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Features:

Europe: A Community
of Memory?

Aleida Assmann and Peter Novick

Reflections on Poland,
Germany, and the
Transformation of Europe

Gesine Schwan and Janusz Reiter

Fact, Truth, and Fiction:

Interview with Frederick Reuss



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BULLETIN

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CONTENTS

List of Contributors	5
Preface	7
FEATURES	
Europe: A Community of Memory? <i>Aleida Assmann</i>	11
Comments on Aleida Assmann's Lecture <i>Peter Novick</i>	27
Response to Peter Novick <i>Aleida Assmann</i>	33
Bridging the Oder: Reflections on Poland, Germany, and the Transformation of Europe: Part I <i>Gesine Schwan</i>	39
Bridging the Oder: Part II <i>Janusz Reiter</i>	47
Fact, Truth, and Fiction: An Interview with Novelist Frederick Reuss <i>David Lazar</i>	53
STERN PRIZE	
Cosmopolitan Conservatism: Transnational Elite Politics in the German-American Atlantic of the Nineteenth Century and the Dialectic of Commerce and Community <i>Lars Maischak</i>	69
HELMUT SCHMIDT PRIZE	
A Plea for a Rapprochement between History and Economic History <i>Volker Berghahn</i>	83

GHI RESEARCH

Terror in the Nineteenth Century: Political Assassinations and
Public Discourse in Europe and the United States, 1878–1901 91
Carola Dietze

Mass Migration and Local Politics in Chicago and Vienna,
1850–1938: Some Questions, Some Hypotheses 99
Marcus Gräser

Public Spirit in Suburbia? The Garden City as Civic Experiment 105
Gisela Mettele

Friendly Skies? A Cultural History of Air Travel in
Postwar America 115
Anke Ortlepp

Coca-Cola History: A “Refreshing” Look at
German-American Relations 127
Jeff R. Schutts

Modernization à la Mode: West German and American
Development Plans for the Third World 143
Corinna R. Unger

CONFERENCE REPORTS

Historical Development of World Rivers 161
Dorothy Zeisler-Vralsted

The Forgotten Generation: The First Generation of Spanish
Immigrants in Hamburg 164
Anke Ortlepp

Bucerius Seminar 2006: American History and American Archives 165
Andreas Etges

Parsing Prussian Personality—Christian Thomasius and the
Psychogram: Edmund Spevack Memorial Lecture 169
Richard F. Wetzell

Award of the Franz Steiner Prize 170
Ulrich Bachteler

A Resource Rediscovered: The Reopening of the German Society
of Pennsylvania Library 171
Frank Trommler

Fifteenth Annual Symposium of the Friends of the GHI and
Award of the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize 173
Richard F. Wetzell

Five Germanies He Has Known: Symposium in Honor of Fritz Stern <i>Carolin Brinkmann and Thrine Kane</i>	175
Arnold Brecht (1884–1977): Democratic Civil Servant and Political Scholar in Berlin and New York <i>Corinna R. Unger</i>	177
Fellows Seminars, Fall 2006 <i>Dirk Schumann</i>	178
ANNOUNCEMENTS: FELLOWSHIPS AND PRIZES	
Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize	181
Doctoral and Postdoctoral Fellowships	181
Kade-Heideking Fellowship	182
Thyssen-Heideking Fellowship	183
Postdoc-Stipendium für Nordamerikanische Geschichte	183
GHI Körber Internships	184
GHI Internships	184
NEWS	
GHI Reference Guides No Longer Available By Subscription	185
German Americana, 1956–2005	185
GHI Fellowship at the Horner Library	186
New Publications	186
Library Report	187
GHI Fellowship Recipients	188
GHI Internship Recipients	190
Staff Changes	190
EVENTS	
Lecture Series, Spring 2007	193
Events Sponsored by the GHI	194
GHI PUBLICATIONS	199

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Contributors not listed here are on the staff of the GHI. See inside back cover for more information.

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PREFACE

If historians are accustomed to thinking about the role of contingency in shaping the past, they are also much like everyone else in talking about “chance,” “opportunity,” and “luck” when it comes to discussing their own lives. Luck has certainly played a very large part in my life over the past decade. In January 1998, I arrived in Washington to take up the position of deputy director of the German Historical Institute. I assumed that I would be spending three, at most five years in Washington, and I had no idea that I would soon be stepping in as acting director. Nor during my tenure as acting director did I think that I would be offered the position of director. As I now prepare to leave Washington to return to Germany, I cannot emphasize strongly enough just how lucky I have been in my time at the GHI.

It was lucky for me that I came to an institute that was a firmly established fixture on the German and American scholarly landscapes. My predecessors in the director’s office, Hartmut Lehmann and Detlef Junker, had built a formidable transatlantic network of connections and contacts for the GHI, and I profited enormously from the goodwill toward the GHI that I inherited. At the center of the GHI’s support network stand its Academic Advisory Board and the Friends of the GHI. I owe a great debt of gratitude to the members, past and present, of those two bodies for their engagement on behalf of the GHI. It also made my job easier knowing that I could draw upon the advice, encouragement, and support of the transatlantic community of scholars who in one way or another have had something to do with the GHI—former research fellows, recipients of GHI fellowships, and participants in GHI-sponsored conferences and programs.

Expanding the GHI’s *Nachwuchsprogramme* for students, doctoral candidates, and postdocs stood high on the list of what I sought to achieve when I became acting director, and it is a source of deep satisfaction to me that the GHI was able to add to its programs for up-and-coming historians. Our long-running annual Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar in German history is now complemented by the Young Scholars Forum in American and comparative history. Our Medieval History Seminar provides another venue for young European and North American scholars to discuss their research with leading senior scholars in their field. We launched a summer course to introduce American students to German archives; the success of that initiative encouraged us to create a counterpart for German doctoral students in American history. The number of

fellowships for dissertation and *Habilitation* research the GHI awards annually has roughly tripled over the past ten years. On just about any given day, two or three GHI interns are at work in Washington helping our research fellows. My pride in these programs goes hand in hand with deep gratitude to the colleagues and organizations who have made them possible. I had the easy job: I just said "yes." The real work fell to those who organized the programs, to the GHI staff members who took care of travel arrangements and logistics, and to the scholars who graciously took the time to serve as mentors. These programs depend in large measure on funding provided by Germany's Federal Ministry of Education and Research through the GHI's sponsoring foundation, the Stiftung Deutsche Geisteswissenschaftliche Institute im Ausland. Many of the *Nachwuchsprogramme* would not be possible, however, without the additional support provided by partner institutions, foundations, and corporations. Their help has been especially important for the GHI's special-purpose, named fellowships and prizes for younger scholars. I am pleased to report, for example, that the GHI and the German Society of Philadelphia (GSP) have just created a new fellowship to enable graduate students to conduct research at the GSP's Joseph Horner Memorial Library, one of the richest collections of German Americana anywhere. Outside funding has also been crucial for the prizes the GHI sponsors to recognize the work of younger scholars: the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize, the Franz Steiner Prize in transatlantic history, and the publication prize jointly awarded by the GHI and the European Society for Environmental History.

The GHI's work in environmental history, one of our principal areas of focus during my tenure as director, has provided an opportunity to build upon the institute's strength in comparative history, to look beyond the Atlantic world, and to expand our network of contacts across the globe. We have also been able to extend our reach and serve students and teachers throughout the world with the most ambitious project now underway at the GHI, the bilingual Internet site "German History in Documents and Images" (GHDI). At last count, 1,300 people per day were visiting the site and spending an average of more than 20 minutes using and downloading the primary source materials it offers. Like GHDI, the *Bulletin* and the GHI's Reference Guides are now available on the institute's Web site, and I am especially happy to report that starting later this spring many of the titles in the "Publications of the German Historical Institute" series that we publish in collaboration with Cambridge University Press will be available free of charge on the website as well.

Taking the balance of my time at the GHI—weighing what I achieved and what I did not, setting the strokes of luck against missed opportunities—I can only consider myself a very fortunate man. Above all, I have

been lucky in my colleagues. It has been an honor and a pleasure to work with the GHI's research fellows, a group of remarkably creative, dedicated, and hard-working scholars. They and everyone else on the GHI's staff have been unfailingly helpful over the years. The help they provided was as diverse as their interests, skills, and personalities. It might take the form of assistance with a project, a constructively skeptical question, or a joke in a moment of stress. As my responsibilities increased, so, too, did my reliance on the GHI's fellows, support staff, administrators, and editors. I do not know how to give adequate thanks to them: Let me say simply that they are the reason I have so enjoyed working at the GHI. Much as I would like to name names in this instance, I do not have space here to thank each member of the staff individually. It is only fair, though, that I single out the five colleagues who had to deal with an unending stream of questions and requests from me: my assistants Christa Brown and Bärbel Thomas; GHI administrative director Sabine Fix; our senior editor David Lazar; and, in particular, my former deputy Dirk Schumann. In closing, I would like to give special thanks to my new deputy and soon-to-be acting director, Gisela Mettele. It was a lucky day for the GHI when Gisela applied for a research fellow position; I know I leave the institute in good hands.

Christof Mauch

FEATURES

EUROPE: A COMMUNITY OF MEMORY?

Twentieth Annual Lecture of the GHI, November 16, 2006

Aleida Assmann

University of Konstanz

“The project of a united Europe will probably require the readjustment of historical narratives—and possibly the recasting of various collective memories from East and West.”

—Jan-Werner Müller

In 1882, at the very peak of the development of nationalism, the French anthropologist Ernest Renan prophesied: “Nations are not permanent. They began and they will end sometime. It is very likely that they will be replaced by the European confederation.”¹ At the beginning of the twenty-first century, we can only confirm this statement: The concept of the nation is receding as a dominant reference point for collective identity. New forms of collective identity have appeared both above and below the level of nationhood. In this process the downward tendency toward disintegration is at least as strong as the upward tendency toward integration on a higher level. An obvious example is the United States, where national myths and visions lost both color and persuasive power to make room for ethnic identities. The immigrants had been expected to relinquish their origins and histories so that they could dedicate themselves completely to the common national project. This nation was united not by a common heritage but by a promise, a common dream. “To be an American (unlike being English or French or whatever),” wrote Leslie Fiedler in the late 1960s, “is precisely to imagine a destiny rather than to inherit one since we have always been, insofar as we are Americans at all, inhabitants of myth rather than history.”² The rationale of this immigration policy was that a common future would gradually replace divided pasts.

Today, we see that the future has lost much of its power to integrate, while the past is becoming increasingly important in the formation of identity. This shift of orientation from future to past occurred in the 1980s and 1990s with the growing acknowledgement of historical traumas. In the aftermath of the Holocaust, colonialism, and slavery, the experience of

the victims found growing recognition and served as a new basis for the formation of collective identity. This fragmentation of national identity into subgroups has become manifest in the so-called hyphenated identities, such as African-American, Caribbean-British, or Jewish-Austrian.

European Identity Formation

Generally speaking, collective identities require both a common goal for the future and common points of reference in the past. This applies also to the case of the European Union. There is currently little disagreement about the guiding values for the present and the future: the basic rights of democratic civil society are compulsory for all member states. The political scientist Bassam Tibi, a German Muslim from Syria and a student of Max Horkheimer, coined the term "European guiding culture" [*europäische Leitkultur*] to identify this normative framework for integration.³ Starting from the premise that every community needs "a consensus of values and an identity," Tibi defined the standard for a "European identity for Germany" in the following way:

Precedence of reason over religious revelation, that is, over the authority of absolute religious truths; precedence of *individual* human rights over communal rights; a secular democracy based on the separation of church and politics; *universally recognized* pluralism as well as mutually effective tolerance. The acceptance of these values alone forms the substance of a civil society.⁴

At the same time, various actions have been taken to create something like a common historical memory for the growing European Union which, it is hoped, will reinforce the bonds between the member states. Politicians, historians, museologists, and image designers are currently in search of a collective European history, which is to be disseminated through common symbols, textbooks, and commemorative practices. Politicians and historians have laid the foundation for a museum of Europe that is to open in 2007 on the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the European Community. It is intended to strengthen the consciousness of a transnational European identity among the citizens of the EU by providing a historical narrative and giving it concrete and visible shape.⁵ Another historical project discussed by a group of international historians is the search for shared "European sites of memory." The project of *Lieux de mémoire* (1984–1992), launched for France by Pierre Nora and his colleagues and successfully imitated in many European countries such as the Netherlands, Spain, Austria, and Germany, is thereby to be raised to a transnational level.⁶ In addition to these projects, various European research teams—most of them funded by the European

Science Foundation—are engaged in investigating key historical events that make up something like the European *imaginaire*.⁷

The Holocaust as the Memory of Europe?

The historian Dan Diner has argued that these efforts to construct a European history are unnecessary because Europe already has a common point of reference in the past, namely, the Holocaust. This, he argues, is the paradigmatic European *lieu de mémoire*, and every construction of a European identity must acknowledge it as a point of departure. Indeed, steps have been taken to institutionalize this common memory as the core of European identity. Prime Minister Göran Persson of Sweden invited representatives of sixteen nations (among them thirteen present and future members of the European Union) to a forum in Stockholm on January 27, 2000, to discuss and define a common framework for commemorating and teaching the Holocaust. In the first year of the new millennium, fifty-five years after the liberation of Auschwitz, there was agreement that the murder of six million European Jews should become a common memory and, in turn, that this memory should inform the values of European civil society and serve as a reminder of the obligation to protect the rights of minorities. A task force was created in 1998 (which has meanwhile grown to encompass twenty-two nations) that is committed to perpetuating the memory of the Holocaust. The last article of the Stockholm declaration states: “It is appropriate that this, the first major international conference of the new millennium, declares its commitment to plant the seeds of a better future amidst the soil of a bitter past. We empathize with the victims’ suffering and draw inspiration from their struggle. Our commitment must be to remember the victims who perished, respect the survivors still with us, and reaffirm humanity’s common aspiration for mutual understanding and justice.”⁸

Though Europe was the stage for the Holocaust, the memory of it is no longer specifically European but extends far beyond Europe’s boundaries. On January 24, 2005, the United Nations for the first time in its history commemorated the Holocaust in a special session. In his address, Kofi Annan emphasized that “the evil which destroyed six million Jews and others in these camps still threatens all of us today; the crimes of the Nazis are nothing that we may ascribe to a distant past in order to forget it. . . . It falls to us, the successor generations,” he said, “to lift high the torch of remembrance, and to live our lives by its light.”⁹ This development of a progressive extension of the memory of the Holocaust beyond the boundaries of Europe confirms the thesis of a book by Daniel Levy and Nathan Sznaider. In *Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age*, the authors argue that “as nothing was more ‘cosmopolitan’ than the concen-

tration and extermination camps of the Nazis" (25), this trauma needs to be answered by a globalization of Holocaust memory. In the globalized modern world, whose most important characteristic is displacement, de-territorialization, and the transcending of borders, the "cosmopolitan memory" of the Holocaust provides the foundation for a global politics of human rights, based on commonly remembered barbarism.¹⁰ A globalization of the Holocaust, I would like to argue, has indeed come about, but in a slightly different way from that envisaged by Levy and Sznajder. The Holocaust has not become a single universally shared memory, but it has become the paradigm or template through which other genocides and historical traumas are very often perceived and presented. The Holocaust has thereby not replaced other traumatic memories around the globe but has provided a language for their articulation.

European Memories after 1945

In Europe, the historical site of the German genocide of the Jews, Holocaust memory has a different quality and resonance than it has, for instance, in the United States, where it is far removed from its local contexts. In Europe this memory is anything but abstract and removed, but rather deeply engraved in local and national history. We therefore have to consider the difference between a global and a European Holocaust memory, and, furthermore, a European and a national Holocaust memory. In Europe, this memory is embedded in the history of the Second World War, which all the nations of Europe experienced but which each experienced differently. In other words, in Europe the transnational memory runs up against a variety of national memory constellations and collisions.¹¹ If we ignore these historical levels of memory or paint them with too broad a brush, we run the risk of ending up with a rather abstract memory construct. In Germany, for instance, there is the danger that, in the adoption of this victim memory, its own perpetrator memory will disappear. Therefore, Volkhart Knigge objected to such an adoption and warned against the "naïve importation of concepts, such as that of 'Holocaust Education.'"¹² Reinhart Koselleck made the following emphatic comment on behalf of the Germans: "By no means may we hide behind victim groups, specifically the Jews, as if by doing so we had gained a Holocaust memorial, as other nations of the globe have done."¹³

The problem on which I would like to focus here was incisively stated by the Swiss author Adolf Muschg when he wrote: "What binds Europe and divides it is at its core one thing: the common memory."¹⁴ More than sixty years after the events, we Europeans are still far from a unified memory; on the contrary, we have to acknowledge that the Second World War and the Holocaust remain subjects of conflict and debate. Appar-

ently, national memories cannot be integrated within a European memory as easily as the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research might wish.

To recognize the heterogeneous memory territory of Europe more clearly, we need to turn to the history of European memory after 1945. With a series of writings culminating in his recent book *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945*, the historian Tony Judt has made us aware of Europe's highly selective postwar memory constructions. Memories, he argues, were politically explosive and unusable during the era when Europe was both divided and bound together by a sharp ideological contest between the two superpowers of East and West. At a time when "the enemy" had been re-identified, it was inopportune, for instance, to recall that the Soviet Union had recently been one of the Allies in the war against Hitler and the Axis powers. Without Hitler, this alliance quickly collapsed and was replaced by the "Iron Curtain," which led to the freezing of memory and history in conformity with the political status quo of the Cold War.¹⁵

In an essay entitled "Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe" (1992), Tony Judt showed that during the Cold War the national memories of Europe were frozen in such a way as to support the political status quo. According to Judt, the official European version of the wartime experience included the "universally acknowledged claim that responsibility for the war, its suffering and its crimes, lay with the Germans."¹⁶ The scale of the evil that had been committed by Nazi Germany had evidently surpassed the limits of experience and imagination, so this consensus was certainly grounded on more than "an intuitive logic." Judt, however, points to the comforting effect of this formula for European nations: Within this framework, many memories of what had happened during and after the war "got conveniently lost."¹⁷ The Hungarian writer Peter Esterházy expressed a similar idea in the speech he gave in St. Paul's Church in Frankfurt upon receiving the 2004 Peace Prize of the German Book Trade, when he said: "To conceal one's own guilt by referring to Germany's crimes is a European habit. Hatred for the Germans is the foundation of the postwar period."¹⁸

During this period there were two generally recognized and honorable roles for European nations to assume: victim and/or resister. Austria can serve as an example of the first, the nation as victim, and France of the second, the nation as resister. In both countries, of course, there were people who were victims of Hitler's Germany and people who engaged in acts of resistance. Memory was not necessarily distorted after the war but a selective memory was generalized and politically instrumentalized. Psychoanalysts speak of "screen memories" that suppress other memories and serve to protect a positive self-image. To put it another

way, one remembers something in order to be better able to forget something else. When applied to the realm of national memory, this means that one recalls one's own suffering in order to avoid being reminded of one's own guilt. Remembering oneself in the role of victim can also block memory of other victims, particularly the Jewish victims. Myths arise when partial memories supported by experience are claimed as the homogeneous and exclusive memory for the national collective, while memories deemed inappropriate are excluded from the national discourse and expunged from the collective self-image.

We could witness how these defensive strategies began to crumble in Western Europe in the 1980s. After a period of extremely stylized and standardized images of the past, many European nations were finally confronting conflicting, painful, and shameful memories. As the protective shields and myths collapsed, they gave way to controversy and more complex representations. In France the acknowledgement of Vichy's collaboration shattered the national "myth of the resistance"; in post-Waldheim Austria the official version of Austria as "Hitler's first victim" became problematic, and even Switzerland, the neutral state and haven for so many refugees, was confronted with its own "sites of memory" in the form of its banks and its border.

Differences in East and West

The year 1989 marked a far-reaching political turning point. The collapse of the bipolar political framework triggered an eruption of suppressed memories. The thaw after the long freeze revived not only memories of the past but also the idea of Europe. But while in Western Europe national myths were challenged and debunked, that was by no means equally the case in Eastern Europe. Here we may invoke another quotation from Renan's speech of 1882: "The act of forgetting—I might almost say historical error—plays a significant role in the creation of a nation, and therefore advances in the field of history are often a threat to the nation."¹⁹ While the Western European nations increasingly brought their national constructions of the past into line with the standards of historical scholarship, the nations that emerged from the Eastern bloc did not necessarily undertake similar reconstructions. Their experience of two dictatorships gave rise to inextricably intertwined memories of both persecution and collaboration, of both victimization and guilt. Far from confronting these complexities, however, many of these nations are now engaged in reestablishing old national myths or creating new ones.

As an example one can cite Poland, which had no fascist movements or structures of collaboration and whose population endured especially harsh suffering at the hands of the Germans. Its national myth continues

to revolve around the victim role. Unlike in Austria, the Polish sense of victimization is backed by centuries of historical experience and cultural tradition. The Polish self-image as “Christ of the nations” highlights this sacrosanct status of Polish martyrology. In light of this deeply entrenched cultural pattern of experience, it is virtually impossible to acknowledge the status of other victims—such as the Jews—and to deal with their own guilt in the context of Catholic anti-Semitism, which became an issue in the story of Jedwabne. Once again, what we see is not so much historical error (as Renan had it) but the generalizing of one respectable memory covering up other uncomfortable memories. The national status as victim can lead to self-immunization against guilt and responsibility.²⁰

The Hungarians also saw themselves, in the *longue durée* of European history, as the victims of oppression and foreign domination by the Ottomans, the Habsburgs, the Nazis, and the Communists. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Hungary could once again refer to these old models of experience and their enduring appeal to the public in its new national self-definition. A similar process took place in the Czech Republic, whose national historical myth revolves around the recurring experience of a legendary defeat (the Battle of White Mountain on November 8, 1620). After the abolition of the unifying socialist vision of history, old national patterns resurfaced and structured the ways in which the historical experience of World War II was processed.

Russia offers a further example of the reconstruction of a national historical myth that disregards the memories of others and the standards of historical research. Here a victor’s memory asserts its “sovereignty” by claiming an absolute and exclusive interpretation of history that will not brook contradiction. At the center of this vision is the fatherland’s mission in the Great Patriotic War. Thanks to the troops of the Red Army, Hitler was defeated, concentration camps were liberated, and a shattered Europe was given a new future. The great historical liberation of 1945 is the kernel of a heroic self-image that does not permit the introduction of other, conflicting elements, such as the victims of the Stalinist dictatorship and the gulag, into this picture.

Again we must acknowledge that these distorted national memory constructs do not necessarily involve a falsification of history but rather the strategic *selection* of expedient recollections. Thus in the case of Russian national memory, the historically accurate recollection of the difficult victory over National Socialism acts as a broad defensive shield against recalling the victims of Communist terror. The victors who write history have the power to suppress counter-memory and to prevent the writing of different histories by keeping the archives locked. As the victor in 1945, Russia claims the privilege of not having to submit its memories to close European scrutiny. Thus memory reveals itself to be inseparable from the

question of power, with “sovereignty” consisting of the privilege to indulge in one’s memories and to construct one’s national myths in a self-validating way. In such states it falls to civic initiatives to construct a counter-memory of the victims and to keep it alive. The nationalistic group *Pamyat* was able to gain official acceptance of its memory. The non-governmental organization *Memorial*, by contrast, is dedicated to historical investigation of the crimes of totalitarian communist regimes on behalf of the victims. Fully in the spirit of Renan, this group deploys the power of historical research to erode the simplistic structure of national myth.²¹

Guidelines for Dealing Peaceably with National Memories

It is becoming more and more obvious that memories serve not only as avenues to unification but also stand in its way. Memories can promote a more critical self-image, but they can also produce conflicts by tearing open old wounds and reanimating inveterate conflicts. A particularly clear example of this ambiguous potential inherent in memories is the current exhibition in Berlin “Flight and Expulsion in Twentieth-Century Europe,” which, according to its organizers, stresses the universality of suffering, but which at the same time has triggered new political conflicts.²² Migration, the streaming of millions of refugees across national borders, is a dominant experience of twentieth-century Europe that calls for a transnational perspective. In 2002, the Polish scholar Karol Sauerland had pointed out that “there are no more problems surrounding the theme of the expulsion of Germans,” to which he added, “The fact that this is no longer a subject of disagreements is seen by historians as one of the most important successes of the Polish/German relationship after the fall of the Berlin Wall.”²³ But it took only a single stroke to undo this hard-won success. One year later, Erika Steinbach, president of the Alliance of Expellees, put forward a proposal to establish a “Center Against Expulsion” in the symbolically charged city of Berlin and to add a new day of national commemoration to the German calendar. Many in Poland immediately began to worry that this German experience of suffering would thereupon be connected to claims concerning the restitution of lost property.

Other concerned observers see in the call for a “Center Against Expulsion” a rival to Holocaust memory.²⁴ While the majority of the victims of the Holocaust and their descendants now live outside of Europe, the majority of the victims of expulsion continue to live within Europe. Is perhaps a German memory of victimhood in the process of replacing the German memory of guilt at a moment when living witnesses are becoming scarce and a new generation is taking over? There are also voices that

plead for forgetting in view of the growing collision of one-sided memories. Can European integration perhaps be achieved only at the price of mutual oblivion?²⁵ There are indeed important instances in history when forgetting proved an important resource for social peacemaking, especially after civil wars, but the intertwined conflicts in those instances are fundamentally different from the asymmetric violence between Nazi perpetrator and Jewish victim that lies behind our post-traumatic age. In addition, in the two world wars, Europe was the stage for an unimaginable unleashing of extreme violence that targeted civilians as well as combatants. The traumatic impact of this violence, which only gradually became evident decades after the war and which still troubles Europe, cannot simply be overcome by a *Schlußstrich*. Shared memory rather than amnesia is today considered a more adequate response to the traumatic legacy of that violence. The network of death and labor camps that covered Europe like a rash during the Nazi period; the battlefields of both world wars, from the Marne to Stalingrad, and the bombed-out cities, from Guernica and Coventry to Dresden—all these have already become European *lieux de mémoire*. “Europe needs its memory sites,” writes the Dutch historian Pim de Boer, “not just as a mnemonic means for identifying mangled corpses, but in order to promote understanding, forgetting, and forgiveness.”²⁶ Common memory sites, according to de Boer’s somewhat paradoxical statement, are needed to forget and overcome the divisive potential in memories.

The questions then arise: How are we to move from trauma to understanding? How to move from dividing and aggressive memories to memories that strengthen the process of European integration? How to clear memory blockages on the one hand and contain the aggressive potential inherent in memories on the other? There are political norms and standards for a peaceful coexistence within the European Union, but there are as yet no norms and standards for the peaceful coexistence of European memories. In the remainder of this article I would like to propose some practical guidelines that might help to regulate the use and banish the abuse of collective memories. It is hoped that identifying some rules and exposing ‘malign’ practices will make it easier to universally recognize and reject such practices.

1. *Separating memory from argument*

We have to distinguish between a memory and the arguments that can be built upon it. One example is the commemoration rites enacted on the sixtieth anniversary of the bombing of Dresden. Some of the city’s residents participated in the official commemoration with the mayor and representatives of Britain, France, and the United States in attendance.

Some marched through the streets carrying banners that read "Bombing Holocaust." And some set up a series of large posters bearing the names of the cities Dresden, Nagasaki, New York, and Baghdad. In these commemorative acts, one event, the bombing of Dresden, was associated with three completely different messages: one diplomatically conciliatory, one aggressive and vengeful, and one pacifistic. Memories are constantly associated with arguments, but the arguments are never an intrinsic part of those memories. To neutralize the malignant potential of memories, a line must be drawn between what has been experienced and what follows from the experience in terms of interpretation, evaluation, claim, and consequence. The same holds true of the assessment of the year 1945 in German memory. After decades of considering it in terms of "catastrophe" and "downfall," the notion of "liberation" was introduced and took hold in the heads of the younger generations. Again, it is not the events that we have changed, but our frames for interpreting them.

2. No more offsetting of guilt

A widespread and completely untenable device in the battle of memories is the tactic of offsetting. In such cases, a historical situation is presented as a zero-sum game: proof of your opponent's guilt automatically reduces or nullifies your own guilt. In this form of competition, both sides use memories as a club. The only memory that is important is the guilt of the other, and establishing that guilt is seen as wiping out one's own guilt. While connecting memory with argument leads to the instrumentalization and politicization of memory, setting off guilt results in minimizing one's own guilt.

3. No more competition among victims

Whereas the offsetting of guilt is intended to minimize one's own share in it or to make it disappear entirely, competition among victims is a battle for recognition of one's own suffering. This sort of memory contest takes the form of a struggle for precedence. Victim groups vie for public recognition and resources. Placing one trauma in a privileged position can serve to eclipse another trauma according to the precept: what is worse covers up what is bad. Focusing on the worst experience (the Holocaust) may make one blind to bad experiences (bombing, expulsion) deemed undeserving of recognition in Germany during the eighties and nineties. To acknowledge one trauma must not mean to marginalize or even discard another.

4. From exclusion to inclusion of memories

Memories that support a collective identity are not only selective but also tend toward uniformity. One memory grows in size to crowd another

out. This serves as a protective shield against other memories; one memory is used to immunize oneself against another. Therefore, the critical question is: how exclusive or how inclusive is a collective memory? The fixation on the crimes of others makes one's own conveniently disappear. For the Germans, as Christian Meier has pointed out, the "negative privileging" of the Holocaust cast a shadow over other atrocities, hiding them from view and consciousness. He asked: "Have not atrocities like those which we perpetrated against Poland and Russia . . . disappeared under the shadow of the Holocaust?"²⁷ While simplistic memories have impeded European integration, more complex memories can promote that process and provide a foundation for it.

5. From a divided to a shared memory

In his speech in Frankfurt's St. Paul's Church, Peter Esterházy negatively summed up the status quo of European memory: "What was supposed to be united has been torn apart in self-hatred and self-pity. . . . Besides the untruth of the exclusive perpetrator, there is the untruth of the exclusive victim, and the unspoken 'we' of the national memory lies hidden beneath both. . . . A common European knowledge about ourselves as both perpetrators and victims is not yet in view."²⁸ For Esterházy, the road to a common European community of memory winds through the memory of one's own guilt and the acknowledgment of the suffering of others. It was the failure of empathy that made the war and the Holocaust possible; in our postwar traumatic age, it is memory that can ameliorate the situation. A divisive memory that leaves the memory of suffering to the affected victim groups perpetuates the original murderous constellation. This fatal polarity can be overcome and lead to a shared memory through the empathetic recognition of the victim's memories.

6. Contextualizing

Another tool for dulling the malignant energy of memories is the ability to place experience and memory into a larger context. This is possible only in retrospection and is a cognitive achievement of historical consciousness. Experiencing and remembering never take place in such a context; those who lost hearth and home in 1945 and took part in dangerous and uncertain treks westward did not automatically view the experience as a just punishment for Hitler's criminal war of aggression. Yet nothing is gained by discarding lived experiences merely because they do not conform to a broader historical perspective. Everyone has a human right to his or her memories. That, however, does not exclude the necessity to place such memories that have been articulated and

recognized on a wider horizon. As contextualized memories, they lose the taint of irreconcilable solipsism. Only by retrospectively placing them in a larger context can they be made compatible with other memories.

7. *Framing*

The European unification project presumes a common framework in which multiplicity of memory plays a double role. On the one hand, it is to be recognized and preserved; on the other, whatever is psychologically damaging or politically divisive within these memories is to be subdued. The common framework must consist in a canon of values and goals. Memories are not just located, but also *framed* within this horizon of values that challenges their built-in tendency toward self-hypnosis. Here the double aspect of identity, based on memories and values, again comes into play. Memories can retain their unmistakable variety and diversity, but they must lose their divisive effects. Only through integration within a common framework of identity and values can they be made to coexist without constantly reigniting old conflicts by adding new fuel. In this way, preserving the past goes hand-in-hand with mastering the past. Between forgetting, on the one hand, and continuously reactivating the past on the other, there is a third possibility, namely, memory as a form of closure in order to open a way to the future.

Europeans are obviously still far from attaining Esterházy's vision of a "common European knowledge of ourselves." With each election, we see that populism and right-wing nationalism are gaining ground, and that is leading to a reestablishment of boundaries between the EU member states. We are dealing, then, with a European knowledge that is not yet a reality, but rather a vision and certainly the great potential inherent in the project of European unification. It offers the opportunity "to face history and ourselves."²⁹ Applied to Europe, this slogan means, in practice, learning to see national histories from a transnational perspective and thus to transform external national borders into internal European ones. National memory and national identity, writes Jan-Werner Müller, are mutually constitutive. And he continues: "This type of memory . . . sometimes conflicts with individual memories."³⁰ In Europe, each national memory is in effect in conflict with that of its neighbor. To the extent, however, that seeing beyond national borders becomes a European habit of thought, the self-serving nature of national myths will become more and more untenable.

"Europe," the Swiss writer Adolf Muschg once wrote, "is a community of destiny."³¹ This community of destiny could become a community

of memory in which, after the unspeakable atrocities and horrors of the twentieth century, all histories of suffering are remembered, including precisely those one would most like to forget. Establishing Europe as a transnational frame for memory would mean building a common European consciousness as victims and perpetrators. National memory constructs will have to be measured against this common "European knowledge," a knowledge of historical events in their context. Historical consciousness does not *eliminate* national memories but rather *integrates* them. Within such a framework, Europeans could learn to face up to their memories and to listen to others with empathy. Such a European memory would not provide a platform for political legitimization; rather, it would work against exaggerated self-images and antagonistic images of others. If national memory is not taught within a common framework of shared historical consciousness, the project of a United States of Europe will remain an empty dream.³²

Lord Dahrendorf once said in an interview: "A happy country does not agree about the future, but is basically in agreement about the past; in an unhappy country the reverse is true."³³ In this sense, Europe is still far from being "a happy country."

Notes:

¹ Ernest Renan, "What is a Nation?" lecture held at the Sorbonne on March 11, 1882, in Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds., *Becoming National: A Reader* (Oxford, 1996), 41–55.

² Leslie Fiedler, *Cross the Border, Close the Gap* (New York, 1972), 73. There are exceptions to this policy, one of which is the statement by Theodore Roosevelt that I found on a commemoration plaque on Kossuth House in Washington D.C.: "Only he can become a good citizen who remains true to the heritage of his native land."

³ Bassam Tibi, *Europa ohne Identität? Leitkultur oder Wertebeligkeit* (Munich, 1998), xiv.

⁴ Tibi's concept of "European *Leitkultur*" was quickly appropriated as "national German *Leitkultur*" by conservative politicians. For Tibi, the distinction between multiculturalism and pluralism is of primary importance. Whereas the former term stands for an unstructured fusion of migration and the globalization of the market, ranging from postmodern indifference to "cultural racism," the latter stands for a consensus of values which guarantees both difference *and* integration. In Tibi's view, the German state is currently risking its values of modern individualism and secularism, which is why he heavily criticized the Minister of the Interior W. Schäuble who conceded communal rights to Muslim immigrants in Germany.

⁵ Two projects for a European museum have been developed, one in Brussels and one in Aachen. In Brussels, during the last decade, the scientific director Krysztof Pomian, together with his team, has created a concept that takes its starting point from the Greeks, Romans, and Celts. In addition to antiquity, it covers the periods of Christianity, Enlightenment, and the process of unification. The initiative of the Aachen project, which began much later, is organized around pivotal dates of European history. It starts from the year 800, using the historical site to establish Charlemagne as the founding father of Europe. While the project recently collapsed in Aachen over the communal issue of an appropriate museum building, this problem remains yet unsolved in Brussels.

⁶ Heinz Duchhardt et al., eds., *Schwerpunktthema: European lieux de mémoire? Jahrbuch für Europäische Geschichte*, vol. 3 (2002); See also Alexandre Escudier, ed., *Gedenken im Zwiespalt: Konfliktlinien europäischen Erinnerns* (Göttingen, 2001); Benedikt Stuchtey, report on the conference "European Lieux de Mémoire," German Historical Institute London, 5.-7. Juli 2002, in *GHIL Bulletin* 24 no. 2 (2002), 121–125.

⁷ An example is the Research Project on European Historiography begun in 2006 under the direction of Oliver Rathkolb (Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for European History and Public Spheres, Vienna, Austria) in cooperation with research groups at the Universities of Basel (Switzerland), Giessen (Germany), and the European University at Florence (Italy).

⁸ <http://taskforce.ushmm.org/about/index.php?content=stockholm>

⁹ *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, lead article, January 25, 2005; UN <http://www.un.org/Press/docs/2005/sgsm9686.doc.htm>.

¹⁰ Daniel Levy and Nathan Sznajder, *Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age* (Philadelphia, 2005). A research project is being carried out by Sibylle Quack at the University of Hannover on "The Process of European Unification and the Memory of the Holocaust in the Trans-Atlantic Dialogue."

¹¹ In 2004, Monika Flacke organized an exhibition around this theme, which was also published in book form: Monika Flacke, ed., *Mythen der Nationen: 1945—Arena der Erinnerungen*. Katalog zur Ausstellung im Deutschen Historischen Museum Berlin. (Mainz, 2004).

¹² Afterword in Volkhard Knigge, Norbert Frei, eds., *Verbrechen erinnern: Die Auseinandersetzung mit Holocaust und Völkermord* (Munich, 2002), 445.

¹³ Reinhart Koselleck, "Formen und Traditionen des negativen Gedächtnisses," in *Verbrechen erinnern*, 21–32; 28.

¹⁴ Adolf Muschg, "Kerneuropa. Gedanken zur europäischen Identität," in *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 31.5.2003. See also his recent book: Adolf Muschg, *Was ist europäisch? Reden für einen gastlichen Erdteil* (Munich, 2005).

¹⁵ Take the years 1962–63 as an example: Shortly after the building of the wall there were the prominent visits by American politicians to Berlin (L. B. Johnson, Robert F. Kennedy, and JFK himself) to convince the West Berlin citizens of their undivided loyalty and support vis à vis the aggressive politics of the Soviet sector. At the same time, paradoxically, the former allies, who had become the new enemies, still had one last joint duty to perform: namely the changing of the guard at the Spandau Prison where three Nazi criminals were kept who had been sentenced at the Nuremberg trials.

¹⁶ Tony Judt, "The Past is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe," in *Daedalus* 121 (Fall 1992): 160; see also Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (New York, 2005).

¹⁷ Tony Judt, "The Past is Another Country," 163. Ian Buruma described this logic as follows: "It was comforting to know that a border separated us from the nation that embodied the evil. They were evil, so consequently we must have been good. The fact that we grew up in a country which had suffered under the German occupation meant, to us, that we were on the side of the angels." Ian Buruma, *Erbschaft der Schuld: Vergangenheitsbewältigung in Deutschland und Japan* (Munich, 1994), 11. Confronted by members of the "Committee for Jewish Claims on Austria," the Austrian government declared, "All suffering of the Jews during this period was inflicted upon them by the Germans and not by the Austrians; Austria bears no guilt for all of these evil things, and where there is no guilt, there is no obligation for restitution." Quoted in Heidemarie Uhl, "Vom Opfermythos zur Mitverantwortungsthese: NS-Herrschaft, Krieg und Holocaust im Österreichischen Gedächtnis," in Christian Gerbel et al., eds., *Transformationen gesellschaftlicher Erinnerung: Studien zur Gedächtnisgeschichte der Zweiten Republik* (Vienna, 2005), 57.

¹⁸ Peter Esterházy, "Alle Hände sind unsere Hände," in *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (11 October 2004), 16.

¹⁹ Ernest Renan, "What is a Nation?" (see note 1).

²⁰ Rudolf Jaworski, "Geschichtsdenken im Umbruch," in Jaworski et al, eds., *Umbruch im östlichen Europa: Die nationale Wende und das kollektive Gedächtnis* (Vienna, 2004); Ewa Kobylińska and Andreas Lawaty, *Erinnern, Vergessen, Verdrängen: Polnische und deutsche Erfahrungen* (Wiesbaden, 1998).

²¹ <http://www.memorial.de/nachr.php?nid=50>

²² Erika Steinbach speaks of a postulate of an indivisible humanity [*Postulat der unteilbaren Humanitas*]. Catalogue of the Exhibition *Erzwungene Wege: Flucht und Vertreibung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts*, 8.

²³ Karol Sauerland, "Minenfelder. Schwieriger Dialog: Deutsche und polnische Historiker," in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* 300 (27 December 2002): 35.

²⁴ The Austrian historian Heidemarie Uhl asked, "Is Germany leaving behind that phase of reassessment of its past which since the eighties was framed by a discourse on guilt?" *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 29 October 2003.

²⁵ Ulrike Ackerman, "Vergessen zugunsten der Zukunft?" in *Merkur* 56:643 (November 2002): 992–1001.

²⁶ Pim de Boer does not exclude communal forgetting as a possible consequence of communal remembering. Pim de Boer, "Lieux de mémoire et identité de l'Europe," in Pim de Boer and Willem Frijhoff, eds., *Lieux de mémoire et identités nationales* (Amsterdam, 1993), 29.

²⁷ Christian Meier, *Vierzig Jahre nach Auschwitz: Deutsche Geschichtserinnerungen heute* (Munich, 1987), 14.

²⁸ Peter Esterházy, "Alle Hände sind unsere Hände" (see note 18).

²⁹ "Facing History and Ourselves" is the name of an organization founded in 1976 that deals with causes and consequences of racism and collective violence. An important prerequisite of this pedagogical history project is that the citizens of a country not only be conscious of the high points of their national history, but that they also confront its baggage.

³⁰ Jan-Werner Müller, "Introduction," *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past* (Cambridge, 2002), 3.

³¹ Adolf Muschg, "Kerneuropa: Gedanken zur europäischen Identität," in *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 31 May 2003.

³² This idea did not originally refer to the Holocaust, but consisted very generally of the "complete elimination of the economic and political causes of the two World Wars." In connection to a "Europe Day" in Milan in 1985, it was resolved that this idea become anchored in an annual commemoration date on May 9, harking back to a famous speech by Robert Schuman in Paris on May 9, 1950.

³³ "Als die Gestapo mich abholte: Gespräch mit dem Sozialwissenschaftler Lord Ralf Dahrendorf," in Stefan Aust and Gerhard Spörl, eds., *Die Gegenwart der Vergangenheit: Der lange Schatten des Dritten Reichs* (Munich, 2004), 32–33.

COMMENTS ON ALEIDA ASSMANN'S LECTURE

*Comment delivered at the Twentieth Annual Lecture of the GHI,
November 16, 2006*

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Professor Assmann in her talk says many things with which I agree, but listing them all hardly seems the best use of my allotted time. Scholars, it is said, cooperate by disagreeing, and I will try to be a cooperative commentator. I will focus on problems I see with the ways in which Professor Assmann talks about "collective memory": its nature, its power, its deployment, and its prospects.

My own understanding of the term derives mostly from the work of the French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, who in the 1920s began to study what he was one of the first to call "collective memory." Instead of viewing collective memory as the past working its will on the present, Halbwachs explored the ways in which present concerns determine what of the past we remember and how we remember it. (There is a certain grim appropriateness in adopting Halbwachs's approach to the study of Holocaust memory. During France's occupation, he protested the arrest of his Jewish father-in-law. Halbwachs was then sent to Buchenwald, where he died.)

Typically a collective memory, at least a significant collective memory, is understood to express some eternal or essential, often tragic truth about the collectivity. A memory once established comes to define that eternal truth, and along with it an eternal identity for the members of the collectivity. Serbs' central memory, the lost Battle of Kosovo in 1389, symbolized the permanent Muslim intention to dominate them. The partitions of Poland in the eighteenth century gave that country an "essential" identity as "the Christ among nations," crucified and re-crucified by foreign oppression. Some collective memories are very long-lived indeed: the Battle of Kosovo for Serbs, the expulsion of 1492 for Sephardic Jews. But the reason that these memories endured for centuries is that the conditions they symbolized also endured: foreign oppression, foreign exile. Long-lived memories are most characteristic of stable, relatively unchanging societies. When we speak of "collective memory," we often lose sight of the fact that we are employing a metaphor—an *organic* metaphor—that draws an analogy between the memory of an individual and that of a community. The organic metaphor seems to me to work best when we are speaking of an organic (traditional, stable, homogeneous)

community, one in which consciousness, like social reality, changes slowly. When Halbwachs first advanced the idea of “collective memory” in the 1920s, the great French medievalist Marc Bloch, who was generally suspicious of organic metaphors for society, nevertheless thought it might be usefully applied to such things as a peasant grandfather, grandchild on his knee, passing on rural traditions. A very organic image. How appropriate the metaphor is for the very inorganic societies of the late twentieth century (fragmented rather than homogeneous, rapidly changing rather than stable, the principal modes of communication electronic rather than face-to-face) seems to me very questionable. Metaphors are supposed to, and sometimes can, enrich and sharpen our understanding, but they can as easily impoverish and dull it.

The life expectancy of memories in contemporary society seems greatly diminished. With the circumstances of our lives changing as rapidly as they do, it is the very rare memory that can resonate with an unchanging “essential” condition. So my first critical observation is that I think that Professor Assmann too easily infers from the undoubted power and endurance of “collective memories” in pre-modern societies that they are likely to have similar power and endurance in our own time.

There is another problem connected with the way in which the organic metaphor of “collective memory” seduces us into imagining society as an organic whole. In the case of an individual, any memory is by definition part of that individual’s mental makeup. But how can we make parallel judgments about the significance of collective memory for what we wind up assuming is a “collective mind”? In her other writings, Professor Assmann has usefully divided enduring collective memories—those that survive the death of contemporary witnesses—into political and cultural components. Political memories are enshrined in state-sponsored memorials and commemorative ceremonies; cultural memories in literature and other art forms. Professor Assmann appears to infer the strength and consequentiality of Holocaust memory among various communities—and, indeed, across the globe—from the frequency with which we encounter these “sites of memory.” But this sort of “supply-side” approach really tells us very little about how these representations are received, and with what impact. I am certainly not saying that there are *no* inferences to be drawn from the multiplication of memorials and literary treatments of the Holocaust. In some instances, it is certainly possible that they reflect broad and deep concern in the community in which they appear. But even when national legislatures support various forms of commemoration, this does not necessarily mean more than that a particular initiative is hard to reject—or awareness that foreign commentators are watching and judging. And in the case of “cultural memory” the undoubted excellence of some representations of the Holo-

caust tells us nothing about their impact (or non-impact) on the public. This seems to me another way in which the seductiveness of the organic metaphor can lead us to “misoverestimate” the phenomenon we are confronting.

An additional problem I have with Professor Assmann’s conception of collective memory concerns her invocation of a distinction one constantly encounters in discourse about memory: She wants, she says, to “regulate the use and banish the abuse of collective memories.” Elsewhere—and in this, too, her remarks reflect a very common usage in these discussions—she inveighs against the “instrumentalization” of memory. The problem with the first distinction is that one person’s use is another person’s abuse. To take one among countless possible examples, in Israel the invocation of the Holocaust to undergird a punitive policy toward Palestinians rests on arguments that are by no means obviously absurd. And the same is true of its invocation in support of an accommodationist policy. I am not saying that anyone can be expected to find these invocations equally compelling. One will favor one or the other invocation by weighing various values and making various calculations. But it cannot be made perched on some Archimedean point from which one can distinguish objectively between use and abuse of Holocaust memory.

The charge of “instrumentalization” seems to me even less sensible if one accepts Halbwachs’s argument—compelling to many of us—that collective memories are characteristically mobilized and deployed by nations and other collectivities for some present purpose. I lack the time to go into this at any length, but let me offer two examples from the long history of Jewish memory.

The suicide at Masada was absent from Jewish memory for almost two thousand years, though the text describing the event was readily available. This was not because Masada was a “trauma” that was “repressed,” but because traditional Judaism focused on survival and holy study rather than military resistance. The tradition remembered Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai and the establishment of the academy at Yavneh, not Elazar ben Yair and the mass suicide. Zionists in the twentieth century found Masada more relevant to their self-understanding and self-representation, and a new collective memory emerged. Some memories, once functional, become dysfunctional. The concluding chapters of the Book of Esther tell of the queen soliciting permission to slaughter not just the Jews’ armed enemies, but the enemies’ wives and children, with a final death toll of 75,000. These “memories” provided gratifying revenge fantasies to the Jews of medieval Europe; in the current era of ecumenism these chapters have become an embarrassment and have simply disap-

peared from Purim commemoration; probably most American Jews today are unaware that they exist.

If it can be shown, as I believe it can, that collective memories rise and fall following changing assessments of communal needs—that they are *always* “instrumental” for some perceived need—the charge of “instrumentalization” is quite empty. I might add that I find Professor Assmann’s use of “instrumentalization” as an epithet particularly ironic. She devotes most of her talk to suggesting various ways in which a certain sort of carefully shaped memory of the Holocaust can be used as an *instrument* for the promotion of European unity. So I am forced to the conclusion that, like “abuse” when contrasted with “use,” “instrumentalization” is a word she employs to refer to uses of which she disapproves. (I should perhaps note here that I am fairly sure that Professor Assmann and I would be in near complete agreement about the uses, or “instrumentalizations”, which we would prefer. But I would insist that they are just that—preferences—not the result of privileged access to knowledge of what is a use and what is an abuse.)

