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PREFACE

In recent months, East German spy Günter Guillaume has been ingratiating himself anew with Chancellor Willy Brandt eight times a week as hundreds of rapt witnesses look on. Michael Frayn’s play Democracy, now running on Broadway, uses the scandal that drove Brandt from office to explore the boundaries of trust, identity, and betrayal. At a program organized by the German Historical Institute in the fall of 2004, Frayn explained his interest in creating theater from history; excerpts from his comments appear in this issue of the Bulletin. Frayn, an acclaimed novelist, translator, and playwright, shows himself to be a diligent amateur historian as well. He explains how he drew upon the documentary record in dramatizing the Guillaume affair, but he acknowledges that he felt free to fill in where the record is silent. The figures in his play, he makes clear, are born of both research and imagination.

Research and imagination also stand behind the essay “Europeanizing German History” that Yale historian Ute Frevert presented as the GHI’s 2005 Annual Lecture. How, she asks, can we look beyond national borders and rediscover neglected “European” dimensions of Germany’s past? Frevert, like Frayn, challenged the members of her audience to reconsider what they think they know about history. That challenge was taken up with brio by David Blackbourn of Harvard University, whose comment appears in this issue of the Bulletin together with Frevert’s lecture.

“Putting history on stage” has a rather different meaning for the GHI than for a dramatist like Frayn. We are pleased to have provided a stage for a number of noted public figures in recent months. W. Michael Blumenthal, the founding director of the Jewish Museum Berlin and U.S. Secretary of the Treasury under President Jimmy Carter, delivered the fifth Gerd Bucerius Lecture sponsored by the Ebelin and Gerd Bucerius ZEIT Foundation. By happy coincidence, the ZEIT Foundation was represented at the lecture by Blumenthal’s erstwhile German counterpart, Manfred Lahnstein, Finance Minister in the cabinet of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and now the chair of the foundation’s board of trustees. Against the background of a presidential election campaign in which foreign policy figured prominently, Blumenthal offered an incisive commentary on recent developments in German-American relations, and Lahnstein briefly took the stage to offer some observations of his own. A similar transatlantic dialogue between public figures had taken place at the GHI two weeks earlier. David Eisenhower, a scholar who has written extensively on the career of his grandfather, Dwight David Eisenhower, and
Michael Naumann, Germany’s former Federal Commissioner for Cultural and Media Affairs and currently editor of DIE ZEIT, delivered the public keynote lectures for the conference “Access-Presentation-Memory: The American Presidential Libraries and the Memorial Foundations of German Politicians.” In lively and engaging fashion, Eisenhower and Naumann outlined the extra-scholarly considerations and practices that shape the documentary record upon which historians depend. The conference itself brought together archivists, librarians, and scholars to compare the ways the U.S. and Germany preserve and shape the memory of their political leaders.

Time to write is all too often a luxury for historians. For that reason, the GHI is pleased to be able to offer two fellowships aimed at historians who are just setting out on their scholarly careers. The Kade-Heideking Fellowship, funded by the Annette Kade Charitable Trust, and the Thyssen-Heideking Fellowship, funded by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation, pay tribute to the memory of the historian Jürgen Heideking (1947–2000). The Kade-Heideking Fellowship enables a German doctoral student to spend a year in the United States; the Thyssen-Heideking Fellowship is open to American postdocs. Heideking published widely in both American and German history, and he would have been delighted by how very different the research topics of the two current Heideking fellowship holders are. Michael Lenz, a doctoral student at the University of Cologne, reports in this issue of the Bulletin on his inquiry into the cultural foundations of the right to bear arms—the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Dorothee Brantz, who was awarded the PhD by the University of Chicago in 2003, is using her time in Germany as the Thyssen-Heideking Fellow to work on her study of the rise of municipal slaughterhouses in Paris, Berlin, and Chicago.

The sponsors of the Kade-Heideking and Thyssen-Heideking Fellowships are two of roughly forty foundations, universities, and cultural institutions that have made our recent programs and activities possible. Individuals, too, have contributed importantly in many ways to the GHI. This winter, for example, the family of the late John Weitz donated his library to the GHI. Best known as a fashion designer, Weitz was also a skilled writer and historian. His biographies of Hjalmar Schacht and Joachim von Ribbentrop stand as important contributions to the scholarly literature on Nazi Germany. We are grateful to the Weitz family and all our friends and partners for their support.

Christof Mauch
Director

GHI Bulletin No. 36 (Spring 2005)
Let me start with some observations from my new life at Yale University. On the first day of class—I am currently teaching a survey course on Modern German History—I asked the students about their ideas of Germany. I got interesting responses ranging from classical cultural stereotypes (like sausages, Oktoberfest, fast and expensive cars) to political images (like goose-stepping soldiers, Auschwitz, and the Berlin Wall). The answer that surprised me the most was given by a young woman: She insisted on associating Germany with the blue, multi-starred European flag. For her, modern Germany is part and parcel of a broader European community and is closely tied to the European Union and its institutional and value system. I did not expect this remark—although, at second sight, there is much out there to confirm it. Any U.S. citizen arriving at Frankfurt airport cannot help noticing that the primary distinction made is not between Germans and non-Germans, but between EU- and non-EU citizens. Lining up at immigration control, you are greeted by the European flag instead of the German colors. You pay with Euros instead of Marks. License plates again show the European flag. And cities welcome their visitors with signs proudly presenting long-standing ties and friendships with other European cities.

So the student’s comment was actually not completely out of the blue, at least in so far as it referred to recent and present developments. But what about the past? Can Germany’s history, too, be “Europeanized”? And suppose it can—should it be? What would we gain?

I.

First things first: what do I mean by “Europeanization?” I use the term here to highlight the complex set of relations that Germans have maintained with other Europeans during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Although European encounters and relations can be traced back far beyond the late eighteenth century, the modern period stands out as an exceptionally dynamic and concentrated phase. Transnational interac-
tion and communication have greatly intensified as personal contacts and
the exchange of goods, ideas, and institutions have expanded. This held
particularly true for Germany, which shared borders with several coun-
tries and thus possessed a great variety of “contact zones.” The presence
of other Europeans took many forms (personal, structural, imagined) and
was not evenly distributed. It could have positive connotations, but it
could also be used as a negative frame of reference.

What, then, are the benefits of applying a “Europeanizing” perspec-
tive to national history? There are, as far as I can see, at least two worth
mentioning. First, the approach offers a different framing of national
developments and opens new avenues of interpretation. After decades of
research on nation-states and nationalism, we might embark on a more
outward-looking track. We now know a lot about the difficulties of
domestic nation-building, about internal divisions and tensions, about
national monuments promising unity and concealing strife. We have
learned about regional and religious diversity, about nationalist move-
ments and local perceptions of Heimat. And we have even seen some fine
comparative studies of how national identities were shaped and con-
structed. All this research has successfully managed to debunk older
myths about the uncontested nature of the German nation-state. At the
same time, however, it has solidified the concept of the nation as a focal
point of historical development and investigation. By deconstructing
the nation and drawing attention to the strenuous and highly artificial work
of nation-building, it strengthened the idea that nations—and in turn,
national history—are the center of the universe.

In some ways, this approach was, as we remember well, a useful and
necessary reaction to the reemergence of nation-states and national con-
flicts in the aftermath of 1989. What happened in the dissolving Soviet
Empire and in Yugoslavia—and in other parts of the world, like South-
east Asia, as well—gave rise to a new interest in visions, concepts, and
practices of nationhood. At the same time, however, this interest tended
to blur the fact that nations were closely linked by a multitude of inter-
actions, interventions, and networks in the past, and that they remain so
in the present. The process of nation-building itself is thoroughly in-
formed by comparisons with and borrowing from others. Transfers of
knowledge and technology, of administrative rules and methods, of po-
litical concepts, have been a recurring feature of European development
throughout the modern period. For Europeans, the models that were
either adopted or rejected came mostly from other European regions. The
major non-European influence has been the United States, which has
posed a critical challenge to the self-images of European societies since
the late nineteenth century and has thus figured as an important creator
of Europeanness.
This is not to say, of course, that nation-states do not matter as agents of historical action and change. To loosen the grip of a narrowly conceived national history is not to deny that nations have been indispensable units of citizenship and entitlements. Even in the European Union, where the process of supranational state-building is relatively far advanced, the member states have not lost their importance in managing and protecting citizens’ rights and obligations. But, as the EU also tells us, they increasingly share this role with non-national structures, be they sub- or supranational. Fifty years of economic, social and political integration have left their mark on the framing of national identities. Above all, the process of integration has accelerated and increased the permeation of transnational trends, ideas, and movements within European societies.4

The transnational flow, however, did not start with the 1950s. This observation runs against a growing tendency to divide German history into a “national” and a “European” part. Throughout most of its modern history, so the story goes, the German nation-state was preoccupied with establishing its defining characteristics and, more than once, overstressing them to the detriment of its European neighbors. After 1945, defeated Germany was integrated into a larger setting where it lost its aggressive self-centeredness and gratefully accepted the blessings of Western, especially American, civilization.

This view—widely held among social scientists and politicians—is much too narrow and short-sighted. In fact, the approach that I favor shows that “Europeanization” occurred long before the founding fathers set out the framework of European integration. It thus takes the steam out of the contention that the EU was opening a completely new chapter of history. Instead, it pays attention to the long-term processes of communication and interaction that shaped German politics, society, and culture long before there were conscious steps and high-level policies of institutional integration.

The critical edge of the Europeanizing approach should thus be evident. Furthermore—and this might be seen as its second merit—it is meant to contribute to a new history of Europe that appears to be urgently needed. As the EU currently undergoes dramatic changes, politicians and intellectuals are desperately searching for common European elements in culture and economics, social values, and political organization. Many try to find them in the past, in an alleged European heritage, in traditions and experiences that seem to be both shared and specific to Europeans. They come up with lofty claims about Greek-Roman-Jewish roots, legal cultures, or European values as the essence of Europeanness.

In place of such wishful thinking, I would suggest conceiving of Europeanness as a web of communication and interaction. This web dis-
plays different degrees and patterns of involvement, shifting centers and margins, uneven and asymmetric relations, and competitive, often violent encounters. It translates “Europe” into a dynamic experience rather than defining it in abstract geographical or cultural terms. The crucial questions then involve the kind and number of transnational experiences available to people (of different generations, genders, classes) at a given time and in a given region of Europe. If we manage to answer these questions in detail for many countries, we will make a big step toward a European history that is more than a compilation of national histories and does not rest upon value-ridden assumptions about the Occident.5

Some people might say that the goal is too modest: Why limit the approach to modern Europe? Why not include the wider world?6 First, I am well aware that there is an exciting premodern chapter of the European story, but I do believe that the nineteenth and twentieth centuries added both quantitatively and qualitatively to its acceleration, density, and inclusiveness. Second, I do not want to imply that Germany’s interests and communication networks were restricted to Europe. They never were, and a globalizing perspective is surely important and much needed. But I would like to start with Europe, as the continent ranked— and still ranks—foremost as a defining sphere of mutual influence and interdependence. Unlike other European countries that built and administered huge empires outside of Europe, Germany remained focused on Europe. There was an increasing demand for Weltpolitik beginning in the 1890s, but those policies were mainly carried out, after 1914 and again after 1939, in Eastern Europe, not in Africa or Asia. Although some younger scholars have recently turned to German colonial designs and projects which they interpret as a crucial feature of the Kaiserreich and beyond, I still have doubts as to how powerful the colonial impact actually was.7 Europe—East and West alike, though in different ways—seems to be of much greater importance when it comes to transnational encounters and interest.

So, even if “Europeanization” falls short of global ambitions, the claims are pretty high. At stake is more than an embedded type of national history. But as usual, claims have to be transformed into the humble work of empirical research. In the remaining part of my lecture, I want to present some fields where the approach can prove its merits. These examples concern wars (and the memories of war), policymaking, and elite culture.

II.

Let us start with wars, which are inter- and transnational events par excellence.8 Seldom, however, are they perceived as such. In historical scholarship, wars figure as primary examples of nation-building.9 This
holds true both in an external and internal sense. The wars of 1866 and
1870/71 are seen as wars of German unification: They set the external
borders of the new nation-state and defined the territory in which do-
mestic nation-building could then take place. World War I is presented as
an exercise in national unity and disunity—from the Kaiser’s promise of
non-partisanship in August 1914, the Burgfrieden policy of Social Democ-
racy to the infamous Jew count of 1916 and the strikes of 1918. Emphasis
is laid on the new “totality” of war, on the intimate links between the
“home front” and the troops. The dominant narrative of 1914–1918 is one
that focuses on social relations, domestic policies, and national propa-
ganda. Virtually absent is any account of the experiences that this war—
like others before and after—brought about in terms of foreign encoun-
ters and transnational communication. For most rank-and-file soldiers,
wars offered an unforeseen opportunity to go abroad. Crossing borders,
being confronted with different customs, languages, food, and architec-
tural styles, was an experience that could leave a lasting impression.
Some men assiduously took notes and wrote home about what they
observed; to them, a military campaign resembled a kind of educational
grand tour.10 Others made friends or even found wives while serving as
occupying soldiers or being held as prisoners of war.

One of my students told me how his family history was shaped by
wars in a peculiar fashion: His great-great-grandfather was a French
soldier from Bordeaux who was taken prisoner in 1870 and lost his heart
to a Rhenish girl. The student’s great-grandfather then served as a Ger-
man soldier in the First World War, was wounded, and then taken pris-
oner. In a Red Cross hospital in Switzerland he became engaged to, and
eventually married, a Swiss woman whose father was in charge of the
interned Germans. One generation later, the student’s grandfather served
as a German soldier in the Second World War. He fell in love with a
Polish woman and, during the final stages of war, hid in her village. After
the war, they married and lived in Legnica (Liegnitz) in Silesia until 1962,
when the family emigrated to Düsseldorf.11

This family history may seem exceptional in its transnational quality,
but who knows how many similar stories can be told? Wars held the
potential, in a positive as well as in a negative way, to forge relationships
across national borders. What makes these relationships special for his-
torians is the fact that they were not restricted to social elites. We will see
later on that men (and women) of the upper and educated classes were
highly privileged in their ability to experience “Europe.” Wars, however,
extended this “privilege” to all social classes.

In talking about wars as transnational encounters, we are usually
inclined to focus on their destructive elements, and for good reasons. But
despite the national propaganda during World War I that transformed
adversaries into eternal enemies, there was a great deal of respect, sometimes even solidarity, between soldiers ordered to kill one another. “They are fighting like lions,” “they are like us”: Such notions of a common fate, of common traits of character and skills, testify to a widely shared feeling of connectedness, which was expressed in humane gestures like spontaneous ceasefires, personal assistance, and exchanges of cigarettes, not to mention the famous Christmas celebrations on the Western front in 1914. It also found expression in postwar meetings of veterans and veterans’ associations. Even in cases like Stalingrad, where both sides engaged in merciless fighting and killing during World War II, survivors (and their children) were able to meet and share memories—memories that zoomed in on the common experience of hardship, deprivation, fear, and comradeship. Long before Chancellor Kohl shook hands with President Mitterand at the vast graveyards of Verdun or before Chancellor Schröder was invited to celebrate D-Day with the Allies, veterans found ways of remembering the war as a unifying experience. This was probably the most ambivalent “Europeanizing” experience ever. Taught to kill, fearful for their own lives, the soldiers clearly had space to discover the enemy as a doppelgänger who was as human—and inhuman—as themselves.

But what about the nationalist language that prepared and accompanied warfare? What about the brutalization of images, the dehumanization of the opponent that became prevalent in the twentieth century (but was already visible a hundred years earlier)? Did this not prevent feelings of solidarity or sameness? Unfortunately, we still know very little about the effect that propaganda had on soldiers. It definitely helped them to justify what they were doing. But to what extent it made them see things and people exclusively through the lens of official ideology is difficult to determine. Propaganda images usually compete with others, and they do not completely preclude contrasting views. German soldiers who fought on the Eastern front during World War II did not always draw on Nazi stereotypes of beast-like Bolsheviks, Jewish commissars, and filthy peasants. They had other perceptions of their own—perceptions of cultural difference, but also of human similarity.12

In some ways, propaganda itself provided information (however distorted and biased) on other countries and populations. The so-called ideas of 1914 that took shape in German intellectual discourse during World War I were meant as a blunt refutation of the French ideas of 1789. By juxtaposing Western civilization and German Kultur, the German population was nevertheless familiarized with crucial components of French and British culture. Instead of being sealed off against the rest of Europe, Germans were thus prompted to actively engage in comparing and evaluating their enemies’ mindset. They could even read the foreign press
(if they had a command of the language) and use it to form their own ideas about the war, about the justifications for and the goals behind it. To sum up: Wars—normally seen as markers of national policies and identities—turn out to be transnational events both in the realm of images and ideas and as direct, personal experience. In war, people of different nationalities came face to face with one another, and although this confrontation was mostly negative and often lethal, it offered some opportunities for positive bonding and reflection. War memories in particular held the potential for bridging gaps between nations, although they could also be used to do the opposite.

