 and July 6, the GHI’s fifteenth archival summer seminar for American doctoral students took place in Germany. This year’s group visited research institutions and met with archivists and scholars in Koblenz, Cologne, and Weimar. The aim of the seminar was to introduce the participants to the practical aspects of their prospective dissertation research in German archives and libraries. In the first part of the seminar, the doctoral students learned to read documents in old German handwriting. During the second week, they visited local, state, and federal archives and libraries to develop a sense of the diversity of the research institutions available. They also met with scholars engaged in archival research to discuss research methods and practices.

As in former years, the seminar started off with a one-week course in paleography, led by Walter Rummel of the Landeshauptarchiv Koblenz. In accordance with the participants’ research topics, the documents he taught the group to read covered the eighteenth to twentieth centuries. In addition to an introduction to the evolution of German handwriting and the technical aspects of paleography, the course included an introduction to Quellenkunde and a tour through the Landeshauptarchiv.

Parallel to the paleography course, the group spent two afternoons at the Bundesarchiv Koblenz. Archivist Jörg Filthaut introduced the participants to the basics of Archivkunde and to the problem of “historical relativity”: Not every document contained in the files has necessarily had influence on the course of history, whereas many of the decisions that did shape history never left a trace in the files. Nevertheless, the immense extent of the archive’s holdings, which the group was shown during a tour through the stacks, suggests that there are many new perspectives yet to be discovered.

On the second afternoon at the Bundesarchiv, Tim Geiger, a historian working at the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Berlin on the Edition der Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik, shared his own research experiences with the seminar’s participants. Using his PhD dissertation—a study of the conflict between Atlanticists and Gaullists within the CDU/CSU in the 1960s—as an example, he offered helpful advice on how to identify relevant material and approach archives, and how to organize and structure archival research.

The next station of the summer seminar was Cologne, home to a large number of archives. The first one the group visited was the Archiv des
Erzbistum Köln. Joachim Oepen received the American students and explained the *Provenienzprinzip*, the system of organizing archival material most common in Germany. To understand this concept, one needs to realize how archival structures and holdings were shaped by historical developments. In the early nineteenth century, for example, secularization resulted in the breakup of church archives’ holdings, which were transferred to state and local archives, creating a complicated network of diverse archives. When looking for material on a specific topic, one has to be aware of this multifaceted archival structure, a fact the participants came to realize by doing a hands-on exercise in working with finding aids.

This was followed by an afternoon at the NS-Dokumentationszentrum der Stadt Köln. Karola Fings led the group through the permanent exhibition set up in the EL-DE-Haus, the former Gestapo office and prison building, recounting the history of National Socialism in Cologne. Next, a presentation of non-printed sources such as inscriptions in the former prison cells and *Feldpostbriefe* emphasized how important it is for a historian to consider non-traditional sources as a means of integrating multiple historical perspectives and experiences.

On the second day in Cologne, Eberhard Illner welcomed the seminar group to the Historisches Archiv der Stadt Köln. Illner started the day with a session on archival methodology, followed by a presentation of finding aids, historical dictionaries, and paleographical aids. He then gave a fascinating tour of the archive’s holdings that told of the city’s rich history: from papal charters and real estate books of the Middle Ages to the personal papers of Heinrich Böll, architectural models of the postwar era, and the remnants of Cologne’s leftist scene of the 1980s.

The last station in Cologne was the photography department of the Museum Ludwig. By recounting the history of the collection, which includes the famous Agfa Archive, Bodo von Dewitz discussed both general museological questions and the specific nature of photographs as historical sources. Talking about the problem of how to present pictures that seem to portray reality but are themselves artifacts, he offered a lively account of the changes historical and artistic work with photography have experienced in the last decades.

After a quick stroll through the Museum Ludwig, the participants took a train to Weimar, the third and last station of the seminar. There, the group went to the Gedenkstätte Buchenwald, where it was given an excellent tour of the grounds by Daniel Gaede, who also illustrated the museological challenges that archivists, historians, and educators at the Gedenkstätte face every day. The questions of what to show, how to show it, and what not to show were also discussed with Wolfgang Röll, who
opened the Gedenkstätte’s collection to the participants. This collection includes archeological findings and donated as well as post-1945 memorabilia. In the third session at Buchenwald, Sabine Stein presented the archival holdings of the Gedenkstätte. Since the SS destroyed most of its documents at the end of the war, sources are scattered and incomplete, but the researchers at Buchenwald make a great effort to reconstruct the camp’s history in detail. One of the most recent projects is the Gedenkbuch, a publication containing the names of those killed at Buchenwald.

The last day of the seminar was devoted to the Herzogin Anna Amalia Bibliothek in Weimar. Michael Knoche led the group through the wonderful new building and explained its structure. This was even more impressive considering that the library, which specializes in German classical literature and writing, had suffered a great loss when a fire destroyed its Rococo reading room and library in 2004. Johannes Mangei presented the library’s efforts to regain those books lost in the fire. The participants were also given insight into the library’s digitization project of its famous holdings on Faust. A much smaller collection of the library is the so-called NS-Raubgut, which Jürgen Weber addressed. Some of the books the Nazis stole from Social Democratic libraries were kept in the library for documentation purposes, but were inaccessible to the public; under communist rule, many of them remained locked away.

Last but not least, Dorothee Brantz (SUNY Buffalo/TU Berlin) spent an afternoon with the group talking about practical aspects of archival research and answering the participants’ questions. Drawing on her own experience as a graduate student from Chicago who did research in Germany, France, and the United States, she discussed different archival cultures and gave recommendations on how to approach archivists, manage one’s limited time in the archives, and take notes efficiently. She encouraged the students to keep sight of their research interest in the midst of masses of fascinating but not necessarily relevant documents.

We would like to extend our heartfelt thanks to all the individuals and organizations that contributed to the 2007 Summer Seminar in Germany. An announcement of the program for the 2008 seminar can be found on our web site at http://www.ghi-dc.org/scholarship_summer.html.

