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Germany and the United States may stand at the center of the GHI’s research program, but they have never been treated in isolation. Many of the projects and conferences the GHI supports focus on the broader transatlantic community. Conferences such as “Natural Disasters and Cultural Strategies” and “Historical Justice in International Perspective” have explored the particular national experiences of events, developments, and trends that transcend national borders. In collaboration with our colleagues at the German Historical Institute in London, we have also gathered scholars from across the globe on three occasions to reflect on the theory and practice of world history. The third of these conferences, held in Washington in the spring of 2005, focused on teaching world history. This issue of the Bulletin features the keynote lecture on the problem of conceptualizing world history by Arif Dirlik that opened the conference. World history, Professor Dirlik persuasively argues, is defined as much by the perspective it promotes—by its insistent questioning of established analytical categories and its focus on complexity—as by its subject matter.

Like Dirlik’s model world historian, Timothy Garton Ash has devoted his career to challenging conventional ways of looking at the world. As a chronicler-participant in Eastern Europe’s independent civic initiatives during the 1980s, Garton Ash explained to readers in the West the alternative vision of a united and democratic Europe espoused by groups such as Poland’s Solidarity and activists like Vaclav Havel. With that vision now largely realized in the expanded European Union, Garton Ash has turned his attention to the broader ramifications of European integration. Thanks to the generous support of the ZEIT Stiftung Gerd und Ebelin Bucerius, the GHI was able to invite Professor Garton Ash to Washington to share his thoughts on relations between the enlarged Europe and the United States. True to form, Garton Ash called prevailing opinion into question by arguing against the widely held view that the transatlantic partnership has outlived its usefulness. The EU and the United States, he contends, can and should work together as strategic partners in building “an international community of democracies”.

Professor Garton Ash’s lecture was typical of many of the GHI’s public events in bringing a historical perspective to contemporary issues and debates. Highlighting the pertinence of the past for the present was certainly one of the main objectives of the panel discussion the GHI organized last winter on the German suppression of the Herero uprising of 1904. German colonial forces employed not only conventional military tactics against the Hereros but also resorted to measures such as poison-
ing water sources and cutting off access to food. This horrific chapter in the history of German imperialism is the subject of current political discussion in both Germany and Namibia. At issue is not only the question of memory and commemoration, but also more immediately tangible matters such as aid policy and financial reparations. The suppression of the Herero revolt is also directly pertinent to ongoing debates on the definition of genocide and the use of military force against noncombatants. Three essays based upon presentations delivered at the panel discussion “The Measure of Atrocity: The German War Upon the Hereros” appear in this issue of the Bulletin. Isabel Hull examines the military background to the German response to the Herero uprising. Gesine Krüger considers the contemporary import of colonial-era violence in Africa. Jürgen Zimmerer situates the massacre of the Hereros within the history of twentieth-century genocide.

The GHI’s panel discussions and lecture programs serve as a forum for dialogue between the scholarly community and the broader public. Public outreach is an important part of the GHI’s mission. It thus was a great pleasure to offer the services of GHI research fellows Bernd Schaefer and Astrid Eckert on the two occasions this summer that producers at PBS’s “NewsHour with Jim Lehrer” called to ask if the GHI had someone on hand to help explain the day’s events from a historical perspective. The GHI has also been featured in the German press recently. Early this summer, several radio stations and newspapers, including the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, reported at length on the conferences “Animals in History: Studying the Not So Human Past,” held at the Literaturhaus Köln and “Turning Points in Environmental History,” jointly organized by the GHI and the University of Bielefeld’s Center for Interdisciplinary Studies.

One recent public program had particular resonance for the GHI’s staff and many longtime supporters. The conference “War in an Age of Revolution” opened with a panel discussion on the concept of total war that provided occasion to pay tribute to one of the initiators of the GHI’s series of conferences on total war, GHI founding director Hartmut Lehmann. This event probably came as close as any could to reflecting the diversity of Professor Lehmann’s scholarly interests. He has written widely on the cultural history of the early modern era as well on the points of intersection in the histories of Europe and the United States. Professor Lehmann recently retired as director of the Max-Planck-Institut für Geschichte; he has used his newfound leisure since then to devote himself to a demanding regimen of writing, research, and guest teaching. My colleagues and I join in wishing Hartmut Lehmann all the best.

Christof Mauch  
Director
PERFORMING THE WORLD:
REALITY AND REPRESENTATION IN THE MAKING OF
WORLD HISTOR(IES)

Keynote address at the “Teaching World History” conference at the GHI, March 3, 2005

Arif Dirlik
University of Oregon

I will take up a question here that has intruded insistently into my thinking in recent years as I have contemplated the writing and teaching of world history, a question that arises out of the contradictory demands on our conceptualizations of the world of a fluid global situation. This is the question of how best to conceive and organize the spatialities of the world in its historical formations so as to answer to the demands both of a critical historiography and the public-pedagogical functions of history.¹ The question is one that bears more heavily on the pedagogical functions of world history, I think, than on its historiographical premises and implications.

First, a caveat: I have never undertaken to write a history of the world, or thought of myself as a “world historian.” What I have done is to write critically of the practice of world history: of the world conquest and ideological structures that produced the notion of “world history” in the first place; of the hegemonic implications of the idea when viewed from perspectives outside of Euroamerica; of the closely connected methodological and ideological problems presented by the spatial and temporal presuppositions that almost inevitably shape all world histories; and, lastly but perhaps most importantly from a personal standpoint, of the naive political and ideological hopes invested in world histories, motivated most recently by visions of a global multiculturalism, that perpetuate those presuppositions unreflectively and contribute to the very problems that they wish to overcome. These criticisms have been intended not to undermine the necessity of a global vision in historical analysis, or the practice of world history as such, but rather to challenge complacent acquiescence in its virtues and to provoke confrontation of the ideological implications of different ways of organizing (or “performing”) the past, including the very idea of “the world” as an organizing principle of history. The ideological implications of practices that on the
surface appear to be merely historiographical are of the utmost impor-
tance in critical historical writing. They may be of even greater moment
in the teaching of history, which is the issue that this paper is intended to
address.

It seems to me that there are two major reasons for the practice of
world history. One is historiographical. A world or global perspective
makes for better history: first, because it enables the pursuit of historical
phenomena and processes across boundaries of all kinds, vastly expand-
ing the spaces available for inquiry and explanation; second, because it
opens up historical vision to the proliferation of spatialities and therefore
temporalities, and allows for a more complex understanding of the pro-
cesses of history; and third, in the cognizance of totality that it enforces,
it enables a more critical historical consciousness. World history, in other
words, is not just a subject matter; it is also a methodology that at once
complements and challenges other ways of doing history.

The second, equally important reason to practice world history is to
foster among students and the general public (not to speak of many of our
fellow historians) an appreciation of the political, economic, and cultural
configurations of the world and of how they came to be—an appreciation
that may be essential to living in a world where differences among hu-
mans have acquired unavoidable visibility in their very entanglement,
which is the condition of what I have described elsewhere as Global
Modernity. Such appreciation is a necessity not just of teaching in the
narrow sense of schooling, but as public pedagogy. And it is profoundly
political in its implications.

The contradictory demands presented by the historiographical and
the public-pedagogical are most readily apparent in the ways in which
we spatialize the past, which will be the focus of this discussion. It is my
sense that there is a tendency in most world history writing to take as the
point of departure for historical analysis modern conceptions of historical
spaces, most prominently nations, civilizations, and on occasion even
cultures. There are good historiographical reasons for doing so. After all,
one of the fundamental tasks of history is to find in the past clues to the
economic, social, political, and cultural formations of the present. Con-
trary to premature declarations of their impending demise, nations and
civilizations still represent the fullest articulations of these formations.
“Artifices” of history do not lose their historical significance—the power
to shape history—simply because they are demonstrably artifices of his-
tory. Civilizations, nations, cultures, and continents may all be constructs
of modernity; nevertheless, they have been essential in giving modernity
its shape and meaning. The organization of the world around these spa-
tialities is part of our consciousness, as should be apparent from the
considerable effort it takes to imagine how the world might look other-
wise, which, ultimately, is the task of historical deconstruction. These spatialities present a problem that needs to be investigated, not dismissed. The goal is to historicize them so as to reveal the spatialities (and the temporalities that go with them) that are suppressed when nations, cultures, civilizations, and continents are rendered into reified subjects of history.

Still, the most compelling reason for such “presentism,” if I may describe it as such, is the necessity of meeting the public obligations of history: education in the formation of the world as we know it, and as it is presently organized, which may enable us to better understand its workings and problems. In a recent paper, Jerry Bentley refers to this requirement as a “moral responsibility.” Whether we conceive of citizenship nationally or globally, the responsible conduct of citizenship requires some knowledge of where continents and nations are located, how different pasts have produced different social and political structures or the different value systems we call cultures, traditions, or civilizations, and how these continue to shape behavior in all its dimensions.

On the other hand, the very reaffirmation of the spaces of nations and civilizations not only serves to legitimate the spaces of contemporary configurations of power and their projections upon the past, but also, for the same reason, reverses the historical processes that produced those configurations. Spaces implied by nations and civilizations are products rather than subjects of complex historical interactions. Greater emphasis on these interactions and the proliferation of spaces it demands yields a far more complicated, albeit anarchic, conception of world history.

This perspective, too, is a necessity (if not actually a product) of a world dynamized by phenomena that are increasingly more difficult to contain within conventional political and cultural spaces. And it makes for better, as well as educationally more challenging, history. But it comes at the cost of relegating to the background—philosophically if not historiographically—the spatialities and temporalities that have been informed by the organization of the modern world, the historical consciousness they have fashioned, and the powerful part they have played in the formation of political and cultural identities. There is a “moral responsibility” here, too, but one that calls for a different kind of historical vision and is informed by a different kind of politics.

This may be one important reason why the practice of world history is presently haunted by questions that refuse to go away in spite of world history’s obvious historiographical and ethical/political promises. There is more than one way to think, write, and teach world history, with different historiographical and political premises and implications, and what makes the most sense from one perspective may seem threatening from another. I am most interested here in confronting the historiographi-
cal with the public/political consequences of one version of organizing
the past: world history organized around nations and civilizations. This
approach to world history also foregrounds a recognition that the prob-
lems of world history are problems of history in general at the present
conjunction. We are all quite familiar with the controversies over “na-
tional history standards” and their entanglement in the so-called “culture
wars” in the United States. Not only are problems of world history akin
to problems of national history, but the one is very much a part of the
other. If world history may possibly have more profound implications, it
is because it raises questions concerning the very viability, or possibility,
of history as we have known it.

There are different modes of conceiving and approaching world his-
tory. One is simply an add-on mode, viewing world history simply as one
mode of doing history that makes no claims on other modes, but simply
provides another version of the world, coexisting with other modes in
more or less mutual disregard. I may be corrected on this, but it is my
sense that this is pretty much the situation with the practice of world
history in the United States. Where the teaching of world history has
found acceptance—as in my department at the University of Oregon, for
example—it still coexists with so-called Western Civilization (and is
taught most of the time as another globalized version of the latter). I may
even be drawing too rosy a picture. Not many of us practice world history
in research and writing, and not many of us want to teach it either.
Having to teach world history probably provokes more complaint than
any other task among university faculty in departments of history, at least
in my experience.

A second mode of approaching world history is as a context for
national and civilizational histories, indispensable to understanding
their formations and dynamics. There is no denial here of the autonomy of
either national or civilizational histories, or their claims to particularity,
but only an insistence on “worlding” them: bringing them into the world,
and bringing the world into them, so to speak. World-history-as-context
and the better understanding of national or civilizational history it pro-
vides may be the most common legitimation offered in the promotion of
world-history-as-practice. And this is what most world history textbooks
seek to offer. World-history-as-context itself may be the most contested
for the very same reason. World-history-as-context is not in and of itself
inconsistent with claims to national or civilizational supremacy, as it may
provide an occasion for rendering either nation or civilization into the
central moment of world history. This, of course, is what presently invites
the charge of Eurocentrism against many a world history text—and not
necessarily only those texts published in the United States and Europe. It
is also reminiscent to me personally of the world history textbooks we
were educated on in Turkey, in which Central Asia appeared as the geographical center (and source) of the world, and Turks as an ur-people.

An alternative deployment of world-history-as-context, a response to Eurocentrism, is one that seeks to de-center all nations and civilizations, including one’s own. Jerry Bentley, who has been a foremost advocate of world history, describes this approach as “ecumenical” world history. The term “context” may not be entirely appropriate here, as world history becomes its own goal. On the other hand, this approach does not necessarily abandon spatialities of nations and civilizations as organizing principles of the past, and is unable to that extent to entirely abolish its own standpoint in a particular nation or civilization (in addition to being caught up in the vocabulary of the cultural, as in “cross-cultural,” which presents its own problems of reification). Hence the calls in recent years for the substitution of “global” for world history, which do not seem to have provoked much response, probably because their assumption of the possibility of spatial transcendence is not very convincing, and may in fact serve to reintroduce Eurocentrism by the back door.

The third and final mode of conceiving world history I would like to take up here is what I will describe as world-history-as-totality, in which the world or the globe becomes the ultimate frame of reference in the investigation and explanation of the forces shaping the past and the present. It is this radical option that in my view both necessitates the practice of world history and renders it highly problematic. Rather than organizing the world in terms of the spaces of nations and civilizations, this perspective calls for a view of nations and civilizations in their historicity, not only as possessing beginnings and endings of their own, but as being by their very nature more process than finished product. Unlike in the advocacy of global history, if I understand it correctly, the issue here is not to find a transcendent perspective that defies concrete grounding and supersedes spatial partiality. It is rather to confront the contingencies and ground-level processes of human activity with the structures that are at once the products and the conditions of that activity. The most obvious examples of this kind of world history would be those informed by a Marxist-inspired world-system analysis.

I would like to suggest here, however, that we need to go a step beyond world-system analysis in order to fulfill the promise of world-history-as-totality. In the sense that I am using it here, world-history-as-totality is intended to refer not just to abstract structural totalities, but even more importantly to a perspective that demands deconstruction—most importantly, historicization—of the spaces that conventionally have been rendered into containers of history; not just nations and civilizations, but such structural totalities as capital. World-system analysis has made seminal contributions to our understanding of the formation and
dynamics of civilizations and nations, but remains itself at an abstract level in its conceptualizations of space primarily in terms of the operations of markets and capital. What we need is greater attentiveness to human activity—from travel to social movements to the construction of social spaces implied by such concepts as class, gender, and ethnicity—in the construction of historical spaces.

World-history-as-totality ultimately is most radical in its theoretical and methodological implications because it calls for the proliferation of space in historical analysis (beyond those of economic, cultural, and political power) and for recognition of the historical interaction between many spaces that produce, but are also conditioned by, structural totalities of various kinds: from nations and empires to the world-systems of capital. Ethnic and diasporic spaces are prime examples in our day of such spaces that often are described, somewhat misleadingly in my opinion, as “transnational” spaces. Such spaces preceded in their existence the emergence of nations; they may not be of equal significance to all parts of the nation, in which case they may help undermine its unity and homogeneity, and they are quite likely to outlast the nation as we have known it. Translocal, I think, is a better (because both more grounded and more flexible) term to describe the motions that create these spaces. The move from the transnational to the translocal involves more than choice of vocabulary; it carries us from one conceptual realm, that of nations and civilizations, to another: that of places.

Historiographically speaking, what makes world histories based on conventional spatialities of nations or civilizations (or cultures, as they are sometimes described euphemistically), or even world systems, seem retrograde these days is that these spatialities have become increasingly questionable in the present, raising questions about their deployment in the past. This is by no means to state that they are irrelevant politically, intellectually, or historiographically. What is in question is whether they are autonomous subjects of history or subjects to history themselves, with all the temporal and spatial implications of such subjection. Let me illustrate by referring to some problems in the study of China, Asia, and Islam, corresponding respectively to issues of nation, continent, and civilization. I will take up issues of world-system analysis in the course of these illustrations. I choose these three because they have been of concern to me in my work, but also because they play a major part in contemporary geopolitics.

The “idea” of China has acquired considerable complexity in recent years, presenting unprecedented challenges in the writing and teaching of Chinese history. The complexity itself is not novel; I derive the term “idea of China” from the title of a book by Andrew March, published three decades ago. China as an imagined entity that has assumed dif-
ifferent characteristics over time has been the subject of many a splendid study, from Raymond Dawson’s *The Chinese Chameleon* to Harold Isaacs’s *Scratches on Our Minds*. The fact that such studies are still called for and produced may also alert us to continued resistance among the general public (here or in China) as well as among scholars to viewing China historically.

The present poses its own challenges. The knowledge of changing images of China was not accompanied in the past by any radical questioning of the realities of China or of being Chinese. Until only a generation ago, the dominant historical paradigm identified China with the boundaries of so-called “Mainland China,” saw in the unfolding of the past the formation—in its more culturalist guises, the articulation—of an identifiable “Chineseness,” and viewed regions and regionalism as legacies to be overcome in the process of nation-building. China in this paradigm was not just a nation, it was a civilization, with a “great tradition” continuing from the earliest times to the present, possibly matched only by India: “five thousand years of civilization,” as the common cliche would have it. It is fair to say that despite all their other differences, Chinese and non-Chinese historians shared this common paradigm.

The culturalism—and the cliches—persist, but they face new challenges, not by phenomena that are necessarily novel in themselves, but by older phenomena that have been given a new kind of recognition. Terms such as “Greater” or “Cultural” China that have become commonplaces of contemporary geopolitics implicitly repudiate the identification of the physical boundaries of “China” or “Chineseness” with the mainland. Greater China brings in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the populations of Chinese origin in Southeast Asia, while Cultural China is global in scope and, in its reference to a so-called Chinese diaspora that somehow retains a fundamental cultural Chineseness, withstands the very forces of history. Such a notion of Chineseness carries with it strong racial presuppositions. The new visions of China and Chineseness are at once imperial in spatial pretensions and deconstructive in their consequences. Spatial expansion of notions of Chineseness brings historical differences into the very interior of the idea of China, calling into question the idea of China as the articulation of a national or civilizational space marked either by a common destiny or a homogeneous culture. The “China Reconstructs” of an earlier day has been transformed in the title of a more recent study into “China Deconstructs,” foregrounding the emergent importance of regional differences against pretensions to national unity. And this is not just the doing of non-Chinese scholars of China: The most important challenges to the idea of national or civilizational unity and homogeneity come from Taiwan and Hong Kong, bent on asserting their local identities.
against Beijing’s imperial ambitions over territories deemed to be “historically” Chinese.

Ideologically speaking, however, it seems to me that the more important effect of these new conceptualizations of Chinese spaces is in fact the questioning of the historical claim that the history of China may be grasped in terms of an expansion from the Central Plains outward. In fact, it may be that looking from the borderlands in is crucial to understanding the formation of so-called Chinese culture, which may be understood as a unified culture only in the sense of variations on common themes. There is an important recognition here that earlier textbook as well as popular notions of Chinese culture identified Chinese culture with a textual culture, and textual culture with a national identity as Chinese, meaning mostly the culture of the elite. Such identification has done much to disguise the complexity of Eastern Asian cultural formations that has persisted despite political colonization from imperial centers, which also suggests that the cultural formations of this region are best grasped in ecumenical terms rather than by extending to the past claims of recent origin, most importantly nationalism.

I do not need to belabor here that similar problems plague the very idea of Asia, which is even more obviously a creation of modern Europeans (even if the term itself goes back to the ancient Greeks or Mesopotamians). It was through Jesuit maps that Chinese of the Ming Dynasty found themselves in Asia, and even that did not matter much until the nineteenth century, when knowledge of geographical location appeared as a necessity of political survival for the Qing. Until the modern period, knowledge of what passed for Asia was knowledge of limited spaces produced by states but also by merchants and travelers. It is fair to say that Marco Polo’s Asia was not Ibn Battuta’s Asia was not Rabban Sauma’s Asia or, going back a millennium in time, Faxian or Xuanzang’s Asia. Whether we speak of premodern world systems or political states, Asia consisted of localized spaces—either for outsiders or for insiders. Notions of inside and outside are themselves products of modern delineation of spaces; accounts of human motions such as those cited above mark passage from one place to another (kingdoms, cities, Buddhist monasteries, etc.), but as far as I am aware, not one account speaks of the crossing of continental boundaries. These spaces were endowed with different significations, moreover, depending on the motives and activities that produced them, so that the same spaces carried multiple meanings—all of them contrasting with the reductionist homogeneity of modern “scientific” mapping.

The multiple “world-systems” Janet Abu-Lughod has identified for thirteenth-century Eurasia suggests some overarching order of world-systems and their interactions in the delineation of spaces stretching from
one end of Eurasia to the other, including large parts of Africa. It is important, however, not to allow the abstract structures suggested by motions of commodities to cover over and erase these other spaces that coexisted with, and created perturbations within and across, the boundaries of world-systems and contributed to their structuring. It is even more important to underline here that world-systems, conceived in terms of national or civilizational entities such as the Mongol, Arabic, Byzantine, and Ottoman Empires, or Song-Yuan-Ming China, or the kingdoms of the Indian subcontinent, not be allowed to cover over the immense differences within the territories designated by these political entities. Significantly, Abu-Lughod’s preferred term is “circuits,” referring to networks and their nodes rather than entire surfaces. How these “networks” contributed to the formation of the political entities indicated by those terms is a fundamental question that has priority over the more common practice of describing the networks in terms of the political entities, which puts the formation of these entities before some of the crucial processes that went into their making.

These complexities in the notion of Asia persist to this day, ultimately undermining confidence in the possibility of defining such an entity or delineating its boundaries. The appearance or reappearance of a discourse of Asian values since the 1980s in its identification of those values with values that are at best national or regional in origin only underlines the fragmented nature of the notion of Asia. The idea is to be understood at best as a utopian ideal and therefore as another mode of constructing Asia that has many hurdles to overcome before it is realized. On the other hand, the very effort is indicative of the historical reality and significance the idea of Asia has acquired, regardless of who initially constructed it and where and when it was constructed. I am not referring here only to the persistence of Orientalist notions of Asia in Euroamerica or the reification of Asia in elite and state ideologies in Asia itself, but to more radical efforts to find “Asian” alternatives to Euroamerican hegemony that acknowledge the fragmented nature of Asia and seek on that basis to produce a more dynamic conception that brings unity and difference together dialectically.

The third case I would like to use by way of illustration is Islam. It is not just George W. Bush, Samuel Huntington, Benjamin Barber, evangelical Christians, or fundamentalist Moslems who reify Islam, taking it out of history as a civilization or a deviation from it. In the aftermath of September 11, a hue and cry went up all over U.S. campuses about the need to find out more about Islam. Those who led the demand were usually liberal scholars, including specialists on Islam, or various Islamic societies. In another example of identifying a “civilization” with a text, the University of North Carolina even made selections from the Koran a
required assignment for the orientation of incoming freshmen, and got sued in the process. Within my immediate circles, everyone wanted to bring an Islam specialist onto the faculty. Few thought or said anything about an Afghan, a Central Asian, or a Saudi historian who might have something to say about concrete circumstances that produce terrorists: struggles within Islamic societies over political, cultural, and social differences, the entanglement of those struggles within a history of imperialism, and resentments bred currently by U.S. colonialism and imperialism, including cultural imperialism, against a modernity dominated by the same powers that have colonized the many worlds of Islam for more than a century, and continue to do so with the complicity of native elites. Peter van der Veer has written of the importance of nationalism in the religious revival in India. The relationship between nationalism and a civilization conceived in religious terms is also very much at issue here. It is a contradictory relationship, a relationship of unity and opposition, that is further exacerbated by class, gender, and ethnic divisions that are as important in so-called Islamic societies as in others. And yet these problems are routinely ignored in the reification of Islam when it is clear that such reification no longer serves the purposes, as it might have a millennium earlier, of unifying either a divided world of Islamic societies or their historical "Other," the equally divided world of Christianity.

I do not need to remind readers of the historicity of Islam, in the sense both of its temporal transformations and its spatial diversity. Even in Samuel Huntington’s delineation of civilizations, Islam stands out for the impossibility of locating it within identifiable boundaries. Aziz Al-Azmeh’s Islams and Modernities, to cite one outstanding example, has made a cogent case for the diversity both of Islam and Islamic modernities. Where factionalism is not suppressed by the domination of one or another sect, Islam is divided into competing and conflicting factions, as is quite evident in the tragic case of Iraq, or in the competition among sects that has marked the recent Islamic resurgence in Turkey. The evidence of history, once again, seems unable to overcome the weight of established traditions: not traditions of Islam, but traditions of scholarship and popular imagination.

My rehearsal of the historicity, boundary instabilities, and internal differences—if not fragmentations—of nations, civilizations, and continents is intended to underline the historiographically problematic nature of world histories organized around such units. These entities are products of efforts to bring political or conceptual order to the world—political and conceptual strategies of containment, so to speak. This order is achieved only at the cost of suppressing alternative spatialities and temporalities, however, as well as covering over processes that went into
their making. A world history organized around these entities itself inevitably partakes of these same suppressions and cover-ups.

It may not be very surprising that as global forces, including forces of empire, produce economic and cultural processes and human actions that undermine modernity’s strategies of containment, we have witnessed a proliferation of spaces, as well as of claims to different temporalities. Perhaps it is living in a state of flux that predisposes intellectuals presently to stress motion and process over stable containers; traveling theorists are given to traveling theories, as cultural critics from Edward Said to James Clifford have suggested by word or example. What is important is that we are called upon to face an obligation to view the past differently, to open up an awareness of what was suppressed in a historiography of order, and to take note of the importance of human activity, including intellectual and cultural activity, in creating the world. That is what I had in mind when I proposed “performing the world” as the title for this presentation—performing in the sense both of accomplishing the world and representing it, each one an indispensable condition of the other.

At the same time, in a world that seems to be caught up in a maelstrom created by forces that simultaneously produce homogenization and heterogenization, history seems to be receding rapidly into the past, even as the past returns to make claims on the present in a “resurgence of history,” as the French writer Jean-Marie Guehenno puts it in his study of the decline of the authority of the nation-state under the assault of forces of globalization and the resurgence in response of a consciousness of the local. In the world of global modernity, we witness a return of civilizational claims, bolstered, ironically, by the same destabilizing forces of transborder ethnicities and diasporas, and calling for alternative epistemologies and alternative claims to historical consciousness. This is the case not just with the so-called “clashes between civilizations.” Different epistemological claims mark struggles over the future of the same civilization, as in the resurgence of biblical attacks in the United States on science and history, which draw upon works that predate—and, obviously, have survived—the Enlightenment. One such work is the biblical history of the world written by Bishop James Ussher in the seventeenth century, which has been recently reissued. This work, *Annals of the World*, is apparently quite popular among evangelicals, who have used it for inspiration in the construction of the proliferating Creation museums and theme parks across the United States.

One historian of China has written cogently if somewhat simplistically of “rescuing history from the nation”—cogent because the “nationalization” of history has indeed been of primary significance in shaping understanding of the spaces of history, if not the denial of history as
such. A political idea to which the legitimation of history is crucial, the nation has sought to disguise its historicity by projecting itself across the knowable past, a kind of colonization of history that corresponds to nation formation itself as a colonizing process. From a historiographical perspective, a national perspective on the past, including the national past, is woefully inadequate, as some of the most important forces in the shaping of the past transcend national boundaries. The same may be said of a world history that is conceived in terms of nations and civilizations.

The denial of the nation is also simplistic, however, because it does not recognize that while the nation itself is historical, which may make the national space into an “artifice of history,” it nevertheless carries all the force of a historical reality. We may dismiss nations, civilizations, continents, and much else besides as constructs of one sort or another, but there is no denying that despite all the criticism, they refuse to go away. This is partly because of their continued importance in the realities of culture and politics, and partly because of the important place they hold in the political and cultural unconscious, including the unconscious of scholars, who still seem to think nothing of terms like “uniting East and West,” or “Asian perspectives,” to cite two recent examples from my own campus. Besides, the space of the nation is not the only space that history needs to be rescued from, and not all phenomena can be easily understood outside the context of the nation. Some may even suffer a distortion when forced into transnational or translocal frameworks: issues of democracy, citizenship, and civil society readily come to mind. This qualification may be especially important when we consider the public-pedagogical functions of history.

The issue here is not merely national against transnational or world history, but the proliferation of space that attends the deprivileging of conventional modes of conceiving of historical spaces. The very deconstruction of national or civilizational spaces, in other words, raises the question of how to reconstruct history spatially and temporally, if that is indeed a desirable goal. Why put Humpty Dumpty back together again, especially after seeing how much mischief he has done? In many ways, this is a fundamental question facing the practice of world history, which simply respatializes the past, not through a radical reconsideration of the spaces of history, but simply by rearranging existing spaces from a perspective that supposedly transcends them all. An anarchist (rather than a Marxist, as Jerry Bentley would have it) would see right away the consolidation of hegemony that may be at work in such a rearrangement.

The answer throws us back to the pedagogical functions of history, including world history. While we need to insist on a critical appreciation of the past that views nations and civilizations in their historicity, it seems to me that if world history is to achieve its pedagogical functions, we
cannot cavalierly dispense with nations and civilizations in its organization any more than we can do away with national histories in the name of world history, or continents in the name of oceans, localized spatialities, or networks.

Is there any way to bring these critical perspectives into history—in this case, world history—without falling into some kind of postmodern and postcolonial cynicism about past ways of doing history? Here, by way of conclusion, I would like to put forth three considerations.

First, a distinction is necessary, I think, between world history understood as transnational history and world history as a history of the world. The confusion of these two understandings of world history disguises the full significance of challenging national histories. The transnational is not the same as the worldwide. More importantly, perhaps, the other side of challenging national history from supranational perspectives is to bring to the surface subnational histories of various kinds. The radical challenge of transnational history lies in its conjoining of the supra- and the sub- or intranational, which calls forth an understanding of transnational as translocal, with all its subversive historiographical and political implications. If national history serves as an ideological “strategy of containment,” the containment of the translocal (as distinct from the worldwide) as process or structure is of immediate and strategic importance, as it bears directly on the determination and consolidation of national boundaries. The translocal presents challenges that are quite distinct from the multicultural, which has been attached to world history as one of its political and cultural goals. The difference may be between abolishing national history (or at least cutting it down to size among other histories) and placing it within the perspective of the world.

Second, it is necessary to reconceive nations and civilizations not as homogeneous units but as historical ecumenes. This is readily evident in the case of civilizations conceived in terms of religions, from which the term derives. The volume edited by Michael Adas, Islamic and European Expansion: The Forging of a Global Order, provides a good example. Jerry Bentley suggests that an ecumenical approach is necessary to overcoming the Eurocentrism of world history. His intention is most importantly ethical. The concept of “ecumene,” however, may also be translated into a way to grasp spatialities. I would like to suggest here that the idea of the ecumenical may be applied productively to regions, civilizations, and continents, among other large entities, as well as to nations, the important issue being the foregrounding of commonalities as well as differences, and recognizing a multiplicity of spatialities within a common space marked not by firm boundaries but by the intensity and concentration of interactions, which themselves are subject to historical fluctuations. Such an understanding of ecumene accords with the term’s etymological ori-
gins, meaning the inhabited or inhabitable world, which is how peoples from the Greeks to Europeans to the Chinese conceived of the world, which did not encompass the world as we understand it, but referred only to the world that mattered. It was modernity that invented one world out of the many worlds of earlier peoples, and even that has been thrown into doubt by so-called globalization that unifies the known globe, but also fragments it along fractures old and new.

If I may illustrate by an example from the part of the world I study, there has been much talk in recent years of a Confucian or Neo-Confucian Eastern Asia, and, of course, Confucianism long has been held to be a hallmark of a Chinese civilization that holds the central place of hegemony in Eastern Asia. It is interesting to contemplate when Confucius became Chinese; when he was rendered from a Zhou Dynasty sage into one of the points of departure for a civilization conceived in national terms. When the Japanese, Koreans, and Vietnamese adopted Confucianism for their own purposes, all the time claiming their own separate identity, did they do so to become part of the Sung or Yuan or Ming, whom they resisted strenuously, or because they perceived in Confucianism values of statecraft and social organization that were lodged in the texts of a tradition that was more a classical than a Chinese tradition, and which unfolded differently in these different states? This is what I have in mind when I refer to commonality as well as difference, even radical difference. It could be complicated further by extending the argument to the entanglement of societies in a multiplicity of ecumenes. What we call China itself did not simply grow from the inside out, radiating out from a Yellow River plains core, but was equally a product in the end of forces that poured from the outside in, from different directions, producing translocal spaces. These interactions of the inside and the outside produced the China we have come to know that, once formed, would contain them and push their memories to the margins. Their recovery toward the center of historical inquiry recasts the history of China in more ways than one, as I noted above.

In underlining the overdetermination of parts that resist dissolution into homogenized wholes, my goal is not to do away with history by rendering it into a conglomeration of microhistories. I merely wish to illustrate what a radical and thoroughgoing historicism might lead to. The paradigm (or metaphor, if you like) is one that may be used productively in many cases. One of its advantages is that it also allows for different parts of the ecumene to react differently—and autonomously—with parts of different ecumenes. Regions may in some instances serve similar functions, but an ecumene conceived not in terms of physical proximity but of social and cultural constructions may also be deployed.
across vast distances, as, for example, with contemporary migrant populations spread across the globe.

The third consideration involves the “worlding” of world history—its relationship to living in a world that is as much about difference as it is about sameness or commonality. It may be that a day will come when everyone around the world will conceive of the world and its history in identical ways. Until that day arrives, however, we need to be attentive at all times to the limited standpoints and visions from which we think and write history, regardless of how global or universalistic we may wish to be. Societies around the world past and present have thought about the world and its history differently, which must enter as a fundamental consideration into any practice of world history. This requires, I think, that world history can be written ultimately only as historiography, as an account not just of different conceptualizations of the world, but also of different ways of conceiving the past. This needs to be undergirded by a consciousness of our own place in time, a self-reflectiveness that serves as a reminder that we are not at the end but somewhere along the course of history, and that the very next generation may demand a different kind of history than the one(s) that our imagination allows. Awareness of spatial and temporal restrictions is crucial, I think, to any critical practice of world history.

These are merely some thoughts regarding different modes of thinking and writing world history that seek to account for processes of commonality and difference, unity and fragmentation, and patterns in motion of homogeneity and heterogeneity. Most important in this consideration is to fulfill the pedagogical goals of world history—the obligation at the most basic level to acquaint students and the public with the whos, wheres, and whens of other societies—while also providing them with the critical perspectives demanded by contemporary global transformations, as well as visions of humanity that promise something beyond contemporary ideologies of order. How this may be achieved is secondary to the recognition of complexity—even chaos—in the first place. We need to remind ourselves that thinking, writing, and teaching world history—indeed, all history—is not merely an exercise in description but also a performance in the double sense I described it above; as accomplishing and representing the world, not just what it has been, but what it has suppressed in the process of becoming what it is, and what it might yet become by recovering what has been suppressed.

The past is not just a legacy: It is also a project. That such an approach to the past opens it up to the possibility of appropriation for diverse political and social causes is a predicament that may or may not be undesirable. An awareness of how the world appears from different social contexts and perspectives, for example, would enrich our own lim-
ited conceptions of the world, which to me appears as a definite advance even if it complicates our tasks as historians, perhaps even makes them impossible. Then there is the biblical rewriting of history, with its own totalistic claims based on blind faith, which is as pernicious in its consequences for history as creationism is for understanding human evolution and development. All we can do is to acknowledge the presence of such alternatives as answering to different social and political needs over which the historian does not, and probably should not, have control. The best we can do is to ask of ourselves what our project might be, while we remain as true as possible to the evidence of the past in all its prolific variation—including variation over the meaning of the world, and of history.

Endnotes

1 I use “public-pedagogical” several times in the course of this discussion. I do so to indicate that the implications of teaching world history go beyond formal schooling, especially in these days of the proliferation of public media.

2 The difficulty is quite apparent in a book such as Martin Lewis and Karen Wigen, The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography (Berkeley, 1997) which, after deconstructing “metageography” for one hundred fifty pages, ends up with the same configuration of continents and regions.

3 Jerry Bentley, “Myths, Wagers, and Some Moral Implications of World History,” 18. I am grateful to Jerry Bentley for sharing this soon-to-be-published paper with me.


6 Work of this kind has proliferated in recent years. For outstanding examples, see Tu Wei-ming (ed.), The Living Tree: The Changing Meaning of Being Chinese Today (Stanford, CA, 1991), and Wang Guangyu, China and the Chinese Overseas (Singapore, 1992). For “greater China,” see the special issue of China Quarterly 136 (December 1993).


8 For further discussion, see Arif Dirlik, “Chinese History and the Question of Orientalism,” History and Theory 35, no. 4 (December 1996): 96–118. It was the Jesuit missionary Matteo Ricci who introduced “Asia” to Ming thinkers. It is equally interesting that the “idea of Asia” was largely forgotten until it was revived again in the nineteenth century, this time as a serious geopolitical problem.

of alternative mappings, see Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation* (Honolulu, HI, 1994). These mappings, needless to say, are very much entangled in questions of national, class, gender, and ethnic power relations.


14 I have discussed these complications at length in “Modernity in Question? Culture and Religion in an Age of Global Modernity,” *Diaspora* (in press).

15 I am referring to Samuel P. Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York, 1997).


21 Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation* (Chicago, 1995).


23 “Ecumene” is understood as “areas of intense and sustained cultural interaction.” This definition is offered by John and Jean Comaroff on the basis of works by Ulf Hannerz and Igor Kopytoff. See Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, “Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming,” special issue of *Public Culture* 12, no. 2 (2000): 291–343, 294.


25 For the most up-to-date, comprehensive, and illuminating discussions of these issues, see Benjamin A. Elman, John B. Duncan, and Herman Ooms (eds.), *Rethinking Confucianism: Past and Present in China, Japan, Korea and Vietnam* (Los Angeles, CA, 2002).
What Future for the West?
Reflections on an Enlarged Europe and the United States in the Twenty-First Century

Sixth Gerd Bucerius Lecture, Washington DC, June 29, 2005

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It is a very real honor and pleasure to deliver the Sixth Gerd Bucerius Lecture. Gerd Bucerius was a remarkable figure in recent German history. If you want to know more, you can read his biography written by the first Gerd Bucerius lecturer here in Washington, Ralf Dahrendorf. It is entitled Unabhängig und Liberal—independent and liberal. Now, liberal is one of those words which at the moment are the subject of some transatlantic misunderstanding. In fact, the American right and the French left, when they say liberal, mean something diametrically opposite. To oversimplify slightly, the American right means the French left and the French left means the American right. This is how it comes about that the French “non” to the European constitutional treaty can be liberalism’s “no” to liberalism! But let’s leave that aside and accept that there is an absolutely fundamental and elementary sense in which a liberal is someone who has a passion for individual liberty. In that sense Gerd Bucerius was a great German liberal. Helmut Schmidt said of him, he was “von der Idee der Freiheit besessen”—possessed or obsessed by the idea of freedom—a good thing, I think, to be possessed by.