Finally, let me say a few words about Professor Assmann’s central argument: that a shared memory of the Holocaust is the best—and perhaps indispensable—foundation of the currently shaky European Union. The role of Holocaust memory in the moral reconstruction of Germany is surely a special case that cannot be generalized. Though repeated reminders of the Holocaust, like anything else, can be pushed too far, mobilizing a backlash, its results in Germany have on the whole been salutary. I greatly admire those Germans—historians and others—who have led in that painful effort. I am also on the side of those in other countries who have pressed for acknowledgment of the ways in which some of their countrymen were complicit in that great crime. Having said that, I am far from convinced that the memory of the Holocaust can provide the role of “founding myth” for a united Europe. For one thing, it seems to me that there is something illegitimately “homogenizing” about establishing a “shared” memory that, in words quoted approvingly by Professor Assmann, would have all Europeans think of themselves as perpetrators—and also as victims. I by no means endorse Daniel Goldhagen’s argument that the Holocaust was a “German national project,” and I was distressed at the enthusiastic reception his arguments often received from the younger generation of Germans. (A Harvard colleague of Goldhagen’s once remarked to me that Goldhagen had made a “Faus-tian bargain” with young Germans: “Give me the souls of your grandfathers, and I will give you a certificate of moral health.”) But it remains true that for all of the success of the Nazi regime in finding accomplices throughout the continent, the responsibility for that crime rests primarily

with Germany. Other states will quite properly reject an invitation to full partnership in that responsibility.

Furthermore, it has always seemed to me that there is something absurdly “minimalist” about a moral consensus based on affirming that, indeed, murdering six million men, women, and children is an atrocious crime. Is this really the moral standard on which the EU would want to base itself? And there is the other side of the coin. The Holocaust is often spoken of as the preeminent symbol of absolute evil, and it is suggested that this leads to much-needed “moral clarity,” enhancing our ability to distinguish evil from good. But as a historian I cannot forebear from observing that what ended the Holocaust—the defeat of Nazi Germany—was, more than anything else, the result of the efforts and sacrifices of the armed forces of Joseph Stalin—Hitler’s competitor for the title of greatest monster of the twentieth century. Not much “moral clarity” here.

Professor Assmann concludes by saying that without a shared framework of historical consciousness, “the project of a United States of Europe will remain an empty idea.” As a renegade historian of Europe who has become a historian of the United States, I wonder about the implications of this dictum for my own country. Not only do Americans lack a shared historical consciousness—they barely have any historical consciousness at all. Does this mean that the United States of America is “an empty idea?” It is an arguable proposition, but surely not a settled one.

There were some shared ideas at the time of the founding of the United States, and over the years some Americans focused on some, others focused on others. During the Civil War both sides appealed to the “Principles of 1776”: Northerners to (rather ambiguous) ideas about equality; Confederates to the “sacred right of rebellion.” And finally, I would note that the establishment of the United States as an *entity* was the work of many generations. Few besides historians know about an interesting grammatical evolution. In its first decades the phrase “the United States” took the plural: “the United States are”; “the United States were.” It was only toward the end of the nineteenth century that it came to take the singular: “the United States is.” With sufficient wisdom and patience, the same thing may, over time, happen in Europe. But if it does I think it will have much more to do with the success with which it conducts its affairs than with its ability to draft a common textbook of history.

RESPONSE TO PETER NOVICK

Aleida Assmann

Professor Novick's comments are wonderfully clear and insightful. I admire this type of criticism, which is based not only on rich expertise and extended knowledge but also on vigorous common sense and skepticism. It provides much food for further reflection on controversial issues that I touched upon in my paper but could not duly elaborate within its limited scope. I am grateful for this opportunity to further clarify the main points of my argument and also reflect more explicitly on the premises of its inbuilt methodology. My response to Novick's comments focuses on what I take to be his three main objections.

First objection: The term "collective memory" is an organic metaphor and applies only to pre-modern societies

In his response, Professor Novick reflects on the possibilities and limits of the term "collective memory" as a critical tool. He bases these reflections on two associations, which are for him an intrinsic part of its semantics: a collective memory is necessarily long-lived and its status is that of an organic image. Because of the enduring quality of a collective memory, it tells an eternal truth about a collective; it represents a society as unchanging. This description, according to Novick, fits only rural and pre-modern societies and is wholly inappropriate to analyzing heterogeneous and inorganic societies of the late twentieth century.

I cannot accept the premises on which Novick defines the term "collective memory." Its longevity is not a seminal trait, nor can it be discarded as an "organic metaphor." The term collective memory was introduced, as Novick reminds us, by Maurice Halbwachs. Halbwachs already took great pains to emphasize that this term "is by no means a simple metaphor." With respect to family memory, for instance, he anchored it in "constant exchanges of impressions and opinions among family members" with the effect that "the framework of collective memory confines and binds our most intimate remembrances to each other."¹ For him, a collective memory is clearly not a mysterious fusion of individual minds or souls but the product of continuous social interaction. Personal interaction (the model of the grandson on the knee of the

grandfather), however, is not the only way in which a collective memory is created. If we replace face-to-face interaction with symbolic communication via media such as newspapers, television, history textbooks, museums, monuments, and commemoration rites, the range of participation in a collective memory widens considerably. If there is a leap of analogy involved in the thinking about "collective memory," it is not from individual memory to a mysterious collective mind, but from *unmediated* (face-to-face) interaction to *mediated* symbolic communication and from informal practices to more formal channels, occasions, and institutions of communication.

If today Halbwachs is esteemed as the pioneer of social memory studies, this is due to his constructivist stance. Had he based his studies on an organic metaphor, he would have little to offer contemporary scholars. *Constructivism*, however, is the very opposite of *essentialism*, which is what Professor Novick dislikes about the notion of "collective memory." Let me clarify the methodological difference. The term "collective memory" evolved in the 1980s and 1990s along with a discourse on *collective identities*. Up until then, the term "identity" had been mostly applied to individuals. New discourses on both memory and identity were backed up by a "constructivist turn" in the humanities. This turn was built on two basic assumptions. One is that cultural symbols (such as texts, images, and rituals) and their historically changing media matter; they play an important role in the formation of identities. The other premise is that the past is always reconstructed according to the needs of the present. As the present is in no way stable, reconstructing the past is a varying and open-ended project. If we follow this line of argument, it becomes more plausible to apply the concept of collective memory also to inorganic societies of the late twentieth century.

As history evolves, nations enter into new political alliances and constellations. Therefore, the distinction between "unchanging" and "changing" societies can no longer serve as an analytical tool to justify or negate the application of the term collective memory. A collective memory, as Novick succinctly puts it, always defines a collective self-image, and this self-image is constructed according to historical and political challenges. If it is seemingly unchanging, this is the case because the conditions persist. But one can also think of it the other way around: Problematic conditions persist because an obsolete self-image, backed up by a collective memory, has not been revised and reconstructed. In this case, an obstinate adherence to a collective memory may result in an inability to adapt to new constellations.

Second objection: “Instrumentalization” has to be dropped as an analytical term because collective memory constructs always serve a purpose

Professor Novick argues that “collective memories rise and fall following changing assessments of communal needs,” and that they are always “mobilized and deployed for some present purpose.” This insight, along with the interesting illustrations, is absolutely in agreement with the basic proposition of constructivist memory research. In his book *The Holocaust in American Life*, Novick made this astute and convincing point. The term “instrumentalization,” then, is an empty one that does not express anything but the moral bias of its user. As one person’s use is another person’s abuse, Novick comes to the conclusion that there is no “Archimedean point from which one can distinguish objectively between use and abuse of Holocaust memory.” (The same, by the way, holds true for the use of the term “ideology.” This was presented as an analytical tool but in practice was generally used as a polemical weapon, “ideology” always being a quality in the position of the other rather than something that one had a share in oneself, and was hence the target of enlightened explosion or theoretical deconstruction.) In this field, Novick claims, we are always actors and not observers; we all have vested interests, political stances, and moral preferences, and hence have no “privileged access to knowledge of what is a use and what is an abuse.”

I go along with everything that Professor Novick says, but it is this last turn of his argument that I would like to challenge. I wanted to argue in my paper that a (dogmatic or laissez-faire) relativism leaves us with self-contained, concentric memory constructs, with detrimental consequences for a federation such as the European Union. It is my aim to push the discussion one step ahead by thinking about possible transnational standards for national memory constructions. I am not looking for these standards in the realm of universals (which would mean from an Archimedean point), but rather on the basis of practical communication and mutual negotiations across borders. The standards are meant as pragmatic guidelines for international agreements concerning the peaceful coexistence of collective memories. To arrive at these standards, what is needed is not the adoption of eternal values, but rather a deeper knowledge, recognition, and internalization of the perspective of the respective other. It is hoped that if such a cognitive practice is introduced into European constellations, it could have a salutary effect, making memory constructs more permeable and inclusive, thereby neutralizing the aggressive potential of the auto-hypnotic memory constructs that were the rule in the heyday of nineteenth- and twentieth-century nationalism. The idea of Europe was formed to overcome this destructive legacy of ag-

gressive nationalism. As there is no intention to abolish the European nations, collective memory constructs remain meaningful and necessary, provided that they fit within a framework of shared knowledge and values. This means that there is an obvious need to identify and abolish problematic and pernicious memory strategies that still persist or have been revived in recent years.

Third Objection: The Holocaust should serve as a founding memory for Germany but not for Europe

Professor Novick writes that he is far from convinced “that the memory of the Holocaust can provide the role of ‘founding myth’ for a united Europe.” In the course of his argument, he touches on various issues:

1. To create a shared memory would in reality mean imposing a homogenizing view of history on the member states.
2. A large supply of external symbols, memorials, and occasions for commemoration, however, is evidence only for an external imposition of memory but not for its acceptance by the public.
3. Responsibility for the crime of the Holocaust rests primarily with the Germans.
4. The Holocaust as a minimalist moral standard denies the complexity of historical experience.

A considerable part of this criticism is based on a misunderstanding of my argument. Here I am especially grateful for the chance of clarification because the misunderstanding may be that of more than one reader. “For all of the success of the Nazi regime,” writes Professor Novick, “in finding accomplices throughout the continent, the responsibility for that crime rests primarily with Germany. Other states will quite properly reject an invitation to full partnership in that responsibility.” The gravest misunderstanding of my article would be to assume that by pointing to the entanglement of European memories, I intended to smuggle in a revisionist argument. I fully agree with Professor Novick that sharing some of the responsibility with others cannot in any way lighten the burden of German guilt and memory.

The term “homogenizing” is rather misleading, as the main thrust of my argument is that the import of a standard and uniformly packaged Holocaust memory must not obliterate and discard the differences of local and national memories. A case of problematic homogenizing is, for instance, the German memory established at the “Neue Wache” monument in Berlin dedicated “To the victims of war and tyranny” [*Den Opfern von Krieg und Gewaltherrschaft*], because it creates an inclusive category of passive victimhood and suffering that obliterates all notions of

crime, guilt, and responsibility. Where there are only victims, the cause of destruction must lie in some natural disaster or vague transcendent destiny. The memory of shared suffering can provide a powerful link, but this link cannot work as a formula for European cohesion, because every memory of suffering comes with a memory of perpetrated violence. A step beyond this state is to acknowledge that where there are victims, there are also perpetrators. It is important to understand that these terms are not to be used as fixed categories. One and the same person may partake of both roles, and the victims or heroes of one period can become the perpetrators of the next.

The point of my argument, and here the misunderstanding arises, is not that we need to look for a common memory that is to be imposed in order to serve as a basis for European integration. My point is a totally different one, and starts from the empirical observation that over the last decades, different collective memories have emerged that create frictions between European neighbors and threaten to block the process of integration. On the post-World War I and World War II European landscape these memories are necessarily entangled memories, which means that the European project will have to include the task of turning these *entangled* memories into *shared* memories. By shared memories I mean neither the imposition of a common memory nor a common textbook. Instead—and this is a difficult but important distinction—I mean a shared “historical consciousness” of events and their causal connections. In this respect, revisionist claims (as those of the Preussische Treuhand addressed to the Polish government) or hardliner positions (such as the confirmation of the Benes Decrees by contemporary Czech politicians) serve to add to the inflammatory force of memories, while mutual acknowledgment of suffering relating to civilian experiences of the war can help to diminish the fervor of memory.

Professor Novick’s point is well taken that with reference to collective memory constructs, we can never clearly distinguish between what is imposed and what is really accepted. In this respect, I fully share his skeptical view. Much of what politicians and self-appointed memory activists proclaim is of no concern whatsoever to a wider public and barely touches the minds and hearts of individuals. A society is not an organic whole with a collective mind or a common set of memories. In this case, however, even more than sixty years after the events, much of what is today debated on a political and public level is still part of an experiential and embodied memory. One of the reasons why memories are so complex is that they are differently constructed on the levels of individual, family, society, and nation. These levels may exist in mutual indifference, but they may also produce dissent and friction, and collide in counter-constructions. An important insight here is that top-down

strategies and bottom-up movements reinforce each other. We know from the Kosovo war how Slobodan Milosevic “instrumentalized” (and here the term, in spite of all methodological qualms, is fully appropriate) age-old national myths for his aggressive warfare, but we still know very little about the reasons why he succeeded so well with these strategies and found public support.

To sum up: My paper is concerned with certain symptoms of a European memory crisis and reflects both on its causes and on possibilities for overcoming it. What I suggest is not a master narrative nor a common history textbook for all member states, but a generally agreed-upon frame of reference that is needed to communicate and negotiate conflicting memories. This common frame of reference is needed not in order to abolish distinctive national narratives and memories, but in order to diminish the destructive differences of national memories by making them compatible with each other. Here Novick’s analogy between the United States of America and the United States of Europe can provide another important insight. If it is part of the success story of the United States of America that it has grown into the format of a nation, now no longer referred to in the plural but in the singular, the United States of Europe might opt for the other model and, in order to visibly maintain the differences of the individual states, gladly retain the plural.

Note

¹ Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, edited and translated by Lewis A. Coser, (Chicago and London, 1992), 54, 52, 53. I have discussed the issue of the legitimacy of the term “collective memory” at some length in my recent book *Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit: Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik* (Munich, 2006), 29–36.

**BRIDGING THE ODER:
REFLECTIONS ON POLAND, GERMANY, AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE
PART I**

*Lecture delivered at the German Unification Symposium,
October 3, 2006*

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I would like to talk about German unification in the context of the Polish-German relationship, in four parts. First, I will compare the two countries with regard to their situation before German reunification in 1989. Because of the time constraints of this lecture, I will do this in a very selective way. The second part will compare key points in the transition and transformation period of both countries. In the third, I would like to present my analysis about the present state of the German-Polish relationship. The fourth part will be a kind of conclusion.

I

Before I start, let me make one comment. When we talk about the reunification in Germany, we very often start with negative remarks: things that have not developed well. Having been born in West Berlin, I am thankful for reunification every day. There was a big difference between living in West Berlin, which was very much an island, and living in Cologne or Bavaria, where you did not really feel the problem of Germany's division. The notion that Berlin would either become a part of the GDR or remain an island forever was not acceptable to me, so I never gave up on the idea that there had to be a reunification—for the sake of freedom, not so much for the sake of national reunification. Because I traveled constantly to the GDR starting in 1967, I could observe the process of change in East Germany. Even though I was quite critical toward West Germany, I felt the differences between the East and West German political systems very deeply. I felt them physically when I would leave East Berlin and return to West Berlin. I remember that when my son was three years old, we were in a car crossing the East German border. We

had finally provided all border documents and were just leaving the customs area when my son asked me very loudly, looking out the window of our car: "Mama, why does it look like a prison here?" I am not only very thankful for reunification, but I am especially thankful to Poland, because Polish behavior and activities—Poland's refusal to accept the division of Europe, Poland's ingenuity in overcoming the difficulties of the "Round Table" situation—have become for me an example of how to deal with a complicated reality. I am very thankful to Poland for that.

What were the fundamental differences between Poland and Germany before 1989? Germany was divided, Poland was not. West Berliners and East Germans never gave up on the idea of unification. Most of them wanted unification, they were interested in it. I remember an encounter near Dresden, when my husband and I were traveling and we asked the way because we were a little lost. Some East Germans explained the way to us, and when we left they said: "Never forget unification." This was very interesting—this was in 1987. At that time, many West Germans did not think of unification at all. If you traveled in the Rhineland, if you traveled in Bavaria, they did not think of it. Even today, many of them do not feel differently, except that they think they have to pay for reunification. There was a clear difference between West Berliners and East Germans, on the one hand, and West Germans (with the possible exception of those who lived close to the inner-German border) on the other: the former remained interested in reunification, the latter had more or less forgotten it.

The motivation of East Germans was that they wanted freedom of movement, a better standard of living, and the dignity of democracy, including freedom of speech—roughly in that order. I think one needs to be clear about this: There were many East Germans who did not suffer from the absence of the freedom of speech, who were not primarily interested in freedom of speech, but who were interested in the freedom of movement—to go and travel anywhere they wanted—and in having a better life. But there was an elite that was interested in freedom of speech, in more democracy, and these people were the ones who initiated the protests in East Germany. These people were not fundamentally pro-capitalist or anti-socialist. Those who were pro-capitalist and anti-socialist had mostly left East Germany long ago. Those who started chanting "*Wir sind das Volk*" and longed for the democratization of the system often thought that there could be a better GDR and were not immediately thinking about reunification. Even if the slogan changed very quickly from "*Wir sind das Volk*" to "*Wir sind ein Volk*"—from "We are the people" to "We are one people"—this was not the intention of the initiators. But there is a dynamism of rhetoric. If you have "*das Volk*" and somebody says "*Wir sind ein Volk*," things quickly change. The original protesters

wanted to build a better GDR. This was one of the reasons why in East Germany there was no Solidarity movement. Many of the East Germans who were interested in a more democratic system were also very critical of West Germany's capitalist system.

In Poland, the political movements' main point of departure was to overcome what the Poles called "Jalta": the division of Europe that was sealed at the 1945 Yalta Conference. The Polish opposition considered it a grave injustice that, having fought Nazi Germany together with Great Britain and having suffered such terrible losses, they were, in 1945, subjected to dictatorship, to a government that was not theirs, to national dependency. In the Polish opposition, the national and the freedom aspect were joined. In Poland, most of the politically active people wanted to overcome the division of Europe. Their country was not divided, but they wanted to overcome the division of Europe.

There was a second key difference between the pre-1989 domestic situations in Poland and Germany. Since 1956 there had been a kind of semi-pluralism in Poland. Sixty percent of the farmers were cultivating private plots. More importantly, the Catholic Church had regained its institutional strength when Cardinal Wyszyński was released from house arrest. In Poland, the Communist Party had completely lost its authority, and most people did not fear it, whereas in East Germany they did. The Poles did not even maintain their respect for the army, although the army had always enjoyed great respect in Poland. I remember that in 1967, when I had my first conversations with Leszek Kolakowski to collect ideas for my dissertation, he told me that in Poland, nobody believed any more in all that stuff: Marxism, communism. This was very different in East Germany, which had believers in communism and Marxism. Poland, by contrast, had islands of open speech, of democratic speech. There were the clubs of the Catholic intelligentsia, which often dealt with private problems—such as how to educate children in the Christian faith while being surrounded by communism—but they also practiced a culture of discussion that was much closer to that of a civil society than in East Germany.

I recently coordinated a collective research project on the building of democratic identity in post-dictatorial societies, comparing Poland, Germany, and France, with three researchers from each country. Our research revealed that in Poland, the revisionist socialists and part of the Catholic intelligentsia were very interested in democracy but not in nationalism. In Poland, there had been a tradition of social self-organization since the partitions of the end of the eighteenth century. There was a special expression for it in Polish—*praca organiczna*—organic work or cooperation, one could say, which meant that society tried to organize itself at a distance from the state, which was an occupying state. This

tradition continued until the First World War and was taken up again by *solidarnosc* in the 1980s and the “flying universities” that tried to organize education in order to shape people’s ideas of Polish history independently from the official teaching. It is interesting to note, by the way, that despite this Polish tradition of self-organization against an occupation government, Poles currently have difficulty in organizing what we call in Western terms “civil society.” Self-organization and civil society are quite different because self-organization took place in complete opposition to the state, whereas civil society has to find a middle way between cooperation and opposition. I remember an article by Tadeusz Mazowiecki from around 1990, in which he wrote that Poles were wonderful in opposing totalitarian dictatorship, but that they would have more difficulty organizing coalition-building and coming together for a constructive policy. I think this is a crucial point. If for nearly one-and-a-half centuries your psychological, mental, and even physical survival have depended on a clear and strong opposition to the authorities, it is difficult to develop an attitude of balance between opposition and cooperation.

In East Germany there was no organized opposition to the Communist Party of the kind that the Catholic Church represented in Poland. The East German Protestant Church was different from the Catholic Church, especially toward the end of the GDR. It was a haven for the development of many movements—for the environment, for democratization—but this was not the same as the opposition of the Catholic Church to the government in Poland. In Germany, you had more of a state-oriented mentality. This has been a long tradition. Karl Marx criticized Hegel, who saw the state as the main entity to bring together bourgeois society. But although Marx considered Hegel’s idea an illusion, he himself became—especially in the Leninist version—more state-oriented in the transition period than the Poles ever were. In Germany, you had a strong sense and tradition of political discipline. You have to do your work, even if you don’t know exactly what the work is for. In Poland, this sense of discipline does not exist, and this is one of the reasons why Poland had that wonderful anarchy against the state authority during the communist period. I said it already: In Germany you still had Marxists and communists; in Poland you had none after the 1950s.

Those who initiated peaceful revolution in Germany mostly wanted a better GDR. West German politicians hesitated to work or call for unification—even the Social Democrats, who had been more serious about unification, especially under Kurt Schumacher, their first postwar party leader. But there were also other orientations. And when the opportunity for unification became visible, I had the impression that Helmut Kohl and Willy Brandt were closer to each other with regard to unification than Brandt and Oskar Lafontaine or Kohl and the Bavarian CSU. There were

splits within the parties. These divisions represented different generations, but also different levels of proximity to the GDR and to the whole problem of the division of Germany. So the picture was complex. One person who really wanted reunification and who played an active role during that time was Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who hailed from Saxony. In short: In Poland, the aim of overcoming Yalta's division of Europe in favor of a free and united Europe had never been abandoned; in Germany, the overcoming of Yalta's division no longer seemed attainable to most.

II

Turning to the post-1989 transformations of the two countries, the most striking difference is that the GDR became a part of the Federal Republic, was helped financially by the Federal Republic, and was shaped by the Federal Republic. While one result of this process was a rapid improvement of the GDR's infrastructure, it also provoked a feeling of non-sovereignty among many East Germans, a lack of self-esteem, and also an escape from responsibility for their region and field of activity. Recent research has shown that the *idea* of democracy is accepted to a high degree in both East and West Germany, but consent for the *existing* democracy has declined: in West Germany it is about 60–65 percent, and in East Germany it has dropped to about 30 percent. Of course, such research is always problematic because people who dislike the government in power might say they do not approve of the existing democracy. Nevertheless, I think this difference between East and West Germany is important. The advantage of West Germany, I would argue, is that many more people have had the chance to experience active democracy in civic associations and social movements, which creates support for existing democracy.

In Poland, the situation was different. While there also is a difference in attitudes between winners and losers, the Poles transformed themselves on their own—they were not transformed by somebody else. There was no elder brother to educate or to lead them from outside. This does not mean that there is fundamental unity in Poland. On the contrary, I would say that at present Polish society has many fissures. In Germany, there is a kind of continuity and stability of "West German" institutions. Only one new party emerged: the PDS, now the Linkspartei. The East Germans also experienced immediate integration into NATO and the European Union. There is no governmental instability and no need to create everything from scratch; you do not find all the problems that Poland and the transformation countries have. These countries do not yet have political parties or orientations rooted in the society; such roots are

difficult to grow. In Poland, there is a clear discontinuity of political institutions. Whereas West German companies often tried to prevent East German competitors from becoming strong by buying them out, in Poland there was a chance to develop an unexpectedly successful economy. I remember a meeting in Berlin with potential investors from America in about 1990. The Americans said: "Poland? Forget about it. There will never be a chance to invest capital in Poland." The contrary has happened: Poland has attracted a lot of capital, and it is interesting to see this empirical defeat of prejudices. The Polish economy is doing quite well. But both countries have problems in the mental transition, especially among the losers.

III

I now come to the third point: the present situation. After 1989 a period of surprisingly good relations began between Germany and Poland. After some hesitations related to upcoming elections, the German government guaranteed the German-Polish border along the Oder-Neisse line. Germany also helped Poland become a member of the European Union. There were some ideological problems, especially the question of the German expellees. For a while, these seemed to have been settled, and they were not an issue between the governments. In the last few years, however, more problems have reemerged. The first is the ideological one: the so-called Center against Expulsion, the idea of the League of Expellees, which began in 1999 or 2000. This problem started on the German side. These ideological disturbances are very unfortunate. Then there is the problem of the gas pipeline, the German-Russian relationship, and the friendship between Schroeder and Putin. These problems had already started during the last Red-Green government.

Where are we now? On the general level of civil society, great progress has been made in German-Polish relations. We have constantly come to a better mutual understanding. Surveys have demonstrated this. It is very impressive that a majority of Poles consider Germany their favorite political partner, and that they even consider Germany—after the United States and Great Britain—as their favorite military partner, which seems miraculous to me. We have also witnessed constantly improving economic relations and cooperation. Exports from Germany to Poland have grown, and tourism from Germany to Poland has grown. Of course, there is a fundamental, historically grounded asymmetry between Poland and Germany. First of all, it has to be remembered that it was not Poland that divided Germany, and it was not Poland that invaded Germany in the Second World War, but the other way around. Nevertheless—this is the second historically grounded asymmetry—Poles are much more in-

terested in Germany than Germans are in Poland. There is always asymmetry from east to west. Poles know Germany much better than the other way around. Poles know the German language much better than Germans know Polish. There are about 2.5 million Polish youngsters who are learning German, but fewer than 10,000 Germans who are learning Polish.

If you are interested in somebody but the other person is not interested in you, that is not pleasant. Psychologically, that is very clear. So we always have to take this asymmetry into consideration. Nevertheless, all the surveys show that Poles have not only more respect, but more sympathy for Germans than the other way around. German attitudes are very slowly improving. But it remains remarkable that Poles—who were victims of German policy not only under the National Socialists but also earlier—are more at ease and more sympathetic toward Germans than the other way around. In a way, this is psychologically understandable because those who have done something bad often have an unconscious tendency to think that the victims must also have had their part in it. This psychological mechanism is at the basis of the “anti-Semitism of resentment.” Because we don’t want to acknowledge our role as perpetrators, we say in order to ease our feelings: “There must have been something about the victims themselves.” And this is the case to a certain degree with Poland too, I would say, especially in the last few years. Public discussions of the Nazi past and World War II in Germany were first about Jews and then expellees, but not that much about what was done to Poland. I think this is a deficit that has to be overcome in order to teach contemporary Germany what really happened in Poland.

There are also problems on the governmental and media level. I cannot deny that I have some problems with the present Polish government. There are points of divergence in their views concerning respect for minorities and homosexuals, the death penalty, and freedom of the press. These are fundamental differences. Playing the “anti-German card” will not succeed in Polish society, and politicians who use it will be prevented from cooperating with Germany. The bigger problem is the instability of the Polish government, which runs the risk of creating a situation where one does not know who one’s political partner will be from one day to the next.

IV

In conclusion: First of all, it is very important to strengthen the good relationship between the two civil societies. I also hope for political stabilization in Poland. Common projects could also help our relationship. This is what Janusz Reiter and I had in mind when we were moderators

of the German-Polish forum. We should try to find a common policy toward Poland's eastern neighbors, because Poland has wonderful expertise in the Ukraine and, to a certain degree, in Belarus, and we should try to discuss how a "good neighbor" policy on the part of the EU could work. We should also discuss what the difficulties concerning the European constitution are and how we can move forward concerning the budget. By the way, I have the impression that especially in the agrarian sector Poland is realizing that the subsidies from the European Union are very helpful. I learned from a Polish politician that there could be a discussion about a common gas station in Szczecin/Stettin. I would also like to see more frequent meetings between the two governments, and to find common ground in the interpretation of history.

Finally, I think it is very important to prevent a negative dynamic from arising from the debate surrounding the so-called Center against Expulsion. The problem, as I see it, is not that Poland does not accept German mourning over the expulsions. What Poles do not like is historical revisionism, and they are right not to like it. The initiators of the Center against Expulsion have put forward revisionist positions. Just two weeks ago, I heard a prominent figure among them saying on the radio that Poles and Czechs had always wanted to expel Germans from Silesia and the Sudetenland, and that Hitler gave them the chance to do this. The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, a leading German newspaper, allotted a whole page to an article by an independent historian, Stefan Scheil, arguing that the Second World War was caused not only by Nazi Germany, but that Nazi Germany was reacting to aggressive and expansionist policies of the allies, especially of Poland. His idea is that the German *Drang nach Osten* was only a reaction to the Polish *Drang nach Westen*. While this will seem completely ridiculous to you, the fact that the so-called evidence for such an interpretation of history is given a whole page in a serious German newspaper is worrisome. This is still a completely isolated position among professional historians, but it represents the ideas of many people who are pushing for the Center against Expulsion. They say that National Socialism merely provided Poles and Czechs with the incidental opportunity to realize long-standing expansionist plans after 1945. Although many people consider the interpretation of history an academic issue, experience has taught me that we have to be careful with interpretations of history because they motivate our actions and our political interpretations for today and for tomorrow.

**BRIDGING THE ODER:
REFLECTIONS ON POLAND, GERMANY, AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE
PART II**

German Unification Symposium, October 3, 2006

Janusz Reiter

Polish Ambassador to the United States, Washington DC

In his recent book, Fritz Stern presents five Germanies that he has known. This made me realize that I have known three Germanies. I have known the old West Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany), East Germany (the GDR), and the united Germany for the past sixteen years now. Each of these Germanies has in one way or another affected Poland and was connected to Poland in a positive, a negative, or, very often, an ambivalent way.

I want to start with one of these Germanies, the GDR, which seems today to be totally forgotten. This Germany was important because it was our immediate neighbor. This country was officially a friend; unofficially it was perceived as something terrifying. Even those who perceived the GDR as useful—and there were some—did it in a very ambivalent way, with distance or even with fear. Useful? You may wonder for what. There were two possibilities. One was that the GDR was useful as part of the Eastern Bloc; it was a sort of guarantor of the Eastern Bloc. So, for official Poland, the GDR was an important part of the status quo that they wanted to maintain. Even they did it with a certain distance and hesitation. For the others, the GDR was more of a buffer, separating Poland from what people considered the real Germany: West Germany, free Germany. Why did they want Poland to be separated from the real Germany? Because they simply did not trust the intentions of the real Germany. They believed that it possibly had revisionist intentions.

During the 1960s and 1970s, Poland's relationship to the Federal Republic of Germany began to change. On the one hand, West Germany was admired for its economic success and also for its political success. The West German way of life as the Western way of life attracted many people in the 1970s. Hundreds of thousands of people left Poland for West Germany. However, even that was ambivalent because the only way to go to Germany, to be accepted in Germany, was to claim German roots. The new arrivals were accepted if they gave up their Polish identity and became German. In many cases, these were families that were of

German descent or had a double identity which made a decision to move easier. But in some cases it was simply the only way into the Western world, it was the only way to join the European Community on an individual basis, so to speak. On the other hand, fear of West Germany made many Poles back in the 1960s and 1970s accept the GDR, as I said, as a useful tool, but at a very high price. The GDR was a key part of the Eastern system, with the Soviet Union as the dominant superpower. In this way, the German problem, primarily because of the Oder-Neisse border, was part of the Polish problem, part of the problem of Poland's freedom and independence, part of the problem of a democratic Poland. In a broader sense, the Polish and German questions were at the very core of the European question, at the very core of the divided continent, of divided Europe.

In the 1970s and 1980s an important discussion started in Poland: a discussion about German unification. The outcome of the discussion was that the democratic opposition of the 1980s, which had started in the 1970s, overcame the fear of German unification. This was an important act of political and intellectual courage. It was based on the consideration that fear of West Germany and of German unification was pushing Poland toward the East, while accepting unification would open the way toward the West, toward becoming part of a free Europe. Fortunately, there were some people on the German side who recognized these encouraging signals from the Polish side and honored them. One of these people was the later minister of defense Volker Rühle. This was important because he is a politician of the German CDU. He was one of the few German politicians who recognized these signals and started a dialogue with the Polish opposition. Poland certainly had specific reasons to fear the unification of Germany. However, it should be remembered that there was widespread skepticism in Europe. All of Germany's neighbors—and not only its neighbors—were skeptical or fearful of German unification. I think what is important today is how fast and successfully, if not easily, Europeans overcame their fears and hesitations and accepted a unified Germany. It does not make sense to blame people for their hesitations back in 1989/90. The way Europeans welcomed united Germany is one of the most encouraging developments in Europe in the twentieth century. The only European power that accepted the idea of German unification without any hesitation was the United States, a European power in the political sense. Why the U.S.? For obvious reasons: The U.S. has been part of European history, but without sharing European historical obsessions, and that helped the U.S. take an unambiguous position toward German unification. The U.S. also does not have as long a memory as we do in Europe. That helped very much.

Where are we today? The best news today is that there is no “German question” in today’s Europe. If we look back where we were eighteen or twenty years ago, this is really great news. We may agree or disagree with this or that German government, we may quarrel (as we do sometimes) with the German government, but there is no German question in the traditional sense. Henry Kissinger once wrote that in modern European history there had always been the problem of Germany being either too weak or too strong, too small or too big for Europe. Today’s Germany is neither too weak nor too strong for Europe, it is part of Europe, and this is really something to appreciate. There are some people in Europe who claim that the relative economic weakness of Germany poses a threat to Europe, but this is very different from the problems caused by Germany in the past. There is no problem of war and peace in Europe linked with Germany as we know it from history. Without a doubt, in 1989/90 German unification disturbed the balance of power that was created after 1945. Even the internal balance of power in Western Europe was affected in certain ways. Look, for example, at Franco-German relations, where there was a certain equilibrium that was disturbed by unification, but this is not the same problem as we know it from history.

In 1989/90 there were fears that German unification might transform Europe into a playground for *Machtpolitik*, power politics. Interestingly, the Germans themselves did not even understand these fears and concerns because these fears were so distant from what the Germans were thinking, how they perceived their situation, how they articulated their interests in Europe. I remember a survey published in a German newspaper back in 1991. The result of this survey was that a vast majority of Germans thought the best model for a united Germany was Switzerland. Why Switzerland? Because it was neutral, harmonious, and it did not have to interact with the world. It was a certain escapism, but certainly not the traditional *machtpolitische* ambitions we knew from the past.

In Poland, too, the fears of 1989/90 are almost completely forgotten. Careful support for unified Germany by the then-opposition in the 1980s turned out to be a good investment in the future. Germany clearly facilitated Poland’s membership in the European Union and NATO. However, we have to recognize that the changes that started in 1989/90 have not been completed. It has been argued that German unification was not the merging of two countries, but the enlargement of West Germany. While there is some truth to this, unified Germany is not just a larger West Germany. Germany after unification is different from what West Germany was before 1990, just as the European Union after enlargement is different from what it was when it had just fifteen members.

Where is Europe heading today, with Germany and Poland in the heart of Europe? For several decades, Europe was absent from interna-

tional politics, and its absence was not considered a weakness, but a virtue. Europe was proud of being absent and not having to participate in international politics. This was the new European identity. Well, this does not work in today's world. Europe can no longer make use of this privilege. Europe has responsibilities that correspond to its economic, political, and military capabilities. Whereas the Cold War world had a consolidating effect on Europe, today's world has a potentially disintegrating effect on Europe unless it can organize itself and become a player in international politics. The question is how to organize Europe and how to cope with this responsibility.

For obvious reasons, no single country can provide leadership in today's Europe. Even the most powerful country cannot be the leader. In the past, Germany and France functioned as dual leaders of the old European Union. Today, we need a larger collective leadership in the European Union, but without strictly formalizing the group that makes up this leadership. Germany is an obvious candidate for this group. I think Poland should be part of this group as well, by virtue of its geography and its potential. This is why I believe there is a common mission for Poland and Germany. One of the reasons we need a common European policy is the eastern neighborhood. We need an "eastern policy" of the European Union. East of Poland—and thus east of the European Union—important geopolitical changes are taking place that will affect the whole of Europe. We have not only to respond to them but to shape them. This task can only be accomplished by Europe as a whole, not by a single European country. Germany and Poland are natural partners in shaping eastern policy because we have vital interests in this part of Europe. Generally, the further away to the east a country is, the less interest there is. Poland is an immediate neighbor. Germany is not far enough away to be indifferent. These two countries have vital interests in eastern policy. To be sure, there are differences in their perceptions, particularly in regard to Russia, which in turn have implications for attitudes toward Ukraine. Germany and Poland do not have identical interests in Eastern Europe, but they have no fundamental conflicts of interest in Eastern Europe. There are more commonalities than differences. One cannot expect Russia to help Europe get together because Russia is not interested in having one well-organized partner in Europe. Russia is more interested in playing countries in the European Union off one another. Gesine Schwan mentioned Ukraine as a field for Polish-German cooperation. I fully agree. However, first one would have to discuss the fundamental question of how to define Ukraine's position in Europe. There are two choices. Either Ukraine is an external partner and a partner in foreign policy or Ukraine is part of the European world and hence a partner in European enlargement policy. The choice makes all the difference be-

cause the European Union has been very successful in enlargement policy but is still very weak in foreign policy. If Ukraine is left to European foreign policy, it will be neglected; for Europe to engage Ukraine, Ukraine has to be declared a partner in enlargement policy, even knowing that it will take a very, very long time. We have to make this choice. What I have said indicates what I believe to be the right one.

There is, finally, another reason why I believe we need close Polish-German cooperation. I think, despite differences in public attitudes, we—elites and government, at least—agree that we need strong transatlantic ties, and that includes a strong American presence in Europe as an important part of an equilibrium in Europe and in the world. The United States has helped transform Europe. There is no reason to believe that Europe would be a safer place without the U.S. There is no reason to believe that we would be able to solve the problems we are facing—for example, in Eastern Europe—without cooperating with the United States. I think this is an important shared interest between Poland and Germany. Particularly now after the shift in Germany's foreign policy, we should exploit this shared interest, and we are encouraged to do so by our American friends.

In conclusion: In the early 1990s, two Americans who were involved in the process of German unification wrote a book entitled *Germany Unified, Europe Transformed*. Sixteen years later we know Germany is unified, but Europe is still being transformed. The question is still open: What sort of Europe will we get at the end of this transformation? Germany and Poland certainly are two countries that not only have to ask this question, but have to answer it. I remember that sixteen years ago, on October 3, 1990, I was standing on the stairs of the Reichstag near Hans Dietrich Genscher, then the foreign minister of Germany, and I was looking at the people in front of the Reichstag, hundreds of thousands of people. I had never seen so many German flags. I felt a new era was beginning. Everybody was asking how reunification was going to change Europe. It is not my task to judge whether these past sixteen years have been one of the best periods in German history, but I can say that they certainly have been one of the best periods in Poland's history.

FACT, TRUTH, AND FICTION: AN INTERVIEW WITH NOVELIST FREDERICK REUSS

Frederick Reuss's novel *Mohr* (2006) is a work of imagination that builds upon years of historical research. Max Mohr, the central character, was an actual person: a doctor by training and a successful playwright and novelist whose literary career roughly coincided with the Weimar era. Mohr came from an assimilated German-Jewish family and emigrated to Shanghai in 1934. The plan was for his wife Käthe and daughter Eva to join him there. They were, however, still living at the family's home in Bavaria at the time of Mohr's death in 1937 during the Japanese siege of Shanghai.

Reuss, Mohr's great-great-nephew, knew almost nothing about Mohr's life when he began tracking down Mohr's writings. The posthumous publication in Germany of one of Mohr's novels in 1997 led Reuss to Nicolas Humbert, Mohr's grandson. From Humbert, whom he had not previously known, Reuss gained access to a large collection of letters, photos, and papers—and to an unknown family history. In turning that story into a novel, Reuss made extensive use of Mohr's papers and other contemporary documents. The novel is interspersed with photos, many taken by Mohr himself, that comprise a second narrative complementing Reuss's prose.

Writing in *The New York Times Book Review*, Geoff Nicholson describes *Mohr* as "a story about love, without being a love story, and a novel about politics whose central character is apolitical." Calling that "quite an achievement," Nicholson adds "How true all this is to the 'real' Mohr is for others to say, but I was fully convinced and engaged by Reuss's creation." The relation between the Mohr of history and the Mohr of fiction, between the novelist's reconstruction of the past and the historian's, is the subject of the following interview with Frederick Reuss conducted by David Lazar in September 2006.

Frederick Reuss is the author of three novels in addition to *Mohr*: *A Novel: Horace Afoot* (1997), *Henry of Atlantic City* (1999), and *The Wasties* (2002). He lives in Washington, DC.

David Lazar: How did you come to Mohr as a topic?

Frederick Reuss: Deeply personally. The knowledge that had been extant in the family of the Mohrs more or less stopped with my grandfather, who came to the U.S. in 1938. My grandfather was a very charming, loquacious man, educated in the *humanistische* tradition, an assimilated Jew from a bourgeois family. His mother was Hedwig Mohr. She was a

paragon of bourgeois respectability. Her husband, Joseph Reuss, was *Oberlandesgerichtsrat* in Bayern, which was a pretty heady position for a Jew to attain in Bavaria at the turn of the century. My grandfather, who was born in 1904, was baptized a Lutheran right away. Odd considering the Catholic predominance there; but perhaps also a way of remaining out of the majority. I don't have any evidence that the parents converted or were baptized. So, he grew up in this twilight world of German-Jewish identity, which he describes very clearly—and with a certain amount of prevarication—in a memoir he wrote in the early 1940s. It was found in 1998 in an archive of manuscripts at the Widener Library at Harvard University by some sociologists from the University of Oldenburg and published in the *Oldenburgische Beiträge zu Jüdischen Studien*. My grandfather claims in the memoir that he only learned of his Jewish identity after trying to join a fraternity at the university in Würzburg. His father took him aside and said: "Son, I have some news for you—you have a Jewish grandfather and because of that this fraternity might not be the place for you." He suggested that instead he try the *Korps Makaria*, which I guess was a more liberal-minded German fraternity that allowed Jews or part-Jews. So, my grandfather joined the fraternity—I have a picture of him in his fraternity gear—and proceeded to make his way in society.

Max Mohr was only spoken of by my grandfather as a beloved old uncle who went off to Shanghai and died there—famous writer, doctor—that was it. He was a friend of D. H. Lawrence—my grandfather was very proud of that—but there was never any discussion or mention of a family, of anything. I accepted that and went through the process of assembling anything I could bibliographically of Mohr's *Nachlass* by going to the Library of Congress and chasing down quotes here and there. I found letters to Mohr in the collected correspondence of D. H. Lawrence; a few references in the Thomas Mann diaries. But I could only get so far. Then, in 1997, a novel of Mohr's appeared in Germany, *Das Einhorn*. It was published by Mohr's grandson, Nicolas Humbert, and contained a selection of letters to his wife written from Shanghai. It was an overwhelming experience. Not just to meet this "lost" relative, but to have access to a huge trove of material. Nicolas, it turns out, is a film maker, and as a student did a film called *Wolfsgrub*. It's more or less the account of his mother, Eva, her life in *Wolfsgrub*, which is what the house is called, and her memories of her father and so on. So I had not just documentation but also the work of a contemporary attempting to come to terms with the history as well.

Lazar: At which point did you begin thinking about Mohr as a subject for a work of fiction? When did you stop thinking about him as an interesting relative whom you wanted to read about?



Max Mohr in China. The photo on the table is of his daughter Eva. Photo courtesy of Frederick Reuss.



Max Mohr at the front during World War I. Photo courtesy of Frederick Reuss.

Reuss: I can't say that there was a moment of truth, although it became apparent to me quickly. Nicolas and I had a very intense meeting. He took me to Wolfsgrub and we spent a week—just he and I—alone in this house, Wolfsgrub. It was show-and-tell—he showed and told me everything he knew. We talked about the similarities between Mohr's ambiguous Jewishness and what I can only describe as my grandfather's total denial. I was deeply interested in the story. Hedwig, by the way, died in Theresienstadt along with her husband, Joseph; so that curtain came down in 1943 for the Reuss-Mohr side of the family. My grandfather's memories, when conveniently fuzzy, were also in many cases false, fabrications. The question I had vis-à-vis my grandfather was: You made it here, you're safe, your parents were killed in a concentration camp—what is there to be ashamed of? Why can't you be truthful about it? I never got the truth from him. He asserted until the very end that he was not 100 percent Jewish. He claimed that he was only part Jewish—there was always this insistence on percentages. It was really incomprehensible to me. Nicolas grew up in Germany, he's culturally German. His mother, Eva, never hid from him the fact that Mohr was a Jew and that she herself was half Jewish.

I found it really odd that the side of the family that had found safe haven in America was the least forthcoming. It opened up certain questions of not just memory, reconstruction of the past, but also *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, the way the past is reconstituted in ways that may or

may not bear any direct relation to the truth. My grandfather's memoir, published in an academic journal, and which asserts the veracity of the first-person, original source material, his own account of himself—is false! He's lying. But he's lying for very interesting reasons. His representation of himself growing up in Germany—the distortion—I saw as itself a part of the picture.

Approaching Mohr as a fictional project—I mean, I'm a novelist, so it was the first thing that came to mind—seemed only natural. For me, it boiled down to one question: Why did he leave his wife and kid behind? But it's not a question anybody today can possibly answer. I found that I would get closest if I tried to enter into the subjectivity of the character rather than present him as just an actor. That opened up the door. But then there was the issue of photographs. There are many. Mohr must have been one of the first amateur photographers. There are pictures of and by him taken in the trenches in World War I. He had his little Kodak Brownie or Leica along with him. Unbelievable. The guy took snapshots at war. It was amazing.

Lazar: Is there much of your grandfather in the Mohr of the novel?

Reuss: No. They were completely different natures. My grandfather took after his mother, Hedwig, a conventional, social-climbing bourgeois. Mohr was rebellious, artistic. They—brother and sister—detested each other. Nicolas told me as much, and I can see it in the material, oblique references. I figure that was why my grandfather didn't speak much about Mohr, or even mention, by the by, that he had surviving family. There was no good feeling. Ironically, by some strange genetic trait, I identify with Max more than I ever could with Hedwig. I have a picture of him with his fellow officers sitting at a table in some fortified bunker during the war. Somehow, Hedwig had it turned into a postcard and sent it to Eva; it's postmarked *Sylvoester 1935*. On the back she wrote something to the effect "This is so you can remember your father as he was in the good old days, your heroic soldier father with the Iron Cross" and so on and so forth. This told me everything I needed to know about Hedwig.

Lazar: I'm curious about the part of his life that you decided to write about. Certainly the historical figure Mohr is a Weimar figure. He lived through interesting times. That part of his life only occurs in flashbacks in the novel. Your framing of the narrative is very much from his decision to leave Germany to his death. Had you thought about other framings?

Reuss: Yes, definitely. Originally I wanted to get it all in. The final form that the novel took came after a process of not just scaling back or scaling down but coming to an understanding of the human side. The temptation was great to write a big, giant, all-encompassing novel. I even

wanted to bring it into the present and have me in there and Nicolas coming to terms with the past in a big Proustian effort, the whole twentieth-century canvas. But the more intimate I became with the material, the more I realized that the only way to really approach it from an artistic standpoint was to strip away and concentrate on the characters and on the situation that a person of that time would have felt themselves to be in. And that turned out to be a much more challenging task.

Imagining oneself into a pre-Holocaust world is impossible. Adorno said there can be no poetry after Auschwitz. There's a certain hyperbole in that, but what there definitely isn't after Auschwitz is firsthand knowledge of what the prewar period *felt* like. The biggest challenge for me was to avoid being portentous. They didn't know what they were facing. Mohr was a writer and somewhat of a public figure and more political, probably, than most. I don't know if you've read the diaries of Victor Klemperer, *I Will Bear Witness*; a very detailed, fantastic picture of *Alltag* under the Nazis. To us, reading today, it's almost too fantastic. How could this erudite, thoughtful man who saw the world around him so clearly have also been so stupid? He wants to work on his study of Voltaire and renovate his house and go on drives in his car, is too married to his domestic and academic routine to get his ass out of there! But it's so wrong to look at it that way. It was the same with Käthe. She clearly was aware of what was going on and had clearly made a decision to stay out of the way as much as she could—but also had no idea what was going to happen.