Moreover, wars served as an impetus to conscious change in international relations and their social underpinnings. Both the First and the Second World War triggered strong movements of Europeanization, especially (but not solely) in Germany. The 1920s saw the emergence of a multitude of Europeanist clubs, associations, journals, speakers’ series, and conferences. Activists voiced different ideas about how to solve the European problem, defined as loss of world power and continuing internal conflict. But they agreed on the need for multilateral European communication and peace-keeping. Some campaigned for a political federation called the United States of Europe, a proposal that even made its way into the 1926 Social Democratic Party program. For most of those involved in the Europeanist movement, the First World War was a watershed event that disrupted the closely-knit fabric of European relations and stripped Europe of its internal cohesion and networks. Now Europe needed a dedicated effort to rebuild its broken bridges and restore its former glory.

III.

This leads us to a second field of European connectedness: international policy negotiation and cooperation. Again, we can trace this back to the experience of war. The nineteenth century saw a deepening concern about the conduct of war. In most European countries (and in the United States), lawyers were busy setting up rules to restrict military violence and civilize warfare. The founding of the Red Cross, the signing of the Geneva Conventions regulating the treatment of wounded and, later, prisoners of war—all these events were of pan-European importance. The same is true of the conferences on armaments control and arbitration in international conflicts that took place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Interestingly, these negotiations, conferences, and agreements were not confined to the realm of diplomacy. Of course, diplomacy by definition has always been a forum for international exchange and encounter. What was new was the extent to which high-level international relations were supplemented and expanded by communi-
cation beyond the channels of professional diplomacy. The modern codification of international law, to mention just one example, entailed the active involvement of a great number of legal scholars who formed organizations like the Institute of International Law in Ghent (1873), who set up joint commissions and who put forward their proposals to European governments. Similar trends can be observed in domestic areas, above all in legal policy. Most European states codified their penal and civil law only after carefully examining how others had dealt with those matters. Differences and similarities in legal traditions were set out systematically and taken into account.

Close observation also took place when it came to enacting new state policies, particularly in the field of social welfare. Before starting their ambitious social insurance policy, German officials and lawmakers toured other European countries and reported on schemes that seemed to work well. They convened international conferences which drew participants from broad sections of society, including entrepreneurs, mayors, and economists. While this area of international cooperation and mutual learning is well known, it may come as a surprise that similar consultations occurred in military and colonial affairs, which are normally taken to be highly competitive and mutually exclusive. Military administrators collected information on different European recruiting methods and results; military journals showed ample evidence of international networking by printing articles on developments, debates and innovations abroad. European conferences on colonial policy discussed and compared best practices in colonial rule, education, administration, and trade. Again, these conferences were attended not only by government officials, but also by academic experts and local practitioners.

The argument here is twofold: First, national policies since the nineteenth century were modelled with considerable attention to foreign patterns—be it to copy “best practices” or to draw clear lines of distinction. Second, knowledge in this field was shared broadly, not only among diplomats and administrators, but also among scholars, journalists, and professionals. They met at international conferences, in multilateral commissions, and in institutions that coordinated national policies on a European scale, or even on a worldwide scale, as in the case of negotiations over time zones, metric systems, or postal services.15

IV.

This kind of international traffic, which basically focused on Europe, but increasingly included the United States from the late nineteenth century on, was replicated in the field of education. Universities were a central location for transnational, intra-European communication since the early modern period, and this role intensified during the nineteenth century.
Germany in particular turned out to be an international magnet. Due to the rising prestige of German science and scholarship, universities from Freiburg to Berlin attracted increasing numbers of foreign students and scholars. Friedrich Paulsen’s book on German universities was immediately translated into English. Professors like Hermann Helmholtz went on extended lecture tours abroad, and his house was always besieged, as his wife reported, by visitors from “all parts of Europe, not mentioning the Americans.”

Anna Helmholtz had gained first-hand experience of foreign manners and styles by attending a French boarding-school and then, as a young woman, spending many months in her aunt’s Paris household and travelling in England. She shared this cosmopolitan education with many daughters of middle-class families. Sending teenage girls abroad emerged as a steady pattern of cultural transfer, and sometimes led to international marriages. From one generation to the next, families would often host one another’s daughters and cousins, thereby forging long-term relationships that sometimes survived into the 1950s or even beyond.

Boys and young men, too, were sent abroad, especially in entrepreneurial families. Their task was not confined to learning languages and getting to know a different way of life; they were also supposed to expand their economic knowledge and interests. In addition, they were expected to stabilize business contacts and social connections that could prove beneficial to economic success. Hans Fürstenberg, the son of a Berlin banker, supplemented his apprenticeship with short-term positions in London and Paris; adding a third year in New York was prevented by the outbreak of war in 1914. After the war, he married a Russian refugee, thus continuing a family tradition (his mother came from Warsaw). My own husband’s great-grandfather, son of a merchant family, met his future wife during his clerking years in Britain, and took her (and a large dowry) home to Saxony; their eldest son then spent many years in England, and two of his brothers and sisters decided to settle there for good. Other branches of the family nurtured strong ties with France, and my husband’s father went to university in Paris and Geneva. For this family, Eastern and Southern Europe did not seem to be equally attractive (except Italy, for tourism). Others reached out to East and West alike, as, for example, Werner Siemens, the successful inventor and entrepreneur. He installed one of his brothers in St. Petersburg to run the family business, and there was quite a traffic between Germany and the Baltics, too.

The German economic and academic elites were fairly cosmopolitan throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; both commercium and connubium connected them to the larger European world (although these ties were not evenly distributed). In their aesthetic interests,
they were not confined to national tastes, either. Just as artists and architects, musicians and novelists went back and forth with great ease and frequency, their products were consumed by a Europe-wide audience. Works of literature were quickly translated into other European languages; music did not need translation, and neither did architecture, sculpture, or paintings. Even if some conservatives tried to reserve museums for German art, French impressionists made it into the new German National Gallery before the turn of the century. Berlin then started to compete with Paris as Europe’s cultural capital. In the 1920s, Berlin was considered a hotbed of avant-garde movements and drew attention from all parts of the continent.

This attention did not stop in 1933. Foreigners continued to visit Germany, though perhaps for other than aesthetic reasons. Whereas tourist offices in major German cities had counted around 500,000 foreign visitors in 1926 and nearly 1 million in 1930, there were more than 2.3 million in 1936/37. The Olympic Games drew huge crowds, as did the many international conferences that convened in Berlin, Munich, Dresden, and Heidelberg during the early years of National Socialist rule. Germans in turn went abroad in greater numbers, too, facilitated by the newly launched Kraft durch Freude programs that enabled even lower-middle-class families to spend some vacation time cruising Norwegian fjords or hiking in the Austrian Alps. Mass tourism, of course, was still far from being a reality, and Italians had to share their gorgeous beaches and cities only with well-to-do travellers, mainly from Britain and Germany.

Having experienced the era of mass tourism, we might be rather cautious in judging the effects of transnational travel. Nowadays, not many would wholeheartedly subscribe to Friedrich Naumann’s enthusiastic comment in 1900 when he visited Paris and its Universal Exposition. Encounters of this kind would, he noted confidently, foster “mutual knowledge and respect” and bridge the gulf of ignorance and distrust between nations. But the strong networks of cultural and economic exchange that existed among European middle and upper classes before 1914 did not prevent the outbreak of hostilities, and the Europeanist movements did not deter German political and economic elites from engaging in a new war in 1939.

Still, it would be inappropriate to dismiss Germany’s European ties because they could not prevent war. Their significance lies not in what they could not accomplish, but in what they managed to achieve. These achievements should not be sought in short-term events, but in long-term developments. While nation-states worked energetically to assert themselves, they were also nurturing strong and diverse bonds of communication and interaction with one another. They accumulated knowledge about what went on abroad, and they permitted personal as well as
formal relationships that enabled the mutual transfer of ideas, goods, people, and institutional arrangements. These transfers, to be sure, did not rule out distinct national patterns of development. Much of what was imported changed by way of adaptation to a new environment (fashion and food are good examples). But despite these changes, transfers still allowed for a high degree of structural affinity between European societies. A great deal of what foreign visitors encountered in Germany (and vice versa) was recognizable, even if somewhat different from home. That this affinity had to be artificially played down in times of political crisis only testifies to its real strength and perceived impact.

V.

It is still very much an open question to what extent the First World War changed or overthrew this pattern. Although some international organizations banned Germans from attending in the postwar years, others did not; especially scientists remained well-connected. There was still considerable interest in the policies of other European governments, for example, policy on disabled veterans. Politicians as well as members of social and professional groups kept in touch across borders. The same held true for the numerous internationalist movements that had formed during the second half of the nineteenth century: Socialists, feminists, pacifists, Zionists. At the same time, the Europeanist network of the 1920s and 1930s took great pains to stress a common European heritage, spirit and mission. Their effort was clearly set against what they perceived as severe threats to European power: the emergence of the United States as a global player; the Soviet Union as a revolutionary regime attractive to other societies; and the rise of colonial independence movements. Confronted with these challenges, Europe west of Russia was called upon to bury its national rivalries and resume its quest for world supremacy.

This appeal turned out to be the radically new element in public discourse after World War I, and it continued to play an important role. It even entered National Socialist propaganda, which used it as a means to rally support for the German assault on Soviet Russia. The war in the East was marketed as a European crusade against Bolshevism, and some sturdy Europeanists eagerly endorsed it as a struggle for Europe’s defense and unification. Nazi Germany here claimed to act on behalf of true European values against an alien power opposed to them. This propaganda reflected and built on the strength that the Europeanist discourse had attained during the interwar period. It isolated the basic element of this discourse—the threat to Europe from non-European forces—and relocated it so as to serve the end of constructing a Greater German Empire.
To some extent, this argument remained effective even after 1945, with two major differences: First, the United States was now part of the European or rather Western alliance and played a hegemonic role. Somewhat ironically, it went from being a challenger of European power to serving as the protector of (West) European autonomy. Second, Germany had given up all ambitions to pursue a course of its own in European politics. The visions of German domination over Central Europe that had inspired public opinion since the late nineteenth century were not—and could not be—revitalized. Even more important, the elites lost their appetite for an Eastern colonial empire. Long-held ideas of German superiority (and supremacy) with regard to culture, race, or state organization were likewise abandoned. The only constant element was anti-communism, which helped West Germany forge a close alliance with other West European countries.

In more than one way, then, the loss of the Eastern provinces and the partition of the remaining German territory helped the Bonn Republic to redraw the map of its interests. It favored the western-leaning elements of transnational communication, and it strengthened the role of those border areas that had long maintained special relations with neighboring countries. It is not accidental that many of the politicians who initially navigated the process of Western European integration came from precisely those contact zones: Konrad Adenauer from the Rhineland, Robert Schuman from Lorraine/Luxemburg, Alcide de Gasperi from Trent. Their efforts of supra-national institution-building were backed by an equally long (though troubled) history of economic cooperation rooted in the post-World War I period. They were supported by Europeanist activism that gained momentum in the immediate aftermath of World War II.

I will resist the temptation to take a closer look at the accelerated process of Europeanization as it unfolded under the umbrella of the integrationist project. Let me just briefly mention two major innovations that are of crucial structural importance. First, the project of European integration offered a strong institutional backbone to a long-standing, but fluid and decentralized culture of transnational communication. These institutions were tied both to interests and values. They provided a space to negotiate converging as well as conflicting interests in a framework of cooperation and trust. Second, this framework proved viable and sustainable for two reasons. On the one hand, it compensated for the material and immaterial losses that most member states had experienced during the 1940s and 1950s. Germany was undoubtedly the biggest loser, but Italy followed right behind, and France, Belgium, and the Netherlands all mourned the dissolution of their colonial empires. Against this background of general decay and powerlessness, the Western European proj-
ect promised comfort and consolation, along with a vision of recovery and stability. This vision was, on the other hand, utterly defensive. It did not aim to regain world power, but was meant to strengthen Western Europe against the Soviet Empire. The pressures of the Cold War thus contributed heavily to bridging conflicting views and policies among EU member states.

It remains to be seen, of course, how the integrationist project will develop now that this pressure is gone. Although I do not want to downplay the many difficulties that are currently haunting the EU, it seems that during the last fifty years an institutional and mental environment has developed in which multilateral deliberation, decision-making and learning can continue to flourish. The fact that this environment is not restricted to Brussels Eurocrats but extends to multiple initiatives within civil society and a growing number of “multinational” citizens, contributes to its viability and vividness. The institutional framework in turn helps to sustain networks of transnational communication and makes them less vulnerable to political crises.

As historians, we have a great opportunity to look at European transnationalism, and, to start with, at Germany’s European connectedness, both before and after the integration process was launched. We can retrieve a largely hidden history of interaction that involves personal and family relations as well as social movements and institutions. We can reconstruct communication channels and follow their directions, rhythms, and outcome. We can examine structures that either encouraged or complicated exchange. Within German history, this approach would redirect attention to border areas and their peculiar web of interaction. But it would also take a fresh look at broader connections (both of elites and non-elites) and assess their impact on social, economic, political and cultural developments. Within European history, the approach, if extended to other countries, would eventually provide an empirical basis for, or critique of, claims about European identities, common features, and shared experiences. It would allow us to detect connections as well as ruptures, asymmetrical as well as symmetrical communication.

In conclusion, we might ask ourselves to what extent such an approach embodies a tendency of “normalizing” German history. Is it perhaps too harmonious a way of looking at Germany’s recent past? Does it polish that past to a degree that its dramatic peculiarities, its catastrophic edges, are no longer visible? What about the shadow lines (to use Thomas Nipperdey’s expression) of European encounters and networks? Where do xenophobia, national hatred, and negative stereotyping fit in? Is not the persistence of anti-Semitism—genuinely fueled by allegations about Jewish internationalism—a powerful argument against any attempt to discover Europeanist currents and increasing cross-national traffic? And
what becomes of the Holocaust, as one of the crucial moments and defining features of Germany’s twentieth-century history, if viewed with Europeanizing eyes?

These are urgent and tantalizing questions that do not lend themselves to quick and easy answers. Generally speaking, the Europeanization of German history has to be constantly and thoroughly aware of the Janus-faced ambiguity of transnationalism, which has never been congruent with harmonious relations of mutual respect and understanding. Transnationalism in the modern period has always existed within a framework of nationalism and strong nation-states that pose limits and restrictions. In many instances, like wars, the negative experience far outweighed the positive effects (without dismissing them altogether). Even tourism very often tends to strengthen rather than weaken national identities and nationalist urges of demarcation. On the other hand, national identities are not fixed and stable entities, and they coexist with other identities that transcend national boundaries (like religion, class, ethnicity, or gender). The politics of nation-states that have been shaping European history throughout the nineteenth and most of the twentieth century are stamped by foreign influences and comparison. Intellectual and political movements like racism and anti-Semitism likewise have a Europe-wide history; any intellectual history that would trace their channels of communication and entanglement would thus contribute greatly to our understanding of Europeanist networking. The extent to which anti-Semitism can really be seen as a reaction to internationalism should be reconsidered; at the very least, the absence of similar criticism of the aristocracy as a highly international class integrating all parts of Europe raises some doubts as to the validity of this interpretation. The Holocaust, finally, is already widely perceived as a “European” experience. Although there can be no contestation of its German origins, its victims were mainly non-Germans, and the mass murder of European Jewry has left its mark on every European society. Moreover, German perpetrators relied heavily on the active and passive collaboration of non-Germans who either willingly or through force aided in the repression, deportation, and killing of their Jewish neighbors and compatriots. Europeanizing the Holocaust is thus not about relativizing German authorship, responsibility, and guilt, but about acknowledging European cooperation and participation. As such, it might ultimately form the cornerstone of a European memory focusing on the (unevenly) shared experience of utter destruction and inhumanity in Germany’s and Europe’s darkest hour.

By this point, it should have become clear that the Europeanizing perspective will do more than just produce an “embedded” type of national history. It will not, to be sure, replace national history with anything like European or even global history. It gives credit to the fact that
nation-states were, and still are, powerful historical players. They evolve and develop, however, in an international environment that is highly competitive, comparative, and relational. Moreover, the approach draws attention to the existence of non-state agents like professional groups, border regions, or social movements that have established their own transnational ties and networks beyond and below the scope of national politics. These networks connected various parts of Europe on cultural, economic, and social levels that need closer scrutiny. The extent to which they were affected by international crises and the degree to which they themselves were capable of influencing “high politics” are interesting and altogether unexplored questions. By asking these (and other) questions, the Europeanizing approach sets out to restore Germany’s relational features and properties, its history of entanglement with other parts of Europe. Applied to other countries, it could eventually produce an integrative European history worthy of the name.

Notes


4 As to the “convergence” of European societies, see Hartmut Kaelble, A Social History of Western Europe, 1880–1980 (Dublin, 1989); Goran Therborn, European Modernity and Beyond: The Trajectory of European Societies, 1945–2000 (London, 1995).


9 Nikolaus Buschmann and Dieter Langewiesche, eds., Der Krieg in den Gründungsmysnthen europäischer Nationen und der USA (Frankfurt, 2003); Jörg Echternkamp and Sven Oliver


11 My thanks to Daniel Brückenhaus for sharing this information with me.


16 Actually, she did not mind this hotel-like atmosphere, but she complained about what she described as the innate taciturnity of scientists which made her task as hostess to keep conversation going rather difficult. Anna von Helmholtz, Ein Lebensbild in Briefen, vol. 1 (Berlin, 1929), 336.