Corinna R. Unger
Summer Seminar Participants and Their Topics:

MICHAEL CALLAHAN, University of Virginia, dissertation project: “Making Witches: Torture, Scholarship, and Imagination in Twentieth Century Germany”

ANTHONY CANTOR, University of Toronto, dissertation project: “Learning to Listen: Music Education and Identity Formation in Early Twentieth-Century Germany”

KRISTEN EHRENBERGER, University of Illinois, dissertation project: “Through the Hygiene Eye: Public Health in Germany from the Perspective of the German Hygiene Museum in Dresden, 1900–1933”

KATHERINE HUBLER, Boston College, dissertation project: “Male Allies of the German Women’s Movement, 1865–1919”


ERIC STEINHART, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, dissertation project: “The Black Sea Germans and the Holocaust, 1850–1945”


LYNN WOLFF, University of Wisconsin, dissertation project: “The Presence of the Past: W.G. Sebald’s Literary Historiography”
CONSTRUCTING CITIES:
TEXT, IMAGINATION, MATERIAL REMAINS, AND HISTORY


The two sessions at Leeds brought together former participants of the GHI’s 2005 Medieval History Seminar who wished to continue their fruitful contact. The sessions attempted to show that cities are not only spatial units confined by physical frontiers, but are also imagined virtual spaces. Proposing that the self-image of urban communities is vital for the unity and development of cities, the papers approached the subject of self-fashioning by asking in what ways and by what means town-dwellers perceived and shaped their own past and present.

The first session opened with Miriam Czock’s paper on “Constructing Community: Places of Community in the Writing of Galbert of Bruges.” She argued that in Galbert’s writing, a twelfth-century source about the murder of Charles the Good, place is at the center of social identity. A careful reading of two instances of conflict arising about places demonstrated how the citizens of Bruges modeled their identity using places. It emerged that the citizens of Bruges perceived themselves as a community because they integrated historical or symbolic meaning in places, and were prepared to protect them from physical harm, as well as shield them from definitions not of their own making.

In her contribution “Material Remains of the Immediate Past and Their Perception in Fifteenth-Century London Chronicles,” Anja Lutz posited that the chroniclers of late medieval London were hardly interested in the materiality of their surroundings and their past, although their contemporaries were interested in and had knowledge about building activities and the “anciennité” of buildings in the city. In contrast, the authors of the so-called London Chronicles aimed to make certain places and buildings of their city “timeless.” Due to this, the history of London (and of the whole realm of England) was firmly connected to the iconic and symbolic sites covering the city like a loose web that did not precisely correspond to the boundaries of the medieval city. Through their work,
the chroniclers made the perception of the city’s history accessible for their readers, and at the same time they shaped this perception.

Damien Kempf contributed a paper called “A Curious Passage From a Sixteenth-Century Chronicle of Metz, Or: The No Less Curious Story of the Transmission of a Greek Apocryphal Text in the West.” In this paper, he investigated a passage from a sixteenth-century chronicle that identifies the fourth bishop of Metz, Patient, as Prochorus. Prochorus was the author of a fifth-century Greek apocryphal text on St. John the Evangelist that enjoyed remarkable success in Byzantium, but remained mostly unknown in the West. A close examination of the manuscript dissemination of Prochorus’s *Acts of John* in the West reveals that the text was, in association with the legends of Patient, mainly disseminated from Metz, thanks to its use by the prominent abbey of St. Arnulf in Metz.

The second session opened with a paper by Florian Hartmann on “The Self-Image of the Aristocracy in Eighth-Century Rome.” Interpreting prominent artworks from the middle of the eighth century in Rome, he asked why examples of aristocratic self-image in Rome are only to be found from the middle of the eighth century onward. He argued that growing aristocratic power was caused by the increasing importance of the estates surrounding Rome, which were in the possession of Roman aristocratic landholders. Symbolic of the expanding power of the aristocracy was its self-image apparent in the extraordinary works located just at the places of aristocratic charity and alms. All the surviving inscriptions and images of the Roman aristocratic laymen are documented in the context of deaconries and charity. As a result, these laymen were linked to the supply of free grain, thus taking some authority away from, and aligning themselves with, the popes.

Alizah Holstein delivered a paper entitled “Death and Memory: Constructing Florentine Communal Identity in Late Trecento Rome.” Drawing on court testimonies from the Archivio Segreto Vaticano, she examined the ways in which Florentine merchants, residing in Rome during the War of the Eight Saints (1375–1378), negotiated their fragile position on the periphery of two warring cities. On the basis of their claimed loyalty to Rome, and at the same time, their open acknowledgment of continued ties to Florence, her paper questioned the dominant paradigm of the city as the single determining factor of late medieval social identity.

In the final paper, Lovro Kunčević dealt with the image of Ragusa as the defender of Christendom to detect the historical context of the creation of this image and the ways in which it changed from the fourteenth to the early seventeenth century. Moreover, he analyzed the sociocultural context of its production, trying to answer questions concerning the creators and users of this image, the purposes it served, and the audiences...
to which it was directed. Finally, he placed this specific Ragusan self-
image within the wider European context, drawing parallels between
Ragusan and other similar claims of being “antemurale” or “propugna-
lum Christianitatis” (e.g. Hungarian and Polish cases).

Every paper was followed by a lively and stimulating discussion. The
participating scholars would like their fruitful experience to continue,
and are now setting up a network to organize regular workshops.

*Miriam Czock and Anja Lutz*
The GHI’s Fellows Seminars are a forum in which fellowship recipients and other visiting scholars present their research to the Research Fellows of the institute and interested scholars from local academic institutions. They are organized by the Deputy Director. The GHI awards doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships for the duration of one to six months. These fellowships are designed for doctoral candidates and postdoctoral scholars whose research deals with one of the following fields: German history, the history of German-American relations, the role of Germany and the United States in international relations, and American history. For the application process, see the “Announcements” section of this Bulletin.