I met Nicolas in July 2001. I had already begun the mental act of transporting myself into the past on a fairly full-time basis. Then 9/11 happened and—I won't say they were similar in any way, but I imagine *Kristallnacht* had similar repercussions. My grandfather, a little late, to be sure, finally took his cue and got out of Germany. The idea that one sees and acts with the same clarity is just not the case. Mohr, I think, could see with a fair amount of clarity, but then there was this complete lack of clarity in the action he took. Emigration is a traumatic and catastrophic event and has permanent repercussions. When you're as close to it as one generation, there is a tendency to sublimate and smooth over, or even revise entirely. I think it takes a few generations for the full, let's say, import to be apparent. Hannah Arendt describes the tendency in an essay she wrote shortly after emigrating herself. "Now I'm a poor *Dackel* [dachshund]. Once, I was a St. Bernard." That was my grandfather.

Lazar: This might be an indiscreet question: We can pass over it if you don't like it. Is your framing of the story, centering on why Mohr didn't bring Käthe and Eva with him—is that also the family's narrative? Is that the question that comes up in the tapes of Eva?

Reuss: No, actually, it's not. I never had a chance to talk to Eva, but her account is fascinating. In Nicolas's film, she not only describes her childhood as idyllic, she remembers in great detail her father, Max, telling her that he was leaving. And she remembers him lying to her. She didn't understand it as a fib until she was an older woman. But she very vividly recalls him saying to her that he was leaving because "your mother doesn't want me to live here anymore"—which of course was completely false and unfair. As an adult she realized what a terrible thing it was to say, what it represented, but as a child she just accepted it. A kid of eight doesn't question. She was perfectly willing to accept what was happening. They were expecting to go and meet up with him. That was the plan.

The question—why did he leave them behind—is my own formulation. I don't think it would have occurred to them to pose it that way. It wasn't part of the framework. But seen from today, it is *the* question. Mohr was aware of the possibility that he would not return to Germany, and he had no intention to do so. And Käthe accepted it because she shared his political views. But nobody foresaw *Kristallnacht* in 1934. That it would become fatal to be a Jew in Germany, I don't think could have been foreseen in 1934. Even so, why do you leave your wife and kid behind? It's a strange thing to do.

Lazar: This work is very different from your previous novels in being set in the past and having a tremendous amount of historical detail. For example, when Käthe goes to Munich to buy luggage, you describe what she sees, she passes by the "*Entartete Kunst*" exhibit. There are descriptions about what Mohr sees when he's out and about in Shanghai. You've clearly done a lot of work, a lot of research into the background. Was this something new for you? How did this attention to historical detail figure into the creative process? Was it a hindrance? Was it inspiring?

Reuss: It was inspiring, and I was very conscious of the process and eager. *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* is the only word I can think of. I've long been interested in the phenomenology of Husserl and, more recently, Paul Ricoeur; ideas about memory and history, how the one is intimately tied up with the other. I was interested in making something of the material, and the existence of a photographic record really brought it to a different level. The personal side in *Wolfsgrub* is very well documented, and I was able to immerse myself in the Shanghai of the period by reading the *North China Daily News*. It was the preeminent English language newspaper of the day and a major resource. It was also illustrated, had photographs. In fact, the photograph of the carnage in the book was a newspaper photograph. Mohr had somehow obtained a print, cap-

tioned it on the back and mailed it back to Käthe. It would be nice to know not only just how he got his hands on it—he must have gone to the offices of the newspaper and asked for a copy. But *why*? An odd thing to do—another glimpse of the man. Between August and November 1937, bombs were being dropped all over the city. The Spanish Civil War and Guernica are seen as the beginning of modern air war against civilians, but it happened in Shanghai and China during the Sino-Japanese War on a massive scale, too. The population of Shanghai in the 1930s was about four million. The aerial bombing of the city was seen not just as a catastrophic event, but as a spectacle as well, well covered and much discussed in the dailies. Even as the subject of cartoons—residents of Shanghai as camera-toting tourists watching dogfights from the roofs of apartment buildings. So I had, on the one hand, this extremely private resource, and, on the other, an extremely public one, the newspapers.

Lazar: To jump back briefly to the problem you mentioned earlier of getting into a pre-Holocaust mind-set and trying not to be portentous: Did you ever find yourself having to cut the detail that was too good or too foreboding?

Reuss: It was tempting to get more into the war experiences. Mohr was a medical officer in a German cavalry regiment, was captured at the front somewhere in France, and spent a year as a POW in England. To have that refracted and reflected in the context of the coming war was a big temptation. But then I asked myself: As Mohr stood at the window of his Shanghai apartment overlooking a scene of devastation, would he necessarily have been thinking about his own wartime past, the Great War? Even if he had, it would have been a cliché, I think. In one letter to Käthe, he writes about how sick and tired he is of war, and Käthe writes back “Ach, du hattest schon zu viel Krieg.” [You have had too much war already.] She is merely commenting on his current predicament; but seen from today, in retrospect, it becomes portentous, a foreshadow. It was important to me to avoid clichés. The epoch is so well known, you can easily fall into cliché by saying too much.

Lazar: Let’s talk a little about the source material and the family materials that you drew upon. Just a basic question first: are the quotations from letters and telegrams in the book genuine?

Reuss: Yes.

Lazar: You didn’t take any liberties?

Reuss: Well, I tried as much as I could to let the texts speak for themselves. Käthe’s recounting of the mountain-climbing accident is taken directly from something she wrote. They are her own memories. I tried as much as possible to leave them to speak for themselves. That’s why in the

end I couldn't infer any single, specific motive for Mohr. I decided he both knew and didn't know what he was doing, which is completely consistent with what I know of human nature. I adapted a lot of his conversation with D. H. Lawrence directly from their correspondence. I put words in their mouths that had actually been written. I don't have Mohr's side of the correspondence, so I used the Lawrence text and then just bounced it off Mohr. A big no-no for an historian but not for a novelist. Here I'm giving you the deep architecture of the book. It was important to me to remain true as much as I could to the record, as it were, while taking liberties wherever I wanted. I maintain that, although this is a novel and although I took liberties and invented characters and parts of the story, it's true to the people. I think Mohr would recognize himself and I think Käthe would recognize herself in the book.

Lazar: You had access to family correspondence and a variety of records as well as to many photographs. It seems, and correct me if this is a false impression, that you rely more on the photos than the other documents and give them more prominence. The book opens and closes with meditations on photography, and either the narrator or Mohr brings up the issue of what photos can help us remember or what they capture. I'm assuming that this was a deliberate decision to give the visual document priority over the written document.

Reuss: Well, no, I wouldn't say priority. It required a completely different level of interpretation. A photograph as an object, as a piece of documentation, carries a completely different significance than a letter, say, or an oral history. One must bear in mind the differences in the material. This difference is what I was drawn to, teasing out some of the issues which I allude to—I wouldn't say superficially, but to provoke questions. There's the work of John Berger, Walter Benjamin, Susan Sonntag; they've all sketched out what the issues are vis-à-vis photography. The late philosopher Paul Ricoeur goes the deepest theoretically and brings up extremely pertinent issues that, in the context of trying to imagine myself back in time, became readily obvious.

In looking at a photograph, one is looking at not just a discrete moment in time but by necessity bringing to it an interpretation. There is only so much that can be *known* from a photograph—the rest is inferential, and I took liberties inferring. I think of the materials that were available to me as parallel modes of interpretation—photograph, memory, inference; text, memory, inference. When you read a letter of Mohr to his wife, you're inferring. Even in the smallest details—"I did this and that today, I miss you"—there's inference going on. This is true with any document. I came to see photographs as texts, which is a cliché of post-modern theory but a compelling way of approaching them.



Käthe and Max Mohr, 1934, just prior to his departure for China. Photo courtesy of Frederick Reuss.

Lazar: Was there something that you could put your finger on that the photos either by or of Mohr told you that his writings and his letters couldn't or didn't?

Reuss: Absolutely. For example, the one of him and Käthe at the table. That picture speaks a thousand words, just the expressions on their faces. I don't think anything, except maybe a beautiful poem, could convey the feeling in the room as well as that photograph does. Their relationship is as plain to see as the dishes on the table, where they're at. One has to look at a photograph not as a mute aesthetic object but as a conveyor of meaning, content. This presents both obstacles and opportunities. As John Berger has famously said, the relation between what we see and what we know is never settled. This is where interpretation begins.

Lazar: Is there a distinction or a boundary line between a photograph as a document containing certain information and a photograph that starts you thinking and you begin imagining what they're saying? Is there a clear line there?

Reuss: I don't know. Probably not. Are there clear lines anywhere?

Lazar: The way historians approach photos can be much more mundane and perhaps circumspect. You might call it the Rodney King problem.



Max Mohr, Wolfsgrub, Bavaria (early 1930s). Photo courtesy of Frederick Reuss.

When we saw the videotape on TV, we saw one thing; when it was shown in the courtroom, the jury saw something very different. There can be more than one way to view and interpret a piece of visual evidence. We can both derive meaning from a photo and project meaning onto it.

Reuss: A photograph connotes meaning; it doesn't denote meaning. A historian by methodological necessity can only consider those things that can be readily contextualized. Anything that is subjective or not apparent isn't properly considered as part of the record. The idea that photographs contain meaning in and of themselves is nonsense—they don't. Meaning is read into them. Even a photograph of Hitler at the Nuremberg rally. Yes, it's pregnant with meaning, it means something; but what it means depends on what the viewer knows. I guess that's the difference between a historian's and a novelist's approach.

As a novelist, I can look at a photograph and imagine the circumstances around it, read into it freely. When Mohr jumps over the stool, for example. I completely contrived that scene. An historian would consider what I did a falsification. There is a picture of him jumping over a stool. Clearly, he set a stool out in the yard one day and leapt over it. That's more or less all we know. But I maintain that the more important thing

we can know from the photograph, the quantum of truth that it contains, is that he was the kind of guy who would do such a thing. He was that kind of person. The precise circumstances are almost irrelevant. Was it a dare? Was he trying to impress his wife? Was he drunk? We don't know. Anyway, I don't think he could have done that drunk—it's a pretty hard thing to do. So I invented a scene and took what I know he did do and used it as a way for him to deliver a little bit of his philosophy of life to a young man. You knit things together in some way. And actually, I don't see that a historian has much choice but to do something similar. Knit things together in some way. I just read something from Paul Valéry; it's a nice quote: "History will justify anything. It teaches precisely nothing for it contains everything and furnishes examples of everything." I agree with the spirit of that statement.

Lazar: How would you distinguish yourself from an historian or a biographer? What sort of boundaries do you see between fiction and history?

Reuss: I guess there's a controversial way of answering that. Very little separates fiction from historical narrative insofar as interpretation is involved—it's all telling and retelling. The narration of events, even contemporary events, is always going to have a subjective aspect. I wouldn't say there's *no* difference between history and fiction. That would be going too far. But take my grandfather's memoir, which a historian would accept as primary-source material. I, as the grandson, see some of the falsehoods it contains; yet if you take one step back, which the sociologists at Oldenburg do, it is a perfectly valid document, it is in itself an artifact of the period, one that they're willing to accept at face value. It was completely irrelevant to them whether he had actually heard Hitler give a diatribe in a Munich *Kneipe* and then leave without paying for his beer—one of the more colorful episodes in the memoir. To them it was more interesting how he, an assimilated Jew, a student, a member of a fraternity, all of these being true, speaks of his experience. Already the nuances involved are many and deep.

I think that two hundred years from now, somebody coming across the story of Max Mohr is going to come across my book too, and they're going to come across it as an artifact of a wider period. Maybe when the Owl of Minerva has flown far enough away, we'll be able to see more clearly just what the relationship between us is. I don't mean in the familial sense, but in how I chose to relate the story, the whole approach to the past. It's all a matter of perspective. I find it amusing when I get into conversations with people who have this incredibly one-dimensional view of what it is that constitutes a fact. A fact is a point of reference, and a point of reference merely reflects a point of view. It's dynamic and fluid, to be played with. Again, I would never call myself a historian, but I also

believe that what I've done is history in a very real sense. A biographer would have assembled evidence to show that Mohr left his wife and family behind in Germany because a, b, and c. But I didn't do that. In some ways, I was truer to life. I drew the line at asserting something I knew I could never know.

Lazar: Is this a factor in the choice to use third-person narration?

Reuss: That's also a very important point—I switch between the second person and the third person. In the very first paragraph, I address a conundrum that literary critics have spent probably too much time worrying about: the ambiguity of the second person as a narrative voice. The author is simultaneously asserting the subjectivity of the character and of the author. The narrator and the narrated. And *you* can also imply the reader, a way of projecting the reader into the text. It's a little bit of a Borges-like puzzle, but I found it useful in drawing attention to the nuances of interpreting photographs.

Lazar: Were you ever tempted to use the first person in this project?

Reuss: Never, never, never. I didn't want to take that final step into the subjectivity of Max Mohr. It just seemed wrong aesthetically, and maybe there's even a taste factor involved, I don't know. It removes some of that interpretive distance that I needed in order to make up what I needed to make up.

Lazar: Historians have a basic code of ethics. If you quote a document, you have to quote it accurately. No picking and choosing; you can't ignore the bits that don't fit your argument. Historians might look at novelists as amoral—you can make things up if you want; we can't. What sort of ethical obligations did you have with this project? Were there ethical constraints because it is a family project and there are people alive whom you're close to and who might be potentially offended?

Reuss: It's an important question. While being constrained by a desire to remain faithful to the material and to the subject, I changed things that a historian would never have been able to justify. Yet in bending all of those rules and in more or less making hay of what I had, I believe I was able to achieve a deep resonance with the subject—a truthful resonance. Like I said, I think if Max Mohr were to pick up this book and read it, he would find it was a fair portrait of him.

Lazar: And Käthe?

Reuss: And Eva too. More importantly—and I think this holds for historians as well—you have to be true to the material. If you find you need

to change things, it can only be after a level of empathy has been established with the subject, and you get to the empathy only after you've done the work and you understand the material. Only when empathy and understanding have been achieved can you begin picking and choosing. Historians pick and choose all the time. You sort through the material. Truth is a by-product of that empathetic experience, that deep identification with the subject.

Lazar: Identification with the subject: historians do it, biographers do it, novelists do it. Historians and biographers usually have very few qualms about saying, "He did this for that reason" or "She was motivated by x, y, and z." Your narrative revolves around a question of motivation—why did Mohr leave, what did he intend to do—and the question isn't fully answered, or at least not explicitly, in the end. What was your goal in not answering this question? Is this part of where you see a difference between history and fiction?

Reuss: It gets back to what I was saying earlier. A conventional biography centered on a man of that epoch would have to take into consideration the reasons, motivations. The problem is that people are not always aware of themselves and their motivations. To ascribe a motivation is to interpret. I'm not saying I don't interpret—the whole book is an interpretation. But it leaves open the possibility that he himself, the subject, might not have been fully conscious of his reasons. There's human material there, you don't just have a formula: storm clouds brewing in Europe. It's more nuanced. To resist ascribing motives requires a greater leap of imagination.

Lazar: Do you think that there's a qualitative difference between the imagination a novelist brings to a story set in the past and the imagination a historian uses in trying to construct a narrative from his or her empirical data?

Reuss: I guess I don't really know the answer to that. I wouldn't want to qualify or distinguish between different aspects of the imagination. But I think the reader knows when a historian is not simply engaged in scholastic minutiae and has a real empathy with the subject. The reader always knows. I like Simon Schama, for example. He transgresses or rather plays, and I think he's making an interesting point. He's a historian interested in narrative. I can only speak as a novelist who has an interest in history. I think his insight is that there are moments of convergence between historical narrative and fiction. I agree. Narrative is storytelling, history is storytelling. You can concentrate on the big general sweeps and strokes and tell it that way—names and dates and ideas and events

and places. Or you can do it at the level of individual experience, as in biography—or a novel.

Lazar: Were you reading much history while working on this project?

Reuss: Of the period?

Lazar: Or also not of the period, for narrative's sake.

Reuss: I read pretty eclectically. I found most valuable the newspapers because that enabled me to really submerge. In terms of assembling the *Zeitgeist*, the nuance, the way people spoke, I was lucky that Mohr was a writer. I was able to use his writings as a lens. The books depict the man's inner state in a very rich way and are period pieces as well. In many ways, I functioned as a sort of literary critic, and found all kinds of correspondence between Mohr and Lawrence, and was able to extract a flavor of the time. Also important were the letters. In a way, letters are like reading the newspapers.

Lazar: Attention to memory seems important to you. It seems like there are two forms of memory at play in the book: individuals' memories of their own experiences and memory as what's passed down. When Eva asks Käthe about her parents' lives before she was born, there's no clear boundary line between these two forms of memory. You play with that. You've talked about how two hundred years down the line when people talk about Mohr, this is going to be part of the record, this will be part of the memory. Let me start with a crude question: How do memory, history, and fiction, or memory and narrative, fit together?

Reuss: Well, I'll point to Paul Ricoeur—who says forgetting is also important. Anyway, one enters a maze of questions. I did very consciously mirror the transmission. When Eva is in bed or sitting on her mother's knee, I am telling the story within the story. As I said, I left those pretty much verbatim—they are absolutely Käthe's words and memories. The idea that stories are what is remembered of something begs the question again of what's true, what's not, what's fact, what's fiction, how much can we rely on our sources. Remembering involves forgetting, to echo the title of Ricoeur's book. This also takes on different forms. Forgetting can be conscious as well as unconscious. For example, trying to enter pre-Holocaust Germany in my imagination involved conscious forgetting—that's one way of putting it—dissociating. Or what Käthe remembers of her early years at Wolfsgrub with Max, when they were happy, is transmitted in the things she chooses to tell. She told stories beyond the mountain-climbing accident. I selected that one for a very specific reason: a

restless quest for adventure that ended in disaster. From my perspective, it mirrors what ultimately became of their life story. Perhaps Käthe was aware of it as she passed the story to Eva; or perhaps not. I chose to retell certain of Käthe's stories for my own reasons; and my retelling then becomes part of the continuing story.

Somebody may ask some day: Why did Frederick Reuss write a novel about his great uncle and portray him in a highly subjective way instead of just telling the real story? I don't know that I have a coherent answer for that, except to say that I wanted to. I'm open to the suggestion that, pulling back, there is a wider historical perspective in which our era may be seen to have been produced out of the earlier one in ways we can't yet formulate. Storytelling is a way of participating in that flow of time. The Owl of Minerva. . . .

Lazar: Perhaps to get back to my question of motivation. One of your starting points is your grandfather. Is *Mohr* the novel in any way recompense for the memoir your grandfather did in the early 1940s, an attempt of sorts to set the record straight?

Reuss: Bending the facts a little bit? It does mirror it in a funny way. But I wouldn't put it quite like that. If his invention is a mirror of his time, so my invention is a mirror of today. My interest in the past was certainly stimulated by what was denied and kept hidden for so many years. But I went about my fictionalizing in an effort to come to a deeper understanding of the truth, not to obfuscate or bury it. And I also see it as an expression of a desire to connect with what was. There are definitely larger forces at work in this. Rootlessness, alienation, transience, the often-cited pathologies of modern life. My guess is that there are a lot of books like this being written right now, and two hundred years from now people will look back and ask: What were they so obsessed with? And why did they puzzle themselves so?

STERN PRIZE

COSMOPOLITAN CONSERVATISM: TRANSNATIONAL ELITE POLITICS IN THE GERMAN-AMERICAN ATLANTIC OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND THE DIALECTIC OF COMMERCE AND COMMUNITY

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The end of the Cold War brought the spread of free trade and globalization at the same time that it reinvigorated nationalism.¹ Rather than seeing a universal victory of liberal, Western democracy, we find ourselves bracing for attacks by fundamentalists who advocate an authoritarian social order. In one narrative, this fundamentalist attack is a matter of an anti-modernist rebellion by those who lost in the process of modernization.² From the mountainous heartlands of Afghanistan and Appalachia, Chechnya and Thuringia, self-styled defenders of the authenticity and purity of the people and its beliefs set out to battle the incursions of modernization. In the minds of these crusaders, global commerce is the conduit for the seed of corrosion that threatens a local morality and way of life. In their view, the city and its archetypical representative, the merchant, bear responsibility for the subjection of the simple farmers and workers to the dictates of the market and the subversion of their ethos by a commercial culture devoid of a higher calling.³

The longer we live under these conditions of global strife, however, the clearer it becomes that a fundamentalist critique of Western liberalism is just as attractive to urban professionals as it is to disgruntled provincials. The biographies of recent suicide attackers are replete with university degrees and urban lifestyles. Likewise, a closer look at the presumed backwoodsmen reveals a high degree of participation in global commerce. Whether we consider opiates from Afghanistan or auto parts from Appalachia, we find that even the remotest regions of the world are tied into the world market. There are no authentic places left that have been untouched by the incursions of modernization. Local, particularist traditions that pose as deeply rooted customs are really inventions already suffused with an engagement with the outside world. In either case, global liberalism and fundamentalism appear not as ideologies that respectively promote and oppose modernity, but as ideological poles within modernity.

Since the 1990s, intellectuals in the United States have perceived the newly globalized world as presenting both dangers and opportunities. Transnational history has been one reflex to the epochal changes at the turn of our century. This new branch of historical scholarship has been mining the past for traces of our direct ancestors: men and women who lived through periods of intense changes that affected the entire world, and who went beyond their local origins to craft a world view from the experiences collected in exchanges with other countries. Transnational historians have discovered a variety of such ancestors, mostly in the Progressive Era at the turn of the twentieth century. Here, they found reformers who, knowing that their local intellectual traditions and political institutions inadequately equipped them to respond to rapid industrialization and urbanization, turned abroad to look for better answers. Here, they also found conquerors and colonizers who went to foreign shores as rulers, looking to spread their own local ideas and practices in the guise of a universal civilization, an American empire.⁴

No matter the intent of those who were driven abroad by local concerns, transnational exchange is always a two-way street. In formulating this insight, transnational historians stand in the tradition of scholarship on the Atlantic World of the eighteenth century. The subculture of sailors and merchants who built the European colonial empires of that era, as well as the novel commodities they introduced into the societies along the Atlantic's shores, remade the everyday life and the world view of the colonizers and the colonized, even if neither ever left their homes.⁵

Thanks to Atlantic and transnational history, we know that at the beginning of the modern era, there was a world in which identities were in flux, and that by the end of the nineteenth century it had been replaced by a world of nation-states imagined as self-contained units, albeit one permeated by—friendly and competitive—transnational connections. One hope of transnational history has been to break nation-states' hold on peoples' political imagination. As history is always a narrative that defines the self-image of contemporaries, transnational history has been offering an adequate narrative for an American population that can no longer afford to ignore the rest of the world. It could become an updated national history of America, just as it could become a critique of American imperial ambition, now and in the past.

So far, the historical period that most resembled our own, and in which the persistent dichotomies of our own era were first fully formed, has evaded close attention from transnational historians. The decades between the Congress of Vienna and the Paris Commune were the formative years for the world we know. They saw the rise of industry outside of Britain and the acceleration of global communication by steam power and telegraphs on land and across oceans. By 1871, these processes

had resulted in the creation of a modern, industrial world market and stronger, increasingly unitary territorial states. These states mediated competition and cooperation on the world market, basing their legitimacy on nationality, their fiscal and military might resting on industry.

Our world, with its dialectic of world market and nation-state, cosmopolitanism and parochialism, universalism and particularism, liberalism and fundamentalism, technological progress and barbarian regression, has its roots in the nineteenth century. It is for this reason that Marx and Engels's account of globalization and creative destruction in the Communist Manifesto rings so contemporary to our ears:

The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world-market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. All old-established national industries . . . are dislodged by new industries whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilized nations; . . . industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe. . . In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations.⁶

Yet the Communists' hope that "national one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible" has not been borne out. From the outset, this ever-shrinking, ever-accelerating, ever-changing world has bred a wish to recapture the "feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations" Marx and Engels had hoped were forever lost to it.⁷ Modernity has been constantly shadowed by its dark sibling, reactionary anti-modernism. More often than not, its rejection of the political and philosophical foundations of modernity has been accompanied by an enthusiasm for its material blessings. Bin Laden would be impossible to conceive of without his satellite phone.

In the shadow of recent events, the deep historical roots of the dialectic of modern world-society and America's entanglement with this dialectic are more clearly visible than in the spotlight of national history. In America itself, and not just among its enemies, the march of technological progress and the course of empire were from the beginning accompanied by a wish to hold back the clock of democracy, liberalism, and individual rights. Between America and Europe, some of the most active promoters of a capitalist world market were among those most skeptical of its purported companion, liberal-democratic society.

The German merchants who dominated trade between the United States and Germany through much of the nineteenth century—based in

the Free Hanseatic City of Bremen, an independent city-republic that today is part of Germany—shared the sense that the boundaries between land and ocean were being blurred by modern commerce.⁸ America and the ocean appeared as metaphors for commodity exchange in the words of Johann Georg Kohl, a merchant from Bremen:

Poseidon is, most of all, a shaker of the Earth. . . . Like mighty springs, America and the Ocean drive and spur the whole great machinery of our modern life. America grows abundantly in all our gardens and fields; and the Ocean pushes with its currents and tides into the most secluded channels of the hinterland.⁹

As a cosmopolitan community equally rooted on both sides of the ocean and equally engaged in the political and economic life of multiple societies, Bremen's merchants allow us to place the antebellum United States in its international context. The history of these merchants illuminates the essential contribution to the making of an industrial-capitalist world market, and of American participation in it, of men and women deeply committed to tradition and fiercely opposed to liberalism and democracy.

Acknowledging the importance of these cosmopolitan conservatives and their American collaborators for tying the United States into the world market means to question the account of America as the undisputed domain of liberalism. Trading with America, these German merchants found in the new world like-minded men and women whose qualms about the dangers of unfettered market relations matched their own, yet with whom they also shared a wish to "improve" the world through the blessings of global communication and commerce.

Together, these German merchants and their American friends represent not an alternative path to capitalism, but its mainstream. If their exertions resulted in a world increasingly characterized by liberal democratic nation-states, it was not what they had envisioned or desired when they set out to improve the older world they knew.

Between the centers of their activities—Bremen, New York, and Baltimore—these Hanseats formed one transatlantic community. They remained linked to each other through trade, intermarriage, friendships, shared religious and political beliefs, and a reliance on the infrastructure of consulates and trade treaties that rested on Bremen's sovereignty. The boundaries that defined this group crossed through cities, nations, and oceans. At the same time, Hanseats helped level boundaries between continents through their trade.

During the middle third of the nineteenth century, when the United States was presumably busy finding its national identity, we find strong traces of both an earlier Atlantic world and of a later transnational world.

The American economy depended on exporting cotton and other staples of slave labor, and on importing immigrants, who provided the manpower and capital for the market revolution and capitalist production. Without an armada of merchant vessels and an army of merchants in the commercial centers, King Cotton would have been about as powerful as your average Polish country squire. These merchants and mariners, however, were largely foreigners.¹⁰

In North America, especially in New York and Baltimore, Hanseats settled to facilitate trade with their home town. By the time the Civil War began, Bremen's merchants were carrying an impressive share of the American export trade and bringing an ever-greater share of European immigrants to New York, Baltimore, New Orleans, and Galveston.¹¹

Economically, Hanseats were essential for facilitating the commerce on which the growing nation depended. Politically, they served as conduits for ideas between the old and new worlds. Their engagement with political and cultural ideas across the Atlantic world shows the essentially transnational character of the central political debates of the time. The related challenges of capitalist modernization and democracy were not limited to America. Hence, it is not surprising that here as elsewhere, elites responded to both processes in similar ways. In engaging with Whigs, Democrats, and Republicans, these merchants reveal that elites on all shores of the Atlantic shared political idioms that made possible a recognition of shared interests and concerns. Socially, Hanseats partook in a global, Victorian culture at the same time that they were rooted in local, German traditions, and as they absorbed the aesthetic of romantic nationalism in both its American and German formulations. In all these ways, they resembled their American and German contemporaries, while forming a group self-consciously apart from both.¹²

In reconstructing the world Hanseats made, we can recover the quint-essentially transnational character of the United States during a time in its history that on the surface appears as one of its most inward-looking periods. Consider Emanuel Leutze's monumental history painting, *Washington Crossing the Delaware* (1851). An icon of American national identity, the original of this work hung in Bremen's Art Museum (*Kunsthalle*) after it had been bought in 1863 with donations from Bremen's mercantile elite. There it served as a reminder of Bremen's cordial relations with the United States. Ultimately, if we give proper weight to the transnational influences on the United States during the antebellum era, we find that the country looks a lot less exceptional than we might assume, and was tied into the international flow of people, ideas and commodities to a much greater extent than we might have expected.

In Baltimore and New York, Hanseats were part of a larger mercantile class that was characterized by a cosmopolitan composition. Hanseats

resembled that larger mercantile class in many of their business practices. An ethos of honor and credibility was common to all merchants, whether they were from Bremen, the United States, or other foreign countries. A tight cooperation between different firms, often tied to each other by blood relations or intermarriage, was just as common among American or British merchants as it was for Hanseats.¹³

In spite of these many similarities, Bremish merchants formed a distinct group within this broader class. Those qualities that set them apart were also factors contributing to the extraordinary stability and success of their group. First, Hanseats maintained a conservative approach to business, eschewing speculation and putting the welfare of the family and the estate above a logic of pure profit maximization. Second, dense ties of intermarriage, and the financial and ideological commitment they entailed, connected Hanseats in Bremen, Baltimore, and New York with each other, establishing in a transnational space a degree of mutual obligations comparable to those found among elites in "home towns" like Bremen.¹⁴

Third, the political ideology that Hanseats had constructed for themselves in Bremen gave them a shared world view. Their agreement on fundamental political values further bound the members of the network to each other. The content of this ideology, a selective embrace of liberalism paired with an insistence on maintaining social hierarchy and a politics of deference, placed them in a peculiar position on one side of an ideological divide. Running across the Atlantic and the countries that bordered it, it split the proponents of a capitalist social order into two camps: radicals who believed in democracy and the Enlightenment, and modern conservatives who wished to uphold social distinctions and Christian morality.

Fourth, Bremen was an independent state, with a foreign policy of its own. The network of consulates and trade treaties that rested on the city's status formed the groundwork of Hanseats' business enterprise. It further tied their interests to the city, and through it, to each other. The state of Bremen was the agent through which Hanseats shaped the development of world trade by extending the infrastructure that intensified and regularized exchange relations across the ocean.¹⁵

Hence, economically, socially, culturally, and politically, Hanseats had things in common that they did not share with their non-Hanseatic mercantile peers, German or American. At the same time, their engagement in trade and their commitment to conservative religious and political values gave them manifold occasions to cooperate with other groups in the United States and Germany.

The distinctness of Hanseats within the larger, American mercantile class was not a function of ethnicity. The same peculiarities that set

Hanseats apart from American merchants also distinguished them from other German merchants.¹⁶ Hanseats had even less in common with the mass of German immigrants whom they were bringing to America in ever-increasing numbers. Bremen's merchants behaved as the members of a privileged estate, not of a *Volk*. Political refugees from the liberal German middle class became ethnic politicians in the United States.¹⁷ Hanseats, by contrast, maintained an attitude toward the many that demanded deference toward one's social betters. As they did in Bremen, Hanseats in the United States related to the mass of Germans with the same stance of "patronage and protection" that they assumed in the old country.¹⁸

Stubborn Hanseatic traditionalism was not a matter of provinciality. Both in formulating their ideals and in shaping their responses to social changes, Hanseats incorporated what they learned abroad. France, Britain, and America made appearances in Bremish thought not just as abstract examples. Hanseatic merchants had experienced firsthand political and social life in these countries, especially in the United States. Hence their ideas differed from the mainstream of German political life. Before the diffuse political currents of the German middle class had congealed into clearly delimited parties, Bremen's elite had found its voice in a Western conservatism. It had thus found a response to the dual challenges of industrialization and democracy that allowed for a supersession of home-town traditions in a political ideology open to trans-local alliances.

By knowing the people who mattered, Hanseats may have had a more enduring influence on American politics than ethnic politicians could have ever hoped for. In Baltimore and New York, Hanseats played leading roles in the local chambers of commerce, which in turn helped shape local and national politics. Chief Justice Roger B. Taney lived next door to Bremish consul Albert Schumacher in Baltimore's upscale Mount Vernon neighborhood.¹⁹ Abraham Lincoln's only visit to a diplomat's residence took place on the eve of his inauguration, when Rudolf Schleiden, Bremen's minister-resident in Washington, hosted a small dinner party for the president-elect.²⁰ Bremen's leading newspaper, the *Weserzeitung*, served as the official organ for notifications by the U.S. federal government in Germany.²¹ And where, if not from the Hanseatic Cities, did Mayor Fernando Wood get the idea to break New York City away from the Union to make it into an independent city-republic?²²

Hanseatic influence depended on a mode of politics that we associate with a pre-democratic era. But even in an age of popular suffrage, when the masses no longer deferred to their social betters in political matters, deals among men of standing did not cease to be important. Hanseats expected their voice to be weighed, not counted. This was the way of

doing politics and business they were used to at home, and they found that it served them well in America.²³

Like Hanseats, American conservatives were engaged in the project of paving the way for capitalist social relations, while attempting to shore up the moral foundations of community eroded by the rise of capitalism. In this approach to modernization, they were located in opposition to democrats on both sides of the ocean, and they were aware that they had a common adversary. Based on this commonality, Hanseats and Whigs embraced steamship technology, which revolutionized international commerce. Unlike Whigs, Hanseats did not promote steamships as a step toward building an industrial-capitalist society. Like their American friends, however, they perceived technological and institutional change as “improvements” upon a fundamentally good social order. Thus it is not surprising to find that the first steamship line subsidized by the U.S. government connected New York with Bremerhaven.²⁴

Elite politics, while relegated to the back of our historical consciousness by three decades of social and cultural history, was not dead in the nineteenth-century United States. In recent years, historians like John Ashworth, Sven Beckert, and Eugene Genovese have shown that anti-democratic sentiment in upper-class circles survived the challenges of Jacksonian Democracy and the Civil War surprisingly intact. If anything, decades of popular participation in politics strengthened conservatives’ disdain for the aspirations of the masses.²⁵

Hanseats listened to their conservative American counterparts and engaged their ideas both in their American homes and in their old home, Bremen. As citizens of a republic, the reactionary politics of Old Regime, legitimist conservatism were distasteful to Hanseats. As notables who reigned in Bremen within a constitutional framework designed to guarantee mercantile dominance, they were just as unwilling to embrace democracy. As global merchants whose capital depended on ever-accelerated circulation, they were eager to embrace technological advances and a legal order that removed just enough of the traditional fetters of privilege to create a free market for commodities and wage-labor, while leaving in place their own privileges. In American conservatism, they found an ideology ideally suited to these specific interests. Thus political ideas flowed both ways across the Atlantic, and Hanseats served as an important conduit.

Thanks to the monumental work of Daniel Rodgers, in present U.S. historiography, transnationality almost has a default association with progressivism in its broadest sense. From the point of view of German postwar historiography, likewise, an “Atlantic orientation” is coterminous with liberal politics in the nineteenth century, or opposition to Fascism in the twentieth. In Hanseats, however, we see the emergence of a

transnational, modern conservatism that is the specific product of a German-American exchange. In the light of this exchange, Whigs begin to look like members of a Conservative International who joined forces with like-minded foreigners in a transnational struggle against the threat of democracy and mob rule, and for an improvement of a fundamentally good social order. Hanseats formed an important link within this trans-Atlantic current of conservative modernizers.

Past and present anti-modernists and others who bemoan the loss of community and its "feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations" might find Hanseats kindred spirits.²⁶ Their life as a mercantile estate represented the ideal of an organic whole resting on the mutual dependence of families, firms, and faith. Inconveniently, however, Hanseats were also merchants, and their community was itself cosmopolitan in its geographical extent and in its prevalent ideology. Thus Wilhelm Kießelbach, an organic intellectual of Bremen's elite, gave voice to a corporatist vision of social order while at the same time promoting capitalist exchange relations.²⁷ Indeed, a moral economy based on reciprocity and exchange relations embedded in a Calvinist ethos supported by mutual social control characterized the *internal* life of the Hanseatic community but less and less of its *external* interactions.

Unlike Kießelbach and other theorists of organicism, Ferdinand Tönnies was aware that trade and industry, while evolving from within traditional community, carry with them the seeds of that community's dissolution or its evolution into a liberal *Gesellschaft*.²⁸ Hanseatic community life gave Bremen's merchants the impulse to engage in global commerce. But global commerce came with an imperative of competitiveness, eventually forcing Hanseats to adapt their business practices, their values, and the social and political order of their home town, thus undermining the foundations of community life. While these seeds of dissolution were sown, they did not begin to reduce Hanseats' ability to practice their accustomed ways of a cosmopolitan community engaged in trans-Atlantic commerce until the 1860s. Until then, they were able to use their very rootedness in a stable network as a resource for furthering their political and social interests.

To understand the role of merchants in the world economy, we can benefit from the work of Karl Marx.²⁹ While in many ways merchant capital paved the way for modern capitalism, its former role differed decisively from its modern one. Yet, Marx observed, the notion that *capital as such* lived off fraud and plunder had survived into modern times. This notion he wished to dispel, mainly by emphasizing that modern, industrial capitalism relies on the exchange of *equivalents* at all stages of

circulation and production. Having embraced production, and drawing on the surplus value generated by labor, modern industrial capital no longer has to “buy cheap to sell dear.” As a consequence, merchant capital loses its independent economic function.³⁰

Over the course of the nineteenth century, in becoming agents of a specialized, commodity-trading branch of industrial capital, Hanseats lost much of what had made them cosmopolitan, or even transnational, in the past. Their ability to maintain a separate community across the Atlantic also ran up against powerful, external obstacles: the modern nation-state with its armed forces and its reliance on popular politics, and the dynamism of industrial capitalism. Hanseats’ traditionalism had been resilient enough to allow them to continue far into the nineteenth century a way of life more typical of the eighteenth. To continue this way of life, with its insistence on a limited scale of business, antiquated economic practices, and a reliance on the household and the family as the end and starting point of profit, would have meant certain ruin in the global economy of the last third of the nineteenth century.

Hanseats’ aloofness from popular politics likewise proved increasingly unsustainable. In Bremen and New York, they had to contend with an invigorated population that insisted on having their say in matters of big politics and enjoyed the support of central governments in many of their claims. If Hanseats wanted their voice to be heard under these conditions, they had to ask for the trust of the public. The currency of the club and the counting-house, character and reputation, were no longer sufficient for political purchase. The discourse of popular politics in the new nation-states was increasingly characterized by nationalism and geopolitics. The days were over when a global class of merchants could believe—with some reason—that they were building a cosmopolitan world beyond war-making states.

The American Civil War and the German wars of unification of the 1860s accelerated, and eventually sealed, the demise of all that had made Hanseats into a distinct, cosmopolitan community. Guns and warships made by modern industry, not mercantile diplomacy, decided the domestic conflicts in the two societies that were most important to Hanseats. The search for a response to their loss of political leeway divided Hanseats. In America, Hanseats-turned-Unionists and their Confederate counterparts dissolved partnerships that had rested on decades-long ties between old families. In Germany, some Hanseats became enthusiastic supporters of a Prussian-led unification of the country, while others continued to detest both the authoritarian Prussian state and the democratic national movement with which it was allying itself. As the masses mobilized themselves to decide political questions with guns and ballots, a fractured elite that faced existential economic changes on top of these

political challenges found it increasingly impossible politically to shape its own destiny. Within a few years, Hanseatic politics had ceased to be what Bremen's longtime Burgomaster Johann Smidt had described as "an extended family life." The hope for an improved society under the careful guardianship of local elites had vanished.³¹

What was left of this cosmopolitan community after the 1860s was a rudimentary family network, stripped of the essential economic and political functions it had fulfilled in the past and reduced by those who had dropped out over political differences or under economic duress. Many old Hanseatic families still exist today, but the essential features of what had made them a community, the organic intertwining of their economic, domestic, and political existence based on a shared moral economy, do not. The memory of the golden age of Hanseatic, transatlantic trade of the 1830s through the 1850s survives but as an ideology in the self-image of present descendants of the great merchant-capitalists of the nineteenth century.

The experience of Hanseats in their interactions with America provides us with an argument against anti-commercialism, against reifying the market, and especially the *world* market, as an *agens* without actors. But it also cautions us against a certain voluntarism that explains market relations as completely reducible to the intentions, interests, and strategies of actors. The whole of the market and its logic adds up to more than the sum of its parts.

Contrary to the anti-commercialist imagination that sees merchants as the conscious agents of exploitation and dissolution, these Hanseatic champions of global commerce were at the same time among the most ardent supporters of preserving traditional values and a communal ethos. Not classical merchant capital, represented by Hanseats, but modern industrial capital and its commodity-trading and money-trading branches, together with its political complement, the nation-state, were the main agents of the dissolution and subversion of community. Hence in the last third of the nineteenth century, the wish of anti-commercialists in both America and Germany to use monetary and trade policies to end exploitative economic relations by subjecting merchants and other agents of the market to the discipline of a national economy, enforced by the nation-state, did not come true. Capital and the state continue to play their role as levelers in spite of their fundamentalist and anti-commercialist fans.

In following interests that arose from within their existence as a *community*, Hanseats helped transform Germany and the United States into industrial capitalist *societies*. The new economy of industrial capitalism undermined the economic independence of classical merchant-capital. In the transition to this new economy, Hanseatic merchant-capital appears

not as an exploiter preying upon local communities, but as a transnational community undone by its own success.

Notes

In this essay, I present a summary of the argument of my dissertation: Lars Maischak, "A Cosmopolitan Community—Hanseatic Merchants in the German-American Atlantic of the Nineteenth Century" (Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 2005).

¹ See, for example, Benjamin Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld—How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World* (New York, 1995).

² I use this term to describe the political program of actors who perceived a need for their respective societies to "catch up" to the leading industrial and commercial powers. Following the argument made by Geoff Eley and David Blackbourn in *The Peculiarities of German History* (Oxford, UK and New York, 1984), we should be aware that democratization, or even a liberal political stance, are not necessarily contained in a "package" of modernization. For example, Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital* (London, 1975), has shown that modernizers' political and social views varied, in a continuum ranging from a full embrace of "Western freedom" to authoritarianism.

³ See, for example, Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations* (New York, 1996); Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, *Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of its Enemies* (New York, 2004); and Ziauddin Sardar, *Postmodernism and the Other: The New Imperialism of Western Culture* (London and Chicago, Ill., 1998). The latter is an example of the views criticized here.

⁴ Thomas Bender, *A Nation Among Nations: America's Place in World History* (New York, 2006); Daniel Rogers, *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age* (Cambridge, MA and London, 1998); Daniel W. Howe, *American History in an Atlantic Context: An Inaugural Lecture delivered before the University of Oxford on June 3, 1993* (Oxford, UK, 1993); Paul Kramer, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2006); Ian Tyrrell, "American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History" (1031–1055) and "Ian Tyrrell Responds" (1068–1072), and Michael McGerr, "The Price of the 'New Transnational History'" (1056–1067), *American Historical Review* 96:4 (1991), pages as given in parentheses.

⁵ Marcus B. Rediker and Peter Linebaugh, *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic* (Boston, 2000); Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge, MA, 1993); Idem, *There ain't no Black in the Union Jack. The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation* (London, 1987); W. Jeffrey Bolster, *Black Jacks: African American Seamen in the Age of Sail* (Cambridge, MA and London, 1997); Robin D. G. Kelly, "How the West Was One: The African Diaspora and the Re-Mapping of U.S. History," in *Rethinking American History in a Global Age*, ed. Thomas Bender (Berkeley, CA, 2002), 123–147; Catherine Molineux, "The Peripheries Within: Race, Slavery, and Empire in Early Modern England" (Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 2005).

⁶ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York and London, 1978), 473–500, here 476.

⁷ Marx and Engels, "Manifesto," 475, 477.

⁸ Herbert Schwarzwälder, *Geschichte der Freien Hansestadt Bremen*, 4 vols. (Hamburg, 1987), is the standard general history of Bremen. For the legal conditions of inclusion in the mercantile estate of Bremen, see Peter Marschalek, "Der Erwerb des bremischen Bürgerrechts und die Zuwanderung nach Bremen um die Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts," *Bremisches Jahrbuch* 66 (1988): 295–305. The Hanseatic League received international recognition as a state-like entity with the Peace of Westphalia, at a moment when its economic and political importance was all but gone. Bremen, Hamburg, and Lübeck served as the Hansa's collective guardians after the demise of the League, and continued to do so in the nineteenth

century. As I am dealing exclusively with Bremish merchants, I use the term “Hanseat” synonymously with “Bremish merchant,” unless specifically noted.

⁹ Cited by Rolf Engelsing, “England und die USA in der bremischen Sicht des 19. Jahrhunderts,” *Jahrbuch der Wittheit zu Bremen* 1 (1957): 33–65, here 55–56 (1861).

¹⁰ Sven Beckert has found that in mid-1850s New York, 26 percent of the elite were foreign-born. By 1870, this share had risen to 44 percent. The share of Germans was 6 percent in 1855 and 23 percent in 1870. Beckert included in his samples taxpayers assessed on real and personal wealth of \$10,000 or more in 1855, and of \$15,000 or more in 1870. Sven Beckert, *The Monied Metropolis: New York City and the Consolidation of the American Bourgeoisie, 1850–1896* (Cambridge, MA et. al., 2001), 31 and 147.

¹¹ Ludwig Beutin, *Bremen und Amerika: Zur Geschichte der Weltwirtschaft und der Beziehungen Deutschlands zu den Vereinigten Staaten* (Bremen, 1953); Rolf Engelsing, *Bremen als Auswandererhafen, 1683–1880, Veröffentlichungen aus dem Staatsarchiv der Freien Hansestadt Bremen* 29, ed. Karl H. Schwebel (Bremen, 1961); Sam A. Mustafa, *Merchants and Migrations: Germans and Americans in Connection, 1776–1835*, Modern Economic and Social History Series, unnumbered vol., ed. Derek H. Aldcroft (Aldershot, UK et al., 2001); Walter Struve, *Germans & Texans: Commerce, Migration and Culture in the Days of the Lone Star Republic* (Austin, TX, 1996).

¹² For parallels to the English world of merchant capitalists, cf. Stanley D. Chapman, *The Rise of Merchant Banking* (London et al., 1984); Chapman, *Merchant Enterprise in Britain From the Industrial Revolution to World War I* (Cambridge, UK, et al., 1992).

¹³ Beckert, *Monied Metropolis* (see note 10); Idem, “Merchants and Manufacturers in the Antebellum North,” in *Ruling America: A History of Wealth and Power in a Democracy*, ed. Gary Gerstle and Steve Fraser (Cambridge, MA, 2005), 92–122; Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital, 1848–1875* (London, 1975), 241. The latter lists examples of family- and clan-based businesses in both the industrial and mercantile sectors. See also note 12. The broader, emerging middle class took many cultural clues from the mercantile elite of the Atlantic World. Hence, it is not surprising to find that both groups shared many features. See, for example, Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall, *Family Fortunes: Men and Women of the English Middle Class, 1780–1850*, Revised Edition (London and New York, 2002).

¹⁴ Mack Walker, *German Home Towns: Community, State, and General Estate, 1648–1871* (Ithaca, NY and London, 1971).

¹⁵ Following the definition of the term by Jürgen Osterhammel and Niels P. Petersson, Hanseats formed a *network*. Osterhammel and Petersson list as criteria for considering a social formation a network: 1. the “social interaction between more than two people,” 2. the “longevity” of these interactions, and 3. their reinforcement by institutions. The availability of “new information technology” lends to networks “the same stability [that characterizes] hierarchical organizations.” Jürgen Osterhammel and Niels P. Petersson, *Globalization: A Short History* (Princeton, NJ and Oxford, UK, 2005), especially 21–27; quotes, 22–23. Hanseats met these criteria. The specific, shared ideologies they held added a further dimension to their interactions and gave an additional source of stability to their network.

¹⁶ The spoken languages among many Hanseats seem to have been English and Lower German, while merchants from the Rhineland or Southern Germany would have spoken in different dialects of German. While educated Germans would have been able to communicate in High German, modulations owed to the habits of speaking dialect, or, as in the case of Lower German, a different language altogether, can render smooth conversation among Germans of different regional backgrounds hard to achieve, even today. See Rolf Engelsing, “Bremisches Unternehmertum: Sozialgeschichte 1780/1870,” *Jahrbuch der Wittheit zu Bremen* 2 (1958): 7–112; Engelsing, “England und die USA” (see note 9), for the social distance between Bremen’s merchants and German hinterland elites.