17 Hans Fürstenberg, Erinnerungen (Dusseldorf, 1968), 19.


21 Frevert, Eurovisionen, 122–127.
EUROPEANIZING GERMAN HISTORY

Comment on the Eighteenth Annual Lecture of the GHI, November 18, 2004

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We are all in Ute Frevert’s debt for a bold and imaginative lecture. I should also like to begin on a personal note. When I fly to Germany (and today it takes me less time to fly to Germany from the United States than it did thirty years ago to travel to Germany by train and ferry from England), my destination is often the city of Mainz. So my German cultural stereotypes are different from those of Ute Frevert’s students: not fast cars, but the constant chug of river traffic on the Rhine; not Oktoberfest but Karneval; not sausage, but Saumagen. But if this small corner of the Rhineland has a distinctive culture and history, it is also part of a larger history. It forms one of those “contact zones” to which Ute Frevert referred. Mainz sits astride east-west trade routes. Its cultural and political exchanges with France form a chapter in modern European history. Its river links Germany with Switzerland, France, and the Netherlands. Historically a center of Italian immigration, the city accommodated its share of East Prussians and Silesians after 1945; now the immigrants are more likely to be Turkish.

Draw a cross section through German history at any geographical point, and you find something both smaller and larger. Teasing out the implications of that is, in many ways, the story of German (but not only German) historiography over recent decades. Just as the nation-state has been challenged by subnational and supranational claims, so the focus of historians has shifted to units of inquiry both smaller and larger than the nation. This double shift has opened our minds to that bracing intellectual exercise the French historian Jacques Revel called the “play of scales.”¹ Interest in the micro- and the macrolevels has, of course, been driven by distinctive concerns. The turn to the local, the regional, and the microhistorical realm of everyday experience was a reaction against social-science history along the lines of Charles Tilly’s Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons.² The emphasis on local knowledge and the human dimension belongs to a well-known shift of historical attention from structures to meanings, from social aggregates to particular cases. The turn to the transnational came later, and had its own causes. These include current debates about globalization and cross-border movements, as well as the deepening process of European integration, all of which have affected how historians think about the past.
Yet concern with the local and the transnational are also two sides of the same historical coin. Both have been driven by an interest in identities, especially the multiple, overlapping identities that are such a hallmark of modern historiography, sometimes to the point of self-caricature. The local and the transnational perspective both allow us to question an apparently stable German identity. For example: What did it mean around 1900 to be a German who was also a Pfälzer and a (reluctant) Bavarian, the more so when you lived on the French border, probably had family members who had settled in the Banat two centuries earlier, and had an uncle in Milwaukee?3 Which brings me to a second common thread that links the local and transnational perspectives: a growing interest in space as the other essential historian’s dimension along with time.4 I mean space here in both the figurative sense of mental topography, and the literal, geographical sense. It sounds so obvious. But for too long the spatial dimension of German history has been lost or buried, perhaps because of the ghosts of Friedrich Ratzel and Karl Haushofer. Anyone who has looked at geopolitical literature of the 1930s or National Socialist planning documents of the early 1940s is familiar with those maps of Europe, filled with huge dynamic arrows that usually pointed east.5 That is an indelible aspect of the history of Germany in Europe. But it should not inhibit us from turning—or returning—to a more geographical conception of history. The Europeanized German history of the future will, I believe, have more maps (it could hardly have fewer than the standard modern histories of Germany), and that is something our visually-oriented students will thank us for, if they do not in fact demand it.

A generation ago, “Europeanizing” German history meant taking Germany and comparing it with other nation-states. How did its economic development, or its political evolution, measure up against those of other nation-states like Britain or France? Or it might be a particular class, or political movement, that was compared across national boundaries. I am sure Ute Frevert and I would agree that there are still strong arguments for a comparative history of this kind, although preferably across a wider range of nations and subjects and with an awareness (very apparent in some recent comparative studies) that the entities being compared are less stable than we once imagined them to be. But Ute Frevert is doing something different: tracking movements of people and ideas across borders. She refers to “webs of communication and interaction,” and I want to pull out that word “web.” It reflects the impact that anthropology has had on history over the last generation: how Clifford Geertz has encouraged us to look at culture as “webs of significance.”6 But it also reminds us that, at the opposite end of the spectrum, it has been a watchword of historians who advocate really big history. I think here of the recent global history by William H. and John McNeill, *The
Human Web. The idea of the web seems to me to fall somewhere between a metaphor and an universal paradigm of human history. Call it a heuristic device—at any rate, a useful idea to think with, and one that has the great virtue once again of connecting history at the small and the large scales.

When it comes to the temporal scale, I think Ute Frevert is right to question currently popular notions of European integration, which present a foreshortened version of the present while projecting a timeless tableau of European heritage onto the past. The draft preamble to the European constitution springs to mind, of which it has also been rather unkindly said that requiring Europe’s school students to read it would contravene the ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Europeanization is indeed a long story, and a dynamic one. The medievalist Robert Bartlett refers to the “Europeanization of Europe” in the centuries before 1300, a process to which German speakers made a large contribution. In some ways our medieval and early modern colleagues have had a sharper eye than we moderns for the movements that stitched Europe together (although also causing new divisions), whether flows of commodities, the spread of architectural styles, or religious explosions with a pan-European reach. Merchants, mendicants, and mercenary armies had moved across Europe for centuries before the modern age of nation-states with which Ute Frevert is concerned.

What, if anything, made that age distinctive, other than the fact that it was an age of nation-states? One answer is that those who lived in it were very conscious of being (or at least self-conscious about not being) modern. And one reason for that was the way those connecting webs thickened with the arrival of new means of communication, surely a key element if we are looking to Europeanize any national history of the modern era. It is not just that the railway, steamship, telegraph, telephone, internal combustion engine, and airplane arrived on the scene. From Heinrich Heine in the 1830s to the writers who celebrated a “wonderland of technology” in the 1920s, these modern marvels prompted reflection about Europe becoming smaller or its national borders less relevant. For most Germans, new means of communication altered perceptions of time and space. This web was more like an iron skeleton—although it was also, perhaps, part of Max Weber’s “iron cage.”

This was the material undergirding, and sometimes the subject matter, of the networks and exchanges we heard about in the lecture. Ute Frevert’s arguments pointed to the rich research possibilities. Her examples suggest the value of trying, for example, to combine a biographical or prosopographical approach with one based on particular bodies of academic or professional knowledge. Could one reconstruct patterns of exchange by linking personal connections to institutional networks, such as professional organizations and their gatherings, the election of honor-
ary foreign members, journals and the expanding world of print culture, perhaps common efforts to standardize knowledge or training? In some areas—medicine, say, or forestry—Germans enjoyed high prestige: in others, like civil engineering, less so. Another rather unruly body of professional expertise, still in its infancy in the early twentieth century but decidedly nonnational in scope, linked people concerned about the environmental effects of economic and technological change: airborne and waterborne pollution, the threat of “invasive species,” and the decline of highly valued indigenous species. Pan-European efforts to save the salmon of the Rhine went back to the 1840s, although they grew more sustained as the problem worsened in the years 1869–85.11

Alternatively, one might look at the mutual traffic in cultural practices or ideas between just two countries. Consider Germany and Britain in the nineteenth century as an example. There was the huge impact of German musical culture in Britain (in Manchester, capital of the Industrial Revolution, both the Halle Orchestra and a vigorous choral culture were “Made in Germany”). Or think of the uneven but still notable impact of German philosophical ideas, from Carlyle and George Eliot to the Edwardians. German local government was admired in Britain; and there, as elsewhere, the German university model helped to transform the indigenous species, especially outside Oxford and Cambridge. The traffic flowing in the opposite direction would include the enthusiastic German reception of Darwin (and of post-Darwinian eugenicists like Francis Galton), the Garden City Movement, the English domestic house architecture taken up by Hermann Muthesius, and the spread of British sports like soccer, rugby, and horse-racing.

These British originals were appropriated, much as an earlier generation turned Shakespeare into a German. Put these borrowings together with other European cultural influences on Germany in the period around 1900—French art, Scandinavian literature, the Tolstoy-cult and the occult currents that flowed strongly from Russia—and they suggest the peculiarly eclectic, hybrid modernity of the late Kaiserreich.12 (And hybridity will surely be a key category of a Europeanized, as of a globalized, German history.) Berlin, as Ute Frevert notes, was a center of this nervous experimentation with cultural forms. Hybridity of another kind was on display in a number of places that established Germany as the center of a truly European travel and leisure culture, places like Wiesbaden and Baden-Baden where one could (in the words of Sir Horace Rumbold) hear “the clatter of a thousand tongues in a dozen different languages.”13 In the great German spas, the tennis and golf were English, the croupiers French, the tenors Italian, and the femmes fatales Russian.

There was, of course, a darker side to all this. Just as the expansion of trade led to a demand for tariffs and “protection of national labor,” so the
cultural traffic across German borders fostered resentment, resistance, and negative stereotypes. Hugo von Tschudi, after all, was sacked as director of the National Gallery in Berlin for acquiring French Impressionist paintings (although he was promptly hired in Munich). A large body of work on cultural conservatives, radical nationalists, and morality campaigners has shown how extensive this kind of backlash was.\textsuperscript{14} There was also a dark side to another chapter of German history that can only be written in European (and global) terms: the history of migration. By 1914, there were around one and a quarter million foreign workers in Imperial Germany: Dutch, Italians, and above all Poles and Ruthenes from Tsarist Russia or Austrian Galicia. Anxiety and contempt underlay the reactions of educated middle-class Germans to this “Slav flood,” and immigration gave birth to a regime of regulation and medical examinations designed to protect the German “national body.” These controls were especially stringent on the eastern border; so were the procedures designed to prevent “Eastern Jews,” who were crossing German soil en route to the New World, from staying in Germany.\textsuperscript{15} In the same years, German historians and popular writers began to write in ominously chauvinistic terms about German settlements in central and eastern Europe during earlier centuries, constructing a heroic narrative about a German “civilizing mission” across its eastern “frontier” lands that drew a dramatic contrast between the “new green of German industriousness” and the “swamps and marshes” of Slavic peoples.\textsuperscript{16} We can, of course, argue about the degree to which these things foreshadowed the European catastrophe of the twentieth century: genocides, forced labor, “settlement” plans, and mass expulsions in which Germans were in turn perpetrators and victims.

That brings me to the most provocative part of today’s lecture: the part devoted to that special form of cross-border movement we call war. War has prompted many historians to write counterfactually; it has led Ute Frevert to think counterintuitively. And it is counterintuitive: war as marriage mart, armed conflict as the pursuit of European understanding by other means. War, the great catalyst or midwife—pick your metaphor—produces unintended consequences like nothing else in human history (except the long-term effects of the changes we make to our environment). Years ago, Marc Ferro’s book on the Great War included a chapter on “war, the liberator”: the intoxicated popular sense in 1914 of being freed from the suffocating constraints within Old Europe (if I may use that phrase).\textsuperscript{17} Those hopes were soon mocked for millions of men and their families. Educational commonalities among European elites now mattered little. Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg’s son (a Rhodes Scholar) and Prime Minister Herbert Asquith’s son were both educated at Balliol
College, Oxford. The two young men were killed on the Western Front within a year of each other.18

The German pacifist Alfred Fried argued in 1914 that war would advance the cause of peace. This was supremely optimistic, but turned out to be true in the long run.19 Now, we know what John Maynard Keynes had to say about that: In the long run, we’re all dead. But that is too easy a response as well: Future generations can reap the unintended, perhaps undeserved rewards of earlier destruction. Ute Frevert’s arguments are disturbing and important. History is not the outcome of what actors intend. It proceeds dialectically; it often happens behind our backs. Some of the most incisive illustrations of that came at the end of today’s lecture, when Ute Frevert argued that the idea of Europe was really born, then reborn, only after two twentieth-century wars had so completely undermined what many Europeans liked to think of as their civilized values. And at both of these historical junctures, the idea owed much to Europeans defining themselves against others—Americans, Russians, colonial peoples—in relation to whom Europe had been weakened by war. Not the least provocative aspect of the lecture is the way it requires us to compare as well as contrast the position of Germany in Europe after 1918 and 1945.

Ute Frevert has offered us a bold prospectus. She sets out some of the opportunities presented by a transnational approach, makes us think again about the trajectory of modern German history, and raises questions about the shadings of light and dark in that history. Let me end by underlining three fundamentals where we are in full agreement. First, European integration owes much to informal connections that long predate the European Union and its predecessors. Second, as European citizens (which both of us are), we do best if we reject the comforting pabulum of European civics and try to uncover the more complex historical dynamics of Germany in Europe. And finally, for historians, the promise held out by “Europeanizing” (and indeed “globalizing”) German history is enormous.20 Thank you again for showing us all how we might start to realize that promise.

Notes
4 See David Blackbourn, A Sense of Place: New Directions in German History. The 1998 Annual Lecture of the German Historical Institute London (London, 1999); Jürgen Osterhammel, “Die

5 Examples in Mechtild Rössler and Sabine Schleiermacher, eds., Der “Generalplan Ost”: Hauptlinien der nationalsozialistischen Planungs- und Vernichtungspolitik (Berlin, 1993).


11 Götzh Kuhn, Die Fischerei am Oberrhein (Stuttgart, 1976), 58.


19 Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and a World without War (Princeton, 1975), 324.

For most of the half-century following the Second World War, the Atlantic Alliance was the linchpin of relations between the United States and Europe. Throughout the Cold War years, we were united by fundamental common interests in the preservation of individual freedom, the defense of democracy against authoritarianism, and the maintenance of world peace.

The success of the Alliance was remarkable. Through mutual cooperation within a strong framework of regional and international institutions and an underpinning of broadly shared aims and values, peace was preserved, Europe was rebuilt, Germany was reunited, and the Cold War was brought to a successful end. Trade barriers fell, world trade expanded, the international financial system was strengthened, European unity made remarkable strides, and people’s standard of living rose to unprecedented levels. The commonality of our fundamental interests was rarely in doubt, and the positive and strong relationship between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany remained a key element of Western unity.

The future, however, has recently looked less promising. The twenty-first century is still in its beginning stages, but to say that the first years have not been auspicious as regards the continuation of the strong and harmonious partnership between our two countries is to state the obvious. At no time since the end of the war have there been more tensions, sharp words, and policy disagreements between us, with language on both sides that would have been unthinkable even a few short years ago. The discordant tone in official relations, recent efforts to mute it notwithstanding, has had disturbing spillover effects on the media and public opinion. Emotion rather than restraint has been the order of the day, especially as regards the events in Iraq and the Middle East, but on other issues as well. The differential spin in reporting on the same events in Iraq and the Middle East, as well as on domestic developments in our two countries by, say, the German public television stations ARD and ZDF and the major German print media on the one hand, and their American counterparts on the other, has been startling.
Never since the Second World War has German public opinion been as negative and critical of U.S. policies as today: 70 percent or more of Germans are said to disapprove of U.S. policy on Iraq, anti-Americanism is disturbingly high, and critical stereotypes of U.S. society, never far below the surface, have once again blossomed. The openly polemical anti-Bush books of Michael Moore grace German bestseller lists and are given credence as gospel truths. What I think of his views is often the first question from the floor when I speak to German audiences, particularly young people. Nothing has struck me as more surprising and worrisome than repeatedly being greeted with standing ovations when I have expressed reservations about elements of U.S. policy, or the stony silences I have encountered when defending others. Recent statistics indicating that noticeably fewer German students are currently choosing the United States for their overseas studies may be just another indication of this situation.

Nor is this an entirely one-sided matter. On the U.S. side, criticisms of German policy and a more negative attitude toward German domestic problems have also been evident. I am not merely referring to Secretary Rumsfeld’s disdainful dismissal of Germany as part of an old, less relevant Europe. I have in mind also the depiction of the Federal Republic as the sick man of Europe, unwilling to invest in its own defense, and as a sclerotic welfare society, living beyond its means, losing its competitive edge, and incapable of achieving needed reforms. Occasionally, such unflattering stories have been coupled with thinly-veiled complaints about German ingratitude for U.S. postwar aid, the defense of Berlin, and the American military shield against the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and with portrayals of the Federal Republic as a weak and willing junior partner of French obstructionism bent on creating Europe as a third force standing apart from America, rather than as a partner in a strong U.S.-European alliance.

These are dangerously distorted attitudes on both sides, and perhaps I have stated them somewhat starkly. In all fairness it needs to be said that the worst may be behind us, and that the recent evidence is that cooler heads may yet prevail. The German Chancellor and the U.S. President have lately taken pains to project a more positive image, though hardly yet a close one. And *Time* magazine’s recent cover story on what is right with Germany also signals a less sour mood. Perhaps a major German publication will soon make a reciprocal contribution and point out what is right in the United States. Perhaps such an article is already in the works somewhere. It wouldn’t hurt.

The basic fact nevertheless is that the future of the U.S.-German partnership remains uncertain. The American people have just elected George W. Bush to a second four-year term. Within two years or less, Germany
will similarly vote on a new government. The time is opportune, therefore, to step back and examine some basic questions. To wit: In the changed circumstances of the post-Cold War world, what remains of the past assumptions of mutual interest on which our previous close relations were based? Is the old logic of the Atlantic alliance, the framework for close U.S.-German relations, obsolete, as some have alleged, or is there a compelling case for it even under the different conditions of today and the foreseeable future? If so, what is the likelihood of a return to civility and mutually beneficial cooperation, and what must be done on both sides to bring it about?