That brings me to my subject today: what future for the West? Now, one of the basic questions of all politics is: When we say “we,” who do we mean? Of course we all have many answers, many political communities. I’m an Oxonian, a Londoner, an Englishman, a Briton, very much a European, but also a Westerner. For me, an Englishman born into the Cold War, “the West” was the largest operational political community, the largest operational “we,” throughout the Cold War. Until 1989, we had no doubt that the West existed.

This Cold War West was a geopolitical unity which was constructed on and related to a larger history of what in American universities was called “Western Civ.” A couple of years back, hunting through the university library in Stanford, I came across on a bottom shelf, gathering dust, a wonderful version of this grand narrative of the Cold War West at its most simplistic and self-confident. It’s entitled Life’s Picture History of Western Man, published in 1951, with “Western Man” always capital-
ized—capital W, capital M. There he is, Western Man setting out from ancient Greece on his way to Yale and the State Department.

Western Man—who is he and where did he come from? When did he step out on the stage of human civilization and what was his performance there? How did the onward road of history affect his beliefs and actions? How did they in turn guide the course of larger events? The purpose of this book is to answer some finite aspects of these infinite questions about the most wonderfully dynamic creature ever to walk this earth—Western Man.

Western Man—says the Life history—was born in Western Europe sometime in the Middle Ages.

His identity as Western Man distinct and different from his predecessors, became historically clear about 800 AD. Under Martel, he fought the Moors at Poitiers, he saw Charlemagne crowned emperor of the West by the Pope, he was with the Norman William at Hastings, he went on the Crusades...his body was like ours with less height and more jaw perhaps, but otherwise the same, and his feelings and appetites were understandably similar.

And here it comes: “He was fair of skin, hardy of limb, brave of heart, and he believed in the eternal salvation of his soul.” You observe that darker-skinned persons, women, and non-believers don’t get a look here. “This Western Man worked toward freedom, first for his own person, then for his own mind and spirit, then finally for others in equal measure...By enormous effort, this Western Man created a civilization which this book takes as its theme—from his first emergence in the Middle Ages to his contemporary position of world leadership in the United States of America.” From Plato to Nato!

Now of course this version of the history of the West was questioned in the universities of North America and Western Europe from the 1960s on, but no one doubted, even into the 1980s, that some political unity called the West existed—least of all, those who were outside it. If you doubted that the West existed, you had only to cross the Iron Curtain to Eastern Europe to be forcefully reminded that there was something they called zapad, zachod, der Westen, which in their view clearly united Europe and America in one civilization and one geopolitical actor.

That is no longer a widely held view in Europe or the Americas. The crisis of the West became apparent, indeed became acute, after what in the United States is popularly called 9/11, the terrorist attacks of the eleventh of September, 2001, and particularly over Iraq. But if you look
more closely, you can see that the crisis was already latent after an earlier 9/11, the European 9/11 with the date written European style, that is with the day before the month: the ninth of November, 1989, and the fall of the Berlin Wall. The truth is that in the very moment of, as it were, the triumph of the West, the crisis of the West begins because we, Western Europe and the United States, are no longer held together by the common enemy.

Owen Harries, the former editor of The National Interest, wrote a remarkable and prescient article in Foreign Affairs in the autumn of 1993 entitled “The Collapse of ‘the West.’” I commend it to your attention. Harries argued that while of course there is a deep cultural, historical, and intellectual community, a common civilization—Jerusalem, Athens, and Rome, Christianity, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and so on—that is a quite different thing from saying that there is a political unity of the West capable of sustaining a single geopolitical actor. That, he argued, was an exceptional state of affairs; the West in this sense was “not a natural construct, but a highly artificial one, the response to a clear and common enemy.”

Harries argued that only in three periods in the twentieth century had there been a clear political unity of the West: 1917 to 1918, 1941 to 1945, and the Cold War. But of course in the first two of those periods—1917 to 1918 and 1941 to 1945—the West that people spoke about was essentially Britain, France, and the United States. It was united against Germany—joined with Austria-Hungary in the first World War, and Italy in the second—in other words, against other constituent parts of Western civilization. This was not the West against the Rest; these were actually civil wars within the West. In the Cold War, argued Harris, we were again, in Western Europe and North America, held together by a clear common enemy: the Soviet Union, the Soviet bloc, the Red Army in the center of Europe, in East Germany and Berlin. Harries predicted in 1993 that with the disappearance of the common enemy, the Cold War West too would, as his title suggested, collapse.

I believe that his analysis has fundamentally been proved correct. The Cold War West has collapsed and, in my view, is most unlikely to reemerge. We shall not again see what Jeane Kirkpatrick and others called “the free world,” in itself a somewhat dubious construct since in certain interpretations, including those of Jeane Kirkpatrick, “the free world” included such countries as Chile under Pinochet.

Two things, it seems to me, have changed structurally. Firstly, Europe and America are not held together by a clear and single common enemy. The so-called War on Terror is not the equivalent of the Cold War. The abstract noun “terror” is by no means the functional equivalent of the Red Army in the center of Europe and does not bring Europe and America
together again, since we do not agree on the analysis of the threat or the 
best response to it. I myself find it difficult to see in the foreseeable future 
that threat which would again pull us together in the same clear and 
unambiguous way that the threat of the Soviet bloc did. I recently heard 
a former British foreign secretary sigh, as he reflected on the state of transatlantic relations, “if only we had Brezhnev back.”

The second thing that has changed structurally is that Europe is no 
longer the central theater of world politics in the way that it was arguably, 
from around the year 1500 until 1945, but also in a different sense— 
no longer as the agenda-setter, but as a central theater for the confronta-
tion between the two superpowers, the two great ideological blocs called 
East and West—between 1945 and 1989. Since 1989 we have said “Good-
bye to all that.” This is particularly the case, it seems to me, seen from this 
city, seen from Washington. Roughly speaking, if you drew up a list of 
Washington’s regional priorities at any point from 1955 to 1985, the list 
would probably have gone: number one, Europe, number two, the 
Middle East, number three, Asia. Today the list goes: number one, Asia, 
number two, the Middle East, number three, Europe; or for some: number 
one, the Middle East, number two, Asia, number three, Europe. In both 
lists, Europe has gone from number one to number three, and that seems 
to be a change that is unlikely to be reversed any time soon.

It is a result of the end of the Cold War, but it also builds on longer-
term trends, including a cultural shift, in which something one could 
indelicately call a residual cultural inferiority complex of America toward 
Europe has largely faded, if not disappeared entirely. Few people in the 
United States are now in awe of the ideas that come out of Paris. Some are 
not even in awe of the honey-stoned medieval quadrangles of Oxford. 
Some Oxonians may regard that as regrettable, but it is a fact. Indeed, the 
major American universities have nothing to fear from any European 
university. Secondly, there has been a demographic change, slow but 
sure. According to one projection, the proportion of the American popu-
lation of European origin, which was roughly 80 percent in 1980, is pro-
jected to decline to about 64 percent in 2020. The population has also 
shifted to some extent to the south and the west. Thirdly, there is that 
fundamental long-term trend of the economic rise of Asia, and not just 
economic, but in its wake political and military. Those seem to me profound 
structural changes in the relationship between Europe and America.

Many people argue, building on this, that what we are also seeing is 
a kind of ineluctable continental drift, a civilizational drifting apart of 
Europe and America, in which our economic, social, and political sys-
tems, our approaches to international relations, even, according to some, 
our values, are fundamentally and structurally diverging. This is a wide-
spread view. According to one poll, done by the German Marshall Fund
in 2003, 79 percent of Europeans believe that Europeans and Americans have fundamentally different values, and 83 percent of Americans believe that, too. It’s a view widely held on the European left. Look at the manifesto of Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida published during the Iraq war, in which Europe is defined in effect as the not-America. Their definition of Europe is a list of things that (they claim) distinguish Europe from the United States. If they still concede that there is something like the West, then they say, with the German Social Democrat foreign policy strategist Egon Bahr: yes, certainly there is a West—but there’s a European West and an American West. (Not for nothing has he been called “tricky Egon.”) This view is widely shared, on the American right as well as the European left. Witness Robert Kagan’s famous quip: “Americans are from Mars, Europeans are from Venus.”

Now, one of the things I’ve tried to do in my book Free World is to demonstrate that this is simply not so. This is not a piece of wishful thinking; it is a purely empirical statement. If you just look at the evidence, it is impossible to sustain the argument that there is a solid coherent bloc—economic, social, political system; values; approach to international relations—called America and a solid and coherent bloc called Europe. Of course there are significant differences: the role of religion in the United States, the position of the military, the attitude to national sovereignty, nationalism, and patriotism. But the systemic differences between Europe and America are much smaller than is often claimed, even in fields we regard as quite distinctive for Europe, such as health care. The figures on health care actually are very interesting. I took some time to look at them. As you know, the United States spends far more on health care than any other country in the world—in 2001, 13.9 percent of GDP. You may say, well, but that’s private health care. So, take it apart and it’s 6.2 percent of GDP that is spent from the public purse on health care—Medicare, Medicaid, and so on. That is the identical figure for the National Health Service in the United Kingdom in the same year—6.2 percent of GDP. So there is a myth that we have this extraordinarily developed health care system, including this great National Health Service, but the United States has nothing.

More importantly, what we have here are not two solid blocs, Europe and America; what we have are two divided continents. The United States, as we all know, is deeply divided between the so-called red and the so-called blue states. It is divided on many of precisely those issues which Europeans regard as most strongly defining what it is to be European. If you look closely, you’ll find that the attitudes of blue America on quite a few key issues are often closer to those of some Europeans than they are to those of at least some red Americans. But Europe too is deeply divided. It is hugely diverse in its own values, in its own social systems.
There is no single European social model. There are many different European social models. So also with political systems, attitudes, and values.

This is particularly true in what in my title is called “an enlarged Europe.” One should more accurately say the enlarged European Union. If you include the central and east European states, then the diversity in these respects is even greater, even on some matters which are regarded as most characteristic of the United States—patriotism for example. It’s always said that Americans are more patriotic than Europeans. But if you look at the comparative surveys, the most patriotic people of the lot are, believe it or not, the Irish, more so than the Americans. The Poles are as patriotic, as “very proud” of their nation, as the Americans. Even with respect to religion, a country like Ukraine is as religious as the United States.

Europe is also divided by a great argument about America. Broadly speaking, it’s divided into two great camps or tendencies: what I call the Euro-Gaullists, who want a strong, united Europe, but want to see it as a rival superpower to the United States, and what I call the Euro-Atlanticists, who want a strong, united Europe, but want it to be a strategic partner of the United States. This is not a division between so-called old Europe and so-called new Europe, à la Donald Rumsfeld. This is a division that runs through every European country, through generations, through classes, through political parties. It’s one of the defining arguments in Europe today: an argument about America.

Incidentally, something I discovered in traveling around Europe with Free World as it appeared in different languages, in Polish, or Spanish, or German, or Italian, was that the one thing all Europeans have in common is America. Whether you are speaking in a lecture hall in Paris or Madrid or in the smallest village hall in Slovenia, you can be sure that your listeners will know all about Cheney, Rumsfeld, Condi, Wolfowitz, Perle . . . down to the third degree of neo-con. This is our shared political theater, this is what all Europeans have in common. We define ourselves through our view of America. Tell me your America and I will tell you who you are. Europeans know much more about Washington than they know about each other, let alone about the rest of the world. This seems to me, I have to say, a great pity.

I want now to ask, and ask consciously as a European: how are we going to resolve these arguments? How, if at all, might a transatlantic partnership be reconstructed in the twenty-first century? I suggest we should proceed as follows. First of all, we should do what Europeans are currently very bad at doing: analyze the world we’re in. Not spend the whole time talking about America or ourselves, but analyze the world re-defined by the two 9/11s, the world at the beginning of the twenty-
first century. What are the great global challenges? Then we should ask ourselves very calmly: what are our common European interests? Not attitudes, not approaches, not values, but interests in the world. Then ask: what are American interests? Then ask: to what extent do these coincide? We should go on to ask ourselves: what are European instruments and capacities to realize these interests? What are American interests, capacities, and instruments? Then: do they conflict or do they complement each other? If the answer is that the interests are coincident and the instruments are compatible, then you have the basis for beginning to reconstruct a new—and it will be a new—transatlantic partnership.

Now, for reasons of time I’m not going to do what would be a rather absurd exercise, which is to analyze the world we’re in in approximately five minutes. There is a theater company called the Reduced Shakespeare Company, which some of you may know. It does all the plays of Shakespeare in two hours. Hamlet takes about three minutes. This would be sort of a Reduced Shakespeare Company performance on world politics. Let me simply list what, it seems to me, are a few of the obvious great global challenges of the early twenty-first century, and then make my basic point in the form of two bold assertions.

These global challenges include the extraordinary challenge of what, seen from Europe, I deliberately call the Near East. It’s now more often called the Middle East or the wider Middle East, but for us in Europe, the old-fashioned term the Near East is much more appropriate because for us it is very near—nine miles at its closest point, from Morocco to Spain. You can get across in a small boat, and many Moroccans do. The extraordinary challenge in particular concerns the state of the Arab world, and I say specifically the Arab world rather than the whole Islamic world. It includes the facts that, among the twenty-two members of the Arab League, there is not a single established democracy (unless you now count Iraq), that obviously many terrorists have come from this part of the world, and that, according to the Arab Human Development Report, the projected population of the Arab world in the year 2020 is somewhere between 410 and 460 million—that is to say, the population of the EU today—of whom more than half will be under thirty. If we do not succeed in bringing some hope to young Arabs in their own countries so that they will stay in those countries, they will come to us, across the Mediterranean, in such vast numbers that it will destabilize our societies and our politics. So we have an elementary interest in the Near East.

Then there is the rise of the Far East: after Japan, now India, China, and smaller Asian countries. This is plainly one of the transformative developments of world politics in our time. Thirdly, the gap between the rich North and the poor South: the shaming fact that half of humankind lives on less than two dollars a day, and that much of that poverty is avoidable
if we ourselves had different policies on aid, debt relief, and, above all, trade. And fourthly, the many ways in which, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, humans are now threatening Earth. That is to say we are actually threatening the basic ecosystem of the planet on which we live, notably with the undoubted fact of climate change, of global warming, and the fact (scientifically established beyond reasonable doubt) that much of this is due to human agency, especially carbon dioxide emissions.

Now each of these themes is what is called in German *ein abendfüllendes Thema*, a subject to fill an evening. I just want to assert, and this is central to my argument, two points. Firstly, I would challenge anyone in this room to point out to me a single major area in which the vital long-term interests of Europe and the United States are not common, complementary, or at least compatible. Attitudes differ, approaches differ, perceptions differ, but interests—I think not. Secondly, I would challenge anyone in this room to show me a single area where the challenge can begin to be met if Europe and the United States are in conflict, are not working together to meet it. I believe I could demonstrate that to you point by point on every single area.

It’s obvious, for example, that we can’t get a trade agreement that will help the poor South without Europe and the United States in tandem making the key concessions on tariffs and agricultural subsidies. It’s obvious that we can’t get the deal on debt relief at the G8 without that cooperation. Let me give you just one other example: carbon dioxide emissions, one of the very few areas where I would say Europe is unambiguously better than the United States, where the facts are clear. The truth is that the largest growth in CO₂ emissions over the next ten to twenty years will not come in Europe or the United States—it will come in the huge emerging economies of Asia, most of all in China and India. However virtuous we in Europe are about carbon dioxide emissions, it won’t make a blind bit of difference. Unless the richest country in the world, the United States, shows more restraint in CO₂ emissions, we have not a snowball’s chance in hell of persuading the Chinese or the Indians to exercise the restraint that America is not itself exercising. Why should they? That is just one example where, like it or not, Europe and America are utterly dependent on one another. Only if Europe and America work together will we begin to have the possibility of confronting the great global challenges of the early twenty-first century.

If we work toward such a new transatlantic partnership, should we again call it the West? The German foreign minister Joschka Fischer has made a very interesting argument on this point—he answers my question affirmatively. He gave an interview in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* in which he talked about the reconstruction of the West. And he’s just
published a book entitled Die Rückkehr der Geschichte: Die Welt nach dem 11. September und die Erneuerung des Westens [The Return of History: The World after September 11 and the Renewal of the West]. In this book he argues for the creation of a new West. I have to say, while I share a lot of his strategic argument, I myself think it would be a mistake to try to name this new partnership “the West.” In my view, if the West is to survive and prosper, it has to go beyond the West; to go so far beyond the West that in some important sense it ceases to be the West.

Indeed, we are already beyond the West in the classic twentieth-century usage of the term. I’m sure many of you will have read Oswald Spengler’s Der Untergang des Abendlandes. Look at his definition of the West, of the Abendland, in his Preface: it is Western Europe and North America. This was the classic definition of the West—it did not include Eastern Europe. So already, since included in our proposed structures of cooperation are Central and Eastern Europe on the one hand, and to a significant degree Central and South America on the other, we are way beyond what was classically considered “the West.” We are already in what I have called in Free World “the post-West.”

My view is that the key to success in any of these fields lies in winning the cooperation of those democracies that lie far beyond the West in the regions in question, be it India, be it the democracies of Latin America, be it South Africa, or be it Taiwan, the first Chinese democracy. To facilitate their involvement, the new operational “we” of Europe and America should not be something we call the West. I would rather we call it the community of democracies—something which, as you know, exists on paper, but not in any operational reality. And there are many of them. Freedom House last year counted 117 electoral democracies, but it included Russia. On the other hand, they didn’t yet include Ukraine. The more serious figure is perhaps their count of eighty-eight free countries, that is to say countries that are not just electoral democracies but liberal democracies. How you turn this into an operational community is a very different and difficult question, but I think that should be our strategic objective—to go beyond the West, to a wider community of liberal democracies. Or in other words, to go beyond the free world and work toward a free world. Never in the history of human grammar has a shift from the definite to the indefinite article been more important.

Ladies and gentlemen, I’ve laid before you a brief argument about where we are, how we got there, and what we, Europeans and Americans, should do about it. Let me—as a bridge to the question-and-answer session—tentatively pose the question whether we will do what we should do. My own view is that U.S. policy toward Europe has shown a very significant change since the re-election of President Bush. Christof

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Mauch mentioned that conversation I (and several others) had with President Bush in May 2001, when he was asking about Europe before his first trip to Europe. One of the first questions he asked was, “Do we want the European Union to succeed?” When a British colleague and I said rather emphatically that we wanted the European Union to succeed, and we thought the United States should too, in its own interest, he said, “Oh, that was only a provocation.” But of course it wasn’t. In the first term there were serious people in the administration who answered the question with no, who thought it was more in the American national interest—and it’s a rational if ultimately unrealistic calculation—to work with individual European powers, to cherry pick, to divide and rule. Now, I won’t say that way of thinking has been wholly overcome in all parts of the administration, but it’s certainly clear to me that the State Department under Condoleezza Rice, and the President himself since his re-election, have made very significant efforts to signal a new approach to Europe, to ask Europe to be a strategic partner, as Bush did in his visit to Brussels.

The problem is that the European Union, which was just beginning to become such a strategic partner—in our approach to Ukraine, where there was a very important European policy; in the offer of EU membership to Turkey, a major strategic initiative; and in policy toward Iran, to name but three—has now been plunged into crisis by the French and Dutch nos to the constitutional treaty. This crisis of the European project has some things in common with the crisis of the West. In both cases the question is asked: What is the thing now for? In the case of the European project which has brought us the EU, there were three clear answers, three meta-narratives—it was for peace, given the memory of the thirty years’ war from 1914 to 1945; it was for freedom, against the Soviet bloc; and it was for prosperity, encouraged by the United States and the Marshall Plan.

The problem is that in recent years all three of these answers, all three of these meta-narratives, have been put in question. The memory of war has so much faded among that younger and middling generation in Europe that it is no longer a major motivating force. The Soviet threat no longer exists, so that argument, which was terribly important in the early years of European integration, is gone. And if you look at the Euro zone, one might seriously ask how much it actually helps to bring prosperity, when Germany has more than five million unemployed, France more than ten percent unemployed.

Like the crisis of the West, the crisis of the European project follows on the heels of triumph. In the case of the West, the crisis followed close on the heels of the great triumph of the fall of the Berlin Wall. In the case of the European Union, we had this extraordinary triumph of the enlargement of the European Union last May to include ten new member-
states, something unprecedented in European history. Just thirteen months later, we have the crisis of the European Union, which is in part itself a response to that enlargement. The French no was, at least in part, a no both to the enlargement that has happened and to future enlargements. This puts in question the greatest single strategic asset that the European Union has, which is its capacity to enlarge, what I call its power of induction.

What is to be done? Let me add just one thought before throwing this open to discussion. On the one hand, we have the institutional questions; on the other hand, we have the question of political will. It seems to me that we will never achieve a European Union which is a potential strategic partner for the United States unless we achieve a historic compromise between the two countries which again and again are the magnetic poles of a divided Europe, that is Britain and France. The rivalry between Britain and France is probably the oldest continuous historic rivalry in history. It goes back at least to the Hundred Years’ War in the fourteenth century. We’ve been at it for seven hundred years and we’re still at it. Look at the recent EU shenanigans. And it’s becoming absurd. Some of you will know that wonderful film Grumpy Old Men. France and Britain are rather like Jack Lemmon and Walter Mathau in that film: we’ve known each other since childhood, we basically understand each other extremely well, but we’re still slugging it out. We will never have a political unity of action in Europe without that historic compromise.

Now to achieve that compromise, we need one other country. Here I come back, in conclusion, to the German Historical Institute and to Germany. Germany remains Europe’s central power, die Zentralmacht Europas, as Hans-Peter Schwarz put it. Throughout the twentieth century, German history has been in many ways an argument about its relationship to the West. In a certain sense, one could say that the First World War, the Second World War, and the Cold War were all wars about Germany and the West. There’s a whole historiography of the Federal Republic which is about histories of westernization, alternative models of westernization, the Anglo-American West versus the Abendland, and so on.

In the 1990s, a view became popular that Germany had now become a normal country. Heinrich August Winkler published an influential book called Der lange Weg nach Westen. Germany, he argued, had finally arrived in the West. Looking at the position of the Schröder government in the Iraq crisis, some in Washington might have doubted that; looking at attitudes toward the United States, looking at the critique not just of America but of capitalism, looking at a certain fascination with Russia, some at least in the United States might doubt that again today. I do not
propose, ladies and gentlemen, at this late stage to get into this complex argument about Germany and the West, which is another *abendfüllendes Thema*. But I do want to say two things in conclusion.

The first is, if it is right to argue that the global challenges of the twenty-first century, correctly analyzed, require a strategic partnership of America and Europe, as a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a larger community of democracies; if the key to that lies not just in the United States accepting the European Union as its first strategic partner but in the European Union becoming such a strategic partner; and if the key to *that* lies in a historic compromise between Britain and France, then indeed the role of Germany is absolutely crucial. And the role for Germany, ladies and gentlemen, is staring us in the face. Germany needs to return to the traditional position of the Federal Republic, which on most issues was always somewhere between London and Paris—and, on a larger canvas, between Paris and Washington. Karl Kaiser, who is with us today, has written about this brilliantly. This role for Germany was classically defined by none other than Bismarck, when he said, in his great speech in the Reichstag in 1878, that Germany should not try to be the *Schiedsrichter* or the *Schulmeister Europas*; it should just be the *ehrlicher Makler*, the honest broker. In this case, Germany should be the honest broker between London and Paris. I hope very much that we will shortly see the Federal Republic of Germany returning to that honorable and important role.

Secondly, and in conclusion, let me say, very simply, that there is a notable German tradition of advocacy, of sacrifice, of commitment in the service of liberty. One of the great figures from that tradition was Gerd Bucerius, and that is why it is particularly appropriate that I should share these thoughts with you in the Gerd Bucerius Memorial Lecture.
FORUM
THE MEASURE OF ATROCITY: THE GERMAN WAR AGAINST THE HEREROS

THE MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN GERMAN SOUTHWEST AFRICA, 1904–1907

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The military campaign in Southwest Africa in 1904–1907 was the largest and in every respect the costliest undertaken by Imperial Germany before World War I. It began in response to a revolt by the Herero people begun on January 14, 1904. Angered by the taking of their land, the death of their cattle in a series of epidemics, and their treatment at the hands of settlers and colonial officials, the united clans of the Herero rose up to overthrow German rule. Contemporary estimates numbered the Herero at between sixty and a hundred thousand people. Between six and eight thousand warriors targeted adult German male settlers, sparing German women and children, German missionaries, and non-German Europeans. The Herero killed about 125 men.

Germany had colonized Southwest Africa only in 1883. Its rule did not extend to the north, where the Ovambo lived, and only 4500 Germans lived in the center, Hereroland, and in the south, populated by the Nama people. Before the discovery of diamonds in 1911, German Southwest Africa (SWA)—arid, sparsely populated, and impoverished—was little known or valued in Germany. Nonetheless, the Herero uprising challenged German state authority and the Kaiserreich’s recently adopted Weltpolitik. Consequently, SWA became an issue of national security, and the Kaiser placed the military response under the command of the General Staff, exactly as if it had been a European conflict.

The war had four phases. In the first, Governor Colonel Theodor Leutwein led the colonial troops (Schutztruppe) and marine reinforcements in a fairly standard colonial campaign that drove the Herero back from towns and the unfinished but strategic railroad. In April 1904 at Oviumbo, Leutwein succeeded in pushing the Herero out of the colony’s center toward the Waterberg at the edge of the Omaheke desert. Because
his troops ran short of ammunition, Leutwein cautiously retreated, an action that horrified the distant General Staff, which interpreted Leutwein’s military success as a defeat. The colonel was removed and the Kaiser and his Chief of the Military Cabinet chose Leutwein’s successor, Lt. General Lothar von Trotha, over the objections of the Colonial Office and the chancellor. By reputation an obdurate commander who reckoned in “purely military terms,” Trotha had developed pronouncedly racist views during an earlier military stint in German East Africa in the 1890s.1

Trotha arrived in June and set about phase two, the attempt to surround the Herero at the Waterberg and defeat them all in a single battle. Trotha poured the ill-trained German reinforcements into the trackless desert, and attacked on August 11. The Herero warriors and the entire Herero people, who were with them, broke through to the southeast, following the dried riverbeds farther into the desert. Trotha ordered the few mobile units he had to pursue the fleeing people, hoping they would turn and give him the opportunity to defeat them in another battle. Instead, harassed and shot at, they struggled farther and farther into the desert, where most of them died of thirst.

In December 1904 a third phase of the war was inaugurated after pressure from the civilian government in Berlin: the internment of Herero who gave themselves up. Collected at first by missionaries, Herero prisoners (men, women, and children) were shipped to prison camps run by the military. Some were then sent on to forced labor camps run by private companies or farmers. A military report in 1908 estimated that 45 percent of Herero prisoners in military custody died there.

A fourth phase of the war began after October 1904, this time against the Nama, when they, too, rose in revolt. They conducted a skillful guerrilla war that made a pitched battle like Waterberg impossible. But their subsequent internment produced death rates even higher than those of the Herero.

For the Germans, the war in SWA was a huge embarrassment. It went on far too long; it required sending almost 19,000 volunteer troops from home, of whom about 1,500 died (many of disease); and it cost almost 600 million Reichsmark, or 40 times the annual peacetime budget of the colony. For the Africans, the war was catastrophic. It is estimated that 75 to 80 percent of the Herero died, and 50 percent of the Nama (whose population was around 20,000 in 1904). SWA was the first genocide of the twentieth century. Survivors were stripped of their rights, condemned to forced labor, and subjected to an openly racist and paranoid regime until 1915, when the colony fell to Allied troops from South Africa during the First World War.

The war in SWA has come to typify the genocidal potential of colonial conflicts. Many scholars have assumed that the genocide was planned in
advance. That view was first given by the East German historian Horst Drechsler, whose work cited for the first time primary documents held in GDR archives. Drechsler called Trotha’s aims at Waterberg “a well-thought-out plan that the Herero should break through towards the south[east] and perish in the desert there.”

One of the abiding puzzles of the war, however, was that the putative “order” for genocide, Trotha’s proclamation to the Herero of October 2, 1904 came after most of them had already died.

When I began researching the revolt in SWA, I expected to find that the experience of colonial war had taught metropolitan troops and their leaders genocidal practices. My expectations came from Hannah Arendt’s brilliant insights in The Origins of Totalitarianism, where she writes that imperialism is the link between racism (anti-Semitism) and totalitarianism with its genocidal outcomes. I was surprised to discover instead a typical European war in which genocide developed out of standard military practices and assumptions. Trotha’s plan at Waterberg was the typical single, concentric battle of annihilation preached as gospel by Chiefs of Staff Helmuth von Moltke (the elder) and Alfred v. Schlieffen. Indeed, it had also been Leutwein’s plan, though he aimed not for a military knockout blow, but rather a defeat strong enough to force negotiations. Trotha was more conventional. He intended a crushing victory of military force. No negotiations, which tacitly implied equality between belligerents, would be necessary. When the Herero escaped (through the Germans’ lack of logistical preparedness and the mistakes of a unit commander), Trotha immediately ordered the next default operation: pursuit, in order to re-create the conditions for the battle of annihilation. When at the end of September pursuit also failed, Trotha issued his infamous proclamation, in which he ordered the Herero banished from SWA forever on pain of immediate death for males or death by thirst for women and children, whom he forbade his soldiers to aid. The proclamation did two things. First, it prevented negotiations (which some Herero clans had been offering since July and which civilian leaders in Berlin and SWA advocated in order to remove SWA from military hands). Second, it provided the ex post facto justification for the genocide that had already occurred. It also stamped male Herero as dangerous, dishonorable outlaws (and thus vogelfrei [fair game] and unworthy of negotiation). In a letter to Schlieffen, Trotha claimed that the welfare of his own troops required the deaths of Herero women and children: “I think it better that the nation perish rather than infect our troops and affect our water and food.”

Trotha’s undeniable racism and his previous experience in colonial African warfare (which routinely targeted all men as potential warriors) was responsible for his apparent order in late June 1904 that German
troops should fire on all adult male Herero. That blanket order, together with poor logistics, lack of training, and frustration at lack of success against “mere” Africans, led to a massacre of African stragglers at Waterberg. In an effort to regain discipline, Trotha issued several orders forbidding the killing of women and children, but his ruthless leadership surely encouraged the breaking of taboos. Nevertheless, most Herero died of thirst, not shooting, and it was the act of pursuit itself more than its manner that led to mass death. Trotha’s racism was most evident in his willingness to announce the “disappear[ance]” or deaths of the Herero, ex post facto, as the necessary goal of operations. And later it reinforced his punitive and degrading treatment of the Herero prisoners forced on him by Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow, who wrenched repudiation of the October Proclamation from the Kaiser in December 1904.

In some ways, it is comforting to think that racist beliefs are primarily responsible for genocide, for that enables us to distance ourselves from the perpetrators and to imagine that only ideological fanatics could produce this kind of mass death. I think it is wiser and more accurate, however, to retain Arendt’s distinction between race-thinking, the widespread but vague presentiment of differences among races, on the one hand, and racism, the full-blown ideology and explanation/prescription for history and politics, on the other. Like Arendt, I have often observed in the history of SWA and elsewhere how the experience of extreme situations in the colonies, and especially the need to justify them, led race-thinking to become racism. Racism is often the product rather than the cause of colonialism and its horrors.

The genocide in SWA was in any event not the product of ideology, but of institutional action. It was produced by the military campaign itself, which was organized and conducted according to principles worked out in Europe for European wars. These standard military practices and assumptions were embedded in Imperial German military culture. They were developed in the wars of unification in 1864, 1866, and especially 1870–71. The resulting configuration shows clearly that Germany’s military was part of the spectrum of European (and American) military cultures: it was more like them than different. But the differences were salient nonetheless, and for a variety of reasons, they increased in scope and importance up to World War I.6

The conflict in SWA and the ensuing genocide exhibited several important patterns of imperial military culture. First, the Imperial German military defined victory much more stringently than did other militaries of the time: demonstrative, complete defeat of the enemy’s armed forces. Governor Leutwein explained this principle to a member of his staff: “In Germany [meaning the General Staff] what counts as a success is not a simple victory, but only the destruction [Vernichtung] of the enemy.”
That is why Leutwein was not to be permitted to attack Waterberg himself; Trotha and a further massing of troops would be necessary to achieve a pure military victory. That also explains the aversion of military commanders to negotiations, which were regarded as a species of defeat.

A second defining aspect of Imperial German military culture related to the techniques that the General Staff had developed to achieve this sort of complete victory: the mobile, offensive, concentric, single battle of annihilation (the “Schlieffen Plan” of World War I) and, when that did not succeed, the energetic pursuit to force the enemy to provide another opportunity for its annihilation. Schlieffen called these techniques “prescriptions for victory.”

These techniques, which were so difficult to employ, encouraged a further set of patterns of training and behavior, one of which was embodied in the model officer. The General Staff set this standard, which called for tremendous initiative, independence, risk-taking, self-sacrifice, and complete relentlessness in the fulfillment of the mission. This was the behavioral aspect of “mission tactics” [Auftragssystem], which distinguished the Imperial German army through the latitude it granted to junior officers in fulfilling their orders. This system rewarded officers who went beyond the usual limits, and it promoted actionism tending to a high level of destruction, even self-destruction. Trotha matched this model better than Leutwein did; so did his successor, General v. Deimling, as well as Captain Klein, a much-sung hero of SWA, to name a few examples.

The emphasis on swift, complete military victory meant that the interests of combat eclipsed everything else, including the welfare of civilians or prisoners of war. Indeed, the German armies had learned in 1870–71 that (French) civilians were the enemy, both in terms of their contribution to the foe’s war economy and their nationalist solidarity with him. That modern principle, which seems to have been first recognized by the German General Staff, was merely reinforced in the colonies, where warfare frequently involved the whole population. In the Imperial German military view, civilians were dispensable; their needs should be totally subordinate to military aims. Their instrumentalization was thought to be essentially unlimited by international law, which in any event most Europeans believed did not apply to the colonies. The erasure of the line separating combatants from non-combatants contributed greatly to increased death rates.

At best, prisoners of war and civilians (in Africa that meant the native population) were subjected to neglect and affected by poor logistics. Racism may have enhanced this effect, but even logistical support for German troops was scandalously bad, especially regarding rations and medical care. The readiness to sacrifice everything for military victory
included sacrificing Germany’s own troops; this readiness automatically worsened the treatment of enemy civilians and prisoners.

A final characteristic of Imperial Germany’s military culture that can be mentioned here was one shared by other European countries: The army represented state authority. But this was nowhere truer than in Germany, where the army had been the instrument of national unification and where Kaiser Wilhelm had elevated it to the chief bulwark of the monarchy. In the context of Weltpolitik, the revolt in SWA assumed national security dimensions that only reinforced the symbolic importance of military success and the use of the military to punish offenders against state authority. This punitive aspect of the German military was significant in determining the lethal conditions in the prison camps. For example, Trotha himself set the original starvation ration, justified by a high colonial administrator “as retaliation for the uprising.” But officers who took over from Trotha after his departure in December 1905 and who set out to ameliorate conditions repeatedly ran up against the principle that enemies of German authority merited exemplary punishment. This was yet another link in the chain of mass death.

Even this brief discussion will have indicated how the standard practices of Imperial German military culture tended to produce absolute destruction. In SWA (and in German East Africa from 1905 to 1908), they achieved this. The same military practices came very close to doing so again in the First World War.

Notes

5 Trotha to Schlieffen, 4 October 1904, Bundesarchiv-Berlin, Reichskolonialamt R 1001, Nr. 2089, 5–6.
6 For an extended discussion of the concept of “military culture,” see Hull, Absolute Destruction.
7 Leutwein to Major Estorff, 16 June 1904, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv Freiburg, Landstreitkräfte der Kaiserlichen Marine 121 I, Nr. 431, 50–51.
8 Jehuda L. Wallach, Das Dogma der Vernichtungsschlacht: Die Lehren von Clausewitz und Schlieffen und ihre Wirkungen in zwei Weltkriegen (Frankfurt, 1967), 129.
9 Deputy Governor Tecklenburg to Colonial Office, 4 July 1905, Bundesarchiv-Berlin, Reichskolonialamt R 1001, Nr. 2090, 22.

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COMING TO TERMS WITH THE PAST

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The one-hundredth anniversary of the Herero uprising in the year 2004 prompted a newly shaped debate on colonialism and especially colonial war crimes in Germany. Already in the 1960s a group of scholars and activists opposed the widespread myth of an alleged German colonial innocence, without much effect. Among them were the historians Horst Drechsler, an East German scholar, and Helmut Bley, a scholar from West Germany. Their well-known and highly controversial books on the colonial settler society in South-West Africa were soon followed by other academic and popular works in the 1970s. Nevertheless, the colonial period seemed to be a rather short and already closed chapter of German history with regard to schoolbooks, university curriculum, public discourse, and politics. In the late 1950s, to mention but one example, with the beginning of development policy, a Foreign Ministry official stated that Germany, free from any colonial obligations, should play a mediating role between Africa and the colonial powers. Today, Germany is rather unexpectedly confronted with the duty to take responsibility for its own colonial past and its postcolonial repercussions. The reason is not only the centenary of the brutal war but a restitution claim issued in 2001 by the Herero People’s Reparation Corporation. Spokesman for the plaintiffs is Paramount Chief and former Member of Parliament Kuaima Riruako. The class action claim was first pending with the Superior Court in Washington. In 2003 it was transferred to New York.

In campaigning for reparations, Chief Riruako is using two very powerful symbols: the land question in Namibia and the Holocaust. I say that the land question is symbolic because the redistribution of land—even if possible—would never solve the social and economic problems in the country. Experts unsuspicious of rubbing shoulders with the group of white commercial farmers that is still dominating the agricultural sector have analyzed this repeatedly. But the land question locates the claim for restitution and reparation in an African postcolonial context, whereas the reference to the Holocaust places the claim in the center of a global debate on justice and history, on human rights and memory.