February 22

LARS AMENDA, Universität Hamburg
Chinesenviertel in westeuropäischen Hafenstädten: Eine transnationale Migrations- und Wahrnehmungsgeschichte 1900–1950

MAREN MÖHRING, Universität Köln
Ethnic Restaurants in West Germany, 1945–1990: Food, Migration, and Consumption

PATRICK KUPPER, ETH Zürich
Naturschutz unter Ausschluss des Menschen? Eine Nutzungs geschichte des Schweizerischen Nationalparks in internationaler Perspektive

March 22

GABRIELE PAULIX, Universität Hamburg
“Architecture Makes a Good Ambassador”- Neubauten für US Information Centers im Nachkriegsdeutschland

CHRISTOPHER NEUMAIER, Technische Universität München

MARTINA STEER, Universität Wien

April 26

DANIEL MAUL, LMU München
David A. Morse (1907–1990)—Modernisierung, Demokratie und soziale Gerechtigkeit im amerikanischen Jahrhundert

MICHAELA BANK, Universität Frankfurt
“Universal Sisterhood”: Migrantinnen in der amerikanischen Frauenrechtsbewegung im 19. Jahrhundert
KATHARINA RIETZLER, University College London  
American Foundations and the “Scientific Study of International Relations” in Europe (1920–1939)

May 24  
NICOLE KVALE, University of Wisconsin, Madison  
Emigrant Trains: Migratory Transportation Networks through Germany and North America, 1847–1914

SILKE HACKENESCH, Universität zu Köln  
“Chocolate Body?” Zur Geschichte der diskursiven und materialen Konstruktionen “schwarzer” Körperlichkeiten in den USA

June 21  
CHAD FULWIDER, Emory University  
“Strangers within our Gate”: German Propaganda among German-Americans during World War I

SEbastian HAUMANN, Universität Frankfurt  

LORA WILDENTHAL, Rice University  
The Politics of Human Rights Activism in West Germany

August 23  
KAREN MOZINGO, Ohio State University  
Choreographing the Border Spaces of Exile: German-American Embodiment in the Works of Valeska Gert, Lotte Goslar, and Pola Nirenska

ANNE-CHRISTIN SASS, Free University, Berlin  
Lebenswelten osteuropäisch-jüdischer Migranten im Berlin der Weimarer Republik (1918–1933)
ANNOUNCEMENTS: FELLOWSHIPS AND PRIZES

FRITZ STERN DISSERTATION PRIZE

Each year, the Friends of the German Historical Institute award the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize for the two best doctoral dissertations submitted in German history, German-American relations, or the history of Germans in North America. The winners are invited to the GHI to present their research at the annual symposium of the Friends in November. The prizewinners receive an award of $2,000 and reimbursement for travel to Washington, DC. Their dissertations will be considered for inclusion in the “Publications of the German Historical Institute” series published by Cambridge University Press.

Candidates are nominated by their dissertation advisers. Their dissertations must have been completed, defended, and authenticated between January 1 and December 31, 2007. The prize committee will accept nominations through April 15, 2008, and announce the prizewinners at the end of the summer.

Dissertation advisers should submit a letter of nomination along with an abstract (1-3 pages) of the dissertation to:

German Historical Institute
Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize
1607 New Hampshire Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20009–2562

For further details, please check our web site at http://www.ghi-dc.org/scholarship_stern.html.

DOCTORAL AND POSTDOCTORAL FELLOWSHIPS

The GHI awards short-term fellowships to German and American doctoral students as well as postdoctoral scholars/Habilitationen in the fields of German history, the history of German-American relations, and the role of Germany and the United States in international relations. These fellowships are also available to German doctoral students and postdoctoral scholars/Habilitationen in the field of American history. The fellowships
The GHI will not provide funding for preliminary research, manuscript composition or manuscript revision. It will give clear priority to postdoctoral projects designed for the “second book.” The monthly stipend is approximately €1,600 for doctoral students and €2,800 for postdoctoral scholars. In addition, fellowship recipients based in Germany will receive reimbursement for their roundtrip airfare to the US. All fellowship recipients are required to present the results of their research at the GHI during their grant period.

The next deadlines for applications are May 20 and October 15, 2008. Applications (two copies) should include cover letter, curriculum vitae, proof of academic degree (or transcripts), project description (3,000 words), research schedule for the fellowship period, and at least one letter of reference. While applicants may write in either English or German, we recommend that they use the language in which they are most proficient. They will be notified about the outcome within approximately two months after the deadline. Please send applications to:

German Historical Institute
Doctoral/Postdoctoral Fellowships
1607 New Hampshire Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20009–2562

KADE-HEIDENKING FELLOWSHIP

Funded by the Annette Kade Charitable Trust, the Kade-Heideking Fellowship is awarded annually to a German doctoral student working in one of the three wider areas to which the late Jürgen Heideking made significant contributions: American history and German-American relations from the early modern period to the present; international history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; and twentieth-century German and European history.

This is a residential fellowship of twelve months’ duration. It can be divided into two separate periods of six months. The recipient is expected to spend part of the fellowship period at the GHI and at the University of Wisconsin in Madison. The stipend amount is $30,000. Applications should include a cover letter, curriculum vitae, proof of academic degree, project description (8-10 pages), research schedule for the fellowship period, and two confidential letters of reference. A decision about funding is pending. The deadline for applications will be posted on the GHI website at http://www.ghi-dc.org/scholarship_kade.html.
THYSSEN-HEIDEKING FELLOWSHIP

The German Historical Institute invites applications for a one-year postdoctoral fellowship in memory of the late Jürgen Heideking. The fellowship, supported by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation, is intended for American scholars working in one of the three wider areas to which Professor Heideking made important contributions: American history and German-American relations from the early modern period to the present; international history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; and twentieth-century German and European history.