¹⁷ Stanley Nadel, *Little Germany: Ethnicity, Religion, and Class in New York City, 1845–80* (Urbana, IL, 1990); Carl F. Wittke, *Refugees of Revolution: The German Forty-Eighters in America* (Philadelphia, 1952); Bruce Levine, *The Spirit of 1848: German Immigrants, Labor Conflict, and*

the Coming of the Civil War (Urbana, IL, 1992); Hans L. Trefousse, *Carl Schurz, a Biography* (Knoxville, TN, 1982).

¹⁸ Andreas Schulz, *Vormundschaft und Protektion: Eliten und Bürger in Bremen, 1750–1880*, (Munich, 2002).

¹⁹ Justice John A. Campbell, later the Confederate States of America's assistant secretary of war, in his concurring opinion to Taney's majority opinion in the *Dred Scott* case pointed specifically to Bremen in stressing the contrast between German law that confers freedom to a person by virtue of his presence in a specific territory and the American legal situation. See *Dred Scott v. Sandford*, U.S. Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Campbell concurring, in: <http://www.tourolaw.edu/patch/Scott/Campbell.asp>. (Touro College Law Center, Project P.A.T.C.H.).

²⁰ Ralph Haswell Lutz, *Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und den Vereinigten Staaten während des Sezessionskrieges* (Heidelberg, 1911), 30–31; Hermann Wätjen, "Dr. Rudolf Schleiden als Diplomat in Bremischen Diensten, 1853–1866," *Bremisches Jahrbuch* 34 (1933): 262–276; "The State of the Nation," *New York Evening Post*, March 4, 1861, 2.

²¹ Engelsing, "England und die USA" (see note 9), 53.

²² Tyler G. Anbinder, "Fernando Wood and New York City's Secession from the Union: A Political Reappraisal," *New York History* 68 (January 1987): 67–92, explains the secession plan as a response to a long history of attempts by New York State politicians to gain control over crucial municipal institutions. Still, if Wood contemplated in earnest the founding of a new city-republic, he would not have found many modern examples besides the Hanseatic Cities.

²³ Engelsing, "England und die USA" (see note 9), 45; Beckert, *Monied Metropolis* (see note 10), 65; Wätjen, *Frühzeit des Nordatlantikverkehrs* (see note 24), 180–181.

²⁴ John G. B. Hutchins, *The American Maritime Industry and Public Policy, 1789–1914: An Economic History*, Harvard Economic Studies 71 (London and Cambridge, MA, 1941); Beutin, *Bremen und Amerika* (see note 11); Hermann Wätjen, *Aus der Frühzeit des Nordatlantikverkehrs: Studien zur Geschichte der deutschen Schifffahrt und deutschen Auswanderung nach den Vereinigten Staaten bis zum Ende des amerikanischen Bürgerkrieges* (Leipzig, 1932).

²⁵ Charles Sellers, *The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815–1846* (New York and Oxford, UK, 1991); John Ashworth, 'Agrarians' and 'Aristocrats': Party Political Ideology in the United States, 1837–1846 (London and Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1983); Ashworth, *Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics in the Antebellum Republic*, 2 vols., vol. 1: *Commerce and Compromise, 1820–1850* (Cambridge, UK, 1995); Eugene Genovese, *The World the Slaveholders Made* (New York, 1969); Beckert, *Metropolis* (see note 10).

²⁶ Quote from Marx and Engels, "Manifesto" (see note 6), 475.

²⁷ "Kiesselbach, Wilhelm," NDB, vol. 11, 599–600. Wilhelm Kiesselbach, *Der amerikanische Federalist: Politische Studien für die deutsche Gegenwart*, 2 vol. (Bremen, London, and New York, 1864); Idem, *Socialpolitische Studien, nach den in der Deutschen Vierteljahrsschrift veröffentlichten Aufsätzen des Verfassers zusammengestellt und neu durchgearbeitet* (Stuttgart, 1862). See also Engelsing, "England und die USA" (see note 9), 57.

²⁸ Ferdinand Tönnies, *Community and Civil Society*, trans. José Harris and Margaret Hollis, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, unnumbered vol. (Cambridge, UK 2001 [1887]).

²⁹ Karl Marx, *Das Kapital*, 3 vols., MEW 23–25 (Berlin, 1979), vol. 1, 61–170, vol. 2, 151–153, and vol. 3, 335–349.

³⁰ Marx, *Kapital*, vol. 1 (see previous note), 161–178.

³¹ Johann Smidt, *Denkschrift über die Judenfrage in Bremen*, as paraphrased by Salo W. Baron, *Die Judenfrage auf dem Wiener Kongress* (Vienna and Berlin, 1920), 105.

HELMUT SCHMIDT PRIZE

A PLEA FOR A RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN HISTORY AND ECONOMIC HISTORY

*Helmut Schmidt Prize Lecture at the German Historical Institute,
February 14, 2007*

Volker Berghahn
Columbia University

It is a very great honor for me to have been given the Helmut Schmidt Prize of the ZEIT Foundation and the German Historical Institute here in Washington. I thank you for coming to this event that is, of course, very special to me.

But there are also some very special thanks that I would like to say, first and foremost to the ZEIT Foundation and the GHI for selecting me. There is also Christof Mauch, who has turned this institute into a unique place of research and discussion for historians and scholars from other disciplines on both sides of the Atlantic. On at least three occasions I have had the pleasure of working with him in the organization of conferences, two of which resulted in publications. I think all who have known him are very sad that he is leaving Washington, and I am sure that you will join me in wishing him and his family all the best for their future in Munich.

Third, I would like to thank Gerry Feldman for agreeing to speak on this occasion. He is a historian who has always upheld the highest standards of scholarship and has made most distinguished contributions to the field of German economic and business history. It is a sign of his magnanimity that he was prepared to give the very generous *Laudatio* that you have just heard.

Last but by no means least, I would like to thank Marion, my wife, for also being my intellectual partner and best critic for some thirty-eight years. And while I have long seen my own work as a bridge between different societies, I feel that she has done much more as an academic publisher for the proliferation of research and ideas across the Atlantic and around the world than I have.

I have been asked to speak for some twenty minutes, and while there are many things on my mind that I would like to talk about, I shall

confine myself to two issues: first, to a few minor, but to my mind almost uncanny, connections between me and DIE ZEIT as well as the man in whose name this prize was endowed. I say this because I would like to assure you that I did not pull any strings to be able to stand in front of you this afternoon. Indeed, self-promotion has always been something I have felt uncomfortable with, shaped as I am by having spent almost half my life in Britain as well as Hamburg, still the most English of cities in Germany. Instead, my concern has been to support the next generation of scholars who are having a much harder time establishing themselves in these difficult times than those of my own cohort. Second, I would like to make a few remarks about the state of economic and business history and the relations of these genres to the rest of the historical profession in the modern period.

As to my first point, I spent my teenage years in Hamburg and, being a consciously political person, I regularly read DIE ZEIT. I continued this habit in London, where I wrote my doctoral dissertation in the 1960s. Living in a damp bed-sitter, I got my weekly copy from a newspaper man near Barons Court underground station. And when I asked him if the new DIE ZEIT had arrived, he first looked at me somewhat puzzled and then smiled: "Ah, you mean DEI ZIET," which he pronounced "DI ZEET."

Many years later, after I had finished my study on "The Americanization of West German Industry," I met Joachim Friedrich, whose father Otto, the well-known industrialist, had passed away before I had a chance to interview him for my book.

Achim and I became friends, and we agreed to write a biography of his father, the brother of the famous Harvard political scientist Carl Joachim. Although in the end I did most of the writing, Achim was my invaluable critic who corrected many errors of fact, if not of judgment. He told me about aspects of the history of that extraordinary Friedrich family that I could never have retrieved from the sources.

And since he had once worked on Helmut Schmidt's staff in the 1970s, it was he who persuaded the latter to write the preface to this biography in which he spoke very warmly of his close relationship with his fellow Hamburgian Otto Friedrich. My only regret is that this book came out before biography became as fashionable again as it is today. It contains many telling insights into German business history and transatlantic relations, but few people read it at the time, and it is now out of print.

There is yet another curious connection that arose when I was asked if I would consider writing a biography of Shepard Stone, the first director of the Berlin Aspen Institute and a friend of Marion Dönhoff, the legendary editor of DIE ZEIT. The end product, "America and the Intel-

lectual Cold Wars in Europe,” is not a biography. Rather, I saw Stone as a key mediator in a world of academic and cultural networks in the decades before his time at Aspen Berlin, supporting a transatlantic dialogue with the millions of dollars that the Ford Foundation invested in the two Cold Wars—one in the East and the other one in Western Europe—that the Americans waged after 1945. I wish Shep Stone were still around to have a word with Karen Hughes here in Washington about how to project “soft power” into foreign societies.

However, you did not come here to be treated to dozens of Hamburgian anecdotes or to a very secret plan for a book that I have been ruminating on for several years about the Hanseatic world of politics, commerce, and culture. It will be on Hamburg’s contribution, and on that of DIE ZEIT in particular, to the reconstruction and recasting of West Germany’s economy and society after 1945. Helmut Schmidt will inevitably play an important role in it.

So, let me move on to my second and more fundamental point. There are two buzzwords that circulate in the social sciences and humanities today, i.e., that scholarship must become more transnational and interdisciplinary. I confess to being skeptical about those grand proclamations to promote interdisciplinarity. To my mind, it cannot be practiced unless you have an advanced degree in the two disciplines that you propose to connect. Merely scouring another field from your home base for a seemingly useful concept is not enough.

However, historians may not have to reach out all that far. In fact, at a time when historical knowledge is undergoing an explosive growth, it seems to me to be more urgent and promising to start by (re)connecting divergent genres of historical writing, such as, for example, economic history with what is traditionally called *allgemeine Geschichte*, general history. There are, it is true, enormous institutional barriers to a closer link between the two. In this respect, we are sadly still suffering from the sins of our great-grandfathers in the nineteenth century.

Then the dominant approach was to write political, diplomatic, constitutional, and “great man” history. Starting with Ranke, professional historians looked at the peaks of Europe’s nation-states. They were not interested in the “valleys” where societies underwent the most dramatic processes of industrialization, urbanization, demographic change, and other developments at the level of the economic and socio-cultural infrastructures. Those who believed that the Rankeans were blind to these aspects of history either established their own departments or joined the budding economics faculties.

It was a development that was particularly marked in Britain, the “first industrial nation,” where the “redbrick” universities in the North became the home of economic history, while Oxbridge vigorously de-

fended the orthodoxies of political, constitutional, and diplomatic history. The continental European universities underwent a similar development. In Germany most economic historians became part of the *volks- und betriebswirtschaftliche Abteilungen*. Although in the United States the picture evolved in more complex ways, most economic historians were appointed to economics departments. At Brown, my former academic home, we had one economic historian who left for UCLA because she felt rather lonely among her twenty-five colleagues who were not terribly interested in her research. At Columbia we have no economic historian in a department of forty. I am listed as a social historian, and my colleagues would be completely surprised if they knew about this ceremony today.

The problem became exacerbated in the United States by the fact that business history came to be taught in business schools, whose case-study approach inevitably impacted the way business history was done, while separating the genre from their economic history colleagues in the economics departments. Although *Volkswirtschaft* and *Betriebswirtschaft* by and large remained under the same roof in Germany, if at times uneasily so, the advent of independent management schools, adopting the Harvard Business School model, has not facilitated contacts between business and economic history, and this applies even more so between those two genres and their relations to the separate history department at the same institution.

The consequences of departmentalism have been enormous and in recent decades have led to a further distancing of economic history from general history. Why? Economic historians have been under great pressure to be quantitative, statistical, "scientific," and mathematical like their economics colleagues, even to the extent that if they were not, they would be threatened with academic extinction. Not falling into line methodologically increased the danger that the next vacancy in the department would go to an economist.

I find this pressure to conform and to work within the received canon regrettable. To be sure, it is important to have a firm grasp of the quantitative aspects of history. Still, many interesting questions are of a qualitative kind; they cannot be cast into a mathematical model but are intangible and require different tools of analysis. Let me put it even more bluntly: I consider the dominance of a certain and exclusivist type of economics in many economics departments with their influence on the practice of economic history unfortunate. To be considered for an academic job you have to have published in certain journals. Where the quantitative citation index becomes the main gauge, the contribution that Gerald Feldman's *The Great Disorder* made to economic history requires different criteria of assessment. A discipline that presents itself as self-confidently as economics does today and that has little tolerance of the

unorthodox will sooner or later become impoverished. Quite a number of years ago, I pricked up my ears when an economist told me that some of his colleagues had become interested in the “imperfections” of the market—that wonderful phenomenon that supposedly regulates a globalized world. My first reaction was that, if you are interested in “imperfections,” maybe you are also interested in the intangibles of the human world. It is not my impression that the discipline has taken this up in any tangible way. Similarly, behavioral economics, which, I am told by experts, held some promise, has not really made much of an impact on the field. Nor has institutional economics gained wider recognition.

While economics and economic history have moved in a mathematical direction, general history has taken the opposite path, as it has become less and less interested in numbers and socio-economic structures. First it turned toward a social history from the bottom up, challenging the orthodoxies of both Rankeanism and structuralism. In the 1980s and 1990s it made yet another turn into cultural history, and with the subsequent rise of the history of memory, trauma, and religious belief, the underlying assumption of the practitioners of these approaches was that consciousness determined being.

Let me be absolutely clear that I very much welcomed the diversification of history when *Alltagsgeschichte* and socio-cultural history first came along. It has made historiography richer, more colorful, and more rewarding. Today we can teach aspects of the past about which virtually no scholarship was available thirty years ago. But just as economics and economic history have, in my opinion, gone too far into a purely quantitative direction, the history pendulum has swung too far the other way. Just look at the programs of the annual meetings of the American Historical Association during the past few years. Scrutiny of current dissertation projects in the German field will confirm Jay Winter’s recent claim that “culture” and “memory” have become the dominant paradigms, projects that have emerged from the kind of graduate training now offered by major history departments in this country.

Another recent example in this instance comes from the Federal Republic: A conference was held in Berlin last month to celebrate Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s seventy-fifth birthday and to look at recent historiography on pre-1914 Germany. Some thirty papers were presented. Most of them dealt with the culture of the Kaiserreich, with German nationalism, and with violence and memory relating to the German colonial empire and the two world wars. At the very end, there was one lonely paper that might be classified as one that at least tried to broach problems of political economy in transnational perspective.

The first point I am therefore trying to make is that, for the reasons just discussed, economic and business history have drifted far from gen-

eral history. They do not have much to say to each other. There is yet another problem that impedes dialogue: All too many British and American economists and economic historians do not read other languages and are therefore liable to miss quite a lot of interesting scholarship that is being produced elsewhere. A sense that their work alone is “world-class” reinforces a superiority complex that impedes mutual learning.

The response to the claim to be superior has not been slow in coming and has affected research positions taken up by European scholars. In the German case, some economic historians have insisted in their work that, whatever the weight of American hegemony after 1945, national path dependencies continued to be more important. Werner Abelshauser is probably the most prominent exponent of this view, with his argument that the West Germans pulled themselves up by their own bootstraps from the material devastations of World War II. According to him, the Marshall Plan was really quite marginal to West German reconstruction. Christoph Buchheim, marshaling plenty of statistics, has also played down the American contribution to the revival of the German economy. What may come into play here is another factor, i.e., the postwar echoes of the profession’s former Germanocentrism and its flipside, i.e., a long-standing intellectual and academic anti-Americanism.

Researching a contribution to a volume marking the one-hundredth anniversary of the *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (VSWG) made the persistence of this Germanocentrism abundantly clear to me. Going through the pre-1914 volumes, I found a truly remarkable cosmopolitanism pervading this famous journal, even to the extent that it published articles in German, Italian, English, and French. After 1914, it became more and more nationalist and ultimately National Socialist. It took the journal until the 1980s to recover its pre-1914 internationalist spirit. Still, more than a few German economic and business historians have found it difficult to accept the pervasive presence of the American economic system in postwar Europe. They have remained skeptical that a process of “Americanization” set in from the turn of the century through the interwar period and then, at an accelerated pace, after 1945.

The critics of “Americanization” as an approach to understanding socio-economic transformations have persistently misunderstood the meaning of this concept. It has never been argued by its protagonists that the United States barged like a steamroller into postwar Germany and Western Europe, flattening everything indigenous around it. “Americanization” was, from the start, concerned with studying the encounter between two or more different industrial systems and cultures. There was hence never any question that there was also resistance and not mere naïve or enthusiastic copying. The end result was a blending of the two traditions, and its shades depended on the degree to which American

ideas and practices succeeded in penetrating the indigenous society and economy. Nor was it ever claimed that socio-economic change happened overnight. On the contrary, a generational model was explicitly used to explain gradual change over time.

It has taken the emergence of a new generation of economic and business historians in Germany to give this argument greater acceptance. It has opened the door for a more sophisticated analysis of the interaction between two industrial systems and cultures in which after 1945 the one clearly occupied the hegemonic position, thus facilitating comparative analysis of an asymmetrical German-American relationship.

Today there are a number of colleagues in Germany who are interested in these problems. They have further expanded the field by not merely looking at production and production regimes, but also at marketing and consumption. With this approach came an interest in non-quantifiable elements, such as culturally ingrained behaviors, practical experiences, and perceptions of reality. It has not always been easy to get these questions more widely accepted, as the Bochum group of economic and business historians will testify. Still, as far as the Federal Republic is concerned, I do see some rays of hope that the two genres are becoming more open to new methods. They are no longer exclusively devoted to quantification. They ask qualitative questions. This means that all I am pleading for is a plurality of approaches, since any genre of historical writing that is dominated by an orthodoxy is bound to grow stale and ossified.

I am less optimistic that history departments will, in the near future, rediscover the economy as a worthwhile subject of research. The resistance to examining the material base of a society continues to be great. Even if postmodernism has not swept the board, the interest in the subjective predominates. The world is seen as fragmented, de-centered, indeterminate, and contingent. The buzz words are discourse and agency, whether individual or communitarian, not structure and infrastructure.

What are the implications of all this? To repeat, I do not advocate a secession of economic history from economics departments or business history from business schools. There are too many obstacles to this. Nor do I propose that "general" history departments go back to the orthodoxies of the early postwar period. But since its practitioners are in the overwhelming majority, it would be a great step forward if they would begin to reach out to their economic and business history colleagues and admit that it is not only perceptions of the world and memory that count; that consciousness is also determined by the economic conditions under which all human beings live—conditions that are all too often not of their own making. Ultimately, I am therefore really an advocate of quite modest change on both sides of the aisle. The maintenance of fortresses has to

stop and with it the condescension of one sub-discipline of history toward another.

Thank you again for giving me this wonderful prize. Thank you for the kind words that you have found. Although I have just argued that too much memory may not be good for our discipline, just as too much mathematical modeling and number-crunching is not, I shall always remember this afternoon spent in a setting that has done so much under its director and his predecessors to bring historians and other scholars together in a lively, cooperative, and productive exchange of important ideas.

I very much hope that the GHI Washington will continue to thrive for many decades to come. And the same applies, of course, to “DEI ZIET.”

TERROR IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES, 1878–1901

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Events do not happen; events are produced. An occurrence becomes an event only when certain groups in society pay attention to it, consider it important, speak and write about it, react to it, and remember it. Thus events are socially constructed. This does not mean, however, that they are pure constructs. At their starting point, they have acts and occurrences that are very real indeed.

A good example of the social construction of an event is Max Hödel's attempt to assassinate Kaiser Wilhelm I on May 11, 1878. As the German emperor states in his handwritten notes, he did not notice the attack. Absorbed in a conversation with his daughter, he heard shots but did not think he was the target. Only when his daughter, the grand duchess of Baden, told him later what she had seen did he begin to understand that somebody had intended to kill him. And only then did he realize "that a crime was involved here!"¹ Although the emperor had not noticed Hödel's attempt on his life, the plot immediately became a first-class event. Half an hour after the incident, masses of people had collected in front of the Hohenzollern palace, cheering enthusiastically to express their sympathy for the monarch. The emperor had to repeatedly appear on the balcony for the public.² That evening, Wilhelm I went to the opera and the theater. Along the way, the streets were decorated with flags and illuminated with Bengal lights, bright flames burning in different colors. When he entered the opera house, the whole audience rose, greeting him with frenzied cheers and singing the national anthem accompanied by the orchestra.³ On the same day, the *Frankfurter Zeitung* in its evening edition printed two telegraphic dispatches dealing with the events in Berlin.⁴ The next morning, the paper reported the events on the front page and tried to establish its own version of the case. It insisted that, just as was the case in England, all attempts to assassinate the sovereign should be considered acts of insanity, at least until there was enough

information about the assassin and his motives to allow clear judgments.⁵ In this way, the liberal paper tried to caution against rash political interpretations already making the rounds, which blamed the assassination attempt on the treason of Social Democrats.

What makes an event an event, therefore, is not necessarily a break in historical continuity, an objective force changing the path of history or some kind of monstrosity, but how people deal with specific incidents.⁶ First, they produce events through their actions, for example, when they swarm together in front of the palace to see the emperor and cheer for him, when they hang up flags in front of their house, light Bengal lights, and rise in the theater. Actions such as these have to be part of the analysis, not only because to a considerable degree they constitute the event "Hödel's assassination attempt," but also because they are part of symbolic politics. Secondly, political attacks such as Hödel's become events by semanticizing. "An interpretation does what it says, while it pretends to simply state, show, or tell," Jacques Derrida states, "[I]n fact, an interpretation produces, it is already performative in a certain way."⁷ Examples of this productivity of interpretations are the eyewitness account of the grand duchess that led the emperor to see the shots as an attack and the *Frankfurter Zeitung's* attempt to interpret the attack as an act of insanity. The productivity and performance of such interpretations point to the task of an analysis of media events. In the words of Jacques Derrida: "The political vigilance that this calls for on our part consists in organizing a critical knowledge of all those apparatuses that pretend to *communicate* the event when, in reality, they are *making*, interpreting, or producing it."⁸

Accordingly, the basic aim of this project is a critical analysis of the actions and interpretations that produced the event "political assassination" around the end of the nineteenth century. The main focus will be on the political dimension of how the event "assassination attempt" was constituted through speech and action. I want to study the role of such attacks in the political process and in public discourse by reconstructing the conflict about the hegemony of interpretation, a conflict about public opinion, political measures, their acceptance, and, as in the German case, a fight about the nation's form of government, its legal character, and the inclusion or exclusion of its citizens.

My research on "assassination attempts" as outlined above will not be limited to the German Empire. By studying the attacks on Tsar Alexander II (1881), U.S. president James A. Garfield (1881), the French president Sadi Carnot (1894), the empress Elisabeth of Austria-Hungary (1898), and U.S. president William McKinley (1901), I want to look at Russia, France, Austria-Hungary, and the United States in an analogous way.⁹ The concrete and immediate political outcomes of these attacks are

well known for every country. They are highly diverse: Whereas in Germany, Bismarck could exploit the middle classes' nightmare of revolution for a conservative turn and his fight against the Social Democratic Party, in Russia, the murder of Alexander II put a sudden end to reforms and the country's development toward a constitutional monarchy. Moreover, anti-Semitic pogroms followed. In the United States, the assassination of James A. Garfield was blamed on the spoils system, a system of party patronage. Hence the Pendleton Act, a law reforming public services, was the immediate outcome of the murder. The shooting of William McKinley twenty years later reinforced the feeling of resentment against immigrants, but at the same time, it opened the way for political modernization in the Progressive Era.¹⁰

Nonetheless, it is necessary to take a closer look at the contested emergence of these political consequences as well as at other topics negotiated in the event "assassination attempt." A preliminary analysis of several European and American newspapers reinforces this impression. After the attack on James Garfield, for example, the *Atlanta Daily Constitution* seems to have regarded it as especially important to underline the loyalty of the Southern states to the president as the first representative of the Union. Thus on the next day the main article on the front page stated, with an explicit comparison to the northern states, "Atlanta has seldom been so moved as she was yesterday. After the news of the president's assassination had been confirmed, business was suspended almost entirely, and the staunchest of New England republican towns could not have felt more profoundly the shame and disgrace of the assassination or sympathized more thoroughly with the stricken statesman than did Atlanta."¹¹ In the following weeks, the theme continued throughout the press coverage, and seems to have been vital for the North as well. The *Daily Constitution* cited articles from the *Baltimore Gazette*, the *Philadelphia Press*, and the *Boston Herald*, writing: "A gratifying feature of the expressions of popular feeling over the assault upon the president's life, has been the swift and manifestly heart-felt sympathy with General Garfield and his family, evoked at the south. [. . .] It is their president who has been stricken down—their government that has received a shock. [. . .] The voice of nature and the spirit of patriotism again show the nation to be one. Around the couch of the suffering president, all are Americans and brethren."¹² Whereas in the German Empire the assassination attempts fired the starting shot for the imprisonment and political exclusion of Social Democrats, it seems that in the United States, in the face of the attack on James Garfield, the inner reunification of the nation was brought about: The assassination attempt was taken as a chance for national reintegration. One outcome of this project, therefore, might be a

comparative history of the way in which societies have dealt with assassination attempts and of the consequences this had for them.

The meaning of such attacks was not negotiated at the national level alone. The shots directed at Wilhelm I and the murders of Alexander II, Garfield, Carnot, Elisabeth of Austria-Hungary, and McKinley produced transnational media events, i.e. they were the object of press coverage and, thus, interpretation in Vienna as well as in St. Petersburg, Paris, Berlin, London, Washington, and beyond.¹³ A whole range of factors seems to have influenced how foreign events were presented and explained to readers at home: the information level of the newspaper editors, the press policy of the government in the country where the attack had taken place, and government measures of censorship, as well as the political system at home and the considerations it imposed. Besides the attacks in the narrow sense, the assassin, his motives and his biography, the interrogations, the custody, the trial, and the sentence—in most cases, the execution—were noteworthy issues. If the victims survived (as in the case of Wilhelm I and, at least for some weeks, James Garfield), there was extensive press coverage on their physical and mental state. Moreover, background articles appeared discussing the social and political situation of the country in question and explaining its political system to enable readers to better understand the attack and the motives of the perpetrator. To this end, even the cultural sections of the newspaper were mobilized, for instance, when after the attack on Garfield, the *Neue Freie Presse* in Vienna suddenly changed from the usual serialized novels to travel stories from the United States and articles on the American economy as well as on American cities and their architecture. Therefore, it seems that the media event “assassination attempt” triggered an expansion and deepening of international press coverage toward the end of the nineteenth century.

The character of the press coverage was not only international in content, however, but also international, or better transnational, in form. For example, newspapers all over the world reprinted articles and comments from the leading newspapers in the country where the attack had taken place. They did this mainly because the information was simply better there. But if the public could be assumed to be well-acquainted with the political circumstances of the country reported on—as was the case for Vienna and Berlin—there seems to have been another reason as well: Newspaper editors thought their audiences capable of reading between the lines and assessing the political sympathies and the meanings of an article for themselves, if given the source. And finally, the leading press from the capitals of the Western world was cited or reprinted to give the public at home an idea of international public opinion.

What is of interest, here, about these media events—inter- or transnational in many respects—is, again, the political dimension. This dimension can be found, first, in the different national formations of the interpretations of the attacks, formations that must be understood against the different national backgrounds. One must not forget, however, that these interpretations were kept open for quite some time, because the international press commentaries, partly competing and partly contradicting one another, stood directly side by side. And second: If on the national level the nation's form of government and its character as a state under the rule of law was at stake, on an international level the question of the *best* type of state and, again, its legal character were negotiated. The ways different states dealt with the assassins and their attacks were in fact critical points of discussion in this context. Here, the passage from the *Frankfurter Zeitung* might again serve as an example, as it claimed that in England all assassination attempts on the sovereign would be dealt with as acts of insanity, and it combined this statement with the suggestion that this problem be handled similarly in Germany. Asking for the consequences on an inter- or transnational level in society, therefore, one could put forward the hypothesis that the transnational media event "assassination attempt" helped to establish a world public embracing at least the European countries and the United States. To put it more carefully: world opinion evolved around the end of the nineteenth century, and this partial process of globalization can be studied in an exemplary form by researching the media events following the attempts to assassinate heads of state.

This project thus attempts to contribute to a transnational history of society, the public, and the media in the second half of the nineteenth century. The comparison between the different ways in which societies dealt with the attempts to assassinate their heads of state and the consequences this brought about is intended to contribute to the history of nation-building. It also offers connections for a political history. The research on the press coverage on the attacks as transnational media events promises to contribute to the history of the evolution of a world public and thus to the history of globalization. Moreover, this project is intended to be a contribution to the history of political ideas, especially the history of social radicalism. The overarching aim is to help historicize the phenomenon "terrorism" by confronting the discourse on the recent attacks with the discussions in the nineteenth century. Along these lines, this raises the question of the relationship between mass media, public, and the attacks: To what extent have the mass media and the world public brought forth the phenomenon "terrorist attack" by creating the national and international sounding-board that is a vital part of the terrorist's calculation?

Notes

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¹ Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz (Berlin), Brandenburg-Preußisches Hausarchiv, Rep. 51, Nr. 851, Aufzeichnung Kaiser Wilhelms über das Hödel'sche Attentat, Berlin 11. Mai 1878 (für den Druck vorbereitete Abschrift).

² *Frankfurter Zeitung*, "Attentat auf den Kaiser. Berlin, 11. Mai, 4 Uhr 59 M.," May 11, 1878, Abendblatt.

³ *Frankfurter Zeitung*, "Telegraphische Depeschen. Wagner's telegr. Correspondenz-Bureau. Berlin, 11. Mai, 11 Uhr 25 M.," May 12, 1878, Morgenblatt.

⁴ *Frankfurter Zeitung*, "Attentat auf den Kaiser. Berlin, 11. Mai, 4 Uhr 45 Min. Nachmittags. (Privatdepesche der 'Frankfurter Zeitung')," May 11, 1878, Abendblatt, and *Frankfurter Zeitung*, May 11, 1878, "Berlin, 11. Mai, 4 Uhr 59 M.."

⁵ *Frankfurter Zeitung*, "Das Attentat auf den Kaiser," May 12, 1878, Morgenblatt.

⁶ See esp. Egon Flaig, "Ein semantisches Ereignis inszenieren, um ein politisches zu verhindern. Die entblößten Narben vor der Volksversammlung 167 v. Chr.," in *Ereignis: Konzeptionen eines Begriffs in Geschichte, Kunst und Literatur*, ed. Thomas Rathmann (Cologne, 2003), 183–198; for a different approach see e.g. Johanne Villeneuve, "Abwesenheit und Wiederholung: Die Erwartung des Ereignisses und das Beispiel der Sowjetunion," in *Zeit des Ereignisses—Ende der Geschichte?* ed. Friedrich Balke, Erich Méchoulan, and Benno Wagner (Munich, 1992). For conceptions of the event in history and historiography see esp. Karlheinz Stierle and Reinhart Koselleck in *Geschichte—Ereignis und Erzählung*, ed. Reinhart Koselleck and Wolf-Dieter Stempel (Munich, 1973): 526–528, 530–534, 560–571, and Hayden White, "The Narrativization of Real Events," *Critical Inquiry* 7 (1981): S. 793–798. On the media event see Pierre Nora, "Le retour de l'événement," in *Faire de l'histoire: Nouveaux problèmes*, ed. Jaques Le Goff and Pierre Nora (Paris 1974); Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz, *Media Events: The Live Broadcasting of History*, (Cambridge, Mass., 1994) and Jacques Derrida, "Une certaine possibilité impossible de dire l'événement," in *Dire l'événement, est-ce possible?* ed. Gad Soussana and Alexis Nouss (Paris, 2003), 79–112.

⁷ Derrida, "Une certaine possibilité impossible," 90.

⁸ Derrida, "Une certaine possibilité impossible," 90.

⁹ For these and other assassination attempts in the nineteenth century see esp. Benedict Anderson, *Under Three Flags: Anarchism and the Anti-Colonial Imagination* (London, 2005) and the relevant chapters in Walter Laqueur, *A History of Terrorism* (New Brunswick, 2002); Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Gerhard Hirschfeld, eds., *Sozialprotest, Gewalt, Terror: Gewaltanwendung durch politische und gesellschaftliche Randgruppen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart, 1982); and the pertinent parts of anthologies written for a wider public, such as Alexander Demandt, ed., *Das Attentat in der Geschichte* (Cologne, 1996) or Jörg von Uthmann, *Attentat: Mord mit gutem Gewissen. Von Julius Caesar bis Jitzhak Rabin* (Berlin, 1996).

¹⁰ See Wolfgang Pack, *Das parlamentarische Ringen um das Sozialistengesetz Bismarcks 1878–1890* (Düsseldorf, 1961), Oleg V. Budnitskiy, *Terrorizm v rossijskom osvoboditel'nom dvizhenii: ideologiya, etika, psikhologiya (vtoraya polovina XIX—nachalo XX v.)* (Moscow, 2000); Kenneth D. Ackerman, *Dark Horse: The Surprise Election and Political Murder of James A. Garfield* (New York, 2004) and Eric Rauchway, *Murdering McKinley: The Making of Theodore Roosevelt's America* (New York, 2003).

¹¹ *Daily Constitution*, "The News in Atlanta," July 3, 1881.

¹² *Daily Constitution*, "The People Reunited: Boston Herald," July 7, 1881. See also *Daily Constitution*, July 7, 1881, "Southern Sympathy. Philadelphia Press. Baltimore Gazette."

¹³ For the term "transnational" see esp. Jürgen Osterhammel, "Transkulturell vergleichende Geschichtswissenschaft," in *Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des Nationalstaats: Studien zu Beziehungsgeschichte und Zivilisationsvergleich* (Göttingen, 2001) as well as the discussion in *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 27 (Göttingen, 2001) and the introduction to Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel, *Das Kaiserreich transnational: Deutschland in der Welt 1871–1914* (Göttingen, 2004).

MASS MIGRATION AND LOCAL POLITICS IN CHICAGO AND VIENNA, 1850–1938: SOME QUESTIONS, SOME HYPOTHESES

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American urbanization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has always been described as a unique experience. Migrants from the peasant villages and small towns of Europe, Central America, and Asia, as well as African Americans from the southern states, converged on the metropolises. The American city resembled a patchwork, and its ethnic divisions were simultaneously a source of dynamism and conflict. “When there are added to one American city more Italians than there are Italians in Rome, we have something new in history,” remarked sociologists Robert E. Park and Herbert A. Miller in 1925.¹

Yet from a comparative perspective the assumption of an American urban exceptionalism may be questioned: Urbanization in Central Europe during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was no less the result of mass migration, mostly from rural areas. Most but not all migrants had the same ethnic background as the old-stock city-dwellers. Some German cities, however, especially in the Ruhr area and in Silesia, and to a lesser extent Berlin, experienced an influx of Polish peasants. Even more interesting, in most of the big cities in the Hapsburg empire, especially Vienna and Prague, urbanization and migration were divided along lines of ethnicity: Prague was split between Germans and Czechs, and a considerable part of the population of Vienna came from Bohemia, Moravia, and Galicia. In 1880, 65 percent of the Viennese population had been born outside the city, and the migration from the surrounding Kronländer to Vienna was heavier than the migration from Austria to the United States. In 1900, 491,295 people in the United States had Austrian citizenship, while 900,852 people in Vienna had not been born in that city.² While none of the Central European cities had an ethnic makeup that resembled those of American cities, the experience of mass migration—both mono- and multiethnic—had a crucial impact on urban governance in both Central Europe and the United States.

The aim of this ongoing research project on Chicago and Vienna is to examine the impact of migration in a comparative perspective, asking questions such as: How did mass migration change the local political regimes and their administrative capacity? How did the degree of de-

mocratization and the processes of naturalization and local party traditions influence a political and social inclusion or exclusion of migrants? What role did corruption, patronage, and a local politics of image play in the real as well as the symbolic integration of migrants? And how did symbolic attempts to unify a fragmented city correlate with the local politics of inclusion or exclusion?

This project is clearly inspired by some of the contemporary debates about an ethnic “parallel society” [*Parallelgesellschaft*] that some consider to be developing in European cities and that they perceive as a threat (or at least a barrier) to democracy. This “parallel society” of migrants seems to be a result of two converging tendencies: The first comes out of a national/local politics that slowly acknowledges the fact that most (Western) European countries are countries of immigration, and which because of this background are reluctant to engage in politics of inclusion and integration. The second comes out of a seemingly self-made retreat of some migrants into their own ethnic (and religious) community. The current characterization of these migrants as examples of a “transnationality without opportunities”³ [*chancenlose Transnationalität*] can be used as a tool of historical analysis: Is the so-called “parallel society” really a threat to democracy? Or is it a social prerequisite for democratization—in the sense that this “parallel society” can be seen as a training ground for finding out about one’s own political interests, thus allowing for the rise of ethnic politicians (mostly but not necessarily from the second generation) who then connect their “parallel society” to the world of multiethnic local politics? Is it possible to describe the security of an ethnically defined social milieu as a prerequisite for a successful participation in the matrix of a non-ethnically defined field of municipal politics and administration? Or is that a somewhat naive perspective that overlooks the fact that a parallel society will always act politically, but not necessarily in a democratic way and not necessarily in municipal politics, i.e. a politics focused on the city as such?

Questions regarding inclusion and exclusion as well as the incentives for ethnic or “native” politicians to engage in municipal politics may seem typical—even a bit old-fashioned—research topics for American urban history. Why this comparison? Does it not seem odd to compare Chicago and Vienna, two cities that at first seem rather “incomparable”? On the one side there is the big boom-town in the American Midwest, increasing from zero to three million inhabitants in the century between 1830 and 1930 and described by John Dewey as “sheer Matter with no standards at all.”⁴ On the other side, there is the old imperial town, the political center of a monarchy and a bulwark of traditional high culture—nothing but “sheer standard.”

A comparison is certainly possible between two dissimilar cases. Any comparison works within the field of differences and similarities; in order to grasp the eminent differences, however, a comparative view needs to start out with some similarities. And it seems that this basic similarity is not restricted to a characterization of Vienna as a multiethnic “melting pot”; an even more striking similarity consists in what may be called “the physiognomy of municipal politics.”⁵ In Vienna, the decline and fall of liberal politics *Honoratioren*-style in the last third of the nineteenth century gave room to the rise of Karl Lueger to the position of mayor in 1897 and the hegemony of his Christian Social Party in the following two decades. Some contemporary observers as well as historians considered Lueger’s regime to represent an American-style mix of machine politics, bossism, patronage, and clientelism—a political regime of the kind prominent in Chicago.⁶ (Such levels of “Americanism” certainly distinguished Vienna from municipal political regimes in nearly all of the cities in the German Empire. Before the revolution of 1918/19 these cities were based on a restricted franchise that allowed an undisturbed bourgeois rule. The project implicitly uses German municipal political regimes as a *tertium comparationis* for Vienna and Chicago.)

The project analyzes Vienna and Chicago as local variations of a political phenomenon described by Max Weber: the interaction of mass politics and charismatic leadership. (At least some of the Chicago city bosses must be considered to have been charismatic leaders.) In both cities, urbanization was a mix of population growth (based primarily on migration from rural areas) and democratization: Vienna did not elect a city council [*Gemeinderat*] on the basis of a general male franchise. The old census-based, restricted franchise was successfully reformed, and in 1885, the *Fünfguldenmänner* (those who paid at least five Gulden in taxes) had the right to vote. This petty bourgeoisie of shopkeepers and landlords served as Lueger’s and his “machine’s” power-base. In order to develop more general answers to questions of mass migration and local democracy, the project will analyze the connection between mass migration and the municipal political regime, between (partial) democratization and the politics of inclusion and exclusion of ethnic groups in the “real” as well as in the symbolic areas of local politics. It is important to understand the obvious connection between population growth and democratization, a connection certainly akin to a “superstructure,” a structure that rests on other interactions that are easy to postulate but difficult to grasp.

In Vienna, the lawful criteria to distinguish in-group and out-group among the city population were threefold: the *Gemeindestatut*, which decided who belonged to the city in the sense of “*Gemeindeangehörigkeit*”; the *Gemeindewahlordnung*, which explained who could vote; and the *Heimatgesetz* (as a state law), which defined the group of city inhabitants who

were entitled to local public welfare. All three criteria (as well as the more symbolic "*Bürgerrecht*" of the City of Vienna) were connected in a way that made it difficult even for lawyers to understand. This web of inclusion and exclusion based on financial status and length of stay remained opaque, and local political elites used the somewhat mysterious distinction between "*Staatsbürger*" (citizens of the state), "*Gemeindeangehörige*" (members of the community), "*Gemeindebürger*" (citizens of the community), and so on as a set of instruments to divide and rule.⁷

The American city in general and the Midwestern city in particular never had a system of municipal citizenship. Home rule in a European sense was unknown: Political scientist Albert Lepawsky pointed out in 1935 that even a large city like Chicago was legally "an infant."⁸ The Illinois General Assembly in Springfield acted as a supra-local government, and this parliament (with a majority of representatives and senators from rural areas) decided many issues of local municipal concern. The less developed possibilities of Chicago's legal system did not allow for any strict *municipal* distinction between "citizens of the city" and "aliens." The prevailing general male franchise and the mostly generous process of naturalizing immigrants created a mass political market that made questions of inclusion and exclusion an issue for political parties.

It is the role and function of political parties within their respective election systems that distinguished Vienna and Chicago. In the latter city (as elsewhere in the United States), both traditional parties, the Democratic and the Republican Party, remained without a clear-cut class basis and without any kind of *weltanschauung*. (They lacked a definite ethos—they were "*gesinnungslos*" in Max Weber's depiction). The necessity of organizing a political majority on the mass market of male voters encouraged an inclusive attitude rather than any kind of pronounced exclusion of an ethnic or racially defined group. (The inclusive appeal of the American party system certainly allowed some to toy with racist slurs and permitted a somewhat preposterous ethnic pride). The Viennese party system, on the other hand—Liberals, German Nationalists, the Christian Social Party, and Social Democrats—was much more linked, in terms of both class and ideology, to particular socio-political urban milieus. It was also the product of the partially democratized but nevertheless still restricted electoral system, which allowed for a "coalition" between the petty bourgeoisie (or even a larger *Mittelstand*) and the Christian Social Party. At the same time, this system made it more difficult for the upper and upper-middle class as well as the working class and their natural political representatives (Liberals and Social Democrats) to secure electoral success and political influence.

The Viennese party system was limited by its inherent exclusion on the basis of property and length of stay. It therefore does not seem sur-

prising that suppressed minorities, especially the Czechs, started to build their own political organizations and ethnic parties in Vienna rather than in the more inclusive political arena of Chicago. It is ironic that the full democratization of the Viennese voting system in 1919 allowed the Czech party and the Jewish-National Party to be successful and equal competitors, and that both parties went out of business at the same time: The Social Democrats became the dominant political force in democratic Vienna, and they preferred not to have other parties compete for working-class votes. Since most of the voters for the Czech and the Jewish party came from the working class and because these voters tended naturally to side with social democracy, it was not difficult for the Social Democrats to incorporate or co-opt the ethnic vote. The Social Democrats already had a considerable number of Jewish members among their city councilors [*Gemeinderäte*], and from the 1923 election on they usually reserved two seats for Czech Social Democrats. For that reason, the short era of ethnic party-building came to an end in 1923. Social Democrats could henceforth count on the Czech and Jewish vote to help them build and preserve the social democratic hegemony in "Red Vienna." It will be one of the intriguing questions of this research project to ask whether the Social Democrats, the heirs to the Lueger political machine, need to be considered to be another (much more powerful) kind of political machine: a machine with an inclusive appeal (among the working class), with less corruption and more ideology, but with other features characteristic of a centralized political machine (of the European type). If this turns out to be so, this machine in the 1920s made Vienna one of the best-governed cities in Central Europe. (At its peak, the party had about 400,000 card-carrying members among a city population of 1.9 million—a degree of political organization of which most German Social Democrats could only dream.)

From the perspective of the political system, it might make sense to characterize the political regime in Vienna (until 1918) as the "plateau type"⁹ and the one in Chicago (since the "invention" of machine politics in the last third of the nineteenth century) as the "pyramid type." To speak of a "plateau type" implies a sharp distinction between the in-group on top of the "plateau" and the out-group in the surrounding "valley." To speak of a "pyramid type" implies a distinction between "top" and "bottom." The "pyramid type" of political regime is inclusive but with its distinction between "top" and "bottom" certainly not a well-balanced "house for all peoples."¹⁰ Vienna switched from the "plateau type" to the "pyramid type" during the revolution of 1918, when a complete democratization of the voting system came along as a rigid form of working-class politics. This overwhelmed the old Lueger-style politics that played on ethnic pride and fear.

One of the problems of any analysis of ethnic politics is this: How can one be sure that members of a certain ethnic group make their political decisions as members of that group rather than for reasons having to do with social class and/or gender? The project does not try to analyze municipal political regimes from the point of view of ethnic political organizations but rather as a point of interaction between the various actors in municipal politics. The main sources, therefore, are the proceedings of the city councils in both cities. These were written in a rather lean and even a bit sterile fashion in the case of Chicago, which will allow for an analysis of the more symbolic aspects of aldermanic politics. In the case of Vienna, the documents contain verbatim minutes, including insults and the occasional slur. The project uses other sources as well, including contemporary commentaries inside and outside local politics.

Notes

¹ Robert E. Park and Herbert A. Miller, *Old World Traits Transplanted* (Chicago, 1925), 259. For the original authorship of William I. Thomas see Dietrich Herrmann, "Be an American!" *Amerikanisierungsbewegung und Theorien zur Einwandererintegration* (Frankfurt am Main, 1996), 299.

² Michael John, "Migration, Ethnizität und Urbanität. Zur Haltung der österreichischen Arbeiterbewegung in der Habsburgermonarchie," in *Die Bewegung: Hundert Jahre Sozialdemokratie in Österreich*, ed. Erich Fröschl et al. (Vienna, 1990), 165–185, 167.

³ See, for example, "Laboratorium einer alternden Gesellschaft? Das Ruhrgebiet vor den Herausforderungen von Demographie und Migration," in *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (international edition), June, 25, 2004, 12.

⁴ Robert B. Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy* (Ithaca, 1991), 83.

⁵ Oscar Jaszi, "Why Austria Perished," *Social Research: An International Quarterly of Political and Social Science* 5 (1938): 304–327, 306.

⁶ John W. Boyer, *Culture and Political Crisis in Vienna: Christian Socialism in Power, 1897–1918* (Chicago, 1995), 13, 239–244. Of course, Boyer also points to a lot of dissimilarities between Chicago and Vienna. For the classic analysis of machine politics in Chicago see Charles E. Merriam, *Chicago: A More Intimate View of Politics* (New York, 1929) and Harold F. Gosnell, *Machine Politics: Chicago Model* (Chicago, 1937).

⁷ Maren Seliger and Karl Ucakar, *Wien: Politische Geschichte 1740–1934. Entwicklung und Bestimmungskräfte grossstädtischer Politik, Teil 2: 1896–1934* (Vienna, 1985), 753–766.

⁸ Albert Lepawsky, *Home Rule for Metropolitan Chicago* (Chicago, 1935), 1.

⁹ For the juxtaposition of plateau and pyramid, see: Monika Glettler, *Die Wiener Tschechen: Die Strukturanalyse einer nationalen Minderheit in der Großstadt* (Munich/Vienna, 1972), 286.

¹⁰ John M. Allswang, *A House for all Peoples: Ethnic Politics in Chicago, 1890–1936* (Lexington, 1971).

PUBLIC SPIRIT IN SUBURBIA? THE GARDEN CITY AS CIVIC EXPERIMENT

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Suburbia—long dismissed as a “non-place”—has been considered in a more differentiated way in current debates. The new suburbanization discussion has, however, frequently lacked historical depth.¹ Suburban sprawl has been a fact of urban life since at least the end of the nineteenth century, both in Europe and America. On both sides of the Atlantic, these sprawl processes were recognized at an early stage, and alternative urban utopias were developed. The demand for healthy living close to nature formed the core of the early debates about suburbia. In the international city reform movements, the notion of the “garden city,” put forward most influentially by Ebenezer Howard in his *To-morrow* (1898), was regarded as the ideal solution for counteracting uncontrolled growth in congested urban areas.² To be sure, the idea of the “garden city” stood for an ecological utopia that attempted to reconcile nature and urban development. Above all, however, it was a political utopia: Howard’s garden city model sought to restore the quality of urban life, which threatened to become increasingly lost in the process of (sub)urbanization. He linked the harmonious interweaving of urban and rural with a comprehensive republican vision into which all aspects of life could be (re)integrated.