The memory of colonial violence has a long history in Namibia. Unnoticed by the German public, a touching commemoration ceremony takes place every year in the small town of Okahandja in the center of Namibia. This town is central to Herero memory and was in the nineteenth century regarded as the “Herero capital.” In 1923, Samuel Maha-
rero, the leading chief during the war, was buried there, his body brought home from Botswana, where he had lived in exile. Since that time, people gather every year at the graves of Samuel Maharero and other important chiefs to celebrate and commemorate the past. For decades, Herero leaders have asked the government of West Germany and its representatives in Namibia to take part in the remembrance of a shared history. They demanded an official apology for war crimes committed by the so-called Schutztruppe. But former president Roman Herzog, chancellors Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Schröder, and other high-ranking politicians until recently always refused to apologize officially, and especially to adopt the term genocide. If Todd Bensman from the Dallas Morning News writes about “a dirty little secret” or “forgotten victims” concerning the colonial war, this clearly refers to the perspective of the German public. In Namibia the war was never either a secret or forgotten.

Sadly enough, colonial history is a history of colonial violence and exterminatory warfare. What makes the Namibian case so special today is not the war’s length, intensity, or aim. Forced labor, a scorched-earth policy, the expropriation of land and cattle, and the dehumanization of the enemy were part and parcel of most colonial wars in Africa. But the Herero restitution claim does not compare the war of 1904 with other colonial wars and massacres, but explicitly connects the war with the Holocaust. The indictment reads for instance: “Foreshadowing with chilling precision the irredeemable horror of the European Holocaust only decades later the defendants and Imperial Germany formed a German commercial enterprise which cold-bloodedly employed explicitly-sanctioned extermination...”5 This argument is not only questionable because it reduces the colonial massacre to a prelude of the Holocaust, but it is also inconsistent. One might well ask why the colonial commercial enterprise should destroy the base of its success: the African workforce. Background to von Trotha’s policy of extermination was not an economic consideration, as many German colonial settlers had already realized to their alarm during the war; instead, his approach was based on the ideology of a “race war” that could only end with a “final solution.” Comments made by settlers and by colonial army officers demonstrate clearly that his policy was no secret, and was at least partly opposed. But should this colonial massacre be termed genocide? We know that genocide is a process, and therefore definitions are difficult to apply. One can hardly talk about an intentional plan to exterminate the African population backed by the German government and conducted by the Schutztruppe. In von Trotha’s view, colonial rebellion foreshadowed an unavoidable race war to be fought without mercy, and he was given plenty of leeway from the German Emperor until December 1904. At the same time, von Trotha had strong opponents among his own officers, not
to mention the missionary societies, as well as the Social Democratic Party, the Center Party, and influential intellectuals in Germany.

Precisely because the Holocaust became a matrix for the Herero restitution claim (as well as for other claims), historical facts tend to be oversimplified in public and academic debates. The images are already there, and are difficult to ignore or to set aside. Some newspaper articles and academic papers describe medical experiments in the concentration camps and systematic sterilization of Herero women without offering any historical proof. Certainly, even if no Mengele tortured prisoners in the name of science, the conditions in the camps cannot be described as being anything other than horrible. Plans for a complete destruction of the sociopolitical organization of Herero, Nama, and other communities regarded as rebellious were discussed and partially implemented. But one has to also realize the delusional nature of and the limits to all the planning of the colonial officers and politicians. The idea of destroying a culture and of transforming the African population into a mere workforce with no memory, no historical or cultural ties, could never have been successfully implemented, of course. Already during the war, Herero and other people tried to escape the camps and to survive outside controlled areas, and they started to reorganize themselves. Endless complaints about “idle workers”—either forced or free laborers—tell stories of disobedience and resistance to bad treatment, violence, and dehumanizing practices.

To discuss contradictions of colonial policy and history and the resulting difficulties of definition is not in any sense to judge the reparations claim as such. From my point of view, the Namibian population has every right to expect German officials to apologize and German-speaking Namibians and the German public to be willing to engage in a process of coming to terms with the past and of acknowledging history as shared history in the double sense of the word—divided and conjoint. With all the new public awareness around the year 2004, it is quite obvious that African history is still ignored, or at least is of little interest in spite of the ongoing debate on colonialism and guilt. In newspaper articles as well as in radio and television features, African men and women tend to appear as voiceless victims and not as historical subjects with a history before and after the war. At conferences in Germany organized by churches and other organizations in 2004, almost all discussions ended up debating German history and the meaning of the colonial genocide for Germans. The term genocide was often easily adopted and German colonialism reduced to exterminatory warfare in one country. This focus results in a paradoxical reinvention of colonial innocence: Apart from the Herero war, Germany still seems to be free from any colonial and postcolonial entanglement and responsibility.
The strong images that immediately appear when we associate colonial war with genocide prevent further interest in African history. And obviously, contemporary political debates in Namibia are not of much interest to the German media either, not even concerning the context of the reparation claim. Chief Riruako, who in the German media is showcased as a rather picturesque traditional leader of a small “cattle herding tribe,” is a powerful and controversial politician running for the presidency of Namibia in 2004. Without at least some knowledge of Namibian politics, the full impact of the claim is hardly understandable. The Namibian government until recently did not back Chief Riruako’s campaign. There are several reasons for this. First, German development aid is officially regarded as a kind of compensation for historical injustice. Second, and even more important, a general debate on any past violation of human rights was not on the agenda of the newly elected government after independence in the year 1990. Such a debate, or even the initiation of a truth commission like in South Africa, could have evoked questions about the violation of human rights by the former independence movement—the People’s Liberation Army—itself.

Another problem points to the ethnic bias of the reparation claim. Although all communities in central Namibia were severely affected by the colonial war and postwar policy, the reparation claim was issued only on behalf of the Herero, and moreover was issued on behalf of the Herero as a “tribe, ethnic, and racial group.” Aside from all theoretical and historical critiques of concepts like “tribe” and “race,” it is important to note the tendency in Namibia to reorder history and politics based on ethnic terms. This holds true not only for Herero politics. Already around the time of Namibian independence, a remarkable movement started. Free from apartheid oppression, pre-colonial kingdoms emerged overnight in all parts of the country. Traditional leaders and royal houses reclaimed inherited pre-colonial rights. Many communities reinaugurated kings, and what seemed to be a mystical step back was in fact a rational move forward. The Namibian constitution provides the institution of traditional leadership with certain special rights regarding especially the rural areas. No wonder that future participation in a democratic state was partly organized around a decisive concept of the apartheid past: the firmly established category of ethnic or tribal identity. Very complicated negotiations concerning traditional leadership followed, among and within communities and between traditional leaders and the government. The conflicts remain unresolved today. Although the Traditional Authorities Act explicitly excludes party politicians from any officially recognized post, Chief Riruako is playing in both fields: as party politician and at the same time as traditionally legitimized leader. In this
context, the reparation claim has a clear political dimension, apart from all self-explanatory demands for compensation for a traumatic past.

The government, on the other hand, has cast the history of the independence movement in “Hero’s Acre,” a monument outside Windhoek. The monument relates the story of anticolonial resistance as a national epic. Many critics mused about the pompous architecture and the heroic symbolism of the site. What is overlooked is the integrative power of such invented traditions. The heroic resistance of the Herero community and the suffering of the surviving people is part of the figurative representation of “Hero’s Acre.” The restitution claim is opening a new and multifaceted debate on history and the past violation of human rights. It might contribute to a debate that is driven neither by nationalistic rhetoric nor by ethnic exclusiveness. Besides the political usage by politicians like Chief Riruako, the claim is part of a generation-long struggle dealing with dignity, trauma, history, and justice.

Notes

1 Horst Drechsler, Südafrika unter deutscher Kolonialherrschaft (Berlin/DDR, 1966); Helmut Bley, Kolonialherrschaft und Sozialstruktur in Deutsch-Südwestafrika 1894–1914 (Hamburg, 1968).

2 See for example Peter Schmitt-Egner, Kolonialismus und Faschismus: Eine Studie zur historischen und begrifflichen Genesis faschistischer Bewusstseinsformen am deutschen Beispiel (Gießen, 1975).


5 Superior Court of the District of Columbia, Civil Division, Case No. 01–0004447, 21.


ANNIHILATION IN AFRICA: THE “RACE WAR” IN GERMAN SOUTHWEST AFRICA (1904–1908) AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR A GLOBAL HISTORY OF GENOCIDE

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In August 2004, Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, the German minister of economic cooperation and development, apologized in Namibia for colonial crimes committed a century before, in the era of the Kaiser. Negotiations on compensation and reconciliation were set to begin in 2005 between the Namibian and German governments, as well as representatives of the Herero people. This striking development in the politics of memory focused attention on German colonial history, a part of the German past that had disappeared from most Germans’ recollection, obscured by the great catastrophes of two world wars and the unimaginable horrors of the Holocaust. The official recognition that the events that occurred in what is today Namibia were in fact genocide inevitably raises the question of how this takes its place within a global history of genocide. It thereby also raises the question of the relationship of the massacre of the Herero to the Holocaust, which was carried out only one generation later.

A thorough discussion of the relationship between colonialism and the Holocaust is not possible here because of space; it would involve five hundred years of the history of European expansion as well as an entire library of literature on the crimes of the Third Reich. I refer readers to my essays on this subject in the bibliography, which go into these issues in greater detail. But I would like to outline here the meaning of this war for a global history of genocide. The war in German Southwest Africa erupted after twenty years of colonial rule (which began in 1884), in an era of relative quiet. The indigenous peoples seemed to have accommodated themselves to German rule. Leaders of the Herero and Nama, who along with the Ovambo and Damara formed the largest sociopolitical groups in the region, collaborated with the Germans, manipulated them for their own purposes, and were in turn manipulated by them. Beneath a veneer of indirect rule, the country did not noticeably change, but the increasing numbers of white settlers—and this was a German policy in Southwest Africa, which was imagined as a settler colony—steadily exacerbated conflicts between newcomers and the African population. The fact that the settlers exhibited a pronounced “master race” attitude and often deceived their African trading partners did not contribute much to peaceful coexistence. But above all it was an increasing incidence of rape...
by white settlers—it was almost exclusively single young men who came to the colonies—that embittered the Africans and undermined the Herero’s social and political structure because traditional leaders were unable to protect their people.

Relations between Africans and “whites” were increasingly determined by a climate of violence. At the same time, many individual German authorities pushed for an energetic, i.e. brutal approach to the Herero and a more rapid expropriation of their land. As more recent studies have shown, one German district official in particular, a certain Lieutenant Zürn, was in large measure responsible for the outbreak of war. Even if he may not have personally made the first hostile move, at the very least he provoked the Herero into doing so. The standard presentation of the events, which holds that the Herero staged a planned “uprising” against the Germans and thus were themselves responsible for their later fate, is in need of correction. Whatever the case may be, the first exchange of shots on January 12, 1904 escalated into one of the most brutal colonial wars in history, and the first German genocide.

It was characteristic of the war in German Southwest Africa that the German commander Lothar von Trotha understood it as a “race war,” part of a world-historical struggle between “whites” and “blacks” that would end with the complete destruction of the latter. With that sort of ideological zeal, von Trotha arrived in the summer of 1904 to take over from Theodor Leutwein, who was considered too mild. Under von Trotha, a limited war became a war of annihilation and genocide. Obsessed with his idea of “race war,” while still onboard ship on his way to Africa, he ordered that all African resisters should be shot immediately. There was no longer any room for compromise. The mere act of resistance was transformed into a capital offense. The notion that war could be governed by rules and conventions, that prisoners and the wounded could be spared and that an honorable end to hostilities could be sought, was totally discarded. Von Trotha’s ideology of race war distinguished the war in German South-West Africa from the other colonial conflicts of the era. Race war meant a war of annihilation: Women and children were seen as legitimate targets, too. Race war is war without limits, a life-or-death struggle against an “absolute enemy.”

If one is searching for the point at which the decisive step toward genocide was taken, then the appointment of von Trotha must be considered it. When von Trotha first landed on South-West African soil, he perhaps did not know exactly how he would conduct the war tactically, but he certainly knew how it would end: with the destruction of the Herero. Local factors—such as a situational radicalization as a consequence of military developments like the Battle of Waterberg or the difficult conditions in the country that German troops had to endure—are of
secondary importance here. All of von Trotha’s orders, starting with the suspension of the laws of war while he was still aboard ship, reveal the same underlying theme: Whoever resists forfeits his life, and because the Herero have resisted as a group, a “tribe,” a “race,” they must be annihilated as such. Von Trotha would not let the arguments of those who knew South-West Africa dissuade him from pursuing war aims rooted in racist frenzy. When Theodor Leutwein appealed to von Trotha before the Battle of Waterberg to spare the Herero for utilitarian reasons, i.e. that their labor was needed, the latter replied sharply that it was his impression that Southwest Africa was a white colony and that whites should work there themselves. There is no more pointed example of the two men’s diametrically opposed domination fantasies: Leutwein’s plans for colonial-economic exploitation versus von Trotha’s military-genocidal dream. Von Trotha prevailed.

By stressing the importance of von Trotha in the genocide against the Herero, and later against the Nama, I do not want to downplay the importance of structural developments in the German colonial and military models. The decisive questions here—how a “race warrior” of the magnitude of a von Trotha could emerge, how he could rise in the military hierarchy, how he came to be entrusted with this very mission, and why he could not be stopped before it was too late—lead us directly to an analysis of the basic military and ideological structures of nineteenth-century German society. This helps to correct the erroneous view that the genocide committed against the Herero and Nama was somehow inevitable, rooted in the colonial situation itself.

As a consequence of this ideology of a race war, the German army shot men, women, and children, prisoners of war, and non-combatants; it forced thousands to die of thirst in the Sandveld of the Omaheke or in Southern Namibia during the anti-guerrilla war against the Nama; and it killed hundreds through deliberate neglect in the concentration camps.

According to the United Nations Convention on Genocide of 1948, genocide is any act, such as “killing members of the group” or “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part,” “committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such.” I think the German policy to drive the Herero into the desert, to destroy their means of life through anti-guerrilla warfare and in the concentration camps, qualifies as the latter.

This makes the Namibian War the first genocide of the twentieth century and the first genocide in German history. Studying the Herero and Nama genocide therefore is not simply an end in itself, but is of interest for a general history of genocide. It is also an important link between colonialism and the Nazi policy of extermination. After all, the
German war against Poland and the Soviet Union can be seen as the largest colonial war of conquest in history. Never before were so many people and resources mobilized by a conqueror, and never before were war aims so expansive. Millions of people were to be murdered in order to conquer “living space” in the East and to establish a colonial empire that would reach far beyond the Ural Mountains.

To Hitler it was obvious that if there was any historical precedent, then only the history of colonialism could possibly provide an example for his plans. As he himself said in September 1941, “The Russian territory is our India and, just as the English rule India with a handful of people, so will we govern this our colonial territory. We will supply the Ukrainians with headscarves, glass chains as jewelry, and whatever else colonial peoples like….”

This perception of “the East” as colonial land was not restricted to the upper echelons of the Nazi movement. Normal soldiers, the much-quoted “ordinary men,” also perceived Russia as a primitive, primordial world. One eyewitness noted, “As marvelous as the successes are, as great as the advance… Russia is on the whole still a huge disappointment for the individual. No culture, no paradise… the lowest level, filth, a humanity that shows us that we will have a huge task of colonization here.”

Was this a misunderstanding, a misperception? Can the racial war of extermination really be seen as part of a colonial history? Are there parallels that exceed the rhetoric of a few Nazis? There are indeed striking similarities between extra- and intra-European colonial projects. On the forefront are similar notions of “race” and “space.” Like Nazi expansionism, settler colonies rest on the control, exploitation, and settlement of huge territories by a new population next to an indigenous one. In both cases, this was not to involve a partnership of equals but the subjugation, on occasion even the extermination, of the original inhabitants. In both cases, this policy was motivated and justified by racism, by humanity’s division into higher races destined to rule and lower races destined to be ruled. At the lowest end of the scale were groups that were doomed to destruction or that were to be deliberately murdered.

Of course, European colonialism experienced various stages of development and assumed different forms in its five-hundred-year history. Even the justification for European expansion and rule over the indigenous populations of the newly “discovered” and conquered areas changed. Yet belief in one’s own righteousness or destiny was always the ideological prerequisite for the expansion of power. Social Darwinism, which gained influence in the course of the nineteenth century, directly emphasized a racial hierarchy and competition among the races. In this way of thinking, the indigenous population was at best at the disposal of the new settlers; at worst, it was to be removed.
The ideological basis for such events was provided by worldly or millenary utopian thinking. The dream of the promised land, of the white settler colony, of the unpopulated tabula rasa that was to be developed anew according to one’s understanding of civilization, or the identification of one’s own life with a godly, historical, or civilizing mission, could create the readiness to commit mass murder if necessary. In the nineteenth century, the religious justification for one’s destined role was gradually replaced by a Social Darwinian racial-biological view of history. Von Trotha’s concept of a racial struggle and his opinion that Africans would “only give in to brute force,” which he wanted to employ “with crass terrorism and even with cruelty” in order to destroy “the rebellious tribes with streams of blood,” was deeply rooted in this tradition.

In all this, the indigenous population was placed outside the “universe of obligation” (Helen Fein), outside humankind. In the Australian frontier in Queensland for example, it was viewed as sport to go hunting the “blacks,” i.e. the indigenous people, who were not regarded as human. And in the Namibian War, lies about Herero atrocities that supposedly proved that they indeed were not human paved the way for their murder. As von Trotha wrote in his infamous genocide order of October 2, 1904:

The Hereros are no longer German subjects. They have murdered and stolen, have cut off the ears and noses and other body parts from wounded soldiers, and in cowardice no longer want to fight. (...) Within the German border every Herero, armed or not, with cattle or without, will be shot, I will not shelter any more women or children, will drive them back to their people or let them be shot at.

The history of genocide is also a history of ever increasing state involvement: In the history of colonization, genocidal massacres first occurred on a local level. Examples of the butchering of men, women, and children by bands of settlers and local militias can be readily found in the settler colonies. These local murders were quickly transformed into punitive expeditions. Over time, army and police units were established for this purpose. A heightened form of these campaigns of annihilation was genocidal war of conquest and pacification, a larger military action requiring a correspondingly higher level of organization, of which the most important example was the Herero and Nama war.

Here, in terms of time and perpetrator, we are in close proximity to the Nazi policy in Eastern Europe. Although the war against the Soviet Union was formally a “normal” war between European powers, the Germans did not fight it as such, waging instead a war that in its conscious
disregard of the laws of warfare resembled a colonial war. Various military ordinances such as the commissar order transformed the military opponent into the enemy, the absolute other: something no longer human. The mechanisms of binary encoding employed by the Nazis in Eastern Europe are very similar to the ones that can be observed in the Namibian war, as indeed in most colonial wars.

Auschwitz is also a symbol of the highly bureaucratized and state-organized murder of the European Jews. It has often been argued that due to the state’s role, the Holocaust differs from all other mass murders in history. This is a rather abbreviated and unhistorical view. The state certainly played a different role during genocides in the colonies compared to the Holocaust. This does not come as a surprise, as the colonial state in America and Australia was far weaker than in Germany between 1933 and 1945. If one historicizes the meaning of “state” and applies a concept of the state appropriate for colonial contexts, then the differences between colonial and Nazi genocides do not appear so great. Thus the Nazis’ bureaucratized and state-organized murder was less a fundamental structural departure than a gradual variation dependent upon the degree of development of the state.

To be sure, the crimes of the Nazis cannot be traced back monocularly to the tradition of European colonialism. Nazi ideology and policy were far too complex and eclectic for such a straightforward reduction. Yet in the sense of an archeology of the idea of population economy and genocidal thinking, colonialism provided important precedents. Even the murder of the Jews, which was distinguished from other genocidal instances by the fact that the victims came from the midst of German society and that a century-long tradition of anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism helped prepare the way for them, would probably not have been thinkable if the idea that ethnicities can simply be wiped out had not already existed and been put into action. This had been done in the colonies. And genocides in the colonies had proven that it was possible to murder entire peoples and get away with it.

It has been doubted whether there is a road from Windhoek to Auschwitz. I would say that there are many roads to Auschwitz, starting at many places. One of these roads ran by way of the colonies, colonial warfare, and genocide, and I would argue that this road was not the least significant one. The Namibian War is on the one hand the culmination of colonial genocide and on the other hand the first step toward the bureaucratized murder of the Third Reich. Providing this link constitutes the world historical significance of the war in Namibia.

Colonialism assumes such an important place in the development of genocidal thought because through it, notions of “discovery,” conquest, annexation, and settlement were positively coded, popularized, and held
up as a model. At the same time, parallels with colonialism help us to understand why the expulsion, resettlement, and ultimately the murder of Jews and Slavs was perhaps not perceived as it is today, as the radical breaking of a taboo. At the very least, colonial history offered perpetrators a way to excuse themselves, a means to deceive themselves about the monstrosity of their own deeds. Auschwitz was the perverse apex of state violence against foreign and domestic populations. The war against the Herero and Nama was an important step in this development, the writing on the wall for what the twentieth century had in store.
THE MEASURE OF ATROCITY:
THE GERMAN WAR AGAINST THE HEREOS

FURTHER READING


In 1851, the magazine *Morgenblatt für gebildete Leser* reported the following from Dresden: “Previously, one felt with all five senses, as if seized by the pushiness of it all, something of the ghetto or the Jewish Quarter in Prague. Crooked faces and rag-clad figures loafed about by the dozen, schlepped unsanitary packages, haggled with hisses and screams, and harassed more or less every passerby. Today,” continued the anonymous reporter from the well-known Stuttgart literary journal, “the crooked noses and black beards haven’t disappeared completely from their usual haunts, but the groups have become more respectable. At the most, one in ten wears an unclean *Kittel*.1

Fourteen years earlier, the Jewish newspaper *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judenthums* had proudly published the following commentary, written by the famous *Conversation-Lexikon der Gegenwart*: “The fact that emancipation was so difficult for the Jews was perhaps not without a great gain for their general and religious *Bildung*. For every force there is a reaction, and the spirit of the Jews has blossomed here as nowhere else on the continent as a result of this dialectic struggle, which has been carried out in Germany for years with the greatest effort.”2

These two very different quotations express both astonishment about the cultural, religious, and social transformation that the German Jews had undergone since the beginning of the emancipation debates, and pride in this change. This was a transformation that affected very different, seemingly autonomous spheres, and in this sense had no counterpart elsewhere in Europe: In the closing years of the eighteenth century, the German Jews had produced a uniquely Jewish Enlightenment, the Haskalah; they invented a modern and pluralistic Judaism; and they brought about what amounted to an almost collective advancement into the middle and upper middle class.3

As late as 1800, probably no one would have thought this possible, because at that time more than two-thirds of all German Jews were living
They also seemed anything but “bourgeois” in terms of culture and mentality: The traditional everyday life of the Jews appeared almost diametrically opposed to the Enlightenment’s call for reason, usefulness, and education, or to use the more precise German term, Bildung.

But by the closing years of the nineteenth century, the signs seem almost to have reversed. The German Jews had by then established themselves in bourgeois society socially, economically, and culturally. They no longer exemplified a deficit of bourgeois virtues, but were almost model pupils of Bildung and Bürgerlichkeit. By Bürgerlichkeit I mean the complex of cultural values and practices that characterized the bourgeois way of life and education.

It is hardly surprising that this rapid transformation soon became a focus of research and the subject of important work. However, this research often gives the impression that it was somehow inevitable that the German Jews, even the poor ones, took the bourgeoisie as their point of reference. In fact, there was nothing inevitable or self-evident about this transformation. This is clear on the one hand from general social trends in Germany, where there was only very limited social mobility and even an expansion of the lower classes during the same time period. On the other hand, the experience of Jews in other countries shows that “embourgeoisement,” or the process of becoming bourgeois, was by no means the only “normal” Jewish path into modern times. Many Jews in England, France, and the Netherlands also profited from the development of capitalist economic structures, and there were certainly also bourgeois Jews in these places. But a Jewish underclass, and before long a proletariat as well, also continued to exist in these countries—classes that had practically vanished in German cities.

But why was it in Germany, where the emancipation process had dragged on for such an excruciatingly long time, that the Jews were able to unleash such dynamic change not only in their social circumstances but also in their cultural and religious life as well? Did this happen despite or because emancipation had been “made so difficult” for the Jews, as the above citation suggested? I would like to discuss this question in three steps. First, I will outline previous explanations and put forward further considerations; second, I will outline the central pillars of the embourgeoisement of the German Jews; and third, I will place this development in its international and its German context.

* * *

Historians have offered a number of explanations for the extraordinary success of the German Jews, including their long experience in commerce and banking, a tendency toward advancement and mobility that is often
present in minorities, specific family structures, and a traditional esteem for learning. However, such arguments, which refer only to a Jewish context, cannot explain why this success story held only for German Jewry and not for Jews elsewhere. Thus we have to reconsider peculiarities of German history, too. And one of the most important peculiarities in this context is that “emancipation” was not regarded as a basic right, as in France or the Netherlands, but rather as a reward for successfully passing through an educational process. As far as the orientation (and the goal) of this “education” was concerned, officials mostly applied their own system of values, above all bourgeois values, such as learning, aesthetics, order, and cleanliness. Self-improvement and a special work ethic were also decisive. Basically the point of this approach, which was tied to the catch-phrase *bürgerliche Verbesserung*, was to bind the German Jews to this new bourgeois cultural model.9

Given this background, it was only logical that authors such as David Sorkin, George Mosse, or Marion Kaplan established the terms *Bürgerlichkeit* and *Bildung* as central categories of modern German-Jewish history. My own research is greatly indebted to their work, as well as to that of Shulamit Volkov, who sees the German Jews as a “paradigm of embourgeoisement.” By asking the apparently simple but in fact little-investigated question, “How did they do it?” Volkov posed a problem that I have found enormously gripping but also puzzling.10 On the one hand, Volkov’s essay focused attention on the importance of cultural factors, particularly in shaping a bourgeois mentality. On the other hand, however, it led to a dead end. Volkov, too, proceeded from the assumption that only those Jews who had already advanced economically behaved like the bourgeoisie culturally. But this could not explain how so many families made the actual jump from poverty to affluence, and how the German Jews actually managed their move to the middle class as a collective process and experience.

This question had occupied me for a long time, and it was initially the Leo Baeck Institute in New York and then the work of a brilliant sociologist that inspired me to turn Volkov’s fruitful approach upside down. Again and again I came across sources and histories of previously moneyless families that showed that bourgeois values, in particular education and bourgeois behavior, played a great role long before their economic advancement.11 There were many young people, such as the bank apprentice Lesser, who got together after a long day at work to learn foreign languages, to go to concerts, or to discuss literature.12 I also encountered many young men such as Adolph Arnhold and Markus Mosse, who came from poor families but still graduated from a university.13 These new graduates had hardly any economic assets, but they did tend to lead their lives in good middle-class fashion and were held in high regard by non-
Jewish citizens as well as by wealthy Jewish fathers-in-law. This was true not only for doctors or lawyers. The life histories of men such as Gotthold Salomon, Eduard Kley, Zacharias Frankel, and Benjamin Ginsberg demonstrate that many teachers, preachers, and rabbis also married into respected merchant families. In other words, these representatives of the new Jewish educated elite had hardly any economic capital, but they did have social prestige. And above all, they had children who succeeded in making an impressive leap into the academic elite or, more often, the upper economic bourgeoisie. Adolph Arnhold and Marcus Mosse for example were communal doctors who treated the poor, and their children ended up becoming noted figures in the banking and business worlds.

But what does all this signify? Had Bildung in the meantime gained a sort of economic value? And how should one deal with the fact that a truly dramatic jump—practically from peddler to millionaire—occurred very rarely, whereas the above-mentioned model of advancement stretching over two or three generations was very common?

While I was occupied with these and similar questions, for which I found only insufficient explanations in historical research, I came across several of the works of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. He has analyzed the social and cultural practices that establish elite groups and repeatedly stabilize them by means of subtle but enormously important differences. Bourdieu sees material capital as only one component of success. Just as important are non-economic factors, such as ties to certain networks, a good reputation, and also education, aesthetic judgments, and public behavior; as Bourdieu so succinctly says, these are cultural and social capital. I found particularly inspiring Bourdieu’s thesis that economic, cultural, and social capital are mutually convertible, and that the lack of one type can thus be compensated for by a surplus of another sort of capital. For our German-Jewish question, this means that if poorer families were also able to succeed in acquiring education, culture, and a bourgeois mentality, then they had gained cultural capital that helped them, or at least their children and grandchildren, to advance into the bourgeoisie in social and economic terms as well. The assumption that the accumulation of cultural capital constitutes the foundation of the German-Jewish success story seemed especially plausible insofar as the development of the bourgeoisie and the emancipation debates in Germany were in large part cultural phenomena.

Historians have generally been critical of this conditional emancipation, but for the German Jews it was also attractive because the message was that whoever adopted the bourgeois cultural model would be accepted as a member of the middle class and later as a citizen regardless of his social origins and religious faith. “Membership” or “inclusion” in these terms was not derived primarily from a common history and origin.
but rather from cultural practices. In this respect, the German states promised “their” Jews a different, primarily culturally defined form of “equality.” But this also had social consequences. In the liberal states of Western Europe, it was up to each individual Jew to decide how he would become part of the modern world and which social reference point he would take. The German states, by contrast, wanted to regulate the modernization of Jewish life from above. German officials thus judged the entire group down to the peddler according to this bourgeois standard, which otherwise was only relevant for a small elite group in society.

This brings me to the second point, the question of how the German Jews took up and transformed this offer from the state. Taking my cue from David Sorkin, who has done pioneering work on the religious and cultural transformation of German Jewry, but who has hardly examined its social and economic relevance, I will concentrate on three pillars of cultural integration: schools and education, the public sphere, and religious practice.

Regarding schools and education, the Jews are considered a people of books and learning. But at the end of the eighteenth century, it was precisely this sphere of activity that came under criticism. The reason was that in traditional Judaism, “learning” was primarily concerned with the Holy Scripture, the Hebrew language, and the observance of religious rules; in other words, with knowledge that was diametrically opposed to Enlightenment principles such as “reason,” “usefulness,” and “individuality.” Thus it is not surprising that this is where the Jewish reformers saw the greatest need for work. By 1815 there were at least fifteen Jewish schools in Germany and countless private teachers who were passing on knowledge and skills that anticipated the demands of the developing capitalistic society. A focal point was the German language, which up until that time only a few Jews had mastered properly. Now, however, instruction in orthography, grammar and style, rhetoric, and the composition of proper letters was on the lesson plan, often to a greater extent even than in the schools that were recently founded to meet the needs of the new middle class, especially of merchants and factory owners. The new Jewish schools could also compete with the latter in other areas, including the teaching of modern foreign languages and mathematics. Even in small towns such as Gröbzig, math lessons also encompassed bookkeeping, accounting, and statistics. Additional subjects included natural sciences such as geography, natural history, physics, as well as history, religion, ethics, drawing, singing, and calligraphy. The new Jewish schools could also compete with the new Realschulen with regard to the social and cultural skills that pupils were supposed to acquire; the focus was on raising children to be industrious and independent with a will to achieve, to take pleasure from work, but also to exercise self-
control and self-discipline. In general, pupils who completed these schools were equipped to live according to middle-class principles and to climb the social ladder.\textsuperscript{18}

That is significant because the new Jewish schools taught primarily poor children, which meant that in social profile, the Jewish schools were comparable to Christian elementary schools, which taught students of the lower classes at this time. But in the subjects they offered and the methods they employed, these Jewish institutions were similar to the new \textit{Bürgerschulen}, which set high standards and were oriented to the ideal of the educated merchant. While the bourgeoisie was stabilizing its social position, in part by means of this very education system, the Jewish educational offensive was aimed more at overcoming social barriers. “Even the lowest classes are filled with the ambition of attaining scholarly cultivation,” said Ludwig Phillipson in 1836. “No wish inspires the Israelite elders of each class more than the wish to ‘let their children study something,’ […] The intelligentsia is becoming important.”\textsuperscript{19} The reformed schools signaled the start of an educational program that went far beyond the standards of German society and became the catalyst for social mobility precisely because it encompassed so many poor children. On the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Hamburg Freischule in 1840, Eduard Kley estimated that very few of his students returned to retail trade or stumbled in their chosen paths in life. In the memorial publication, he writes that “the formerly common sight of families that had persisted for generations as beggars has been wiped out; since good schools have been established, the daily encounter with poor begging Jewish children of both sexes has disappeared forever.”\textsuperscript{20}

The second pillar of the embourgeoisement of the German Jews was the development of a specific public sphere. This likewise represents a new phenomenon. The early advocates of the Haskalah still published in Hebrew because they wanted to address a solely Jewish audience. But the modern era lived from transparency and exchange, thus demanding that the Jewish community also open up to the outside and develop new models of communication even inside the Jewish field. This included, first of all, the establishment of Jewish publishing that used the German language even for internal Jewish exchanges. The starting-point was the periodical \textit{Sulamith}, which began publishing in Dessau in 1808. By the mid-nineteenth century, German Jewry already accounted for half of all Jewish periodicals worldwide.\textsuperscript{21} It is precisely this pioneering achievement, claimed Abraham Geiger in 1844, that testifies to the active intellectual life and dynamism of German Jews. It is evidence of “a joyous awareness of the true riches of Bildung” and proof of “an existing interest in living development […] In any case, just as before, Germany now
stands alone in terms of the richness of its Jewish life; other countries show little independent power in this area.\textsuperscript{22}

This was also true of Jewish associations, which were sprouting up like mushrooms at the same time. Young Jews had already attempted to organize religious fraternities according to new principles around 1800. They replaced religious obligations and abstract piety with Enlightenment values such as ethics, honor, and morality. They thereby laid the foundations for a modern system of associations that also took over some of the functions that synagogues had previously performed: Jews who wanted to learn and communicate or to initiate marriage or business connections were now drawn more to an association than to the synagogue. Soon there were modern Jewish associations for all purposes and dimensions of life, from social life and education to welfare and religion.

David Sorkin coined the term “subculture” for this phenomenon, which he traced back to the rejection of Jews by public associations.\textsuperscript{23} But this interpretation is problematic; for one thing, it overlooks the fact that many Jews held multiple memberships. In Karlsruhe, for instance, those Jews who had been admitted into the elite association Museum were also members of the similar Jewish club Harmonie, and in Mannheim the bankers Ladenburg and Hohenemser founded a parallel Jewish society after they had been admitted as the first Jews ever in the society Harmonie.\textsuperscript{24} Sorkin focuses one-sidedly on integration. However, looking from the perspective of embourgeoisement, it becomes clear that poorer Jews in particular could learn middle class practices much better in purely Jewish surroundings. In Dresden, for instance, a Jewish reading society was formed around 1810 in order to create a “unifying point for knowledgeable people and literary patrons […] to fulfill the former’s wish to be useful through their knowledge and to provide the latter with a productive activity in their free time that will be useful for the cultivation of their mind and spirit.” At the same time, the association placed particular emphasis upon integrating the “lower classes among our Jews” as well. This goal was explained with the statement that “the larger segment of our nation lacks culture and scientific knowledge,” and with the complaint that the “great, indolent crowd is unused to reading […] and becomes a burden because of its ignorance.”\textsuperscript{25} German emancipation ideology is quite obvious here: Since the individual Jew was promised equality only at the moment at which the last dawdler would meet bourgeois standards, it was above all the “educated” who spared no effort to ensure that the “swarm” were trained to live according to middle-class principles.

The modern Jewish associations, like the initially separate schools, were thus much more than an involuntary retreat to a purely Jewish public sphere or a “makeshift solution.” Instead, they were a midwife and
a vital laboratory for Jewish Bürgerlichkeit. This applied particularly to those Jews who, because of their social status, would not have had access to bourgeois associations even as Christians. Only within the Jewish public sphere could poorer Jews accumulate cultural capital that would serve the next generation’s social advance and integration with gentiles—if they strove for integration at all, which should by no means be taken for granted.

There are definite connecting lines from this to the third and last pillar of the German Jews’ embourgeoisement: religion. Germany was the birthplace of the Jewish Enlightenment, the Haskalah, and the starting point for the reform of religious practice. There one finds the most important attempts at a historicization of Judaism, and it was there where, parallel to Reform Judaism and earlier than anywhere else, a Jewish orthodoxy also developed that closely united piety and Bürgerlichkeit.26 In France, an adequate process of religious modernization began only much later; in the Netherlands, this was a marginal phenomenon up until the end of the nineteenth century; and in Great Britain, at most 10 percent of Jewish families were considered followers of a modern Judaism. Thus it seems obvious to ask: Was there a causal connection between these two special characteristics—that is, religious modernization on the one hand and the social success of the German Jews on the other hand? Was the social and cultural embourgeoisement of the German Jews also supported or even accelerated by the changes in the religious domain?

Around 1800, this question would probably have evoked peals of laughter. For Christian and Jewish representatives of the Enlightenment, the religious laws were a symbol of formalism, rigidity, and irrationality. That was the one side. The other side, however, shows an everyday Jewish life that was strongly or predominantly shaped by religion until the mid-nineteenth century. In this sense, religion stood in the way of the embourgeoisement project, but nonetheless this project could not be realized in opposition to religion because then it simply would not have reached the majority of Jews. Thus there was only one choice: the aspired-for collective embourgeoisement process also had to be supported by, or perhaps even emanate from, the religion.

That, in turn, was possible only if Halachic Judaism reformed itself. The forms and also the content of religious life were not to be oriented to Christian criteria, as one often reads, but primarily to bourgeois criteria. Questions of aesthetics and order, manners and taste, played a central role here. Again and again the reformers complained of unclean and improperly dressed people, insisting that it can no longer be acceptable that someone “is called to the Torah in a cap or other inappropriate head-covering or that they […] enter the synagogue inappropriately dressed, for example in slippers or sheepskin clothing.”27 The same was
true of “noisy moving about and entering and exiting,” as well as prayers spoken in an “excessively loud, crying, or mournful” way, sitting on the floor, or uttering loud laughter or expressions of thanks. Additionally, the following behaviors were frowned upon: “chanting a few bars ahead as a prelude, prompting or hurrying others, […] rising ceremoniously, swaying, rocking back and forth, opening and closing the pews, and any other kind of disruptive behavior.” These also included ritual practices such as loud shouting and wailing, swaying during prayer, baring one’s feet, audibly kissing the ritual fringes on one’s garments, and at times even parading with the Torah. Criticism was also aimed against the “unnatural stretching out” of the prayer rites, which promoted “thoughtless repetition and a soulless performance of rituals.”

Rabbi Elias Grünbaum of Landau once observed that “no person can remain for such a long period in a state of deep devotion [Andacht], if he does not bring it to the point of statue-like asceticism, that is, or Ochsen-Eremiten who occupy their spirit with screaming and yelling; for that reason alone, ignoring questions of form and content, all pious silence [Andacht] vanishes from the house of prayer, disorder and noise set in, and mere lip-service takes the place of inner elevation and growth.”