The Thyssen-Heideking Fellow will receive a stipend of €25,000 (plus a family allowance if applicable) for a fellowship period of six to twelve months in residence at the University of Cologne to begin in 2008. Fellows will be expected to give one public lecture on their other research. Applications should include a cover letter, curriculum vitae, proof of academic degree, project description (8-10 pages), research schedule for the fellowship period, and two confidential letters of reference. A decision about renewed funding is pending. The deadline for applications will be posted on the GHI web site at http://www.ghi-dc.org/scholarship_thyssen.html.

POSTDOC-STIPENDIUM FÜR NORDAMERIKANISCHE GESCHICHTE

GHI Internships

The GHI Internship Program gives German and American students of history, political science, and library studies an opportunity to gain experience at a scholarly research institute. Interns assist with individual research projects, work for the library, take part in the preparation and hosting of conferences, and help with our publications. They receive a small stipend. The program is very flexible: The GHI tries to accommodate the interns’ interests, abilities, and goals. A two-month minimum stay is required; a three-month stay is preferred. German students are strongly advised to familiarize themselves with the American visa requirements beforehand. The process of obtaining a visa has become complicated and expensive. Information is available at the web site of the American Embassy in Berlin at www.usembassy.de. The GHI cooperates with an organization authorized by the State Department to issue the relevant papers to obtain a visa. Applicants accepted into the internship program will receive further information on the procedure in their acceptance letters. Applications should contain a cover letter, a CV, a letter of recommendation, and copies of Zwischenprüfungs- or Abschlusszeugnis. You may apply either in English or German. For further information please contact Dr. Uta Andrea Balbier (balbier@ghi-dc.org).
HARTMUT BERGHOFF NAMED NEW DIRECTOR OF GHI WASHINGTON

The Stiftungsrat [council] of the Stiftung Deutsche Geisteswissenschaftliche Institute im Ausland (DGIA) has appointed Professor Hartmut Berghoff as the next director of the German Historical Institute in Washington DC. He will take up this position on April 1, 2008. Berghoff is Professor of Economic and Social History and currently Director of the Institut für Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte at the University of Göttingen. He was a fellow at the Berlin Institute for Advanced Study [Wissenschaftskolleg] in 2002/03, Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., International Visiting Scholar at the Harvard Business School in 2006, and Visiting Professor at the Maison des Sciences de l’Homme in Paris in 2007. Professor Berghoff has published widely in the fields of the history of the middle classes (Bürgertumsforschung), business history, and the history of consumption. His publications include: Englische Unternehmer 1870–1914: Eine Kollektivbiographie führender Wirtschaftsbürger in Birmingham, Bristol und Manchester (Göttingen, 1991); Zwischen Kleinstadt und Weltmarkt: Hohner und die Harmonika 1857 bis 1961. Unternehmensgeschichte als Gesellschaftsgeschichte (Paderborn, 1997); (with Cornelia Rauh-Kühne), Fritz K. Ein deutsches Leben im 20. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 2000); and Moderne Unternehmensgeschichte: Eine themen- und theorieorientierte Einführung (Paderborn, 2004). He has edited (with Jakob Vogel) Wirtschaftsgeschichte als Kulturgeschichte: Dimensionen eines Perspektivenwechsels (Frankfurt am Main, 2004); (with Jörg Sydow), Unternehmerische Netzwerke: Eine historische Organisationsform mit Zukunft? (Stuttgart, 2007); and Marketinggeschichte: Die Genese einer modernen Sozialtechnik (Frankfurt am Main, 2007).

IN MEMORIAM: GERALD D. FELDMAN

Gerald D. Feldman, professor emeritus of the Department of History at the University of California, Berkeley, died on October 31 at his home in Berkeley at the age of 70. He was a key supporter of the GHI over many years, serving on the Executive Committee of the Friends of the GHI since 1990 and as their president since 2002; since 2003, he also was a member of the GHI’s Academic Advisory Board.
Gerald Feldman was a preeminent political historian and a leading authority on the political, social, and economic history of Germany in the twentieth century. He was greatly admired by his colleagues here and in Germany, where he was a frequent visitor, for the breadth and depth of his scholarship. “He was a master of the first half (of the twentieth century) of the German political economy,” said his Berkeley colleague Martin Jay. “He was very much a real historian’s historian. He had a tremendous respect for the archives and getting the truth revealed.”

From 1963 to his retirement in 2007, Feldman was a faculty member of the UC Department of History, where he also held the Jane K. Sather Chair. His publication record of more than twenty-seven books, which he authored, co-authored, or edited, and more than a hundred scholarly articles, earned him international renown. His first book, *Army, Industry and Labor in Germany, 1914–1918* (1966), explored the extent to which Germany’s political, social, and economic institutions became transformed by the demands of war, as heavy industry and socialist labor collaborated in exploiting the opportunities provided by the war. It was a path-breaking study and became an instant classic. It was translated into German and re-issued thirty years later. The series of studies on the German inflation that Feldman co-authored and co-edited with a number of eminent German scholars in the 1970s led to yet another classic work, *The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics, and Society in the German Inflation, 1914–1924*, published in 1993. Nothing less than “a masterpiece” according to Berkeley professor Margaret Anderson, this book won him a best-book award in 1995 from the Conference Group for Central European History of the American Historical Association. His investigation of the German insurance industry and its involvement with the National Socialist regime resulted, in 2001, in the prize-winning book *Allianz and the German Insurance Business, 1933–1945*.

In the 1980s and 1990s, Gerald Feldman, together with German and American scholars, published a history of the Deutsche Bank from its beginnings to recent times. He continued to be deeply engaged in research of German and, more recently, Austrian banks during the period of National Socialism. He charted new paths in investigating the extent of the collaboration of German business with the Nazi regime, and although he was never formally trained in economic or business history, he produced major work in that field. He had a passion for work in the archives, an unwavering commitment to original research, and an unflagging energy in the pursuit of historical explanation. “He wanted to understand the deeper forces driving German and European History,” said his Berkeley colleague John Connelly. “He was working on history at the foundation.”
Gerald Feldman was the recipient of many prizes and honors in recognition of his scholarly contributions, including, in September 2000, the prestigious Commander’s Cross of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany. At the beginning of 1994, he took over the directorship of the UC Center for German and European Studies, a research center serving all campuses of the University. In 2000, the Center became part of the newly formed Institute of European Studies, where Feldman served as Founding Director until 2006.