In both Europe and the United States, the idea of the garden city developed into one of the most important concepts in twentieth-century suburban city planning. It therefore seems worthwhile to look at the commonalities and differences of this settlement type in Europe and America. My research has two main points of focus: the first is the relationship of compactness and decentralization, which plays a key role in the debate about the “European” vs. the “American” city.³ I will concentrate, however, on civil society, and consequently on the public spaces in suburbia that have long been largely dismissed by research. Civil society is here understood as individuals’ fashioning of their everyday worlds and their attempt to influence social processes in the free encounter of equal actors. It is based upon the forms of middle-class communication and interaction that had developed in urban spaces in the eighteenth and, above all, the nineteenth centuries, for example in voluntary associations. My research explores the migration of these forms from their bourgeois origins and their traditional location, the city.⁴

Similar to modern cities, which were alternately denounced as “Molochs” or idealized as “sources of power,” the suburbs have also elicited contrasting cultural metaphors.⁵ In the popular perception transmitted by advertising, the media, and visual culture, they simultaneously symbolize bourgeois utopia—the realization of the dream of a better life—and dystopia—the conformist prison of privileged middle classes.⁶ In either case, however, the death of public life in suburbia had long been an unchallenged assumption. Suburban living, which concentrated on the privacy of the nuclear family, was contrasted to the pulsing, public activities in the cities. In the suburbs, indifference or even aversion to participation in social life reigns. If the residents of suburbia participate publicly at all, they tend to be conservative defenders of their proprietary interests and the exclusivity of their residences.⁷ The American suburbs, in particular, frequently appear to be places without character, whose design does not suggest any active society that would have given them a specific face and whose houses do not reveal the individuality of their inhabitants. Their uniform and banal external appearance corresponds to the social monotony. When Alfred Döblin migrated to the United States in 1941, he wrote about the “dreadful desert of houses” that he found in suburban Los Angeles: “indeed, one is much and extensively in the open here—yet am I a cow?”⁸ Suburbia, thus, was a quiet life close to nature, similar to that of peaceful, cud-chewing animals in the pasture, a lot of open green but no public space.

Women were generally perceived as victims of suburbia’s spatial structures. Since Betty Friedan made the dissatisfaction of women in the suburbs a political topic in the 1960s, the sadness of suburban mothers has also been proverbial in research literature. Physically isolated, without any noteworthy social relationships, these women were separated from the male-dominated public world of the city. Suburbia appeared to be the successful implementation of a dichotomized concept of gender.⁹

Over the past few years, these stereotypes have increasingly been called into question. A growing number of researchers, primarily in England and in the United States, are addressing the subjective dimension of suburban life. They study the spheres of experience and communication, and, instead of uniformity, they find a multifaceted social life in music groups, sports clubs, neighborhood committees, and churches; instead of places of isolation and anomie, they find active communities; and instead of conformity, they find very diverse forms of self-realization.¹⁰

In more recent American and English research, women also appear more frequently as creative participants in the shaping of suburban lifestyles.¹¹ In suburbia, it was primarily women who had to struggle against the adversities of everyday life, from overcrowded schools to the lack of

public services. Women have frequently mobilized their neighborhoods very successfully in order to achieve improvements in their environment; they have organized collective babysitting and campaigns for safe streets; and they have been active in clubs and organizations, as well as in local politics. They have published local newspapers, organized parties, sung in choirs, and so on. In their own lives, the suburban environment was the hub, while the city was the periphery.

Little is known about everyday life in German suburbs. Have similar lifestyles developed here? Have new suburban civic cultures emerged? Did the suburbs only restrict women, or did they also provide women with opportunities?

Planned settlements, mostly in the tradition of garden cities, stand in the foreground of the more recent American and English studies. The very active German garden city movement, however, is hardly mentioned at all in the current Anglo-American debate.¹² My study aims to integrate German developments into the context of the international debate on suburbia. Initially, it will be limited to the period that begins with the founding of the German Garden City Society in 1902 and extends to World War I, the era that represents the zenith of garden city establishments in Germany.¹³ In a comprehensive inventory of the German garden city movement, seventy-nine settlements, along with the most important structural data, have been recorded in a database.¹⁴

Only a diachronic comparison between the garden city movements in Germany and the United States is possible. While there were garden city experiments in Germany already at the beginning of the twentieth century, in the United States, the debate about Howard's ideas was long limited to intellectual discussions among progressive city planners and architects, above all Lewis Mumford, Catherine Bauer, and Clarence Stein. In the United States, an attempt to convert Howard's ideas into concrete settlement plans was not made until the end of the 1920s. The zenith of garden-city establishments came only around the middle of the century.

Despite or perhaps even because of these differences, a glance across the Atlantic—which already shaped city planning debates in the early twentieth century—seems important. The international framework of the city planners' discussions notwithstanding, the real developments took place in specific national narratives; they received different community and governmental support; and they were integrated into different urban configurations and fundamental social frameworks. Precisely because the garden city movement understood itself largely to be an international movement that developed within the constant interplay of mutual perceptions, it is even more interesting to inquire about the significance of the respective national conditions.

As is generally known, Ebenezer Howard wanted his garden city to provide a model for solving the acute social, hygienic, and ecological problems of the industrial cities of his age. At the same time, he wanted to find a solution to the problems associated with the beginnings of urban sprawl. The rapid improvements in transportation systems and communication technologies had opened up the region to settlement and dissolved what had previously been clear boundaries between the city and the countryside. Expanding urban sprawl threatened the very foundations of the countryside as well as the city, and destroyed the respective advantages that were associated with life in the country or the city.¹⁵ Howard saw this process as irreversible. His goal, however, was to transform the “state of war” between the city and the countryside into a “happy marriage” (to use his famous expression) in which the respective advantages of life in the country or the city were harmoniously combined into a new type of settlement, the garden city.¹⁶

Howard considered the garden city to be a community that would unite as many functions as possible—living, working, culture, consumption, and recreation. With their multifunctional community facilities and public parks, the local wards into which the city was divided formed the basis of public life. It was clear to Howard, however, that the social life of the modern world, which was becoming more and more mobile in every regard, could not be restricted to the area of the local neighborhood, but—and herein lies the truly innovative character of his approach—would play itself out on various levels. As soon as a settlement had achieved a certain size, instead of further sprawl, a new settlement was supposed to be established, with a green belt separating the two, until a complete cluster of satellites finally emerged. A well-established and differentiated traffic infrastructure—a ring-shaped train, streets, and waterways—would connect the settlements with one another and enable easy exchange of goods, people, and ideas. According to Howard’s concept, the individual settlements could not be truly self-sufficient; rather, they could achieve their full potential only within a regional network. Together they were supposed to provide all of the economic, social, and cultural amenities of a large city.¹⁷

With this idea, Howard went well beyond the traditional concept of city and space. His design was not based, as is frequently claimed, on the contrast between city and countryside, hub and periphery.¹⁸ In Howard’s broad vision of regional urban living, there is no longer a hub and periphery in the true sense. For all intents and purposes, the cities form only the intersections of the network of a mobile society, which is organized on various levels—via neighborhood, local, and regional connectivity. Howard was one of the first to foresee the decentralization of metropolitan areas and reflect upon the consequences of urban sprawl. According to

Howard, compactness in terms of the traditional “European” city had become an illusion in view of urban growth and the new traffic and communications options in modern industrial societies. Howard’s so-called “social city,” as a complex structure at the regional level, was the new site of urbanity and civil society. His model therefore is extremely relevant to current discussions about “post-suburbia” and “post-metropolis.”¹⁹ Key in these discussions is the assumption that the compact city in the conventional sense is becoming increasingly obsolete due to modern traffic and communications technologies, and that it is being replaced by new, decentralized structures. Howard’s design, which looks beyond the classic concept of the compact “European” city while preserving its key features and the social vision implicit in it, is as relevant and as promising today as when he proposed it over a century ago.²⁰

If one understands Howard’s idea as an ideal model, then—as has frequently been emphasized—no garden city has ever been built. The history of the international garden city movement is a history of very different interpretations, selective adaptations, and numerous changes through international transfer.²¹ Yet Howard himself expected that his design would change during the process of implementation since his idea was not based upon a tangible concept of city. He did not define a city primarily by its structural features, but by its social processes.²² Social practices were more important to him than a precise, detailed implementation of his model. It is therefore inappropriate to disqualify the suburban reality of most garden settlements as nothing more than an atrophied step of an ideal model, as frequently happens in German garden-city literature.²³ In contrast to most of this literature, my study will focus on analyzing social practices rather than architectural structures.

The question of “civic design,” that is, to what extent participation in civic action can be promoted by structural design, has been an important topic in city-planning debates since the beginning of the twentieth century. During the past few years, this question has been revisited primarily by New Urbanism.²⁴ Compared to planning debates, however, there are surprisingly few studies that examine what actually happens after the planners and architects have more or less successfully concluded their work. My study will rely on a concept of space which assumes that spatial structures influence social activity and, more importantly, that social space is created by social activity.²⁵ It is based on the premise that the availability or lack of public facilities, buildings, and spaces (for example, libraries, museums, churches, schools, kindergartens, community centers, washhouses, community kitchens, public gardens, restaurants, parks, etc.) is not decisive for the success or failure of an urban design as a civic project. It is more important to examine the lifestyles that have developed due to the availability (or despite the lack) of community facilities, that is,

the public space resulting from social interactions, appropriations, and conflicts that, not least of all, have gender-specific connotations.

On the basis of my preliminary research, I would propose several tentative theses. Despite having arisen in different contexts, everyday life in garden-city settlements developed a dynamic that was similar on both sides of the Atlantic. Borne by the pioneer spirit of highly motivated residents, an active social life developed both here and there, even if community facilities could not be completed due to lack of funds or for other reasons during the construction of the settlements. Cooperatives, associations of mutual self-help groups, were the most important organizational form, both in Germany and in the United States. On this basis, joint bulk purchasing of consumer and household articles was organized, shops were operated, child-care facilities were organized, local newspapers were founded, and much more.

In the German garden settlements of the early twentieth century, residents were consulted more during the planning and design processes than they were in the greenbelt towns of the United States. The residents' wishes were frequently clarified in meetings using drawings, plans, models, or general questionnaires. Above all, personal contributions played a greater role in German developments, that is, in settlements that as a rule were built by self-help initiatives and financed by savings and building cooperatives. In the United States, it was generally private developers who planned, built, and marketed a settlement. Philanthropic entrepreneurs, however, played an important role in such developments, both in the United States and in Germany. Some well-known examples include James Rouse, the builder of New Town Columbia, Maryland, or Karl Schmidt, the founder of Dresden's garden suburb, Hellerau.

The question of whether a "fortress mentality" developed among the residents, or whether supra-local networks existed, must still be examined. In Hellerau or Berlin's garden suburb, Falkenberg, some cultural events attracted thousands of visitors from Dresden or Berlin. In Falkenberg, the German premiere of Eisenstein's "Panzerkreuzer Potjemkin" took place, and the Berlin theaters "Freie Volksbühne" and "Reinhardt Bühne" also sponsored events. Hellerau and Falkenberg are the outstanding examples among garden suburbs. How far the experiences of other garden cities were similar remains to be investigated. The examples suggest that it is misleading to refer to garden suburb culture as anti-urban. Instead, here new spatial relationships of urbanity become evident, and the activities of their residents show that civil society could also exist in the suburbs.²⁶

To echo Thomas Sieverts, I would therefore like to refer to garden-city settlements as "experimental fields of modernity."²⁷ They were spaces for new lifestyles that for economic or political reasons had become more

difficult or even impossible to realize in the city. In contrast to the city and the village, with their highly structured and regulated public spaces, the suburbs were an open “realm of opportunity” that could be assigned new—and one’s own—meanings.²⁸ If the city had traditionally been the place where individuals could reinvent themselves, this site was now being shifted to suburbia. In this sense, the history of suburbanization was also the history of emancipation.

Of course, the history of German garden suburbs did not end after World War I. Many settlements from the first phase still exist today, despite all the intervening political and cultural disruptions. The fact that as early as the Weimar era, garden-city settlements were home not only to avant-garde cultural movements, but also to radical nationalist ideas and projects, is frequently overlooked. For example, already in 1910, the *völkischer* journalist Bruno Tanzmann came to Hellerau, where he opened a bookstore and a “self-consciously-German” [*deutsch-bewusste*] circulating library and a nationalist reading circle that became the meeting place of the newly organized *völkische* scene.²⁹ In 1912 the bookseller Ernst Kraus settled in Hellerau and subsequently edited the collaborative “Notes from Hellerau.” Under the pseudonym Georg Stammler, he became one of the most important *völkische* authors in Germany. The *völkisch* movement and, later, the Nazis were able to take advantage of the distinctive communal structure of the garden suburbs to serve their political ends. How large the following of the *völkische* scene was in the garden suburbs, however, has not been explored.

Notes

¹ See, for example, Klaus Brake, Jens S. Dangschat, and Günter Herfert, eds., *Suburbanisierung in Deutschland: Aktuelle Tendenzen* (Opladen, 2001); Kevin M. Kruse and Thomas J. Sugrue, eds., *The New Suburban History* (Chicago/London, 2006).

² A new and excellent edition of *To-Morrow* has recently been published: Peter Hall, Dennis Hardy, and Colin Ward, eds., *To-Morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform* (London, 2003). See also Peter Hall and Colin Ward, *Sociable Cities: The Legacy of Ebenezer Howard* (Chichester et al., 1998); Stephen V. Ward, *The Garden City: Past, Present, and Future* (London et al., 1992); Kermit C. Parsons and David Schuyler, eds., *From Garden City to Green City: The Legacy of Ebenezer Howard* (Baltimore and London, 2002); Stanley Buder, *Visionaries and Planners: The Garden City Movement and the Modern Community* (New York and Oxford, 1990).

³ See for example Dieter Hassenpflug, ed., *Die europäische Stadt: Mythos und Wirklichkeit* (Münster, 2002); Walter Siebel, ed., *Die europäische Stadt* (Frankfurt am Main, 2004); Friedrich Lenger and Klaus Tenfelde, eds., *Die europäische Stadt im 20. Jahrhundert: Wahrnehmung—Entwicklung—Erosion* (Cologne, 2006); Friedrich Lenger, “Urbanisierung als Suburbanisierung: Grundzüge der nordamerikanischen Entwicklung,” in *Die europäische Stadt*, ed. Lenger and Tenfelde, 437–475. With New Urbanism, the garden-city idea has been experiencing a renaissance for several decades in the United States as a model for sustainable design. For a detailed discussion of New Urbanism, see Harald Bodenschatz and Barbara Schönig, *Smart Growth—New Urbanism—Livable Communities: Programm und Praxis der Anti-Sprawl-Bewegung in den USA* (Wuppertal, 2004). In Europe, there is no equivalent

correlation. Just the opposite: The “Green Paper on the Urban Environment” of the European Commission, published in 1990, mentions the garden city only twice, both times critically, for example, as the cause of urban sprawl. The Commission instead advocates the traditional townscape as a “compact,” densely populated city. See Stephen Ward, “The Howard Legacy,” in *From Garden City to Green City*, ed. Kermit C. Parsons and David Schuyler (Baltimore and London, 2002), 222–244, here 233ff.; Mike Jenks, Elizabeth Burton, and Katie Williams, *The Compact City: A Sustainable Urban Form?* (London, 1996). On this, see the criticism of the European Commission’s paper by Dennis Hardy, “The Garden City Campaign: An Overview,” *The Garden City: Past, Present, Future*, ed. Stephen Ward (London, 1992), 187–209, here 205.

⁴ Up to now, research on the middle class has dealt little with these transformation processes. On the concept of civil society, see Manfred Hildermeier, Jürgen Kocka, and Christoph Conrad, eds., *Europäische Zivilgesellschaft in Ost und West: Begriff, Geschichte, Chancen* (Frankfurt am Main, 2000); Jürgen Kocka, “Zivilgesellschaft: Zum Konzept und seiner sozialgeschichtlichen Verwendung,” in *Europäische Zivilgesellschaft*, ed. Hildermeier, Kocka, and Conrad; “Neues über Zivilgesellschaft: Aus historisch-sozialwissenschaftlichem Blickwinkel,” *Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung* P 01-801 (December 2001): 4–21.

⁵ Clemens Zimmermann and Jürgen Reulecke, eds., *Die Stadt als Moloch? Das Land als Kraftquell? Wahrnehmungen und Wirkungen der Großstädte um 1900* (Basel et al., 1999).

⁶ See the presentation on suburban myths in Mark Clapson, *Invincible Green Suburbs, Brave New Towns: Social Change and Urban Dispersal in Postwar England* (Manchester and New York, 1998), 1–22; Robert Fishman, *Bourgeois Utopias* (New York, 1987); Kenneth T. Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier* (New York and Oxford, 1985); Mike Davis, *City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles* (London and New York, 1990).

⁷ For the American example, Mike Davis and, more recently, Robert M. Fogelson have primarily emphasized the role of home-owners associations; Davis, *City of Quartz*; and Robert M. Fogelson, *Bourgeois Nightmares* (New Haven and London, 2005).

⁸ Quoted in Mike Davis, *City of Quartz*, 34.

⁹ Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier*, 244. Betty Friedan, *The Feminine Mystique* (New York, 1963). For an overview of the debate, see Marc Clapson, *Suburban Century: Social Change and Urban Growth in England and the United States* (Oxford and New York, 2003), 125–142.

¹⁰ See especially Clapson, *Invincible Green Suburbs*; Mark Clapson, *Suburban Century: Social Change and Urban Growth in England and the United States* (Oxford and New York, 2003); Ann Forsyth, *Reforming Suburbia: The Planned Communities of Irvine, Columbia, and The Woodlands* (Berkeley and others, 2005); Nicholas Dagen Bloom, *Suburban Alchemy: 1960s New Towns and the Transformation of the American Dream* (Columbus, 2001); Cathy D. Knepper, *Greenbelt, Maryland: A Living Legacy of the New Deal* (Baltimore and London, 2001); George A. Warner, *Greenbelt: The Cooperative Community* (New York, 1954); Richard Harris and Peter J. Larkham, eds., *Changing Suburbs: Foundation, Form and Function* (London, 1999); Rosaly Baxandall and Elizabeth Ewen, *Picture Windows: How the Suburbs Happened* (New York, 2000).

¹¹ For example, see Veronica Strong-Boag et al., “What Women’s Spaces? Women in Australian, British, Canadian and US Suburbs,” in *Changing Suburbs*, 168–186; Deborah Chambers, “A Stake in the Country: Women’s Experiences of Suburban Development,” in *Visions of Suburbia*, ed. Roger Silverstone (London and New York, 1997), 86–107; Sylvie Murray, *The Progressive Housewife: Community Activism in Suburban Queens, 1945–1965* (Philadelphia, 2003).

¹² It is significant that in the volume edited by Stephen Ward, *The Garden City*, only an older article by Gerhard Fehl on Nazi concepts of spatial planning is published: Gerhard Fehl, “The Nazi Garden City,” in *The Garden City*, ed. Ward, 88–106.

¹³ Following World War I, the garden-city concept was absorbed more and more by the various reform movements of the small settlement construction industry. Furthermore, the

designation was increasingly used in an inflationary manner as little more than an effective advertising slogan for living in a green area in the suburbs.

¹⁴ The recording included, among other things, location, type (social housing, private-sector utilization interests, industrial settlement, etc.), start of planning, developer (cooperative, private investors, city, federal government), community facilities and public buildings (schools, kindergartens, washhouses, community centers, libraries, churches, museums, etc.), and transportation infrastructure.

¹⁵ See Howard's famous diagram "The Three Magnets," in *To-Morrow*, ed. Hall, Hardy, and Ward, 24.

¹⁶ It is often overlooked that, in this regard, Howard's reflections frequently begin with the city, and his consideration of the countryside is, in the final analysis, colonialist. He wanted to halt the increasing destruction of the landscape, but it was above all the idea of the city that he wanted to save with his model.

¹⁷ See the "Social City" diagram in *To-Morrow*, ed. Hall, Hardy, and Ward, 158.

¹⁸ In the United States, Jane Jacobs is considered to be the most important critic of Howard's model. In Howard, she sees a promoter of a backward-looking, city-destroying utopia. Although her book reveals an almost complete ignorance of Howard's work, it has continued to be extremely influential up to the present (See Ward, *The Howard Legacy*, 230). In his essay "The American Garden City: Still Relevant?" (in: Ward, *The Garden City*, 164) Robert Fishman took a position similar to that of Jacobs, but then developed a more differentiated position in his "The Bounded City," in Parsons, *From Garden City to Green City*, 58.

¹⁹ See, for example, Edward W. Soja, *Postmetropolis: Critical Studies of Cities and Regions* (Oxford, 2000); Saskia Sassen, *The Global City* (New York, 2001).

²⁰ Recently, Friedrich Lenger again reminded us of the link between urban historical research and contemporary urban developments. See Friedrich Lenger, "Einleitung," in *Die europäische Stadt*, ed. Klaus Tenfelde, 1–21, here 2.

²¹ Stephen Ward, "The Garden City Introduced," in *Garden City*, ed. Ward, 1–27. Eugenie Birch, "Five Generations of the Garden City: Tracing Howard's Legacy in Twentieth-Century Residential Planning," in *From Garden City to Green City*, ed. Parsons, 171–200, traces the various adaptations of the garden-city idea in international transfer.

²² Hall and others, *To-Morrow*. See also Robert Beevers, *The Garden City Utopia: A Critical Biography of Ebenezer Howard* (New York, 1988).

²³ See for example Walter Pahl, *Die Gartenstadt: Visionen und Wirklichkeit am Beispiel der Gartenstädte Dresden-Hellerau und Mannheim* (Mannheim, 2000). Frank Jost, *Roter Faden "Gartenstadt": Stadterweiterungsplanungen von Howards garden city bis zur "Neuen Vorstadt"* (Berlin, 1999); Axel Schollmeyer, *Gartenstädte in Deutschland: Ihre Geschichte, städtebauliche Entwicklung und Architektur zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Münster, 1988). Exhibiting the same tendency, but more sophisticated, is Thomas Krückemeyer, *Gartenstadt als Reformmodell: Siedlungskonzeption zwischen Utopie und Wirklichkeit* (Siegen, 1997). On the German garden city movement, see also Franziska Bollerey, Gerhard Fehl, and Kristiana Hartmann, eds., *Im Grünen wohnen—im Blauen planen: Ein Lesebuch zur Gartenstadt* (Hamburg, 1990) and Kristiana Hartmann, *Deutsche Gartenstadtbewegung: Kulturpolitik und Gesellschaftsreform* (Munich, 1976).

²⁴ Ward, "The Garden City Introduced"; Bodenschatz and Schönig, *Smart Growth*.

²⁵ See Martina Löw, *Raumsoziologie* (Frankfurt am Main, 2001). On the various dimensions of public space, see Tilman Harlander and Gerd Kuhn, "Renaissance oder Niedergang? Zur Krise des öffentlichen Raums im 20. Jahrhundert," in *Stadt macht Platz—NRW macht Plätze*, ed. Initiative StadtBauKultur NRW (Düsseldorf, 2004), 6–13.

²⁶ Participation in the annual Labor Day Parade in Greenbelt, Maryland, is still a "must" for many Democratic politicians within the Washington establishment. See the list of participants at www.greenbelt.com.

²⁷ Thomas Sieverts, "Die Kultivierung von Suburbia," in *Die europäische Stadt*, ed. Walter Siebel (Frankfurt am Main, 2004), 85–91.

²⁸ See Walter Siebel, "Einleitung: Die europäische Stadt," in *Die europäische Stadt*, ed. Siebel, 11–50, here 49.

²⁹ The importance of the *völkische* variants of the garden-city idea for the German Garden City Association has hardly been researched at all. Also, Dirk Schubert, *Die Gartenstadtideologie zwischen reaktionärer Ideologie und pragmatischer Umsetzung. Theodor Fritschs völkische Variante der Gartenstadt* (Dortmund, 2004) only marginally addresses actual social activities in the garden cities. Similarly, Fehl, *The Nazi Garden City*, mainly focuses on *völkische Raumplanungskonzepte*.

FRIENDLY SKIES? A CULTURAL HISTORY OF AIR TRAVEL IN POSTWAR AMERICA

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“Pretzels and Pillows Take a Back Seat to First-Class Perks.”¹

“At Dulles and National, the Wait Gets Worse.”²

When air travelers read today’s newspaper headlines announcing the constantly diminishing features of airlines’ in-flight service and the tightening of airport security checks, few may remember the time when travel by airplane was considered an activity that promised fun and excitement. Americans readily accepted Frank Sinatra’s invitation to “Come Fly With Me,” issued in a song he recorded in 1958 in which he daydreamed about trips to Peru and Acapulco Bay.³ By the 1950s and 1960s, American tourists were not only flying coast to coast in their own country, but were also busily exploring destinations in Latin America and venturing across both the Atlantic and the Pacific. Decreasing fares and faster planes enabled them to go more places in less time. At the same time, air travel promised participation in the desirable and chic jet-set culture that Sinatra personified.

This project deals with the cultures of air travel in postwar America. It examines the ways in which traveling by airplane came to stand for a new way of living in which an increasing number of Americans participated. In this context, air travel is conceived of as a cultural practice, a system of cultural meanings and symbolic order that influenced people’s behavior and was in turn transformed by them. Culture here stands for a matrix or framework “in which events, behaviors and institutions can be described.”⁴ Whereas the car as a means of transportation has been explored from this perspective, we lack a cultural history of air travel, a gap this study seeks to fill.⁵ It does so by focusing on the decades between the 1940s and the 1980s, when air travel was transformed from an elite way of traveling into a means of mass transportation. During those years, it argues, Americans created a distinct “travel culture” in which both business and pleasure travelers participated.⁶ This project, then, conceives of air travel not only but also as an activity connected to leisure. It analyzes the characteristics of the collective experience of traveling by airplane and how this experience changed over the decades. Rooted in cultural history, the study also borrows methodologies from neighboring disciplines such

as cultural anthropology, human geography, the history of architecture and design, art history, and gender studies.

The different stages of a trip by airplane serve as the organizing principle for the study. The first chapter focuses on the stage of planning. It looks at the ways in which travelers were induced to travel by airplane and how they prepared for their trips. The arguments and images that were presented to prospective travelers by the airlines and that were designed to sell "air travel" can best be studied through an analysis of advertising. It shows that during the 1950s and 1960s, airlines tried to target a predominantly male traveling public. To do so, they promoted several themes that had a masculine connotation: technology, professionalism, and adventure. All three were spun around a set of three characters that constantly reappeared in the ads: the captain, the businessman, and the tourist.

Captains were featured as their airlines' most precious asset. In drawings or photographs, they appeared as handsome, white, middle-aged men. Captions described them as men who combined a number of personal qualities. Any captain was a highly trained professional who managed new jet-engine aircraft technology perfectly and got passengers to their destinations on time. Moreover, he was a reliable partner to his co-pilot and a fair and compassionate boss to his female in-flight crew, as Trudy Baker and Rachel Jones never tired of stressing in their fictional stewardess memoir *Coffee, Tea or Me?*⁷ At times the captain might have taken some liberties, spending an occasional night with one of his stewardesses. In general, however, he was a family man who longed to get home to his wife and children after spending demanding hours or days on the job. As part of this job, the captain took care of his passengers, whether they were a group of business travelers or a boy traveling alone. He was a knowledgeable person even beyond his high-tech expertise, and a patriot on top of that. American Airlines captain Willie Proctor, an ad stated in 1953, spent his summer vacation in the American Southwest to learn lessons that he could later pass on to his passengers via the plane's communication system: "Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, this is your Flagship Captain speaking." "From high in the sky," the ad continued, "his detailed descriptions of points of interest made the whole trip seem like a personally guided tour. Scenic highlights and historic landmarks—Indian chiefs and pioneer heroes—Proctor wove them all into one fascinating American history lesson that thrilled thousands of travelers."⁸ It portrays the captain's efforts as an expression of the care he invested in his passengers. He wanted them to experience the landscape they traveled across not only as something remote and abstract but as a real space that had layers of meaning. One could assume that he also wanted to sell tickets for future trips with the same airline. Moreover, his

shiny uniform and hat made any captain instantly recognizable. As a symbol of his job's prestige, it commanded admiration and respect, something that the movie *Catch Me If You Can* has most recently played on. Frank Abignale (played by Leonardo di Caprio) easily makes the transition from check-forging con man to professional pilot whenever he puts on his Pan Am uniform. Colleagues and travelers greet him with respect, and female flight attendants shower him with attention.⁹

At a time when many middle- and working-class American men had difficulties making the transition from military to civilian life and finding their place in postwar American society, the captain seemed like an ideal role model of how this transition could be accomplished. Many airline pilots had been with the Air Force during World War II. After the war, the expanding passenger airline industry had provided large numbers of them with an opportunity to find high-profile employment in an emerging transportation sector.¹⁰ Most airlines had recruited their highly trained professional personnel almost exclusively from the military. The captain's story suggests, moreover, that unlike many of his contemporaries, he did not have to compete with women in a highly gender-segregated job field. Instead, his profession provided him with the opportunity to display some qualities that were considered to be quintessentially male: expertise, command, independence, and adventurousness. These were the same characteristics that had defined the Anglo-American self-made man for centuries and had set him apart from men of other ethnicities, as sociologist Michael Kimmel has shown.¹¹ To emulate the captain's ideal, therefore, seemed like a chance for the average man to identify with his personal characteristics and his success story.

The businessman shared only some of the captain's qualities. He too was white, but while the captain might have been in his forties and fifties, the businessman was somewhat younger, in his thirties and forties. His group included both the corporate executive and the traveling salesman. Each chose air travel because it was convenient, fast, and reliable. They also chose it because it was the most modern and advanced means of transportation. A 1952 American Airlines advertisement bragged that while Don, who relied on the train, "made the trip—too late again," his younger colleague John "made the sale—he took the plane."¹² The businessman liked to be among his peers, men easily recognizable by their grey flannel suits with their hats and briefcases. He enjoyed offers like the "New York Executive," an all-male New York to Chicago flight that United Airlines offered between 1953 and 1970. Here he could enjoy the soothing presence of the stewardesses without having to deal with female fellow travelers. After all, each of their stewardesses, the same airline promised in 1967, "knows a Friday-night face when she sees one. It's the tired face of a businessman who's put in a hard week and just wants to

go home . . . Extra care is different for every passenger. But they all get it."¹³ As much as he enjoyed business, the businessman, like the captain, was a family man at heart. He longed to spend time with his wife and children and could hardly wait to return home in the evenings or at the end of a busy week.

The image of the successful, air-traveling businessman was designed to sell tickets because it promised relief for the hundreds of thousands of corporate employees in the 1950s and 1960s. Caught in a life that oscillated between demanding, 9-to-5 white-collar jobs with limited career opportunities and suburban family life with its lack of excitement and gender segregation, many middle-class men experienced identity crises in the postwar decades, as Michael Kimmel and Anthony Rotundo have shown.¹⁴ Disappointed by what the "masculine mystique" had promised—fulfillment in their traditional role as breadwinners and protectors—increasing numbers of men began to question ideals of manliness and to look beyond their normative construction.¹⁵ The image of the businessman as jet-age professional seems like an attempt to reconcile middle-class men with America's postwar economic order. It still centered around family and work. At the same time, however, it offered travel as a possibility to escape from everyday life and to participate in a new lifestyle, if only for a few days. Air travel and its possibilities revamped the corporate clone and transformed him into a sky-smart individualist.

The tourist seemed like the most adventurous character of all. He used the airplane for pleasure trips, and did not need to worry about managing technology or arriving on time. He, too, was white, but he was also someone who had considerable financial means at his disposal, at least in the 1950s and early 1960s ads. Travel for him was an opportunity to get together with his best friend for a weekend of male bonding: "That special 'somewhere' you dream about—don't let earthbound concepts of time and distance block it out of your thoughts," a TWA ad recommended in 1951, showing two men in a fishing boat on a lake.¹⁶ Travel was also an opportunity to explore exciting places within the United States and abroad. San Francisco and Las Vegas were fun destinations if the traveler wanted to take only a short trip. For extended vacations abroad, Europe, the Caribbean, Latin America, and Pacific islands like Hawaii were coming closer with each new generation of airplanes. The tourist explored these destinations not with his family but with a beautiful female companion: his wife, maybe, or a friend. With Pan Am, Europe was only 6 hours and 55 minutes away. Rome, London, and Paris were just around the corner.¹⁷ In Latin America, Punta del Este, Uruguay, was recommended by Pan Am as a place that offered beautiful beaches, the ocean, perfect weather, yachting, polo matches, and lush

entertainment.¹⁸ Alternatively, tourists could explore the Hawaiian Islands or try the Caribbean: “Head for Barbados and Antigua for British accents. Mark down Martinique and Guadeloupe for French flavor. Go Latin in Puerto Rico. Or try our Dutch treats—Curaçao and Aruba.”¹⁹ The cosmopolitan globetrotter would see all these places, and enjoy the best that they had to offer. He provided the loftiest ideal for white, middle-class men to emulate. He would not help them come to terms with their colorless existence like the businessman did: He would make them forget their identity crises and help them to invent an alternative, if only imagined, existence. As adventurous explorer of the jet-set frontier, the middle-class man might rediscover his roots and give his manhood the boost that it needed to cope with the gradual loss of male prerogatives.

During the late 1960s, airlines began to look beyond their white male customers and increasingly targeted travelers of different gender, racial, and social backgrounds. “Fashion” now became a recognizable theme in advertising, as airlines competed for the most up-to-date look of their flight attendants. Many airlines introduced or reinvented their slogans and logos—United went public with its “Friendly Skies” campaign in 1965—to be more recognizable and distinct from their competitors. Pan Am by then had become a pioneer in creating a corporate identity that provided a design vocabulary for anything from its letterhead to its ticket offices. For those who were ready to buy a ticket, ticketing agencies and electronic reservation systems, which many airlines introduced during the 1960s, brought more convenience.²⁰

Chapter Two deals with airports as places of departure, focusing on Idlewild/John F. Kennedy (New York City), Love Field (Dallas), and O’Hare (Chicago) Airports. Like most major American cities, New York, Dallas, and Chicago began expanding their airport facilities during the 1950s. Large and complex structures like JFK Airport were constructed to cope with rising numbers of passengers and demands for accessibility and convenience. Eero Saarinen’s TWA Terminal at JFK, which opened its doors in 1961, translated the idea of flying into architecture and inspired corporate designs for airlines.²¹ After its completion, the building was celebrated as an architectural masterpiece that gave built expression to a new postwar spirit of mobility. Its cool, free-flowing concrete structure was a big step away from the Beaux-Arts architecture that had dominated airport design during the 1930s and 1940s. At the same time, it provided a stylish, space-age alternative to the internationalist language of form that had inspired the International Arrivals Building or the American Airlines Terminal. The TWA Terminal ideally translated the idea of flying into architecture, for its main concourse seemed to imitate the body shape of a landing eagle, the American national symbol. It welcomed

busy travelers at curbside to take them under its wings and helped them make the transition from ground transportation to airplane.

As a liminal space, or to use Mark Gottdiener's term, a transition space, the terminal also served as a platform where travelers' everyday movements and states of mind connected to their air-travel experience, which in the 1950s and 1960s still had the flavor of exceptionality and exclusivity.²² The architects of the Pan Am Terminal at JFK Airport, which began serving passengers in 1963, envisioned a flowing transition from everyday life to air travel. Travelers did not enter the building through doors but instead had to pass through an "air curtain." The idea was to remove "congestion caused by funneling passengers through several doors and confusion as to which doors are 'in' and which are 'out.'"²³ Both terminals provided the stage for the different kinds of activities associated with departure and arrival: the main level housed ticketing and check-in counters from where departing passengers could proceed to the main lobby. Arriving passengers could pick up their luggage in the baggage-claim area. The second floor or Gallery Level provided a more leisurely atmosphere. Here the traveler could wine and dine or choose between different lounge areas. The TWA terminal offered three lounges: the International Lounge, the Ambassadors Club, and the VIP Lounge. They provided room for conversation, drinks, or waiting, while their names suggested the exclusive character of these activities.

The trend to conceive of airport terminals as multifunctional spaces has continued since the 1960s. It has found expression in the construction of new airports such as the Denver Airport, which opened its doors in 1995, or the renovation if not reinvention of the United Airlines concourses at O'Hare International Airport in Chicago designed by the German-American architect Helmut Jahn. Travel is only one of the many activities people engage in at airports these days. Airports function as gateways to national and international destinations, but they are also shopping malls, places to eat, convention centers, hotels, and, if we are to believe Steven Spielberg's movie *The Terminal*, places where people live. Increasing numbers of people seem to go to airports without even planning to travel anywhere.²⁴ Instead they spend their time much like they would in a shopping mall or amusement park. Those who do travel often find it difficult to navigate terminals and to keep their bearings from the building's entrance to the departure gate. Extensions and additions to existing structures have left many buildings less than clearly laid out. Attractions like the ones named above add to the sense of disorientation, as does the uniformity of design that characterizes many terminal interiors. Passengers can no longer see and visually connect to their aircraft once they arrive at the airport. Whereas the design of the Pan Am

Terminal had evolved around the idea that the plane had to be brought to the passenger, not the passenger to the plane, today's travelers often see the plane that is about to take them someplace at the very last minute upon arrival at the gate.²⁵ Airports give built expression to transition and movement from one place to another and from one experience to another. They can no longer be considered as places where people feel a sense of belonging, however, as Marc Augé has argued. Instead we have to understand them as the quintessential non-places of our time, "in which neither identity, nor relations, nor history really make any sense; spaces in which solitude is experienced as an overburdening or emptying of individuality, in which only the movement of the fleeting images enables the observer to hypothesize the existence of a past and glimpse the possibility of a future."²⁶

A third chapter of my study deals with the "in-flight" experience. It looks at the introduction of different classes (first class, business, and economy), interior design, entertainment, fashion, and food. In-flight food service started almost with the inception of commercial passenger service. At first, airlines offered only snacks and sandwiches, but they soon served full (albeit cold) meals. The rapid development of kitchen technology enabled some airlines like United in the 1930s to start serving hot meals, parts of which could be prepared in the airplanes' galleys. By the end of the war, hot meals had become a regular feature of in-flight service.²⁷ Airlines now advertised a passenger's choice of meals, fancy recipes, the quality of the products that were offered, and the ingredients that were used. In a 1953 press release, Pan Am extolled the virtues of its cooperation with the Paris restaurant Maxim's on the flights between the United States and Paris: "For over sixty years, the gilt-framed mirrors above the red plush seats of this famous restaurant have reflected the faces of kings, princes, millionaires, actresses, artists, publishers, war heroes—the celebrities and near-celebrities of world-wide society. This extraordinary restaurant . . . has made a specialty of catering to the eccentric demands and fastidious palates of everyone who ever was anybody."²⁸ If kings and queens were satisfied, this quote suggests, Maxim's creations would also please the delicate palates of Pan Am's American customers. Meals were prepared and precooked in canteen kitchens in New York and Paris and reheated and arranged aboard the aircrafts. Leaving New York in the direction of Paris, a traveler was served "crème de volaille, aiguillette de caneton (duckling) aux pêches petits pois à la françoise, Pommes Anna, pain, beurre, Salade du Chef 'Clipper', mousse glacée, café, and thé".²⁹ The single courses of the meal were arranged in a way that made the trip seem short and enjoyable: "Starting from the New York takeoff, the Jet Clipper is over Boston when the cocktails are in the shaker and the canapés on the tray. Over Nova Scotia, the passenger is

having his consommé or spearing his shrimp cocktail. Directly south of Greenland, pastry and fruit are being served. Coffee, cognac and a nap leave Paris or London just two or three hours away."³⁰ To infuse the atmosphere with even more European character, Pan Am chose to serve French wines with its meals and printed all its menus in French. Focusing on French cuisine on its European routes, the airline snapped up contemporary trends in cooking culture. Cookbooks like television chef Julia Child's *Mastering the Art of French Cooking* sold millions. It familiarized Americans with French products and ways of preparing meals that were very different from what most homemakers and hobby cooks were accustomed to. It also suggested that expensive ingredients, new kitchen gadgets, and fancy recipes could be status symbols that defined a cook's or a food connoisseur's class status.³¹ Consuming French products was expensive, trendy, and glamorous, and that is why Pan Am offered a taste of them in its service package. The lure of exclusivity and the promise of participation in the jet-set's lifestyle that they suggested were intended to induce customers to travel with the airline.

A look at flight attendant uniforms and fashion leads me back to my argument that air travel must be understood as a thoroughly gendered experience. Before men were once again hired as flight attendants, the airlines' efforts to dress their in-flight crews focused on women. While the design of the captain's uniform changed but little in the decades after the war, the design of women's uniforms quickly changed and stewardesses became fashion trendsetters during the 1960s. In the immediate postwar period, most airlines chose flight attendant outfits that looked similar to the uniforms that army nurses had worn during the war. Styles still mirrored prewar stewardesses' job qualifications, which included a professional nursing degree.³² The suits worn by flight attendants displayed the classic 1940s silhouette: jackets with broad shoulders and narrow waists as well as pencil skirts that opened up toward the bottom. The skirts ended around the knee, less a statement of sexual liberation than a result of fabric shortages during the war.³³

During the 1950s and 1960s, airlines paid increasing attention to fashion trends. The uniforms that Pan Am introduced in 1952 were inspired by Christian Dior's *New Look*, which celebrated women's hour-glass shape but also reintroduced the corset.³⁴ Many airlines now hired famous designers to create their uniforms. Trendsetter Braniff International Airlines made headlines in 1965 when they asked the Italian fashion designer Emilio Pucci to infuse air travel with color and to design a collection of outfits that would match the new corporate motto "The End of the Plain Plane."³⁵ Braniff flight attendants now wore ultramodern cuts, lurid colors, and fancy headgear. Clothes became an event, part of the entertainment that the airline offered to its passengers. On international flights,

Braniff's flight attendants performed "the Air Strip." Over the course of a trip they changed their outfits numerous times. But instead of dressing and undressing, they simply peeled off layers of clothing until they wore their blue arrival outfits.³⁶ In comparison, the uniforms that flight attendants wore who worked for Southwest Airlines during the 1970s were much more minimalist, featuring miniskirts and go-go boots. Moreover, they were tight, accentuating the female body shape and leaving much of the leg exposed.³⁷ Such outfits suggested that Southwest offered the bodies of its in-flight crews as an extra feature of its bargain tickets. One can read the marketing campaign that National Airlines ran in 1974 and 1975 along the same lines. It showed the faces of flight attendants along with the invitation "Fly Me."³⁸ Both built on the sexist assumption that airlines could sell more tickets by advertising the sexual availability of their flight attendants. Two factors eventually led to the reevaluation of such blatant forms of gender stereotyping: the readmission of men to the flight attendant profession and the unionization of flight attendants in the early 1970s.³⁹ By the 1980s most airlines had returned to classic cuts and the colors black and blue. They also introduced pantsuits for women. The designs that airlines such as United, American, and Delta Airlines now featured were much more subdued and were created specifically to express respectability and professionalism.⁴⁰

A final chapter of the study will focus on issues connected with "arrival." It will return to the airport as the travelers' gateway to their destinations. It will also concern itself with frequent-flyer cultures and explore the relationship between air travel and travel by car, two travel cultures that intersect at the airport.

My findings so far lead me to conclude that the way travelers experienced a journey by airplane thoroughly changed over the course of the postwar period. Not only did they go through the transition from piston-engine to jet-engine aircraft and the transformations of airports: they also experienced the expansion and class differentiation of in-flight services, as well as their reduction to a no-frills level. Over the years, the choice of destinations increased, as did the number of people who were able to afford a trip by airplane. Increasing numbers of Americans of different backgrounds were able to use a means of transportation that only few had been able to afford before the war. By the late 1960s, the airplane had brought about an increase in mobility that compared to and even surpassed that triggered by the railroad and the car. Businesspeople and tourists, men and women, used and benefited from the availability of cheap air travel in different ways. By using the airplane and by claiming air space as their territory, however, they helped create a new and distinctly American travel culture.

Notes

¹ "Pretzels and Pillows Take a Back Seat to First-Class Perks: As They Make Cuts in Coach, Airlines Use Amenities to Retain Higher-Paying Fliers," *Boston Globe*, 14 August 2005.

² "At Dulles And National, the Wait Gets Worse: TSA Official Worries About Holiday Crowds," *Washington Post*, 31 October 2006, D01.

³ Frank Sinatra, "Come Fly With Me," *Come Fly With Me*, Capitol 1958.

⁴ Thomas Mergel, "Kulturgeschichte—die neue 'große' Erzählung," in *Kulturgeschichte heute*, ed. Wolfgang Hardtwig and Hans Ulrich Wehler (Göttingen, 1996), 41–77, 60. See also Clifford Geertz, *Dichte Beschreibung: Beiträge zum Verstehen kultureller Systeme* (Frankfurt am Main, 1983), 21.

⁵ Scholars argue that the car increased people's mobility and at the same time triggered processes of individualization, issues that also need to be explored in regard to air travel. See for instance Mark S. Foster, *Nation on Wheels: The Automobile Culture in America since 1945* (Belmont, Cal., 2003); David L. Lewis and Laurence Goldstein (eds.), *The Automobile and American Culture* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1983); Warren J. Belasco, *Americans on the Road: From Autocamp to Motel, 1910–1945* (Cambridge, Mass., 1979).

⁶ The term derives from James Clifford's "travelling cultures." Clifford assumes that all cultures are traveling cultures and that negotiation and intercultural transfer produce cultural identity. German scholars and historians of German history like Rudy Koshar have used it to refer to the practices and traditions of travel. See James Clifford, *Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, Mass., 1997), 17–46; Rudy Koshar, *German Travel Cultures* (New York, 2000), 9–11; Hermann Bausinger, Klaus Beyrer, and Gottfried Korff (eds.), *Reisekultur: Von der Pilgerfahrt zum modernen Tourismus* (Munich, 1991).

⁷ Trudy Baker and Rachel Jones, *Coffee, Tea or Me? The Uninhibited Memoirs of Two Airline Stewardesses* (New York, 1967).

⁸ American Airlines Ad, print advertising campaign 1953, appeared in various news magazines and newspapers.

⁹ *Catch Me If You Can*, Dir. Steven Spielberg, Perf. Leonardo DiCaprio, Tom Hanks, Christopher Walken. Umvd/ DreamWorks, 2002.

¹⁰ Roger E. Bilstein, *Flight in America: From the Wright Brothers to the Astronauts* (Baltimore, 2001), 195; David T. Courtwright, "The Routine Stuff: How Flying Became a Form of Mass Transportation," in *Reconsidering a Century of Flight*, ed. Roger D. Launius and Janet R. Dalz Bednarek (Chapel Hill, 2003), 209–222, 213–214.

¹¹ Michael Kimmel, *Manhood in America: A Cultural History* (New York, 1996), 13–78.

¹² American Airlines Ad, print advertising campaign 1952, appeared in various news magazines and newspapers.

¹³ United Airlines Ad, print advertising campaign 1967, appeared in various news magazines and newspapers.

¹⁴ Cf. Kimmel, *Manhood in America*, 223–258; James Gilbert, *Men in the Middle: Searching for Masculinity in the 1950s* (Chicago, 2005).

¹⁵ Andrew Kimbrell has coined the term "masculine mystique." It stands for the male experience of what Betty Friedan has labeled "the problem that has no name" in her 1963 book *The Feminine Mystique*. She described the frustration of middle-class women who could not find fulfillment in their roles as wives and mothers. She called for a redefinition of gender ideals and set the stage for the second wave of American feminism. Cf. Andrew Kimbrell, *The Masculine Mystique: The Politics of Masculinity* (New York, 1995); Betty Friedan, *The Feminine Mystique* (New York, 1963).

¹⁶ TWA Ad, print advertising campaign 1951, appeared in various news magazines and newspapers.