Faith instead of law, aesthetics instead of meaningless ritual—that was what mattered above all else when the reformers introduced such new elements as synagogue regulations, choral singing, sermons, or confirmations. Religion was to awaken the capacity for inwardly-guided behavior and provide orientation for dealing with rapidly changing everyday life. These challenges were met by the new appearance of sermons in the German language, documented for the first time in 1808—a change that had reached even small religious communities within three decades and thus had accelerated the progress of the language change. But above all, the sermons conveyed decidedly bourgeois orientations, an aspect that has hardly received any attention in research. Cultural practices and models of identity and interpretation, indispensable for the everyday life of a citizen, were now being conveyed with religious impetus in the synagogues. In addition to a new gender model and responsibility for the education and upbringing of children, this also included the confirmation of bourgeois virtues such as order, modesty, or thriftiness, as well as an ethic of work and responsibility, recalling Weber’s Spirit of Capitalism. This concerned rational use of time as well as the fact that “work” and “profession” now had a basically positive connotation. “Only he who lives in the happy consciousness of faithfully fulfilled obligations,” said Zacharias Frankel, “is truly free.”

Gotthold Salomon preached, “Be aware of what luck it is, […] to work in one’s profession for oneself and for others, and to be helpful to yourself and others.” For the Hamburg rabbi it was a biblical commandment to “belong fully to and live com-
pletely for one’s profession.” He reminded listeners that “neither the sweetest joys nor the greatest pleasures should tempt us to remove ourselves from our calling from this hour to the next [. . .] for we should experience the sweetest pleasures, the greatest enjoyment in our work itself, which is a task God gives to humanity, a daily service to God, as Moses considered it.”

Religious action thus was no longer to be realized through strict observance—the traditional Talmud Jew was now criticized as an idler—but rather through one’s profession and the daily fulfillment of obligations. “It is God’s will that the Law be fulfilled,” Eduard Kley pointed out, “but it cannot be fulfilled here in temple but outside in life. In the house of prayer, you receive no sign that prayer will make you holy or adept, but outside the true prayer service begins.”33 “Achieve perfection,” admonished Ludwig Philipsson in one of his model sermons. Published in 1834 in his journal *Israelitisches Predigt- und Schulmagazin*, it was intended to be widely copied. “And in which way can one achieve perfection? Not by practicing vain arts in which one excels, not through beautiful garments, or delicate gestures, or deceptive ways of speaking, but perfection through the fulfillment of one’s calling, perfection through the love of service, perfection in reverence before God! Whichever calling you may choose, achieve perfection in it, be it scholarship, science, art, trade, or craft! Do not be satisfied with incomplete knowledge or sloppy work [. . .] Idleness is deadly, lack of follow-through is deadly, neglect is deadly.”

If one now asks to what extent cultural capital was able to promote the social embourgeoisement of the Jewish lower classes, these new mentality themes surely played an important role. Moreover, many preachers spoke about the transparency of the social borders and the transience of possessions, and warned the poor not to surrender fatalistically to their fate but rather to become active. These, too, were interpretive and behavior patterns that exactly suited the needs of the new capitalist society. This Judaism suddenly did not seem unworldly anymore. In contrast, it integrated experiences and challenges from everyday Jewish life in worship, and thus indirectly conveyed the message that *Bürgerlichkeit* could be combined with, indeed was even compatible with, “Jewishness.” Since this hardly infringed upon the Halacha, but only placed it in a new cultural framework, the “improvement program” could really be reinterpreted as a Jewish project, and could be anchored comparatively widely, even within the orthodoxy.

* * *

It should be clear by now that the social advancement of the German Jews was based above all on their cultural and religious embourgeoisement. If one asks why this development applied only to individual Jews in other
countries, but covered the majority of Jews in Germany, then the German path to emancipation of the Jews must be seen above all—and quite in keeping with the initial quotation—as having had enormous impetus. Certainly in revolutionary France the state and the bourgeoisie also desired integration of the Jews. But this was to grow out of emancipation and not be made a prerequisite. The question of how far the minority would assimilate could thus be answered on an individual basis. Education, ethics and morals, or even religious reforms barely played a role in the expectations of the state. The primary reference point was Jews’ acknowledgment of the nation and their readiness to participate actively in the process of nation-building.

In contrast, in Germany the discussion always had a cultural and collective pattern; the starting point was the—unrealistic—belief that equality for the individual was only possible when all Jews had undergone bourgeois improvement. The new Jewish elite that took shape around 1800 in the environment of the salons and the universities foun
dered on this expectation. They gave up and followed a path into modern times mostly as Christians. But with this the path was free for another group of major thinkers who, because they worked as preachers, rabbis, and teachers, could not profit from baptism, and therefore sought a collective and explicitly Jewish answer to the state’s demands. They spared no effort to raise the lower classes to the bourgeois standard as well, precisely because this also seemed to be the only guarantee for the emancipation of the individual. However, at the beginning of this process, the fact that the German Jews thus also accumulated cultural capital, which advanced the social-economic embourgeoisement of the following generations, was neither intended nor foreseen.

In any case, two points must be emphasized in conclusion. First, that which I have called a “collective embourgeoisement” or “project” did not, of course, run according to a sort of master plan, and especially not according to any plan by the state. The German Jews had in fact only adopted those demands that corresponded with the Zeitgeist and with their identity. In contrast, other initiatives fizzled out. For instance, the attempt to force poorer Jews permanently into the track of skilled trades or agriculture failed. They remained primarily faithful to commerce, at first denounced as unproductive, because with the shaping of a market society, it offered quite new, attractive chances. The adoption of bourgeois values had by no means led to uncritical assimilation. It did not allow “Jewishness” to erode, but rather transformed it for a modern world and adapted it for life in that world.

Second, what I have described here are the strands of development that succeeded in the end, those that were dominant. However, there were also always Jews who did not succeed, or who did not even want to
follow the bourgeois path. Potential for resistance and obstinacy can be
found in all religious communities; the modernization of everyday Jewish
life did not proceed as quickly, smoothly, and without conflict as a paper
that is intended to show the major trends might lead one to believe.35
How strongly traditional elements also shaped the mentality of those
who considered themselves modernizers can be illustrated by a journal
entry by Hermann Baerwald. This Gymnasiast had visited a small syna-
gogue in 1847 and had seen how even educated Jews submitted them-
selves to the traditional ceremony:

Thus an intelligent man stands there in such an environment and
prays right out of the book [. . .] Thus is man a slave to custom.
I remember that in the past I thought about my parents and
prayed with true fervor. To me these reminiscences were sweet,
and as far as I am from such things today, in a moment I would
be taken away and pray everything just as it was written. I did
not omit passages that fully contradicted my beliefs, because it
would be disruptive. I would have begun to have doubts while
praying and begun to think, and that would have torn me away
from my paradise: so I just recited all of the prayers. Why? I did
not know then and I do not know now. Perhaps in order to put
myself again in the position of a pious Jew, in that cozy, modest
state. Afterwards, I conversed with N. about many things, in-
cluding [Wilhelm] Meister.36

The tension in which this generation grew up, in which they became
educated and defined their Judaism anew, could not be more aptly de-
scribed.

What has often been misunderstood as assimilation and has been
interpreted as acculturation therefore manifests itself as a complex pro-
cess of hybridization, in which various identities—Jew, citizen, and Ger-
man—overlapped, supplemented, and mixed with one another, in a
process in which both sides, the Jewish and the non-Jewish, changed,
although by no means always at the same speed. Whereas the Jewish
reformers adapted the central ideals of the Enlightenment—that is, edu-
cation and morals—and tried to bring them closer to “their” people,
Christian thinkers were coming up with other values that were much less
attractive for the Jews: the romantic orientation to the German nation and
the unity of church, Volk, and state. By the time the ideal of bürgerliche
Verbesserung had become attractive and popular on a broad front in the
Jewish microcosm, the other side had already taken leave of it. But this
also meant that the German Jews self-confidently reinterpreted the eman-
cipation ideology as a Jewish project, a project that ended in a success
story that was as extraordinary as it was precarious. It was precarious
because the coveted “normality” was not quite achieved and the distance between Jews and other Germans was not quite abolished, but only changed in form.

The German Jews were henceforth perceived as the success group par excellence abroad as well; there, too, their success seemed to be rooted in a “broader cultural outlook” and a special “cultural baggage.” In the judgement of Todd Endelman, “their rise from poverty to prosperity [was] the most rapid of any immigrant group at the time.” In this respect, the “German Jew” soon developed into a cultural category, a symbol. Just as the “Polish Jews” had been symbolized during the Enlightenment discourse by the poor, uncultivated, haggling Jew or the Talmud-studying, aesthetically repellent idler, so the “German Jew” also took shape as a type, especially overseas: a type that was also primarily culturally defined, and a type that also embraced a decidedly social component. But this time it was embodied by the opposite of poverty: a remarkable economic success and a maximum of Bürgerlichkeit.

Notes

Translated by Jonathan Skolnik, GHI. I am grateful to Jonathan not only for translating this paper, but also for organizing this year’s joint Leo Baeck-GHI lecture.

1 Morgenblatt für gebildete Leser (Stuttgart, 1851): 737f.

2 Allgemeine Zeitung des Judenthums (1839): 624.

3 For a more comprehensive and differentiated analysis, see Simone Lässig, Jüdische Wege ins Bürgertum: Kulturelles Kapital und sozialer Aufstieg im 19. Jahrhundert (Goettingen, 2004).


6 See especially: Jacob Katz, ed., Die Entstehung der Judenassimilation in Deutschland und deren Ideologie (Frankfurt am Main, 1935); Jacob Katz, Aus dem Ghetto in die bürgerliche Gesellschaft: Jüdische Emanzipation 1770–1870 (Frankfurt am Main, 1988).


8 Jonathan Frankel and Steven J. Zipperstein, eds., Assimilation and Community: The Jews in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Cambridge, 1992); Pierre Birnbaum and Ira Katznelson, eds., Paths of Emancipation: Jews, States and Citizenship (Princeton, 1995); Frances Malino and


15 See e.g.: Pierre Bourdieu, *Sozialer Raum und “Klassen”: Leçon sur la Leçon* (Frankfurt am Main, 1985); Pierre Bourdieu, *Sozialer Sinn: Kritik der theoretischen Vernunft* (Frankfurt am Main, 1987); Pierre Bourdieu, *Zur Soziologie der symbolischen Formen* (Frankfurt am Main, 1994); Pierre Bourdieu, *Die feinen Unterschiede: Kritik der gesellschaftlichen Urteilskraft* (Frankfurt am Main, 1996).


23 Sorkin, Transformation.

24 Lässig, Jüdische Wege, 508f., 551.

25 Stadtarchiv Dresden, RA C.XXII Nr. 50 (Jüdisches Leseinstitut).


27 Landesarchiv Oranienbaum (LAO), Abt. Dessau C 15, Nr. 48, Bl. 55b.


29 Elias Grünebaum, Zustände und Kämpfe (Carlsruhe, 1843), 44.

30 Zacharias Frankel, Rede bei Gelegenheit der Feyer des Dankfestes, gehalten am 15. Sept. 1832 in der Synagoge zu Teplitz (Teplitz, 1832), 22.

31 Gotthold Salomon, Predigten in dem neuen israelitischen Tempel zu Hamburg gehalten (Hamburg, 1820).


33 Kayserling, ed., Bibliothek jüdischer Kanzelredner, 81.

34 Internationales Predigt- und Schulmagazin (1834), 40.

35 Lässig, Jüdische Wege, passim.

36 Hermann Baerwald Tagebuch 1.06.1847, archives of the Leo Baeck Institute New York, Baerwald Collection.

THE PARK INTERNATIONAL:
PARK SYSTEM PLANNING AS AN INTERNATIONAL
PHENOMENON AT THE BEGINNING OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY

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Looking at the metro map of Washington, DC in 2005, a knot of thick blue, orange, yellow, red, and green lines catches the eye, with the lines disentangling themselves toward the edges of the map and running for different lengths in different directions until they suddenly terminate. The Potomac and the Anacostia, the rivers on which the U.S. capital was built beginning in 1792, offered the metro map’s designers suitable natural features to place the viewer on the map, providing graphic signs for the necessary quick orientation amid the jungle of colored metro lines. A second glance at the metro map, however, reveals that not only the abstract blue depictions of the Potomac and Anacostia Rivers structure the map and provide the required orientation: A light shade of green underlies the map in certain areas. This represents the capital’s green centerpiece, the Mall; Roosevelt Island (formerly Analostan Island) in the Potomac; the extensive Rock Creek Park running through the city from north to south; Arlington Cemetery; and the green open space along the Potomac. These areas are elements of the national capital’s park system that was planned, developed, and partially realized beginning in 1900. The inclusion of the most extensive and prominent features of Washington’s park system in the metro map and their use as abstract graphic symbols by the map’s designers reflect the important role green open space and the park system have played for the capital’s urban development and its representation after 1900.

After some early forerunners, municipal and metropolitan park system planning as a component of city planning became relevant on both sides of the Atlantic on a broader scale in the early 1900s. It strove to alleviate social ills, enhance citizens’ well-being, increase the value of land in certain areas, and act as a means for municipal and national representation. Park systems perpetuated the social, moral, hygienic, and representational aims that underlay the creation of the first public urban parks on broader municipal and metropolitan scales.

Urban historians have in the last decades pointed to the park system as one of the pioneering urban design works accomplished in the United States, and have referred to it as one of the greatest contributions to city
planning in the United States. In 1966, George F. Chadwick found the “idea of the planning of complete systems of parks and parkways” responsible for the subsequent development of “the idea of comprehensive planning of cities and their environs [as in Washington].” Likewise, the international milieu of city and town planning in the first decade of the twentieth century, also characterized as the “Urban International,” has in the last decades attracted further research.

However, although several scholars have drawn attention to park system planning as an American phenomenon that attracted attention in Europe, and while some have acknowledged the importance of green open space in city planning history, no study exists that deals with the “Park International,” or more specifically, with park system planning as an international phenomenon. The scope of this project therefore is to investigate the points of contact, the cultural transfer and exchange of ideas concerned with modern park system planning and design in the United States and Western Europe from its inception in the United States after the Civil War in the late 1860s until 1930.

Whereas the last three decades of the nineteenth century in the United States can be considered as the time period when landscape architects such as Frederick Law Olmsted, Sr. (1822–1903), Horace William Shaler Cleveland (1814–1900), and George Edward Kessler (1862–1923) pioneered the first park systems, the three decades after the turn of the century marked the park system’s establishment as one of the key elements in comprehensive city planning. Park system planning became one of the major preoccupations in North American cities. In 1909, foreseeing large population growth, Oklahoma City for example planned a twenty-eight-mile-long and two-hundred-foot-wide boulevard encircling the city and combining private parks and pleasure grounds. Park systems also played a major role in the city plans drawn up in the first decade of the twentieth century for the nation’s capital and for Chicago, at the time one of the fastest-growing cities.

The period spanning the years from 1900 to 1930 is regarded as the birth of modern city planning in the United States. In terms of American public park development, it has been described as the “reform park era,” and more recently as the “rationalistic era” because of park planners’ emphasis on the hygienic and social functions of parks. It is also the time period when an increasing number of national and international conferences and exhibitions on city planning and landscape architecture took place on both sides of the Atlantic, attracting an increasing number of professionals in these fields and providing manifold opportunities for the diffusion and transatlantic transfer of ideas.

This project is concerned with providing insights into the mechanisms underlying the cross-national transfer of planning and design
ideas. While focusing on the park system, the study seeks to reveal the international impact of individual planning and design solutions. To what extent did the evolution of the park system on both sides of the Atlantic trigger or promote international relations and cause a transatlantic, cross-cultural transfer of ideas on a broader scale in the planning professions?

One of the first park systems to gain international recognition was Frederick Law Olmsted and Calvert Vaux’s plan for Buffalo (1868–69), which won an honorable mention at the Paris Exposition of 1878. It is very likely that Olmsted and his followers such as George Edward Kessler, who designed a park system for Kansas City in 1893, were influenced by the design of open space systems along ringroads and on the grounds of fortifications, as was the practice in many European cities at the time. Olmsted had traveled widely in Europe, and Kessler had trained as a gardener in Weimar and Potsdam, where he was probably exposed to the new accomplishments in open-space planning. In 1911, the city planner and advocate of the American City Beautiful movement, Charles Mulford Robinson (1869–1917), pointed to the European example of tree-lined ringroads and public green open space along the ruins of former fortifications for the development of the system of parks and boulevards in Chicago and Boston.\(^\text{10}\)

The European idea of reutilizing the grounds of former fortifications as tree-lined ringroads or green open space was adopted in Washington, DC’s park system plan at the beginning of the twentieth century. Originally drawn up by the Senate Park Commission in 1901–1902 to celebrate the national capital’s centenary with a design that was to act as an example to the nation, the park system was further developed on the metropolitan scale during the first decades of the twentieth century. Washington’s planners suggested securing and linking the open spaces of the old Civil War forts surrounding the city by constructing thirty miles of parkways.\(^\text{11}\) The so-called McMillan Plan for Washington was followed by an elaborate municipal and metropolitan park system plan in Chicago.

In 1903, the Special Park Commission, formerly a playground-planning group, was instructed by the Chicago city council to develop a park scheme for the metropolitan area. The architect Dwight Heald Perkins (1867–1941) and the landscape architect Jens Jensen (1860–1951) planned eighty-four new parks comprising thirty-seven thousand acres in four zones. Daniel H. Burnham (1846–1912) and Edward Bennett’s (1874–1954) Chicago Plan, which included the municipal and metropolitan park system, in 1909 proposed to turn “grubby commercial Chicago into Parisian Boulevards and Venetian lagoons.”\(^\text{12}\)

The recognition of the park systems’ functions gained momentum with the maturation of the City Beautiful movement in the first decade of
The idea of connecting parkways and boulevards linking all of a city’s principal parks and points of interest corresponded to the movement’s aim to combine utility and beauty in city development, and was therefore promoted. In 1911, Charles Mulford Robinson asserted that “parks and park systems are the most important artistic work which has been done in the United States.”

At the beginning of the twentieth century, North American and European contemporaries acknowledged the value of the park systems. Among the progressive ideas for urban planning that crossed the Atlantic between the United States and Europe, the park system was considered to have originated in the United States. As Charles Mulford Robinson commented in 1911, “[surveying] the whole range of park activity, it becomes clear that as far as the interest of the study goes American cities are in advance of those in Europe.” Robinson praised American comprehensive city planning schemes, which included park systems as “a seemingly natural part of its [the city’s] organism” rather than letting “the park which has been bestowed upon the city as an after-thought […]” remain “a separate entity.” In 1917, the garden director of the city of Hanover, Hermann Kube (1866–1944), acknowledged that German park planning was far from being able to compete with the “gigantic park systems of North American cities.” Chicago’s park system was one of the most frequently quoted examples in German garden architectural journals. German architects, city planners, and landscape architects traveled to the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century, looking for new ideas and planning solutions. Among them were Werner Hegemann (1881–1936) and Hugo Koch (1883–1964), who after their return presented some of their newly gained experiences to the German public in exhibitions and publications. Having experienced American parks and park systems and their strong interrelation with the urban fabric, Hugo Koch in 1928 expressed his belief that “the city once opposed to nature would become the birth place of the ‘new garden.’”

American planning efforts attracted the attention of European planners because of the Americans’ structured, systematic, and comprehensive approach in which the planning of parks and park systems was considered a means to promote the civilization of cities. Already in 1879, after having visited the United States, the French landscape architect Édouard André (1840–1911) expressed his fascination with American town planning, public urban parks, parkways, and cemetery design in his book *L’art des jardins: Traité générale de la composition des parcs et jardins.* Almost thirty years later, in 1905, his colleague, the landscape architect and city planner Jean Claude Nicolas Forestier (1861–1930), wrote a monograph on park system planning, *Grandes villes et systèmes de parcs,* published in 1906. Acquainted with the members of the Senate Park
Commission from Washington, DC, whom he had met during their European study tour in Paris in 1901, and well informed through international publications, Forestier presented the most recent American accomplishments in the field. Besides presenting the park systems of Adelaide, Letchworth, Vienna, Cologne, London, and Paris, Forestier focused on the realization of park systems in Boston, New York, Chicago, Baltimore, and Harrisburg. He observed that European cities such as Barcelona, Cologne, Vienna, and London were imitating American examples and improving as well as adding to their existing systems. Ahead of his time, he propagated park system planning on a regional scale, and argued that park system planning could also become a national or even international program, involving neighboring nations and thereby crossing political borders. He also anticipated the idea that parks and park projects should be the object of a general plan for various cities, municipalities, and regions so that open space and parks would be uniformly distributed.

Although most ideas and the impetus for park system planning came from the United States, England, Germany, Austria, and France, park systems were also implemented in southern Europe. In 1914, the English landscape architect Thomas H. Mawson (1861–1933) was invited by Greece’s King Constantine to advise the municipality of Athens on the creation of a park system and other improvements. Mawson had gained prominence not only as a landscape architect and planner in his home country, but also internationally, through a lecture tour in the United States in 1910, subsequent lecture tours to all the major cities in Canada between 1911 and 1913, and the success of his first book, The Art and Craft of Garden Making (1900). Citing Forestier in text and image, Nicodemo Severi, the director of parks and gardens in Rome, in 1909 promoted the idea of the park system for its hygienic as well as aesthetic qualities. Echoing the tendencies in the United States and other European countries at the time, Severi in 1921 finally published and ardently promoted suggestions for a municipal and metropolitan sistema di parchi in Rome. A few years earlier, in 1916, Marcello Piacentini (1881–1960), later to become Benito Mussolini’s state architect, had proposed a park system as a structuring element for modern Rome. After his return from a journey to the United States on the occasion of the Panama-Pacific International Exposition in San Francisco in 1915, a trip during which he also visited New York, Buffalo, Chicago, Washington, and Boston, Piacentini presented a park system plan for the city of Rome. Rome was to be surrounded by a greenbelt (l’anello dei parchi) that incorporated the remaining villas, thereby providing for their protection and conservation. Piacentini referred to Chicago’s South Park system as a model. To explain his park system plan, he employed a direct translation of the metaphor commonly
used for Boston’s metropolitan park system, the “emerald necklace.” A tree-lined avenue was supposed to act as a connector between the individual gardens and parks, “like the string of a necklace of precious stones.” In order to convey the impression of a linear park, only small villas were to be built on the land adjacent to the tree-lined avenue.

While Europeans looked toward America and tried to learn from American park system planning, American planners and landscape architects joined the already established forums in Europe and traveled the continent, visiting gardens, parks, and cities, and subsequently introducing into their own country design ideas and planning tools such as zoning laws that they had picked up in Europe. Accordingly, the journal The American City announced in its first issue that it would be providing its readers with abstracts and translations of articles from European magazines so that “by studying their [the Europeans’] methods and achievements we may avoid some of their mistakes and be guided by their successes.”

In 1909, the president emeritus of Harvard University, Charles William Eliot, stated that “democratic America is far behind Europe in providing effectively for the health and happiness of the urban part of the population.”

In fact, Americans admired what was thought to be “true democracy” in the European parks and the social services they provided. Returning from a study trip in Europe, the American landscape architect George Elberton Burnap admired the numerous “milk houses” he found, especially in German and Austrian public parks. There, glasses of milk were sold for a relatively low price so that many people could afford this healthy refreshment. In his treatise on park design published in 1916, Burnap promoted the idea of milk houses in the United States, where at the time only five milk stations in New York’s Central Park were known to him. The Christian Science Monitor emphasized the democratic values that were endorsed in Madrid’s Retiro Park. Like the library in the Italian Parco del Valentino in Turin, which let park visitors take its books into the park, the Madrilene municipality was reported to provide a case of books, “one of which any person may take to read while in the park, a notice at the stand placing him on his honor, for the common weal, to return it before he leaves.

Besides experiencing public parks as a means of creating a more democratic social order in countries characterized by autocratic governments and stratified societies, American landscape architects sought to learn from Europe’s classical design tradition. Its adaptation, which gradually spread from the East Coast westward in the thirty years from 1890 on, caused American landscape architects to spend as much time as possible on study trips in Europe. Although these architects applied classical Italian and French designs especially to privately owned country
estates, they also employed classical features in the design of public open space. Urban parks such as Meridian Hill Park in Washington, DC, Grant Park in Chicago, the Paseo in Kansas City, Missouri, and the open grounds of the Civic Center in Denver, all conceived as individual parts of an extensive park system, still reveal the borrowed Italian and French classicism today.

Research into the international exchange in open space and park system planning also requires an investigation of the park system planners themselves. What role did landscape architects, architects, city planners, and engineers play on both sides of the Atlantic? As the architect and planner George B. Ford noted in 1916, “the working out of an adequate system of parks and boulevards, playgrounds and playfields, is a civic enterprise that architects and landscape architects are peculiarly fitted to inspire and to lead.”37 Whereas city planning in Europe was at the time mainly done by architects and engineers, in the United States, landscape architects were largely involved in the planned development of cities. A German observer commented in 1930: “A superficial glance at American city planning already is enough to surprise one by the outstanding role landscape architecture plays in it.”38 It is, in fact, emblematic that John Nolen (1869–1937), trained in landscape architecture after an early career as professor of adult education at the University of Pennsylvania, should become one of the leading figures in American city planning at the beginning of the twentieth century.

The articles in Landscape Architecture, the official journal of the American Society of Landscape Architects, reveal a steadily increasing attention to the subject of city planning from the journal’s founding in 1910 until 1925, when the quarterly journal City Planning was established as the official organ of the American City Planning Institute and the National Conference on City Planning. Instruction in city planning was first offered within divisions of landscape architecture, landscape design, and horticulture, with a few offerings from departments of civil engineering.39 In his book on park design and park planning published in 1916, the landscape architect for the Office of Public Buildings and Grounds in Washington, George Elberton Burnap (1885–1938), recommended “a simultaneous advancement of city planning and park building.”40 It was only a logical consequence that landscape architects were to be on the forefront in the early city planning movement in the U.S.

The aspects mentioned so far treat the park system as a city planning concept with certain functions, namely to provide all citizens with a healthy and beautiful urban environment for recreation and to increase the value of adjacent tracts of land. However, the park system is also a conceptualized idea: it expresses and symbolizes a specific set of cultural, social, and political values and ideologies. It is one of the key elements
which after the Civil War and into the twentieth century redefined urban form and acted as an “institution[s] of social reform.” This project therefore also explores the park system’s theoretical, cultural, and social origins. What role did Renaissance, Enlightenment, Romantic, and anti-Romantic thought play in the development of the park system? What ideas of nature and city underlie its concept? For example, two ideas that date back to antiquity were re-enlivened by park system planners in the United States: *rus in urbe* and the *dulce utili*.

On a citywide scale, the park system was to connect the city with the countryside and provide the citizens with a naturalistic landscape, with *rus in urbe*. In contrast to the *rus in urbe* of Roman times described by the poets Martialis and Horace, when only the aristocracy was able to afford the advantages of urban and country life simultaneously, in late-nineteenth-century America, *rus in urbe* was assigned democratic, social values. The creation of a moral cityscape, one of the goals of the city beautiful movement, implied the upgrading of the urban environment through parks, playgrounds, “modern civic art” and the “parking” of streets. These measures were thought to be both practical and beautiful, and therefore provided a modern version of the *dulce utili*, which can be traced back to landscape beautification projects in Europe during the Enlightenment, the Renaissance, and in antiquity. At the beginning of the twentieth century, American landscape architects added a social, democratic conviction to the concept of the *dulce utili*. Referring to one of the three “unalienable Rights” listed in the American Declaration of Independence and declaring landscape architecture an art, Harvard University President Emeritus Charles William Eliot described the profession’s aim in 1910 as “the pursuit of public happiness.” In fact, happiness, John Nolen explained in 1922, would be created through beauty: “In our city planning we must provide for people, and if we are to successfully provide for people we must think of their happiness, and if they are to be happy, the beautiful must be included in any complete program.”

Given the importance attributed to park-system planning at the beginning of the twentieth century, it is not surprising that park systems could also become the core issue of electoral campaigns, such as in Harrisburg for example, where a Democratic mayoral candidate Vance McCormick based his successful campaign on the necessity to provide Harrisburg with a park system.

The Washington metro map described at the beginning of this article demonstrates the continuing impact of the park system as a pattern and element of urban form and as an iconic code or symbol. To what extent did the park systems and their iconography relate to the need for municipal and national representation?
Like public parks, whole park systems provided cities with representational means. The international acclaim of the Chicago Plan, in which the park system played a dominant role, was probably due to the fact that it had been promoted successfully on a local, national and even international level.45

In 1920, the first issue of the short-lived American journal *The Park International* was published. The journal promoted “internationalism” and “universalism” in park design. Its first issue introduced the reader to the idea of “internationalism”:

> The field of Parks has no limitation of country or nationality. Interchange of ideas proceeds most advantageously when geographical lines are disregarded. It is mutually profitable to consider park scenes of other countries rather than follow too closely what may be the vogue in one’s own country. The selective reader will not favor or pattern after the character of foreign accomplishment; but, as the home-returned traveler, well advised by the English essayist, “only prick in some flowers of that he hath learned abroad into the manners of his own country.”46

Besides being international and appropriating ideas from other countries, it was considered equally important to adapt them to the “American manner.” The journal’s chief editor, George E. Burnap, had already conveyed this conviction in his book on parks in 1916.47 Architects, landscape architects, and planners assumed that borrowing design motifs from foreign countries could serve national self-representation, a fact that became explicit in Washington’s McMillan plan. The highly symbolic design of the national capital’s municipal center resulted from a study tour through Europe that the consulting committee, the so-called Senate Park Commission, had undertaken in 1901 in order to appropriate design elements and discuss how they would successfully be transplanted to the New World. The wish to achieve at least “cultural parity” with the old European capitals, if not outdo them, guided the commission’s work.48

The Mall, the centerpiece of Washington’s park system drawn up by the commission’s members, the architects Daniel H. Burnham (1846–1912) and Charles F. McKim (1847–1909), the sculptor Augustus Saint-Gaudens (1848–1907), and the landscape architect Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr. (1870–1957), had already been conceived as a national symbol at the end of the eighteenth century by Pierre L’Enfant. It retains its iconic status today, as the map of the Washington metro testifies in its subtle way.
Notes:

The title is adopted from the bimonthly journal *The Park International: An Illustrated Bimonthly Magazine Offering From Widely Chosen Sources Guidance in the Development and Enjoyment of Park Areas Both Public and Private*. The journal was published under the direction of its chief editor, the American landscape architect George Elbert Burnap, from July 1920 until May 1921.

1 Official metromap with the copyright 2000 of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. The original metro signage and system map were designed by Massimo Vignelli of Unimark International. The metromap was introduced in 1968, and with some alterations and adjustments is still in use today.

2 The importance of the park system for modern city planning in the United States has been recognized by Jon Peterson in his recent work. Peterson has observed that park systems had a far greater impact on city planning during 1902–1905 than had monumental civic centers. See Jon A. Peterson, *The Birth of City Planning in the United States, 1840–1917* (Baltimore, London, 2003), 42, 162. David Schuyler has noted that “by the end of the [nineteenth] century, under the leadership of Olmsted and his colleague Charles Eliot, the park system became a comprehensive metropolitan solution to the recreational needs of the modern city.” David Schuyler, *The New Urban Landscape: The Redefinition of City Form in Nineteenth-Century America* (Baltimore and London, 1986), 5, 149. Peter Hall has argued that “U.S. cities pioneered the concept of an integrated park system planned in advance.” Cf. also Robin F. Bachin, *Building the South Side: Urban Space and Civic Culture in Chicago 1890–1919* (Chicago, London, 2004), 167.


7 For a historical overview of the evolution of modern city planning in the United States, see Peterson, *Birth of City Planning*.


Hugo Koch, “Grün, Spiel und Sportplätze,” *Die Gartenkunst* 41, no. 6 (1928), 82.


Forestier, *Grandes villes*, 53.


44 Forestier, Grandes villes, 36.
TEACHING WORLD HISTORY


Participants: Robert B. Bain (University of Michigan), Bill Bravman (Maret School), Roger B. Beck (Eastern Illinois University), Jerry H. Bentley (University of Hawaii), Arif Dirlik (University of Oregon), Ross Dunn (San Diego State University), Marnie Hughes-Warrington (Macquarie University), T. Mills Kelly (George Mason University), Matthias Middell (University of Leipzig), Katja Naumann (University of Leipzig), Susanne Popp (University of Siegen), John F. Richards (Duke University), Heidi Roupp (World History Connected), Tamara L. Shreiner (University of Michigan), Anthony J. Steinhoff (University of Tennessee), Peter N. Stearns (George Mason University).

Over the past three decades, world history has become a major teaching field and part of the history curricula for undergraduates and high school students in the United States. Efforts to establish this field as a subdiscipline have produced remarkable historical scholarship and led to the establishment of journals, organizations, and conferences. In continental Europe, however, with only a few exceptions, historians have thus far been reluctant to approach this field, and attempts to introduce a global perspective into secondary school and university curricula are still rare. Curriculum studies have only recently started to address this topic; international comparative studies do not yet exist. An effort to bridge this gap, the conference “Teaching World History” was the third in a sequence of conferences on world history and historiography organized by the German Historical Institutes in London and Washington since 1997. While the first two meetings dealt with the writing of world history since the early nineteenth century, the main goal of the third was to assemble academic practitioners of world history and representatives of the field of curriculum studies from several different countries to discuss the issues that arise in teaching world history both at the college and the secondary school level.

In the keynote speech, entitled “Performing the World: Reality and Representation in the Making of World Histor(ies),” Arif Dirlik empha-
sized the public pedagogical function of teaching world history. Focusing on the concept of historical spaces used in most world history research, he underlined the historiographical reasons for an approach that takes nations, civilizations, and cultures as the points of departure. He posed the question, however, whether these conventional spaces were autonomous subjects of history or whether they are themselves created by this historiographical approach. Dirlik argued that these spatialities are constructs of modernity and therefore need to be historicized in order to reveal those spatialities and temporalities that are suppressed by such an approach. Outlining different modes of conceiving world history, he suggested the concept of “world-history-as-totality,” which sees the globe as a frame of reference. This mode calls for the proliferation of the use of the concept of space in historical analysis and the recognition of the interaction between many translocal spaces, such as ethnic and diaspora spaces. Using examples from Asia and the Islamic world, he demonstrated not only the historicity, instabilities, internal differences, and even fragmentation of the notions of nation and civilizations, but also their function as mediator for bringing a hegemonic political order to the world. Teaching world history, therefore, brings with it the obligation to acquaint students with the “facts” of world history on the one hand, and to develop a critical perspective that articulates the suppressed in history and alternative ways of the historical process on the other.

The first session addressed the topic “Teaching World History in Secondary Schools.” In his talk “World History: Curriculum and Controversy,” Peter Stearns summarized the debates in the United States over the introduction of world history as a teaching program at high schools and colleges. Whereas academic worries from specialized professional historians and the lack of specific training were important causes for objections, Stearns argued that the cultural resistance by the national conservative establishment was the main force against the new teaching program, since it was seen as a threat to American values and the Western political heritage. The insistence on a national framework of history curricula at high schools corresponded to the resistance at the college level to replacing the traditional Western Civilization survey with world history courses. In addition, the flow and diversity of the U.S. immigrant population and the growing complexities of the U.S. world role—especially after 9/11—deepened the conflicts over new curricula between proponents of world history programs and their opponents. Despite the ongoing culture wars, Stearns believes that world history curricula have, on the whole, gained ground in American high schools and colleges. The resistance prevented neither the introduction of world history programs and standards in many states and individual school districts, nor the success of the Advanced Placement World History
course established by the College Board. Nevertheless, various issues, such as the quality of teaching, the uneven distribution of courses, teacher training, and competing views of the contents of world history, as well as of the relationship between world and American history at the curricular level, remain significant.

Eckhardt Fuchs presented a comparative overview of the historical background of world history teaching at the secondary education level in the United States and Germany in his paper on “Why Teach World History in School: Curriculum Reform in German Secondary Education.” He showed that the varying traditions not only caused the development of different paradigms of history teaching, but also that German history instruction has been bound to a strict national perspective until the present. Curriculum issues have only become a topic within the German educational reform discourse because of the stimulus of international studies such as PISA. Fuchs demonstrated that the newly introduced history curriculum in Baden-Württemberg tries to take up some of the international developments, such as standards, output orientation, and a European perspective, but it fails to incorporate a true world history approach. Referring to recent empirical studies on the effects of history instruction on the development of a historical consciousness of students, he claimed that curriculum reform in Germany can only be successful if it abandons insufficiently empirically supported statements about the relationship between history teaching and identity formation in a global world. In contrast, he pleaded for empirical research on history instruction and curriculum in order to base history curriculum reform on scientific evidence and, in so doing, legitimize it in public discourse.

Susanne Popp’s paper, “Integrating World History into a National Curriculum: The Concept of a Globally Oriented Historical Consciousness,” took up this topic and discussed how to include a globally conceptualized world history perspective into the Eurocentric German history curriculum. In her view, such a transformation would improve the ability of students to understand regional, national, and European history from a global perspective. She argued that changing the focus or perspective of historical analysis is an important factor in a growing globalized historical consciousness that enables students to learn to explore local events in a global setting and to analyze global issues by considering local examples. In addition, students can learn about the impact of historical consciousness on the identity of human beings while also learning to respect different views on history in other parts of the world and in other cultural domains. Drawing upon some examples, Popp demonstrated how to place the curriculum of national history into a more global framework, under the precondition that more than five thousand years of German history are covered in the current curriculum. She proposed
embedding European and national history in a global approach of connections, interactions, encounters, and contacts of major civilizations, and therefore placing cross-era, long-term social change in a global and comparative framework while also conceptualizing the history of globalization.

In the last presentation of this session, “Creating National and International Assessments in World History,” Robert Bain and Tamara Shreiner took the current instructional climate of assessments and evaluations, especially in mathematics, reading, and science, as a point of departure for their argument to introduce large-scale testing into history as a way to further world history education. Although the National Assessment Governing Board has already created and administered a U.S. history assessment, no assessment for World History yet exists, although the latter has been the fastest growing segment of the American school curriculum in recent years. The main obstacles have been the lack of a common structure of world history courses, the various types of world history, and the distribution of these courses throughout and across grade levels, which makes the development of a nationwide assessment difficult. In analyzing the growth and state of world history education at the high school level, Bain and Shreiner described four patterns of world history curriculum. Challenged by this diversity, the Assessment Board suggested three options for creating a common national exam to assess students’ understanding of world history. Bain and Shreiner offered a fourth model that asks professional historians to join forces at the national and the international level and to take up the challenge of assessing world history for the sake of securing the long-term existence and high quality of world history education.