Gerald Feldman was renowned for his devotion to his students. No American historian of Germany, Margaret Anderson commented, trained more doctoral students, virtually all of whom hold teaching positions, some of them quite prominent, in the United States and abroad. “Generations of undergraduates,” she added, “sat spellbound through lectures characterized by their depth of information, analytical bite, and wit.” Similarly, with respect to his scholarly activities, as John Connelly noted, “Gerry Feldman was a man of boundless dedication to scholarship and never too tired to contribute to academic meetings on his many interests anywhere in the world.” Indeed, he was constantly either organizing or taking part in international conferences and meetings. “He was also a man of great culture with whom you could talk about anything—literature, music, cuisine. Like all great historians, he loved life.”

Gerald Feldman is survived by his wife Norma von Ragenfeld-Feldman and his two children, Aaron Joseph Feldman and Deborah Eve Feldman. Services were private. The family asked that, in lieu of flowers, a donation be made to the UC Department of History in honor of Professor Feldman and in support of graduate students in German history.

Margaret Anderson, John Connelly, Beverly Crawford

GHI-ESEH Prize in Environmental History

On Friday, June 7, 2007, the biennial GHI-ESEH prize in environmental history, which is sponsored by the German Historical Institute (GHI) and the European Society of Environmental History (ESEH), was awarded to David Moon of Durham University for an article about the environmental history of the Russian steppes. The prize was awarded during a special dinner ceremony at Artis in Amsterdam by the chair of the GHI-ESEH prize committee, Christof Mauch (University of Munich, formerly GHI). The other committee members were Fiona Watson (St. Andrews) and Lajos Racz (Szeged). In his awards speech, Mauch pointed out that Dr. Moon had brought to the attention of environmental historians an area of
the world of global significance. He praised the *longue durée* approach and pointed out that the article was of special political relevance today, as it discusses the role of scientists and politicians in dealing with ecology.

**GHI-CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS SERIES NOW AVAILABLE ONLINE**

The full texts of most of the titles in the *Publications of the German Historical Institute* series published by the GHI in collaboration with Cambridge University Press are now accessible online free of charge in PDF format. For a list of the entire series and links to the volumes now available online, go to the GHI’s web site: [www.ghi-dc.org/publications/books/cambridge.html](http://www.ghi-dc.org/publications/books/cambridge.html).

**NEW PUBLICATIONS**

1. **Books by GHI Research Fellows**


2. **Publications of the German Historical Institute (Cambridge University Press)**

   **Andreas Daum,** *Kennedy in Berlin* (New York and Washington DC, 2007)


3. **GHI Reference Guides**


   **Christoph Strupp and Kai Dreisbach,** with the assistance of Patricia C. Sutcliffe and Birgit Zischke, *German Americana, 1956–2005: A Comprehen-


4. Other Publications supported by the GHI

Alexander Nützenadel and Christoph Strupp, eds., Taxation, State, and Civil Society in Germany and the United States from the 18th to the 20th Century (Baden-Baden, 2007)

Library Report

We are happy to announce the acquisition of the microfiche collection Partei und Staat in der DDR: Akten aus der Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv. The collection contains a wide range of documents and consists of three parts: records from Walter Ulbricht’s office; records from Erich Honecker’s office; and the minutes of the Zentralsekretariat of the SED and the Politbüro, 1946 to 1989. We were also able to acquire the microfiche collection Tarnschriften 1933 bis 1945, edited by the Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv. Camouflaged leaflets and brochures played an important role in the resistance to the Nazi regime. Books with disguised or false covers made the distribution of oppositional texts possible. This collection contains reprints of 1024 camouflaged leaflets and brochures. Other important additions to our library are Ernst Cassirer’s Gesammelte Werke in 25 volumes, Die geheimen Papiere Friedrich von Holsteins in four volumes, Preussische Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkriegs, and Martin Buber’s Werkausgabe.

We would like to express our gratitude to the following people and institutions that donated books to the GHI library: Wiebke Becker, Christoph Bottin, Deutsches Archäologisches Institut Athen, Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte, Georg-Eckert-Institut für internationale Schulbuchforschung, Bernd Herrmann, Christian B. Keller, Simone Lässig, Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Brandenburg, Landtag Thüringen, David Lazar, Christof Mauch, Margaret Midgley, Militärhistorisches Museum Dresden, Daniela Münkel, Jens Niederhut, LaVern J. Rippley, Susanne Peters-Schildgen, Dominique Schiffer, Steiner Verlag Stuttgart, Martin Skubima, Corinna Unger, Benjamin Ziemann.
EXHIBITION PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE MIES–MLK LIBRARY

The Martin Luther King, Jr., Memorial Library at 9th and G Streets, NW, in downtown Washington, DC, was designed on commission by architect Ludwig Mies van der Rohe. Ground was broken in July 1968, and the building opened in 1972. Having been poorly maintained for decades, Mies’s modernist structure is deteriorating and in need of urgent repairs. The government of the District of Columbia is currently considering a plan to spend over 100 million dollars on a new public library located at the site of the recently demolished convention center. This discussion has mobilized architects, architectural historians, preservationists, and local community groups, all of whom have come out in strong support of the renovation and expansion of Mies’s building.

In a series of approximately fifty images, photographer Colin Loughlin undertook to document Mies’s library, from its grand metal-and-glass exterior to its smallest details and interior fixtures. Loughlin, a recent graduate of the Corcoran College of Art and Design, also focused his lens on library patrons—more specifically, the way in which they interact with the surrounding space. “Over the course of this project,” he notes, “I came to appreciate the fact that the library offers many people a type of solitude that is difficult to find elsewhere.” Loughlin goes on to explain, “The softly lit reading rooms make the library an appealing retreat, a space with which visitors can comfortably co-exist.” The exhibition (May 4–June 15, 2007) was organized by Kelly McCullough (GHI). Professor Richard Longstreth (George Washington University) spoke at the opening reception on May 4. The GHI would like to thank the German Embassy for sponsoring the opening reception.