It is these questions that I want to address this evening. Before doing so, however, allow me a brief personal aside. Germany is the country of my birth, but I left it at age thirteen, and for most of my life, America has been my home. Since the early 1950s, I have been a frequent visitor to Germany in official and private capacities, during my two tours of duty in three different Democratic administrations, and in other years as an academic, businessman, and banker. More to the point, for the last six years as much as a quarter or more of my time has been spent in Berlin, helping the German authorities to create the Jewish Museum there. In a real sense, therefore, throughout much of my professional career, and particularly in recent years, I have had a foot in both worlds. Of course, I know my own country best, but I have also come to know Germany rather well, and have learned to admire the country’s remarkable rise from the disaster of National Socialism into a strong and stable Western democracy. My current activities in particular have brought me into contact with a broad spectrum of the political establishment, and with German citizens in all walks of life; including young Germans, with whom I speak frequently, and who visit our museum in large numbers.

This is the personal perspective I bring to the subject under discussion. And here I am reminded, finally, that Helmut Schmidt, who occupied this podium a year ago, began his remarks by professing his warm feelings for the United States, and the confession that if unable to live in Germany, emigrating to America would have been his next best alternative. I can reciprocate, even if only in part. I don’t know about emigrating: I had to do that once, in the opposite direction, and reversing track a second time would frankly not be an option for me. Yet, much like his warm feelings for America, I too have a soft spot for Germany. Not, to be sure, for the old Germany of my youth, but for the postwar Germany of today.

I have great respect for the strength of German democracy, for its talented people, and for their commitment to building a tolerant and socially just society. I also especially respect the effort of current generations to confront honestly the Nazi crimes of the past, to make amends
where possible, and to remain vigilant against racism and bigotry in all its forms.

What critical comments I shall make regarding recent German policies and pronouncements are therefore offered in a spirit of friendship and understanding. They will in any case be more than even-handed regarding what has transpired in each of our countries. For in this, I have a very clear conviction: Whatever the merits of the disagreement between us over Iraq and other matters, mistakes were made in the diplomacy of both countries, and unnecessarily so. For this, I think, there is plenty of blame to go around.

II.

The essence of the case of those who hold that the recent U.S.-German unpleasantness over Iraq is not merely a temporary estrangement, but evidence of a long-term structural divergence of national interests is as follows. With the end of the Cold War, the argument goes, the Atlantic Alliance has declined in importance, and the same applies to a close U.S.-German partnership, because the strategic priorities of the two countries have moved in different directions. Freed of the need for protection from the Soviet threat, Germany is less dependent on the United States, and is bound to be a less reliable U.S. partner. Its primary focus is on regional relations within the EU, enlarged to 25 members, and less on allying itself with U.S. global interests. The enlarged EU, moreover, is a work in progress, with weak and uncoordinated defense capabilities and without a common foreign policy. Germany’s weight within the EU and the surrender of some degree of sovereignty to it limit the Federal Republic’s freedom of action and lead to a preference to pursue German influence on wider non-European issues through the rule-making of international institutions, while avoiding confrontation in favor of negotiation and compromise in all but the most dire situations of imminent danger.

In contrast, it is said, U.S. priorities are overwhelmingly global, and have shifted from a focus on Atlanticism and Europe to remaking the Middle East and to bilateral relations with others. Germany is a regional power, the United States a distinctly global one. As the world’s only superpower, America has less interest than Germany in strengthening the power of the UN and other multilateral institutions, instead preferring to maintain freedom of action to use its overwhelming military power, and to focus on traditional diplomacy with key sovereign states such as Russia and Japan, and rising new powers like China and India. In a world with many new problems, U.S. strategic priorities have shifted to fighting terrorism and to dealing with major trouble spots outside Europe, those
constituting the greatest threats to world peace: the Middle East, Central Asia, and Korea.

This, in brief, is the core argument underlying what Henry Kissinger has termed the “structural estrangement” of America from Europe. There are several variants and extensions of this basic idea. Some Europeans, for example, see in U.S. policies under Bill Clinton, and more explicitly under George W. Bush, not only hegemonic but much more sinister motives. The Bush doctrine of preemption and prevention is for them a clear manifestation of American imperialism. Some go further and suspect the United States of having abandoned its long-standing support for European unity and of being engaged in a policy of benign neglect, if not a deliberate effort to undermine the EU, in order to clip the wings of a pesky competitor and to facilitate picking off individual EU countries in ad hoc “coalitions of the willing.”

This type of argument, it seems to me, raises the following questions worth further analysis: Are the differences in our respective current strategic priorities real, and are they sufficiently fundamental to signal an inevitable, permanent estrangement between us? Or, to the contrary, are there both traditional and new common interests between us that provide the basis for a U.S.-European partnership at the beginning of the twenty-first century, much as it existed in the second half of the twentieth? In other words, is what unites us still more important than what divides us, and could a reinvigorated Atlantic partnership continue to serve our mutual interests?

III.

As to the first point, it is certainly true that our respective strategic priorities have changed and diverged in some important respects. Recent world developments have fundamentally altered the situation on both sides of the Atlantic, and it is obvious that our partnership during the Cold War was based on some circumstances that are now history: first and foremost, fortunately, the need to counter the Soviet threat to Europe. It is equally true that, as new issues have arisen—enlargement of the EU, world terrorism, new trouble spots in the Middle East and in Central and East Asia—our respective foreign policy priorities have shifted as well.

A further important post-Cold War factor with significant implications is that the United States now stands as the world’s sole superpower. Militarily, both in size and advanced weaponry, we live in a new world in which the U.S. dominates without real counterweights. In absolute numbers, its almost half-trillion-dollar annual military budget practically equals that of the entire rest of the world combined; it is three times that of all other NATO countries, and eight times that of Russia and of China.
It is, however, still only 3.5 percent of the U.S. GDP, attesting to yet another important reality: the great strength and vitality of the American economy over recent years, and U.S. success in achieving a relatively more rapid adjustment to globalism, in contrast to a number of EU countries. This is especially true of Germany and France, where this process has been more halting, growth in productivity and GDP sluggish, and unemployment high.

Finally, the September 11 attacks on the United States and the menace of international terrorism have clearly had a differential impact on American priorities on the one hand, and on those of Germany and the rest of the EU on the other. It is therefore hardly surprising that it should have evoked a different intensity of responses between us. It is, after all, Americans who are the terrorists’ principal declared targets and America which has suffered the greatest losses. Moreover, it is American soldiers who are the first to be put in harm’s way when trouble erupts.

All this is true enough, but the question is whether, as has been suggested, it follows that the United States will permanently downplay the importance of its relations with Europe, and that German policy will shift inward toward its EU relationships at the expense of close relations with the United States. On the surface, this may appear to be a logical inference, but it strikes me that the following alternate hypothesis is equally plausible. Simply put, it is that many vital common interests between us remain, that equally critical new ones involving both common dangers and shared opportunities have arisen, and that this constitutes a sufficient basis and, indeed, a strong argument for a mutual commitment to a refocused transatlantic alliance and the close U.S.-German relations that have served us well over many years.

Underlying this hypothesis stands the conviction that though differences exist between us that will not be easily resolved, there remains enormous potential strength in Atlantic unity far greater than any of us can marshal alone to confront critical common challenges in the years ahead. This audience is certainly familiar with most of them, so I shall merely list a few of the most important ones. To begin with, we surely have a common interest in countering the threat to our security from instabilities in the Middle East. Whatever our past disagreements over the U.S. military intervention in Iraq, working toward the establishment of a stable, peaceful and, hopefully, democratic government in Iraq is of equal importance to us. So is collaboration in support of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and in dissuading the Iranians from going nuclear. In the best of circumstances, ending Iraq’s endemic violence, mending its broken economy, and repairing its shattered institutions will require great effort over many years. Everyone today knows that the United States cannot do this alone, and that the United Nations will have to play an
important role. But Germany, the EU, and the United States have a particular stake here, and a coordinated effort of a strong Atlantic partnership and common strategies among our countries possessing most of the needed resources have to be the essential components for achieving the positive outcome that would benefit us all.

Our fate is just as much intertwined in countering world terrorism and dealing with the conditions that spawn it. The United States may have borne the brunt of the threat to world security from the perversions of Muslim fundamentalist fanatics on September 11, but their terrorists have little regard for national borders. They can, and do, strike anywhere: in Spain, Italy or Turkey just as much as in the United States. French, Italian, German, and other EU citizens are subject to the risks of kidnapping, murder, and general mayhem no less than Americans. There is, it seems to me, an urgent need for a permanent defense framework, for clearly coordinated policies and tactics to fight terrorist plots, and for a common Western strategy for dealing with the circumstances that enable the terrorists to mobilize misguided young recruits for their cause.

The list of further vital common priorities is long. There is a broad community of interests between us on such important issues as nuclear non-proliferation, the danger of the dispersion of tactical nuclear weapons, and in protecting our common environment, to name just a few. In all these instances, coordinated U.S. and EU efforts are critical, much as they are when it comes to our vital common stake in the health of the world economy.

Together, the EU and the United States account for roughly half the entire world’s output. The U.S. is the top destination of EU exports and the top source of imports into the EU. In fact, at something like $1 billion a day in transatlantic trade and investment flows, the EU and U.S. have by far the largest bilateral trading and investment relationship in the world. Something like a million telephone calls between Europe and North America and, I am told, an unbelievable 1.4 billion email messages are exchanged every day.

Within this broader context, the U.S.-German relationship is particularly important. Germany is the largest U.S. export market on the continent, and the United States is a key market for German goods. Outside the petroleum sector, Germany’s direct investments in the U.S. rank first; German companies employ over a million U.S. workers; and for some of the largest companies, a quarter or more of total world revenues are generated here. For Daimler-Chrysler, in fact, the United States represents close to 50 percent of worldwide sales. The stake of U.S.-owned companies in Germany is similarly very large. The United States and Germany, moreover, have much that binds and that cannot be forgotten. We are both vital parts of Western society and our people share common
Western values. Forty-two million Americans have, in part, a German heritage. These are ties that are not easily broken.

Close trade and investment ties have been the key to our prosperity. Collaboration within the Atlantic Alliance in building and supporting the institutions that made this progress possible has been the means. I would argue that we continue to face a number of challenges together: to lead in negotiating the lowering of trade barriers through the WTO; coordination between our finance ministers and central bankers to ensure the stability of the world financial systems; support for the IMF and World Bank; working together to promote economic development; and the integration of the rising economies of China and India into the global system.

IV.

This leads us to the next question: Is the experience of the last several years convincing evidence that in spite of these many common interests, our strategic priorities have diverged so fundamentally on other matters as to deprive a continued alliance of its essential basis?

This is what some have argued, but I question it, because though it is true that it has been a particularly difficult time of controversy and disagreement, the immediate past may not provide us with a particularly good view of what lies ahead. It is equally plausible that this may merely have been an unfortunate accident of history, that our recent problems were exacerbated by special, albeit temporary circumstances on both sides of the Atlantic which obscured our common interests and intensified our differences, but which are not a good guide to the future.

The radical shifts in U.S. foreign policy in the years between 2001 and 2003 were a major factor, so let me address these first. Following a disputed election decided in the courts, the administration that took office in the United States on January 20, 2001 chose to break sharply with decades of bipartisan consensus over the fundamental principles of U.S. foreign policy, embarking instead on an alternative course long advocated by a small group of intellectuals, the so-called neo-conservatives.

This is not the place for a detailed analysis of “neocon” views. Suffice it to say that the name itself is probably a misnomer because the neocons are not conservatives at all, at least not in any traditional sense, and are better described as radical activists. While they have been around a long time, they were and remain a small minority of moralists with a simple black-and-white view of a world split between good and evil. Because the United States holds the preponderance of military power, they believe that it should, when necessary, be used preemptively and unilaterally to promote good and defeat evil, by which they mean to spread democracy around the world. They consider military power the key to the relation-
ship between nations, and have a decidedly less favorable view of, if not disdain for, for traditional diplomacy and international institutions, treaties, and commitments that restrict the freedom of the United States to act as it wishes. Nor do they attach high value to the effectiveness of so-called “soft power,” such as economic incentives, alliances, and moral example.

For various reasons of politics and personality, the neoconservatives directly influenced the foreign policy of George W. Bush in the early years, a trend first apparent when the Bush administration proclaimed its intention to renounce several important international agreements, among them the International Court of Justice, the Kyoto Protocols on Global Warming, and the 1972 ABM Treaty with Russia. There were legitimate problems with each of these, but it was the needlessly peremptory manner and harsh rhetoric, eschewing effective international consultation, that understandably gave our alliance partners the impression that America no longer cared for the views of others and was bent on unilaterally imposing its will.

Yet the neocons have never reflected the mainstream thinking of foreign policy leaders in either of the two major political parties. It was the national trauma of September 11 that created the unique circumstances of an alliance between the neocons and other powerful nationalist voices on the right inside the Bush administration—the Vice President and the Secretary of Defense come to mind—that convinced an inexperienced president to reject the advice of the ablest foreign policy leaders in his own party, including many who served under his father, and to abandon traditional diplomacy based on alliances and international consensus in favor of unilateralism and military intervention, which, at a moment of national agony, found bipartisan support in Congress.

I do not refer to attacking Al Qaeda and the ousting of the Taliban in Afghanistan, for which there was good reason and widespread international support. I do have in mind the notion of an “axis of evil,” the promulgation of the doctrine of military preemption backed by so-called “alliances of the willing,” and, finally, the invasion of Iraq.

It was these policies that brought about the severest strains between us and created the understandable impression that the United States had permanently embarked on a new road, turning its back on traditional alliances and curtailing American support for the United Nations and international law. The fault here was on the American side, but it needs to be said that the severity of the ensuing transatlantic disputes and polemics was caused not by these U.S. actions alone, but also by the nature of the less-than-subtle responses from a Europe unable to speak with a single voice, and with domestic problems and special circumstances of its own, including a tense election campaign underway in Germany. The aggressive maneuverings of the French to organize oppo-
sition to U.S. actions were unwise and needlessly provocative, and played into the Bush administration’s hands. And the unfortunate impression from Berlin that Chancellor Schröder was whipping up opposition in Germany for his own political purposes further fed the flames. Referring to the possibility of an American policy of adventurism was unwise. Schröder’s blunt public statement that Germany would not support the United States, even if authorized by the Security Council, was not merely unhelpful, it was unnecessary. It was, unfortunately, a particularly inopportune moment for dealing with this crisis in a more measured manner, particularly in Germany, or calmer spirits might have prevailed. It cannot be said that it was diplomacy’s finest hour—on either side.

Yet those who saw in this crisis a permanent and unbridgeable divergence of strategic priorities between us may wish to reflect again. The prospects for so radical a permanent change in U.S. foreign policy—the triumph of emotion and misguided ideology over considered long-term national interest and historical experience—were never very good. Recent developments appear to have borne that out.

Had the administration’s Iraq policy fulfilled its promises, the story might have been different, at least for a time. But that was not the case. In fact, few of the predictions and claims made for it were realized. U.S. military power succeeded brilliantly in ousting an awful dictator in record time, yet in the absence of international legitimacy, it created serious problems that remain unresolved. American soldiers were not welcomed as liberators. As of now, close to 1,300 American soldiers have died, many more thousands were wounded, and the numbers are still rising. Iraq is in turmoil, and the number of Iraqi victims is in the tens of thousands. More than 150,000 foreign troops, mostly Americans, occupy the country, and will have to remain there indefinitely. Few knowledgeable observers still believe that anything approaching western-style democracy will take root any time soon. Stability in the Middle East and progress in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict remain elusive, and the fight against Al Qaeda and their sympathizers has, if anything, been complicated. The terror threat in the United States, we are told, has not abated, but worldwide anti-Americanism has risen, at the cost of undermining a precious national asset: our moral authority.

Rhetoric aside, all this is well understood here and is having an impact, with the administration already having moved to adjust the course of its foreign policy, in acknowledgment of what James Mann has called their “spent vision.” Traditional diplomacy is again in the ascendency, and a number of steps have already been taken to repair relations with our traditional allies, including Germany. Signals have gone forth for a greater willingness to share power with the United Nations, accompanied by open appeals for military and peacekeeping help in Iraq and
elsewhere. References to the once loudly proclaimed “axis of evil” are no longer being heard. Talk of spreading democracy around the world behind U.S. military strength has been muted and has lost its meaning in the face of the reality of Pentagon and budget constraints. The neocons, meanwhile, are in some disarray and, at least for the time being, their influence has waned.

I realize that some may argue that these are mere tactical moves, and that it says nothing about a fundamental change in the direction of U.S. foreign policy under a second four-year George W. Bush administration. That is possible. Yet there are a number of signs that important lessons have been learned, and in Congress there has clearly been a mood shift in both parties. The enormous cost of the Iraq war—$200 billion and rising casualties—has been sobering, and the effects on the budget and the military, the constraints this imposes, and the need for international support and alliances are increasingly understood. My point is that it is therefore not unreasonable to suggest that the foreign policy the re-elected U.S. president will pursue will be more cautious and marked by more realism and reliance on traditional diplomacy and alliance than before.