The second panel shifted the topic from secondary school issues to teaching world history at the university. Anthony J. Steinhoff opened this panel with his paper “In Search of a New Paradigm: World History and General Education on the American Campus.” In the first part of his talk he focused on the relationship between world history and general education, arguing that, as a result of becoming the primary option for fulfilling general education history requirements, world history surveys as “mega Western Civilizations” have become unsatisfactory for students and teachers. The reasons are not only the huge amount of knowledge to be taught, the complexity of the pedagogical task, and the diversity of world history definitions, but also the ongoing debate on what constitutes general education. Exploring alternative ways of defining world history within general education, he suggested a link between the goals of the traditional liberal arts, such as the training and stimulation of the independent intellect, and world history teaching. Using examples from world history curricula and textbooks, he pointed out that such an ap-
proach needs a new conceptual and chronological framework for world history. Therefore, Steinhoff encouraged a thematic, microhistory approach to world history teaching that allows more choice at the level of course offerings and aims at raising the interest and engagement of the students.

In his paper “Global History and Global Studies: A European Perspective and the Leipzig Experience,” Matthias Middell introduced a recently established graduate program at the University of Leipzig. After suggesting four reasons for the current differences in the state of world and global history teaching in the United States and Europe, he argued that on the one hand, world history research and teaching in Europe take different shapes than they do in the U.S. On the other hand, the attempts of the European Union to homogenize structures of higher learning and to decrease state regulations offer the chance for the universities to develop their own curricula and programs. The University of Leipzig, with its long tradition in world history and the structural changes after 1989, which strengthened the area studies programs, utilized this opportunity. Leipzig’s new doctoral programs in transnationalization and occidentalization since the mid-1990s, its summer school for doctoral students since 2002, and international networks and programs created over the past decade all opened the path for the inauguration of a European Master’s program in global studies in 2004. This program is co-funded by the EU Erasmus Mundus program and involves three other European universities. In the final part of his talk, Middell presented the structure and the contents of the program, which, in contrast to the survey courses at American colleges, is taught at the graduate level, and is therefore designed completely differently.

Katja Naumann’s paper, “The Debate on Transnational and Global History in Germany,” filled out the picture of the state of world history teaching and research in Germany by reconstructing some debates on world, or global, history that have been taking place there in the last five years. These debates have raised four major points: the role of national history in relationship to global history; the differences between “transnational history” and global history; the challenges that this history offers for the professional standards of historians; and the question of whether global history should be seen as an additional field analogous to established fields, or as a new method of analysis that questions existing categories. Naumann pointed out that, while much of this debate has been conducted on a theoretical level, there has been little attention to practical issues and questions. She therefore called for more consideration of how institutions, journals, and conferences can and should foster the study of global history, of the audience for global history, and, importantly, of the future career possibilities for global historians. The field of
global history can only flourish in Germany and elsewhere if doctoral programs are created to train global historians, and if post-doctoral fellowships and faculty positions open in larger numbers than has hitherto been the case.

The third paper of this session turned the focus away from the United States and Germany. Marnie Hughes-Warrington discussed the status of global education and world history at Australian universities and secondary schools in her talk, “World Historiography Education: An Australian Perspective.” She emphasized the uniquely Australian aspect of world history curricula compared to the German and the U.S. cases: that is, the turn toward historiography already in high school education, especially in New South Wales. Taking Macquarie University as an example, she argued that the establishment of a world history teaching and research program beyond the first-year survey was possible through this historiographical turn. Since 2002, Macquarie has offered a world history program at all levels based on the questions of what world history is, what purposes it serves, what its historiographical traditions are, and how it might be taught and researched. This program replaced the previous tradition of world history initiated by David Christian’s “big history” course at Macquarie. The new focus on historiography, designed by Hughes-Warrington and outlined in her talk, is justified because it provides a basis for discussing ethical issues, and because historiographical reflections expose the patterns of privilege and exclusion in historical practice. In addition, it fosters an appreciation of the local, regional, national, and international contexts of world history writing and helps clarify the contents and purpose of world history. Most importantly, Hughes-Warrington concluded, historiographical studies address the problem of the purpose and audience of history in general. In his talk “An Emerging Field: World Environmental History,” John Richards argued that environmental history provides a good structure for teaching world history, also offering one of his own classes, on world environmental history at Duke University, as an example. The concerns of environmental history are necessarily global, as environmental changes are not limited by national or regional boundaries. In addition, Richards pointed out, other themes, such as the history of science, technology, and medicine, gender history, labor history, and the history of migration, also lend themselves well to world history approaches in the classroom.

In the panel on textbooks for world history, Roger Beck pointed out the problems of inclusion and the potential of bias in world history textbooks in his paper “World History Textbooks: Have We got it Right Yet?” He posed the challenging question of how we can make readers from other cultures in other parts of the world feel that we are accurately portraying their history in our world history textbooks. Is it possible to
write a textbook that treats the military conflict in Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s in a way that would satisfy both readers in the United States and in Vietnam? There are no clear answers to such a question, but it opened up the issue of the different interests and audiences of world history textbooks, which was taken up by Jerry Bentley in his paper “The Construction of Textbooks and the Negotiation of Interests.” Bentley delineated five separate constituencies of world history textbooks: textbook authors, textbook publishers, the scholarly community, student readers, and the general public. Even though world history and world history textbooks have often been made the subject of the “culture wars” in the United States, as noted by Peter Stearns in his paper, Bentley argued that each of these five constituencies has an interest in the writing and teaching of a world history that does not aim to serve a particular ideological agenda. In his view, the United States’ position as a world leader gives American students and citizens a particular moral responsibility to understand world history and the role of American history within world history. Such an understanding should be an ecumenical one, dominated neither by ideologies of the right nor of the left.

In the final panel on world history and the new media, T. Mills Kelly and Heidi Roupp in their well-integrated papers, “The Role of Technology in World History Teaching” and “Teaching World History: Establishing the Teaching Field,” discussed how world history teachers could make use of media inside and outside of the classroom to enhance world history teaching. After presenting some of the concerns and problems surrounding new media, such as Powerpoint presentations in the classroom and student research on the Internet, Kelly recounted some of his experiences as director for the Center for the Study of History and New Media at George Mason University. He presented one of the projects of the center, the website World History Matters (http://chnm.gmu.edu/worldhistorymatters/), which provides students with historical case studies involving primary sources, with both images and texts, in order to enhance student learning outside the classroom. This website also contains a guide for students to direct them to historically accurate websites for research and to help them evaluate the content of the websites they find. Kelly also noted that he found that the use of media enhanced student learning much more effectively when it was used outside the classroom by individual students for self-directed learning, rather than by presenting websites and Powerpoint-directed lectures inside the classroom. In her presentation, Roupp discussed the challenges and opportunities of teacher training in a world history context. She pointed out some of the problems and need for teacher training in the world history field, noting that few teachers have ever taken a world history course before they are asked to teach one. They also have only limited time and money
to undertake more training alongside their full-time jobs. In the second part of her paper, she discussed two possible solutions for these problems. First, she described the two-week world history summer workshops for teachers sponsored by the College Board, the World History Association, the National Endowment for the Humanities and the Stavrianos Teaching Fund, which have been offered since 2000. This workshop includes readings by world history scholars such as Peter Stearns, Jerry Bentley, Patrick Manning, and Kenneth Pomeranz, as well as discussion of pedagogical techniques for critical thinking skills. A second means of disseminating teacher training material is by the electronic journal World History Connected (http://www.worldhistoryconnected.org). This journal publishes research articles on world history, articles on pedagogical issues, and reviews of world history teaching resources. Access is free, and the site has had over 70,000 visitors since its founding in 2003.

The conference concluded with a roundtable panel discussion in which Bill Bravman, Arif Dirlik, Ross Dunn, and Eckhardt Fuchs participated. This lively discussion took up many of the questions raised in the papers. One major area of discussion dealt with the aim and contents of world history teaching, teacher education, quality assessment, subjects, and methods. A second topic focused on the ideological implications, cultural contexts, and political dimensions that are embedded within world history teaching. For the American participants, one important outcome of the conference was an awareness of the rise of world and global history in Europe that is based on different traditions and scholarly contexts and therefore takes on different shapes in the structure and contents of world history courses. For the German participants, it was useful to discuss the various issues with American colleagues and to gain a better understanding of the world history field that is, after all, not nearly as homogeneous and academically established as it might appear from the outside. Nevertheless, the discussions also revealed the commonalities between the United States, Europe, and Australia, which is the assumption that if world history, and history in general, are to achieve any educational goals and exercise any pedagogical function, they both depend to a large degree on how world history is composed and what purpose it serves. To date, the contents and purpose of world history have often been the subjects of heated public controversy, especially in the United States. This conference therefore provided the opportunity to examine past debates, reassess the current state of the field, and look toward promising future directions for teaching world and global history.

_Eckhardt Fuchs and Karen Oslund_
Conference at the GHI, March 11–12, 2005. Conveners: Roger Chickering (Georgetown University), Stig Förster (University of Bern), Christof Mauch (GHI).

Participants: Timothy Breen (Northwestern University), Marion Breunig (University of Heidelberg), Michael Broers (Lady Margaret Hall), Jost Dülffer (University of Cologne), Donatus Düsterhaus (University of Tübingen), Mary Favret (Indiana University), Alan Forrest (University of York), Azar Gat (Tel Aviv University), Karen Hagemann (Technical University of Berlin), Beatrice Heuser (Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Potsdam, Günther Kronenbitter (University of Augsburg), Wolfgang Kruse (Fernuniversität Hagen), Jörg Nagler (University of Jena), Ute Planert (University of Tübingen), Jean Quataert (Binghamton University, SUNY), Dennis Showalter (Colorado College), John Tone (Georgia Institute of Technology), Dirk Walter (Hamburg Institute for Social Research).

The prelude to the conference was a roundtable discussion in honor of Hartmut Lehmann, the former director of the Institute. The occasion was the publication of the fifth and final volume of the series on total war, for Lehmann was the original patron of the conference series from which these volumes emerged. Stig Förster, Jörg Nagler, Roger Chickering, Jean Quataert, and Dennis Showalter, five of the principals in this series, shared their perspectives on its history, evolution, and conclusions. The presentations and ensuing discussion focused on the enduring problems of conceptualizing “total war,” as well as the difficulties encountered in the effort to analyze its history from the American Civil War to the Second World War.

The conference itself was devoted to the changes and continuities in the character of warfare in Europe and North America during the “age of revolution.” The organizers had hoped to unlock this problem from the discussion of total war, but the effort proved difficult, for the wars of the late eighteenth century have figured centrally in the narrative of total war in the modern era. In the first panel, which was devoted to theoretical frameworks, Azar Gat analyzed the “military revolution,” the narrative that has governed the history of war in the early modern era. Roger Chickering’s paper explored the nexus of this narrative and the narrative of total war. Stig Förster then argued for the global dimensions of warfare in the revolutionary era.

The second panel analyzed more closely the character of combat in the revolutionary era and the extent to which it represented a departure from patterns of the eighteenth century. Alan Forrest considered the
problem of supplying the mass armies of the French Revolution. John Tone analyzed the partisan warfare that greeted French occupation of the Iberian peninsula, while Dirk Walter argued that the Prussian reforms of the early nineteenth century represented a revolutionary innovation. A third panel addressed broader intersections between military and social history in the revolutionary era. Timothy Breen’s paper tapped several of the same themes as Tone’s paper in analyzing popular mobilization in the American revolution, while Wolfgang Kruse looked at the force of revolutionary ideology in the French armies of the early 1790s. Beatrice Heuser examined the theoretical work of Jacques-Antoine de Guibert, who is commonly regarded as the intellectual father of revolutionary war but, as Heuser’s paper made clear, was a complex thinker who had retreated from his earlier theories by the time the French Revolution began.

The second day of the conference began with a panel on occupation and invasion. Ute Planert argued that French occupation policies, particularly in southern Germany, were driven by many of the same material pressures as the policies of eighteenth-century armies. On the other hand, Donatus Düsterhaus depicted the social and political disruptions that accompanied the repeated invasions of Alsace by revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces. In her account of the British war on Washington and Baltimore during the War of 1812, Marion Breunig demonstrated both the limited goals of the occupiers and their willingness to contemplate terror against civilians as a tool of war. The final panel then turned to questions of war and culture. Karen Hagemann reflected on the new constructions of masculinity that emerged in Germany during the Wars of Liberation. Günther Kronenbitter used the work of Friedrich Gentz to analyze the lessons drawn by prominent European conservatives about revolutionary warfare. Mary Favret then presented a stimulating paper on the traces that the revolutionary wars left in British literature.

After Jost Dülffer and Michael Broers presented their reflections on the deliberations, the conference concluded with a general discussion, which dwelled on the topics omitted in the papers. General agreement reigned that an attempt to assess the innovations brought by the American and French Revolutions required more attention to problems of ideology, confession, mobilization, and everyday life. The organizers hope to address some of these lacunae, as well as to devote more consideration to North America, in the volume that presents the proceedings of the conference.

Roger Chickering
YOUNG SCHOLARS FORUM
CROSSING THE ATLANTIC:
EUROPEAN DIMENSIONS OF AMERICAN HISTORY

Seminar at the University of Texas, Arlington, March 31–April 2, 2005.
Co-sponsored by the GHI, the University of Texas, Arlington and the
Dallas Goethe Center. Conveners: Thomas Adam (University of Texas,
Arlington) and Christof Mauch (GHI).

Mentors: Kathleen Conzen (University of Chicago), Christiane Harzig
(University of Winnipeg), Frank Trommler (University of Pennsylvania).

Participants: Ian Chambers (University of California, Riverside), Reto
Geiser (ETH Zurich), Andrew P. Haley (University of Pittsburgh),
Michelle Henley (University of Cambridge), Lauren L. Kientz (Michi-
gan State University), Friederike Kind (Zentrum für Zeithistorische
Forschung Potsdam), Pascal Maeder (York University), Alistair S. Maeer
(University of Texas, Arlington), Adam Mendelsohn (Brandeis University),
Paul Petzschnann (St. Anthony’s College), Emily Pugh (City Uni-
versity of New York), Julia Schaefer (University of Düsseldorf), Udo
Schemmel (University of Frankfurt am Main), Stephanie Lynn Trombley
(University of New Hampshire).

From March 31 to April 2, 2005, the GHI, together with the History
Department at the University of Texas at Arlington and the Dallas Goethe
Center, convened this year’s Young Scholars Forum in Arlington. In the
past, Young Scholars Forums have been held at the facilities of the GHI
in Washington, DC. This time, however, the conveners entered uncharted
waters by bringing this international graduate student workshop to
Texas. Fourteen students from Germany, Switzerland, the United King-
dom, Canada, and the United States came to Arlington to discuss their
doctoral research among themselves and with distinguished scholars.
Arlington was chosen as the site for this conference in order to allow
these scholars to experience the academic setting of an American univer-
sity.

The topic of this workshop invited a large number of submissions
from a broad spectrum of doctoral candidates who work on various
aspects of what is becoming known as transatlantic history. Ian Chambers
and Alistair S. Maeer discussed ways in which Europeans and Native
Americans attempted to map their environment. This opening panel on
space and history set the tone for the entire workshop. A spatial turn, the
importance of space for the construction of identity and the difference
between space and place, were topics that reemerged throughout the lively discussions. Space, however, is not always something concrete, visible, and clearly distinguishable. For Chambers, space is not a geographical location but “a meeting place or encounter zone” between European settlers and Native Americans. Identities, still considered cultural constructs, receive a new infusion by adding a spatial dimension. Cultural history, as it became clear during the event, remains the dominant approach in historical investigation (Kathleen Conzen), although older questions, as for instance the question about class, resurface. Andrew P. Haley’s paper on “foreign fixin’s” and class formation in American cities is a case in point. Ethnic cuisine, as became clear from his investigation, certainly contributed to the diversification of Americans’ diet, and at the same time allowed the growing middle class, which was “eager to find its cultural identity,” to “colonize the foreign restaurant,” and thereby transformed it into an institution that catered to the middle class. Historical inquiry into class seems to be in vogue again, considering that Sven Beckert just published his major book on New York’s upper class. This newer generation of historians seems to have embraced E. P. Thompson’s famous dictum that class does not exist but that class simply happens.

A number of papers dealt with travel and migration between Europe and North America. Pascal Maeder discussed the role of European expellees in postwar Canada. He argued that they became a “third force” next to the presumed French and British founding nations. Adam Mendelssohn discussed aspects of European Jewish migration to America during the formative period of the mid-nineteenth century. Lauren L. Kientz discussed the European travel experience of African-Americans between 1820 and 1860. In the decades before the American Civil War, wealthy Americans traveled frequently to Europe to pursue an academic education and to absorb Europe’s rich cultural and social life. For African-Americans with some means, however, European travel provided much more: It brought them into a world in which they felt liberated from racism. Far from home, they were able to “become a part of the intellectual and artistic elite.” A closer investigation of Americans’ travels to Europe during the nineteenth century might hold a couple of surprises for us. Wealthy Americans enjoyed aristocratic societies and felt at home in cities such as Dresden and Berlin. They often praised the well-educated and reasonable German aristocracy and thus behaved much more like noblemen than as citizens of a republic. For African-Americans to feel liberated in a monarchy seems to turn the idea of a democracy on its head.

More than half of the papers dealt with intellectual transfers within the transatlantic community. Julia Schäfer studied the crossing of borders
of *Arbeitswissenschaft* and Taylorism during the first half of the twentieth century, and Paul Petzschmann discussed the role of Weimar-era political concepts in the United States. Emily Pugh investigated the transfer of what was deemed to be American-style architecture to West Berlin during the 1950s. She focused on the architectural competition between East and West for the reconstruction of Berlin. West Berlin’s Hansa District and the Interbau 1957 exhibition were to provide a countermode to East Berlin’s Stalin-Allee. Ironically, what was then perceived as American architecture had been deeply grounded in the Bauhaus tradition and thus provides an excellent example of transatlantic intellectual exchanges that worked in both directions. In a similar vein, Reto Geiser emphasized the two-way intellectual transfer of Sigfried Giedion’s architectural theories and his professional standing in both Switzerland and the United States. Intellectual transfer and the idea of transatlantic identity were also at the core of papers by Friederike Kind and Stephanie Trombley. Both analyzed political and cultural exchanges during the Cold War period. Kind discussed transnational communication between journalists in Central Europe, Paris, and New York. Trombley argued that the postwar concept of “Atlantic identity” was a prerequisite for the United States and the “free world” to meet their ideological commitments and construct a new role for the Federal Republic of Germany around 1950.

Looking at a much earlier time period, Michelle Henley focused on the German-speaking settlers of Ebenezer, Georgia. Henley pointed out that transatlantic advice and support from sister-communities in Germany played a role in the social and religious guiding and in the forging of identity of this particular eighteenth-century religious community. Likewise, Udo Schemmel compared institutional structures and studied influences between protestant churches in Germany and the United States throughout the early modern period.

The fourteen papers discussed at this workshop represent the many aspects of transatlantic history. Like every space, the transatlantic community is a constructed world, as Frank Trommler pointed out. It is constructed by the people who move around in this world: by politicians who emphasize the common values of the transatlantic community when it serves their political goals, and by political scientists and historians who write the history of this community. The concept of transatlantic history is still a very “fuzzy” one (Christiane Harzig) with regard to the timeframe, the spatial definition of the transatlantic world, and its character. What becomes obvious, however, is that the nation-state is no longer the “right container” (Harzig) to understand the life experience of people in the nineteenth century. Furthermore, the collapse of Eastern European nation-states in the wake of the 1989/90 revolutions, European integration and globalization cause scholars to rethink the character and
importance of national borders in people’s lives. Nation-states are artificial constructs that have provided a framework for the organization of political, social, cultural, and historical organization. This does not mean, however, that individuals accepted these artificial borders and lived their lives inside these borders. Although we speak of the “wall in the minds” of East and West Germans today, the opposite concept of minds in which artificial national borders did not matter might be something historians could consider for the nineteenth century. Many questions and challenges remain and will certainly stimulate further debates. How do we conceptualize the moving of people and goods (art, technology, ideas) within the transatlantic world? The investigation of cultural transfers will certainly change our understanding of European-American relations. However, we first need to develop a language to describe these processes analytically. How does the meaning of goods change in the process of transfer, and what does this tell us about the sending and the receiving society?

Thomas Adam and Christof Mauch
RAISING AMERICANS—RAISING EUROPEANS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY


Participants: Christina Benninghaus (University of Bielefeld), Ellen L. Berg (University of California, Berkeley), Sibylle Brändli Blumenbach (University of Basel), Katherine Bullard (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign), John Cornell (Butler University), Lynne Curry (Eastern Illinois University), Andrew Donson (University of Massachusetts, Amherst), Astrid M. Eckert (GHI), Eckardt Fuchs (University of Mannheim), Karl-Heinz Füssl (Technical University, Berlin), Brian Ganaway (Presbyterian College), Julia Grant (Michigan State University), Caroline Hinkle McCamant (University of California, Berkeley), Charles A. Israel (University of the South, Sewanee, TN), Carolyn Kay (Trent University), Till Kößler (University of Munich), Seth Koven (Villanova University), Christof Mauch (GHI), David MacLeod (Central Michigan University), Sonya Michel (University of Maryland, College Park), Robert Moeller (University of California, Irvine), Katharine Norris (American University), Christine von Oertzen (GHI), Manon S. Parry (National Library of Medicine), Rebecca Jo Plant (University of California, San Diego), Brian Puaca (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill), Christoph Ribbat (University of Bonn), Till van Rahden (University of Cologne), Judith Sealander (Bowling Green State University), Jonathan Skolnik (GHI), Emilie Stoltzfus (Library of Congress), Richard F. Wetzell (GHI), Tara Zahra (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor).

The twentieth century, the century that Swedish author Ellen Key had hoped would be the “Century of the Child,” saw an unprecedented expansion of expert knowledge on and state activity in childrearing, education, and children’s welfare on both sides of the Atlantic. The appropriate methods of raising children and the roles of mothers and fathers in the process, as well as the scope and degree of state intervention, remained contested throughout the century, however. Recent years have seen an increase of scholarly interest in these issues in both America and Europe. The conference brought together historians from both sides of the Atlantic to intensify the dialogue between them, take stock of current debates, and identify paths for future research. It focused on three key questions: How did concepts and practices of childrearing change over the course of the century? What was the impact of pivotal political developments and ruptures, such as the change of political regimes and
wars? And how did transnational and transatlantic academic communication shape concepts and practices in individual nations?

In the opening paper “Children and the National Interest,” Sonya Michel set the stage by discussing how children’s welfare and the national interest became intertwined in the nineteenth century. Following the American Revolution, which had been cast as a revolt against a tyrannical father, public discourse in the United States again emphasized obedience. It also called for a “Republican Motherhood” that was to inculcate the values of the new state in its future citizens, and advocated state intervention to have the children of the poor raised properly. This, however, largely excluded African-Americans. While fathers continued to lose authority, mothers became the target of various kinds of advice-givers. Drawing on the work of Sylvia Schafer and others, Michel pointed out that in France, too, children came to be seen as precious national resources that mothers in particular had to care for and social policy had to focus on. In the secular moral order that the Third Republic attempted to create, the state would govern through the family. While these new concepts of state intervention began to give rise to new state bureaucracies, a complex relationship of agency and resistance unfolded. Constructions of plight and deviance in public discourse enabled the state to intervene in the lives of its citizens and thereby to exert more control but also to provide relief. As the subjects of these interventions were able to mold them to their own advantage, they contributed to the general expansion of this new state activity. Michel concluded by positing that this advance of social policy seemed to be “inexorable and unavoidable.” The discussion of her paper centered on the reasons for and the character of the changes in childrearing and child welfare around 1900. Demographic developments, urbanization, the rise of empires, and the “New Immigration” in the United States were cited as key factors. Several participants also suggested that the fears these processes evoked among contemporaries, especially fears related to sexuality, deserved closer scrutiny.

The first panel of the conference examined concepts of the roles of fathers and mothers. In Wilhelmine Germany, as Carolyn Kay showed in her paper “How Should We Raise Our Son Benjamin? Advice Literature for Mothers in Early Twentieth-Century Germany,” the rise of the sciences coincided with an increase in the number of advice books on childrearing that acknowledged the pivotal role of the bourgeois family for the strength of the nation. Drawing in particular on the works of pediatrician Adalbert Czerny and pedagogue Adolf Matthias, Kay argued that these books, written by academic experts from various disciplines and directed primarily at mothers, agreed that discipline was the precondition for attaining the other middle-class values. Only a minority of advice-givers, which included female authors such as feminist Adele Schreiber, empha-
sized the primacy of a nurturing environment over stern methods of punishment.

In her paper “From Mother’s Enforcer to Boy’s Pal: The Changing Ideals of Fatherhood in the American Middle Class, 1900–1929,” Caroline Hinkle McCamant discussed how concerns about the stability of the middle-class family led a wide range of authors from the mid-1910s on to call for a fundamental redefinition of fatherhood in the United States. At the beginning of the century, a father’s principal task was to connect his family to the outside world. He was supposed to show friendly interest in his children but keep his distance and act as the disciplinarian if need be. Under the impact of skyrocketing divorce rates, the upheaval of the First World War, and the rise of peer culture, advice-givers, fearing the dissolution of the family, advocated more democratic relations between its members. Fathers were now encouraged to become emotionally close and playful companions of their sons and win acceptance by their friends. Being such a “dad” would not only be fun but also keep fathers young themselves.

Rebecca Jo Plant examined a fundamental change of the definition of the mother’s role in her paper “Toxic Mothers: Diagnosing the American family, 1930–1960.” American experts warned that just as in their view authoritarian fathers had given rise to totalitarianism in Nazi Germany, overly protective mothers would weaken democratic fortitude in the United States. Citing the findings of psychoanalysis, they recommended close bonding between mother and child only in the very early years, but urged emotional distance thereafter to allow the child to develop its individuality. As letters to popular author Philip Wylie demonstrated, many mothers seemed to agree with the experts’ position. Plant argued, contrary to the dominant position in present scholarship, that this redefinition marked a break with the tradition of “Republican Motherhood,” as it devalued and pathologized mother love, and discouraged women from constructing their entire identities around their maternal role.

In his paper “Democracy and Authority: The Constitutional Court’s Ruling Against Patriarchy and West German Political Culture in the 1950s,” Till van Rahden posited a link between the legal dismantling of patriarchy and the evolution of West German democracy. While the chancellorship of Konrad Adenauer had initially been characterized by the restoration of the patriarchal family in response to its subjugation to state control both in Nazi and Soviet totalitarianism, it then, as van Rahden argued, became a period of “experiments and new beginnings” in which a new democratic fatherhood began to take shape. When the Constitutional Court ruled in 1959 that fathers and mothers had fully equal rights in the family, Catholic commentators at first voiced fears about a “fatherless society” but soon viewed a father who was playful and spent much
time at home with his children positively, as an antidote to the militaristic father of the past.

In his comments, Robert Moeller drew a sharp line between the post-1945 convergence of the United States and (West) Germany and their pre-1945 differences and emphasized the difference of military cultures as one key factor. He suggested a number of issues that deserved closer scrutiny: the differences between boys and girls; the audiences that the advice literature addressed; the role of sex in children’s development; the influence of religion and popular culture; the definitions of the dysfunctional and abnormal as instructive contrasts to the standards advice books prescribed; and the impact of the Cold War. One key point of the following discussion was the question of how closely the advice literature mirrored the actual practice of childrearing in middle- and working-class families; another was the links between the American and the German debates that had not been mentioned in the papers. These included the explicit resistance against the German definition of the father in Wylie’s work, the insistence on privatizing motherhood in the United States in light of the opposite situation in Nazi Germany, and the prominence of American advice literature (Spock, Gesell) in postwar Germany. Attention was also drawn to the many references of the post-1945 German discussion to Weimar and Nazi Germany.

The second panel addressed the relationship between parental rights and those of the state. Placing the infamous Scopes trial of 1925 in a new perspective, Charles A. Israel in his paper “Who Owns Children? Parents, Children, and the State in the United States South, 1875–1925” described conflicts about religious and moral education in the American South. At the turn of the century, this education was seen primarily as the task of parents, not of public schools. As Progressive reformers were focusing their efforts on public schools, which had been established in significant numbers only since the Civil War, conservatives in the South sought to give the Bible a substantial presence in the classroom. William Jennings Bryan, as Israel pointed out, fought against the teaching of evolution mainly because he regarded it as inspired by a Nietzschean materialism that allegedly had become the hallmark of German education, the superiority of which the First World War had called into question. Combining the arguments of the will of the majority and of parental rights, Bryan and his followers cast the state as “creature and servant” of parents and found courts sympathetic to their views.

Lynne Curry gave a detailed description of a case of child abuse and the failing responses of state agencies to it in her paper “DeShaney vs. Winnebago County: Child Abuse, State Action, and Children’s Rights in a Family Tragedy.” Four-year-old Joshua DeShaney suffered severe brain damage and remained partially paralyzed after a number of beatings by
his father and the women he lived with in 1983–84. This was not due to negligence on the part of the state agencies involved, however. Instead Curry argued that the reason was that the social worker who was in charge of the case and to whom the police deferred followed a “therapeutic” rather than an “authoritative” model in her actions. This model, which reflected the guiding principle of the training of social workers in Wisconsin in the 1960s and 1970s, gave priority to keeping a family together and to counseling its members over placing a child in state custody to protect it from abuse.

Dirk Schumann argued in his paper “Asserting Their ‘Natural Right’: Parents and Schooling in Post-1945 Germany” that parental involvement in school affairs made a contribution to the liberalization of educational methods and to political democratization in West Germany. As parents’ rights were acknowledged as “natural rights” in the new constitution and further strengthened by the influence of the concept of “natural law” on contemporary legal thinking, many parents became actively involved in school matters already in the late 1940s and 1950s. Even though they were always in the minority, these active parents did not hesitate to challenge school authorities on all levels, by participating in newly formed parents’ councils and in face-to-face encounters with teachers and officials. Corporal punishment by teachers became a particular source of conflicts. As parents’ actions demonstrated that authority could be legitimately criticized, they contributed to the gradual liberalization of education in the 1960s. In the liberal political climate around 1970, parents’ involvement was given a new boost, but it now largely failed to have a major impact, given the diversity of its goals and the increasing bureaucratization of schools.

In his paper “Reinventing Kindergarten: Early Childhood Education and Care in Reunited Germany,” John Cornell compared the development of the Kindergarten (nursery school and kindergarten in American terminology) in both German states after 1949 and following reunification in 1990. West German Kindergärten were for the most part half-day institutions, on the assumption that most women were not gainfully employed, and even on the eve of unification offered places for not more than 70 percent of all young children. They provided a realm of social learning in groups of mixed age and allowed for some experimentation in teaching methods. In marked contrast, their East German counterparts, set up to take in every child, relied on very traditional teacher-centered methods and rigid separation of age cohorts. Following unification, the East German system was partially dismantled, especially in rural areas, due chiefly to the declining birthrate. The western states of reunified Germany saw a marked increase in Kindergarten places (especially full-day) as a result of the growing number of working women. This has
brought about noticeable disparities in quality of care and questions about whether sufficient resources are being devoted to early childhood education. *Kindergärten* in both parts of Germany now were on their way to becoming truly child-centered institutions, Cornell argued.

Christina Benninghaus raised two general points in her commentary. She emphasized that despite the general acceptance of state interference in the post-1945 period, its concrete form still had to be negotiated with parents. She also called attention to the fact that the social class that parents belonged to must not be overlooked, adding that in the East German case the new childcare institutions allowed many women to be mothers, while at the same time limiting their control of their children. Addressing the individual papers, she wondered why evolution was such a delicate issue for those concerned about teaching moral values from a religious perspective in the American South, and wanted to learn more about the concrete work experience of the social worker in the DeShaney case. She also asked for more precise data on how many parents actually were engaged in school matters, warned against overestimating the democratizing effects of this engagement, and wondered to what extent parents at present were satisfied with the structure of German child-care institutions. Several contributions in the discussion addressed general issues related to the DeShaney case, such as the distance between academic experts and the practitioners of social work, the role of preconceptions like that of the “evil stepmother,” and the epistemological question of how research on child abuse had to be guided by a normative concept of children’s rights. Other comments pointed out the differences between Catholic and Lockean concepts of “natural rights” and between “natural rights” and “property rights” in conflicts over children’s protection and education.

The third panel focused on the strategies and attitudes of various groups of experts. In his paper “Reform Dolls: Men and Women, Childhood and Politics in Wilhelmine Germany,” Brian Ganaway, following a concept of consumption that stresses its empowering as opposed to its destructive qualities, discussed how those male businessmen who dominated the market for toys, 60 percent of which were dolls, were successfully challenged by female entrepreneurs. While the men offered dolls that were standardized and technologically precise versions of adults, intended to shape girls as rational future housewives, the female producers, most notably the later famous Käthe Kruse, used simple materials but individualized faces for their dolls, thus encouraging girls to take an active role in playing with them. As they found a sympathetic public and attracted even the interest of Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, producers of the new “character dolls” and of hybrids with the traditional “techno-
logical dolls” became commercially successful on the eve of the First World War.

In his paper “Educating Catholics, Raising Spaniards: The Catholic Church and Child Rearing in Spain in the Twentieth Century,” Till Kößler explored the ways in which the Catholic Church sought to change its educational institutions in order to retain its influence on Spanish society. Criticizing the prevailing view that simplistically casts the conflict between the church and liberal groups over education as one between tradition and modernity, he suggested conceptualizing it as a truly modern struggle about how to define order in a society in transition. As the Catholic colegios, for the most part boarding schools, introduced modern technology in their facilities, shed rigorous disciplinary methods, and offered study trips and courses in the field of industry and commerce in the 1910s and 1920s, Catholic pedagogy began to redefine education as a task that required the expertise of modern psychology. Kößler pointed out, however, that this wide-ranging modernization was fraught with the tension between opening schools to a liberal environment and fighting against liberalism itself.

Drawing on detailed case files and emphasizing the importance of analyzing negotiations between experts and their clients for understanding changes of childrearing practices, Sibylle Brändli Blumenbach described the emergence of new relationships between both groups in her paper “Negotiating Trouble, Negotiating Care: Parents, Teachers, Children, and the Medico-Pedagogical Institutions of Basel, Switzerland, in the 1970s.” This decade was a time of transition in Basel for state services such as school psychology that dealt with children’s behavioral and learning difficulties. The old concept of removing a severely troublesome child from their class or family gave way to an approach centered on counseling and therapy. Emphasis shifted to the psychological dimension of the problems and to working on relationships between all family members. This granted children a substantial degree of agency but also met with resistance from clients. The egalitarian thrust and experimental mode of interaction in many such encounters placed them firmly in the context of the 1970s. The therapeutic “intimate relations” generated in the consultation room revealed shifting expectations and demands of citizens from all strata vis-a-vis the state with respect to the education and personal development of children, and Brändli pointed out that these relations both registered and helped define new social relations between family members.

In her commentary, Julia Grant pointed out the difference between Ganaway’s and Kößler’s papers on the one hand and Brändli Blumenbach’s on the other. While the former addressed a market situation in which “products” of different types had to be sold, the latter focused on
the changing emphasis on expert control in the activities of a specific profession, reminiscent of the situation of American psychology in the 1920s. While she called for a more precise conceptualization of “tradition” and “modernity” in all three cases, Grant emphasized that in Brändli Blumenbach’s case, discourse and power play had to be separated more clearly for analytical purposes. Much of the following discussion focused on children’s agency. Participants debated to what extent children had an active role in buying their toys and to what extent they could influence the process only by resisting choices others made for them. Childhood diaries such as those by Breslau pedagogue and émigré William Stern were seen as a valuable source for this purpose. It was also pointed out that the question of children’s agency could be historicized by analyzing experts’ changing views of childhood. Other issues raised in the discussion concerned the nature of the “markets” addressed in the papers, in particular the question of how in the Swiss case children became clients of school psychologists in the first place.

The fourth panel explored the links between concepts of education and visions of national futures. In her paper “Creative Children, Abnormal Children, and Criminals: French Visions of Child Psychology on the Eve of World War I,” Katharine Norris examined how child psychology became a key, if controversial, academic discipline in France on the eve of World War I. As demographic decline exacerbated fears of archenemy Germany, French children were regarded as a national resource of utmost importance, and practitioners of the emerging science of child psychology drew attention to the variety of ways in which their expertise could be used to improve education and child rearing. Attention to the importance of children’s spontaneity and imagination became the basis for fundamental reforms in the public-school art curriculum in 1909. That same year, newly developed IQ tests became the basis for tracking “abnormal” children into special classes within the public school system. When specialized juvenile courts were established in 1912, however, psychiatrists were stymied in their efforts to require that all accused juvenile offenders be submitted to psychological examinations. In the eyes of magistrates, educators, and politicians, child psychology was a helpful yet potentially dangerous discipline, and psychologists who sought to widen their institutional influence were often accused of trying to manufacture mental abnormality where there was none.

In her paper “‘Children Betray their Father and Mother’: Collective Education, Nationalism, and Democracy in the Bohemian Lands,” Tara Zahra challenged the traditional view that the concept of collective education typically stood in fierce opposition to that of education in the family. Absent a nationalizing policy of the government in Vienna, German and Czech nationalists set up their own networks of educational and
child welfare institutions prior to 1914 to make up for deficits of family education and win over children of binational origins. As tensions between the two groups grew after 1918, these institutional networks expanded and harnessed the expertise of more academic disciplines, including that of the new discipline of psychoanalysis. Following the Nazi takeover of Bohemia in 1938/39, all of its educational institutions were placed under state control, a measure that fundamentally changed views of collective education. Czech nationalists now called upon families, mothers in particular, to turn their homes into bulwarks of Czech nationalism, and Sudeten Germans, fearing that they might lose their cultural hegemony, likewise wanted their mothers to stay at home. After 1945, attempts to create distance both to Nazism and Communism created the myth of an apolitical private sphere that totalitarianism had tried to invade and destroy.

Katherine Bullard described the ambivalence of a new institution that was a product of Progressive reform in her paper “Children’s Future, Nation’s Future: Race, Citizenship, and the U.S. Children’s Bureau.” Founded in 1912 and particularly active in wartime, the bureau cast its programs, which provided advice and medical support, as necessary assistance for those representing the future of the nation. Citing several surveys conducted by the bureau, Bullard pointed out, however, that this concept of “social citizenship” was based on an explicit distinction between whites and non-whites. Representing the standard against which the health of all others was measured, white children were depicted in promotional materials in a clean and prosperous environment, whereas African-American and other non-white children were portrayed in primitive settings. The Children’s Bureau ran special programs in the U.S. territories of Puerto Rico, Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippines, justifying them by referring to similar activities in parts of the British Empire, not in those with large indigenous populations, however, but in those such as New Zealand that could more easily be portrayed as basically white.