EXHIBITION INWARD TURN: PORTRAITS BY LOTTE JACOBI

Lotte Jacobi’s portraits are among Weimar Germany’s most recognized photographs—her portraits of Lotte Lenya and Peter Lorre, for example, stand as icons of that rich era. And it is no leap to suggest that her works are also among the most recognized portraits of the twentieth century: a pensive Einstein in his leather jacket, the weathered face of poet Robert Frost. These and other famous photographs were exhibited as part of Inward Turn—Portraits by Lotte Jacobi, a show organized by the GHI in conjunction with bookseller Steve Schuyler (North Reading, Massachusetts), who spoke at the opening reception on June 22, 2007. The photographs on exhibit from June 22 to August 24 were from Steven Schuyler’s
own collection. The GHI is grateful to have had the opportunity to show them in Washington.

Jacobi was born in 1896 in Thorn, West Prussia. At the time, her family could already boast three generations of photographers—her great-grandfather is said to have purchased his equipment in Paris from Daguerre himself. Jacobi grew up in Posen and began taking photographs as a child. Throughout her teens, she helped in her father’s busy atelier, but it was not until 1925, when she enrolled in photography school in Munich, that she became serious about entering the profession. After completing her studies in 1927, she moved to Berlin, where her family had relocated and her father had opened another studio. As historian Peter Gay has written, “To go to Berlin [at that time] was the aspiration of the composer, the journalist, the actor; with its superb orchestras, its hundred and twenty newspapers, its forty theaters.” Jacobi soon began supplying images of these very types of people to Berlin’s insatiable illustrated press. The circles in which she moved were extremely progressive, not just artistically, but also politically. She photographed politicians of the far left, including Ernst Thälmann, the Communist candidate for Reichstag president. After Hitler’s rise to power, Jacobi realized that neither her Jewish background nor her political sympathies would endear her to the Nazi Party. In 1935, she left for America and settled in New York, where she opened a studio and operated within a world of art and culture similar to the one she had left behind. Her subjects included members of the émigré community, but also new personalities—Benjamin Britten, W.H. Auden, Alfred Stieglitz. Jacobi left New York in 1955 and settled in Deering, New Hampshire, where she spent the remainder of her life. It was there, in the 1970s, that Schuyler—then a young Harvard graduate student—first met Jacobi. At the time, Schuyler was conducting research for his dissertation on Jacobi’s second husband, the renowned German publisher Eric Reiss, whom she had met and married in New York. The meeting marked the beginning of a friendship that ended only with Jacobi’s death in 1990.

**EXHIBITION ZEIT MIT PALUCCA: PHOTOGRAPHS BY GÜNTER BERSCH**

In 1986, East Berlin photographer Günter Bersch traveled to Dresden to photograph the legendary dancer Gret Palucca (1902–1993) in the school she founded during the Weimar Republic. Then age eighty-four, the former Bauhaus muse (who was sketched by Wassily Kandinsky, among many others, and was once described by artist László Moholy-Nagy as
the “newly discovered law of motion”) was still dancing and teaching, just as she had been doing—with the exception of a forced six-year interruption during the Third Reich—since her school first opened its doors in 1925. Although East German cultural officials never warmed to Palucca’s signature style of expressive modern dance [Ausdruckstanz], they prized her international reputation and granted her institution official status as a national technical school for professional dance. The photographs on view at the GHI (September 7–December 14, 2007) were presented to Palucca on the occasion of her eighty-fifth birthday in 1987.

Günter Bersch (1943–2007) was one of Germany’s leading reportage photographers. After finishing his studies at the Academy of Visual Arts in Leipzig (1975), he published his first book, Soldatengesichter, a subtly humorous and ultimately critical view of the GDR National People’s Army. From 1978 to 1990, Bersch worked as a photographer for the illustrated magazine Für Dich. Between 1990 and 2007, he contributed to numerous magazine and book projects and collaborated on several documentaries for German television. (He himself was the subject of two documentaries: Westside-Stories (1998, ZDF/ARTE) and Der zweite Blick (1999, ZDF/ARTE).) Starting in 1997, he was a reference photographer for the firm Leica. In 2002, Bersch was named official photographer of the city of Eisenach. Over the years, he published numerous books, including Startbahn Ost: Zehn Lebensbilder (2000), Soviel Heimat (2003), Die Stille is die Zeit (2004), and “ForscherLeben” (2005).

The opening night program on September 7 included dance performances by Brigitta Herrmann, a former student of Palucca who is co-founder and artistic director of the Ausdruckstanz Dance Theater in Philadelphia, and Mary Anne Santos Newhall, a “dancing historian” and a professor of dance at the University of New Mexico. The GHI would like to thank the Arnhold Foundation, New York, for its generous sponsorship of this exhibition and the German Embassy for its support of the opening-night program.

**Recipientsof GHI Fellowships**

**Postdoctoral Fellowships**

**Monika Dommann,** Universität Zürich, “Kopieren, Regulieren: Die Normierung der Vervielfältigung seit 1850”

H. Glenn Penny, University of Iowa, “The German Love Affair with the American Indian”

**Doctoral Fellowships**

Christiane Berth, Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte in Hamburg, “Hamburg und die außereuropäische Kaffewelten”

Mary Lynn Fehler, Texas Christian University, “Thriving on a Strange Soil: Gender, Identity, and Religion in German Texas Communities, 1830–1880”

Robert Fuchs, Universität zu Köln, “Heiratsverhalten deutscher Migrantinnen und Migranten in den USA: Das Fallbeispiel Cincinnati, 1850–1920”


Enrico Heitzer, Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung Potsdam, “Terror für die Freiheit? Die Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit 1948 bis 1959”