- ¹⁷ Pan Am Ad, print advertising campaign 1959, appeared in various news magazines and newspapers.
- ¹⁸ Pan Am Ad, print advertising campaign 1965, appeared in various news magazines and newspapers.
- ¹⁹ Pan Am Ad, print advertising campaign 1967, appeared in various news magazines and newspapers.
- ²⁰ Delta Airlines, for instance, introduced its electronic “instant” reservations system in 1962. “Delta Through the Decades,” [http:// delta.com/home/press_url/dal_stats_facts/daltimeline/index.jsp](http://delta.com/home/press_url/dal_stats_facts/daltimeline/index.jsp).
- ²¹ Mark Lamster, “Introduction,” in *The TWA Terminal*, with photographs by Ezra Stoller (New York, 1999), 1–11.
- ²² Mark Gottdiener, *Life in the Air: Surviving the New Culture of Air Travel* (Lanham, Md., 2001), 9–11.
- ²³ “World’s Largest Air Curtain Eliminates Congestion and Confusion at Terminal Entrance,” Press release, n.d., Box 162, Folder 2, Pan Am Records, PAWAR.
- ²⁴ *The Terminal*, Dir. Steven Spielberg, Perf. Tom Hanks, Catherine Zeta-Jones, Stanley Tucci. Dreamworks, 2004.
- ²⁵ “The Air Terminal that Brings the Plane to the Passenger,” Press release, n.d., Box 163, Folder 2, Pan Am Records, PAWAR.
- ²⁶ Marc Augé, *Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity* (London, 1995), 87.
- ²⁷ Jochen Eisenbrand, “Essen an Board,” in *Airworld: Design und Architektur für die Flugreise*, ed. Vitra Design Museum (Weil am Rhein, 2004), 212–228.
- ²⁸ “Maxim’s of Paris Serves Pan American’s Transatlantic Passengers,” Press release, 30 January 1951, Box 247, Folder 2, Pan Am Records, PAWAR, 1.
- ²⁹ “Maxim’s of Paris,” 2.
- ³⁰ “Two Dozen Choices Plus Champagne on New Pan Am Jet Menu,” Press release, 25 November 1958, Box 247, Folder 2, Pan Am Records, PAWAR.
- ³¹ Simone Beck, Louisette Bertholle, Julia Child, *Mastering the Art of French Cooking* (New York, 1961).
- ³² Cf. Suzanne L. Kolm, “Women’s Labor Aloft: A Cultural History of Airline Flight Attendants in the United States, 1930–1978” (Ph.D. diss., Brown University, 1995).
- ³³ For pictures of United Airlines’ and American Airlines’ 1940s uniforms see William Garvey and David Fisher, *The Age of Flight: A History of America’s Pioneering Airline* (Greensboro, 2001), 132 and Helen E. McLaughlin, *Footsteps in the Sky: An Informal Review of U.S. Airlines Inflight Service, 1920-Present* (Denver, 1994) 134, 1940.
- ³⁴ “Pan Am Stewardess Uniform—1952,” Press release, n.d., Box 293, Folder 4, Pan Am Records, PAWAR.
- ³⁵ Ads and images that illustrate the Pucci look as well as the “End of the Plain Plane” advertising campaign can be found at <http://www.braniffinternational.org/image/puccifashion.htm> and <http://www.braniffinterntional.org/image/advertising.htm>.
- ³⁶ The ad promoting the “Air Strip” can be found in Johanna Omelia and Michael Waldock, *Come Fly With Us: A Global History of the Airline Hostess* (Portland, 2003), 102–103.
- ³⁷ Omelia, *Come Fly With Us*, 118.
- ³⁸ Ads appeared, for instance, in *Newsweek* and *Ebony* magazines.
- ³⁹ Cf. Cathleen M. Loucks, “Battle in the Skies: Sex Discrimination in the United States Airline Industry, 1930–1978” (M.A. thesis, University of Nevada, 1995).
- ⁴⁰ “High-Flying Fashion Show Introduces New Pan Am Uniforms,” Press release, 29 June 1980, Box 291, Folder 13, Pan Am Records, PAWAR.

COCA-COLA HISTORY: A “REFRESHING” LOOK AT GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

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Coke is It! (1982)

Everyone knows that “Coke is It!”—everyone, at least, who read a magazine, listened to the radio, or watched television during the 1980s. In the United States the announcement came on the evening of 4 February 1982 when a “roadblock” of new Coca-Cola television commercials was broadcast simultaneously on all three networks. By the next morning, four out of ten Americans had heard the unprecedented \$40 million advertising campaign’s slogan and brassy new jingle.¹ “This is a very bold, hard-hitting campaign,” declared Roberto Goizueta, the new chairman of The Coca-Cola Company. “In three words, it tells what the product is, what the company is.”² Donald Keough, Coca-Cola’s president, elaborated, “Delicious. Refreshing. Thirst. The Real Thing. Life. The words we use and the themes we create are a dictionary of the American spirit. They define the force driving Americans to overcome strife, to be better than the rest and to enjoy life. ‘Coke is it!’ responds to that chord.”³

However, despite such patriotic rhetoric, Americans were not even the first to learn that “Coke is it”: the slogan and its jingle originally were part of a Coke advertising campaign in Canada.⁴ Furthermore, the “Coke is It!” marketing blitz pioneered centrally developed advertising aimed at Coke’s many international markets. “[W]e were going for share of the [global] throat, you know,” explained a Coke adman. “Whatever it is that you drink, whether it is mineral water or other soft drinks or whatever, we’d like you to replace that by Coca-Cola because it’s a part of everything you do and something to share and all the rest of that.”⁵ Three years later, when the campaign was extended abroad, West Germans were among those informed, “Coca-Cola is It!”

This was the first time English was used in Coke advertising in Germany. Nonetheless, one of the soft drink’s most important foreign markets since shortly after its introduction there in 1929, Germans—whatever their language abilities—understood the gist of the marketing campaign.⁶ The following year, 1986, a century after the soft drink’s modest conception in the kettle of an Atlanta pharmacist, Coca-Cola achieved an ex-

traordinary 100 percent consumer recognition rate in Germany. Whereas over 95 percent of West Germans recognized classic German trademarks, like *Pril* soap powder and *Eduscho* coffee, literally everyone surveyed by a market-research team from Hamburg could identify Coca-Cola.⁷ In Germany, “Coke is It” made sense.

But the question remained, what is the “It” that Coke is? Was Coke’s It the same in both Berlin and Atlanta? More to the point, does Coke’s It have a history? Was It the same in 1982 as it was in 1942? Was Coca-Cola’s It an “actor” in history, like a nation-state and the Catholic Church, or a kind of lubricant for metahistorical developments, like “modernization”? Or was It simply a trivial refreshment sometimes enjoyed on the sidelines of historical events? Recognizing the truth in all three of these conclusions, “Refreshing the Fatherland,” my project researching Coca-Cola’s history in Germany from 1929–1961, investigates how Coca-Cola’s international success illuminates German-American relations and the making of the world we live in today.

It’s The Real Thing (1942/1970)

Despite its declarative power, the famous 1980s advertising slogan did not unlock Coke’s secrets. As demonstrated by Keough and Goizeuta, Coca-Cola’s official representatives also have been little help in determining exactly what Coca-Cola embodies. “Coca-Cola is special. It’s a feeling, an attitude, a belief,” listed another Coke executive in 1982. “We should not be too precise, too descriptive or too literal . . . Whatever the feeling, whatever the need. Coke is it. *Period.*”⁸ In January 2003 the company launched a similar “marketing platform”—“Coca-Cola . . . Real.”⁹ Whereas another earlier slogan, “Always Coca-Cola” (1993), was ahistorical, the new tagline recalled classic advertising campaigns from the soft drink’s past, such as “It’s The Real Thing” (1942/1970). Advertising analysts commented, “‘Real’ returns the brand to its heritage.”¹⁰ Today, with its latest marketing platform, Coca-Cola invites the world to “Live on the Coke Side of Life” (2006). “Overall,” explained a company vice-president, “the message is that only a Coke will do because in the most basic terms, Coca-Cola is happiness in a bottle.”¹¹

With over 1.3 billion Coca-Cola products consumed every day, a global per capita consumption rate more than double that of 1982, consumers worldwide appear to have little difficulty swallowing Coca-Cola’s advertising claims.¹² In fact, countless enthusiasts have taken the “idea” conjured in Coke’s advertising to heart. “In some ways I think Coke is like life,” announced one woman. “You’ve only got one and it is the real thing.”¹³ Such sentiments confirm the observation made twenty-five years ago by two journalists who investigated *The Cola Wars*. “Gathering momentum from its roots,” they wrote, “Coca-Cola quickly became

a religion of its own, complete with a creation myth, a system of consecrating values, and a pronounced ethic for its propagation."¹⁴ A Coca-Cola employee concurred: "Coca-Cola is the holy grail, it's magic. Wherever I go, when people find out I work for Coke, it's like being a representative from the Vatican, like you've touched God."¹⁵

Others have been more skeptical. They regard talk of such grand abstractions as "Happiness," "It," and "The Real Thing" as distractions from what was "really 'real' about Coke," namely its status as a commodity, a mere soft drink. "There is no need to consume them," noted a survey of beverage-industry technology. "Carbonated soft drinks are a man-made product and a man-made market."¹⁶ "If they are nutritious, that is a bonus," remarked another soft drink insider, "if they cause a person to pass up on more-needed foods, they become a liability."¹⁷ "What is there about a soft drink that is more or less authentic than anything else?" asked advertising analyst Bob Garfield. "Is it the real high-fructose corn syrup? The real caramel coloring? The real CO₂-tank-infused carbonation?"¹⁸

Scholarly approaches to Coca-Cola's past must navigate between these poles. Conceptualizing Coca-Cola's history requires that the feel-good mantras of its marketers be tempered with pragmatic attention to the bottom line of the soft drink's socio-economic impact. Then it may be possible to fashion analytical tools that can cut through both popular celebratory myths and cynical dismissal of Coke's relevance. Ultimately, the problem is not that Coca-Cola is too trivial to have a history, but that its effervescence in popular culture too easily hides its significance. Despite recent international trends toward soft drinks perceived to be healthier than The Real Thing, the unprecedented global "Cokempire," first heralded by *Time* magazine in 1950, remains unparalleled.¹⁹ As an expert on "corporate identity" observed, "The traditional bottle, the logo-type, and the lavish advertising on a mega scale have combined with obsessive attention to detail and an unequalled global distribution system to create the world's greatest-ever brand."²⁰

Like fish to water, we can be blinded by Coca-Cola's ubiquitous presence and not recognize its magnitude. From the ghettos of San Paolo to the chicest Parisian bistro, from George W. Bush's White House to the three pivots in his "axis of evil," ice-cold Cokes can be had for a few pieces of pocket change in more than two hundred countries. Moreover, wherever one turns, the world has been branded with the red and white Coca-Cola trademark. "Look around you, the Coca-Cola Company has more impressions than any other company on the planet," bragged a Coke executive in 2003. "Our brands light up Times Square and Piccadilly Square, but also neighborhood delis and ballparks. People wear the brand on t-shirts and ball caps. They display it on coolers and beach balls and

key chains and just about anything you can think of."²¹ Consequently, Coca-Cola has infiltrated our collective imagination. Not only are Coke logos a frequent element found in contemporary art worldwide,²² the soft drink's cinematic "placement" has extended from the most undeveloped corner of Africa to the frontiers of science fiction.²³

However, even these fantasies pale before Coca-Cola's corporate aspirations, which range from taps dispensing Coca-Cola in every home to new "nutraceutical" soft drinks that improve one's complexion with each sip. Already controlling 10 percent of the volatile global market in non-alcoholic beverages (last year almost three-quarters of the company's estimated \$80 billion in sales was outside the United States), Coca-Cola's visionaries believe that future growth will come from drinks that "cross over traditional beverage categories." In this spirit, the company has deployed Coca-Cola Blak (a Coke-coffee blend meant to infiltrate the Starbucks market) and a "portfolio" of over 2,400 other products in its ongoing effort to secure an ever greater "share of the throat."²⁴

Always Coca-Cola (1993)

Coca-Cola's success at colonizing our *Lebenswelt* has not escaped attention. In a manner more profound than that claimed in any advertising, Coca-Cola has made itself an integral part of the contemporary world—"a metaphor for our late-industrial experience of life," as one German art historian noted in the 1970s.²⁵ More recently, another German scholar argued, "More than any other product, Coca-Cola has shaped the popular culture of the twentieth century."²⁶ Thus, Coke's history *is* our history. Folklorist Paul Smith elaborated:

'Coke-Lore' commentary—ranging from the innocuous 'It removes rust,' to tales of sex escapades—allows all of us, if we so choose, regardless of our age, sex or social standing, to *become involved* in 'Coke-Lore' at a level with which we feel comfortable. And this very respect of 'Coke-Lore' mirrors the ideals and ambitions of the Coca-Cola company itself, in that it hopes to persuade everyone, world-wide, regardless of age, sex or social standing, to become involved and drink Coca-Cola. As such, *folklore* mirrors *reality* and *reality* mirrors *folklore*. To borrow that well-known phrase—"It's the real thing."²⁷

"Perhaps," as a critic once pondered in the *New York Times*, "the sweep of modern times really was aimed, after all, at making the world safe for Coca-Cola."²⁸

In representing its own past, The Coca-Cola Company has promoted its own version of Coke-Lore—mythologized anecdotes of Coke's history fashioned to enhance its reputation and sales figures. Such pre-packaged

sips of nostalgia can be found throughout Coca-Cola's marketing, from the company's web site to the "special edition" cans of Coke at Christmas that recount how Santa's parka came to be "Coca-Cola red."²⁹ Such Coke Lore also permeates the corporation's ostensibly less commercial depictions of its past, its official company histories and museum exhibitions.³⁰ Both serve to conflate history and commerce. As one critic noted of The World of Coca-Cola, the company's museum in Atlanta, "This is a world in which Clio has become a capitalist, and capitalism depends on the historical Muse."³¹ "[T]he Coke story is told absolutely without tension or conflict—except insofar as rivals and pretenders are concerned," noted historian Neil Harris. "This is the museum as summer vacation."³² Some ten million visitors have visited The World of Coke since it opened in 1990, and similar exhibits have been set up elsewhere, including one in 2002 at the German state museum for contemporary history, the Haus der Geschichte in Bonn.³³ In all cases, the ultimate message for the curious visitor remained, as suggested in the preface to the company's latest historical monograph, "Pause and refresh yourself."³⁴

Such an amiable approach to Coca-Cola's past also has characterized many of the Coke histories not written by the company, such as the recent *The Sparkling Story of Coca-Cola: An Entertaining History including Collectibles, Coke Lore, and Calendar Girls*.³⁵ This triviality is to be expected of the endless photo-laden volumes intended for the collectors of Coca-Cola memorabilia, who only need to know enough Coke history to date their treasures,³⁶ but a light-hearted approach also informs the "classic" Coke books: the compilation of E.J. Kahn's 1959 series for the *New Yorker* magazine, *The Big Drink*, and Coke's first substantial history, Pat Watter's *Coca-Cola: An Illustrated History*, published in 1978.³⁷ This celebratory flavor is more understandable in the handful of books published worldwide to mark Coca-Cola's centennial in 1986, although here awe of Coke's "global reach" could leave a sinister aftertaste.³⁸ The mid-1990s saw the publication of two well-researched popular histories of Coca-Cola: Mark Pendergrast's best-seller, *For God, Country and Coca-Cola: The Definitive History of the Great American Soft Drink and the Company that Makes It*, and *Secret Formula: How Brilliant Marketing and Relentless Salesmanship made Coca-Cola the Best-known Product in the World*, by Frederick Allen.³⁹

As illustrated by the titles above, maturation in the historiography of Coca-Cola can be measured by the degree to which authors have spotlighted the company as opposed to the trademark-bearing flotsam left over from its century-old marketing juggernaut. In fact, the most interesting recent studies have used Coca-Cola to illustrate, either explicitly or tangentially, the machinations of corporate capitalism. These works include the company and executive profiles written by business journalists,⁴⁰ as well as the seminal text by Harvard business historian Richard

Tedlow, *New and Improved: The Story of Mass Marketing in America*.⁴¹ Other examples range from scholarly exposés of Coca-Cola's environmental and labor troubles⁴² to British anthropologist Daniel Miller's monograph, *Capitalism: An Ethnographic Approach*, which profiles Trinidad's soft drink market to illuminate the production and consumption of commodities.⁴³ For the more general reader, the Australian writer Humphrey McQueen recently spotlighted Coca-Cola's development in a more polemical interpretation of global capitalism. For a title, he drew from a quip by Robert W. Woodruff, Coke's legendary "Boss" from 1923–1985, *The Essence of Capitalism*.⁴⁴ This easy equation between Coke and capitalism has not been lost to authors more sympathetic to the pursuit of profit—a handful of children's books profile The Coca-Cola Company to provide a sugar-coated introduction to the world of business.⁴⁵

Although Germany became one of Coke's largest and most important foreign markets soon after the company's international expansion in the 1920s (with sales there doubling annually throughout the 1930s), Coca-Cola's German past has not received the scholarly attention devoted to its experience in neighboring France, where the National Assembly tried to ban the soft drink in 1950.⁴⁶ This is surprising considering that, as the newly-liberated French fretted over American influence, skyrocketing Coca-Cola consumption in the new Federal Republic made the soft drink a key icon of postwar Germany's "economic miracle."⁴⁷ Ralph Willett, a British scholar of American Studies, briefly highlighted this phenomenon in his 1989 work on *The Americanization of Germany, 1945–1949*.⁴⁸

Although Willett's cursory account left much open to further analysis, later scholarship on postwar Germany has overlooked the Coca-Cola case study, even when variations of the Coke trademark appeared on a book's cover. Most notably, Reinhold Wagnleitner, although he had little to say about the soft drink, cashed in on Coke's "brand power" to title his otherwise illuminating account of American cultural diplomacy in Austria, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War*.⁴⁹ (For Coke's history in Austria, one must instead turn to the work of Irene Bandhauer-Schöffmann.⁵⁰) With its postwar success so stunning, Coca-Cola's earlier presence in the Third Reich had been largely forgotten before it was recounted in a rather sensationalized chapter of Pendergrast's 1993 bestseller.⁵¹ Exceptions include a *Diplomarbeit* on Coca-Cola's German launch by a beverage industry professional,⁵² and, less obscurely, the pioneering examinations of Nazi popular culture written in the 1980s by Hans Dieter Schäfer.⁵³ The literary scholar's controversial argument that Coca-Cola's presence in the Third Reich helped constitute an "ongoing Americanization" that buttressed Nazi rule was echoed in *Eiskalt: Coca-Cola im Dritten Reich*, a 1999 television documentary by the Munich-based director Hans-Otto Wiebus.⁵⁴

Coke Macht Mehr Draus (1976)

My current research as a Thyssen-Heideking Fellow follows the lead of Schäfer and, more recently, Götz Aly, Wolfgang Knig, Shelley Baranowski, Victoria de Grazia, and others in its effort to understand the role played by consumerism in Nazi “totalitarian” society.⁵⁵ In this context, I am taking a closer look at interactions within the German soft drink industry, especially once the SS became a significant player through their wartime acquisition of the Apollinaris mineral water firm.⁵⁶ Additionally, on a lighter note, as an epilogue to my study, I plan to give a final twist to the tangled Coca-Cola-drenched knot of German-American relations by examining the cult status within Germany of *One, Two, Three/Eins, Zwei, Drei*, the 1961 Billy Wilder film about a Coca-Cola bottler in Cold War Berlin. These activities are part of a larger work-in-progress, “Refreshing the Fatherland,” the refinement of my 2003 doctoral dissertation outlining Coca-Cola’s history in Germany from its quiet introduction in 1929 to its spectacular postwar success.⁵⁷

Although limited to this finite case study, my work too has flirted with the sirens of “totality” conjured forth by Coke’s ubiquity and its apparent embodiment of “world-historical” forces. My initial conception of the project, part common sense and part utopian hubris, was to highlight Coca-Cola’s historical “agency” as a way to transcend the limitations of academic disciplines and the demarcations of scholarly specialization. With the training received at Georgetown University’s multidisciplinary BMW Center for German and European Studies, I set out to analyze Coca-Cola’s past with the discipline of a historian, the sensitivities of a cultural studies enthusiast, and the pragmatism of a political economist. In an odd tribute to my *Doktorvater*, Roger Chickering, who had recently completed an award-winning book on the ill-fated turn-of-the-century dean of *histoire totale*, Karl Lamprecht, I envisioned an all-encompassing approach to cultural history that would comprehend a world shaped not only by nation-states and dialectical materialism but also transnational corporations and “postmodern” identities.⁵⁸

The Coke-in-Germany case study lent itself well to such Lamprechtian idealism. Not only did the project bridge German and American history (as well as cultural, political, social, and business history), my conception of the protagonist as a “trinity” (soft drink, company, and icon) offered a myriad of side roads into other disciplines and their analytical models. When addressing Coca-Cola as a soft drink, my study could be sweetened with insights from anthropology (problems of alcohol, sugar, eating rituals)⁵⁹ and material culture (the bottle “consumed” with the beverage).⁶⁰ Examining Coca-Cola as a corporation demanded not only business and economic analysis (e.g. franchising, branding, and

management); it also cleared a path to the wide-open fields of study on “globalization” and consumer culture (everything from the reification of commodity aesthetics to the relationship between free trade and human rights).⁶¹ Finally, looking at Coca-Cola as an “icon” opened the window to breezy ruminations on popular culture, the power of advertising, layered identities, and other scholarly playgrounds just around the corner from the “literary turn.”⁶² As Roberto Goizeuta declared, “There is nothing apologetic about it, there is no pussy-footing around—Coke is it.”⁶³

Of course, the project has not developed as I imagined. (Nonetheless, although the ambition toward “totality” was lost to the necessity of actually finishing the dissertation, hopefully, as with Coke’s “secret formula” after the cocaine is leached from its coca extract, a hint of the project’s original zest may remain.) Instead of pulling the curtain on the Oz of consumer society and global capitalism, the dissertation more modestly sought to illuminate the mechanics of “cultural transfer,” the drive shaft that powers the overworked concept of “Americanization”—and thus, I maintained, its sibling conceptualizations of “modernization” and “globalization.”

All of these concepts are greased pigs in the halls of academia. Although each has had a respectable career helping scholars make sense of historical trends, they all suffer, as one German suggested of the term “Americanism” eighty years ago, “the usual fate of catchwords: the more it is used, the less one knows what it means.”⁶⁴ Moreover, each of these “-izations” has been repackaged at one time or another with the new-and-improved label “Coca-Colonization.” After all, in the popular mind, Coca-Cola *is* America: William Allen White called it “a sublimated essence of all that America stands for.”⁶⁵ Coca-Cola *is* global: In 1996 the Coca-Cola Company became a true citizen of the world by structurally severing its ties to a “domestic” base.⁶⁶ And Coca-Cola *is* modern: As one German journalist insisted, “In any case, Coca-Cola fits into the modern way of life, or better yet, it is a necessary part of it.”⁶⁷ It follows, therefore, that a scholarly examination of Coca-Cola’s success at transcending national and other frontiers may shed light on the use of these concepts and the historical forces they attempt to address without itself having to pin down the “reality” each claims to capture.

However, since it first gained currency in the 1950s, the term “Coca-Colonization” has grated on the ears of Coca-Cola executives. Their sentiment was expressed to the author by Claus Halle, the German who as president of Coca-Cola International rose the highest within the company’s hierarchy.⁶⁸ His boss, Roberto Goizueta, once noted, “A few years back, some clever person—not on our payroll I can assure you—coined the phrase ‘Coca-Colonization’ to criticize what he saw as the imposition of American consumer goods and tastes on the rest of the world. But that

is not what has happened."⁶⁹ To the faithful, Coca-Cola's global mission of "refreshment" has nothing to do with the dynamics of Americanization or, to use the words of Marcio Moreira, "some new kind of imperialism." The Coke advertising executive insisted in 1989, "I don't think it's fair really . . . It's wrong because all the thing [Coca-Cola] wants to do is to refresh you, and it is willing to understand your culture, to be meaningful to you and to be relevant to you. Why is that called Coca-Colonization?"⁷⁰

I empathize with the consternation of the Coca-Cola mandarins. Trading on Coca-Cola's valuable "brand power," academics, journalists, and alarmists of all stripes have used the phrase to promote their position on the apparent socio-economic hegemony of the United States and its corporations.⁷¹ As the interviewer confronting Moreira suggested, "You're using the power of the media to brainwash people. Or make them all the same? Homogenize the world?"⁷² Over fifty years ago, the East German communist Alexander Abusch declared, "The overall idea of Coca-Colonization more than anything manifests the reduction of quality and national culture to the level of cheap trash and inferior kitsch."⁷³ More recently, the French philosopher Régis Debray warned, "An American monoculture would inflict a sad future on the world, one in which the planet is converted to a global supermarket where people have to choose between the local Ayatollah and Coca-Cola."⁷⁴ As if it were a global "super value menu," the concept of Coca-Colonization appears to come pre-packaged with fear of living in a suburb of a US-dominated McWorld.⁷⁵

My project on Coca-Cola in Germany avoids such pitfalls by taking "Coca-Colonization" literally. Instead of using the phrase as a grand generalization or catchy metaphor for the spread of either "democratic values" or "superficial commercialism," it investigates the German case study of the internationalization of Coca-Cola to map the multi-dimensional crosscurrents of cultural transfer. In this way, my work falls amid a growing body of scholarship that has put new life into the idea of Americanization.⁷⁶

Rejecting the simple unilateralism implied by models of cultural imperialism, such studies sound out the "creolization" of lifestyle forms caused by the historical forces that typically fall under the rubric of Americanization.⁷⁷ As noted by Rob Kroes, the Dutch scholar of American studies who has popularized the model:

The metaphor of creolization is a felicitous one because it takes the structural transformations of languages in the melting pot of the world's periphery as an illustrative case of the more general processes of cultural change that take place there. Linguistically,

creolization refers to the reduction of the structural complexity of a language in the sense that strict rules of grammar, syntax, and semantics prevailing in the parent country lose their compelling force. Words no longer obey the structural discipline of spelling, inflection, conjugation, gender, syntactic order, connotation, and denotation; they align themselves more freely and more simply.⁷⁸

Highlighting the dynamic “hybrid” cultures that people simultaneously create and experience, the creolization model reveals the complexity of cultural transfer and human life.

Where There’s Coke There’s Hospitality (1948)

By striking this chord, my approach to Coke’s history resonates with a view advanced by those who believe “Coke is It!” Concurrent with his dismissal of “Coca-Colonization,” Moreira spoke proudly of how Coca-Cola’s advertising nurtured a “Coke World”—“It’s an inviting world for people. It’s reassuring. It’s special . . . It’s in those old drawings and those old Coke trays. They always show all the people with rosy cheeks and clean lifestyles, idealized situations.” This Coke World, as Moreira saw it, was not an “imposition”: “I don’t think that Coca-Cola projects. I think that it reflects . . . Coca-Cola looks at it and then puts a mirror in front of you. Sometimes it puts a window in front of you that allows you to see how you’d like to be.” Ultimately, he suggested, what one finds in the Coke World conjured by Coca-Cola’s iconography is “an idealized reflection . . . airbrushed, retouched . . . The mirror that makes you look good.”⁷⁹

The epilogue of my dissertation, subsequently published in an anthology on *Consuming Germany in the Cold War*, concluded that skyrocketing Coke sales revealed that postwar Germans liked what they saw of themselves at the bottom of empty Coke bottles. In consuming Coca-Cola they “creolized” the Coke World to satisfy their own needs at a specific historical moment—namely, during the *Wirtschaftswunder* when, after the horrors of the Third Reich, they wanted to be “Born Again in the Gospel of Refreshment” as new cosmopolitan “consumer-democrats.”⁸⁰ Key to this opportunity, I suggested, was the fact that Coca-Cola had been considered a *deutsches Erzeugnis* during its initial wave of commercial success in Germany under the Nazis.⁸¹ When Coca-Cola was reintroduced to the new Federal Republic in 1949, this Made-in-Germany status mitigated the apprehension over Coca-Colonization that was evident across the Rhine and elsewhere.

Twentieth-century America, Hitler’s Third Reich, and the postwar Federal Republic of Germany were very different societies, but all provided remarkably fertile environments for Coca-Cola’s success. Each con-

tained multitudes of consumers who liked what they saw promised in Coke's advertising and who felt themselves "refreshed" by consuming ice-cold Coca-Cola. My research seeks to make sense of these Americans and Germans wanting to be part of the Coke World by examining in detail the "It" that Coke was—as a "modern" soft drink that satisfied thirst in a "delicious and refreshing" manner that was consistent and readily available, as a business enterprise that pioneered a coast-to-coast "American" market of true mass consumption and then expanded it abroad, and as a universal "pure and wholesome" icon of simultaneously both an idealized past and promising future. Contributing to the developing fields of advertising and consumer history, while challenging conventional assumptions that distinguish "the German" from "the American," this project taps into a promising spring of Coca-Cola historiography to refresh our conceptions of history, German-American relations, and contemporary global society.

Notes

¹ Nancy Giges, "New Coke Ads Reflect A New Aggressiveness" and "Sing Along," *Advertising Age*, 8 February 1982, 1 and 82. For an overview of the campaign, see Daniel Pope, *The Making of Modern Advertising* (New York, 1983), 252–253.

² Thomas Oliver, "Coca-Cola Launching 'Coke is It!' Ad Theme," *Atlanta Constitution*, 5 February 1982, 1 and 3-C.

³ Trent Spurgeon, "'Coke is it' says it all!" *Refresher USA*, March 1982, 8.

⁴ Mark Pendergrast, *For God, Country and Coca-Cola: The Definitive History of the Great American Soft Drink and the Company that Makes It*, second edition (New York, 2000), 339–340.

⁵ "The Airbrushing of Culture: An Insider Looks at Global Advertising. William M. O'Barr Interviews Marcio M. Moreira," *Public Culture* 2.1 (Fall 1989): 4–6.

⁶ For reports on the slogan's positive reception, see "Spitzenplätze für unsere Werbung," *Coca-Cola Nachrichten* 1 (1986): 6.

⁷ "Das schaffte noch keine Marke: Bekanntheitsgrad 100%," *Coca-Cola Nachrichten* 1 (1986): 10.

⁸ Spurgeon, "Coke is it," *Refresher USA*, March 1982, 9.

⁹ Coca-Cola Company Press Release, "Coca-Cola Introduces 'Real' Marketing Platform," 9 January 2003, *PR Newswire*, accessed 12 February 2003 <<http://www.prnewswire.com>>.

¹⁰ Al Ries, "Coca-Cola Gets It Right With 'Real': New Campaign Demonstrates Why Good Ads Are Not About Creativity," 20 January 2003, *AdAge.com*, accessed 27 January 2003 <<http://adage.com>>.

¹¹ Coca-Cola Company Press Release "Welcome to 'The Coke Side of Life,'" 30 March 2006, accessed 28 December 2006 <http://www2.coca-cola.com/presscenter/nr_20060330_coke_side_of_life.html>.

¹² *The Coca-Cola Company 2005 Annual Review* (Atlanta, 2006), 5 and 23. Annual worldwide per capita consumption of Coca-Cola products was 32 eight-ounce servings in 1985, 77 in 2005.

¹³ Coca-Cola collector Joyce Hill, profiled by Chris Allen Baker in the *Neshoba Democrat*, "Philadelphia [Mississippi] Woman Cherishes Coca-Cola," distributed by The Associated Press State and Local Wire, 20 June 2003.

- ¹⁴ J.C. Louis and Harvey Z. Yazjian, *The Cola Wars* (New York, 1980), 33.
- ¹⁵ Pendergrast, *For God, Country and Coca-Cola*, 442.
- ¹⁶ R. Hall, "The Growth and Development of Carbonated Soft Drinks," in *Formulation and Production of Carbonated Soft Drink*, ed. Alan J. Mitchell (London, 1990), 5.
- ¹⁷ Jasper Guy Woodroof and G. Frank Phillips, *Beverages: Carbonated and Noncarbonated*. Revised Edition. (Westport, 1981), vi.
- ¹⁸ Bob Garfield, "Misguided Nostalgia Obscures What's Really 'Real' About Coke," *Advertising Age*, 13 January 2003, 53.
- ¹⁹ Coca-Cola was the first non-human newsmaker placed on the cover of *Time* magazine. "The Sun Never Sets on Cocoola," *Time*, 15 May 1950, 28–32. Although company missteps and market trends have caused the estimated value of the Coke trademark to drop 20 percent in six years, to \$67 billion, Coca-Cola remains the most valued brand in the world. See "The Best Global Brands," *BusinessWeek*, 7 August 2006, accessed online 28 December 2006 <http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_32/b3996410.htm>.
- ²⁰ Wally Olins, *Corporate Identity: Making Business Strategy Visible Through Design* (London, 1989), 33.
- ²¹ Steven J. Heyer, "Keynote Remarks at the *Advertising Age* Madison + Vine Conference," 5 February 2003, Beverly Hills, CA, accessed 19 February 2003 <http://www2.coca-cola.com/presscenter/viewpoints_vineconference_include.html>.
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- ²⁶ Peter Zec, ed., *Mythos aus der Flasche: Coca-Cola Culture in 20. Jahrhundert* (Essen, 1994), 4.
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⁶⁴ Rudolf Kayser in *The Weimar Republic Sourcebook*, ed. Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, and Edward Dimendberg (Berkeley, 1994), 395.

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⁶⁶ Glenn Collins, "Coke Drops 'Domestic' and Goes One World," *New York Times*, 13 January 1996, 35.

⁶⁷ "Einem Phänomen auf der Spur," *Die Leistung* [Special edition on Coca-Cola] 13, Nr. 105 (1963), 3.

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fortune he has established the Halle Foundation to promote German-American understanding, and the Halle Institute for Global Learning at Emory University. For a profile of his career, see Jeanne Lukasick and Alan E. Wolf, "Hello, Goodbye: Exclusive Interviews with Coca-Cola International Soft Drinks' Retiring President Claus Halle and his Successor, John Georgas," *Beverage World International* (June 1989).

⁶⁹ Roberto C. Goizueta, "Globalization: A Soft Drink Perspective," *Executive Speeches*, September 1989.

⁷⁰ "Airbrushing of Culture," *Public Culture* (1989), 15.

⁷¹ Consider, "Brand names have become so ubiquitous that they provide an idiom of expression and resources for metaphor. With phrases like the Coca-Cola-ization of the Third World, the Cadillac® (or the Edsel) of stereo systems, meeting with the Birkenstock® contingent (or the Geritol® generation), we convey messages easily and economically." Rosemary J. Coombe, *The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties: Authorship, Appropriation, and the Law* (Durham, 1998), 57.

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⁷³ Alexander Abusch, "Die Geistige Coca-Kolonisierung—und der Friede," *Sonntag: Wochenzeitung für Kultur, Politik und Unterhaltung*, 22 January 1950, 2.

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⁷⁵ This synergy between the Golden Arches and The Real Thing was demonstrated when the German publisher translated the title of Benjamin Barber's 1995 bestseller *Jihad vs. McWorld* (New York, 1995) into *Coca-Cola und Heiliger Krieg* (Munich, 1996).

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⁷⁷ John Tomlinson, *Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction* (London, 1991).

⁷⁸ Kroes, *If You've Seen One, You've Seen the Mall*, 163–164. The model was coined by the Swedish anthropologist Ulf Hannerz. See his "American Culture, Creolized, Creolizing," in E. Asard, ed., *American Culture, Creolized, Creolizing*, 7–30 (Uppsala, 1988); "Culture between Center and Periphery: Toward a Macro-anthropology," *Ethnos* 54 (1989): 200–216; and *Cultural Complexity* (New York, 1992).

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⁸⁰ Jeff R. Schutts, "Born Again in the Gospel of Refreshment? Coca-Colonization and the Making of Postwar German Identity," in *Consuming Germany in the Cold War*, David Crew, ed. (New York, 2003), 142–143.

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MODERNIZATION À LA MODE: WEST GERMAN AND AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT PLANS FOR THE THIRD WORLD

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The research presented in this paper is part of a larger project entitled “How to Make Men Modern: Western Modernization and Development Policies vis-à-vis the Third World since 1945.” This paper will introduce some of the problems central to the project: decolonization and postcolonialism, modernization theory, Cold War politics, and development aid. It will also provide a short case study of an aid project in India to give insight into the complicated relationship between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany in the field of development politics in the late 1950s and early 1960s. At this point, I am concentrating on West German and American perspectives, but I do plan to integrate the perspectives and experiences of those who received development aid at a later stage.

I. Decolonization, the Cold War, and the Creation of the Third World¹

Decolonization—formally “the process whereby colonial powers transferred institutional and legal control over their territories and dependencies to indigenously based, formally sovereign, nation-states”²—played an extraordinarily important role in determining the world’s political course after 1945.³ As old empires were dismantled in the wake of World War II, new nations and alliances established themselves in parts of the world that for centuries had been marginalized as “periphery.” In everyday practice, decolonization was “a clutch of fitful activities and events, played out in conference rooms, acted out in protests mounted in city streets, fought over in jungles and mountains.”⁴ The effects of decolonization on the former colonies were sweeping, often dramatic, even though continuities to colonial times were strong: “The whole entity that the new leaders were trying to fill with their own content was a colonial construct: its borders, its capital city, its official language.”⁵ The newly gained independence posed at least as many problems as chances, seeing that “[t]he world was, quite simply, filled up. The postcolonial responsibility was essentially to undo the clutter: crowded cities, unemployment, trade imbalance, inefficient bureaucracies, insufficient educational establishments. And yet all such needful activities were largely constrained or

twisted by a global economic system itself undergoing major change."⁶ In this situation, new dependencies to the industrialized nations were difficult to avoid.

Very differently, decolonization presented the former colonial powers with grave challenges, too. On the economic level, they feared for their privileged access to resources, export markets, and the loss of financial advantages.⁷ On the socio-cultural level, they had to come to terms with the fact that their civilizing missions were no longer welcome and that their nations were reduced to their original territories. This implied a loss of power and status as well as a challenge to national identity.⁸ On the political level, the redistribution of international power and the creation of new sovereign entities led to an overall restructuring of the Eurocentric world. What came to be called the Third World was soon posing "a fundamental challenge to Western global dominance."⁹ But the evolution of the Third World—a political as well as a cultural construct—cannot sufficiently be explained by decolonization. The Third World was also a brainchild of the Cold War, which coincided with decolonization and intensified its inherent problems.¹⁰

The Cold War world was divided into two camps, both of which were driven by the effort to enlarge their respective spheres of ideological and political influence as well as their access to markets and natural resources. Above all, Arne Odd Westad argues, it was a competition over two concepts of modernity, one socialist, one capitalist, with both claiming universal validity.¹¹ Since the newly sovereign nations did not belong to either of the two blocs, their existence constituted a strategic and ideological vacuum. From the Western point of view informed by the domino theory, there was a danger that if one of the non-aligned nations became communist, the whole region would "fall" to communism.¹² Thus, the Soviet Union would gain the upper hand in the struggle for global power. Consequently, any communist effort to draw the non-aligned nations closer to the East was to be countered, and the West had to convince the African and Asian societies that it was in their interest to join forces with the free world. Backed by the belief in a historical mission to support independence movements and to promote American civilization, intervention into Third World countries became an integral part of American foreign policy during the Cold War.¹³

Building nations and establishing democratic, capitalist, modern structures in the developing regions gained in importance after the Conference of Bandung (1955), the largest meeting of the newly independent nations and those struggling for independence. Bandung was not only proof of Afro-Asian solidarity but also of the evolution of the non-aligned movement, whose members tried to stay independent from both East and West.¹⁴ In American eyes, neutrality was acceptable as long as it was

stringently anticommunist.¹⁵ But since communism was defined as “any resistance to Third World governments that swore allegiance to capitalism, democracy, and an alliance with the United States,” the perceived need to intervene clearly increased.¹⁶ From the consensus-liberal perspective that dominated political thinking in the postwar era, modernization theory seemed to allow for such interventions to be nonviolent, peaceful, and constructive.

II. Modernization Theory and Development Aid

Modernization theory, developed by American social scientists in the mid-1950s, believed in the existence of a linear path from tradition to modernity that every society could, and should, take.¹⁷ In order to become modern, one would have to discard traditions and embrace rational, objective norms and values supposedly free of ideology. Under the influence of the Cold War, the belief in the intellectual superiority of the West and the inferiority of traditional lifestyles helped to construct a picture of the Third World that strongly differed from, and seemed to threaten, everything the West believed in. The danger of societies remaining traditional and falling prey to communism appeared so great that it was deemed imperative to transform them to modernity by encouraging their economic development. According to Walt W. Rostow, the most popular proponent of modernization theory, once a country had reached a certain economic stage, it would automatically progress toward modernity—modernity meaning the democratic, capitalist nation-state embodied by the United States. To further this process, the already-modern nations had a duty to help the backward societies reach the level from which “take-off” would begin.¹⁸ Consequently, economic and technical aid played a central role in the modernization scheme, making foreign interventions into Third World nations’ domestic politics appear as philanthropic missions. And since Rostow and others had close connections to the American administrations, many of their recommendations concerning Third World politics were put into practice. In the 1950s, the U.S. government and philanthropic foundations, “as a nonofficial extension of U.S. policy,” began to invest huge amounts of money in Third World countries to encourage their economies’ growth and kick off modernization.¹⁹

Development aid, as it came to be called, promised to help those in need, to contain communism peacefully, and to establish Western norms of modernity in the “backward” areas of the world. In many cases, “deep cultural biases . . . conditioned U.S. attitudes toward non-Western societies and leaders—attitudes that abounded with dismissive stereotypes regarding the presumably effete, emotional, unstable, and, above all, in-

ferior nature of Third World peoples."²⁰ Thus, one had to win their "hearts and minds" for the cause of modernity. This became one of the central goals of American foreign policy—via cultural exchanges, films, exhibitions, and sports events.²¹ Neither the need for modernization nor the assumption that every developing nation wanted to become a Western-style nation-state was truly questioned, and modernization theory's inherent teleology seems to have been largely ignored.

West German observers were greatly interested in American modernization schemes, and they eagerly read Rostow's writings. They, too, believed in the need to modernize the decolonized regions by applying Western methods and standards. In fact, the Federal Republic, which was believed to "lack" a colonial past and therefore to have easier access to the decolonized nations than the other European powers, became a prominent player in this endeavor—although West Germany had just overcome its very own anti-modern, anti-Western prejudices. In this sense, the Cold War served as a catalyst that promoted Western-style modernity across national borders. Yet despite agreement that change toward modernity and, consequently, external interventions were necessary, American and West German methods of bringing about change differed. West German development aid always remained distinctly German, especially by relying on private investments and concepts like cooperative societies and the "social market economy."²² Also, reservations toward American-style modernity and the United States' pragmatic, Cold War-determined approach to development aid seem to have caused conflict within the transatlantic "alliance for modernity."

In retrospect, we often seem to believe that the Cold War, Adenauer's eagerness to integrate the Federal Republic into the West, and the American appreciation of West Germany's usefulness as an ally resulted in an extraordinarily solid partnership that withstood domestic and international disputes. Yet West German-American differences concerning methods and measures of development aid, and, more broadly, the adequate type of modernity for the Third World burdened the two countries' relationship. Hence, it does not seem to be true that "Bonn's [development] policies merely represented faithful support for the role assigned to the Third World within the post-war framework designed by the West."²³ Unquestionably, the Federal Republic did subordinate itself to the Western alliance, with the Cold War transcending many national interests. But that does not mean that it gave up its political ideals or its ambition to influence the course of international politics. No matter how strong the influence of the Cold War, it did not fully neutralize nations' beliefs in their historical and cultural individuality. Consequently, each nation projected its own expectations onto other parts of the world. Thus,

what has been called the “Americanization” of the West might have to be analyzed more closely to recognize the divergences that remained alive beneath the common rhetoric of Western modernization and integration. Development politics offer a gateway to this phenomenon.

III. West Germany and the Third World in the Context of the Cold War

In the late 1950s, West German observers were convinced that the Federal Republic’s political, economic, and cultural efforts in Africa and Asia were insufficient: They neither kept communism at bay nor strengthened the position of the West. At the same time, communist activities in the decolonized regions intensified. As soon as a former colony became independent, the U.S.S.R. initiated a multifaceted program of financial and technical aid, goodwill missions, and cultural exchanges. Its representatives approached the indigenous societies respectfully, studied local languages and cultures, took serious interest in everyday problems, offered (and actually gave) generous material aid, and distributed professionally designed information—propaganda in the Western view—about the Soviet Union and communism, Bonn’s embassies reported.²⁴ In sharp contrast to the Soviets, most West German diplomats lived gated lives, had little contact with the general population, showed little interest in their host cultures (about which they often had strong, sometimes racist prejudices), and concentrated their public outreach—academic booklets about the Oder-Neisse line and the like—on the local elites.

Convinced that the U.S.S.R. was trying to expel Western European influences from Africa and to integrate the continent into the communist bloc in order to promote world revolution, members of the Foreign Service in the late 1950s demanded that the Federal Republic work harder “to win the developing peoples of Africa over for our intellectual orientation and to offer them practical advice on how to solve their economic and sociological problems.”²⁵ Interestingly, American observers in the State Department thought that their West German colleagues were exaggerating the “communist threat” in the Third World. Marxist theory did possess some potential to explain the Third World’s inequalities, making it attractive to some, they conceded. But they were convinced that “our basic cause is so superior to that of the Soviets that our credibility should grow, whereas the contradiction between Soviet theory and practice will be more revealed with the passage of time.”²⁶ Sooner or later, the developing countries would turn away from communism and join the West, they believed.

But even if one shared this pragmatic optimism, it did not seem advisable to allow the Soviet Union to become overly popular and pre-

vent the West from pursuing its legitimate interests in the Third World, observers on both sides of the Atlantic agreed. For the Federal Republic this meant that its public outreach should follow a less elitist, more practical approach—without ever entering into a competition with the U.S.S.R., of course.²⁷ In trying to anchor Western principles in African societies, West German diplomats should make better use of the colonial legacies in the fields of language, religion, culture, law, and administration, the Foreign Office recommended.²⁸ Christian missions, which the decolonized societies regarded much less suspiciously than government institutions, could function as “bastions of the West,” “immunize the people against communism,” and “support the developing countries’ attempts to improve their intellectual and social levels.”²⁹ In addition, the “materialistic attitude [of many in the Third World], especially of the Blacks” seemed to hold the possibility of winning the developing countries’ sympathies by offering them goods the Eastern bloc could not afford.³⁰

Development aid was the “natural” instrument for realizing these goals. To be sure, some bureaucrats in the West German ministries warned that aid to the Third World must not be exploited but must remain an end in itself and be used only as the first step toward self-help [*Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe*].³¹ They argued that it was at least as important to convince the developing societies that liberty, individualism, and capitalism were morally superior to totalitarianism, collectivism, and planned economies as it was to keep up with Soviet levels of aid. But the Soviet dual promise of rapid industrialization and social justice was hard to counter, and concepts like “freedom” and “democracy” were much too abstract to attract immediate enthusiasm from societies that at this point had much more urgent problems to solve. In this situation, development aid, as a “show and tell” approach under the umbrella of philanthropy, was seen as the best way of exporting Western values to the non-aligned countries. Goodwill campaigns like the donation of mobile hospitals to newly independent nations,³² the invitation of local elites to the Federal Republic,³³ financial aid for schools and hospitals,³⁴ and the delegation of agricultural, engineering, and medical experts to developing countries³⁵ soon became regular elements of West German development politics.

IV. What to Give and How to Help: Concepts of Foreign Aid

Development aid was taken seriously in the Federal Republic’s ministries, and many of the bureaucrats involved tried hard to further what they thought was in the best interest of the developing nations. Aid should be given with regard to the receivers’ needs instead of being instrumentalized in the donor nations’ interests, they urged. The latter seemed to be true of U.S. aid to developing countries, as the West German

OECE representative stated in 1961. Whereas the U.S. government portrayed its aid as purely philanthropic, he was convinced that most of it was being allocated according to American military and economic interests.³⁶ To some degree, such criticism was part of the effort to counter American demands that the FRG spend more money on foreign aid and liberalize its conditions of granting money, credits, and material to developing countries. Citing the Federal Republic's remarkable export surplus, the U.S. government in the late 1950s and early 1960s continuously increased its pressure on West Germany to contribute a larger share to the alliance's cause in the Third World.³⁷ The FRG eventually fell in line, and by the early 1960s it was one of the leading donors of development aid worldwide. Already by the late 1950s, West German aid had surpassed American aid as a percentage of GDP.³⁸

Still, the administration continued to argue that it was irrational to spend money too freely or on a multinational level, and that it made much more sense to give aid to individual nations for specific projects that could be controlled and evaluated. Bonn's development experts were also critical of American measures that aimed to enable Third World nations to stabilize their export rates. In practice, this meant buying large quantities of raw materials or agricultural produce from developing countries at fixed prices. While such measures brought short-term relief to the producers, they carried the danger of creating structural disadvantages and requiring long-term commitments from the donor nations, West German officials argued.³⁹ Similarly, they did not believe in the American policy of stockpiling natural resources for fear that it would damage local producers in the long run.⁴⁰ In general, the FRG's economic and financial aid guidelines can be characterized as conservative in the sense that they emphasized the need to promote sustainable development. They were progressive in acknowledging the interdependencies between economic, financial, political, and social conditions of underdevelopment. Overall, West German development experts regarded aid not primarily as a means of change but as a catalyst to initialize change.⁴¹

This positive assessment of West German development aid and the high degree of theoretical thinking it was based on should not suggest, though, that the Federal Republic's development policy was solely dedicated to improving the living standard of the Third World nations.⁴² The large bureaucratic apparatus—a result of continuous inter-ministerial power-struggles—and the complicated process of granting aid prevented the West German programs from being truly efficient.⁴³ The founding of the Ministry for Economic Cooperation in 1961 was, in part, a reaction to this situation. But the new ministry's establishment and its attempt to centralize development policies did not bring about significant change

because, for a long time, it did not succeed in coming up with a coherent development policy.⁴⁴

This lack of coherence was largely due to the Foreign Office's argument that foreign aid was a diplomatic instrument that must be employed with utmost flexibility.⁴⁵ Accusing the Ministry for Economic Cooperation of an "addiction to general planning [*Generalplanungssucht*]," the Foreign Office argued that committing the Federal Republic to a specific concept of aid or to certain regions as focal points of aid would undermine the political usefulness of development aid. Those countries that supported the FRG's position on the "German Question" should be rewarded with increased aid, while those that questioned or counteracted it risked being sanctioned. Obviously, the Foreign Office supported foreign aid not for philanthropic reasons but as a measure "useful to foreign policy."⁴⁶ While this utility was greatest vis-à-vis the developing countries, it also held the chance to improve the Federal Republic's standing in the world and within the Western alliance, especially with the United States. West German development activities in India may serve as a case in point.