In her commentary, Judy Sealander noted that the politicization of childhood as a “potent and easily manipulable icon” from the early twentieth century on was a common theme in all three papers. It established standards of normality and modernity, not the least against the backdrop of visions of racial suicide. While children were now regarded as “suggestible,” it remained unclear, as Sealander emphasized, whether state social policy or the new social science professions were the first to take initiative in this direction. In each case, it was crucial to “follow the money” and analyze the interests of those who provided funds. Contributions to the discussion called for closer examination of international influences such as that of the USSR on Czechoslovakia after 1945 and that of colonialism. It was also suggested that definitions of what constituted
“abnormality” and “family” were pivotal for the developments that all three papers described. While it was acknowledged, in particular with regard to the activities of the U.S. Children’s Bureau, that laws were crucial for determining inclusion in and exclusion from programs, the actual in- and exclusionary effects of expert activities seemed to deserve closer scrutiny. It was also asked to what extent research activities reflected real concerns as opposed to merely the availability of children for empirical studies.

The fifth panel addressed effects of war on childrearing and education. In her paper “‘Linked with the Welfare of all Peoples’: The American Kindergarten and World War I,” Ellen L. Berg refuted the view that wartime kindergarten redefined Americanization as complete and potentially coercive assimilation. Prior to the war, the Americanization movement had discovered kindergarten as a powerful instrument, in particular because it allowed reaching many immigrant mothers through their children. As during the war the term “war work” became shorthand for the broader goals of kindergarten activities, it denoted for the most part the teaching of useful habits such as conservation techniques and calls to save for the Red Cross. Traditional Froebelians, who represented a teacher-centered style of work, regained some ground against Progressive reformers, and the patriotism that kindergarten promoted sometimes turned into jingoism. On balance, however, kindergarten remained committed to a concept of internationalism and world citizenship, symbolized by the fact that the institution’s German name “kindergarten” was kept.

Andrew Donson described the convergence of reform pedagogy with German nationalism and militarism in his paper “War Pedagogy in the Era of the Burgfrieden and the ‘Spirit of 1914.’” Prior to 1914, schooling in Germany was marked by an authoritarian style that featured rigid discipline and learning by rote, but as Donson pointed out, attempts by Wilhelm II and leading officials to inculcate it with an aggressive nationalism had met with resistance from teachers and the academy. The outbreak of the war, however, triggered a wave of patriotism that silenced pacifist voices among the teachers and led to ad hoc revisions of curricula and class-room activities that introduced references to the war and materials such as newspapers, previously shunned as too “political.” As teachers were encouraged to develop close relationships with their students and to experiment with curricula, key demands of reform pedagogy were fulfilled, albeit in a uniformly nationalistic and militaristic spirit. Drawing upon collections of the new “free” compositions, Donson argued that at least until early 1916 most students shared the violent militarism and nationalism taught in German schools.

In his comments, David McLeod emphasized the general point that gauging what societal changes were brought about by wars and how long
they lasted always raises difficult methodological issues. He found Donson’s argument basically convincing but wondered what influence peer groups might have had on student’s attitudes as well as social class, age, and gender. While he was not entirely surprised by Berg’s thesis, he pointed to the tensions in American society at the time it went to war in 1917, something that could have been expected to affect kindergarten more profoundly. Contributions to the discussion pointed to the parallels between school reforms and reforms of the military in Germany, but they also questioned the impact of reform pedagogy on schools and called for a closer look at the relationship between continuity and change in 1916–17 and the influence of the new propaganda techniques, especially visual ones, on teaching. Since the hallmark of the period under scrutiny was reform in a Progressive spirit, it was also suggested that the students’ agency needed better conceptualization.

The sixth and final panel addressed international transfers and exchanges. In his paper “Child Welfare and Juvenile Delinquency: the Mechanics and Effects of Transnational Educational Relations in the Early Twentieth Century,” Eckardt Fuchs introduced a systematic framework for investigating the history and mechanics of internationalism. His case study demonstrated the continuities through three phases of international exchange: a first one from 1820 to 1870 that was marked by a “sainte alliance” of private and religious actors; a second one of institutionalized international cooperation between 1870 and 1914; and a third after 1918, in which the League of Nations took over many responsibilities. Organized chiefly by Belgium, international congresses served as the principal venue of international exchange prior to 1914, bringing primarily scholars and government officials together and leading to the widespread adoption of American juvenile courts in Europe. After the First World War, the League of Nations became the center and “clearing house” of this transnational network and played a key role in establishing international rules in the fields of child welfare and education.

Examining American photography of children in America and Europe in his paper “Back to Innocence: Photographers and the Faces of Children, 1939–1958,” Christoph Ribbat put forth the thesis that the image of the innocent child was not a timeless concept but a (re)creation of the years of the Second World War. Victorian photographers had indeed portrayed poor children in the slums of London and New York as angelic creatures. In the interwar years, some photographers depicted the Great Depression by focusing on the plight of families; others, such as the New York photographer Weegee, showed children as strange and sexualized beings. Europe’s Children, a photobook published in 1943 by American expatriate Therese Bonney, who had lived in Paris since World War I, then exemplified a paradigm shift. In an era when picture magazines
such as *Life* and photobooks were at the zenith of their influence, Bonney used this medium to portray children as innocent creatures and guiltless victims of war to make a poignant appeal for help. When American photographers again presented a complex picture of American children in the late 1950s, they now couched it in the “normalcy” of middle-class homes and schools, as Ribbat pointed out, while they depicted poor and suffering children as a phenomenon of parts of the world that were far away from the United States.

In his paper “From Michigan to Munich: German Exchange Teachers and Teenagers and Democratic School Reform in the Postwar Federal Republic,” Brian Puaca argued that exchange programs were a highly successful form of cultural transfers from the United States to West Germany in the first postwar decade. Focusing on West German school teachers and high school students, he gave a detailed account of their respective programs and, drawing upon reports and letters they wrote at the end or soon after their stays, of how those teachers and students assessed their experiences and how they changed their views of schooling in Germany. While some teachers criticized that fundamental facts and skills were not always given sufficient attention in America, both teachers and students were profoundly impressed by extracurricular activities in American schools such as student governments and newspapers, PTAs, and club sports. Viewing them as lessons in democracy, teachers and students expressed their intention to launch similar activities at their own schools in Germany, and often made concrete efforts toward doing this.

In his commentary, Karl Heinz Füssl raised the methodological question of to what extent a specific set of circumstances, including a yet underdeveloped part of a national educational system, was necessary for transfers to be successful. With respect to Puaca’s paper, he suggested examining the long-term influence of the programs, as evident from the careers of prominent politicians and scholars. He also suggested taking into account the frustration a number of German students felt after their return, prompting them to express the wish to emigrate to the United States. He suggested to Ribbat that he consider the reception of the images by their viewers. He asked Fuchs why Belgium played such a pivotal role in international exchange, and also pointed to pronounced differences of opinion between the United States and Europe on child welfare policy. Contributions to the discussion called for placing the three papers in a long-term perspective by examining how international exchange such as that organized by philanthropic organizations prior to the processes discussed was taken up later, what influence iconographic traditions such as depictions of suffering in the religious imagery of the Middle Ages exerted in the twentieth century, and what impact the socialization of children prior to their stay in the United States had on their
experiences. Ribbat’s two contrasting types of images were not seen as mutually exclusive, while the places of race and gender in children’s photography were regarded as deserving closer analysis.

In general comments on the conference, Seth Koven raised a number of conceptual and methodological issues. Emphasizing that the history of childrearing and education had to be placed firmly in its national and international political contexts, he pointed out that it was important to take a close look at how children were represented in political discourses—typically as mirrors or sources of world views and as investments or drains on wealth—and how funds were allocated accordingly. Educational institutions had to be conceptualized in such a broader sense both as sites of teaching knowledge and of providing social services, as well as points where international and national influences intersected. While pedagogical and political aims of educational reforms had to be dissociated analytically, there was no time period in which political aims were totally absent from such reforms, not even prior to the 1920s. Koven also called for dismissing Whiggish notions of modernity and modernization in the field of education, and opted for a periodization that emphasized unevenness and the plurality of modernities. In this context, the 1920s had to be seen as an academic laboratory in which the boundaries between the relevant academic disciplines were not yet drawn; when this happened later, it came with normative expectations. Citing scholarship on maternalist movements, Koven suggested that mothers should be conceptualized as having agency rather than as being denied it, while in the case of fathers, constraints on agency should be given more attention. He concluded by calling for more international comparisons, noting for example that the “democratization of education,” a key goal on both sides of the Atlantic, had different meanings in the United States and in Germany, and that race and immigration so far had not been adequately examined as factors in European education.

Adding a specifically American perspective, David McLeod drew attention to the problems of researching state activity in the field of child welfare and education. He underlined that, in addition to the differences between the fifty states and between the federal, state, and the local levels, it had to be taken into account that especially in the early Progressive era much legislation by state governments did not demand action by local governmental units (cities, counties, etc.) but merely permitted them to establish child-oriented programs. Since these local governments were the units that actually provided most child services, this legislative permissiveness contributed to enhancing the differences between urban and underdeveloped rural areas and left organizations such as the humane societies their own field of activities. McLeod pointed out that it was not clear why the United States did not create a stronger welfare state, given
that it built up a comprehensive system of public education. Perhaps the American ideology of individualism made this the most acceptable venue for child services. He tentatively suggested an overarching narrative that centered on “state surveillance” in the early twentieth century, “state provision” in the 1960s and 1970s, and “state demands” thereafter. European influences had an impact on this process up until the 1930s; from then on, influences from abroad made themselves felt only as “political shocks,” reflected especially in an erratic school policy. Citing policy discussions about child abuse and autism, McLeod warned against overemphasizing the criticism of parents and against constructing linear narratives.

The discussion that followed focused mainly on how to conceptualize the twentieth century as a distinct period in the history of childrearing and education. While the proposition to drop this notion altogether did not win acceptance, participants agreed that one common thread could be seen in the increase of state activity. This, however, did not necessarily entail the increase of state control, although the impact of totalitarian systems needed closer scrutiny. Traditional narratives that posited a teleological development of institutions of childhood welfare and education in a progressive spirit needed to be deconstructed. Examining the varying definitions of “citizenship” seemed to be one particularly useful approach; another seemed to be exploring definitions of “normality,” not the least that of gender roles, as mirrored in the fears that informed educational practices, most notably those related to sexuality and criminality. Parental authority could be constructed in various ways vis-à-vis state authority and that of experts. The rise of the latter was obvious, but their actual influence, in particular in the case of advice literature, needed to be explored, not taken for granted. Children could be conceptualized in multiple ways that reflected various degrees of intrusion and distance on the part of their educators and the fact that they now became aware of their own development. Given the importance of peer groups as a source of influence rivaling that of parents and teachers, it was pointed out that the specific discourses and interests at play here deserved particular attention, as adolescence was redefined by psychoanalysis as a part of childhood and hence as a period in which expert advice was needed.

The papers and discussions of the conference have shown how current research projects in the field redefine questions about the structure and function of the welfare state by focusing on discourse, representation, and agency. They have thrown into sharp relief the problems of periodization and conceptualization of the “Century of the Child.” The results of the conference will be published as a collection of essays.

Dirk Schumann
German History, 1890–1930
Eleventh Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar in German History

Seminar at the GHI and Georgetown University, April 13–16, 2005. Co-sponsored by the GHI and the BMW Center for German and European Studies, Georgetown University. Conveners: Roger Chickering (Georgetown University) and Richard F. Wetzel (GHI). Faculty Mentors: Rüdiger vom Bruch (Humboldt University), Edward Ross Dickinson (University of Cincinnati), Martina Kessel (University of Bielefeld), Suzanne Marchand (Louisiana State University).

Participants: Simone Ameskamp (Georgetown University), Eva Bischoff (University of Munich), Matthew Brown (Washington University), Jürgen Denzel (University of Freiburg), Olaf Hartung (University of Kiel), Heather Jones (Trinity College, Dublin), Stephanie Kleiner (University of Konstanz), Jonathan Koehler (University of Rochester), Christopher König (Theological University Kampen, Netherlands), Martin Lücke (University of Bielefeld), Marti Lybeck (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor), Michael O’Sullivan (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill), Daniel Siemens (Humboldt University, Berlin), Lisa Todd (University of Toronto), Sven Trösch (University of Cologne), Katja Zelljadt (Harvard University).

The eleventh Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar brought together sixteen doctoral students from Europe and North America to discuss their dissertation projects on German history in the period 1890 to 1930. The first panel examined two different aspects of popular culture and politics in the Kaiserreich and Austria. Jürgen Denzel’s paper “Fussball und Militär im Kaiserreich” argued that the increasing popularity of soccer in Imperial Germany owed much to the promotion of the sport by the military. On the one hand, the military supported the activities of bourgeois soccer clubs in order to immunize working class youth against the leisure-time offerings of social-democratic organizations. On the other hand, the incorporation of soccer into military training created more demand for soccer clubs. The increasing role of sports in military training, Denzel suggested, can be seen as a sign of modernization and liberalization. Jonathan Koehler’s paper examined the Austrian Social Democratic Party’s use of street demonstrations and political protest in Vienna between 1890 and 1907. He argued that the party fashioned Austrian Social Democracy as the “modern religion of the masses” by using Catholic religious language to mobilize workers according to an idea of civic participation, which rejected previous claims that liberalism had made upon private life.
The second panel featured two papers on issues of gender. Marti Lybeck’s paper “Are These Women? Gender and Sexuality in Representation of Women Students in Zurich in the Late Nineteenth Century” used autobiographical texts by women students as well as novels of ideas featuring women students to investigate the role of same-sex relations in each. Although sexological discourses were becoming known to a broad public sphere at this time, the concept of homosexuality was marginal to an intensive discussion of heterosexuality and absent from the conceptions of women students. The relatively conservative framework of Bildungsbürgertum, Lybeck argued, provided a basis for women students to engage in new forms of sociability and to develop a variety of close relations, often with both sexes, under the flexible rubric of friendship.

Sven Trösch’s paper “Der gekaufte Mann: Männlichkeit und Konsum in Herrenmodezeitschriften der Weimarer Republik” asked in what ways consumption helped to construct masculinity. Through an examination of three male fashion magazines Trösch was able to trace the formation of a civilian, consumerist and fashion-conscious form of masculinity in the course of the 1920s and 1930s, which was especially appealing to big-city white-collar workers.

The third panel dealt with sexuality and violence during the First World War. Lisa Todd’s paper “‘Almost All Loose Women Are Infected’: The Campaign to Combat Sexual Promiscuity in World War I Germany” discussed the changing nature of sexual relations on the German World War I home front, the heightened legal control of “promiscuous” women and public spaces, and the continuing debates on immorality in order to illustrate how the myriad responses to these challenges were symptomatic of a much larger wartime concern—the effect of “total war” on the future health of German society. Heather Jones’s paper “The Spring Reprisals of 1917: Prisoners of War and the Violence of the Western Front” considered how particular cycles of violence operated during the First World War by looking in detail at reprisals against French and British prisoners held by the German army in spring 1917. These reprisals occurred as retaliation for mistreatment of German prisoners by the French. Such cycles of violence, Jones contended, significantly altered contemporary opinions regarding the permissible boundaries of prisoner treatment and military behavior.

Moving beyond the war years, the fourth panel, too, was devoted to sexuality, violence, and crime. Martin Lücke’s paper “Markt, Macht, Männlichkeit: Mann-männliche Prostitution in Deutschland im Kaiserreich und in der Weimarer Republik” asked in what ways gender codes influenced the debates over male-male prostitution in Imperial and Weimar Germany. Lücke used Robert W. Connell’s concept of “hegemonic masculinity” as a heuristic device, which he applied to three levels of
analysis: the construction of homosexual clients and male prostitutes in the sexological literature; debates over the legality or criminality of male-male prostitution; and aspects of the social interaction between male prostitutes and their homosexual clients. Daniel Siemens’s paper “Inszenierung und Emotionalisierung: Sensationsprozesse der Zwischenkriegszeit in Chicago und Berlin” explored the role of court reporting by looking at two sensational 1920s trials that took place in Berlin and Chicago. His analysis showed that the newspapers’ presentation of the trials contained a strong emotional component. In both cases, the newspapers interpreted the crimes in question as “typical of the times” and thus gave them a meaning that drew readers in. The reporting appealed to “society’s innovative potential” to reflect on itself critically and thus to renew urban society. The transnational perspective, Siemens argued, reveals “local moral orders” of the modern metropolis.

The fifth panel extended the discussion of violence and death to the topics of cannibalism and cremation. Eva Bischoff’s paper “Wahrheit und Verfahren: Ethnologisches und kriminologisches Wissen vom Kannibalisimus” analyzed trials of supposed cannibals in German East Africa in 1908/09 and in Germany between 1922 and 1931. By examining professional publications as well as medico-psychiatric expert witness testimony she sought to show how the trials constructed and maintained a cannibalistic “Other” through “plays of truth.” The paper aimed to reconstruct the interconnections between ethnologic and criminological knowledge in order to demonstrate its “effectiveness” in producing and reproducing identity and alterity. Simone Ameskamp’s paper “The Meaning of Death and Life: Cremation in Imperial and Weimar Germany” argued that the fiery images that members of the cremation movement used around the turn of the twentieth century indicated a shift in attitudes toward mortality: The traditional notion of death as sleep faded, while cyclical ideas of an accelerated return to the origins came to the fore. Employing organic metaphors, cremationists conceived of life as a constant transformation. They regarded death as a form of homecoming and dying as the separation of the immortal soul or spirit from the physical body. Dynamic and cyclical images evoked a sense of eternity and thereby dampened the fear of death.

The sixth panel was devoted to the theme of history and memory. Katja Zelljadt’s paper “Alt-Berlin: Deciphering a lieu de mémoire of Imperial Germany” argued that around 1900 Alt-Berlin became increasingly popular as a catchphrase for all things urban and historical in the capital. In her discussion of the three realms in which Alt-Berlin appeared during the Imperial period—theater, exhibits, and photography—Zelljadt analyzed the meanings behind each form of Alt-Berlin and revealed how historical consciousness functioned as an essential element in Berlin’s
Wilhelmine era. Olaf Hartung’s paper “Museumsgründungen zwischen Historismus und Moderne: Formen bürgerlicher Geschichtskultur in Zeiten gesellschaftlichen Umbruchs” examined three examples of a new breed of museum: Nuremberg’s transport museum, Dresden’s Hygiene Museum, and Bochum’s Mining Museum. The exhibits mounted by the railroad officials, doctors, and mining engineers who founded these museums were primarily cultural-historical. Therefore, when historicism entered a crisis during the Weimar years, so did these exhibits. That this crisis was largely due to their problematic historiographical assumptions was lost on those who ran these museums. Instead of revisiting these assumptions, they simply reduced the historical dimension of their exhibits.

The seventh panel dealt with the role of religion. Christopher König’s paper “Germanisierung des Christentums: Nationalreligiöse Vorstellungen im deutschen Protestantismus und der völkischen Bewegung” examined attempts to create a German national religion. König used the cases of Wilhelm Schwaner, the founder of the Volkserzieherbewegung, and Arthur Bonus, who coined the phrase “Germanisierung des Christentums,” to argue that such figures regarded religious renewal as the precondition for a “German rebirth.” This religious renewal should not be understood as an Ersatzreligion but as a search for a genuine religion. Michael O’Sullivan’s paper “Roots of Renewal: The Role of Gender in Catholic Religious Revival, 1918–1933” used an analysis of gender to suggest an alternative interpretation of the religious decline and revival of Catholic life in western Germany during the Weimar Republic. Instead of searching for the decline of religion in the modern world, O’Sullivan explored how Catholics found new ways to understand their religious traditions after war and revolution made older approaches less meaningful. In particular, the paper demonstrated how new articulations of Catholic masculinity and appeals to women as maternal guardians of Catholic religious life and morality motivated young men and mothers to undertake a religious awakening in the early 1930s.

The final panel was devoted to cultural and intellectual history. Stephanie Kleiner’s paper “Inszenierung der Macht—Macht der Inszenierung: Oper und Festspiele als Medien politischer Repräsentation, 1890–1930” examined the role of opera as a medium of political Sinnstiftung in the political festival culture of the period 1890 to 1930. Her analysis addressed institutional as well as discursive and performative aspects so as to understand opera as a musical-dramatic genre and the opera house as a place of gathering and entertainment. Matthew Brown’s paper “Retrieving the Past: Cassirer, Heidegger, and the Legacies of German Culture, 1916–1925,” which focused on the development of Cassirer’s philosophical project from the First World War through the 1920s, argued that the salient differences between Cassirer and Heidegger lay in their
competing interpretations of Western thought and German culture, pitting Cassirer’s retrieval of the German humanist tradition against Heidegger’s vision of a religiously oriented heritage with roots in Romanticism.

Even more than in the previous year’s seminar, the prominence of cultural history—especially work on gender, sexuality, and deviance—among the seminar’s papers was striking. But while most papers focused on cultural history, almost all of them sought to place their topics in the larger contexts of political, social or military history. The work in cultural history was fueled by a profusion of sources, ranging from fashion magazines to expert witness testimony in criminal trials. The focus on cultural history also meant that the caesuras of political history marking this period, especially the First World War, did not play much of a role in most of the papers. While this left some participants wondering whether the influence of the war had been understated, others argued that it was important to let cultural history find its own chronology and trajectory. Equally noteworthy was the absence of the rise of Nazism from almost all of the papers. This, too, was regarded as a sign that cultural history was emancipating itself from political history. The papers’ move away from familiar political reference points was not accompanied by a turn to new master narratives or theoretical paradigms. Instead, skepticism (and eclecticism) regarding theory and master narratives reigned at the seminar, as concepts such as modernity, modernization, crisis, hegemonic masculinity, and political religion were subjected to vigorous critical scrutiny. As far as themes were concerned, the “Verwissenschaftlichung des Sozialen” and the increasing role of experts were certainly prominent concerns in many of the papers. But the papers and discussions did not advance the Foucauldian argument that individuals were becoming increasingly subject to a medico-legal knowledge-power complex. Instead, many papers suggested that social processes of control and exclusion were in many respects counterbalanced by the erosion of boundaries (between normal and abnormal; men and women) that had some liberating effects for individuals. While some participants wondered if the papers had paid sufficient attention to the question of power, almost everyone agreed that the papers had provided a highly differentiated picture of Kaiserreich and Weimar society and culture, one that eschewed easy generalizations in favor of demonstrating the complexity of social phenomena such as gender relations, deviance, violence, memory, and religion.

Richard F. Wetzell
SELLING DEMOCRACY: PRODUCTIVITY AND PROPAGANDA IN THE SERVICE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Discussion panel and film screening at the Goethe-Institut, Washington, DC, April 18, 2005. Co-sponsored by the GHI, the Goethe-Institut, and the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Conveners: Christine von Oertzen (GHI), Sandra Schulberg (Selling Democracy), and Jonathan Skolnik (GHI).

Participants: Rebecca Boehling (University of Maryland, Baltimore County), Alberto Fernandez (United States Department of State, Office of Public Diplomacy, Iraq Affairs), Amy Garrett (United States Department of State, Office of the Historian), John K. Glenn (German Marshall Fund), Michael Meyer (Newsweek).

Included in this year’s Washington, DC International Film Festival was a remarkable series showcasing American films produced to promote the European Recovery Program (ERP, the “Marshall Plan”) from 1948 to 1953. “Selling Democracy,” as the series was entitled, had been shown previously to great acclaim as part of the New York Film Festival. The GHI was honored to co-sponsor a discussion panel that preceded the final screenings in Washington.

John Glenn of the German Marshall Fund of the United States moderated the panel. Two historians provided a detailed framework for understanding the economic and political context of American information efforts in Western Europe during these years: Rebecca Boehling of the University of Maryland, Baltimore County and Amy Garrett of the United States Department of State’s Office of the Historian. Michael Meyer, a senior editor at Newsweek who headed the magazine’s European bureau for many years, challenged the other panelists and the audience to question some of the enduring myths about the Marshall Plan, specifically the notion that America, rather than Europe itself, was the prime mover in postwar reconstruction. Alberto Fernandez of the U.S. Department of State’s Office of Iraq Affairs offered his perspective on the contrasts between the type of public diplomacy represented by the Marshall Plan films and current American efforts in the Middle East. For Fernandez, the ambitious effort to reach out to the European populace and to educate them about America after World War II is a model that contemporary planners have unfortunately neglected in favor of public diplomacy run “more like an American political campaign.” The audience included many individuals who had played a role in the Marshall Plan, providing for a vibrant discussion.

The six short films that followed the panel pursued a clear anti-
Communist agenda with different emphases. *Struggle for Men’s Minds* sought to transform despair into optimism by changing European mentalities regarding the relation of citizens to the state. Dark images of Communists nearly paralyzing Italy with strikes gave way to a scenario where clever individuals can overcome the chaos and enjoy productivity and prosperity. The other films included animation. While *Without Fear* used color animation for a monochrome political message, *The Shoemaker and the Hatter* and *Do Not Disturb!* used humor and a light-hearted tone to illustrate the virtues of free trade.

Jonathan Skolnik and Julia Driesen
RETHINKING EMBOURgeoisement AND THE JEWS OF GERMANY


The SecondJoint Symposium of the Leo Baeck Institute (LBI) and the GHI was held at the LBI’s new, more spacious home in the Center for Jewish History in New York. The first Joint Lecture was held at the GHI in October 2003 (see Bulletin 35) and featured Liliane Weissberg (University of Pennsylvania) with a commentary by Jeffrey Peck (Georgetown University). The first joint event explored the changing landscape of German-Jewish Studies, focusing on the mushrooming interest in Jewish Studies in Germany and the influence of Jewish immigration to Germany since 1989 on both conceptions of post-Holocaust German-Jewish relations and the Jewish understanding of “diaspora” in the new global reality. The Second Joint Symposium in New York provided a concrete example of the new Jewish Studies in Germany, highlighting the work of two scholars whose recent books on nineteenth-century German Jewry are moving research in that area in an important direction.

The theme of the symposium was “Rethinking Embourgeoisement.” Drawing on the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of “cultural capital,” Simone Lässig’s paper argued that the story of the transformation of Jewish society in nineteenth-century Germany should be uncoupled from a binary opposition of “assimilation” to “Jewish cultural preservation.” Centering her discussion around three examples—reforms in Jewish education, the reshaping of religious life, and Jewish participation in all-Jewish and integrated Vereine—Lässig contended that the growth of German-Jewish institutions should not be viewed as a reaction to prejudice and exclusion, but rather as a workshop or laboratory for the values, skills, and habits required for entry into the German middle class. Till van Rahden’s paper noted the enduring deficit of scholarship which examines Jews as a “core group of the German middle class,” despite the voluminous literature on Bürgertum. Reflecting broadly on developments from 1800 to 1933, van Rahden demonstrated the striking economic heterogeneity of the German-Jewish middle class and suggested that the complexity of Jewish ethnic and class identity and mobility can offer insight into the nature of class, status, and civil society as a whole. He argued in particular for a nuanced re-examination of German civil society.
and its relation to minorities. Whereas van Rahden claimed that the dynamic of social and economic inclusion and exclusion was something hardly specific to Jews and invited parallels with Catholics and other groups, he was careful to identify the factors marking the German-Jewish experience as unique. The considerable political clout Jewish voters had in Imperial Germany, especially at the municipal level, was one factor; their fateful symbiosis with the left-liberal bourgeoisie (whose influence declined dramatically in the twentieth century) was another.

The two papers were rich in detail and conceptually ambitious; together they are evidence of a powerful blend of social and cultural history that rethinks both the long-dominant narrative of German-Jewish “assimilation” as well as more recent attempts to conceptualize the German-Jewish milieu as a “subculture.” Both presentations raised many new questions, most importantly regarding how to think about prejudice and anti-Semitism at the same time that German-Jewish social advancement is studied in more detail. The questions from the audience opened an equally important dimension: How does the German example compare with other Western European nations? With the Jewish experience in the Americas? In Eastern Europe? Perhaps comparative history based in part on the German-Jewish experience might serve as a theme for a future joint symposium.

Jonathan Skolnik
On Saturday, April 30, 2005, the Mid-Atlantic German History Seminar met at the GHI for its semi-annual meeting. Katherine Aaslestad of West Virginia University presented a very informative historiographical survey of recent interpretations of the Napoleonic occupation of central Europe, focusing on the year 1806. Her essay posed several questions around the themes of state building and consolidation, the nature of early nineteenth-century liberalism, and the relationship between regional culture and the Napoleonic continental system that, according to Aaslestad, “tied into everyone’s lives” through taxation, conscription, new judicial systems, and the billeting of soldiers. She concluded that, while the “role of nationalist political discourse” emerging during the French revolutionary and Napoleonic periods continues to occupy historians, “recent studies . . . explore the transformation of political culture.” In addition, “gendered representations of patriotism in military and civilian society” coexist with studies of “shifts within local civic identity . . . from the ground up.” Historians are posing questions such as: What were the levels of collaboration and/or resistance to occupation in various parts of Germany? Was resistance political or more cultural? She pointed out that, on the eve of the two-hundredth anniversary of 1806, new questions and new studies are demonstrating the complexity of this critical time in German history.

After her overview, based on her paper sent to participants in advance of the seminar, a discussion ensued, beginning with a question about Mack Walker’s classic *German Hometowns* that explored this time period. Did local administrators and bureaucrats block reform and hence contribute to a “failed modernization?” Further discussion centered on whether one can use terms such as “modernization” rather than “reform.” Recent studies have suggested that resistance to the French have opened up additional questions. For example, were the revolutionary and Napoleonic eras transitional or a dramatic rupture from the eighteenth-century past? Several participants noted that the period was probably a combination of both. Others surmised that examining the period through the lenses of generations and age cohorts may be fruitful. Furthermore, additional fruitful approaches could look at issues of confessionalization and at everyday life under occupation. How varied would everyday experiences be in newly reconstituted entities such as Bavaria? Would comparative studies be helpful in comparing Baden, Württemberg, or Saxony along with Bavaria? Other questions centered on the role of edu-
cation during this era. Participants asked about recent French historians’ views regarding the issues of modernization and of resistance in the Rhineland. More broadly, how have these historians characterized the nature of French occupation? How have the French evaluated the economic changes brought about by the continental system? How corrupt was it? For some, according to Aaslestad, Napoleon is still revered as a “unifier” of Europe. Following the description of French efforts at evaluating the period, the seminar’s discussion turned to the former GDR’s view of the Napoleonic era. Aaslestad noted that one of the best exhibitions was held in Leipzig commemorating the Russian role in the Wars of Liberation. After continued discussion of issues such as the role of the Confederation of the Rhine and the strength of pan-German resistance, the seminar concluded with two additional provocative questions: Was the old Holy Roman Empire, eliminated by Napoleon, really defunct or an early embryo of the EU? And, finally, can sovereign states be formed as a union without the domination of one state?

The next Mid-Atlantic German History Seminar will be held in the fall at Georgetown University. John V. Maciuika of Baruch College, CUNY, will present material from his recently published work, Before the Bauhaus: Architecture, Politics, and the German State, 1890–1920 (Cambridge University Press, 2005). For additional information, please contact Marion Deshmukh, Department of History and Art History, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, 22030, mdeshmuk@gmu.edu.

Marion Deshmukh
ANIMALS IN HISTORY

Conference at the Literaturhaus Cologne, May 18–21, 2005. Conveners: Dorothee Brantz (GHI) and Christof Mauch (GHI). Co-sponsored by the GHI, the Anglo-American Institute of the University of Cologne, and the Literaturhaus Cologne.

Participants: Anne Alden (Alliant National University), Sofia Åkerberg (Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences), Greg Bankoff (University of Auckland), Stefan Bargheer (University of Chicago), Mark V. Barrow (Virginia Tech), Marcel Boldorf (University of Jena), Renate Brucker (Dortmund), Jonathan Burt (London), Peter Edwards (University of Roehampton), Amanda Eisemann (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign), Pascal Etter (University of Bielefeld), Kelly Enright (Rutgers University), David Allen Feller (University of Hawaii), Bernhard Gissibl (International University, Bremen), Susanne Hehenberger (University of Vienna), Oliver Hochadel (University of Vienna), Kathleen Kete (Trinity College), David Lazar (GHI), Garry Marvin (University of Roehampton), Susan McHugh (University of New England), Clay McShane (Northeastern University), Scott Miltenberger (University of California, Davis), Robert Mitchell (Eastern Kentucky University), Brett Mizelle (California State University, Long Beach), Susan Nance (University of Guelph), Tillman Nechtman (University of Southern California), Amy Nelson (Virginia Tech), Carl Niekerk (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign), Johannes Paulmann (International University Bremen), Susan Pearson (Northwestern University), Helena Pycior (University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee), Harriet Ritvo (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Mieke Roscher (University of Bremen), Nigel Rothfels (University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee), Aaron Skabelund (Hokkaido University, Sappororo), Julie A. Smith (University of Wisconsin, Whitewater), Jessica Ullrich (University of the Arts, Berlin), Martin Ullrich (University of the Arts, Berlin), Mary Weismantel (Northwestern University), Anna-Katharina Wöbse (University of Bielefeld).

Reading most history books, one is left with the impression that the world was only inhabited by humans; however, when thinking about the everyday lives of people, one must ask if history really would have taken the same course without the presence of many non-human actors, whose labor and products supplied much of the material wealth upon which human prosperity is based. Would the sciences and arts have been able to advance in the same manner without the ability to experiment on animals, depict them visually, or employ them for entertainment purposes? In short, would human cultures and societies be the same without the
domesticated and wild animals that have shared our space in the past and in the present?

In recent years, a growing number of scholars are turning their attention to the place of the non-human in history. That this type of historical investigation is quickly gaining prominence was demonstrated by the fact that the call for papers for this conference garnered over 180 proposals from across the globe. Paying tribute to the mission of the GHI, the final program centered primarily on Europe and North America, which was nevertheless a crucial step toward the internationalization of this emerging field because thus far most work had been done in the United States and Great Britain rather than continental Europe.

For four days in May, this interdisciplinary conference brought together a diverse group of scholars, including anthropologists, historians, literary scholars, musicologists, psychologists, and sociologists, as well as members of the press and the general public. Participants debated conceptual, historical, and methodological questions concerning the role of animals in human society. While each panel centered on particular case studies, the overall goal of the conference was to develop common themes and questions about what a more animal-centered view can add to historical scholarship and our concrete understanding of the past. The conference sought to address the following key questions, among others: Why bother to study the role of animals or human-animal relations in history? What are some of the major conceptual and methodological questions arising from such a focus? What are the potential gains as well as limitations of a more animal-centered perspective for the wider study of history?

The Wednesday night keynote address by Harriet Ritvo opened the conference with an overview of the many arenas where animals have been present in human history, starting with their domestication, which arguably marked the beginning of history, up to contemporary debates about biotechnology. Ritvo also offered her thoughts about the newly emerging field of “animal studies.” While she welcomed the growing interest in animal-related topics, she also cautioned against the formation of yet another insular sub-discipline where scholars only communicate among themselves rather than engaging larger audiences and already-existing academic and real-life discourses. Ritvo’s thought-provoking remarks set the tone for many of the discussions that followed.

The first panel laid some of the conceptual foundations regarding how animals might be integrated into the study of the human past. Questioning the convention that all we can know about animals is their representation in historical texts, Nigel Rothfels turned to the quotidian historical praxis of those who professionally worked with animals, in this case elephants, in order to ask if a shift from emphasizing “looking at
animals” (as John Berger did) toward more “tactile” engagements might offer a different, more direct way to access human-animal relations. Susan McHugh, in turn, focused on the connection of animal histories and aesthetic theories, arguing that Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s notion of “becoming-animal” might be a particularly useful way of reconceptualizing the place of animals in human society. In their presentation, Mary Weismantel and Susan Pearce began by lamenting the inadequate theorizing of animals, particularly with regard to notions of the social, to propose that a closer focus on conceptions of space might help us recognize both the cultural and the social significance of animals. Finally, Julie Ann Smith insisted that scholars must distinguish more carefully between representations of and actual encounters with animals, a distinction that was repeatedly taken up in subsequent discussions.

Turning to more empirically driven case studies, the second panel focused on the changing human perceptions of specific animals throughout history. Peter Edwards examined the treatment of horses in early modern England to show that class relations played a significant role in how horses were treated. He also addressed the problematic of finding and interpreting primary sources in early modern history. Shifting to the United States in the nineteenth century, Kelly Enright discussed the place of the rhinoceros in the American cultural imagination, arguing that this exotic creature revealed “the American preference for myth over science, as well as a predilection for locating savage wilderness abroad rather than at home.” The third paper, by Marc Barrow, focused on the multiple, often contradictory perceptions of alligators in American society. Demonstrating that alligators have been viewed as fierce predators, emblematic symbols of the Florida landscape, tourist attractions, and commodities, Barrow argued that American attitudes were not only driven by fear but also by the desire to tame this beast and profit from it.

The third panel focused on moral concerns surrounding the relations between humans and animals. Naturally, such concerns centered on human rather than animal morality; however, it was interesting to hear how discourses about rights, social class, and sexual aberration were frequently projected onto animals. For instance, Susanne Hehenberger’s paper about bestiality cases in early modern Austria showed that animals, the “instruments of sin,” were supposed to be burned at the stake alongside the human perpetrators. Examining specific court cases, Hehenberger showed that sodomy was particularly severely punished (usually with a death sentence), primarily because it threatened the assumed boundary between humans and beasts. A different kind of boundary crossing was addressed by Stefan Bargheer, who focused on debates about civility and animal protection in mid-eighteenth to mid-nineteenth-century England in order to demonstrate that emerging discourses about
the need for animal protection legislation attested to shifting notions about honor, namely from a concept of warrior honor to more civilized concepts of virtuous honor, particularly among the upper classes; but he also showed that early animal protectionists were often ridiculed rather than revered for their activism. Turning to more explicitly philosophical debates, Renate Brucker investigated the historical linkages between the peace and animal rights movements in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Claiming that most scholars have overlooked the fact that many peace activists were also strong advocates of animal rights, Brucker showed that already some 1848 revolutionaries, especially Gustav von Struve, and later Magnus Schwantje, insisted on the link of pacifism and discourses about animal rights.

Turning even more explicitly to the question of politics, the fourth panel featured two papers, one by Pascal Eitler, who offered a rather cautionary tale by applying a genealogical approach to the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century debates about vivisection and vegetarianism to argue that discourses about animal protection can also have potentially dangerous effects, opening the gates for problematic conceptions of life and biopolitics, which found their most radical expression in Nazi Germany. Anna-Katharina Wöbse, in contrast, centered on the growing significance of animals in international politics by tracing debates about animal protection, particularly with regard to livestock, whales, and birds, in the League of Nations, which, according to Wöbse, should be viewed as a forerunner of contemporary global environmental movements.