Martin Lüthe, Justus-Liebig Universität Giessen, “Cars, Color-Line, and Crossing-Over: Motown and die amerikanische Musikindustrie”

David Motadel, Pembroke College, Cambridge, “Islam im Dritten Reich”

Thorsten Schulz, Universität zu Köln, “Die sicherheitspolitische Dimension der internationalen Umweltpolitik in Europa: Das Beispiel Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Großbritannien und USA 1965 bis 1975”


**Recipients of GHI Internships**

The GHI was fortunate to have a number of excellent interns who made valuable contributions to our work. The interns conducted research in libraries and archives, helped prepare and run conferences, assisted edi-
tors, librarians, and administrators, and cheerfully performed all other tasks that came their way. For their excellent work we would like to thank Susan Eckelmann (Indiana University), Antje Hoehler (University of Munich), Andreas Lutsch (Mainz University), Anja Milde (Heidelberg Center for American Studies), Anna Niederhut (Humboldt University of Berlin), Marius Nimphius (University of Duisburg-Essen), Anne Kurr (Free University Berlin), and Frank Scheffler (Technical University Dresden).

**Staff Changes**

**Uta Andrea Balbier**, Research Fellow, joined the Institute in May 2007. She studied history, political science, and journalism at the universities in Münster and in Hull (Great Britain). She received her Ph.D. in Modern History from the University of Potsdam in 2005. Until May 2007, she worked as a Research Fellow at the Hamburg Institute for Social Research. Her dissertation analyzed how sports became a field of political interference and interpretation in both German states in the first two decades of the Cold War. Under the pressure to rise to the East German challenge to gain international recognition in the field of sports, the West German government and the coordinating sports association became increasingly aware of the political importance of athletic competition. Thus, they implemented training and research institutions in the field of sports similar to the ones existing in the GDR. Her book received one of the Carl Diem Awards of the German Sports Association for outstanding research in sports science. In November 2006, it was published under the title *Kalter Krieg auf der Aschenbahn: Deutsch-deutscher Sport 1950–72, eine politische Geschichte* (Paderborn: Schöningh Verlag). Her research interests include the history of sports, modern American and German History, the history of religion, and transnational history.

**Carolin Brinkmann**, Project Associate since January 2006, left the GHI in September 2007 to continue her career in Berlin. She still supports the project “German History in Documents and Images” on a freelance basis and can be reached at brinkmann@ghi-dc.org.

**Bryan Hart** joined the GHI in June 2007 as a Research Assistant to assist the acting and deputy directors of the Institute. He recently completed a Master’s degree in political science from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, as well as interned at the Berlin Institute for Comparative Social Research and the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC.
MARY E. (BETSY) HAUCK, Administrative Assistant, joined the GHI part-time in May 2007. Ms. Hauck was formerly a fixed-income portfolio manager and holds a degree in economics from the University of California at Berkeley.

KERSTIN JAGER, Project Associate, joined the GHI in April 2007 to support the “German History in Documents and Images” project. Kerstin received her Master’s degree from the Center for German and European Studies at Georgetown University in 2006 and worked at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies before coming to the GHI.

INSA KUMMER joined the GHI in June 2007 as Project Associate for the online project “German History in Documents and Images.” From 2004 until April of 2007, she served in the cultural affairs department of the German Embassy in Washington. She holds an M.A. in American Studies, History, and Art History from the Free University, Berlin.

GISELA METTELE, Acting Director since April 2007 and Research Fellow since March 2005, left the GHI in October 2007 to accept a tenured position as lecturer in European Urbanization at the University of Leicester, UK. She can be reached under g.mettele@le.ac.uk

STEPHEN J. SCALA, coordinator of the German Studies Directory since September 2005, left the GHI in August 2007 to conduct research in Berlin for his dissertation on foreign policy expertise in the GDR in comparative perspective. He is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Maryland-College Park and can be reached at sjscala@gmail.com.

BERND SCHAEFER, Research Fellow since June 2001, left the GHI in May 2007 to become a Senior Scholar with the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington DC. He can be reached at bernd.schaefer@wilsoncenter.org.

CHRISTOPH STRUPP, Research Fellow since April 2001, left the Institute in March 2007. He is currently a DGIA-Research Fellow at the Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte in Hamburg (FZH) and participates in an FZH research project on foreign consular reporting from Germany, 1933–1945. He can be reached at strupp@zeitgeschichte-hamburg.de.
EVENTS

LECTURE SERIES, FALL 2007

THE “GERMAN AUTUMN” OF 1977: TERROR, STATE, AND SOCIETY IN WEST GERMANY

_Deutscher Herbst_—“German Autumn”—was the name a group of filmmakers bestowed upon a series of terrorist attacks and the atmosphere of crisis they provoked in West Germany in late 1977. On September 5 of that year, the self-styled urban guerillas of the Red Army Faction (_Rote Armee Fraktion_, RAF) kidnapped Hanns Martin Schleyer, a prominent businessman, and demanded that imprisoned RAF members be freed as the condition for Schleyer’s release. After the government of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt refused to meet the kidnappers’ terms, a group of Palestinian terrorists hijacked a Lufthansa passenger jet and, like Schleyer’s kidnappers, demanded the release of the imprisoned RAF members. West German counterterrorist forces stormed the plane in the night of October 17–18 and succeeded in rescuing the eighty-six passengers on board. Later that same night, four imprisoned RAF members attempted suicide; three died, the fourth survived. Shortly after the raid on the hijacked plane, Schleyer was shot by his captors; his corpse was found on October 19. These events and the measures enacted in response to them gave new urgency to West Germany’s long-running debate on political violence and civil liberties. This lecture series revisited the _Deutscher Herbst_ and West Germany’s confrontation with terrorism.