V.

This, then, leads me to a few final thoughts on where this leaves us for the future. For almost half a century, the Atlantic Alliance served us well, and a close U.S.-German partnership was one of its key components. Though we had a common Western strategy, the transatlantic dialogue was rarely free of controversies, sometimes quite fundamental and emotional ones, over East/West tactics, nuclear policy, and issues of trade and finance. The Cold War was difficult and tense, but we understood that in the interrelated world of the last half of the twentieth century, neither of us could fight it alone. Whatever the arguments, we were determined not to repeat the mistakes of the interwar years, and we knew that we shared common interests in defending our democratic way of life, the security of our people, the health of the world economy, and the maintenance of peace. We understood that we needed each other, and so together we created the regional and international institutions that provided the framework for the alliance. Our partnership stood as the cornerstone of our foreign policies and led to the successful end of the Cold War and an unprecedented rise in the standard of living of our people.

Today the West faces another critical time, with dangers no less severe in a world in which technology has intertwined our affairs more closely than ever. Perhaps the risks we confront at the beginning of the twenty-first century are even greater and more complex than those of the
last decades of the twentieth. The times are different, and there are new divergences of viewpoints and strategic priorities. Yet, as I have argued, our common interests remain compelling.

We are now in a critical period of opportunity for reflection and policy reassessment in the United States, in Germany, and in the EU. Elections will be held, choices will be made, and much is at stake. I would suggest that there is evidence of a return to internationalism and alliances in U.S. foreign policy, though it would be an overstatement to say that the outcome of the debate on this side of the Atlantic is a foregone conclusion. From the earliest beginnings of this republic, there has always been a desire for freedom from entangling alliances, and once upon a time the oceans surrounding this continent were a formidable protective barrier making American isolationism a plausible policy. We last pursued an isolationist policy, with unfortunate consequences, during the period between the wars. Wisely, we chose differently after 1945, because we had learned from the past and understood that to fight the Cold War in the modern world, only a policy of internationalism based on a strong alliance with the other Western democracies would work.

Today we live in a different world, a world in which the United States stands alone with overwhelming military power. It is a world in which many of the rules of the game have changed, a world threatened not by military conflicts between the uniformed armies of sovereign states, but by shadowy terrorist fanatics and criminal gangs who strike whenever and wherever they please. Writing in The National Interest during the height of the controversy between us just before the invasion of Iraq, Josef Joffe observed that, in what he called a dependency-unhinged unipolar world, the old Atlantic Alliance had died a slow death beginning in 1991. That is the way it may have seemed then, but I have argued that eighteen months later one can no longer be so sure. On both sides of the Atlantic, there are signs of renewed reflection, signs that the lessons of history and the experience of the immediate past have been learned: that while the dependencies of the Cold War are gone, others no less compelling have taken their place. So it may be—and this is my hope—that the report of the Alliance’s demise may prove to have been premature and that there is sound basis, with carefully prescribed remedies and a wise regimen of rehabilitation, for reviving it.

In the United States, certainly, there is a better understanding of the limits of our overwhelming military and economic power. In this regard, a recent comment from Henry Kissinger caught my attention. There are three things a statesman can learn from history, he said: a sense of direction, humility, and a feeling for the interrelatedness of events. A sense of direction defines the limits within which action is possible, and Kissinger expressed grave doubts about people who advocate the rapid transfor-
mation of a society, especially through foreign advice. Quoting Bismarck, Kissinger noted that humility was central for both a people and for statesmen. Finally, understanding the interrelatedness of events means understanding the period in which one is living. Thus, he pointed out, it is critical to remember that in our globalized world different parts of it live in different time periods—the West in the twenty-first century, the Asian world in nineteenth-century Europe, and the Middle East in seventeenth-century Europe. I wish he had explained more clearly to the American president that establishing democracy by force in seventeenth-century Iraq is highly problematic, and that this sound advice would have been heeded earlier.

Now there are signs that our policies are being adjusted and moving in the right direction. It is not too late. The EU and the United States are Western democratic pluralistic societies with similar values, though not always necessarily identical ones. In a fundamental sense, we have common interests and face common threats. Therein, I believe, lies the case for a concerted mutual effort to rebuild our Atlantic Alliance. For this, we must carefully consider our options, remember the lessons of history, and choose wisely. The United States would do well to recognize that military might alone cannot prevail, and by itself is an inadequate instrument of foreign policy, particularly for a democracy in which the political leadership is dependent on the will of the people; that a more prudent mix of hard and soft power is a more effective policy basis.

The EU and the Federal Republic also face an important choice. The debate is between those who believe that there is political gain in opposing the United States and that Europe should look inward and build institutions that enable it to stand apart as a third force, and those who prefer Europe pursuing its common interests in an alliance with the United States; between those who emphasize the divergent strategic priorities between the U.S. and the EU, and those who argue that there are common interests that outweigh them. It is the latter who, I am persuaded, have by far the better argument.

So, let us learn from the past. What is needed now is a coordinated approach, with specific steps and initiatives to give new substance to a reinvigorated alliance. In this, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States have an opportunity once again to form a close partnership and to play a leading role.

The Atlantic Alliance was a great success, and the U.S.-German partnership served both countries well. That is the experience on which we should draw. It will require the mobilization of substantial manpower and financial resources on both sides, probably for an extended period of time. This too needs to be understood in Germany and within the EU. For Europe to speak with a more equal voice in the Atlantic dialogue will
mean making more commensurate contributions to a common effort. More effective economic performance is a prerequisite for this, which is why steadfastness in the current restructuring efforts is so important. Above all, it will require imagination, statesmanship, patience, and careful diplomacy. The three-quarter billion people of the Atlantic area have much to offer and, allied together, can be a powerful force. The late George Ball, a close friend of that great European visionary statesman Jean Monnet, was a wise and courageous practitioner in foreign affairs. He was my friend and mentor, and I admired him greatly. When the stakes were high and the battle was joined, George was fond of observing that Monnet had taught him that optimism was the only sensible philosophy of life for an intelligent man or woman. Let us remember his advice.

Note

The text of the lecture was slightly revised and updated for publication in December 2004.
Dramatizing German History: Michael Frayn on Democracy

Michael Frayn’s play Democracy premiered at the Royal National Theatre in London on September 9, 2003. It had its American premiere at the Brooks Atkinson Theater in New York on November 18, 2004. Two weeks before the New York premiere, the German Historical Institute, the Goethe Institut and Theater J of the DC Jewish Community Center invited Michael Frayn to Washington DC for a public conversation about “Dramatizing German History.” The conversation, which took place on November 1, was moderated by Peter Marks, theater critic of the Washington Post. Excerpts appear below.

Born in London in 1933, Michael Frayn studied philosophy at Cambridge and worked as a reporter and columnist for the Guardian and Observer. He is the author of numerous award-winning plays—including Noises Off (1982) and Copenhagen (1998)—and novels, including Headlong (1999) and Spies (2002).

Writing a Play about German Politics

I have focused Democracy on a rather dramatic instant. It’s a story that’s very painful in its own right, whatever I’ve done with it. It’s the story of the chancellorship of Willy Brandt and its ending when his personal Referent, his personal assistant, was unmasked as being a spy for the Stasi. Guillaume had worked very faithfully for Brandt and very skillfully. Brandt didn’t like him very much; he found him servile, but he appreciated his skills, and Guillaume had come not just to respect Brandt, but possibly even to love him while he was working for him. At the same time, he was working loyally for his other master, the East German foreign intelligence service, to undermine Brandt.

Why did I write it? I first went to Germany seriously in the 1970s and up until that point, I suppose, I shared all the usual British prejudices and preconceptions about Germany. And when I got there and actually began to look at it seriously, I was completely overwhelmed by it. One of the things that seemed most astonishing and perpetually interesting about Germany is not the Nazi period, which is what English people seem to be fixated on, but how Germany recovered from the Nazi period. Every time I go to Germany, still, I’m intrigued and moved once again that after that terrible disaster, which left Germany in physical and moral ruins in 1945, Germany was able so quickly to construct one of the most stable and decent parliamentary democracies in Europe in spite of the fact they had very little tradition of parliamentary democracy to go back to. So that’s one of the threads of the play.
I also wanted to write something about the complexity of the political process in general. It’s astonishing that even two people can get together and make common cause to do anything. Each of us has a different outlook on the world, each of us has different interests. If you get the cake, I don’t get the cake. If I get the cake, you don’t get the cake. And, of course, we can make compromises and agree that we both share the cake: we have half of it each. In that case, you end up with half a cake less than you might have had, and so do I. When you think about national politics and you think of reconciling the different viewpoints and different interests not of two people, not of three people, but of tens of millions of people, it does become absolutely astonishing, to me at any rate, that it can ever be done. And it’s a very complex process.

Germany is a particularly good case about the complexity of politics for three reasons. Because of the federal system, for a start. Germany is divided into Länder, each Land has its own parliament and there is a federal parliament, the politics of which have to be combined with the politics of all the different Länder, more familiar of course to Americans than to English people. But secondly, because all politics in Germany since the Second World War has been coalition politics. Every government has been a coalition. Coalitions are inherently unstable enterprises. They’re thought of in Britain to be almost unworkable. We had a coalition during the war and people have occasionally suggested coalitions since, but people back away every time because they think that they would never last. In this country, I think, a coalition is a more or less unthinkable proposition. So that’s the second reason for the complexity of German politics. Every government has had to balance the different interests of two political parties and find some way of working with two parties. And the third thing that has made German politics very complex is that, for the greater part of the second half of the twentieth century, Germany was divided into two separate states, antagonistic to each other—in fact, on opposite sides in the Great Divide that ran through the world during the Cold War, and this made for hideous complexities in Germany. So that was the second string of my play.

But the third reason I wanted to write [this play] was that it seems to me that each of us in himself or in herself is a kind of parliamentary democracy. Each of us has different possibilities, different ways we can go in life, different interests that have to be resolved. And how each of us manages to resolve those different factors, those different forces, is almost as complicated as how a national government manages to do the same.

Those three stories came together in the story of Brandt and Guillaume because the events that led to Brandt’s resignation were very complicated. The occasion for his resignation was certainly the discovery that one of his personal assistants, Guillaume, was a spy and the realization...
that Guillaume may well have, almost certainly had, passed back to his masters in East Germany the details of Brandt’s extramarital liaisons, which, it was suggested, would make Brandt—and by extension the West German government—blackmailable. But in fact, although that was the occasion of his downfall, the causes of it were much more complicated. Some of them were public matters, some of them had to do with world politics because the oil producers had put up their prices and produced an economic crisis throughout the western world, and particularly in Germany. Some of them were internal political German reasons because the SPD, the Social Democratic Party, had lost popularity dramatically in Germany and there were many people in the party, including some of its most influential members, who thought the time had come to get rid of Brandt and to replace him.

But [there is also] the complexity of Brandt himself. I think he was a great man. He did an extraordinary thing: He pulled off one of the great triumphs of postwar politics. He persuaded his fellow West Germans to accept an accommodation with the Soviet Union and its allies in the East, even though the cost was terrible. The Soviet Union would not sign a peace treaty with West Germany until West Germany had renounced all possible claims to the territories it had lost in the east at the end of the war and until it had recognized the division of Germany. It was very, very difficult to persuade West Germans to do that, for good reason. Millions of people had been driven out of their homes in the territories they had lost in the east. Millions of people had fled from the DDR and millions of people in the West had relatives who were still trapped inside the DDR. But until that move was made, there was no possibility of beginning to scale down the Cold War. Brandt managed to do it, with great difficulty, and only by the skin of his teeth. So that was his great achievement.

But at the same time Brandt had considerable weaknesses. He was a womanizer, he was a drinker; many politicians are womanizers and drinkers and manage to survive. He had more serious weaknesses still. He was depressive. He was what Germans call wortkarg, he was very unforthcoming. He was konfliktscheu, he didn’t like confronting people and he found it very difficult to take decisions. These are really serious weaknesses in a politician. All politicians have to confront people at every hour, every day, and they have to make decisions at every hour of every day. In spite of this, Brandt pulled off his great achievement. So, he was a very complicated person. Guillaume obviously was a very complicated person because he was both loyally serving Brandt and undermining him. So that was what made me interested in this story.

I’ll tell you what made me first think I could really do it. I vaguely remembered the story when I started to research the play, but I didn’t know any of the details and I had to do a great deal of research. And I
discovered that when Guillaume was first suspected of being a spy, the security people didn’t have enough evidence to charge him, so they came to Brandt and said: “The only way we can get the evidence is to keep him in post and to watch him at work, and you must not tell him anything.” It was just, let him go on, same access to documents, same job as before, while we watch him. So from that point onwards, effectively not only was Guillaume spying on Brandt, but Brandt was spying on Guillaume. And any dramatist who discovers that he’s got two people who are in this complex relationship with each other must think: I’ve got a play on my hands.

Writing about Real Characters

It is daunting to take on real characters. I’d never done it before I wrote Copenhagen. When I first began to write Copenhagen, I was completely intimidated by the task. I thought, however much research I do, there is no way I can go back and actually talk to Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg, and Margrethe Bohr and get a feeling of what they were like as people. I can read everything that I can get my hands on that they wrote. I can read everything that people wrote about them, as I did, but I still, whatever I do, whatever efforts I make, I’m never going to get back to the real people. But after a time, when you start to write, the characters do start to take on a life of their own. It happens with fictitious characters, but it even happens with real characters. And you know they can’t really be like the real characters and I know that my Brandt can’t really be like the real Brandt or my Guillaume like the real Guillaume, but they do at some point start to speak and start to do things. You just have to accept that that’s the characters they’re going to be.

One of the frightening aspects of Democracy is that not all of the characters in the play are dead. Helmut Schmidt is still alive. And [his character] is a slightly sharp portrait of him because, by all accounts at the time, when he was minister in Brandt’s government, he was very impatient and very ambitious and although he genuinely revered Brandt and regarded him as his political mentor, he was immensely impatient with his dithering because he was an extremely competent man and he thought, “I can do this. Why do I have to sit here and watch Brandt hesitate and put things off and never make a decision?” And who else is still alive? Reinhard Wilke and Horst Ehmke, who both worked in Brandt’s office, Horst Ehmke running the chancellory, Wilke as his immediate departmental leader. They’re still alive and they came to see the play in London. I happened to be in Germany at the time and when I came back I found the cast absolutely enchanted by their visit because there’s a lot in the play about how everyone in the SPD at the time had
drunk far too much, and what they’d drunk was red wine. And Horst Ehmke and Reinhard Wilke had arrived with large supplies of red wine, which they took around back stage afterwards and sat talking to the cast and drinking far into the night and telling them indiscreet stories about life in Brandt’s government. I thought the nicest tribute to the actors, to the production in particular, was at the end of the evening, as they left to go, Horst Ehmke’s wife flung her arms around Roger Allam, the remarkable actor who played Willi Brandt, an absolutely astonishing performance, and said: “You even smell like Willi!” But I did meet [Wilke and Ehmke], finally, because they also came to the first night of the play when it was done in Berlin and they were extremely generous about it and they said that one of the things they thought I hadn’t got right was that in the play they call each other Horst and Reinhard. They both said they would have never done that: “We would have called each other Herr Dr. Wilke and Herr Dr. Ehmke.”

Wilke and Ehmke also said that I made Guillaume too interesting, that he was a very dull man. And this is certainly partly conscious dramatic license. I’ve certainly felt perfectly free to make Guillaume more interesting than he was. Brandt didn’t like Guillaume. He found him servile and kumpelhaft, he didn’t like him. But he did appreciate his skill and his devotion. [When Wilke and Ehmke told the actors that they] found Guillaume very dull, uninteresting, one of the actors said to them, “Well, he did manage to fool you for five years, so he can’t have been as stupid as all that.” And Ehmke thought about this for some time and said, “Yes, perhaps he was more intelligent than we thought.” In the play, I’ve made Brandt indeed begin to take more of an interest, when he thinks that Guillaume may be a double playing two different roles. And in actual life, according to Klaus Harpprecht, Brandt’s speechwriter, Brandt did make serious efforts to detect Guillaume in the act. He used to leave hairs in books and pencils at certain angles on his desk to see if they had been disturbed in the morning and, as Harpprecht said, he found this rather touching. He thought Brandt had probably got this out of some boy’s story years back.