The fifth panel shifted away from an emphasis on politics. Instead, the four presenters concentrated on a range of scientific discourses. Carl Niekerk looked at a number of eighteenth-century scientific, philosophical, and artistic texts and how their depictions of apes shaped contemporary discourses about the relationship of humans and anthropoid apes. Turning to the correspondence and personal papers of Charles Darwin, David Allan Feller’s presentation contextualized the place of dogs in Darwin’s personal life and his work on natural selection to show that scholars have thus far overlooked the importance of these canine influences on his thinking. Robert Mitchell offered a self-critical analysis of the use of anthropomorphic concepts in psychology and the behavioral sciences. Highlighting some of the key debates, he maintained that many of the discourses against anthropomorphism today have not taken into account new scientific data about the relationship of human and animal behavior. Looking at a very different type of anthropomorphism, Martin Ullrich posed the provocative question “do birds sing” to address the aesthetic relevance of the musical actions of animals. Offering numerous audio examples ranging from Beethoven to Messiaen, Ullrich examined
how composers have used bird sounds in their music, thus transforming animal chants into human art.

The problematic of exhibiting wild animals was the focus of panel six. Brett Mizelle opened the discussion with a presentation about the exhibition of wild animals and public market culture in the early American Republic. He also used the specific example of Pinchbeck’s “pig of knowledge” to show how animal exhibitions were affected by changes in popular culture. Oliver Hochadel also focused on the public exhibition of animals, in his case apes in nineteenth-century zoos. He argued that zoos functioned as a medium to transpose Darwinian ideas to a general audience. As Hochadel demonstrated, this did not always generate the anticipated results because encounters between apes and zoo visitors often led to an anthropomorphization of the animals rather than a deeper scientific understanding. Finally, Susan Nance discussed the question of animal agency through the example of elephant behavior in nineteenth-century American circuses. She insisted that acts of aggression, docility, and resistance demonstrated that human authority over animals even in settings as controlled as circuses is never as complete as it might seem and consequently that we need to take their agency into account when studying the place of animals in human society.

The seventh panel centered on the multivalent histories of dogs in twentieth-century popular culture. Anne Alden looked at the changing representations of dogs in The New Yorker magazine cartoons throughout the twentieth century. Viewing these cartoons as a mirror of American culture, Alden argued that they attested to varying notions of anthropomorphism, reflecting not only the changing position of dogs in American society but also the shifting representations of human activities, particularly the rise of the computer age. Helena Pycior explored the cultural significance of “first dogs” in American political culture to show how pets like Harding’s Laddie Boy and Roosevelt’s Fala have become political props in the White House in order to add a human face to the American presidency. Looking at the other end of Cold War politics, Amy Nelson examined the use of dogs in the Soviet space program. As Nelson demonstrated, dogs like Laika also gained celebrity status, although in this case not so much to add a gentle touch to communism, but to underscore the technological and scientific superiority of the Soviet Union in the space race and also to distract from the more secretive aspects of these operations.

Panel eight turned to the issue of gender, which has always been closely linked to the treatment of animals and the politics of animal protection. Mieke Roscher looked at the involvement of three generations of women in the British debates about animal welfare and vivisection in
particular in the late Victorian and Edwardian period. Arguing that each of them represented a specific mode of engagement, she demonstrated how Francis Power Cobbe stood for motherly protection, Anna Kingsford chose a more emotionally driven tactic many labeled hysterical, and Louise Lind-af-Hageby insisted that only a rational, scientifically oriented approach could lead to tangible results. Amanda Eisemann provided a different interpretation of some well-known early modern images of horse stables by focusing on how masculine identities manifested themselves in relation to equestrian trades. She insisted that the equestrian trades functioned as a means to distinguish between different social and economic orders. Kathleen Kete in turn explored the connection between animals and another often-neglected group of historical actors, namely children. Maintaining that contemporary notions about the loving relations between children and animals are by no means “natural” but rather historically conditioned, Kete traced the changing cultural links between animals and children from the Middle Ages through the nineteenth century. She argued that the connection between animals and children reflected most of all adults’ need to define their social relationship with children and animals.

The connection of colonialism and animals was the focus of panel nine. Tillman W. Nechtman studied various forms of encounters between the British population and the wild and exotic animals that Britons imported from South Asia in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. He argued that these “imperial animals”—elephants, tigers and hyenas—became living fables in British society while they also threatened the structured world of domestic Britain. In his paper on German East Africa, Bernard Gissibl explored diverse ways in which humans related to elephants before World War I. Back in Berlin, the fear of the extermination of elephants and other African wild animals was a major concern of zoologists and scientists. In East Africa, on the other hand, the colonial administration was not only concerned with declining wildlife numbers but also with the waning ivory trade. In individual encounters of big game hunters and elephants, yet another aspect of human-animal relations in the colonial context emerged: the symbolic claim of white superiority over African nature. In his paper on disasters in the Spanish Philippines, Greg Bankoff reflected on the much-ignored impact that floods had on domestic animals. He analyzed the effects that the loss of livestock and poultry had on the livelihood of farmers in the Philippines, and he argued that the notion of vulnerability was a viable concept in studying the exposure of animals to natural hazards.

Panel ten turned to the hunting of animals and some related issues. In her paper on the moose and moose hunting in Sweden, Sofia Åkerberg
argued that balancing moose populations has been a goal throughout the twentieth century even though this has never been entirely achieved. Åkerberg discussed conflicts between hunters and forest companies over moose populations and pointed out that notions of moose hunting had changed considerably over the last hundred years. In earlier times, moose hunting was seen as a “glorious and manly sport”; today, in contrast, administrators are more likely to discuss moose-hunting in such profane terms as “production-adapted culling.” Like Åkerberg, Gary Marvin analyzed changing social and cultural constructions of an animal. At the core of his paper on wolves, he asked why this particular species has been viewed by some groups with loathing, and by others with awe and reverence. The German Shepherd dog was seen as the epitome of a colonial dog, according to Aaron Skabelund. He demonstrated that this dog became an “ideal creature of metaphor” in numerous different cultural settings. German Shepherds became icons of imperial militarism in 1930s Japan, for instance. Much more recently the same dog came to signify American imperial savagery in the Islamic world, since U.S. troops supposedly used German Shepherd dogs to torture prisoners in Abu Ghraib.

In a panel titled “Animal Urbanity,” Clay McShane, Marcel Boldorf, and Scott A. Miltenberger discussed the place of animals in nineteenth- and twentieth-century German and American cities. McShane argued that the presence of horses, their size, and their speed was related to the size and population density of cities. City administrations changed the width of streets and their surface, for instance, in order to accommodate horse-drawn traffic. McShane also pointed out that the modification of horses by man, through breeding and castration, was a prerequisite for deploying horses in cities. Turning to a case study about cats in the city, Marcel Boldorf discussed the fate of stray cats in southwestern Germany’s Mannheim. Boldorf emphasized the important role that the local Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals played over the course of the twentieth century. In the final paper of the conference, Scott A. Miltenberger applied the concept of the “anthrozootic city” to nineteenth-century New York. In the middle of that century, discussions about public health heightened concerns of New Yorkers about encounters with animals in the city. It was feared that encounters of humans of all classes, “promiscuously mixed together” with animals, might increase the risk of disease or even create social disorder.

In a final roundtable, chaired by Christof Mauch, panelists Dorothee Brantz, Jonathan Burt, and Harriet Ritvo summarized some of the major themes of the conference and asked “where animal historians should go from here.” They discussed issues of audiences, national cultures, and the institutionalization and organization of the field of animal studies. In the
debate that followed, conference participants discussed ways and methodologies in which animals as actors could be integrated into larger historical narratives. The fact that this conference, unlike many other GHI conferences, had been open to the public had attracted a number of journalists. As a result, several articles and reports about “animals in history” appeared in the press as well as in local, national and international radio programs. The conference organizers plan to publish both an English and a German collection of essays based on some of the papers.

Dorothee Brantz and Christof Mauch
THE PURSUIT OF PUBLIC HAPPINESS: GARDENS AND PARKS IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA


Participants: Gert Gröning (University of the Arts Berlin), Susan Herrington (University of British Columbia), Rainer Herzog (Bavaria Administration of State Palaces, Gardens and Lakes, Munich), Wolfram Höfer (Bundesgartenschau München 2005 GmbH, Munich), John Dixon Hunt (University of Pennsylvania), Solveig Köbernick (Leipzig), Sara Cedar Miller (Central Park Conservancy, New York), Philip Paar (Zuse Institute Berlin), Elizabeth Barlow Rogers (Foundation for Landscape Studies, New York), Alan Tate (University of Manitoba), Andrew Theokas (City of Boston and Boston Architectural Center), Joachim Wolschke-Bulmahn (University of Hanover), Terence Young (California State Polytechnic University, Pomona).

On the occasion of the biannual German National Garden Festival, held in Munich in 2005, the German Historical Institute and the Bavarian American Academy hosted a public conference in the Bavarian capital. Bringing together scholars of garden history, landscape architecture, and garden and landscape conservation from the United States, Canada, and Germany, the conference provided insights into transnational aspects of garden cultural history in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe and North America. It also examined similarities and differences in dealing with garden cultural heritage and open-space planning on these continents. In accordance with the conference title “The Pursuit of Happiness,” all presentations dealt with public green open space, and the conference was open to the public.

Garden and landscape historian John Dixon Hunt began the conference with an evening keynote speech. Five questions concerning European and North American public park planning structured his talk. Looking back at park history, Hunt provided examples of what over the centuries was considered “public” and who the “public” was that was granted access to urban parks and gardens. The public functions attributed to parks not only included “community, congregation and conversation,” but were and still are educational in many different ways. Hunt pointed out how Lawrence Halprin, just like Frederick Law Olmsted a century before him, had considered parks and public open space as a
common meeting ground for all classes. Just like New York’s Central Park and Philadelphia’s Fairmount Park in the nineteenth century, the *grands projets* initiated by President Mitterrand in Paris were part of political agendas, securing local pride and local or even national images. Asking what ideas of “nature” influenced park design, Hunt offered various examples from the American public park movement. Furthermore, he noted the garden’s influence on park design while at the same time stressing the garden’s neglect in the 1960s, seventies, and eighties, when landscape architecture and planning were largely influenced by the ecological movement. Lastly, considering tradition and innovation in park design over the centuries, Hunt suggested the continuity of an alluring green world which, just like the idea of paradise, continues to provide the basis of all park and open space planning.

The presentations on the following conference day explored some facets of the transatlantic connections in nineteenth and twentieth-century garden culture in the public realm. Gert Gröning gave an overview of the work of German-American landscape architects in the nineteenth century and their influence on park and open-space planning in North America. Gröning began his presentation by shedding some light on German immigrants who were involved in early professional activities in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. However, it was the big influx of German immigrants to Texas during the second third of the nineteenth century and their knowledge of and leanings toward gardens and designed landscapes which Gröning suggested as reasons underlying an increasing interest and reception of German landscape literature by American landscape architects such as Andrew Jackson Downing, Frederick Law Olmsted, and Henry Sargent Codman. Following the examples of *Turnvater* Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, the immigrant German university lecturer Karl Theodor Christian Follen introduced the first sports grounds at Harvard University and in 1826 a *Turnplatz* in Boston. Sports grounds would later play an important role in urban public parks. After having pointed out some of the ideas that crossed the Atlantic, Gröning also presented some lesser-known German-born figures in American landscape architecture such as Robert Demcker and Hermann Schwarzmann, active on the East Coast, and Friedrich Kanst and Maximilian Gottlieb Kern, whose traces can be found in Midwestern landscapes.

Franziska Kirchner had to cancel her presentation on short notice. Kirchner, a free-lance art historian and author, would have presented her thesis that Frederick Law Olmsted’s and Calvert Vaux’s aesthetic sensibilities and social vision underlying their design of Central Park originated in German garden theory. When designing and building Central Park, Olmsted was not only familiar with C.C.L. Hirschfeld’s and
Friedrich Ludwig von Sckell’s works, but also employed gardeners trained in Germany.

Philip Paar, a research associate at the Zuse Institute Berlin, filled in for Kirchner with a presentation of the virtual reconstruction of a historic garden in the park of Sanssouci, Potsdam. By virtually reconstructing and simulating a “lost garden,” research into computer landscape modeling and visualization was extended to the field of garden history and garden conservation. Researchers are testing the degree to which interactive computer simulation would be a desirable tool not only for future open space and landscape planning but also for the management and maintenance of garden cultural heritage.

While Gert Gröning had focused his attention on the East Coast and the Midwest, Terence Young talked about German influences on the development of nineteenth-century greenspace on the West Coast in San Francisco. Young pointed out the role two German immigrants played in the creation and design of two of the oldest and most important designed greenspaces in San Francisco. Founded by German immigrant Christian Russ, Russ’s gardens served beer and food and provided a site for German festivals in the 1850s and early 1860s. Additionally, the landscaped grounds provided a variety of gymnastic facilities and shooting ranges so that Russ’s gardens became particularly attractive to the local German Turnverein. With the garden slowly losing its attraction as more and more Germans became acculturated, advocates of a major public park for the city gained ground, and in 1870 San Franciscans created Golden Gate Park. When William Hammond Hall, the superintendent of the newly planned park, failed with the tree and shrub plantings, Frederick Law Olmsted recommended to him one of his German acquaintances. William Fredrick Poppey, most probably a “48er,” had already been employed by Olmsted on various projects. Under the hands of this German landscape gardener, trained at the Royal Educational College in Berlin, Golden Gate Park began to flourish. His horticultural skills enabled him to successfully establish a park on grounds with highly unfavorable soil conditions.

Whereas these German influences might not be conspicuous to the unsuspecting visitor anymore today, the idea of the kindergarten, which crossed the Atlantic in the nineteenth century, has since left its mark on the English language. Susan Herrington explained how the kindergarten, invented by Friedrich Fröbel in Thuringia in 1838, spread to become one of the most globally shared educational experiences in the world. Beauty, connectivity, and self-directed play were central to Fröbel’s kindergarten pedagogy. Fröbel’s education included block playing, interpretive walks, and gardening. Herrington pointed out how in the United States, many aspects of the kindergarten, including its garden, were transformed to suit the needs of a burgeoning free-market society eager to prepare their
children for industrial life. Furthermore, she analyzed how the kindergarten helped necessitate the provision of children’s play areas in public outdoor spaces. Children’s play areas, playing fields, and sports facilities figured especially prominently during what has been described by Galen Crantz as the reform park movement in the first decades of the twentieth century.

On the other hand, the American playgrounds and park planning movement at the beginning of the twentieth century attracted attention in Europe. The parks and playgrounds that the German architect and writer Hugo Koch experienced in 1910 during a study tour to Chicago and various cities on the East Coast deeply impressed him. By focusing on Koch’s American experiences and his accomplishments as a widely-traveled architect interested in garden architecture, Solveig Köbernick provided a profound insight into the impact of American park planning on German developments at the beginning of the twentieth century. During his North American journey, Koch met with landscape architects Jens Jensen and the Olmsted brothers. His American experiences on the one hand and the German concept of Heimat and his work within the German circles of city planning on the other hand led Koch to develop a theoretical basis for a “green network” that would link city centers to the surrounding countryside. Koch promoted this idea in his book Gartenkunst im Städtebau. American park systems that were discussed internationally at the time provided Koch with a number of examples for his “green networks.”

Park system planning, which had been promoted by Frederick Law Olmsted, his colleagues, and his followers, especially after the Civil War, and which largely influenced the city planning movement at the beginning of the twentieth century, attracted not only German architects and planners. Although city planning was discussed in international forums dominated by American, British, French, Austrian, German, and Dutch professionals at the time, park system planning became an international phenomenon that spread south as well.

Sonja Dümpelmann showed in her presentation that while Americans were appropriating small-scale “Italian beauty” for their private gardens and public parks, Italians were importing the large-scale “American system.” American park system planning was discussed by Rome’s director of parks and gardens Nicodemo Severi in 1909, and the Chicago South park system served as a model for the architect Marcello Piacentini’s park system plan for Rome in 1916. As a result of the international significance of park systems for urban planning, and due to the fascists’ political interest in garden culture, the final proposals for the Roman land-use plan presented to Mussolini in 1930 featured a park system. Dümpelmann showed how American landscape architects and city plan-
ners adopted design features associated with autocratic systems to represent their democratic political system, while Italian city planners appropriated open space models from democratic America to bolster their totalitarian, fascist state.

Using a range of old and new city parks in different European and North American cities, Alan Tate provided an overview of today’s functions of city parks by asking, “What works?” He thereby introduced the topics presented on the next conference day. Supporting Hunt’s arguments, Tate demonstrated that city parks remain as versatile and significant in the twenty-first century as they were intended to be when Christian Cay Lorenz Hirschfeld called for them in Germany in the second half of the eighteenth century, and when Andrew Jackson Downing and William Cullen Bryant promoted the case for a large park in New York in the first half of the nineteenth century. Tate enumerated the contemporary purposes of city parks and commented on decisive factors for a park’s success, such as its location, response to context, and funding. He attributed the resurgence in usage of a lot of central city parks over the last twenty-five years to the re-gentrification of the post-industrial western city.

Besides presentations dealing with the history, current development, management, and maintenance strategies of Munich’s Englischer Garten and New York’s famed Central Park, the final conference day provided insights into the history of garden festivals and the aims of the current Munich garden festival Bundesgartenschau 2005 (BUGA 05).

Sara Cedar Miller from the Central Park Conservancy New York discussed the political, social, and economic forces that led to taking the land for Central Park, the first major public park in America. Apart from introducing the leading men and women in the development of this new urban institution, Miller showed the combined influences of contemporary paintings of the Hudson River School, the American landscape, and private European estates in shaping the design of the park. Contrary to a common assumption attributing Central Park’s landscapes and character traits entirely to Calvert Vaux’s and Frederick Law Olmsted’s genius, Miller revealed the influence of other competition entries and designers on this work of art. Miller’s presentation testified to Hunt’s and Tate’s statement that although park uses have changed over the decades, there is a strong continuity in the requirements that Central Park is apt to fulfill.

A narrative of the more recent history of and a contemporary outlook on Central Park was provided by Elizabeth Barlow Rogers, who founded the Central Park Conservancy in 1980. Rogers explained how the first public-private partnership in support of an American park drew up a management and restoration plan between 1982 and 1985 that would guide the rebuilding of the park, which by that time had been run down
by mass events and unregulated sports. In dealing with the park’s restoration, the Central Park Conservancy regarded the park as a time-layered palimpsest and work of art that has to provide for a wide range of contemporary uses. The successful restoration of Central Park, following Olmsted’s and Vaux’s original design intentions while at the same time taking into account modern usage and developments, provided the necessary starting point for Christo and Jeanne-Claude’s final realization of “The Gates” in Central Park in February 2005. The two artists had been waiting for permission for the installation since the year the Central Park Conservancy had been founded. Barlow Rogers pointed out how in February 2005 Central Park had again acted as a landscape palimpsest upon which cultural intentions were inscribed, thus confirming and promoting the Central Park Conservancy’s belief and aim to revalidate the park’s original vision and the layers of its subsequent additions.

Supposedly having influenced Olmsted and Vaux in their design of Central Park, the English Garden in Munich, a model for urban green space designed to serve a social function, today faces similar challenges as New York’s Central Park. Rainer Herzog, acting director of the garden department at the Bavarian Administration of State Palaces, Gardens, and Lakes, presented a narrative history of the first German Volksgarten, largely designed by Friedrich Ludwig von Sckell during the first two decades of the nineteenth century. Influenced by events during the French Revolution, as early as 1789 Elector Karl Theodor of Bavaria decreed that the royal hunting grounds along the river Isar should be laid out as public pleasure grounds. The undertaking was promoted by the American-born courtier and adjunct to Elector Karl Theodor of Bavaria Benjamin Thompson, a social reformer who later explained that the public park was intended to benefit “not merely one class, but the public in its entirety.” The English Garden, which was opened to the public in 1792, served the public not only as a place of enjoyment and relaxation but also as a place of instruction and education. The objective of cultural preservation work in the English Garden is both to bring the botanical assortment closer to Sckell’s conception and to recreate the garden’s original spatial and visual structure. At the same time, however, it has become very important to determine which usages to permit in which areas.

What public parks were for nineteenth-century European and North American cities, garden festivals have sought to provide for cities in European countries such as Germany, Britain and the Netherlands after the Second World War: horticultural exhibitions paired with newly designed public open space and a tool for urban development. Andrew Theokas asked why garden festivals—so successful in some North European countries—had not caught on in the United States. With the exception of the AmeriFlora ’92 in Columbus, Ohio, celebrating Columbus’s
arrival in America, the United States has not undertaken garden festivals similar to the European examples. As one possible reason, Theokas pointed out the differences in urban open space legislation between the United States and Europe, where in some cases federal or even state-wide statutes affect the amount or kind of open space to be provided in a particular locality. In contrast, urban open space legislation is a local phenomenon in the United States, which Theokas subsequently exemplified by presenting the open space plans of the cities of Phoenix, Chicago, and Boston. As major new public parks are being built in the United States, Theokas considered worth bringing to the United States the garden festivals’ educational landscape and their function as a temporary planning agency providing impulses for comprehensive change.

Currently working for the Bundesgartenschau München 2005 GmbH, Wolfram Höfer introduced the planning concept of Munich’s BUGA 05. The master plan of the national garden festival takes place on a former airport site on the outskirts of Munich. This venue, which from 1992 has been developed as a new city quarter mixing residential and commercial uses, was designed by the French office Latitude Nord under the direction of the landscape architect Gilles Vexlard. Munich landscape designer Rainer Schmidt is responsible for the design of the garden festival’s grounds. The aim underlying his garden designs is to entertain and educate the public, and in this way the event has some parallels to the original functions of the first public urban parks on both sides of the Atlantic. Continuing his talk on site, Wolfram Höfer concluded the conference with a guided tour of the BUGA grounds.

After a first international conference organized by the Atlantische Akademie Rheinland Pfalz e.V. and the Rhineland-Palatinate office of the German Association of Landscape Architects in October 2000, the conference in Munich provided further insights into the transatlantic transfer of ideas in garden cultural history. This is an area of study that until now has been neglected but, as the conference has shown, has great potential.

Sonja Dümpelmann
Turning Points in Environmental History

Conference at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies (ZiF) at Bielefeld University, June 16-18, 2005. Co-sponsored by the GHI and the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies. Organizers: Christof Mauch (GHI Washington), Joachim Radkau (Bielefeld University), and Frank Uekötter (Bielefeld University)

List of Participants: Werner Abelshauser (University of Bielefeld), Alla Bolotova (European University, St. Petersburg), Stefan Brakensiek (University of Bielefeld), Franz-Josef Brüggemeier (University of Freiburg), Jens Ivo Engels (University of Freiburg), Deborah Fitzgerald (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Bernd-Stefan Grewe (University of Constance), Richard H. Grove (University of Sussex), Thomas Lakan (University of South Carolina), Carmit Lubanov (Tel Aviv University), John McNeill (Georgetown University), Christian Pfister (University of Bern), Thomas Pothast (University of Tübingen), Friedemann Schmoll (University of Tübingen), Dieter Schott (Darmstadt Institute of Technology), Joel Tarr (Carnegie Mellon University), Fiona Watson (University of Stirling), Verena Winiwarter (IFF Vienna), Anna-Katharina Wöbse (Bielefeld University).

Usually, when one organizes a conference, one has a rough idea of the prospective result. For this conference, the starting point was different: it was a set of questions, along with a feeling that the question of general turning points in environmental history has somehow faded into the background. With the boom of research, environmental history has become more and more specialized, and the full breadth of its challenge for the historical profession has been somewhat lost. It is clear that historians cannot define turning points as easily today as could the first generation of environmental historians, where turning points simply marked the shift from an “ecologically benign” lifestyle to a “destructive” or “environmentally unsustainable” one. There seems to be near-unanimous agreement currently that it is fruitless to search for these “points of no return,” and that the periodization of environmental history will need to be more complex. But in what ways?

The conference sought to address this issue through a discussion of major topics of environmental history research. The speakers were asked to discuss turning points in broadly conceived fields like agriculture, forest history, and urban environmental history. In each case, the speakers were urged to concentrate on the same guiding questions: What are the major turning points in the respective fields, and what are the criteria for your judgment? The idea was that a combination of these perspectives would provide a path toward a discussion of the general questions un-
derlying the conference: What were the major turning points in the gen-
eral history of man and the natural world? What are the criteria that historians should use in the periodization of environmental history? And how do the turning points of environmental history relate to the turning points of general history? Does environmental history demand a periodization of its own, or would it be wiser to adopt the turning points of general history?

It quickly became clear during the conference that turning points in environmental history are usually not momentary events. Joel Tarr mentioned the importance of specific events like the air pollution episodes in Donora and London or the toxic waste incidents at Love Canal and Times Beach, as did Joachim Radkau in his discussion of the “Atomic Age,” and Deborah Fitzgerald stressed the importance of the two world wars in the history of agriculture as times of great innovation with light regulation. However, most of the turning points that speakers identified extended over long periods of time: Dieter Schott provided a fitting definition when he described turning points as “periods of accelerated and correlated change in different fields.” It is not difficult to see that this is related to general characteristics of the field: with natural processes usually proceeding at a rather leisurely pace, environmental history deals with long-term processes. As a result, the search for sharp turning points often proved elusive: *natura non fecit saltus*—nature does not jump.

With the borders of environmental history being notoriously porous and open to change, the choice of topics proved particularly tricky. A number of papers focused on one of the three main fields of inquiry that John McNeill identified in a recent review essay: the material (soil, forests); the cultural/intellectual (biology, knowledge society); and the political (nation-state). Other papers covered all three of these fields (agriculture, urban environmental history) or focused on two time periods, the so-called Second Thirty Years’ War (the years between 1914 and 1945) and the “Age of Ecology,” in order to discuss their place in environmental history. Finally, two papers looked at Eastern Europe and the colonial world in order to inquire whether the environmental history of these areas requires a different periodization. Also, these two papers provided a helpful reminder that the conference, in spite of its thematic breadth, mostly focused on Western societies since 1500.

Among the diverse set of themes that environmental historians have covered, one has been particularly ripe for the definition of turning points: energy. In fact, Rolf Peter Sieferle even developed a periodization of world history based solely on the dominant modes of energy use. Christian Pfister’s paper on the 1950s syndrome echoed this preference with his strong emphasis on the relative decline of energy prices in the postwar decades. Pfister pointed out that economic growth and energy
consumption were closely related, demonstrating the crucial role of energy for an environmental history of the postwar years. However, his narrow focus on energy drew criticism from Joachim Radkau in his keynote speech, where he argued for a broader perspective. In Radkau’s presentation, the rise of energy consumption appeared less as a trend in its own right than a consequence of the globalization of an “American way of life”; with that, Radkau stressed the demand side where Pfister had pointed to the supply side. More generally, Radkau proposed to look not only at changes in the environment but also at turning points in human nature, in patterns of behavior that are rooted deeply in the human condition. While this “human nature” may be semiconscious at best, Radkau argued that it had an enormous environmental impact; examples ranged from the habit of a daily shower to the global mobility that low-cost air travel permits.

Does the environmental history of agriculture demand a periodization that differs from that of urban environmental history? The conference proceedings indicate that the answer may be a cautious yes. While the late nineteenth century emerged as a crucial time of change in the urban environment, the turning points in agriculture were both earlier and later. Deborah Fitzgerald saw a first wave of change in agriculture roughly between 1750 and 1850, with a growing emphasis on livestock and more productive crop rotation. While Fitzgerald depicts the second half of the nineteenth century also as a time of change, with soil science, mechanization, and Mendelism as the key innovations, this change does not look as dramatic as that in contemporary urban society. The industrialization of agriculture was lagging significantly behind the industrialization of cities, in spite of the close links between the two processes. According to Fitzgerald, the total industrialization of agriculture is a process that began after World War II—yet another argument for a broad conception of the “1950s syndrome.”

Fitzgerald’s paper found an interesting complement in Stefan Brakensiek’s discussion of the commons. Agricultural reformers in the late eighteenth century were unanimous in their complaints over the mismanagement of the commons, a stance that clearly goes along with Garrett Hardin’s famous argument of a “tragedy of the commons.” But Brakensiek urged a closer look: In the region around Bielefeld, the dissolution of the commons between 1770 and 1830 did not induce decisive changes in farming practice. Even more, it has proven impossible to link privatization of land with soil erosion. In the discussion, Brakensiek stressed the market, rather than land ownership, as the key agent of change; Joachim Radkau spoke of the “law of inertia ruling supreme in agriculture.” Brakensiek suggested viewing nineteenth-century agricultural history as essentially a process of colonization, a theme that also figured prominently.
in Alla Bolotova’s paper on the conquest of the Soviet north. It was one of the unexpected results of the conference that the concept of colonization may be of greater importance in environmental history than many researchers have realized.

The turning points of agriculture bear some resemblance to the turning points in forest history, though Bernd-Stefan Grewe pointed out that the periodization of forest history is especially difficult due to the long-term impact of changes in forestry. For the early-modern era, Grewe argued that turning points depended strongly on local and regional conditions. The first, more general turning point was the link between statehood and forestry that evolved around 1800, but Grewe kept his distance from the traditional narrative that had the wise foresters saving the German forests from destruction; rather, state control over the forests merely opened the stage for a century of crisis. In the twentieth century, wood no longer had an uncontested position as a key resource, making the periodization of twentieth-century forest history especially difficult, if not impossible.

It has become fashionable in recent years to speak of an age of “classic modernity” spanning from the late nineteenth century to the 1960s, but the conference showed that this periodization is clearly of only limited use in environmental history: Thomas Lekan’s paper on the nation-state was the only one with even a vague resemblance to the periodization of “classic modernity.” Drawing on James Scott’s book Seeing Like a State (New Haven, 1998), Lekan saw the roughly one hundred years between 1850 and 1945 as the era of utopian or authoritarian high modernism. Lekan’s paper instigated a stimulated discussion that raised a number of important caveats. Discussants pointed out that Scott sees any state as authoritarian, regardless of whether it was a democracy or a dictatorship. And did the history of the interventionist nation-state really end in 1945, giving way to what Lekan called a “post-national era?” Finally, discussants stressed that Scott focuses only on one field of state activity, namely resource use and social engineering. But what about the state as an agent of control, possessing a monopoly on violence and the ability to impose limits on people’s behavior, a function that is crucial in many fields of relevance for environmental history, from pollution control to nature protection? For these themes, it may be helpful to refer to Charles Maier’s definition of an age of “territoriality” spanning from the second half of the nineteenth to the late twentieth century, a time when the centralized nation-state was able to wield a decisive influence within its boundaries. (Charles S. Maier, “Consigning the Twentieth Century to History,” American Historical Review 105 (2000): 807–831). If this is true, the rise of environmentalism would look like an odd turn of events: Just at the time when environmental issues were climbing to the top of the political
agenda, the powerful nation-state that an effective environmental policy needs so dearly was eroding due to the process of globalization.

In chronological perspective, the conference identified two time periods where turning points in several fields overlapped: the time around 1900 and the postwar era. The former time period is characterized by the rise of urban industrial society and the ensuing environmental problems. Dieter Schott and Joel Tarr analyzed this set of problems and the first wave of responses, including transportation, water and wastewater, and energy systems. This reading was surprisingly consistent with Friedemann Schmoll’s interpretation of the rise of nature protection, which Schmoll conceived as an agent of modernization. To be sure, reverence for nature was not new in itself; as Fiona Watson argued in her engaged presentation on the history of landscape perception in early modernity, the intellectuals of the Enlightenment were “not as arrogant as many think.” With this background, the key innovation of conservationists around 1900 was to see nature as something that had to be defended against human civilization. However, while the turning point in terms of problem awareness was unmistakable around 1900, things were looking more ambivalent in terms of solution. Schmoll argued that the early nature protection movement was “much more important for the household of modern culture than for the household of nature.” The ambivalence of late-nineteenth-century solutions in urban environmental history is a familiar theme since Joel Tarr’s much-quoted book The Search for the Ultimate Sink (Akron, Ohio, 1996).

While the conference sought to focus on Western societies since 1500, the strong emphasis on the twentieth century proved a recurring feature in many papers. While a number of contributors make an effort to look beyond the nineteenth and twentieth century, Fiona Watson’s paper was the only one to focus on the early modern era. This result clearly mirrored John McNeill’s argument in his well-known Something New under the Sun (London, 2000) that the twentieth century was marked by a distinct environmental footprint: “The twentieth century was unusual for the intensity of change and the centrality of human effort in provoking it.” But environmental issues were not a constant fixture in twentieth-century politics: as Frank Uekötter argued in his paper on the Second Thirty Years’ War, the time period between 1914 and 1945 constituted something of a “Great Hiatus” where environmental issues played a rather marginal role and conservation movements were, with some exceptions, held at bay; the general picture was one of following pre-1914 trends in a more or less lukewarm way. However, this argument was challenged by Alla Bolotova, who argued that times of tumultuous change also offer unexpected chances for environmental initiatives, as the designation of numerous nature reserves during the collapse of communist rule in East-
ern Europe demonstrates. Both perspectives are not necessarily at odds; after all, bold initiatives usually follow a period of stagnation. The German conservation law of 1935, which ended two decades full of difficulties and disappointments for the conservation community, provides a case in point.

The second cluster of turning points were the postwar decades, where a number of important but conflicting trends overlapped: the rise of mass consumption, a new perception of environmental issues in the media, and the much-touted "ecological turn." The latter came across badly in Jens Ivo Engels’s paper. Analyzing the state of the environment, environmental consciousness, and environmental protection practice, Engels argued that the 1970s constitute a turning point only concerning awareness and rhetoric. However, this skeptical conclusion drew criticism from numerous sides, which stressed the strengthening of environmental policy over recent decades; perhaps the most forceful argument came from Bolotova, who urged Engels to look at Russia for a truly unsuccessful environmental movement. But controversial as the discussion was, it also took place with remarkable moderation, and not the flaming rhetoric that Engels’s argument would have evoked some ten years ago. The process of historicizing the environmental movement is clearly under way.

It was perhaps inevitable that some topics proved more difficult to integrate into a general picture than others. Though no environmental historian would doubt the importance of demography, it proved surprisingly difficult to relate the turning points in population history with that in other fields. Perhaps reflecting part of this problem, Carmit Lubanov’s paper on the topic had to cover two stories, that of demographic theories and that of actual population growth. Both stories were linked in Thomas Malthus’ Essay on the Principle of Population, but the subsequent development of demographic thought did not have a major impact on population figures. Likewise, Richard Grove’s fascinating presentation on the impact of colonialism, discussed by the example of the tropical island of St. Helena, nourished the impression that the environmental history of colonialism is a chapter of its own. The transformation of the island’s ecology was stunning, even more so since much of it was more of an incidental byproduct: the desertification of great parts of the island was to a large extent the result of the introduction of goats. The British interest in the island was mostly of a strategic kind, as the islands’ cliffs made it a veritable fortress at sea.

All in all, the conference proved to be a workshop in the true sense of the word: a place where broad questions were raised and discussed and paths toward potential answers explored, knowing that the result would inevitably be much more complex than the “points of no return” that
environmental historians identified some two decades ago. As it turned out, the historical interest was matched by a political one: with the governing coalition of Social Democrats and the Green Party on its way out of office in Germany, and the conference coinciding with the defeat of the same coalition in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia after thirty-nine years of social democratic rule, the issue of turning points caught the interest of the media. And so it came that the author of this report, when interviewed by German public radio, was faced with the question whether we are currently witnessing the end of the “age of ecology.” Needless to say, the author expressed doubts about the death of environmentalism, and not only to avoid entering environmental history as “The Man Who Announced the End of the Ecological Era.” After all, if all has been said and done about the environment, then why did we have such a stimulating conference?

*Frank Uekötter*
ARCHIVAL SUMMER SEMINAR IN GERMANY 2005

Between May 29 and June 11, eleven graduate students from North American universities traveled to Germany as part of the thirteenth GHI Summer Seminar. The group visited research institutions and met with archivists and scholars in Koblenz, Cologne, and Gotha. The aim of the seminar was to prepare the young scholars for the practical aspects of their prospective dissertation research in German archives and libraries. In order to achieve this goal, participants first learned to decipher documents in various types of old German handwriting. They were also introduced to several archives and libraries to develop a sense of the diversity of research institutions available. Finally, German and American scholars engaged in archival research met with the group to discuss and share research methods and experiences.

Koblenz once again served as the port of entry to this year’s seminar. Walter Rummel of the Landeshauptarchiv Koblenz was our instructor for the first week, during which he offered five sessions on paleography. He prepared examples of different handwriting ranging from the sixteenth through the twentieth century. After a brief introduction to the history of how German handwriting evolved, the participants soon moved on to practical exercises, reading texts aloud or transcribing them, requiring less and less help from their mentor.

Koblenz is also the home of the Bundesarchiv. Archivist Michael Hollmann took the group on a “backstage” tour of the facilities, explained the philosophy of storing and preserving files, and introduced the participants to the peculiarities of German Verwaltung, including the hierarchies indicated by different ink colors and the “secret signs” researchers can encounter on contemporary documents. At the Bundesarchiv, the group also met with Philipp Gassert of Heidelberg University. Gassert shared his experience researching a biography of former Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger. He explained how to identify relevant source material, establish first contact with an archive, take notes, manage time, and organize the newfound material in order to prepare for the writing phase.

In keeping with tradition, the last evening in Koblenz was reserved for dedicated study of the local wine culture at Weinhaus Schwaab in Koblenz-Güls on the Mosel River. The participants had ample opportunity to sample Grauburgunder, Spätburgunder, and Riesling, and to discuss the merits of Spätzle vs. Rösti. After one more morning of class, the group relocated to Cologne to enjoy a weekend without files, archives, or archivists.

In Cologne, the group spent the first full day at the Historisches Archiv der Stadt Köln, Germany’s largest communal repository, where we were received by Eberhard Illner and Letha Böhringer. The two seasoned ar-
chivists introduced the group to the multifaceted history of Cologne and showed them some of the archive’s most valuable and curious pieces. The participants went roaming the stacks together with Herr Illner and came upon unique posters from the student movement in Paris, a letter by Charlie Chaplin, and the personal papers of former Reichskanzler Wilhelm Marx—a wide range of materials that they had not necessarily expected to find in Cologne’s city archive. Lunch was taken at Malzmühle, a traditional Kölsch establishment, where the group found itself at the table where President Clinton enjoyed his Halve Hahn in 1999.

On the second day, the group was welcomed at the Historisches Archiv des Erzbistums Köln. Archivist Joachim Oepen introduced the participants to the holdings of the archive and explained the intricate story of provenance of records against the backdrop of a seemingly ever-changing territorial map, populated with archbishops and Electors (Kurfürsten), who, for the sole purpose of confusing American students of early modern German history, might even appear in personal union and constantly rearrange their territories.