V. Competing for Influence: American and West German Aid to India

Having become independent in 1947, India, though one of the poorest countries in Southeast Asia, held great strategic importance in the Cold War world due to its location, size, and economic potential, especially vis-à-vis communist China.⁴⁷ Jawaharlal Nehru, India's charismatic leader who became the spokesperson of the non-aligned movement, was anxious to maintain the country's autonomy while creating a "modern India." Consequently, both the United States and the Soviet Union tried to persuade Nehru of the superiority of their respective courses toward modernity. The West faced the difficult task of countering the Soviet promise of "turning an agricultural nation into an industrial powerhouse . . . in less than a generation."⁴⁸ This challenged the United States to come up with a competitive development policy that also projected Indian industrialization within a short period of time while preventing its turn away from capitalism. When the Indian economy began to struggle in 1957-58, the risk of "losing" India to communism seemed greater than ever. Consequently, the U.S. government offered India an aid package of \$225 million and organized a World Bank consortium to support the country. Parallel to this effort, the Ford Foundation gave a large grant to MIT's Center for International Studies, calling on its economic experts, including Walt W. Rostow, to design a development plan that would surpass the Soviet model.⁴⁹

The Ford Foundation had dealt with India before: In the early 1950s it had invested several million dollars into integrated rural development projects that promoted social reform while increasing agricultural production. Its goal was to break "the cycle of rural poverty marked by increasing population, inequitable distribution of land, and low-yielding agricultural practices."⁵⁰ But by the late 1950s, new social-scientific concepts like modernization theory, which took into account technological and scientific advancements and drew on the latest sociological and economic findings, made such approaches look rather old-fashioned. From the perspective of many of the young, ambitious experts involved, promoting structural change in rural areas could hardly compete with the highflying plan to fully industrialize India within a few decades with the help of modern technology.

In the meantime, the Federal Republic had turned its attention to India, too. West German economic interests in India had been strong ever since the FRG's postwar economic boom had set in. Offering India credits and industrial loans was regarded as the best way of helping the West German economy to gain a foothold on the continent in order to "open up" its markets to exports "made in Germany."⁵¹ This was one of the motives for the Federal Republic to grant India \$1.5 million of its \$12.5 million development fund in 1959–60. The grant's official aim was to further India's industrialization, but the West German embassy in India neatly captured the larger idea behind it by stating: "In adapting the thesis 'The trade follows the flag,' one could now say 'Trade follows technical help.'"⁵² What made India even more interesting was the prospect that it might be an oil-rich country. Accordingly, in 1957–58 the Foreign Office paid a team of seismic experts to search for oil in India, hoping not only for an economic payoff but also for a boost to the Federal Republic's international prestige if its team found oil before the Soviets did.⁵³ Clearly, Cold War and economic interests went hand in hand in shaping West Germany's policy toward India.⁵⁴

This is not to say that economic considerations always determined West German development aid policy. In the case of the Federal Republic's sponsoring the establishment of model villages in India in the early 1960s, political and ideological motives clearly dominated. The village project's goal was to increase agricultural productivity, raise the general level of income, level social discrepancies, and solve the perceived problem of "overpopulation." These efforts responded to the problem of rural populations leaving their villages for the cities, where observers feared they were likely to become "proletarianized." In order to prevent revolts rooted in the unjust distribution of property and inspired by socialist propaganda, a new socio-economic order was believed necessary. Cooperative societies seemed to hold a solution: As burden-sharing arrange-

ments, they allowed for more efficient agricultural production and greater, more equal wealth while fully embracing the principles of private property and individual achievement.⁵⁵

Otto Schiller became one of the most prominent advocates of cooperative societies for the decolonized regions in the postwar era. Prior to 1945, he had concentrated on Russia, arguing that the Bolshevik Revolution could have been prevented if the czarist regime had initiated property reforms in time and thereby alleviated conflict within Russian society. After World War II, Schiller transferred his models onto Southeast Asia, whose conditions he found to be similar to Russia's.⁵⁶ Working for the United Nations' Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), he built model villages in Pakistan in the 1950s, finally realizing the plans originally produced for Russia. The Foreign Office supported his work because his efforts to "support systematically the agricultural progress of small farms through corporative measures" perfectly complemented the FAO's village aid project, which promoted "general progress on the social, hygienic, communal and educational levels." In the eyes of the ministry, this double effort was the best way of countering the communist model's attraction because it helped the decolonized countries develop the "intellectual and moral [*sittlichen*] capacities necessary for a constructive and progressive solution to their difficult agricultural problems."⁵⁷

In 1961, Schiller became advisor to a five-year agricultural development project in India that the Federal Republic funded with nearly \$2 million.⁵⁸ The project's goal was to increase agricultural productivity and improve living standards in order to keep the population in the rural areas. It was informed by the community development concept, which argued that modernizing agricultural and economic techniques without modernizing the people involved would ultimately fail.⁵⁹ The search for an adequate region in which to set up the model village proved difficult, not least because American development experts were involved with similar projects in India. In 1960, the Ford Foundation had started its Intensive Agricultural District and Community Development Programs, very similar in design to the West German project.⁶⁰ While the West Germans were looking for a model district, their American colleagues had already chosen districts in which the preconditions for agricultural modernization seemed encouraging. This meant that the Federal Republic had to pick from the "left-over" areas that were not as well suited for a successful experiment. Another advantage on the American side was that the Ford Foundation paid for artificial fertilizer, which improved the chances that agricultural output would be increased at a significant rate within a short time.⁶¹

Finally, the West Germans decided on the district Mandi in the northwestern part of Himachal Pradesh, which they believed to hold the high-

est chances for success compared to the American projects.⁶² Due to this competitive notion, they were greatly interested in the Ford Foundation's program. The FRG's embassy in New Delhi sent a copy of the agreement between the foundation and the Indian government to Bonn, along with a detailed analysis of the American program. This information was supposed to help the Federal Republic come up with "its very specific," characteristically German project for India.⁶³ Whereas the Ford Foundation's expert traveled from site to site, the West Germans were to work directly in the village for longer periods of time, which it was hoped would give them greater influence on its development. Structurally, they planned to transfer the traditional German agricultural model—the mixed-economy family farm, with intensive tillage and gardening in addition to dairy and livestock farming—to India and adapt it to the local conditions. Seeing that, over a period of eight years, the Ford Foundation had spent \$40 million in India on fertilizer, pesticides, laboratory equipment, and vehicles, the Federal Republic would have to be truly generous, the embassy emphasized. But it was clear that the FRG could not match the foundation's practice of paying for half of the salaries for the Indian personnel, which resulted in "a certain financial dependence" of the Indian key personnel on the foundation. To make up for West Germany's lack of direct control over the Indian personnel, the embassy recommended that Bonn's program include a bonus system that would encourage the Indians to work hard. This would increase the chances that the project would succeed, thereby improving the FRG's prestige.⁶⁴

This episode gives an idea of the degree to which the urge to help India's rural population improve its living standard was overshadowed by the Federal Republic's competition with the United States (despite, or parallel to, a rather close coordination of general foreign aid issues).⁶⁵ Since the FRG could not afford "magic" help like artificial fertilizers to speed modernization, its development experts had to come up with cheaper alternatives that relied more heavily on structural, long-term changes. And while there can be no doubt that the U.S. experts genuinely wanted to do good in India, it seems clear that they also saw a chance to achieve spectacular successes that would persuade the global public that the United States was the most progressive society and would win the competition with the East within due time.

VI. Conclusion

As this overview has shown, Western development aid to the Third World during the Cold War has to be understood in terms of a bundle of extremely divergent motives. These included the First World's honest wish to help the poor increase their living standards and achieve greater indi-

vidual and political freedom; the attempt to secure one's access to raw materials and markets; the attraction of trying out social scientific models in the Third World "laboratory"; the effort to contain communism, strengthen the West, and stabilize democracy; the wish to increase one's international prestige; and the belief in one's responsibility to share with the world one's real or imagined national achievements and to ease the new nations' way to (the right kind of) modernity. Semantically and methodologically, these efforts often bore a striking resemblance to the "civilizing missions" of colonial times.⁶⁶

The case study of Western aid to India suggests that one cannot blame the Cold War and economic instrumentalization of development aid alone for the overall failure of Western development policy in the Third World. Internal competition within the Western alliance, too, kept development aid from being truly effective. Looking at the Federal Republic's struggle to keep up with American development politics and its desperate efforts to improve its international reputation, one could argue that West Germany's engagement in the Third World served as a means to reinvent a national identity that, after World War II, was so laden with negative associations that a new, constructive relationship to international politics was indispensable. Many West Germans seemed to believe that their country, despite its recent "lapse" into genocide, was entitled to embark on a "civilizing mission" in the Third World. Thus, participating in international development politics might also have served as a means of re-establishing the country's reputation as a trustworthy, respectable power. Simultaneously, turning one's attention to Africa and Asia and fantasizing about a new sphere of influence abroad might have eased the discarding of German imperial dreams.⁶⁷ Finally, the Federal Republic's attempts to improve its standing vis-à-vis the United States—its most dependable, yet most demanding ally—are proof of the difficulties it encountered in accepting American seniority and in coming to terms with its ultimately belonging to the West.

Notes

¹ On the relevance of the Cold War to the Third World and vice versa, see Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge, 2005).

² Prasenjit Duara, "Introduction: The Decolonization of Asia and Africa in the Twentieth Century," in *Decolonization: Perspectives from Now and Then*, ed. Prasenjit Duara (London, 2004), 1–18, 2.

³ The literature on decolonization is as vast as the range of approaches. An overview is provided by Dietmar Rothermund, *Delhi, 15. August 1947: Das Ende kolonialer Herrschaft*, 2d edition (Munich, 1999). Duara, *Decolonization* presents contemporary writings by African and Asian leaders of decolonization as well as historical interpretations of decolonization from the last fifty years. Duara's introduction deals with the experience of decolonization by the decolonized; Duara, ed., *Decolonization*, 1–18. Also see the overview by Mike Mason, *Development and Disorder: A History of the Third World since 1945* (Hanover, NH, 1997).

⁴ Raymond F. Betts, *Decolonization*, 2d edition (New York, 1998), 1.

⁵ Westad, *Global Cold War*, 90. Also see Rothermund, *Delhi*, 247–254.

⁶ Betts, *Decolonization*, 66.

⁷ In his book *The Decolonization of Africa* (Athens, OH, 1995), David Birmingham stresses the colonial powers' national economic interests. See Birmingham, *Decolonization*, 89. On the economic aspects of India's decolonization, see Rothermund, *Delhi*, 34–37. Betts pays less attention to political parties and international accords than "to environment and atmosphere, to the sense of place, space, and perspective." Betts, *Decolonization*, 3.

⁸ For case studies on decolonization from the colonial powers' perspectives, see Wolfgang J. Mommsen, ed., *Das Ende der Kolonialreiche: Dekolonisation und die Politik der Großmächte* (Frankfurt am Main, 1990). On the domestic process of decolonization in Great Britain, see Gerhard Altmann, *Abschied vom Empire: Die innere Dekolonisation Großbritanniens, 1945–1985, Moderne Zeit 8* (Göttingen, 2005).

⁹ Robert J. McMahon, "Introduction: The Challenge of the Third World," in *Empire and Revolution: The United States and the Third World since 1945*, ed. Peter L. Hahn and Mary Ann Heiss (Columbus, OH, 2001), 1–14, 1. Without ignoring the multiple ideological overtones of terms like "Third World," "backward nations," "developing countries," "less-developed countries," "development," "modernity," and "modernization," they are used in this paper without specifically labeling them.

¹⁰ Carl E. Pletsch, "The Three Worlds, or the Division of Social Scientific Labor, circa 1950–1975," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 23/4 (1981): 565–590. On the Third World as a cultural and ideological construct, see Mason, *Development and Disorder*, chapter 1.

¹¹ Westad, *Global Cold War*, 4f: "Locked in conflict over the very concept of European modernity—to which both states regarded themselves as successors—Washington and Moscow needed to change the world in order to prove the universal applicability of their ideologies, and the elites of the newly independent states proved fertile ground for their competition. By helping to expand the domains of freedom or of social justice, both powers saw themselves as assisting natural trends in world history and as defending their own security at the same time. Both saw a specific mission in and for the Third World that only their own state could carry out and which without their involvement would flounder in local hands."

¹² See Frank Ninkovich, *Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago, 1994).

¹³ See Westad, *Global Cold War*, 22–32; Marc Frey, "Indoktrination, Entwicklungspolitik und 'State Building': Die Vereinigten Staaten in Südostasien 1945–1961," in *Zivilisierungsmissionen: Imperiale Weltverbesserung seit dem 18. Jahrhundert, Historische Kulturwissenschaft* 6, ed. Boris Barth and Jürgen Osterhammel (Konstanz, 2005), 335–362.

¹⁴ See Betts, *Decolonization*, 43f; Westad, *Global Cold War*, 99–103; Rothermund, *Delhi*, 187–195. On the further development and eventual failure of the non-aligned movement, see Rothermund, *Delhi*, 195–210; Westad, *Global Cold War*, 103–107; Walther L. Bernecker, *Port Harcourt, 10. November 1995: Aufbruch und Elend in der Dritten Welt* (Munich, 1997), 190–200.

¹⁵ H. W. Brands argues that the Truman and Eisenhower administrations' politics vis-à-vis neutralist countries were driven by geopolitical pragmatism, not by ideology: "If the neutralist actions of a particular country worked to the advantage of the United States, that country deserved, and usually received, American support. If a neutralist country challenged American interests, opposition was the rule." H. W. Brands, *The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947–1960* (New York, 1989), 308.

¹⁶ Westad, *Global Cold War*, 119.

¹⁷ On American modernization theory, see Michael E. Latham, "Modernization," in *The Modern Social Sciences, The Cambridge History of Science* 7, ed. Theodore M. Porter and Dorothy Ross (Cambridge, 2003), 721–734; Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore, 2003); Michael E. Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill, 2000).

For a comprehensive overview, see Westad, *Global Cold War*, 32–38. For an analysis of modernization theories from a German historiographical and methodological perspective, see Thomas Mergel, “Geht es weiterhin voran? Die Modernisierungstheorie auf dem Weg zu einer Theorie der Moderne,” in *Geschichte zwischen Kultur und Gesellschaft: Beiträge zur Theoriedebatte*, ed. Thomas Mergel and Thomas Welskopp (Munich, 1997), 203–232.

¹⁸ See Walt W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge, 1960). On Rostow’s theory, see Mark H. Haefele, “Walt Rostow’s Stages of Economic Growth: Ideas and Actions,” in *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War*, ed. David C. Engerman and others (Amherst, 2003), 81–103.

¹⁹ Gary R. Hess, “Waging the Cold War in the Third World: The Foundations and the Challenges of Development,” in *Charity, Philanthropy, and Civility in American History*, ed. Lawrence J. Friedman and Mark D. McGarvie (Cambridge, 2003), 319–339, 324.

²⁰ McMahon, “Introduction,” 12.

²¹ See the essays in David C. Engerman et al., eds., *Staging Growth*, and Frey, “Indoktrination, Entwicklungspolitik und ‘State Building.’”

²² Agrarian and development expert Otto Schiller called for a “modern economic order . . . which is better than the Eastern economic system but also better than what we have inherited from the 19th century under the token of capitalism.” Letter from Schiller to George F. Kennan, August 6, 1954, Archiv des Instituts für Osteuropäische Geschichte und Landeskunde Tübingen, Ordner “J-K von 1954.”

²³ Brigitte H. Schulz, *Development Policy in the Cold War Era: The Two Germanies and Sub-Saharan Africa, 1960–1985*, Die DDR und die Dritte Welt 3 (Münster, 1995), 52.

²⁴ See, for example, a report on the Soviet Union’s activities and consequent success in Ethiopia. Memorandum by the West German embassy in Addis Ababa, “Zusammenfassende Berichterstattung über die politische, wirtschaftliche und kulturelle Aktivität des Ostblocks in Äthiopien, Verschlussache—Nur für den Dienstgebrauch,” August 11, 1959, Politisches Archiv (PA), B 12/357.

²⁵ 702-86.00-749/59 (Hoffmann), Memorandum “Politisch-strategische Konzeption der Sowjetpolitik gegenüber den sog. unabhängigen und unterentwickelten Ländern,” October 1, 1959, PA, B 12/340. See also the memorandum by the West German embassy in Conakry, “Zusammenfassende Berichterstattung über die politische, wirtschaftliche und kulturelle Aktivität des Ostblocks,” December 11, 1959, PA, B 12/357.

²⁶ Memorandum “German Foreign Office Analysis of Soviet Strategy and Prospects in the Underdeveloped Areas. Confidential,” undated [1960], PA, B 12/340. This observation supports John Kent’s statement that the Americans “did not see an actual communist threat from within” Africa but were concerned about “the potential threat from Soviet-inspired communism, which they always saw as likely to increase.” John Kent, “The United States and the Decolonization of Black Africa, 1945–63,” in *The United States and Decolonization: Power and Freedom*, ed. David Ryan and Victor Puongong (New York, 2000), 168–187, 175.

²⁷ See the report by the West German embassy in Conakry, “Gesteigerte Aktivität des Ostblocks in Guinea,” January 11, 1960, and the letter from the West German embassy in Addis Ababa to the Foreign Office, March 25, 1960, PA, B 12/357.

²⁸ See Referat 408 (LR I Graf von Posadowsky-Wehner), Memorandum “Aktivität des Sowjetblocks und Gegenmaßnahmen,” draft, November 23, 1959, PA, B 12/356.

²⁹ Abteilung 7 (Duckwitz), Memorandum “Die Lage der Bundesrepublik angesichts der weltweiten Aktivität des Ostblocks,” March 10, 1960, PA, B 12/356.

³⁰ Referat 702, “Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse der Konferenz der Missionschefs der BRD in Afrika (Addis Abeba, 12. bis 18. Oktober 1959) durch den Herrn Staatssekretär,” October 22, 1959, PA, B 12/340. The author continued by saying that he did not believe that it was true that this materialism made “the negro more susceptible to communism than to capitalism.”

³¹ See Abteilung 7 (Duckwitz), Memorandum “Die Lage der Bundesrepublik angesichts der weltweiten Aktivität des Ostblocks,” March 10, 1960, PA, B 12/356.

³² For example, Cameroon, Togo, Nigeria, and Somalia, all of which became independent in 1960, received a "Clinomobil" each from the Federal Republic. Clinomobils cost about \$32,500 each, which the Foreign Office paid for out of its development fund. See 307-82.50-90.-669/59, Memorandum "Entwicklungshilfe für die im Jahre 1960 unabhängig werdenden Staaten Afrikas," September 2, 1959, PA, B 34/123.

³³ For example, in 1958 the Federal Republic was hosting five interns from Liberia, two from Sudan, two from Ghana, one from British West Africa, and ten from Ethiopia, and there were offers for thirty-seven more internships, all paid for by the Federal Ministry of Economics and the Foreign Office. See letter from Referat 407 to Referat 307, "Praktikanten südlich der Sahara," September 20, 1958, PA, B 34/123.

³⁴ In 1959/60, technical aid for the newly independent states included \$250,000 for a cocoa-planters' school in Cameroon, \$275,000 for sending three medical doctors to Togo and for supporting a vocational training center there, \$200,000 for hospital equipment and the delegation of three medical doctors to Nigeria, and \$200,000 for the delegation of expert teams to Somaliland. See 307-82.50-90.-669/59, Memorandum "Entwicklungshilfe für die im Jahre 1960 unabhängig werdenden Staaten Afrikas," September 2, 1959, PA, B 34/123.

³⁵ A specialist for cattle breeding was sent to Guinea in 1958 in order to help the economically weak state and to counter East German engagement there. Concerns about possible conflicts with Guinea's former colonial power, France, were regarded as less important than the strengthening of the Federal Republic's position on the "German question." See Leiter Abteilung 4, VLR Dumke, Memorandum "Wirtschaftliche Förderungsmaßnahmen für die Republik Guinea," November 21, 1958, PA, B 58, Abt. 8/14.

³⁶ See the letter from the FRG's Representative at the OECDE to the Foreign Office, "Internationale Lastenverteilung bei der Entwicklungshilfe," March 17, 1961, PA, B 58/115.

³⁷ See, among others, Grewe, Cable (encoded) from Washington, Citissime, No. 2044, September 27, 1960, copy, Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BAK), B 102/67069. The West German ambassador here gave an account of discussions he had had with American and British politicians, among them U.S. Secretary of State Anderson. See also Heide-Irene Schmidt, "Pushed to the Front: The Foreign Assistance Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1958-1971," *Contemporary European History* 12/4 (2003): 473-507.

³⁸ Schmidt, "Pushed to the Front," 479. In 1962, the FRG was spending 1.06 percent of its gross national product on foreign aid, which put it in fifth position behind the Netherlands, France, Belgium, and Great Britain, yet in front of the United States and Canada. See Referat 6 (Dr. Praß), Memorandum "Aufwendungen der Bundesrepublik und einiger wichtiger Nato-Staaten für Verteidigung und Entwicklungshilfe im Vergleich zum Bruttosozialprodukt und zum Haushalt," January 6, 1962, Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (ACDP), Nachlaß Karl Friedrich Vialon (I-475), 015/11. West German public aid had increased from DM 1,321 million between 1950 and 1955 to DM 4,845 million between 1956 and 1959; in 1960, expenditures reached DM 938.8 million, DM 1,464.2 million in 1961, and DM 1,627.5 million in 1962. Manfred Glagow and Andreas Stucke, "Die Etablierung des Bundesministeriums für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (BMZ) und die Rolle seiner Gründungsmitglieder 1961-1963: Personelle Gestaltungsräume bei der Herausbildung administrativer Strukturen," in *Das Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (BMZ): Entstehungszusammenhang, Personalpolitik, Steuerungsfähigkeit*, ed. Manfred Glagow, Wilfried Gotsch, and Andreas Stucke (Pfaffenweiler, 1989), 1-90, 25.

³⁹ See "Entwurf für eine kurze Ansprache des Herrn Minister anlässlich der konstituierenden Sitzung des Wissenschaftlichen Beirates," May 10, 1963, BAK, B 213/7021. See also II A/1—E 6435—159/63, Memorandum "Entwicklungspolitische Grundsätze zur Handelshilfe," draft, April 2, 1963, ACDP, Nachlaß Gerhard Fritz (I-289), 006/1.

⁴⁰ See Unterabteilung I A, I A 3—2090/58, Memorandum "Förderung und Stabilisierung der Rohstoffimporte im Interesse der Entwicklungsländer," copy, October 1, 1958, BAK, B 102/55804. On international efforts to stabilize prices for raw materials and to liberalize the terms of trade in favor of the Third World, see Bernecker, *Port Harcourt*, 34-60.

⁴¹ Schmidt, "Pushed to the Front," 475–478.

⁴² See John White, *German Aid: A Survey of the Sources, Policy and Structure of German Aid* (London, 1965). Cited in Schmidt, "Pushed to the Front," 474.

⁴³ See, for example, the critique in the letter from V A 4 a to Herrn Unterabteilungsleiter V, "Hilfe an Entwicklungsländer—Aufsplitterung der Zuständigkeiten bei der technischen Hilfe auf die einzelnen Ressorts," draft, June 19, 1959, BAK, B 102/7100. Due to the complex nature of development policy, it continues to be a field in which a large number of institutions are involved. See Franz Nuscheler, *Entwicklungspolitik*, Lizenzausgabe der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (Bonn, 2005), 433ff and 455. On the multiple levels and complicated mechanisms of public aid granting, see Bastian Hein, *Die Westdeutschen und die Dritte Welt: Entwicklungspolitik und Entwicklungsdienste zwischen Reform und Revolte 1959–1974, Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte* 65 (Munich, 2005), 40–60.

⁴⁴ On the founding and organization of the BMZ, see Glagow, Gotsch and Stucke, *Das Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (BMZ)*.

⁴⁵ See, for example, 801–80.00, Aide-Memoire "Aufgaben des Auswärtigen Amtes auf dem Gebiet der Entwicklungshilfe," January 25, 1962, ACDP, Nachlaß Vialon (I-475), 015/10. The author of this memorandum stressed the importance of foreign aid as a means of realizing the FRG's foreign policy goals and of improving the country's standing within the Western alliance.

⁴⁶ Dg III B (Mdg Dr. Rolf Pauls), Memorandum "Verhältnis von Außen- und Entwicklungspolitik," January 16, 1965, PA, B 34/628. On German-German competition in the Third World, see Schulz, *Development Policy in the Cold War Era*; Hans-Joachim Spanger and Lothar Brock, eds., *Die beiden deutschen Staaten in der Dritten Welt: Die Entwicklungspolitik der DDR—eine Herausforderung für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland?* (Opladen, 1987); Ulf Engel and Hans-Georg Schleicher, *Die beiden deutschen Staaten in Afrika: Zwischen Konkurrenz und Koexistenz, 1949–1990* (Hamburg, 1998). On the GDR's engagement in the Third World, see Jude Howell, "The End of an Era: The Rise and Fall of GDR Aid," in *Journal of Modern African Studies* 32/2 (1994): 305–328; Haile Gabriel Dague, *Das entwicklungspolitische Engagement der DDR in Äthiopien* (Münster, 2004).

⁴⁷ On India's economic development since 1947, see D. K. Fieldhouse, *The West and the Third World: Trade, Colonialism, Dependence and Development* (Oxford, 1999), 298–314.

⁴⁸ David C. Engerman, "West Meets East: The Center for International Studies and Indian Economic Development," in *Staging Growth*, ed. David C. Engerman et al., 199–223, 209 and 204.

⁴⁹ Engerman, "West Meets East," 212.

⁵⁰ Hess, "Waging the Cold War in the Third World," 319. The pilot project, the Etawah Project, was initiated and conceptualized by Albert Mayer, an American architect and urban planner who had worked on housing reforms during the New Deal and turned his attention to India and rural development after the war. See his account of the Etawah Project: Albert Mayer et al., *Pilot Project, India: The Story of Rural Development at Etawah, Uttar Pradesh* (Berkeley, 1958). His papers, which I plan to work with, are located at the University of Chicago.

⁵¹ See Referat 411, Memorandum "Schreiben von Herrn v. Keiser, New Delhi, vom 12. August 56 wegen verstärkter finanzieller Hilfe an Indien," September 12, 1956, PA, B 58–407/15.

⁵² Letter from the FRG's embassy in New Delhi to the Foreign Office, "Planung der Zuwendungen aus dem Entwicklungsfonds im Haushaltsjahr 1959/60 für Indien," May 25, 1960, PA, B 61–411/257.

⁵³ See Referat 400 (von Podewils), Memorandum "Bericht der aus Indien zurückgekehrten Erdölexperten des Amtes für Bodenforschung," June 14, 1957, PA, B 58-407/5. Also see the correspondence between the Foreign Office and the West German embassy in New Delhi on that matter; Referat 400 (von Podewils), Memorandum, *ibid*.

⁵⁴ For an analysis of West German-Indian relations until the mid-1960s, see Amit Das Gupta, *Handel, Hilfe, Hallstein-Doktrin: Die bundesdeutsche Südasienpolitik unter Adenauer und Erhard 1949 bis 1966* (Husum, 2004).

⁵⁵ Letter from the West German embassy in New Delhi to the Foreign Office, "Seminar über landwirtschaftliches Genossenschaftswesen der Deutschen Stiftung für Entwicklungsländer in Berlin und deutsch-indische Beziehungen auf genossenschaftlichem Gebiet," April 28, 1960, BAK, B 102/55957. On the origins of the idea of cooperative societies, see Martin Peters, *Die Genossenschaftstheorie Otto von Gierkes (1841–1921)*, Marburger Schriften zum Genossenschaftswesen 95 (Göttingen, 2001); Werner Wilhelm Engelhardt, *Allgemeine Ideengeschichte des Genossenschaftswesens: Einführung in die Genossenschafts- und Kooperationslehre auf geschichtlicher Basis* (Darmstadt, 1985).

⁵⁶ See Otto Schiller, *Agrarstruktur und Agrarreform in den Ländern Süd- und Südasiens, Agrarpolitik und Marktwesen 2* (Hamburg, 1961). On Schiller's plans for Russia see Christian Gerlach, "Die deutsche Agrarreform und die Bevölkerungspolitik in den besetzten sowjetischen Gebieten," in *Besatzung und Bündnis: Deutsche Herrschaftsstrategien in Ost- und Südosteuropa*, Beiträge zur nationalsozialistischen Gesundheits- und Sozialpolitik 12 (Berlin, 1995), 9–60; Alexander Dallin, *German Rule in Russia, 1941–1945: A Study of Occupation Policies* (London, 1957), 330–335. On Schiller's postwar career see Corinna R. Unger, *Ostforschung in Westdeutschland: Die Erforschung des europäischen Ostens und die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, 1945–1975* (Stuttgart, 2007), chapter V.4.

⁵⁷ 400–88–00, Memorandum "Vorläufige Leitsätze für den Entwicklungsfonds (Fonds für die Förderung der Entwicklungsländer)," January 3, 1957, PA, B 58-407/9.

⁵⁸ Referat 801, Memorandum "Bereitstellung von Mitteln aus dem Entwicklungsfonds (Kapitel 0502, Titel 669)," September 4, 1961, PA, B 61-411/272.

⁵⁹ See West German embassy in New Delhi, Attachment to Report No. 1199/62 of July 20, 1962: "Aufzeichnung über die Errichtung einer Ländlichen Gemeinschaftsanlage (Rural Community Center) in Verbindung mit dem deutsch-indischen landwirtschaftlichen Musterdistrikt Mandi in Himachal Pradesh," PA, B 61-411/276. Community Development continues to be an important approach in development policy. See, for example, Hennie Swanepoel and Frik de Beer, eds., *Community Development: Breaking the Cycle of Poverty*, 4th edition (Lansdowne, 2006).

⁶⁰ See Hess, "Waging the Cold War in the Third World," 325f.

⁶¹ See the memorandum of March 25, 1960, PA, B 61-411/272.

⁶² Landw. Rat z. Vv. C.-Th. Hinrichs and Dr. agr. J. H. Gwildis, "Zwischenbericht über die Errichtung eines landwirtschaftlichen Projektes in Indien," January 1961, PA, B 61-411/272.

⁶³ Letter from the West German embassy in New Delhi to the Foreign Office, "Deutsche Hilfe im Rahmen des indischen Programms für die Intensivierung der Landwirtschaft in ausgewählten Distrikten," February 14, 1962, PA, B 61-411/272.

⁶⁴ Letter from the West German embassy in New Delhi to the Foreign Office, "Deutsche Hilfe im Rahmen des indischen Programms für die Intensivierung der Landwirtschaft in ausgewählten Distrikten," February 14, 1962, PA, B 61-411/272.

⁶⁵ On such cooperative measures, see, among others, I A 3—E 6000—70/65 (Lamby), Memorandum on "Besprechungen im BMZ mit dem Leiter der AID, Mr. Bell, am 24. und 25. Februar 1965," March 10, 1965, ACDP, Nachlaß Vialon (I-475), 021/3.

⁶⁶ See the essays in Barth and Osterhammel, eds., *Zivilisierungsmissionen*; with regard to India, see Michael Mann, "'Torchbearers Upon the Path of Progress': Britain's Ideology of a 'Moral and Material Progress' in India," in *Colonialism as Civilizing Mission: Cultural Ideology in British India*, ed. Harald Fischer-Tiné and Michael Mann (London, 2004), 1–26.

⁶⁷ On such colonial fantasies, see Birthe Kundrus, ed., *Phantasiereiche: Zur Kulturgeschichte des deutschen Kolonialismus* (Frankfurt am Main, 2003).

CONFERENCE REPORTS

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF WORLD RIVERS

GHI-sponsored panel at the International Conference on Rivers and Civilization: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Major River Basins, La Crosse, Wisconsin, June 25–28, 2006. Organizer and moderator: Christof Mauch (GHI). Participants: Mark Cioc (University of California—Santa Cruz), Meredith McKittrick (Georgetown University), Donald Worster (University of Kansas) Dorothy Zeisler-Vralsted (Eastern Washington University).

As part of a multidisciplinary approach to studying rivers and civilizations, this panel examined the historical context for viewing the world's major rivers. The conference was comprised of scientists, resource managers, artists, poets, writers, and historians, to name a few disciplines. In establishing the historical narrative of rivers, each of the panelists considered a specific region with its dominant river or rivers. For Europe, Marc Cioc spoke on the Rhine River, while Meredith McKittrick examined the major rivers of sub-Saharan Africa. Dorothy Zeisler-Vralsted represented Eurasia with a discussion of the Volga River, and Donald Worster considered the development of rivers in North America from the ideological perspective of capitalism.

In discussing the Rhine River, Mark Cioc drew upon his eco-geography *The Rhine*, published in 2002. One of his themes was the lack of wildness in the German landscape and how rivers have evolved from being perceived as a natural part of the landscape to being understood as an administered part. Cioc traced the historical development of river engineering beginning with the Renaissance and the Italian contribution of the art, soon to become the science, of hydraulics. Armed with a scientific approach to river development, engineers viewed rivers as canals with all of their idiosyncrasies removed. In this spirit, the Rhine River was modified to the point that Cioc asked: When did the river become an artifact, no longer functioning as a biological entity? In recent years, however, there have been attempts to restore the river. But restoration also has its challenges, as much of the original habitat is no longer left along the Rhine. In concluding, Cioc cautioned against earlier efforts to tame rivers into mechanized canals. He reminded participants of the consequences of engineering a river, when fish and other species that did not have a utilitarian value become the casualties.

Following Cioc's analysis, Meredith McKittrick introduced the audience to dominant perceptions of rivers in sub-Saharan Africa in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Given the overwhelming presence of the European powers in Africa in the nineteenth century, McKittrick framed much of her discussion around the effects of imperialism in developing Africa's rivers. In contrast to pastoral and romanticized visions of rivers, in southern Africa, rivers were also dangerous places. But McKittrick also emphasized the diversity of rivers in southern Africa and included language maps in her presentation. She reviewed the alternative historical dramas regarding rivers and how the riparian peoples claimed to have power over water. By the mid-nineteenth century, however, rivers reached a new ascendancy, and as they became the major highways, the Europeans were not happy that the rivers were not under their control. Despite the lack of ownership, Europeans did not stop dreaming about what they could do with the rivers in Africa. McKittrick included several examples of European schemes to develop rivers in southern Africa, such as the development plans in the Portuguese territories of Mozambique and Angola. The discussion concluded with comments regarding the interesting sociological aspects of these schemes.

In considering Eurasian rivers, Dorothy Zeisler-Vralsted focused on how artistic depictions of the Volga River in the nineteenth century contributed to an emerging Russian national narrative. Beginning with the absence of a landscape aesthetic in Russia until the mid-nineteenth century, Zeisler-Vralsted traced the evolution of landscape art from early Italian scenes to nineteenth-century works such as those of the Hudson River School. Russian artists such as Issak Levitan paralleled the efforts of American artists, as each sought to celebrate their native landscapes. Many of Levitan's better-known works included the Volga River, and Zeisler-Vralsted showed a number of slides of his paintings. In each work, several themes dominated, including the centrality of the Volga River in the Russian national narrative, complemented by the ever-present immense Russian space and the iconic symbol of the Russian Orthodox Church in the foreground. Adding to Levitan's work was the art of another Russian painter, Ilya Repin, whose famous work "The Bargehaulers" shows the Volga River as part of the oppressor of Russian souls. In this depiction, the bargehaulers, or *burlaki*, are tethered to a barge in the Volga River as they move the ship along the channel. Zeisler-Vralsted compared this depiction of the Volga with paintings of the Mississippi River by Caleb Bingham. The contrast was evident, as Bingham's portraits, such as the "The Jolly Flatboatmen," evoke a patriotic sentiment that celebrates exceptionalism and individuality. In concluding, Zeisler-Vralsted reiterated the importance of considering the artistic legacies of

the world's rivers, as these legacies also contribute to a better understanding of historical developments.

The last panelist was Donald Worster, who drew upon a number of his earlier works in his discussion of the powerful historical forces that prompt us to think about rivers. He considered how controlling these historical forces are and how one of the most entrenched is capitalism. Worster used the example of the textile factories on the Merrimack River in the northeastern United States to demonstrate how water, like land, became commodified. This change in thinking about resources was a product of the logic of capitalism, where the chief goal was to increase one's personal wealth and to experience endless growth. Worster argued that in order to do this, nature must be disassembled and then put back together. He cited Adam Smith, who said "the greatest of all improvements is the good roads, canals, and navigable rivers." Karl Marx complemented Smith's ideas, as Marx contended that rivers should be reorganized for their potential. According to Worster, Marx and Smith taught the rest of the world how to think, as both saw rivers in terms of their potential. Worster supported this theme with examples of developments of rivers in North America such as the Colorado, and he also considered legislation such as the Reclamation Act, which recognized the limits of capital but also ushered in an age of big dams and irrigation projects. Similar to Cioc, Worster also cautioned the participants to think about the environmental degradation that ensued from the commodification of rivers.

Lively discussion, moderated by Christof Mauch, followed these presentations. Many audience members representing various disciplines posed questions. The panel succeeded in providing a historical framework in which to view subsequent discussions regarding rivers and civilization.

Dorothy Zeisler-Vralsted

THE FORGOTTEN GENERATION: THE FIRST GENERATION OF SPANISH IMMIGRANTS IN HAMBURG

Film screening and discussion, August 25, 2006. Co-sponsored by the GHI, the Spanish Embassy, and the Goethe Institute. Film director Ainhoa Montoya Arteabaro was present at the event.

The city of Hamburg has attracted quite a bit of scholarly attention in the past few years, especially from scholars from abroad. Ainhoa Montoya Arteabaro's documentary deals with the history of one part of its immigrant community: the Spanish. It provides a glimpse into the lives of those people who made up the first wave of guest workers, *Gastarbeiter*, to Germany in the late 1950s and early 1960s, a time when the German economy was booming and labor was short. Those who arrived from Spain came mainly from poor rural regions like Andalusia, Galicia, or Castile. Some came as tourists and decided to stay; others were recruited by German employers and had labor contracts even before they arrived in places like Hamburg. Many were unskilled laborers. The industrial regions of the German states of North-Rhine Westphalia and Baden-Württemberg attracted the largest numbers of Spanish workers. Hamburg drew its share of several thousand men and women who found employment in different industries like machine construction or textile production. By 1967 the Spanish community in Germany had grown to about 10 percent of its immigrant population, third in size behind the Italians and the Greeks. The Germans generally felt that they could get along with the Spanish. They seemed to blend in very well as workers and neighbors even though they formed rather tight-knit communities in many places. Paella, tapas, and sangria soon became part of the German vocabulary.

Filmmaker Arteabaro shows five stories of this generation. Today nearly all of the men and women she interviewed are retirees living in Hamburg. They talk about the experience of going abroad and about the difficulties they have had living in a strange country. Yet after forty years, Spain no longer feels like home to them either.

Born in Bilbao, Spain in 1973, Arteabaro studied media culture and advertising at the University of Madrid. In 1998 she moved to Germany, where she works as a projectionist in the oldest cinema of Hamburg. This is her first feature-length film, produced in 2006 as part of a program with the Hochschule für bildende Künste in Hamburg (HfbK).

Anke Ortlepp

BUCERIUS SEMINAR 2006: AMERICAN HISTORY AND AMERICAN ARCHIVES

Co-organized by the GHI, the Department of History of the University of Chicago, and the John F. Kennedy Institute for North American Studies at the Free University of Berlin. Conveners: Kathleen Conzen (University of Chicago), Andreas Etges (Free University of Berlin), Christof Mauch (GHI). Made possible by a grant from the ZEIT Foundation Ebelin and Gerd Bucerius.

The third Bucerius Seminar on American History and American Archives took place from September 4–16, 2006. Twelve doctoral students—nine from different German universities and three from the University of Chicago—visited American archives and libraries in Chicago, Madison, Boston, and Washington, DC. As in years past, the program began with a reception on Labor Day. Kathleen N. Conzen of the University of Chicago invited the group as well as colleagues and graduate students to her house.

The first day and a half of the seminar was organized by the excellent staff of Chicago's Newberry Library led by Martha Briggs, John Brady, and Jim Grossman. Their task was to give a general introduction to the American archival system, major finding aids, and search strategies, as well as to present some of the large collections of the Newberry. The second half of Day Two was spent at the University of Chicago. Alice Schreyer and Daniel Meyer welcomed the group to the Regenstein Library's Special Collections Research Center. Showing many examples from their large collections, they discussed the peculiarities of their archive, which holds many papers of famous professors who taught at Chicago. This was followed by four intense hours in the history department's John Hope Franklin Common Room, where each of the research projects was discussed briefly. Kathleen Conzen, her colleague Jim Sparrow, Jim Grossman of the Newberry Library, and Andreas Etges served as commentators. On the final day in Chicago, the group visited the Archive of the Circuit Court of Cook County on the eleventh floor of the Richard J. Daley Center. Philip J. Costello skillfully described how much social history can be found in court records and how scholars have made use of it.

The next stop was Madison. Harry Miller and Michael Edmonds of the Wisconsin Historical Society gave an introduction to the immense archival and library sources of their institution, including quite a number of collections of use to several of the participants. Over lunch, the group met with Jack Holzhueter. Like his former colleagues, the retired editor of

the Wisconsin Magazine of History and leading expert on the history of Wisconsin proved how much an institution like the Historical Society is shaped by the people working there. Holzhueter, who helped generations of researchers there, shared his many insights on doing local and regional history.

It might have been because the group traveled east on September 9, and not September 11, or because the domestic flights had been booked in the United States this time. But to everyone's surprise, unlike in past years there were no special screenings at the airports for any of us, and the group arrived safely in Boston.

Michael Comeau of the Massachusetts Archives presented some of the most famous and valuable documents in the possession of his institution, including Massachusetts's constitution of 1780. Later in the day, the group visited the Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in America, where Ellen M. Shea had brought out documents of potential use to the individual research projects and gave an overview of the collections. Not far from there, Timothy Mahoney of Harvard's Baker Library presented a sample from the library's immense historical collections in economic, business, technical, and social history. In the reading room the group met Jon Levy, who had participated in the Bucerius Seminar in 2005 and had received a fellowship from Baker Library. The Kennedy Library hosted the group on its final day in Boston. This year Stephen Plotkin met the group in the Hemingway Room, decorated with a lion skin among other things. Plotkin talked about why the Hemingway Papers are now housed in the Kennedy Library. After Laurie Austin had described the large audiovisual holdings, Maura Porter expertly discussed the issue of declassification and played a number of "secret" tape recordings by John F. Kennedy.

In Washington, DC, where the group traveled next, the program deviated slightly from that of previous years. The National Archives in College Park was visited on the group's first day in DC. Robert Coren, Peggy Adams, Bob Richardson, and Nick Natanson spoke about the archives, the possible use of electronic records for research, and the large collections of cartographic and architectural maps, aerial photographs, as well as still pictures. The group was shown important examples from the archives' priceless collections, including battle maps from the Civil War and some of the famous Mathew Brady photographs of Civil War battlefields. For those who might use State Department records, Michael Hussey later gave a special introduction to the respective record groups.

The next day began at the National Archives in downtown Washington, DC, where Rick Peuser gave an overview of the holdings there and received much praise for his very entertaining "performance." He had pulled some of his favorite items, including "fan mail" to the imprisoned

Jefferson Davis from “your assistant, the devil.” Next, the group got an introduction to the Center for Legislative Archives, which holds the records of the House of Representatives and the Senate. Later in the day, at the National Museum of American History, John Fleckner gave a brief overview of the Smithsonian Institution and its many collections, and described the large holdings of his archive in business, engineering, communications, and advertising history. In the evening, eminent historian Robert Dallek talked about doing research in Presidential Libraries and about his current project, a book about Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. His wonderful talk was followed by a reception at the GHI, where there was also a chance to meet the director and a number of the fellows.

The final day of the Bucerius Seminar was spent at the Library of Congress. The tour guide in the morning had a hard time adjusting to the fact that this was not a group of high school kids. Next, Daun Van Ee showed some examples from the vast holdings of the Manuscripts Division and also gave a tour through the stacks, where the papers of many presidents, judges, the NAACP, and numerous other famous individuals and institutions can be found. One of the highlights of the archives seminar was once again the visit to the Prints and Photographs Division, where Sara Duke and her colleagues had spared no effort to find photos, cartoons, and so on for all the topics. Several participants left this session convinced that they needed to return. The day at the Library of Congress ended with a new part of the program, a visit to the Geography and Map Division. Division chief John R. Hébert showed the group magnificent globes and all kinds of old and newer maps, and discussed how maps might be used for historical research. A farewell dinner near Dupont Circle concluded the archival seminar.

The Bucerius Seminar 2006 was the third consecutive seminar that introduced groups of American and German Ph.D. students in American history to archives and research libraries in the United States. The participants have been very grateful for the unique opportunity that was offered to them, made possible by the generosity of the ZEIT-Stiftung and the GHI. Librarians and archivists involved have been full of praise for this innovative way to prepare students for their prospective dissertation research trips, which in their view should become an essential part of graduate training of historians. They sometimes voiced their jealousy in not being able to travel with the group and get to know so many different institutions. I think I can speak for the participants of all three Bucerius Seminars in once again thanking everyone involved who has made the seminars possible: the sponsors as well as the librarians and archivists, who generously invited us and hosted sessions at their institutions.

Andreas Etges

Participants and Their Projects

ANDREJ BARTUSCHKA (University of Jena), "Fighting the Other War: U.S. Propaganda and Counterinsurgency during the Cold War. The Hukbalahap Insurrection 1946–1954 and the Vietnam War"

BERNADETTE FISHER (University of Mainz), "American Politics in the Rhineland, 1918–1923"

SEBASTIAN HAUMANN (University of Düsseldorf), "The Interdependence of Protest and Urban Renewal, 1965–1985"

ROMAN J. HOYOS (University of Chicago), "'A Fifth Branch of Government': Constitutional Conventions, Law, and Democracy in the Nineteenth-Century U.S."

DANIEL KARCH (University of Würzburg), "Genocides of Indigenous Peoples: The German Colonial Wars in South-West Africa in Comparison with the U.S. Policy towards the Plains Indians"

NORA KREUZENBECK (University of Cologne), "The Haitian Revolution in Southern Discourse, 1791–1865"

NEA MATZEN (University of Hamburg), "Bella Fromm: A German-American Life"

DOMINIK NAGL (Free University of Berlin), "Ruling the Unruly: Social Discipline, Public Order Crime, and the Lower Classes in Eighteenth-Century Boston and Charleston"

ANNA-MARIA PEDRON (International University of Bremen), "Contacts and Conflicts: German-American Relations in Bremen from the End of the Second World War through the 1950s"

PETER SIMONS (University of Chicago), "Isolation on the Road to Damascus: World War II and Internationalism in the Rural Midwest."

MARION STANGE (Free University of Berlin), "Governance of Health: Disease Control and Regulation of Health Care in Eighteenth-Century South Carolina and Louisiana"

ELIZABETH TODD (University of Chicago), "From Grassroots to Governing: African-American Politics in the Post-Civil Rights Era"

PARSING PRUSSIAN PERSONALITY: CHRISTIAN THOMASIVS AND THE PSYCHOGRAM

Fourth Edmund Spevack Memorial Lecture at Adams House, Harvard University, October 20, 2006. Co-sponsored by the GHI and the Edmund Spevack Memorial Trust. Speaker: Mack Walker (Johns Hopkins University).

This Memorial Lecture honors the memory of the historian Edmund Spevack, who was closely connected to both Harvard University, where he was an undergraduate and later taught, and to the GHI, where he was a Research Fellow before his untimely passing. After introductory remarks by Sean Palfrey (Master of Adams House), Witold Potempa (Edmund Spevack Memorial Trust) and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI), the Fourth Edmund Spevack Memorial Lecture was delivered by Edmund's doctoral adviser, Mack Walker of Johns Hopkins University.