The Cold War Context

I would say that [Guillaume’s spying] hastened the acceptance by East Germany of the seriousness of Brandt’s intentions. At any rate, that’s what Markus Wolf, the head of the East German Foreign Intelligence Service, says in his memoirs. He says Guillaume bringing down Brandt was a terrible own goal, but he also says that what Guillaume told them about what was going on in the Chancellor’s office in Bonn helped them to believe that Brandt was serious. After all, when Brandt first came to
office as Chancellor, his reputation was as a Cold Warrior. He had been mayor of Berlin at the time when Berlin had been resisting the efforts of the Soviet Union in East Germany to absorb West Berlin into East Germany, and Brandt had been the great champion of West Berlin. So the Russians and the East Germans were not unreasonably suspicious of him. The thought was: Has he really changed or is this just some political ploy? And according to Wolf, the reports from Guillaume did help the East Germans to trust in Brandt’s seriousness. And the other irony is that one of the things that Brandt persuaded the Federal Republic to do was to accept as permanent the division of Germany. Up until that point no one had wanted to accept that there was a separate state in East Germany because they hoped it would go away. They hoped it would somehow be reunited with the Federal Republic. But Brandt said, “We have to recognize reality,” and he persuaded people to do so. But his persuading West Germany to accept this is one of the things that undermined East Germany because now the Russians felt that they could trust West Germany and they didn’t feel the same need to prop East Germany up. After all, every time there had been a rising in another Soviet dependency in Eastern Europe—in Poland or in Hungary or in Czechoslovakia, indeed in East Berlin in 1953—Soviet tanks had gone in to ensure that the status quo was not changed. But when the DDR began to fall to pieces in the late 1980s, they didn’t get any support from the Soviet Union. There are many reasons for that and, of course, a lot of it had to do with the pressure under which the Soviet Union had been placed by America, and partly to do with the genuine humanity of Gorbachev, the Soviet leader. But it was also because they no longer needed to prop up east European states in the same way.

Working with the Play’s Director

Was it easy for Michael Blakemore to direct Democracy because we’d worked together before? I think this is the sixth or seventh play we’ve done together and we were old friends even before we’d started working. We’ve been trying to work out what it is we have in common. What we have in common is stupidity. We’re both as thick as two short planks. Michael cannot understand anything about my plays. I can’t understand anything about the subjects I’m writing about. So I have to go out and find out about the physics or the German politics or whatever, and he has to find out about the play and in both cases it’s a slow and laborious process. But if you manage to find out enough about physics, say, to be able to write the play, if you can understand it yourself, you have a chance, possibly, of making it comprehensible for other people. And if Michael can find out enough about my play by talking to me—and we

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talk about it at great lengths: He makes me read every line to him and I have no ability as an actor, I can’t even hit the right stress on my own lines, it’s a very painful process. And he asks very stupid questions, like “Why does she say that?” or “Why does he do this?” and I get very impatient and then in the end I see why he’s asking. And in the end, we’ve done things so closely together, we’ve cooperated so closely together, that I let him get on with it and direct it, and I just go and look at the finished result.
STERN PRIZE

ALSACE TO THE ALSATIANS?
VISIONS AND DIVISIONS OF ALSATIAN REGIONALISM, 1890–1930

Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize Presentation, November 19, 2004

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My project explores the evolution and divisions of Alsatian regionalism. I originally came to this subject interested in how Alsatians sought to shape their regional culture against the nationalizing demands of the Germans, and later, the French. Too often the tale of the Alsatians had been told—told well but in narrow terms—by concentrating either on specific developments in Alsace or on one side of the 1918 divide. In this way, earlier studies captured essential elements of the Alsatian situation, but did not trace the broader, complex evolution of the idea of region across the First World War.

The work of scholars such as Celia Applegate, Alon Confino, Carolyn Ford, and Anne-Marie Thiesse further inspired me to explore the nature of Alsatian regionalism. Their respective investigations of the relationship between nation and region demonstrated that the “imagined” nation was realized in its local roots. Regional identity, in this rendition served to integrate the locality into the larger national community. Yet in Alsace, regionalism had often been used to balk the process of nationalization. Therefore, I was led to ask, what was the nature of regionalism in a borderland such as Alsace?

As I began to delve into the case of Alsace, it quickly became apparent that while Alsatians may have resisted the heavy-handed German and French attempts to win their allegiance, there existed equally fierce debates among the Alsatians about what it meant to be Alsatian. Indeed, some Alsatians putatively ranked as allies against the Germans fought bitterly over issues of regional belonging and political orientation. Various Alsatians used regionalism to maintain the French legacy in the region, to defend Alsatian interests within the German Empire, or to integrate the region into the cultural and political life of the Kaiserreich. Despite such divisions—which naturally colored attitudes toward France...
after the First World War—certain commonalities existed, above all the claim of all interested parties to represent the idea of “Alsace to the Alsatians.” A second question therefore appeared: How did internal divides among Alsatians—religious, social, political, and national—affect the nature of Alsatian regionalism?

To address these questions, I took a threefold approach. First, I explored how poets, writers, amateur scholars, and intellectuals sought to define the customs, traditions, and history of Alsace. Given the political limitations on Alsatians in the Kaiserreich, cultural battles over history, memory, custom, and language often became stand-ins for political action. But politics too had a role here, as Alsatians used those parliamentary tools at their disposal to push their regional agenda. Finally, I examined how Alsatians recast their identity by investigating the links between culture and politics, especially in light of the fact that artists often became involved in politics, and politicians pontificated on aesthetic matters of political importance. Woven throughout these three lines of inquiry was a further question: How did the First World War and the return of French sovereignty to the area transform Alsatian regionalism? Festivals, literary journals, monuments, children’s books, the political press, and Landtag records collectively demonstrated how Alsatians employed regionalism to protect their cultural heritage, defend their regional traditions, and fight for greater political rights, both under German rule before 1918 and under French control after the First World War.

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Although Alsatians had been aware of their peculiar status under French rule as well as in the first decades of German control after 1871, the closing decade of the nineteenth century witnessed a blossoming of regional culture. As in many other localities in Europe, local artists, writers, historians, poets, and painters mined the customs, traditions, history, landscape, and local German dialect to evoke and articulate specific visions of the region. Leading members of this cultural renaissance espoused the notion of an Alsatian “dual culture,” a mélange of the best of German and French cultural worlds. This stress on the cultural uniqueness of Alsace found its greatest proponents among the editors and writers of the Revue alsacienne illustrée. The Francophile editors of the journal hoped that the invocation of a unique regional culture within the context of a federated German Empire would stress the French elements that constituted a part of Alsace’s special cultural heritage.

Such conceptions resonated with much of the local populace. However, some Alsatians adopted the argument of Alsatian uniqueness to promote more politically neutral aspects of the regional culture. The play-
wright and poet Gustave Stoskopf, for example, founded a dialect theater in which local actors used the regional patois to poke fun at French and especially German nationalists, as well as Alsatians who sought to profit from the region’s difficulties. In contrast, some Germans in the area, often in conjunction with local writers, sought to use local traditions to prove the “Germanness” of Alsace. In particular, the contributors to the Vogesenverein’s (a hiking association) Jahrbuch für Geschichte, Sprache, und Literatur consisted almost entirely of Germans from across the Rhine who pursued this German agenda. Finally, some Alsatians took the idea of a unique regional culture in the opposite direction, using regionalism as a means to promote a pronounced pro-French version of Alsatian history and culture. Such disagreements gave rise to multiple visions of the region.

Debates over “Alsatianess” found purchase not simply in the fields of ethnography, literature, and history, but also in the realm of memory. German authorities and Alsatians sought to define the region’s past to legitimize their respective political visions. For the Germans, this meant linking Alsatian history to the “Germany” of the Holy Roman Empire. Not just schools, but public spaces in Alsace such as the Strasbourg train station or the castle of Hohkoenigsburg became sites for such historical lessons. For Francophile Alsatians, such a goal assumed differing forms. Opposition was one route. For example, Alsatian deputies tried to undermine the restoration of Hohkoenigsburg. In other cases, this meant tying Alsace to France in a more explicit manner, such as in the Auguste Bartholdi statue in Colmar or the monument to the fallen French soldiers of the battle of Wissembourg.

The various cultural conceptions of Alsatian regionalism possessed analogues in the political arena. While the earlier cultural battles were motivated by specific visions of Alsace, it was precisely during debates over a new regional constitution that the deep political and cultural divisions among Alsatians became most apparent. The subsequent elections for the Landtag of Alsace-Lorraine clearly demonstrated the limits of the Francophile “dual culture” within the local political scene. When a small group of politicians tried to form an umbrella political organization, the Union Nationale, to unite Alsatian interests, they failed miserably. Center Party leaders refused to work with the group’s anti-clerical members, and Liberals and Social Democrats rejected a coalition that included a religious agenda. Despite the acrimonious constitutional debates and electoral campaigns, Alsatian leaders managed to rally in anger against German mistreatment and poor administration, in particular during the Zabern Affair.

The First World War served as a pivotal point in altering Alsatian attitudes toward nation and region. The poor treatment of Alsatians in
the German army, harsh martial law at home, and lack of input into German plans for the region’s future reversed much of the progress of integration achieved over the previous decades. French authorities, in contrast, tried to win over Alsatian loyalties. Alsatian prisoners of war from the German Army, for example, were placed into special camps, offered generous rations of tobacco and alcohol, made to dress in French uniforms, given French lessons, and even asked to join the French Army; few volunteered. Some troops remained loyal to Germany, even regaling a French colonel with the song *Wacht am Rhein*. Potential strains between French officials and Francophile Alsatians likewise rose to the surface in post-war planning. Such problems, however, belonged to the future, as German mistreatment of Alsatians generally alienated them from Germany, made them more receptive for a return to France, and convinced them of their own unique if tragic circumstances.

Cheering throngs met French troops in November 1918; Raymond Poincaré, the French President who hailed from neighboring Lorraine, happily proclaimed in a Strasbourg speech that “le plebiscite est fait.” Yet such initial enthusiasm quickly waned in response to French policies. French authorities mistakenly understood Alsace to be the loyal region of 1871, an error compounded by the memory of those Francophile Alsatians who had remained in the region to defend French interests. Alsace, however, had changed in the intervening five decades, as had France. The vast majority of Alsatians spoke German, had served in the German army, remained devoutly religious, and had developed a strong regional identity. France, in contrast, had become more secular, more nationalistic, and had suffered through a long and brutal war. While certainly not predestined, it is also unsurprising that French authorities and Alsatians quickly clashed over the proper management of regional affairs.

Ironically, the French managed to commit many of the same errors as the Germans had in the 1870s. French mistakes, in turn, aroused the very regionalism that the French had encouraged under German rule. Alsatian regionalism nonetheless remained moderate, and Alsatian leaders sought compromise with the French Third Republic. However, the decision of the Herriot government in 1924 to introduce all French laws into Alsace, including those separating church and state, galvanized the region’s Catholic population.

This mobilization of the region’s Catholic population reflects the importance of overlapping forms of identity, as attacks on the region’s Catholicism were protested through the means of regionalism. Issues of language, educational system, and regional autonomy all came to the fore in the ensuing debates. Of greater importance for the immediate politics in the region, this resurgent, religiously-inspired regionalism served as a wedge for more militant groups to move to the fore.
Organizations such as the Heimatbund tried to mimic the idea of the
1911 Union National in order to form an overarching organization of
interested regional parties. Like its forerunner, the Heimatbund largely
failed to garner widespread support, but like the Union National it too
managed to reshape political discourse in the region. The Heimatbund
and its political successors often framed their demands in the Wilsonian
rhetoric of self-determination, seeking far-reaching administrative au-
tonomy, permission for the use of German, and the protection of the
religious status quo. Such demands met a frigid reception, especially as
the pain and sacrifice of the war reinforced an already nationalistic con-
ception of Alsace as a French province. The government moved harshly
against such autonomists by banning newspapers and trying autonomist
leaders as traitors.

More importantly, such struggles overshadowed the efforts of mod-
erate Alsatian regionalists to improve French-Alsatian relations, thereby
dividing many of the local parties into strongly nationalist and staunchly
regionalist camps. Indeed, even the leading party of Alsace for several
decades, the Catholic Union Populaire Républicaine, found itself divided.
In the tension-filled years of the late 1920s, the voices of even moderate
regionalism were drowned out in the cacophonous polemics of French
nationalists and increasingly radical, then separatist, members of the au-
tonomy movement.

Amid the politicized debates over the future of the region, fights also
occurred over the nature and future of the region’s culture. Autonomists
tried to stress the unique qualities of Alsatian culture, often drawing
upon the heritage of the Revue alsacienne illustré. Though they relied less
on the arguments of the region’s “dual culture” in favor of the idea of a
national minority, they nonetheless argued for the right of Alsatians to
maintain their “Germanic” heritage. Yet a “dual culture” conception did
not wither. Gustav Stoskopf and his literary circle, at times in the face of
opposition from their more assimilationist, Francophile countrymen, re-
opened the Alsatian theater. Later, they would found literary journals
whose political bent clearly favored France. Alsatian particularism, in this
mindset, could coexist with loyalty to the French nation. Indeed, some
“assimilationist” Alsatians deliberately employed regionalism to ease the
return to the mère-patrie.

In the 1930s, Alsatians and the French government began to find a
modus vivendi. As the Alsatian autonomist movement began to splinter
into a variety of increasingly radical groups, it saw its already tenuous
support slip away. Moreover, the French government took a more mod-
erate approach in the region, relenting in its campaign to Frenchify the
region. Finally, the rise of the Nazis, and later, the gathering storms of
Regionalism as a political language, as a cultural vision, and as a central community of identity stood at the forefront of developments in Alsace from its annexation by Germany in 1871 until well into the interwar decades. Alsatians repeatedly turned to regionalism to express their displeasure with German or French measures, and more centrally, to assert their own desires for the future. Yet internal Alsatian divisions over national loyalty, religion, political ideology, and the very meaning of Alsatianess splintered this movement into a variety of competing regionalisms.

The diversity of regionalisms in Alsace between 1871 and 1940, in turn, speaks to a more complicated relationship between region and nation. Elements of a common Alsatian identity did emerge, largely based on folklore, the local dialect, and a conception of Alsatian culture sharing in both the German and French cultural spheres. Yet unlike in much of France or Germany, regionalism in Alsace never became a purely integrative force with the nation. For some Alsatians, the region could nicely merge with the nation. For many, though, regionalism remained a means of defending a range of interests: religious, social, economic, linguistic, and political. Indeed, Alsatian regionalism stood at its strongest when joined to other identities. Alsatian regionalism therefore had a powerful allure, if varied success, in providing Alsatians with a means of protest, sense of agency, and form of community against the tides of fortune as a border region between two great powers.

As a region on a border, finally, Alsace allows us to reconsider the differences and similarities between differing ethnic German and civic French conceptions of the nation-state. Germany, with its federalized conception of the state and emphasis on language and race, could not countenance the defense of the French heritage in the region and thus denied the Alsatians full membership in the German Empire. The French, in contrast, wished to include Alsace in a centralized French Third Republic; the Alsatian desire to have a regional administration, to speak German, and to maintain a strong role for religion all flew in the face of the prevailing Jacobin notion of nationhood. Alsatians wanted to be French, but not on terms acceptable to the French.

The history of Alsatian regionalism is tinged with numerous ironies. The French and Germans pursued markedly similar goals and policies in the region, only to find the Alsatians repeatedly invoking a strong regional identity in defense of local prerogatives. Germany was a nation of
regions, yet nationalist administrators consistently refused to accept the Alsatians’ definition of their region’s unique characteristics. The French encouraged Alsatian regionalism before 1914, yet found themselves at a loss when the Alsatians called upon the same sense of regional loyalty to resist French policies. Perhaps the greatest irony, however, was the inability of Alsatians to reconcile their dual culture with either the German or French nation-state despite their desire to do so. For many Alsatians, “Alsace to the Alsatians” could also mean “Alsace within Germany” or “Alsace within France.” France, however, saw the German face of the Alsatian Janus, Germans the French. The fractured vision of “Alsace to the Alsatians” only furthered Alsace’s divided destiny.

Notes


4 Vogler, Histoire culturelle, 239–250.


7 See, for example, Gustave Stoskopf, Hoffieren: éläsische Komödie in drei Aufzügen (Strassburg, 1906); D’r Verbote Fahne: éläsische Komödie in drei Aufzügen (Strassburg, 1908); Demonstration: éläsische Komödie in drei Akten (Strassburg, 1904).

9 Klaus Nohlen, Baupolitik im Reichsland Elsass-Lothringen, 1871–1918 (Berlin, 1982).


12 Mayeur, Autonomie.


14 ADHR AJ 30/85 (Purg. 11745) “Régime des prisonniers de guerre alsaciens-lorrains,” signed Ed. Ignace; Circular on the treatment of Alsatians, signed Verand; report entitled “Traitement reservé en France aux prisonniers de guerre alsaciens-lorrains: dépots spéciaux.” This particular incident also found its way back to German authorities in 1918, when an interned German officer managed to send them a lengthy report on the special treatment of Alsatians. See ADBR 22 AL 59, “Die Behandlung der els.-lothr. Kriegsgefangnen in Frankreich: Die Speziallager” signed Gabriel Welter (June 1918).


20 Goodfellow, Between the Swastika and the Cross of Lorraine.
In a 1928 essay, the social commentator Willy Meisl imagined himself looking back on the tumultuous changes of the 1920s from the vantage point of the year 4000. “It was sports that cleared the way for the emancipation of the woman,” Meisl wrote in mock retrospection. “It made her more similar to man and also gave her the opportunity to make man more similar to her, until ultimately they met on that middle ground where humankind truly becomes one.” Meisl predicted that athletes would one day be recognized as the agents who most dramatically altered the social landscape of early twentieth-century Germany. He presented sports first of all as a physical equalizer that enabled women to achieve both athletic performances and physical bodies more comparable to those of men. Moreover, Meisl depicted sports as a social equalizer, directly linking sports to women’s emancipation and to the convergence of masculine and feminine ideals on a “middle ground.”