On the same day, the seminar participants were invited to visit the August Sander photo archive, administered by the SK Stiftung Kultur. Sander can rightly claim his place as one of the most important photographers of the twentieth century. He is best known for his “People of the Twentieth Century,” a collection of several hundred portraits of people from different social backgrounds. Sander took these portraits during the 1920s. At the time, his pictures were cutting edge work in photography and are today seen in the context of “New Objectivity” [Neue Sachlichkeit]. Besides holding the August Sander Archive, the SK Stiftung Kultur currently exhibits photography of Erich Salomon, the famous Berlin press photographer of the 1920s, or, as Aristide Briand called him, “le roi des indiscret.” As a well-formed contrast, Salomon’s pictures are accompanied by an exhibition of Barbara Klemm’s press photography of the 1980s and 1990s. Claudia Schubert of SK Stiftung Kultur gave the participants an insightful tour of the two exhibitions.

In the evening, the participants were invited to a book presentation at the restaurant L. Fritz, named after a contemporary photographer from Cologne, the late L. Fritz Gruber. The book, by historian Jürgen Müller and commissioned by the Kölner Gesellschaft für christlich-jüdische Zusammenarbeit, explores the history of the Cologne cabaret Kolibri 1930–1933. It retrieves the story of the little theater and its mostly Jewish cast. For the occasion, actors Sabine Postel and Joachim Król read Kolibri sketches about political crisis and recurring elections that sounded surprisingly current in the context of the announcement of new federal elections last June.

The last stop in Cologne was the EL-DE Haus. Formerly the Gestapo headquarters, the EL-DE Haus was turned into a museum and research
center in the 1980s. It houses an exhibition on Cologne during National Socialism and incorporates the former prisoner cells in the basement, including the prisoners’ graffiti on the walls of the cells, a rare and disquieting feature. The director of EL-DE Haus, Werner Jung, led the group through the exhibition and took the time for a discussion about the history of the site, the concept of the exhibition, and the challenges to research posed by the history of everyday life in Nazi Germany in general and in Cologne in particular.

On Wednesday of the second week, the group traveled to Gotha in Thuringia and discovered immediately that life in the provinces is less expensive and comes with less traffic, making for a perfect, if sleepy, town. A very good reason to travel to Gotha, however, is the famous research library located in Schloss Friedenstein. This library came into being with the partition of the Ernestine territories in 1640, and benefited from the collecting instinct of Duke Ernest the Pious. The library holds over 570,000 volumes, and stands as a vivid witness to Gotha’s glorious past as a center of enlightened political and philosophical thought. Our host in Gotha, Rupert Schaab, organized a two-day program for the participants. It included a tour of the library that occupies the entire east wing and east tower of the impressive baroque palace. Another unforgettable highlight was a tour of the former publishing house Justus Perthes, publisher of the Stieler Weltatlas and the Almanach de Gotha, known simply as “the Gotha.” Evelyn Ernst led the group through the impressive collection that consists of a geographical library dating back to the company’s beginnings in the late eighteenth century, historical maps and globes, and the company’s business correspondence. She explained the art of composing maps as hand-colored engravings. This skillful diligence, paired with cutting-edge geographical research, made the Stieler the most precise and usable atlas of its time. The Perthes collection is still held in its original location, contributing greatly to the impression of entering a time warp, throwing the visitor back into the days of the spirit of discovery of the nineteenth century and then forward into the office culture of the GDR’s VEB Geographisch-Kartographische Anstalt Gotha.

In addition, the group attended several small workshops. Cornelia Hopf introduced the participants to working with medieval and modern handwritten scripts, and laid out the history of books and book printing. Kathrin Paasch taught how to work with incunabula. In another session, she gave an overview of the German library system, explaining what a student can expect to find in a university library, a seminar library, or a public library, and how German library catalogues are organized. In a final meeting, Wolfgang Helbich familiarized the group with the library’s collection of the letters that German immigrants to the United States wrote back to their homeland. Helbich built up the collection during his time as
professor of American history at the University of Bochum and brought it to the Forschungsbibliothek Gotha.

The two-week seminar ended with a lively presentation by William Glenn Gray, professor of modern German history at Purdue University. Drawing on his research experience for his book *Germany’s Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany 1949–1969*, he provided valuable tips from the perspective of a former American graduate student working on a limited time and financial budget without the chance to return to an archive to check for the missing comma. His presentation did not shy away from the “nitty gritty” of archival work, including some thoughts on note-taking and “coming up for air” during the intense weeks and months of primary research. The last evening was spent in the company of Herr Helbich, who took the group to the idyllic Thuringian village Schnepfenthal for dinner at the village’s *Gasthaus Zur Tanne*.

We would like to extend our heartfelt thanks to all the individuals and organizations that contributed to the 2005 Summer Seminar in Germany. An announcement of the program for the 2006 seminar is already on the GHI website.

* Astrid M. Eckert

**Summer Seminar Participants and their Topics**

**ROBIN BARRY**, Clark University; dissertation project: “German Opposition to Genocide: The Herero 1904–1907.”


**CHAD FULWIDER**, Emory University; dissertation project: “The Kaiser’s Most Loyal Subjects? The German View of America and German-Americans during World War I.”

**ERIN HOCMAN**, University of Toronto; dissertation project: “*For Volk, Heimat, Vaterland, and Republik? (Re)Constructions and Contestations of Community in Vienna and Berlin, 1918–1929.*”

**KAREN JUNG**, Institute of Fine Arts, NYU; dissertation project: “The Schnitzaltar as Gesamtkunstwerk.”

**JOURDAN T. MOGER**, University of California, Santa Barbara; dissertation project: “Wolfgang Koenigstein and the Reformation in Frankfurt am Main, 1520–1548.”

JUERGEN SCHAUPP, University of Wisconsin, Madison; dissertation project: “Emil F. Ruedebusch: A Progressive German-American in the Age of Anarchy, Free Love, and Comstock.”

ALICE WEINREB, University of Michigan; dissertation project: “Cold War, Hot Bodies: Body Discourse between East and West Germany.”

JAMES WRZOSEK, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign; dissertation project: “The People’s Healers and Hitler’s Soldiers: The German Medical Profession and the Construction of the Racial State, 1939–1945.”

XIAO WU, Princeton University; dissertation project: “The German Empire in East Asia: Weltpolitik in Northeast China.”
Comparisons in German and American Film

Workshop in Berlin, June 19, 2005. Conveners: Christof Mauch (GHI) and Kiran Patel (Humboldt University). Participants: Edward Dimendberg (University of California, Irvine) and Anton Kaes (University of California, Berkeley).

This workshop was part of a series of workshops within the project on Competing Modernities sponsored by the Bosch Foundation in Stuttgart. (See Bulletins 35 and 36 for more information on this project.) The workshop’s purpose was to discuss the role played by film in German and American modernization and to formulate a series of theses that would be explored in the essay by Anton Kaes and Edward Dimendberg. As the only contribution to the Competing Modernities project addressing a cultural form, the essay on cinema must negotiate the dual challenge of acknowledging the determining character of symbolic expression and mass reception in modern societies while simultaneously specifying the distinct social character of film in Germany and America. It was agreed that cinema is uniquely suited to provide a cultural articulation of the nation, fusing as it does literature, theater, music, and architecture, and frequently appropriating the collective voice traditionally associated with these older media.

Kaes and Dimendberg proposed narrative cinema as the master cultural discourse of industrial modernity. Culturally specific representations of space, power, gender, and class attain visibility in American film genres such as the western, or in uniquely German genres such as the Bergfilm. Here space is confirmed as particularly significant, for just as German film contains no precise equivalent to the filmic treatment of American suburbs, Hollywood cinema lacks a genre comparable to the Heimatfilm.

By virtue of its determining economic influence upon the global film industry, however, Hollywood remains the force against which other national cinemas inevitably define themselves. Thus the markers of regional identity that German cinema has appropriated from “The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari” to the present, in particular an emphasis upon film as a fluid visual language, must be viewed as product differentiation strategies through which German film can be “branded” on the world market.

The nature of this relationship, whether it is best understood using notions of competition, dialogue, intertwining, negotiation, or exchange, was discussed at length with reference to German exile and emigre filmmakers such as F. W. Murnau, Fritz Lang, and Douglas Sirk, whose work contributed much to the stylistic evolution of Hollywood. In the post-
1945 period, the paradox was noted that German film obtained the greatest international response by engaging with its own national history, unlike Hollywood, which generally achieves global popularity through genre films such as comedies or action stories.

In conclusion, the workshop considered how national film styles might evolve in an age of globalization and increasing mobility of capital, ideas, and cultural values. In what sense is it still possible to speak of national cinemas when film financing and creative personnel have become globally dispersed and contemporary German films display an increasingly conspicuous mastery of Hollywood techniques and conventions? These are but some of the topics discussed in the workshop that will be addressed in the essay and in continuing dialogue with other members of the research team.

*Edward Dimendberg and Anton Kaes*
FELLOWS SEMINARS, SPRING 2005

The GHI’s Fellows Seminars are a forum in which fellowship recipients and other visiting scholars present their research to the Research Fellows of the Institute and interested scholars from local academic institutions. They are organized by Deputy Director Dirk Schumann. The GHI awards doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships for the duration of one to six months. These fellowships are designed for doctoral candidates and post-doctoral scholars whose research deals with one of the following fields: German history, the history of German-American relations, the role of Germany and the United States in international relations, and American history. For the application process, see the “Announcements” section of this Bulletin.

February 24  Daniel Nagel, Universität Mannheim  
Amerikabilder der Achtundvierziger: Transatlantischer Kulturtransfer im 19. Jahrhundert

March 17  Vanessa Ogle, Freie Universität Berlin  
Zeitordnungen: Globale Geschichten von Uhrzeiten und Kalendern um 1900

Thomas Freiberger, Universität Bonn  
Allianzpolitik in der Suezkrise

Joachim Baur, Universität Tübingen  
“Celebrating the Immigration Experience”: Museale Konstruktionen von Einwanderungsgeschichte als Nationalgeschichte in den USA, Kanada und Australien

April 21  Ralf Richter, Universität Göttingen  
Innovationskluster und flexible Spezialisierung: Die Netzwerke der Werkmaschinenbauindustrie in Chemnitz (Deutschland) und Cincinnati (USA), 1870–1930

Susanne Peters, Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg  
William S. Schlamm: Die politische Biographie eines “Rennigen”

Jutta von Zitzewitz, Humboldt-Universität Berlin  
StadtBild: Fotografie und Urbanisierung in New York 1945–1965

May 19  Christian B. Keller, Dickinson College  
Chancellorsville and the Germans: Nativism, Ethnicity, and the Creation of German-America
Monika Dommann, Universität Zürich
*Kopieren und regulieren: Autorrechte und Copyrights zwischen technischer Reproduktion, ästhetischer Revolution und juristischer Normierung (19./20. Jahrhundert)*

Irene Aue, Universität Göttingen/Jerusalem

Alexander Frings, Universität zu Köln
*Wissenschaftliche Feindbilder—Politik und Alltag in Poston in den Augen zeitgenössischer Sozialforschung (1942–1945)*

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**June 2**

Kraig Larkin, State University of New York, Stony Brook
“Sham Currency” to “Powerful Butts”: Cigarettes in the Occupation of Germany, 1945–1949

Hedwig Richter, Universität zu Köln
*Fromme Lebenswelt und globaler Horizont in der SED-Diktatur—Die Herrnhuter Brüdergemeine in der SBZ/DDR*

**June 16**

Tanja Penter, Ruhr-Universität Bochum/USHMM
*Collaboration on Trial: War Crimes Trials in Different Regional Settings in Ukraine*

Jan-Otmar Hesse, Universität Frankfurt
*Deutsch-amerikanische Beziehungen in der Wirtschaftswissenschaft nach 1945*

**July 28**

Frank Uekötter, Universität Bielefeld/Breuninger Fellow DHI
*Auf dem Weg zu industrialisierten Bauern: Umrisse einer Wissensgeschichte der Landwirtschaft im 20. Jahrhundert*

Thomas Koinzer, Humboldt-Universität Berlin
*Bildung aus Amerika: “Amerikafahrer,” Bildungstransfer und Reformhabitus in der Zeit der bundesdeutschen Bildungsreform*
CALL FOR PAPERS

Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar 2006
German History, 1930–1960
Freiburg, April 26–29, 2006

The German Historical Institute in Washington DC and the BMW Center for German and European Studies at Georgetown University are pleased to announce the 12th Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar in German History. The 2006 seminar is being organized in cooperation with the Historisches Seminar of the University of Freiburg and will take place in Freiburg from April 26–29, 2006.

The seminar brings together young scholars from Europe and North America who are nearing completion of their doctoral degrees. We plan to invite eight doctoral students from each side of the Atlantic to discuss their research projects. The organizers welcome proposals on any aspect of German history during the years 1930 to 1960. Doctoral students working in related disciplines—such as art history, legal history or the history of science—are also encouraged to apply, as are students working on comparative projects or on the history of Austria or German-speaking Switzerland. The discussions will be based on papers (in German or English) submitted in advance of the conference. The seminar will be conducted bilingually, in German and English. The organizers will cover travel and lodging expenses.

We are now accepting applications from doctoral students whose dissertations are at an advanced stage but who will be granted their degrees after June 2006. Applications should include a short (2–3 pp.) project description (in German or English), a curriculum vitae, and a letter of reference from the major advisor. Questions may be directed to Richard Wetzell by email at r.wetzell@ghi-dc.org.

Potential applicants whose projects focus mainly on the period after 1960 should consider applying next year for the 2007 Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar, which will be devoted to the period after 1960.

Applications and letters of reference must be received by December
1, 2005. They should be sent to Ms. Baerbel Thomas at the German Historical Institute and may be submitted by email, fax or regular mail:

German Historical Institute
Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar
Attn: Ms. Baerbel Thomas
1607 New Hampshire Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20009–2562
USA
Email: b.thomas@ghi-dc.org
Fax: (202) 483–3430

**FRANZ STEINER PRIZE**

The Franz Steiner Verlag and the GHI will be awarding the Franz Steiner Prize for German-American Studies for an outstanding scholarly manuscript in the field of transatlantic relations or North American studies from the early modern period to the present. The prize carries an award of €3500 and will be awarded for the first time in 2006. Submissions for the prize should be (1) unpublished manuscripts in German or (2) works on transatlantic topics written and/or published in another language that are being recommended for translation into German. The prize-winning manuscript will be published in the Steiner Verlag’s series “Transatlantische Historische Studien.” The selection committee is composed of German and American scholars. If you have any questions, please contact Gisela Mettele via email at mettele@ghi-dc.org.

Applicants should submit their manuscript, a one-page abstract, a letter of reference and a c.v. by March 1, 2006 to:

German Historical Institute
Franz Steiner Prize committee
1607 New Hampshire Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20009–2562
USA

**FRITZ STERN DISSERTATION PRIZE**

Each year the Friends of the German Historical Institute award the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize for the two best doctoral dissertations submitted in German history, German-American relations, or the history of Ger-
mans in North America. The winners are invited to the GHI to present their research at the annual symposium of the Friends in November. The prizewinners receive an award of $2,000 and reimbursement for travel to Washington, D.C. Their dissertations will be considered for inclusion in the “Publications of the German Historical Series” published by Cambridge University Press.

Candidates are nominated by their dissertation advisers. Their dissertations must have been completed, defended, and authenticated between January 1 and December 31, 2005. The prize committee will accept nominations through March 20, 2006, and announce the prize winners at the end of the summer.

Dissertation advisers should submit a letter of nomination along with an abstract (1–3 pages) of the dissertation to:

German Historical Institute
Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize
1607 New Hampshire Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20009–2562

For further details, please check our website at http://www.ghi-dc.org/scholarship_stern.html

DOCTORAL AND POST-DOCTORAL FELLOWSHIPS

The GHI awards short-term fellowships to German and American doctoral students as well as post-doctoral scholars/Habilitanden in the fields of German history, the history of German-American relations, and the role of Germany and the USA in international relations. These fellowships are also available to German doctoral students and postdoctoral scholars/Habilitanden in the field of American history. The fellowships are usually granted for periods of one to six months but, depending on the funds available, can be extended by one or more months. The research projects must draw upon source materials located in the United States.

The GHI will not provide funding for preliminary research. It will give clear priority to those post-doc projects that are designed for the “second book”. The monthly stipend is approximately €1,581 for doctoral students and €2,650 for post-doctoral scholars. In addition, fellowship recipients based in Germany will receive reimbursement for their roundtrip airfare to the U.S. All fellowship recipients are required to present the results of their research at the GHI during their grant period.

The next deadlines for applications are October 15th, 2005 and May 20th, 2006. Applications should include cover letter, curriculum vitae,
proof of academic degree (or transcripts), project description (3,000 words), research schedule for the fellowship period, and at least one letter of reference. While applicants may write in either English or German, we recommend that they use the language in which they are most proficient. They will be notified about the outcome within approximately two months after the deadline. Please send applications to:

German Historical Institute
Doctoral/Postdoctoral Fellowships
1607 New Hampshire Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20009–2562

KADE-HEIDEKING FELLOWSHIP

Funded by the Annette Kade Charitable Trust, the Kade-Heideking Fellowship is awarded annually to a German doctoral student working in one of the three wider areas to which the late Jürgen Heideking made significant contributions: American history and German-American relations from the early modern period to the present; international history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; and twentieth-century German and European history.

This is a residential fellowship of twelve months’ duration. It can be divided into two separate periods of six months. The recipient is expected to spend part of the fellowship period at the GHI and at the University of Wisconsin in Madison. The stipend amount is $30,000. Applications should include a cover letter, curriculum vitae, proof of academic degree, project description (8–10 pages), research schedule for fellowship period, and two confidential letters of reference. The application deadline is November 15, 2005. Please send applications to:

German Historical Institute
Kade-Heideking Fellowship
1607 New Hampshire Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20009–2562

THYSSEN-HEIDEKING FELLOWSHIP

The German Historical Institute invites applications for a one-year postdoctoral fellowship in memory of the late Jürgen Heideking. The fellowship, supported by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation, is intended for Ameri-
can scholars working in one of the three wider areas to which Professor Heideking made important contributions: American history and German-American relations from the early modern period to the present; international history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; and twentieth-century German and European history.

The Thyssen-Heideking Fellow will receive a stipend of €25,000 (plus a family allowance if applicable) for a fellowship period of six to twelve months in residence at the University of Cologne to begin in 2006. The fellow will be expected to give one public lecture on his/her research. Applications should include a cover letter, curriculum vitae, proof of academic degree, project description (8–10 pages), research schedule for fellowship period, and two confidential letters of reference. The application deadline is November 15, 2005. Please send applications to:

German Historical Institute
Thyssen-Heideking Fellowship
1607 New Hampshire Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20009–2562

GHI INTERNSHIPS

The GHI Internship Program gives German and American students of history, political science, and library studies an opportunity to gain experience at a scholarly research institute. Interns assist individual research projects, work for the library, take part in the preparation and hosting of conferences, and help with our publications. They receive a small stipend. The program is flexible and tries to accommodate the interns’ interests, abilities, and goals. A two-month minimum stay is required; a three-month stay is preferred. There is a rolling review of applications. Applicants interested in coming to Washington in 2006 are encouraged to submit their application by November 2005. German students are strongly advised to familiarize themselves with the American visa requirements beforehand. Information is available at the website of the American Embassy in Berlin at www.usembassy.de. The GHI cooperates with an organization authorized by the State Department to issue the relevant papers to obtain a visa. Applicants accepted into the internship program will receive further information on the procedure in their acceptance letters. Applications should contain a cover letter, a CV, a letter of recommendation, and copies of Zwischenprüfungs- or Abschlusszeugnisse. You can apply either in English or German. For further information please contact Anke Ortlepp (ortlepp@ghi-dc.org).
The GHI is pleased to announce that the project’s third section, *From Vormärz to Prussian Dominance, 1815–1866*, edited by Jonathan Sperber, is now complete and can be viewed online at http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org. This section includes 85 primary source documents, each of which is accompanied by an English translation. Almost all of these translations were commissioned by the GHI for this project. *From Vormärz to Prussian Dominance* also includes historical images from the collections of the Bildarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz and the Deutsches Historisches Museum, as well as maps in both jpeg and pdf formats. All supporting texts, including a comprehensive introduction to the period, image captions, and map legends, are available in both English and German.

Additionally, the first seventy documents in section four, *Forging an Empire: Bismarckian Germany, 1866–1890*, have been posted to the website. Texts will be added on an ongoing basis over the course of the fall. Please check back regularly. Work on section five, *Wilhelmine Germany and the First World War, 1890–1918*, is proceeding apace.

The GHI is grateful to the ZEIT Foundation, Hamburg, and to the Max Kade Foundation, New York, for sponsoring this project.

**ART ENABLES EXHIBITION**

*Art Enables “spricht Deutsch”* was exhibited at the GHI from May 6 to June 17, 2005. The show included works in various media by the artists of Art Enables, an arts-and-enterprise program for adults with developmental and/or mental disabilities from the Washington, DC metropolitan area (http://art-enables.org). Among the featured works were several original interpretations of the Institute’s façade and interior. The show’s opening drew supporters of the GHI and Art Enables, as well as Dupont Circle neighbors and DC art lovers.

**VISIT OF BOCHUM STUDENT GROUP**

On April 5, 2005 a group of students from the Ruhr-Universität Bochum (Politikwissenschaftliches Hauptseminar of Professor Gustav Schmidt) visited the GHI. Christof Mauch gave a brief introduction to the mission
and main activities of the GHI and then compared the German and American educational systems in historical perspective. Carl Lankowski, Deputy Director of Area Studies and Coordinator for European Area Studies at the Foreign Service Institute of the U.S. Department of State, discussed the training and career paths of U.S. Foreign Service officers. Christoph Bottin (GHI) discussed his dissertation project on the causes of migration. The event concluded with a lively discussion of immigration policy in Germany and the United States.

**Beate Ruhm von Oppen Donation**

A most generous donation came from Ms. Beate Ruhm von Oppen, who passed away on August 10, 2004. She was a historian and translator, and had taught at St. John’s College since 1960. Born in Zurich, Switzerland, and raised in Germany, she spent most of her adult life in the United States. Much of her work focused on documents and letters from the Nazi era. She translated and edited the letters from Helmuth James von Moltke to his wife Freya von Moltke. The book appeared in both English and German, with the German edition winning the Scholl prize in 1989. We received about 500 books from her large library and are very happy to include them in our holdings.

**Library Report**

A donation of about 200 books came from Mr. Bernhard Unti. The books belonged to his grandfather and cover German literature, philosophy, and history. The German Historical Institute is grateful to Mr. Unti for this generous gift. We are happy to announce subscriptions to three new journals: The *Jahrbuch für europäische Überseegeschichte* covers world history from a European angle; the *Journal of World History* is devoted to historical analysis from a global point of view; and the *Informationen zur modernen Stadtgeschichte* examine the history of German communities, towns, and cities in the 19th and 20th century. We also acquired the fifteen-volume series *Blackwell Companions to American History*, which presents current research in American history, and closed some gaps in the series *Deutsche Geschichtsquellen des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts*, published by the Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Two new encyclopedias were added to our reference collection: The *Encyclopedia of World Environmental History*, in three volumes, providing current, comprehensive
coverage of environmental history from ancient times to the present; and
the Brockhaus Taschenlexikon Weltgeschichte from 2004, also in three vol-
umes. Further important acquisitions include the Collected Works of F. A.
Hayek, August Sanders’s multi-volume People of the Twentieth Century, and
the Quellen zur Geschichte des Rheinlandes im Zeitalter der Französischen
Revolution.

We would like to express our gratitude to the following people and
institutions for donating books to the GHI library: the Bundesarchiv, Mrs.
Burns, Astrid Eckert, the Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte, the Georg-
Eckert-Institut, Kurt-Ulrich Jäschke, Edward Luft, Christof Mauch, Anke
Ortlepp, Arnold Price, the Stadtarchiv Köln, the Südtiroler Landesarchiv,
Christoph Strupp, the Technisches Museum Wien, the Volkswagen AG,
Ina Wavazelskis.

NEW PUBLICATIONS

1. New Books by GHI Research Fellows

GISELA METTELE, Weltbürgertum oder Gottesreich? Die Herrnhuter Brüderge-
meine als transnationale Gemeinschaft 1760–1856 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck
und Ruprecht, 2006)

ANKE ORTLEPP, LOTHAR HOENNIGHAUSEN, JAMES PEACOCK, and NIKLAUS
STEINER, Regionalism in the Age of Globalism: Forms of Regionalism (Madison:
Center for the Study of Upper Midwestern Cultures, 2005).

RICHARD F. WETZELL and PETER BECKER, eds., Criminals and Their Scientists:
The History of Criminology in International Perspective (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2005; Publications of the German Historical In-
stitute)

THOMAS ZELLER and THOMAS LEKAN, eds., Germany’s Nature: Cultural Land-
scapes and Environmental History (New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University
Press, 2005)

2. GHI Reference Guides

ANTJE UHLIG and BIRGIT ZISCHKE, eds., Research–Study–Funding: A German-
American Guide for Historians and Social Scientists

3. Transatlantische Historische Studien, published in
collaboration with the Franz Steiner Verlag

SYLVIA TASCHKA, Diplomat ohne Eigenschaften: Die Karriere des Hans-
4. Other Publications Supported by the GHI

Alan LessofF and Christof Mauch, eds., Adolf Cluss, Architect: From Germany to America (Berghahn Books, 2005)


Recipients of GHI-Fellowships for 2005/06

Postdoctoral Fellowship for North American History

Markus Hünemöder (University of Munich), “Privacy—Das Recht auf Privatheit in den USA und Deutschland”

Postdoctoral/Habilitation Fellowships


Helke Rausch (University of Heidelberg), “Transfer stiften? Amerikanische Philanthropen und westeuropäische Wissenschaftseliten, 1945 bis 1970er Jahre”

Doctoral Fellowships


INTERNSHIP RECIPIENTS

The GHI was fortunate to have a number of excellent interns who made valuable contributions to our work. The interns conducted research in libraries and archives, helped prepare and run conferences, assisted editors, librarians, and administrators, and cheerfully performed all other tasks that came their way. We would like to thank Marc Landry (Georgetown University), Steve Scala (University of Maryland, College Park), Katherine Wihry (Syracuse University), Birte Lotz (University of Hamburg), Sabine Donauer (University of Augsburg), Thorsten Graebe (University of Frankfurt), Caroline Grimm (University of Freiburg), and Rouben Bathke (University of Cologne).

STAFF CHANGES

KEITH ALEXANDER, Research Associate since August 2003, left the GHI at the end of August to teach in the history department at Shepherd University in Shepherdstown, West Virginia. He will continue to be affiliated with the GHI as a Visiting Research Associate.

KAREN MANNING, Project Assistant since February 2005, left the GHI at the end of July to attend law school.

CHRISTINE VON OERTZEN, Research Fellow since June 2002, left the GHI in June 2005 to accept a tenured position as Research Scholar at the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science in Berlin.

STEPHEN SCALA, Research Associate, joined the GHI part-time on September 1 to serve as coordinator of the German Studies Directory. A former GHI intern, Steve is a Ph.D. student at the University of Maryland in modern European history, with a focus on the history of political culture and intellectual history in Germany and Russia.

CHRISTOPHER WILEY, Systems Manager since October 2002, left the GHI at the end of July to accept a DAAD fellowship to conduct dissertation research in Berlin.

BIRGIT ZISCHKE, Research Associate since October 2002, left the Institute at the end of September 2005 to accept a position as Senior Program Officer at the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs.
EVENTS

FALL 2005 LECTURE SERIES
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF GERMAN EXPRESSIONISM:
Painters and Patrons, Politics and the Public

All lectures will be held at the German Historical Institute, 1607 New Hampshire Avenue, NW, Washington, DC. Refreshments will be served at 6 p.m. Lectures begin at 6:30 p.m.

September 8  German Expressionism: Nineteenth-Century Roots
Robert Rosenblum, Institute of Fine Arts, New York University

September 19  From Impressionism to Expressionism: Harry Graf Kessler on Modern Art and its Public in Imperial Germany
Laird Easton, California State University, Chico
Following the lecture, Sabine Carbon (24pictures, Berlin) will screen her documentary
“Harry Graf Kessler—der Mann der alle kannte” (2005)

October 6  “A Non-Male German Talent”: Gabriele Münter’s Work Perceived through Wassily Kandinsky’s Eyes
Reinhold Heller, University of Chicago

October 27  Künstlergruppe Brücke and the Public Sphere: The Formation of the Modern Woman Patron and Collector
Shulamith Behr, Courtauld Institute of Art, University of London

November 3  Franz Marc at the Lenbachhaus
Annegret Hoberg, Städtische Galerie im Lenbachhaus, Munich

November 10  Expressionism and the Third Reich
Jonathan Petropoulos, Claremont McKenna College

December 8  “Kunst der Freiheit” or “Phänomen spätbürgerlicher Dekadenz”? The Art of Die Brücke in the Cold War
Christian Saehrendt, Humboldt University, Berlin

This series has been made possible by the generous support of Altana. Additional sponsorship has been provided by the German Information Center.
## Events Sponsored by the GHI, 2005–2006

For a regularly updated calendar of events, please check our website at [www.ghi-dc.org](http://www.ghi-dc.org).

### 2005

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Conveners/Participants</th>
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<tr>
<td>September 5–17</td>
<td>Bucerius Seminar: American History and American Archives Seminar in Washington, Chicago, Boston, and Madison</td>
<td>Kathleen N. Conzen (University of Chicago), Andreas Etges (Free University of Berlin), Christof Mauch (GHI)</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 15</td>
<td>U.S. Intelligence and the Gehlen Organization, 1945–1956 Symposium at the GHI</td>
<td>Bernd Schaefer (GHI) and Robert G. Livingston (GHI)</td>
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<td>September 29–</td>
<td>The History of Translation Theories, the History of Political Thought, and Begriffsgeschichte</td>
<td>Conveners: Martin Burke (CUNY), Melvin Richter (CUNY), Dirk Schumann (GHI)</td>
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<td>October 1</td>
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<td>October 3</td>
<td>German Unification Symposium, at the GHI</td>
<td>Christof Mauch (GHI)</td>
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<td>October 20–22</td>
<td>2005 Medieval History Seminar, at the Centro Tedesco di Studi Veneziani (Italy)</td>
<td>Michael Borgolte (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin), Patrick J. Geary (University of California, Los Angeles), Barbara H. Rosenwein (Loyola Univ., Chicago), Christof Mauch (GHI), Jonathan Skolnik (GHI)</td>
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<td>November 2</td>
<td>Edmund Spevack Memorial Lecture, at Harvard University</td>
<td>Robert Gerald Livingston (GHI)</td>
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<td>November 17</td>
<td>Annual Lecture, at the GHI</td>
<td>Kenneth T. Jackson (Columbia University); comment by Adelheid von Saldern (University of Hannover); Christof Mauch (GHI)</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 18</td>
<td>Fritz Stern Dissertation Award and Symposium of the German Historical Institute</td>
<td>Gerald Feldman (Friends of the GHI) and Christof Mauch (GHI)</td>
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December 1–3  The Place of Nature in the City in Twentieth-Century Europe and North America 
Conference at the GHI 
Conveners: Dorothee Brantz (SUNY Buffalo, GHI), Sonja Dümpeleman (Auburn University, GHI), Christof Mauch (GHI), Jennifer Price (Los Angeles)

2006

Spring 2006  Western Integration, German Unification and the Cold War—The Adenauer Era in Perspective 
Conference at Georgetown University 
Conveners: Jost Dülffer (Univ. of Cologne/Georgetown Univ.) and Bernd Schaefer (GHI)

March 16–18  Funny Texts, Laughing People: Humor in the Twentieth Century 
Conference at the Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto 
Conveners: Martina Kessel (University of Bielefeld), Patrick Merziger (Free University Berlin), Dirk Schumann (GHI)

March 22–26  Crossovers: African Americans and Germany 
Conference at the University of Münster 
Conveners: Maria Diedrich (University of Münster), Larry Greene/Jürgen Heinrichs (Seton Hall University), Anke Ortlepp (GHI)

March 23–25  Max Liebermann (1847–1935): An Artist’s Career from Empire to Third Reich 
Symposium at the GHI, in cooperation with George Mason University and the Goethe-Institut, Washington DC 
Conveners: Marion Deshmukh (George Mason University) and Kelly McCullough (GHI).

March 30–April 2  Philanthropy in History: German and American Perspectives 
Conference at the GHI, in cooperation with the Stiftung Deutsch-Amerikanische Wissenschaftsbeziehungen im Stifterverband für die deutsche Wissenschaft 
Conveners: Simone Lässig (GHI) and Gabriele Lingelbach (Universität Trier)

April 20–22  Removing Peoples: Forced Migration in the Modern World 
Conference at King’s Manor, York (UK) 
Conveners: Richard J. Bessel (Univ. of York), Claudia Haake (Univ. of York), Dirk Schumann (GHI), Karina Urbach (GHI London)

April 26–29  Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar in German History: German History, 1930–1960 
Seminar at the University of Freiburg 
Conveners: Roger Chickering (Georgetown Univ.), Ulrich Herbert (Univ. of Freiburg), and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)
May 4        German Imperial Biographies: Soldiers, Scientists, and Officials and the 'Arendt Thesis'
            Conference at the GHI
            Conveners: Karen Oslund (GHI), Eric D. Weitz (Univ. of Minnesota), Jürgen Zimmerer (Univ. of Essen)

May 4–7    Colonialism, Postcolonialism, and the Environment
            Conference at the GHI
            Conveners: Niels Brimnes (Univ. of Aarhus, Denmark), Christina Folke Ax and Niklas Thode Jensen (Univ. of Copenhagen, Denmark), Karen Oslund (GHI)

May 12–13  German Ostpolitik, 1966–1974: The European and Global Response
            Conference at Mershon International Center of Ohio State University in Columbus
            Conveners: Carole Fink (OSU) and Bernd Schaefer (GHI)

May 31        Seventh Gerd Bucerius Lecture
            Speaker: Kurt Masur (Paris/New York)

June 19–30  Archival Summer Seminar in Germany
            Convener: Anke Ortlepp (GHI)

June 22–25  Pückler and America
            Conference at the Stiftung Fürst-Pückler-Park Bad Muskau
            Conveners: Sonja Dümpelmann (GHI/ Auburn University) and Cord Panning (Stiftung Fürst-Pückler-Park Bad Muskau)

Fall 2006  Uncertain Environments: The Insurance of Natural Hazards in Historical Perspective
            Conference at the GHI
            Conveners: Uwe Lübken (GHI) and Christof Mauch (GHI)

            Conveners: Kathleen N. Conzen (University of Chicago), Andreas Etges (Free University of Berlin), Christof Mauch (GHI)

October 3     German Unification Symposium, at the GHI
            Convener: Christof Mauch (GHI)

October 2006  Franz Steiner Prize Award
            Event in Stuttgart
            Conveners: Ulrich Bachteler (James F. Byrnes Institute), Christof Mauch (GHI), Thomas Schaber (Steiner Verlag)

November 2006  Annual Lecture, at the GHI
            Convener: Christof Mauch (GHI)

November 2006  Fritz Stern Dissertation Award and Symposium of the Friends of the German Historical Institute Symposium at the GHI
            Conveners: Gerald Feldman (Friends of the GHI) and Christof Mauch (GHI)
GHI PUBLICATIONS

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176 GHI BULLETIN NO. 37 (FALL 2005)
BULLETIN. Published semiannually, in spring and fall, and available free of charge from the Institute; currently edited by Richard F. Wetzell.


28 (Spring 2001) Feature articles: Wolfgang Hardtwig, “Political Religion in Modern Germany: Reflections on Nationalism, Socialism, and National Socialism” (Fourteenth Annual Lecture of the GHI, November 9, 2000); Jane Caplan, “Politics, Religion, and Ideology” (Comment on the Annual Lecture); A Conversation with Fritz Stern; Johannes Dillinger, “American Spiritualism and German Sectarianism: A Comparative Study of the Societal Construction of Ghost Beliefs.”

29 (Fall 2001) Feature articles: Lord Ralf Dahrendorf, “Democracy Under Pressure: The European Experience” (First Gerd Bucerius Lecture, June 5, 2001); Robert Gerald Livingston, “From Harry S. to George W.: German-American Relations and American Presidents”; Deborah Cohen, “Comparative History: Buyer Beware.”

30 (Spring 2002) Feature articles: Caroline Walker Bynum, “Violent Imagery in Late Medieval Piety” (Fifteenth Annual Lecture of the GHI, November 8, 2001); Mitchell B. Merback, “Reverberations of Guilt and Violence, Resonances of Peace” (Comment on the Annual Lecture); Raimund Lammersdorf and Vera Lind, “The
German Studies Association at Twenty-Five: Interviews with Gerald R. Kleinfeld, Mary Nolan, and Frank Trommler; Wilfried Mausbach, “European Perspectives on the War in Vietnam.”

31 (Fall 2002)

32 (Spring 2003)

33 (Fall 2003)

34 (Spring 2004)

35 (Fall 2004)

178 GHI BULLETIN No. 37 (FALL 2005)
Feature Articles: Ute Frevert, “Europeanizing German History” (Eighteenth Annual Lecture of the GHI, November 18, 2004); David Blackbourn, comment on the Annual Lecture; W. Michael Blumenthal, “The Closest of Strangers: German-American Relations in Historical Perspective” (Fifth Gerd Bucerius Lecture, September 27, 2004); “Dramatizing German History: Michael Frayn on Democracy”

REFERENCE GUIDES


No. 5: Ulrike Skorsetz and Janine S. Micunek, with the assistance of Luzie Nahr, Guide to Inventories and Finding Aids at the German Historical Institute. Washington, D.C., 1995.*


ANNUAL LECTURE SERIES


No. 2: Carl N. Degler, Culture Versus Biology in the Thought of Franz Boas and Alfred L. Kroeber. New York, 1989.8


**Note:** This series has been discontinued. In 1997 the Annual Lecture was published as part of the *Occasional Papers* series. Since 1998 it is featured in the *Bulletin* (see above).

**OCCASIONAL PAPERS**


No. 19: Marion F. Deshmukh and Jerry Z. Muller, eds., Fritz Stern at 70. Washington, D.C., 1997.*


CONFERENCE PAPERS ON THE WEB (at www.ghi-dc.org)


ADDITIONAL PUBLICATIONS SUPPORTED BY THE GHI


Matthias Judt and Burghard Ciesla, eds., Technology Transfer Out of Germany After 1945. Amsterdam, 1996.


Note: * indicates no longer in print.