September 27

_Ideology and Terror in the Red Decade: Reflections on Communism, Anti-Zionism, and the Memory of Terrorism’s Victims_

Jeffrey Herf (University of Maryland)

October 25

_Refusing to be “Good Germans”: New Left Violence as a Global Phenomenon_

Jeremy Varon (Drew University)

November 1

_Terror and Security: Law Enforcement, the Media, and Social Change in West Germany during the 1970s_

Klaus Weinhauer (University of Bielefeld)

November 8

_Militant Subcultures: The Origins of West German Terrorism in the Late 1960s_

Detlef Siegfried (University of Copenhagen)

November 29

_Stammheim and Majdanek: Prosecuting Terrorists and Nazis in 1970s West Germany_

Rebecca Wittman (University of Toronto)
EVENTS SPONSORED BY THE GHI, 2007–2008

FOR A REGULARLY UPDATED CALENDAR OF EVENTS, PLEASE CHECK OUR WEBSITE AT WWW.GHI-DC.ORG.

2007

July 12–14  Local, Regional and Global Constructions of Christianity: Religious Communication Networks, 1680–1830
Conference at the GHI London
Conveners: Andreas Gestrich (GHI London), Gisela Mettele (GHI)

July 21  Michael Frayn’s “Democracy”
Panel Discussion at the Olney Theater (Olney, MD)
Conveners: Gerald Livingston (GHI), Gisela Mettele (GHI)

September 6–8  Reading Hamburg: Anglo-American Perspectives
Conference at the Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte in Hamburg (FZH)
Conveners: Axel Schildt (FZH/University of Hamburg), Christoph Strupp (FZH/GHI), Dorothee Wierling (FZH/University of Hamburg)

September 7  Zeit mit Palucca—Photographs by Günter Bersch
Exhibition opening at GHI

September 13–14  Pleasure, Power, and Everyday Life under National Socialism
Conference at the GHI Paris
Conveners: Fabrice d’Almeida (IHTP, Paris), Corey Ross (University of Birmingham), Pamela Swett (McMaster University), Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)

September 13–15  Uncertain Environments: Natural Hazards, Risk, and Insurance in Historical Perspective
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Uwe Lübken (GHI), Christof Mauch (LMU Munich)
October 3

*German Unification Symposium (Hertie Lecture)*
Speaker: Bärbel Bohley

October 4–6

“A Humanitarian as Broad as the World”: Abraham Lincoln’s Legacy in International Context
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Gabor Boritt (Gettysburg College), Uwe Lübken (GHI), Jörg Nagler (University of Jena)

October 4–6

*Caribbean Encounters: A German Missionary’s Discovery of the New World*
GHI-sponsored panel at the German Studies Association (San Diego, CA)
Convener: Gisela Mettele (GHI)

October 9

*Still a Community of Values? Historical Reflections on the Normative Basis of the West*
Lecture at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University
Speaker: Heinrich August Winkler (Humboldt University, Berlin)

October 11–14

*Medieval History Seminar*
Conveners: Carola Dietze (GHI), Karsten Plöger (GHI London)

November 9

*Film Screening: Between the Lines*
Woodrow Wilson Center

November 15

*The Future of the Sovereign State: Some Historical Reflections on the German Case*
Twenty-First Annual Lecture of the GHI
Speaker: James J. Sheehan (Stanford University); Commentator: Cornelia Rauh-Kühne (University of Hannover)

November 16

Sixteenth Annual Symposium of the Friends of the GHI and Award of the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize
Conveners: Friends of the GHI, Anke Ortlepp (GHI)

December 6–8

*Connecting Atlantic, Indian Ocean, China Seas, and Pacific Migration, 1830s to 1930s*
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Gisela Mettele (GHI), Marcel van der Linden (Institute of Social History, Amsterdam), Donna Gabbacia (Immigration History Research Center), Dirk Hoerder (Arizona State University)
2008

January 5
Joint Reception of the GHI and the Conference Group for Central European History of the AHA (for CGCEH members)

January 25–27
Transregional and Transnational Families
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Gisela Mettele (GHI), David Sa- bean (UCLA)

February 21–23
Managing the Unknown: Natural Resources and Reserves in History
Workshop at the GHI
Conveners: Uwe Lübken (GHI), Frank Ueköt- ter (Deutsches Museum München)

Spring 2008
Why Terrorists Stop: Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in Global Comparison
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Timothy J. Naftali (University of Virginia, Nixon Presidential Library and Mu- seum), Christof Mauch (GHI / LMU Munich)

March 28–29
Modernization as a Global Project: American, Soviet, and European Approaches
Workshop at the GHI
Conveners: Corinna Unger (GHI), David En- german (Brandeis University)

May 15–17
Fire and Flammable Cities: Urban Environment and Culture in History
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Uwe Lübben (GHI), Greg Bankoff (University of Hull), Jordan Sand (Georgetown University)

May 23–24
Public Eating, Public Drinking: Places of Consumption from Early Modern to Postmodern Times
Conference at the GHI
Convener: Maren Möhring
May 28–31  
*Early Modern German History*

Fourteenth Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar in German History, at the Free University, Berlin
Conveners: Roger Chickering (Georgetown University), Claudia Ulbrich (Free University, Berlin), Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)

May 30–31  
*Gender and the Long Postwar: Reconsiderations of the United States and the Two Germanys, 1945–1989*

Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Karen Hagemann (University of North Carolina), Sonya Michel (University of Maryland), Corinna Unger (GHI)

June 16–27  
Archival Summer Seminar in Germany
Convener: Corinna Unger (GHI)

September 25–27  
*Human Breeding for the Improvement of the Nations: Proto-Eugenic Thinking Before Galton*

Workshop at the GHI
Conveners: Maren Lorenz (GHI), Christoph Irmscher (Indiana University, Bloomington)

Fall 2008  
*Global Migration Systems of Domestic and Care Workers*

Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Gisela Mettele (University of Leicester, UK), Christiane Harzig (Arizona State University), Mary Romero (Arizona State University)

Fall 2008  
*Poverty and its Representation in Historical Perspective*

Workshop at the GHI
Conveners: Anke Ortlepp (GHI), Christoph Ribbat (University of Paderborn)

Oct. 30–Nov. 1  
*Moving Beyond a History of Sports*

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