In sports-crazy Weimar Germany, popular representations of male and female athletes did, indeed, shape new ideals of masculinity and femininity. My dissertation explores this process through the examples of three sports—tennis, boxing, and track and field—each of which posed a different challenge to gender norms after the First World War. Tennis represented a sport in which women’s participation had gained full acceptance by the 1920s, so much so that many commentators, advertisers, and players themselves had come to view it as a primarily feminine sport. Not only did tennis provide numerous examples of strong, talented women for the popular press, it also presented images of self-made, independent, and financially successful ones. The presence of the professional female player, with her contingent of trainers and her lucrative endorsements, suggested economic as well as physical power. At the same time, the gentlemanly persona that many of the male players cultivated ran counter to the robust masculinity projected by most competitive sportsmen at the time.

If tennis occupied the feminine end of the sports spectrum, then boxing had clearly established itself as the quintessentially masculine
sport by the 1920s. Nevertheless, women actively participated in this sport, too, albeit to a more limited extent than men. Moreover, images of female boxers circulated widely during this period in advertising, films, songs, and popular literature, and they celebrated female strength and aggression. Just as women in the Weimar period were presenting a more active image of themselves through pugilism, male boxers were steadily evolving into objectified, even eroticized figures for the consumption of adoring male and female fans, a trend that boxers themselves often consciously encouraged. Precisely because of the boxer’s ambiguity, representing both an active fighter and a passive object, the sport of boxing reconfigured masculinity and femininity during the Weimar Republic.

With tennis and boxing forming the two poles of the sports spectrum, track and field represented the contentious middle ground. Because of the sport’s international reputation, the press celebrated male runners and shotputters as the embodiment of national strength and prowess, explicitly linking masculinity, athleticism, and Germanness. For many officials, too, track and field served as a forum for men to demonstrate their heroism and erase the humiliations of the Versailles Treaty, and it provided a surrogate for the military training so tightly restricted under the terms of the peace. At the same time, as female track stars achieved increasing prominence during the 1920s, commentators and officials launched heated debates over the social ramifications and medical consequences of vigorous running, jumping, and throwing. They argued that female athletes needed to reconcile competition with motherhood, and they worried openly about the sport’s impact on women’s reproductive health and the fulfillment of their maternal obligations to the nation.

With regard to German conceptions of manhood, the male champions in all three sports injected a distinctive element of individuality into a hitherto quite regimented Wilhelmine ideal. The male athlete’s unabashed willingness to pursue his own glory captured the self-interested spirit of modern business and republican democracy, and it stood in stark contrast to the synchronized uniformity of communal forms of physical culture such as Turnen. Whereas Walter Schönbrunn in 1930 criticized this latter program of exercises as best suited for “the subjects of a monarchical government,” he hailed competitive athletes, such as boxers and sprinters, as reflecting the values of “republican men.” Even an athlete like Otto Peltzer, who preached a self-sacrificial sense of duty, embodied the willful pursuit of self-interest by virtue of his own success. He also represented a new breed of national hero, who served his patria not by defending its territory on the battlefield, but by defending its honor on the playing field.

In addition, male athletes marketed their appeal on the model of the era’s much-celebrated self-made businessmen. Boxers not only turned
professional, they also promoted themselves as heartthrobs, in the pursuit of media attention, endorsements, a fan base, and movie roles. By consciously placing his body on display, the Weimar boxer turned Wilhelmine man on his head, transforming the viewing subject into the object on view. Just as importantly, women as well as men happily accepted this invitation to gaze. Ladies’ handbooks encouraged their readers to sit ringside for better views, and a literary and cinematic subgenre featured female protagonists in pursuit of their favorite sportsmen. Even tennis players, despite a genteel reluctance to reveal their bodies in short pants or shirts, flirtatiously elicited advances from their more assertive female partners.

The female athlete also exploited the business opportunities inherent in competitive sports. Tennis players, like male boxers, often turned professional in the 1920s, and translated their celebrity status into paid exhibition matches and commercial endorsements. And, like male boxers, female boxers clearly marketed a titillating appeal. More importantly, female athletes in all sports stood out as public figures at a time when women, or at least middle- and upper-class women, had just begun to venture out of the home in large numbers. These athletes provided visible examples of self-reliance and independence, and their aggressive competitiveness subverted notions of female passivity.

The anxious debates surrounding women’s sports in Weimar Germany also illustrated how these athletes unsettled the maternal ideal. Officials worried that female track and field competitors in particular might jeopardize their reproductive health as a result of intensive training and busy schedules. This concern generated a flurry of commentaries on both sides of the issue, and it ultimately led to the elimination of the women’s 800-meter race, despite Germany’s 1928 gold medal in this event. Meanwhile, female tennis players, by virtue of their sexual assertiveness for the sake of pleasure alone, and female boxers, by virtue of their engagement in the most stereotypically masculine activity, seemed to reject motherhood altogether.

Elite male and female athletes in the 1920s recast the physical bodies of men and women as well as their roles in German society. The lean, muscular ideal for both men and women reflected their shared pressures and ambitions, and it indicated that both sexes needed to cultivate the same physical qualities in order to succeed. Female boxers purposefully built their biceps with daily workouts on the punching ball, and their counterparts in track and field developed sleek, wiry builds as a consequence of rigorous training regimens. In tennis, meanwhile, women helped to make the straight-hipped, anti-hourglass body into the defining physical characteristic of the new woman. Male athletes moved toward a streamlined ideal, too, and displayed slimmed-down physiques that, in
the case of middle-distance runners, bordered on scrawny. On the tennis circuit, men had similarly trim frames, and even boxers, who prided themselves on the force of their punches, nevertheless cultivated a lean look, lest the extra pounds push them into a higher weight class.

Commentators charged that competitive sports had not simply changed the human body, they had reengineered it. The emphasis on measurement, record-keeping, and head-to-head rivalry in modern sports motivated athletes and trainers to incorporate cutting-edge techniques and the latest technologies to improve the efficiency of hearts, lungs, and biceps, and these methods received widespread coverage in the press. Athletic bodies represented some of the most prominent examples of Taylorism at work in Weimar Germany, and they demonstrated that the modern efficiency imperative penetrated to the level of flesh and bones. Furthermore, unlike the prewar research on human performance, Taylorism in its athletic application during the 1920s looked only to the next championship fight, international tournament, or Olympic race, not at the longtime health of the individual. This marked a clear break from the scientific agenda of Imperial Germany.3 Elite athletes, then, embodied not just the era’s physical androgyny but also its technical advances, which prompted the media to equate the highly rationalized body with a quintessentially modern one.

As Meisl predicted, the physical and social transformations ushered in by competitive athletes in the 1920s had long-lasting consequences, and ones that extended beyond the demise of the Weimar Republic itself in 1933. The Nazis’ promotion of certain women’s sports with the explicit goal of producing healthy, fit mothers represented a more systematic implementation of an aim first articulated by German officials prior to 1933, and the Nazis drew heavily on the debates that had swirled around track and field and other competitive women’s sports in the 1920s. On the one hand, trainers and medical authorities in Weimar Germany had raised concerns over female participation in endurance sports precisely because of the feared consequences for the athletes’ reproductive potential. On the other hand, as Gertrud Pfister has noted, the Nazis actively encouraged a number of sports, given that the medical community at the close of the Weimar Republic no longer viewed most of them as inherently antithetical to motherhood, and it actually encouraged many as beneficial.4 The Nazis coopted a number of Weimar impulses in the realm of men’s sports, too. Thomas Alkemeyer, for instance, describes the National Socialist celebration of athletic male bodies, particularly as seen in the monumental sculptures of Arno Breker and Josef Thorak, as the further evolution of an essentially Weimar aesthetic.5

Following the Second World War, men and women continued a pattern that had begun after the earlier conflagration, participating in sports
in ever-greater numbers. East Germany, in particular, nurtured sports at all levels, and it elevated elite female athletes to a national priority. As a result, sportswomen accounted disproportionately for that country’s success in international athletic competitions between the 1960s and the 1980s, so that the image of a burly, shot-putting Mädchen became an easily recognizable stereotype. The East German dominance in many women’s sports unquestionably derived from the systematic use of performance-enhancing drugs. It also, however, owed something to the fact that East Germany was one of the few countries to train female athletes seriously, a legacy of the relative acceptance and support that women’s sports had received during the Weimar Republic. One could even argue that the East German use of pharmaceuticals to improve the efficiency of its athletes drew on the rationalizing and technophilic impulses that enjoyed such prominence in the 1920s.

Competitive sports offered a physical expression of the rapidly modernizing, increasingly permissive, and socially unstable Weimar society, and they formed an element of cultural modernism that has had an important and long-overlooked impact on the nation’s subsequent development. Through sports, men and women articulated a response to the changes around them and presented new standards of manhood and womanhood. Above all, the elite athlete, whose every move received widespread media attention and almost instant trend-setting status, helped to reshape notions of masculinity and femininity and to reshape the physical body itself to better fit the demands and expectations of the modern age.

Notes

1 "‘Der Sport war es, der den Weg für die Emanzipation der Frau ebnete. Er machte sie dem Manne ähnlicher und gab ihr so Gelegenheit, den Mann auch sich ähnlicher zu machen, bis man sich auf jener Mittellinie traf, die die Menschheit erst wirklich zu einer Einheit macht.’ Willy Meisl, “Vorschau in Vergangenheit,” in Der Sport am Scheidewege, ed. Willy Meisl (Heidelberg, 1928), 83.


7 With regard to the former German Democratic Republic’s legacy of illegal steroid use, see Steven Ungerleider, Faust’s Gold: Inside the East German Doping Machine (New York, 2001).
In early November 1865, a mysterious illness spread in Hedersleben, a village between Halle and Magdeburg about two hundred kilometers southwest of Berlin. An increasing number of the two thousand villagers began to complain about agonizing abdominal cramps, nausea, and severe restlessness. Many of them were overcome by violent bouts of vomiting and diarrhea accompanied by high fever, sleeplessness, and rheumatic muscle pains. By December 1, fifty were dead; just eight days later the death toll had risen to sixty-five. As the Prussian daily *Volkszeitung* reported on December 8, 1865, “the situation in Hedersleben is getting more hopeless every day. Last week a couple of patients had gotten better so that they could leave their room, but then they fell ill again and suddenly died of a paralysis of the lungs.”

Doctors from many German-speaking cities including Berlin, Breslau, Prague, and Vienna traveled to Hedersleben to investigate the situation. Puzzled as to the causes of this ailment, they suspected typhus and even cholera. However, autopsies soon pointed to a very different explanation, especially since a local butcher and his wife had been among the first to die. Their dissected corpses revealed that neither typhus nor cholera had caused their death, but rather a tiny roundworm known as *Trichinella spiralis*. Numerous other autopsies and microscopic investigations of muscle tissue confirmed that thousands of these tiny parasites were the true culprits behind this deadly tragedy in Hedersleben. Having identified the trichinae, medical officials quickly deduced that this epidemic had not been caused by polluted water or contaminated air, but rather by pork.

Within days, the origin of this epidemic was traced to a two-year-old pig. The animal had appeared completely healthy when butcher Becker had slaughtered it on the morning of October 25. News that the local butcher had slaughtered a fat pig had spread quickly, and by that eve-
ning, much of the pig’s meat, which had been mixed in with that of three other pigs, was being served on local dinner tables. As was customary in the region, especially among the poor, most pork was eaten raw or barely cooked. No one had suspected that, along with their meat, they had ingested thousands of tiny trichina worms. However, within a week, symptoms of the debilitating illness had begun to appear. By the end of December, more than three hundred villagers had gotten sick and close to one hundred had died. Declaring that: “not even the bullets of war can create such a dreadful scene,” the Volkszeitung observed that:

There is hardly a more pitiful condition. Tortured by severe pain, these poor people lie fully conscious but unable to move. They complain of shortness of breath because the breathing muscles refuse their duty and hurt badly. Even in the best cases, a new enemy appears, a torturous hunger, but the chewing and swallowing muscles are paralyzed so that only liquid food in droplet amounts can be eaten with great pain.

According to the medical investigations, patients who had vomited often or had strong diarrhea had a better chance for recovery than those who did not. Hence the decision of the local doctor, who (thinking that these were cases of cholera) had prescribed opium instead of the much-needed laxatives, had only increased mortality.

The outbreak in Hedersleben was not an isolated incident. Two years earlier in 1863, there had been a much-publicized case in Hettstädt, a small community in Saxony, where 156 had fallen ill and 26 had died. A number of smaller outbreaks had also been reported from Magdeburg, Quedlingburg, Leipzig, Weimar, Celle, Hannover, Konitz, and even as far away as Malmö, Sweden. The growing recognition of and increased reporting about trichinosis had raised the public’s awareness about the potential dangers emanating from meat. It had also sparked widespread scientific interest. That spoiled meat could make people sick certainly was not a new discovery; however, the realization that seemingly healthy animals could pass on deadly parasites to unsuspecting human consumers posed new questions about food safety and health, questions that ultimately led to the building of municipally-run slaughterhouses not only in Berlin, but throughout Germany.

In my talk this afternoon, I want to investigate how the growing scientific understanding about the transferability of diseases from animals to humans raised new concerns about food safety in Germany, which, in turn, became the primary impetus for slaughterhouse reforms in the second half of the nineteenth century and which even instigated a diplomatic crisis between Germany and the United States in the mid-1890s. I argue that scholars who are interested in the underlying causes of
historical transformations ought to sometimes look beyond the intentional
ity of human agency to also recognize the often crucial role of non-human elements and their unintended consequences on the course of history.

**Trichinosis as Scientific Discourse**

Trichinosis was not a new phenomenon. It had existed for centuries, but before the invention of the microscope, *Trichinella spiralis*—the small organism responsible for the outbreak of the disease—had evaded human visual perception and medical consciousness. *Trichinella spiralis* was first discovered in the eighteenth century, but it did not gain medical significance until 1835 when James Paget, then a demonstrator of anatomy at London’s St. Bartholomew hospital, detected trichinae in the breast muscle of a seventy-year-old man who had supposedly died of cancer. Later that same year, Richard Owen classified this parasitic roundworm as part of the phylum *Nematoda*. It took another twelve years before a Philadelphia veterinarian discovered *Trichinella spiralis* in pigs. Initially, the trichina worm was perceived as a zoological curiosity, but beginning in the 1850s, it increasingly sparked the interest of a wider scientific community. Pathologists, veterinarians, and other medical practitioners began to investigate the prevalence and spread of trichinae in a number of organisms, hoping to generate scientific explanations about the origins and spread of this parasite. Feeding experiments with dogs, rabbits, pigs, horses, and birds, to name but a few, revealed that carnivorous animals were the only viable hosts for these parasites. However, since this category included humans, trichinae generated growing interest among doctors and anatomists.

Starting in the late 1850s, pathologists began to record the occurrence of trichinae in human corpses. For instance, the acclaimed Berlin pathologist Rudolf Virchow reported that in 1859 alone, he had recorded six cases. However, he insisted that this figure constituted only a fraction of the actual numbers because doctors rarely bothered to look for such parasites. His Dresden colleague F.A. Zenker even estimated that one in thirty-four corpses revealed trichinae infestations. It was also Zenker who first identified how trichinae were transferred from pigs to people and how the disease subsequently progressed in human organisms, leading to a potentially deadly outcome. As another well-known medical researcher put it, “Zenker is the real discoverer of trichinosis, and actually we should call trichinosis Zenker’s disease.”

Trichinosis was a rather curious disease. Its cause was neither viral nor bacteriological, but parasitic. The fact that tiny worms could invade and paralyze human bodies was not only a painful experience for those
who had ingested these parasites, it also generated widespread fears among the public at large because trichinosis was a silent killer that could strike anyone who ate pork. The trichina was invisible to the naked eye, tasteless, and not even pigs, for the most part, gave any indication of illness. Trichinosis raised the awareness that a food, which was supposed to nourish, could actually kill, and that it could do so without any visible indications of danger. People had always known that a bad cut of meat could make a person sick, but the trichinae revealed that meat could be dangerous without smelling rotten or looking putrefied. This realization raised new concerns about the safety of meat and the nature of food-borne illnesses. As a result, it generated much medical interest and publicity. Newspapers, medical journals, and even butchers’ publications frequently reported about this problematic. By the mid-1860s, trichinosis clearly had become part of medical and popular discourses, yet it still remained to be seen how this knowledge would be used and what effect it would have on the production and consumption of meat.