Walker spoke on the fascinating topic "Parsing Prussian Personality: Christian Thomasius and the Psychogram." Christian Thomasius (1655–1728) was a German law professor best known for his formal denial of evidence obtained by torture and his rejection of criminal liability for witchcraft. A less well-known and earlier episode offers, if not exactly a professional parable, then perhaps an instructive anecdote. When Thomasius was appointed to the senior chair in law at Halle, a university that had been recently founded to train civil officials and pastors for the Prussian state, he offered the Prussian government in Berlin a scheme for personality analysis to guide its domestic personnel practices and its negotiations with other powers. His project was to assign arithmetical quantities to key character traits—greed, love, ambition, sensuality—in order to produce psychological profiles that would allow prediction and manipulation of the analyzed subject's behavior. Thomasius set about testing the procedure by analyzing colleagues and acquaintances, and by assigning to his students practice analyses of prominent biblical characters and contemporary figures. After several months of experimentation, however, he concluded, mainly on evidence from the self-analysis he himself experienced, that it was impossible to prevent the analyst's own personality mix from distorting and corrupting his weighing of others' personalities. As a result, he renounced and withdrew the project. All this left Thomasius wondering what kind of knowledge of others was possible after all, but after a lengthy silence he abandoned this line of inquiry and turned to procedural issues such as torture and witchcraft. Mack Walker's lecture was followed by a lively discussion.

Richard F. Wetzell

AWARD OF THE FRANZ STEINER PRIZE

Award ceremony and concert at the Neues Schloss, Stuttgart, October 26, 2006. Co-sponsored by the GHI, Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, Landesregierung Baden-Württemberg, James F. Byrnes Institute/Deutsch-Amerikanisches Zentrum Stuttgart, Verband der deutsch-amerikanischen Clubs (Region Schwaben), and Franz Steiner Verlag. Conveners: Ulrich Bachteler (James F. Byrnes Institute, Stuttgart), Christof Mauch (GHI), Thomas Schaber (Franz Steiner Verlag).

On the occasion of German-American Day 2006, the Franz Steiner Prize for Transatlantic History was awarded for the first time. The award ceremony featured a concert in the White Room of Stuttgart's Neues Schloss in Stuttgart. The Schloss's White Hall, filled to capacity, provided a festive setting for the event. The introduction and words of greeting (the American embassy was represented by John M. Koenig) were followed by the first part of the concert, featuring jazz interpretations of Mozart sonatas. Following this, Christof Mauch presented his introduction. Like the colorful facets of the chandeliers in the White Room, he noted, the German-American relationship reflects a fascinating history, which either glitters or is rather dark according to the angle from which it is viewed. Friendship and skepticism have been constant companions of transatlantic relations.

Thomas Schaber introduced the work of the prizewinner, Daniel Siemens of the history department of Humboldt University, Berlin. Siemens received the prize for his dissertation "'A Popular Expression of Individuality': Kriminalität, Justiz und Gesellschaft in der Gerichtsberichterstattung von Tageszeitungen in Berlin, Paris und Chicago, 1919 bis 1933." The members of the German-American award committee included the director of the GHI as chair, the head of the Steiner Verlag, and several professors from Germany and the United States. Herr Schaber noted that the committee had faced a difficult task evaluating the works submitted. Nevertheless, the committee was able to agree on the prizewinner fairly quickly. Schaber explained that the Franz Steiner Prize is awarded for an outstanding unpublished scholarly manuscript in the field of transatlantic relations or research on North America from the early modern era to the present. The prize is jointly sponsored by the GHI and the Franz Steiner Verlag, one of Germany's leading academic presses.

After brief words of thanks by the prizewinner, the students of the State University for Music and the Visual Arts of Stuttgart continued the concert. The memorable evening ended with a reception in the foyer of the White Hall.

Ulrich Bachteler

A RESOURCE REDISCOVERED: THE REOPENING OF THE GERMAN SOCIETY OF PENNSYLVANIA LIBRARY

Symposium jointly organized by the GHI and the German Society of Pennsylvania at the Joseph B. Horner Memorial Library in Philadelphia, November 5, 2006. Conveners: Hardy von Auenmüller (GSP) and Dirk Schumann (GHI). Participants: Hans-Jürgen Heimsoeth (German Consulate, New York), Christof Mauch (GHI), Kevin Ostoyich (Valparaiso University), Birte Pflieger (California State University, Los Angeles), Frank Trommler (University of Pennsylvania), Christof Mauch (GHI).

Founded in 1817 by the oldest German immigration society in North America, the Joseph B. Horner Memorial Library in Philadelphia represents a valuable treasure house of sources about the history of Germans in America, their culture, reading tastes, local and national politics, and close relations with German-speaking countries. Its reopening on November 5, 2006, in the presence of Hans-Jürgen Heimsoeth, Consul General of the Federal Republic of Germany in New York, Christof Mauch, Director of the GHI, and a large group of members of the German Society of Pennsylvania, offered an opportunity to take stock of an at times stormy, at times sleepy history of this collection of about 70,000 volumes, arguably the largest privately owned German-American library (outside of universities).

After being restored and catalogued (mainly in its holdings before 1917) thanks to a five-year project in 1994–99, the Horner Library is currently in the process of redefining itself as a research collection that opens its holdings to students, scholars, and visitors interested in all facets of German-American history and culture. The GHI has been most helpful in furthering this transformation in which the one-time *Volksbibliothek*, rendering its services mostly to members, becomes a document of a long-standing passion for popular fiction and non-fiction (especially popular science) in German that is of great value to historians, cultural historians, and Germanists. Its core is the German-American Collection, an archive whose holdings reach back to Francis Pastorius, the founder of Germantown. This archive was certainly used by historians during the course of the twentieth century, though it was not always easily accessible. The new GHI Reference Guide no. 20, *The German Society of Pennsylvania: A Guide to Its Book and Manuscript Collections*, will make access much easier. (It is available free of charge in hard copy and as a pdf file on the GHI web site.) The guide was written, thanks to a grant from the GHI

in 2005–2006, by Kevin Ostoyich, who has brought the information about the recently catalogued German-American collection and the manuscript collection up to date.

Celebrating the publication of this book was a central feature of the November 5 event in Philadelphia. In the symposium part, under the title of “Pennsylvania and the German-American Heritage,” Hans-Jürgen Heimsoeth illuminated the history of the GSP and its importance for the physical and spiritual needs of German-speaking immigrants since its founding in 1764. Heimsoeth emphasized that its primary mission was charity work, which had its ups and downs according to the tides of the immigrant waves, while the cultural commitments—and conviviality—did not fully develop until the latter part of the nineteenth century. In his talk “In Search of the German Americans,” Christof Mauch provided an intriguing frame of reference for these humdrum activities as he located this amazingly large but hardly visible ethnic group in the United States in its often inconspicuous contributions to the well-being of the larger society. His preferred example was the German-American architect Adolf Cluss, who gave Washington DC a distinctly modern profile in the second half of the nineteenth century but is hardly remembered for his innovative architecture and urban planning.

It was fitting for the occasion that a new history of the GSP, the first since the comprehensive volume by Oswald Seidensticker and Max Heinrici of 1917, was unveiled and distributed. Sponsored by the GHI in 2005–2006, the study represents the efforts of Birte Pflieger, a scholar of Germans in eighteenth-century Pennsylvania. She has gone into the archives and produced a critical history of the Society that provides new information about earlier developments, as well as the active Women’s Auxiliary and the sometimes erratic activities of the GSP in the era of the two world wars. Also published under the auspices of the GHI, the book has the title *Ethnicity Matters: A History of the German Society of Pennsylvania*.

Equally fitting for the celebration of the Library’s reopening was the announcement of the newly established “GHI Fellowship at the Horner Library.” The fellowship, co-sponsored by the GHI and the GSP, will support two to four scholars for up to four weeks for research at the Horner Library between June 1 and July 15, 2007. (More information can be found on the GHI web site). It is designed to expand the use of the Library for the growing scholarship in German-American studies and German and American cultural history, as well as German popular literature and science before 1900.

Frank Trommler

FIFTEENTH ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM OF THE FRIENDS OF THE GHI AND AWARD OF THE FRITZ STERN DISSERTATION PRIZE

Symposium at the GHI, November 17, 2006. Conveners: Gerald D. Feldman (President, Friends of the GHI) and Christof Mauch (GHI). Participants: Elizabeth Heineman (University of Iowa), Christoph Klessmann (University of Potsdam/ ZZP Potsdam), Lars Maischak (California State University, Fresno). Made possible by a grant from the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

The Friends of the German Historical Institute convened in Washington on November 17, 2005, for their fifteenth annual symposium, chaired by Gerald D. Feldman. The morning session featured the awarding of the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize, which has been awarded for seven years for the best dissertation—or two dissertations—in German history at a North American university. This year's prize was awarded to a single winner, Lars Maischak, who earned his 2005 doctorate at the Johns Hopkins University under the supervision of Ronald G. Walters, for his dissertation "A Cosmopolitan Community: Hanseatic Merchants in the German-American Atlantic of the Nineteenth Century." An article offering an overview of Maischak's dissertation can be found in the "Stern Prize" section of this *Bulletin*. Fritz Stern attended the award ceremony and gave a comment. The Prize Committee was composed of Doris Bergen (University of Toronto), Norman J.W. Goda (Ohio University), and Craig M. Koslofsky (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign). The prize committee cited Maischak's dissertation as "extraordinary in the range of issues it addresses, its depth of research, and its elegance of style." "At once transnational and clearly focused on Bremen, Maischak's dissertation brings to life a group of people who emerge as a self-conscious elite but also as individuals and members of complex family and business networks. . . . In sum," the award statement concluded, "Lars Maischak's dissertation succeeds on every level: it is ambitious, original, transnational, innovative in its focus, aware of gender and religion, and beautifully written. It is a model for what many scholars seek to do, not only as an integrated approach to the past, but in its understanding of cultural, economic, intellectual, and political exchange in the Atlantic world."

The afternoon featured an event honoring Konrad Jarausch on the occasion of his sixty-fifth birthday in order to thank him for his extraordinary service to the Friends of the GHI. Jarausch was the first president of the Friends of the GHI from 1991–94 and served as their president

again from 2000–2002. Elizabeth Heineman spoke from the perspective of one of Jarausch's former Ph.D. students. With his wide range of thematic and methodological interests, she noted, Jarausch inspired in his students "a kind of fearlessness" about venturing into new territory. But former students equally valued Jarausch's conscientiousness about teaching: his thoughtful responses to draft chapters, his constant engagement even when abroad, and his ability to divine "not just when grad students need some direction, but also when to get out of the way and let them get on with it." Christoph Klessmann, Jarausch's longtime partner as co-director of the Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung (ZZF) in Potsdam, spoke about Jarausch's role in the founding and successful establishment of the ZZF as a premier research institute. Jarausch's most important contribution, he argued, was to bring an "outsider's view" and an international perspective to the ZZF. This ensured that the ZZF's work was informed by and connected to international historical research, and thus helped to gain the ZZF international recognition. He also commented on the remarkable stamina underlying Jarausch's transatlantic commute between Chapel Hill and Potsdam, as well as the initially improvised, but successful division of labor between the two co-directors, who seem to have complemented each other in felicitous ways.

Richard F. Wetzell

THE FIVE GERMANYS HE HAS KNOWN: SYMPOSIUM IN HONOR OF FRITZ STERN

Symposium co-sponsored by the GHI, the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, the BMW Center for German and European Studies at Georgetown University, the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the Goethe-Institut Washington, and Farrar, Straus and Giroux, held at the Westin Embassy Row Hotel, Washington DC, January 29, 2007. Conveners: Jackson Janes (AICGS) and Robert Gerald Livingston (GHI).

Participants: Roger Chickering (Georgetown University), Marion Deshmukh (George Mason University), Hope Harrison (George Washington University), Claudia Koonz (Duke University), Charles Maier (Harvard University), Jerry Z. Muller (Catholic University), Fritz Stern (Columbia University).

To conceptualize German history in the twentieth century is to consider multiple histories, including Imperial Germany, the Weimar Republic, the Nazi dictatorship, occupied Germany, East and West Germany, and today's unified Germany. The German-American historian Fritz Stern and his family represent a microcosm of that history. The January 29, 2007, symposium in honor of Stern aimed to explore that history through commentary on Stern's history-cum-memoir *The Five Germanys I Have Known* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006). Each panelist used one Germany as a basis for reflection on the man and his career, as well as on the complexities of modern German history. In his opening commentary, Chickering noted that Stern fits Weber's model of the public intellectual, in that he feels an obligation to comment on issues of public importance; his work has been pivotal in the multiple post-World War II reconciliations within Germany, within Europe, and across the Atlantic.

Marion Deshmukh, a former student of Stern's, commented on the Imperial German section of Stern's book, presenting the history of Stern's family as "a microcosm of the greater historical panorama." Typical German first names such as Fritz's own and that of his grandmother Hedwig bear testimony to the acculturation among German Jews, even though anti-Semitism and persecution eventually led to the family's emigration. Deshmukh pointed out the importance of family histories such as Stern's for Americans' understanding of how closely they are linked to the European drama. Jerry Z. Muller, another of Stern's former students, recalled Stern's remark that "capitalism is too important a topic to be left to

economic historians,” and commented on Stern’s role as an economic historian. Muller then turned to a humorous evaluation of Stern’s qualities as a historical researcher. The most important among them, according to Muller, comprise Stern’s capacity for benign self-deception (about the size of a research project, for instance), serendipity, *Sitzfleisch* [steadiness], *Gründlichkeit* [thoroughness], fortitude, and his aptitude to make good use of personal connections.

The third commentator, Claudia Koonz, looked at Stern’s person and work from the perspective of an “intellectual grandchild.” Koonz embraced Stern’s concerns for the moral problems faced by Germany and discussed “the Nazi Germany that Fritz knew,” focusing in particular on the legacy that it left on him and his family when they arrived in New York. This legacy sharpened Stern’s future vigilance and taught him contempt for elites who looked the other way when protective custody became a euphemism. Stern’s great capacity to draw analogies between past and present, Koonz argued, holds lessons for us all. Hope Harrison commented on Stern’s relation to postwar Germany, specifically the years between 1949 and the construction of the Berlin Wall. Stern became a key figure in German-American-Jewish relations, and played the role of both a German and a non-German in his efforts to examine German history.

Robert Gerald Livingston discussed Stern’s chapter on the German Democratic Republic. He challenged Stern’s argument that the West Germans neglected the East German state by arguing that the Bonn government’s buying out of political prisoners provided the East with monetary funds that were crucial for its survival. He also posed the question of whether the East German state was actually the “better” Germany, in that it broke more completely with the Nazi past than did its West German cousin. Charles Maier focused on Stern’s public role in postwar Germany and defined him as “the man of the second chance.” Through his “knowledgeable and revealing” writing, Stern reminds Germans that they have been given a second chance—namely, democracy—and that they should not squander the opportunities they have today. Democracy continues to remain a project, and Stern remains one of its chief ambassadors in both his role as teacher and advocate. At the symposium’s conclusion, Stern took to the podium to thank the speakers and to offer a few reflections on the roles of other German historians before him. The symposium ended with a short question-and-answer period, during which one audience member inquired as to Stern’s predictions for the next Germany of the future. Fritz Stern politely replied, “Five were enough for me!”

Carolin Brinkmann and Thrine Kane

ARNOLD BRECHT (1884–1977): DEMOCRATIC CIVIL SERVANT AND POLITICAL SCHOLAR IN BERLIN AND NEW YORK

Book presentation, Berlin, February 21, 2007. Co-sponsored by the GHI and the Herbert and Elsbeth Weichmann Foundation (Hamburg). Conveners: Claus-Dieter Krohn (Hamburg) and Corinna Unger (GHI). Participants: Egon Bahr (Bundesminister a.D.) and Brigitte Zypries (Bundesministerin der Justiz).

The GHI presented one of its most recent publications, a collection of articles on Arnold Brecht edited by Claus-Dieter Krohn and Corinna Unger, at the *Landesvertretung* Hamburg in Berlin this February. More than 120 guests attended the event, and the Franz Steiner Verlag displayed copies of the *Transatlantische Historische Studien* it publishes in cooperation with the GHI.

Brecht, a high-ranking civil servant in Weimar's federal and Prussian administrations, had to leave Germany in 1933 for his defense of democracy against the Nazis. He became a highly acclaimed professor of political science at the New School for Social Research in New York, wrote a prize-winning book on political theory, and advised the U.S. administration on questions concerning Germany during World War II. After the end of the war, he traveled regularly to Germany to participate in its rebuilding and democratization. Having acquired American citizenship, he did not re-migrate to Germany, but he engaged intellectually in the "German cause" by offering advice to West German politicians on both German and European unification.

For a long time after his death, Brecht's name as well as his intellectual and administrative achievements had been forgotten. Thirty years later, Brecht's legacy is being revived, thanks, among others, to Federal Minister of Justice Brigitte Zypries. At the Berlin book presentation, Zypries recognized the importance of Brecht's far-reaching reform projects during the Weimar Republic and honored his intellectual and personal integrity as one of the few democratic civil servants of the Weimar era. Egon Bahr, a central protagonist of the SPD's *Ostpolitik*, appreciated Brecht's engagement to help solve the "German question" by initiating talks with the GDR and embracing *détente*. He argued that Chancellor Adenauer had missed the opportunity to recruit Brecht as head of the chancellery, a position he would have filled perfectly.

Corinna R. Unger

FELLOWS SEMINARS, FALL 2006

The GHI's Fellows Seminars are a forum in which fellowship recipients and other visiting scholars present their research to the Research Fellows of the institute and interested scholars from local academic institutions. They are organized by the Deputy Director. The GHI awards doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships for the duration of one to six months. These fellowships are designed for doctoral candidates and postdoctoral scholars whose research deals with one of the following fields: German history, the history of German-American relations, the role of Germany and the United States in international relations, and American history. For the application process, see the "Announcements" section of this *Bulletin*.

September 28 SEBASTIAN JOBS, Universität Erfurt
Celebrating and Performing Victory—US-amerikanische Siegesparaden 1898/99, 1918/19 und 1945/46

FABIEN THÉOPILAKIS, Université Paris X-Nanterre/
Universität Augsburg
Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in französischer Hand in der nationalen Erinnerung in Frankreich und Deutschland nach 1945.

MANUEL SCHRAMM, Technische Universität Chemnitz
Digitale Landschaften? Zum Wandel der Landschaftswahrnehmungen in der Geodäsie und Kartographie in Deutschland und den USA 1950–2000

October 26 LYDIA NEMBACH-LANGER, Universität zu Köln
Vom "Tante-Emma-Laden" zum "Supermarkt"—Transatlantischer Wissenstransfer und die Einführung der Selbstbedienung im deutschen Einzelhandel (1949–1970)

PHILIPP STELZEL, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Rethinking German History after 1945: A Transatlantic Enterprise

REINHILD KREIS, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Amerikanische Kulturpolitik und westdeutsche Amerikabilder: Deutsch-Amerikanische Institute und Amerikahäuser im Wertewandel der 1960er und 1970er Jahre

- November 16 CHRISTOPH FRANZEN, Universität Frankfurt am Main
*Gestalt als Argument in der politischen Kommunikation der
Zwischenkriegszeit*
- ANNA-MARIA PEDRON, International University Bremen
*Kontakte und Konflikte vor Ort: Deutsch-Amerikanische Be-
ziehungen in Bremen vom Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges bis
in die fünfziger Jahre*
- KATJA KÖHR, Universität Kiel
*Die vielen Gesichter des Holocaust: Neue Konzepte musealer
Holocaustdarstellungen und ihre Rezeption*

ANNOUNCEMENTS: FELLOWSHIPS AND PRIZES

FRITZ STERN DISSERTATION PRIZE

Each year the Friends of the German Historical Institute award the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize for the two best doctoral dissertations submitted in German history, German-American relations, or the history of Germans in North America. The winners are invited to the GHI to present their research at the annual symposium of the Friends in November. The prizewinners receive an award of \$2,000 and reimbursement for travel to Washington, DC. Their dissertations will be considered for inclusion in the "Publications of the German Historical Institute" series published by Cambridge University Press.

Candidates are nominated by their dissertation advisers. Their dissertations must have been completed, defended, and authenticated between January 1 and December 31, 2006. The prize committee will accept nominations through April 15, 2007, and announce the prizewinners at the end of the summer.

Dissertation advisers should submit a letter of nomination along with an abstract (1–3 pages) of the dissertation to:

German Historical Institute
Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize
1607 New Hampshire Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20009–2562

For further details, please check our web site at http://www.ghi-dc.org/scholarship_stern.html

DOCTORAL AND POSTDOCTORAL FELLOWSHIPS

The GHI awards short-term fellowships to German and American doctoral students as well as postdoctoral scholars/*Habilitanden* in the fields of German history, the history of German-American relations, and the role of Germany and the United States in international relations. These fellowships are also available to German doctoral students and postdoctoral scholars/*Habilitanden* in the field of American history. The fellowships

are usually granted for periods of one to six months but, depending on the funds available, can be extended by one or more months. The research projects must draw upon source materials located in the United States.

The GHI will not provide funding for preliminary research. It will give clear priority to those postdoc projects that are designed for the "second book." The monthly stipend is approximately € 1,600 for doctoral students and € 2,800 for postdoctoral scholars. In addition, fellowship recipients based in Germany will receive reimbursement for their roundtrip airfare to the U.S. All fellowship recipients are required to present the results of their research at the GHI during their grant period.

The next deadlines for applications are May 20 and October 15, 2007. Applications (two copies) should include cover letter, curriculum vitae, proof of academic degree (or transcripts), project description (3,000 words), research schedule for the fellowship period, and at least one letter of reference. While applicants may write in either English or German, we recommend that they use the language in which they are most proficient. They will be notified about the outcome within approximately two months after the deadline. Please send applications to:

German Historical Institute
Doctoral/Postdoctoral Fellowships
1607 New Hampshire Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20009-2562

KADE-HEIDEKING FELLOWSHIP

Funded by the Annette Kade Charitable Trust, the Kade-Heideking Fellowship is awarded annually to a German doctoral student working in one of the three wider areas to which the late Jürgen Heideking made significant contributions: American history and German-American relations from the early modern period to the present; international history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; and twentieth-century German and European history.

This is a residential fellowship of twelve months' duration. It can be divided into two separate periods of six months. The recipient is expected to spend part of the fellowship period at the GHI and at the University of Wisconsin in Madison. The stipend amount is \$30,000. Applications should include a cover letter, curriculum vitae, proof of academic degree, project description (8-10 pages), research schedule for the fellowship period, and two confidential letters of reference. A decision about funding is pending. The deadline for applications will be posted on the GHI web site at http://www.ghi-dc.org/scholarship_kade.html.

THYSSEN-HEIDEKING FELLOWSHIP

The German Historical Institute invites applications for a one-year post-doctoral fellowship in memory of the late Jürgen Heideking. The fellowship, supported by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation, is intended for American scholars working in one of the three wider areas to which Professor Heideking made important contributions: American history and German-American relations from the early modern period to the present; international history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; and twentieth-century German and European history. The Thyssen-Heideking Fellow will receive a stipend of € 25,000 (plus a family allowance if applicable) for a fellowship period of six to twelve months in residence at the University of Cologne to begin in 2008. The fellow will be expected to give one public lecture on his or her research. Applications should include a cover letter, curriculum vitae, proof of academic degree, project description (8–10 pages), research schedule for the fellowship period, and two confidential letters of reference. A decision about renewed funding is pending. The deadline for applications will be posted on the GHI web site at http://www.ghi-dc.org/scholarship_thyssen.html.

POSTDOC-STIPENDIUM FÜR NORDAMERIKANISCHE GESCHICHTE

Das Deutsche Historische Institut in Washington vergibt 2007 zum dritten Mal ein Stipendium für Postdoktoranden im Bereich der nordamerikanischen Geschichte. Die Bewerberinnen und Bewerber sollten in Neuerer Geschichte promoviert sein. Mögliche Forschungsschwerpunkte sind die Geschichte Nordamerikas von der Kolonialzeit bis zum 20. Jahrhundert; vergleichende Geschichte oder internationale Geschichte (jeweils mit Nordamerika-Schwerpunkt)

Das Stipendium wird zunächst für ein Jahr vergeben und kann ab Mitte 2008 angetreten werden. Eine Verlängerung ist möglich. Neben dem Stipendium in Höhe von monatlich € 3,000 erhält die/der erfolgreiche Bewerber/in ein eigenes Budget für Forschungsreisen und für die Organisation eines Workshops mit amerikanischen Kolleginnen und Kollegen. Außerdem werden die Flugkosten von und nach Deutschland übernommen.

Bitte richten Sie Ihre Bewerbung mit den üblichen Unterlagen (Lebenslauf, Schriftenverzeichnis, Abschlusszeugnisse nach Abitur) sowie der Skizze des durchzuführenden Forschungsprojekts (8–10 Seiten) und einem Empfehlungsschreiben bis zum 15. Juli 2007 an das:

German Historical Institute
Nordamerikastipendium
1607 New Hampshire Ave. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009–2562
U.S.A.

GHI-KÖRBER INTERNSHIPS

Das Praktikum richtet sich an Preisträger des Geschichtswettbewerb des Bundespräsidenten, die sich am Ende oder kurz nach Abschluss des Geschichtsstudiums befinden und unter 30 Jahre alt sind. Das dreimonatige Praktikum findet am Deutschen Historischen Institut in Washington statt. Praktikanten erhalten Einblicke in die unterschiedlichen Arbeitsbereiche des Instituts und werden mit einem Forschungsprojekt betraut. Die Körber-Stiftung in Hamburg übernimmt die Kosten für die Ausstellung eines Visums und die Reisekosten. Als Gesamtvergütung erhalten Praktikanten 800 Euro im Monat, die je zur Hälfte von der Körber Stiftung und dem Deutschen Historischen Institut getragen werden. Interessierte wenden sich bitte an Dr. Anke Ortlepp (ortlepp@ghi-dc.org).

GHI INTERNSHIPS

The GHI Internship Program gives German and American students of history, political science, and library studies an opportunity to gain experience at a scholarly research institute. Interns assist with individual research projects, work for the library, take part in the preparation and hosting of conferences, and help with our publications. They receive a small stipend. The program is very flexible: The GHI tries to accommodate the interns' interests, abilities, and goals. A two-month minimum stay is required; a three-month stay is preferred. German students are strongly advised to familiarize themselves with the American visa requirements beforehand. The process of obtaining a visa has become complicated and expensive. Information is available at the web site of the American Embassy in Berlin at www.usembassy.de. The GHI cooperates with an organization authorized by the State Department to issue the relevant papers to obtain a visa. Applicants accepted into the internship program will receive further information on the procedure in their acceptance letters. Applications should contain a cover letter, a CV, a letter of recommendation, and copies of *Zwischenprüfungs-* or *Abschlusszeugnis*. You may apply either in English or German. For further information please contact Dr. Anke Ortlepp (ortlepp@ghi-dc.org).

NEWS

GHI REFERENCE GUIDES NO LONGER AVAILABLE BY SUBSCRIPTION

To better serve its different audiences, the German Historical Institute is changing the way it distributes its Reference Guides. Individuals must now order Reference Guides on a title-by-title basis (libraries and other institutions on the GHI mailing list will continue to automatically receive new Reference Guides upon publication). Reference Guides will still be distributed free of charge.

Two forthcoming Reference Guides can now be ordered:

Reference Guide 22—*German Americana, 1956–2005: A Comprehensive Bibliography of German, Austrian, and Swiss Books and Dissertations on the United States*, edited by Christoph Strupp and Kai Dreisbach, with the assistance of Patricia C. Sutcliffe and Birgit Zischke

Reference Guide 23—*North American History in Europe: A Directory of Academic Programs and Research Institutes*, edited by Eckhardt Fuchs and Janine S. Micunek Fuchs

To order, return the reply card mailed with this issue of the *Bulletin* or order directly online at www.ghi-dc.org/publications.html. Please order by July 1, 2007.

GHI Reference Guides are also available in electronic format on the GHI website, www.ghi-dc.org.

GERMAN AMERICANA, 1956–2005

The GHI is pleased to announce the publication of its Reference Guide 22: *German Americana, 1956–2005*, the follow-up volume to Reference Guide 18: *German Americana, 1800–1955* from 2005. The new guide was compiled by Christoph Strupp and Kai Dreisbach, with the assistance of Patricia C. Sutcliffe and Birgit Zischke. It provides information on almost 21,000 original books published in Germany, Austria, and the German-speaking parts of Switzerland from 1956 to 2005. Unpublished dissertations and *Habilitationen* on American topics submitted to German, Austrian, and

Swiss universities are also listed. Prior to this publication there was no bibliography that comprehensively covered the books and scholarship on the United States produced in the German-speaking countries over the last fifty years. This reference guide is the first attempt to fill this bibliographic gap. In thirty-one thematic sections, the guide covers everything from art to economics, emigration, history, language, literature, media, and medicine to religion, society, travel guides, and women. Sections on European images of America and American studies in Germany are also included. It should provide a valuable basis for future research on all aspects of the German image of America. As a GHI in-house publication, it is available free of charge in hard copy for those who sign up online by July 1, 2007 (see notice above). An online version is available at the GHI web site under "Reference Guides."

GHI FELLOWSHIP AT THE HORNER LIBRARY

In cooperation with the German Society of Pennsylvania, the German Historical Institute will be sponsoring three short-term fellowships for summer research at the Joseph Horner Memorial Library in Philadelphia. The fellowship is awarded to Ph.D. and M.A. students and advanced scholars without restrictions in research fields or geographical provenance. The "GHI Fellowship at the Horner Library" provides a travel subsidy and a stipend that depends on the length of the stay and the qualifications of the fellow. The fellowship recipients for 2007 are listed below. The Joseph Horner Memorial Library houses 70,000 volumes and is the largest German-American collection outside of a university. The collection offers rich materials from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries to historians of German-American immigration culture, especially in Pennsylvania, as well as historians of German fictional and non-fictional literature, including travel and popular literature. For information on the Horner Library, see GHI Reference Guide 20 and the catalog at the German Society of Pennsylvania.

NEW PUBLICATIONS

1. New Books by GHI Research Fellows

CAROLA DIETZE, *Nachgeholtes Leben: Helmuth Plessner 1892–1985* (Göttingen, 2006)

2. Transatlantische Historische Studien (Franz Steiner Verlag)

MARKUS LANG, *Die politische Theorie Karl Loewensteins. Eine biographische Studie zur Entwicklung des politischen Denkens und der Politikwissenschaft im 20. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart, 2007)

DANIEL SIEMENS, *Metropole und Verbrechen: Gerichtsreportage in Berlin, Paris und Chicago 1919 bis 1933* (Stuttgart, 2007)

3. GHI Publications

ASTRID M. ECKERT, ed., *Institutions of Public Memory: The Legacies of German and American Politicians* (Washington, DC: German Historical Institute, 2007).

LIBRARY REPORT

The GHI Library is happy to announce the acquisition of three very important microfiche collections:

(1) *Der Wahre Jacob*, a satirical magazine published 1884–1923 and 1927–1933. Alongside *Kladderadatsch* and *Simplicissimus* it is one of the most important German political satirical magazines published over a longer period of time. The program of *Der Wahre Jacob* was “to fight for the rights of the working classes in its peculiar and effective way.” It represents a valuable primary source for critical public opinion during the *Kaiserreich*, the First World War, and the Weimar Republic.

(2) The journal *Die Tat*, published monthly from 1909–1939. At first, *Lebensreform* and religious revival characterized the articles written about literature, art, economy, politics, geography, and philosophy. Later on, the magazine became an influential voice for National Socialism. The long-lived magazine is an important source for the cultural and political history of early twentieth-century Germany.

(3) The third microfiche collection is the *Handbuch der Frauenbewegung*, published 1901–1906 in five parts by Helene Lange and Gertrud Bäumer. It was the first comprehensive treatment of the sources of the “Frauenfrage” and the women’s movement in Germany.

With the help of the *Stiftung Deutsche Geisteswissenschaftliche Institute im Ausland* the library was able to gain access to several databases in a project called *Nationallizenzen*. Our users can access the databases free of charge. Included are the Comintern Archive, North American immigrant

letters, diaries and oral histories, and the *Historisches Lexikon Bayerns*. New databases will be added this year.

We would like to express our gratitude to the following people and institutions that donated books to the GHI Library: Jeff Carter, Astrid M. Eckert, Ernest Fisher, Wolfgang Form, Wolfgang Lehmann, Christof Mauch, Elizabeth Midgley, Katrin Pieper, Birgit Ramscheid, Martin Skubinna, Library of the Smithsonian Institution, Thüringer Landtag, Frank Uekötter, Ulrich Unger, Bernhard Unti.

RECIPIENTS OF GHI FELLOWSHIPS

Thyssen-Heideking Fellowship

ERIC KURLANDER (Stetson University), "Living with Hitler: Liberal Democrats between Resistance and Collaboration, 1933–1945" (Fellow 2007–08)

JEFF R. SCHUTTS (Douglas College, New Westminster, BC), "'Refreshing the Fatherland': The History of Coca-Cola in Germany, 1929–1961" (Fellow 2006–07)

Postdoc-Stipendium für nordamerikanische Geschichte

MARTIN KLIMKE (Universität Heidelberg), "The African-American Civil Rights Struggle in Germany after 1945"

NEH-GHI Fellowships

MARCUS GRÄSER (Universität Frankfurt am Main), "Mass Migration and Local Politics in Chicago and Vienna, 1850–1938: Some Questions, Some Hypotheses"

MAREN LORENZ (Hamburger Stiftung zur Förderung von Wissenschaft und Kultur), "Proeugenisches Denken und sein Einfluss auf nationale Züchtungsutopien in Westeuropa und den USA (1750–1860)"

MAREN MÖHRING (Universität zu Köln), "Ethnic Restaurants in West Germany, 1945–1990: Food, Migration and Consumption"

GHI Fellowships at the Horner Library

MICHAEL BOYDEN (Cambridge, MA), "Lebenserinnerungen/Reminiscences: The Bilingual Autobiography of Carl Schurz"

KIRBY DON RICHARDS (Philadelphia), "German Mysticism in Colonial Pennsylvania"

STEFAN ZAHLMANN (Konstanz), "Die geselligen Deutschen? Zur Integration und Desintegration von Deutschen in die Gesellschaft der USA am Beispiel des Deutsch-Amerikanischen Nationalbundes"

Postdoctoral Fellowships

TRYGVE HAS-ELLISON (University of Texas at Dallas), "Janus-faced Modernity: German Nobles and the Shaping of Fin-de-Siecle Artistic Modernism, 1890–1914"

DANIEL MAUL (LMU München), "David A. Morse (1907–1990)—Modernisierung, Demokratie und soziale Gerechtigkeit im amerikanischen Jahrhundert"

TOBIAS NAGL (University of Massachusetts), "Race Wars: Fascisms and the Black Diaspora, 1914–1945"

LORA WILDENTHAL (Rice University), "The Politics of Human Rights Activism in West Germany"

Doctoral Fellowships

MICHAELA BANK (Universität Frankfurt am Main), "'Universal Sisterhood': Migrantinnen in der amerikanischen Frauenrechtsbewegung im 19. Jahrhundert"

DOREEN ESCHINGER (Humboldt Universität Berlin), "Deportiert-zwangsverpflichtet-'displaced': Ungarische Jüdinnen im Holocaust"

SILKE HAKENESCH (Universität zu Köln), "The Chocolate Body? Zur Geschichte der diskursiven und materiellen Konstruktionen 'schwarzer' Körperlichkeiten in den USA"

KATHARINA HERING (George Mason University), "The History of Genealogical Research Tracing Pennsylvania German Ancestors Between 1891 and Today"

S. MARINA JONES (University of North Carolina), "Outsiders from Within: Afro-German Men in Rhineland-Palatinate, 1945–1995"

NORA KREUZENBECK (Universität Erfurt), "Die Stellung der Haitianischen Revolution im Diskurs des Amerikanischen Südens, 1791–1865"

CONSTANZE KUTSCHKER (Universität Jena), "Schuldkonfrontation als Kollektiverfahrung? Zum Umgang der Alliierten mit den Deutschen 1944/45"

NICOLE I. KVALE (University of Wisconsin, Madison), "Emigrant Trains: Migratory Transportation Networks through Germany and North America, 1847–1914"

CORNELIA MATZEN (Universität Hamburg), "Bella Fromm—Eine politische Biographie"

KAREN A. MOZINGO (Ohio State University), "Choreographing the Border Spaces of Exile: German-American Embodiment in the Dance Works of Valeska Gert, Lotte Goslar, and Pola Nirenska"

GABRIELE G.E. PAULIX (Universität Hamburg), "'Architecture makes a good Ambassador'—Neubauten für U.S. Information Centers im Nachkriegsdeutschland"

KATHARINA RIETZLER (University College London), "American Foundations and the 'Scientific Study of International Relations' in Europe (1920–1939)"

ANNE-CHRISTIN SAß (Freie Universität Berlin), "Lebenswelten jüdischer Migranten im Berlin der Weimarer Republik (1918–1933)"

MORITZ SIEMANN (Universität Tübingen), "Der gedachte Krieg: Die Entstehung eines Feindbildes seit dem deutsch-amerikanischen Manila-Konflikt von 1898 und das Dilemma der Deutschamerikaner"

INTERNSHIP RECIPIENTS

The GHI was fortunate to have a number of excellent interns who made valuable contributions to our work. The interns conducted research in libraries and archives, helped prepare and run conferences, assisted editors, librarians, and administrators, and cheerfully performed all other tasks that came their way. For their excellent work we would like to thank Malina Emmerink (University of Hamburg), Nadja Ridder (Bochum University), Hubert Seliger (Augsburg University), René Städtler, and Iris Zschiedrich (both Technical University Chemnitz).

STAFF CHANGES

CAROLA DIETZE, Research Fellow, joined the Institute in November 2006. She studied history, sociology, philosophy, and Slavic languages at Göttingen, St. Petersburg, Cambridge, and Groningen. She was a doctoral student at the Max-Planck-Institute of History at Göttingen and received her Ph.D. from the Georg-August-Universität Göttingen in 2005. Until November 2006, she worked as a Postdoctoral Fellow in the *Graduiertenkolleg* "Transnational Media-Events from Early Modern Times to the Present" at the Justus-Liebig-Universität Giessen. Her dissertation is an

intellectual biography of Helmuth Plessner, focusing on his emigration to the Netherlands, his return to Germany in 1951, and his experiences as a former emigrant in the early years of the Federal Republic. It received the Hedwig Hintze Dissertation Award of the German Historical Association in 2006. In September 2006, it was published under the title *Nachgeholtes Leben: Helmuth Plessner 1892–1985* (Wallstein-Verlag, Göttingen). Her new research project focuses on terrorism in nineteenth-century Europe and the United States (see the *GHI Research* section of this *Bulletin*). Her research interests include German and American history in the nineteenth century, the history of the media and of social radicalism, the history of the emigration and remigration after 1933, intellectual history, and historiography.

THRINE KANE, Project Associate, worked on the “German History in Documents and Images” project since February 2005. She performed editing and proofreading duties, handled permission requests, and worked on translations. Thrine holds a Master’s degree in German and European Studies from the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. She left the GHI at the beginning of April 2007 to take a position in the public sector.

ANGELA LAINE, Receptionist from 1994 to 2006, retired from the GHI in December 2006.

SIMONE LÄSSIG, Research Fellow since October 2002, left the GHI in October 2006 to accept a position as Director of the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research in Braunschweig and Professor of modern history at the University of Braunschweig. She can be reached at Laessig@gei.de.

CHRISTOF MAUCH, who joined the GHI as Deputy Director in January 1998 and headed the Institute since September 1999, left the GHI in April 2007 to take up the Chair in North American History at the Amerika-Institut of Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Munich.

KAREN OSLUND, Visiting Research Fellow since September 2004, left the GHI in June 2006 to accept a position as Assistant Professor of World History at Towson University in Towson, Maryland. She can be reached at koslund@towson.edu.

DIRK SCHUMANN, Deputy Director since June 2002, left the GHI in December 2006 to accept a position as Professor of History at Jacobs University Bremen (previously International University Bremen).

JONATHAN SKOLNIK, Editor, left the GHI to teach full-time at Virginia Commonwealth University in Richmond, Virginia.

EVENTS

LECTURE SERIES, SPRING 2007

EMPIRE IN GERMAN AND AMERICAN HISTORY

The quest for empire is not always acknowledged by those who pursue it. Germany openly espoused imperial ambitions at several points in its history before other powers reined it in. The United States has time and again refused to label itself an empire even when its exercise of power beyond its borders has taken on many hallmarks of imperial rule. This lecture series will explore the multifaceted concept of empire through the examples provided by German and American history. All lectures are held at the German Historical Institute. Refreshments are served at 6 pm. Lectures begin at 6:30 pm.

- March 1 *Globalization and Nation: The German Empire until 1918*
Sebastian Conrad (Free University Berlin)
- March 8 *Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors*
Charles Maier (Harvard University)
- March 29 *Empire by Land or Sea: Germany's Imperial Imaginary*
Geoff Eley (University of Michigan)
- April 19 *Irresistible Empire? America's Global Cultural Attraction*
Victoria De Grazia (Columbia University)
- May 10 *Colonialism and German Notions of Empire, 1918–1945*
Birthe Kundrus (Hamburg Institute for Social Research)

EVENTS SPONSORED BY THE GHI, 2007–08

For a regularly updated calendar of events, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org.

2007

- January 29 The Five Germans He Has Known: Symposium in Honor of Fritz Stern
Event at the Westin Embassy Row Hotel, Washington, DC
Conveners: Gerald Livingston (GHI), Jeff Andersen (Georgetown University), and Jackson Janes (AICGS)
- February 14 Presentation of the Helmut Schmidt Prize, at the GHI
Convener: Christof Mauch (GHI)
- February 16–18 Histories of the Aftermath: The European “Postwar” in Comparative Perspective
Conference at the University of California, San Diego
Conveners: Frank Biess (UC California, San Diego), Robert Moeller (UC California, Irvine), and Gisela Mettele (GHI)
- February 21 Arnold Brecht (1884–1977): Demokratischer Beamter und politischer Wissenschaftler in Berlin und New York
Book Presentation, Berlin
Conveners: Corinna Unger (GHI) and Claus-Dieter Krohn (Hamburg)
- March 21 Max Weber: A Passionate Thinker
Lecture and Discussion at the Goethe-Institut
Speakers: Joachim Radkau (University of Bielefeld) and Lawrence Scaff (University of California, Berkeley)
Convener: Gisela Mettele (GHI)
- March 22–25 Environmental History and the Cold War
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: John McNeill (Georgetown University) and Corinna Unger (GHI)
- March 29—April 1 Beyond the Nation: U.S. History in Transnational Perspective
Young Scholars Forum, at the University of Texas at Arlington
Conveners: Thomas Adam (University of Texas at Arlington) and Uwe Lübken (GHI)
- April 21 Epitaph for the Bonn Republic: Habermas’s Mature Political Theory, 1985–1995
Mid-Atlantic German History Seminar, at the GHI
Speaker: Matthew Specter (Duke University)
Convener: Marion Deshmukh (George Mason University)

- April 30 "The Lives of Others": East Germany Revisited?
Symposium at the GHI
Convener: Bernd Schaefer (GHI)
- May 2 New European Dynamics in Promoting Science and Humanities: Challenges and Opportunities for the United States and Europe
Panel Discussion at the German Embassy
- May 2–5 German History, 1945–1990
Thirteenth Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar, at the GHI
Conveners: Roger Chickering (Georgetown University) and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)
- May 4 Mies van der Rohe's Martin Luther King Jr. Memorial Library: An Exhibition of Photographs by Colin Loughlin
Opening Reception at the GHI
- May 11–12 Mass Migration and Urban Governance: Cities in the United States and in Central Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Marcus Gräser (University of Frankfurt/NEH-GHI Fellow), Daniel Czitrom (Mount Holyoke College/NEH Fellow) and Gisela Mettele (GHI)
- May 17–19 Gender, War, and Politics: The Wars of Revolution and Liberation—Transatlantic Comparisons, 1775–1820
Conference at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Conveners: Gisela Mettele (GHI) and Karen Hagemann (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill)
- May 18–19 The Uses of Immigrant Letters
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Wolfgang Helbich (Bochum) and Anke Ortlepp (GHI)
- May 20 and 27 Thomas Keneally's "Either Or"
Panel Discussion with the Audience, Theater J, DC Jewish Community Center
Conveners: Gisela Mettele (GHI) and Ari Roth (Theater J)
- May 22 Eighth Bucerius Lecture, in Washington DC
Speaker: Joschka Fischer
- June 5–9 GHI-sponsored Panel at the Fourth Conference of the European Society for Environmental History, Amsterdam
Panelists: Uwe Lübken (GHI), Dorothee Brantz (SUNY Buffalo), and Sonja Dümpelmann (Auburn University), chaired by Christof Mauch (LMU Munich)
- June 20–23 Toward a New Transatlantic Space? Changing Perceptions of Identity, Belonging, and Space in the Atlantic World
Conference in Leipzig
Conveners: Hartmut Keil (Leipzig) and Corinna Unger (GHI)

- June 25—July 6 Archival Summer Seminar in Germany
Convener: Corinna Unger (GHI)
- July 12–14 Local, Regional, and Global Constructions of Christianity:
Religious Communication Networks, 1680–1830
Conference at the GHI London
Conveners: Andreas Gestrich (GHI London) and Gisela Mettele (GHI)
- July 21 Michael Frayn’s “Democracy”
Panel Discussion with the audience, Olney Theater
Conveners: Gerald Livingston (GHI) and Gisela Mettele (GHI)
- September 6–8 Reading Hamburg: Anglo-American Perspectives
Conference at the Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte in Hamburg (FZH)
Conveners: Axel Schildt (FZH/Universität Hamburg), Christoph Strupp (GHI), and Dorothee Wierling (FZH/Universität Hamburg)
- September 13–14 Pleasure, Power and Everyday Life under National Socialism
Conference at the GHI Paris
Conveners: Fabrice d’Almeida (IHTP, Paris), Corey Ross (Univ. of Birmingham), Pamela Swett (McMaster University), and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)
- September 13–15 Uncertain Environments: Natural Hazards, Risk, and Insurance in Historical Perspective
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Uwe Lübken (GHI) and Christof Mauch (University of Munich)
- October 4–6 Caribbean Encounters: A German Missionary’s Discovery of the New World
GHI-sponsored Panel at the Annual Meeting of the German Studies Association, San Diego
Convener: Gisela Mettele
- October 5–7 “A Humanitarian as Broad as the World”: Abraham Lincoln’s Legacy in International Context
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Gabor Boritt (Gettysburg College), Uwe Lübken (GHI), and Jörg Nagler (University of Jena)
- October 11–14 Medieval History Seminar
Conveners: Carola Dietze (GHI) and Karsten Plöger (GHI London)
- October 18–20 Fourth Conference of the International Society for First World War Studies
Hosted by the GHI
- November 15 Twenty-First Annual Lecture of the GHI
Speaker: James J. Sheehan (Stanford University)

- November 16 Sixteenth Annual Symposium of the Friends of the GHI and Award of the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize
Conveners: Gerald Feldman (Friends of the GHI) and Gisela Mettele (GHI)
- December 6–8 Connecting Atlantic, Indian Ocean, China Seas, and Pacific Migration, 1830s to 1930s
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Gisela Mettele (GHI), Marcel van der Linden (International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam), Donna Gabbacia (Immigration History Research Center, Minneapolis), and Dirk Hoerder (Arizona State University)

2008

- January 25–27 Transregional and Transnational Families
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Gisela Mettele (GHI) and David Sabean (UCLA)
- February 21–23 Natural Resources and Reserves in History
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Uwe Lübken (GHI) and Frank Uekötter (Deutsches Museum München)
- May 28–31 German History, 1500–1800
Fourteenth Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar, at the Free University, Berlin
Conveners: Roger Chickering (Georgetown University), Claudia Ulbrich (FU Berlin), and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)
- Spring 2008 Why Terrorists Stop: Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Global Comparison
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Timothy J. Naftali (Nixon Presidential Library) and Christof Mauch (University of Munich)

GHI PUBLICATIONS

PUBLICATIONS OF THE GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE
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- Vol. 1: Hartmut Lehmann and James J. Sheehan, eds., *An Interrupted Past: German-Speaking Refugee Historians in the United States After 1933*. New York, 1991.
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- 25 (Fall 1999) Feature articles: Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, "Turning to the Atlantic: The Federal Republic's Ideological Reorientation, 1945–1970" (12th Annual Lecture of the GHI, November 12, 1998); Charles S. Maier, "Mehr Sozialgeschichte wagen" (Comment on the Annual Lecture).
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- 33 (Fall 2003) Feature articles: Rita Süßmuth, "People on the Move: The Challenges of Migration in Transatlantic Perspective" (Third Gerd Bucerius Lecture, May 5, 2003); Joachim Radkau, "Exceptionalism in European Environmental History"; John R. McNeill, "Theses on Radkau"; A. James McAdam, "Transitional Justice After 1989: Is Germany so Different?"
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