From Scientific Theories to Municipal Policies

Although the disease had been identified, a substantial problem remained because it continued to be unclear how trichinosis could be detected and, more importantly, how it could be prevented in pigs as well as in humans. Numerous scientific publications took up this question in the hope of transforming scientific theories into practical solutions. Among them were Rudolf Virchow’s 1866 Die Lehre von den Trichinen (The Study of the Trichinae) and Friedrich Küchenmeister’s 1867 Ueber die Notwendigkeit und allgemeine Durchführung einer mikroskopischen Fleischbeschau (About the Need for and General Implementation of Microscopic Meat Inspection). Both had conducted extensive experiments, which had shown that heating meat above 60°C would kill any existing trichinae. Consequently, they advised that all meat should be cooked until it reached at least that temperature. This seemingly simple solution to the threat of trichinosis, however, posed its own set of problems. For one, most people did not possess thermometers to accurately determine the temperature of their food. In fact, many, especially poor, households did not even have proper cooking facilities, nor did they often have the time and knowledge to correctly prepare their meals. And poverty was not the only problem; habits and food preferences were also an issue. As the experience of recent trichinosis epidemics had shown, the consumption of raw meat, which was a widespread practice in eastern and northern Germany, posed the main threat. But even if meat was cooked, it was still not necessarily safe. As long as there were any raw parts or remaining meat juices, the risk of trichinosis remained; hence, even a roast was potentially
dangerous, because often it was not cooked all the way through. Bacon and smoked hams according to Virchow and Küchenmeister also posed serious risks because the curing and smoking was often carried out at low temperatures and only for a brief period. In addition to raw meat, sausages also posed dangers. Not only were they made from many (often unidentifiable) parts of a pig; usually they were not cooked at all. Finally, there was always the problem that meat was not stored properly or kept for too long. Doctors and other health officials repeatedly appealed to the public to cook meat adequately, but they also realized that protective measures would have to be implemented elsewhere if trichinosis prevention was to be effective.

Obvious targets were, of course, the pigs themselves. Both Virchow and Küchenmeister insisted that pigs had to be kept clean and healthy. Their pens should be dry, warm, and well ventilated. The floors should be covered with cement rather than wood to keep out vermin that might carry diseases. Their food should be supervised, especially since pigs were known to eat just about anything, including small animals, bugs, and excrement. Yet Virchow and Küchenmeister were well aware that the total control of pigs was not possible. In the nineteenth century, when most livestock still went to pasture, pigs often roamed in the woods, thus making it difficult to keep track of their food intake. Moreover, given that most pigs were kept on small farms or even in private households, it was impossible to impose any specific standards for feeding and shelter.

The risk of livestock diseases was always high, and trichinosis posed a particular problem. Not only was it difficult to prevent pigs from ingesting trichinae, which they could get from eating mice, feces, or even kitchen garbage containing meat, it was also next to impossible to detect trichinosis in living pigs because, for the most part, pigs did not exhibit any recognizable symptoms of illness. This absence of visible symptoms in living pigs meant that veterinary inspections prior to slaughter, while useful for the detection of numerous other diseases, could not be used to ward off trichinosis. Different methods of prevention would have to be devised.

Most of the experts agreed that the only method to detect trichinae was through the microscopic inspection of the animals’ flesh immediately after they were slaughtered. Hence, most publications of the 1860s called for the immediate implementation of such inspections as the only viable means to ensure consumer safety. Describing how such inspections should be carried out, researchers explained that several muscle-tissue samples from different parts of the slaughtered pig, e.g., lungs, tongue, and legs, should be taken and closely investigated under an appropriate microscope. For proper meat inspections, microscopes were a key prerequisite because only through them
would tiny parasites become visible to the human eye. Apart from microscopes, such inspections required trained personnel. Declaring that laymen could not recognize trichinae, Küchenmeister and Virchow insisted that only doctors and veterinarians should be entrusted with this task.

With their call for microscopic meat inspection, scientific experts expressed their concerns about consumer health, while at the same time asserting their authority over questions regarding nutrition and food safety. The increasing number of studies and reports about trichinosis, as well as the growing publicity about outbreaks like the one in Hedersleben, generated debates that brought the knowledge of veterinary and medical scientists into the public limelight and political arena.

Pleas for meat inspection, which centered on questions of food safety, also had a political undercurrent that exemplified how scientific discourses were increasingly becoming entangled with state authority, not only because the state appropriated scientific domains, but also because scientific experts themselves called for state intervention. Most medical experts seemed to agree that food safety and the protection of the public from animal diseases was the responsibility of state agencies which should not only provide the legal basis for enforcing meat inspection, but which should also see that inspections were carried out correctly, because butchers could not necessarily be trusted. Surely, individuals also had to take precautions, but doctors believed that the question of meat quality reached beyond the grasp of individual consumers. It was a matter of public welfare that needed to be addressed by higher authorities, i.e., by specially trained personnel and, ultimately, by the municipality and the state. Thus, a much larger issue loomed beneath the call for meat inspection, for as B. Rupprecht, a medical professor at the University of Berlin, stated, “If microscopic meat inspection is to be truly safe, it must be legally enforced in small towns and in the country, and in large cities it must also be connected with public abattoirs.”

Legal Interventions and Official Initiatives

Attesting to the urgency of such reforms, the Prussian Ministry of Interior introduced a new slaughterhouse law on March 18, 1868, declaring:

In those communities where a public facility for the slaughter of livestock exists, it can be ordered through a city ordinance that
within the community district or in part of it the slaughter of particular kinds of livestock as well as certain connected trades may only be performed in the public slaughterhouse.\textsuperscript{22}

The law entitled communities to establish such facilities. Moreover, the law stated that “[F]ollowing the establishment of a public slaughterhouse, a further ordinance can be passed to enforce the inspection of all livestock to determine the animals’ health before and after slaughtering.”\textsuperscript{23} Such inspections were to be carried out by veterinarians or other qualified personnel. This law, which became known as the \textit{Schlachtzwanggesetz}, underscored that the establishment of public slaughterhouses was closely linked to the implementation of veterinary inspections.

However, the ratification of this law did not yet amount to actual change because even though it enabled communities to build public abattoirs, it did not require them to do so. Nevertheless, numerous cities did. According to an 1890 census, ninety-four German cities, among them Berlin, Breslau, Cologne, Hamburg, Frankfurt, and Munich, operated such facilities. In Berlin, due to municipal quarrels that I cannot explain here, it had taken over a decade until the city’s public slaughterhouse was opened in 1881, but once it did, the Zentral-Viehhof quickly emerged as an exemplary site for the enforcement of veterinary and meat inspections. Not only did veterinarians inspect all livestock following its arrival at the train ramps, but samples of its flesh were examined right after slaughter. The microscopic inspection of pigs for trichinosis received particular attention. In Berlin, special trichinosis labs were established right at the Zentral-Viehhof. Initially, 64 inspectors worked in these labs, but by 1910, attesting to the growing significance of such inspections, 370 specially trained trichinosis investigators were employed at the Zentral-Viehhof alone, many of them women, because they were believed to be especially rigorous. As one administrator somewhat cynically claimed, “It is well known that women, once they have become suspicious, see much better than men. This characteristic, while quite unpleasant in many instances, is definitely an advantage when it comes to trichinae inspections.”\textsuperscript{24}

To be sure, trichinosis was not only a problem in Germany, but in many countries where pork was a popular food, including most of eastern and northern Europe, as well as the United States. In Denmark, for instance, trichina worms were regarded a public health threat requiring police attention. However, nowhere were postmortem meat examinations as stringent as in Germany. In fact, fears about trichinosis were so deep-seated that efforts at controlling this disease did not stop at the German borders. The growing availability of imported meats in the 1880s and 1890s, particularly from the massive meat packing plants of Swift and Armour in Chicago, generated additional concerns about the safety of
pork, especially since an increasing number of German visitors to Chicago reported about the abhorrent hygiene and health standards they witnessed in those slaughterhouses. As one visitor to Armour’s factories wrote: “Here time is money. In this place where seven pigs are slaughtered every minute in buildings made of wood rather than concrete, hygiene and proper meat inspections cannot exist.”

Alarmed by such reports, German health officials began to conduct their own investigations of U.S. meat imports, especially with regard to trichinae. One 1893 study of the Kaiserliche Gesundheitsamt estimated that about three in every one hundred cans of Armour hams showed traces of trichinae infestations. While this might not sound like much, it was enough to lead examiners to complain to the German Ministries of Health and Commerce who, in turn, contacted the Foreign Ministry to demand immediate action. The latter quickly complied by sending German embassy officials to Chicago to investigate the situation. Their subsequent report, which only further solidified existing concerns, generated a substantial and increasingly hostile correspondence between governmental agencies in Chicago, Washington, and Berlin. German officials demanded that U.S. federal agencies implement meat inspections to test for trichinae and other potential health hazards. By late 1894, German-American negotiations had reached such an impasse that German officials threatened that if such inspections were not immediately imposed, all imports of American meat would be halted. And indeed in January 1895, Germany as well as a number of other European countries that had joined Germany’s efforts did impose an import stop on most American pork products; however, this did not yet mark the end of the affair, particularly on the side of the Americans. Furious about the audacity of European governments, many U.S. officials felt that Europeans, and especially the Germans, rather than acting on actual threats posed by American-produced meat, were simply trying to boycott American products in favor of marketing their own meats. As the Washington Evening Star reported on March 3, 1895:

It is well understood by the president and Secretary of State and all of the cabinet officials interested in the question that the health plea made against our products which are excluded by Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark is merely a diplomatic excuse and the prohibitions are believed to be but the beginning of a tariff war against the United States.

Numerous officials advocated that the U.S. government also should impose stricter import regulations, and even make use of the 1890 flag law, which stated that additional tariffs could be collected from any country deemed to discriminate against American products. Yet, President
Cleveland apparently was reluctant to make use of the flag law because such import restrictions would have harmed the American economy more severely than the European. Instead, the Cleveland administration decided to bow, albeit reluctantly, to European pressures by implementing federal trichinosis inspections on all pork products intended for export to Europe. At the same time, no such inspections were mandated for meats sold in the United States. American consumers had to wait another decade until federal meat inspections were imposed in the United States following the publication of Upton Sinclair’s 1905 novel *The Jungle*.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, then, I would like to make the following three points about why it might be worthwhile to look at parasites and their place in history. The first is about micro-history. Micro-historians emphasize the significance of conducting small-scale localized studies that focus on the everyday experiences of ordinary people. Parasites lend themselves not only to a micro-history, but even a microscopic history that commences very locally—inside the bodies of certain animals and humans. This would perhaps be of little historical interest in itself if this story ended there. But of course it does not. Rather the history of parasites often sheds light on the intricate linkages between everyday practices—in the case of trichinae, food consumption—public health, and scientific knowledge production, as well as the transfer of this knowledge into political discourses and policy making and back into the arena of everyday life. Hence, parasites enable us, on the one hand, to offer “thick descriptions” (even if somewhat disconcerting ones), while on the other hand also making it possible to move from the very small existence of a worm to the quite large-scale implications it generated, not only on a local but on a national and even international stage. Parasites, viruses, and bacteria can indeed have quite remarkable careers, as trichina worms amply demonstrated. Not only did they function as crucial instigators of German slaughterhouse reforms, they also led to the internationalization of meat inspections.

This leads me to my second point—the transnationality of the history of disease. As we all know about the plague, cholera, or even more recent examples like SARS, epidemic diseases do not conform to national boundaries. In that sense, they necessarily link different geographical regions, but they also forge transnational bonds on a different, less territorial, scale, since disease control often requires international cooperation, not just in the realm of politics, but through scientific knowledge exchange. Trichinosis attests to how the growing globalization of food consumption also intensified the internationalization of politics and diplomacy (or the breakdown thereof) as well as knowledge exchange.
Moreover, this example should also serve as a reminder that when looking at transatlantic history, we should not only examine the Americanization of Europe, but that we should also look in the other direction to learn more about the Europeanization of America.

My third and final point also revolves around interchange, but interchange of a different sort, namely between humans and non-human organisms. While I certainly do not mean to suggest that parasites should be considered as historical agents who intentionally shape the course of history or even their own existence, I would like to suggest that in order to grapple with the complexities of historical change, we might need to expand our conception of what constitutes our historical universe. For quite some time now, scholars have abandoned the idea that the past is mainly his story. Perhaps now it is also time to embrace larger notions concerning the web of life by incorporating the non-human, and even the microscopically small, into our conception of the past, particularly when thinking about the role of the body in history. After all, history is not simply a matter of the mind or the heart, but at times, it also goes through the stomach.

Notes

1. *Volkszeitung* (8 December 1865).
2. The doctors concluded that this habit of eating raw or undercooked meat was the main reason why the poor had been especially susceptible to this illness. Indeed, of the twenty-seven laborers from the workers’ barracks, twenty-six would die.
7. It has not been established with certainty if there had been any knowledge of this disease prior to the nineteenth century, but many interpreters of the Jewish and Muslim prohibition of pork have attributed this taboo to concerns about trichinosis.

11 Rupprecht, *Die Trichinenkrankheit im Spiegel der Hettstädter Endemie betrachtet*, 6–7. He lists more than twenty names of international scholars who had added to the knowledge of this smallest of animals. Even today, humans are considered one of the main hosts of trichinae next to pigs and rats. J. F. Gracey, ed., *Thornton’s Meat Hygiene* (London, 1981), 314.  


15 Incidentally, today trichinae are destroyed by freezing pork to -15°C. Gracey, *Thornton’s Meat Hygiene*, 317.  


17 Pigs were usually not infested with enough trichinae to display any symptoms. Only some of them exhibited discomfort, lack of appetite, and fever. See Gracey, *Thornton’s Meat Hygiene*, 316.  

18 Küchenmeister, Rupprecht, Virchow, and Zenker were, of course, among the proponents.  

19 Virchow maintained that microscopes with an enhancement of fifty to one hundred times were sufficient to detect the presence of any *Trichinella spiralis*.  

20 Rupprecht, *Die Trichinenkrankheit im Spiegel der Hettstädter Endemie betrachtet*, 165.  

21 A. C. Feit, Bericht der zur Berathung der Trichinen-Frage niedergesetzten Commission der medicinischen Gesellschaft zu Berlin über öffentliche Schlachthäuser (Berlin, 1864), 15.  


23 *Gesetz-Sammlung für die königlichen Preußischen Staaten* 23 (Berlin, 1868), 277–81.  


27 Such tariffs could range from 10 percent higher fees to the total exclusion of foreign products.
GUNS, GUN CULTURE, AND THE ROOTS OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT

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Introduction and Key Questions

Before the publication of *Arming America* in 2000, it had been considered axiomatic among scholars of the American colonial and early national periods that Americans were generally armed and very adroit in the use of their firearms. Michael Bellesiles’s book, it seemed, very much destroyed that certainty: “[H]e has virtually shattered every assumption that many historians accept and most gun enthusiasts hold dear concerning guns and their role in American history,” opined John Grenier in one of many rave reviews. No one else has put [the facts] together in so compelling a refutation of the mythology of the gun or in so revealing a reconstruction of the role the gun has actually played in American history,” wrote Edmund Morgan in the *New York Review of Books*. When in 2001 *Arming America* also won the Bancroft Prize, Bellesiles seemed to have a secure academic future ahead of him.

It was during that same time, however, that many questions and criticisms began to surface, calling into question not only Bellesiles’s findings but also his methods and, finally, even his academic honesty. Emory University convened an investigative committee to examine the charges made against Bellesiles and to report on whether he had fabricated or falsified his data and whether he had “engaged in other serious deviations from accepted practices in carrying out or reporting results from research [. . .].” While the committee could not “speak of intentional fabrication or falsification” of research data, it did find “evidence of falsification,” and it also stated that Bellesiles’s work did not live up to professional standards of historical scholarship. Following that committee report, the Trustees of Columbia University voted to rescind the Bancroft Prize, and only weeks later, the publisher, Alfred A. Knopf, disowned the book. Bellesiles, in a statement published October 25, 2002, resigned his teaching appointment at Emory.

Following that scandal, *Arming America* was largely discredited as a scholarly contribution. Nonetheless, some questions remain. How prevalent was gun ownership in early American history? What shape did gun culture have during that time? And, perhaps most important for the
constitutional and political development of the United States, where did the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution come from? Hence, I find that we cannot entirely ignore Arming America, its flaws notwithstanding, as it “compels us to re-examine how and why Americans have developed an enchantment with firearms, whenever the mania began.”

More important, perhaps, than the question of the “mania” are the questions of constitutional history that underlie the issue. After all, the Second Amendment reads, “A well-regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.” One would assume that a provision featured in so prominent a place as the Bill of Rights must have some sort of societal background. Thus, it seems very likely that guns must have been present in some number, and that some kind of gun culture must have surrounded whatever firearms were extant. It will be the purpose of this project to shed some light on these unanswered questions of constitutional history by elucidating the cultural origins of the Second Amendment.

Methodology

In this project, I will attempt to solve a mystery of constitutional history by using the tools of social and cultural historians. I believe this approach to be novel, as most histories of the Second Amendment focus on the constitutional precursors of the amendment rather than its cultural roots. Even Michael Bellesiles’s focus—though his work and the controversy around it are unquestionably stimuli of my own project—was rather different. I will be asking whether and how cultural phenomena came to be set in constitutional stone.

Flawed as Bellesiles’s use of his probate sources was, it was nonetheless innovative. The wide availability of probate inventories for many places covering almost the entire colonial period (and well into the nineteenth century) makes them a suitable source for the inquiry into the preponderance of certain household items. Indeed, it may well be the only source we have in order to get some sort of statistical idea of how widespread firearms really were. That said, a caveat is in order: While probate inventories are immensely valuable sources, they do not necessarily list all items someone might have owned, and hence they paint an incomplete picture. Moreover, there is no way to measure how complete or incomplete any one inventory may have been. Counting guns in inventories will, however, give us at least the minimum number of guns owned by the probated population. It is here that we encounter the next difficulty: the fact that the decedent population is on average older and wealthier than the population in general. This opens the door to a po-
tential age and wealth bias that will be very hard to measure. Despite these complications, some number, even with caveats attached, will be better than groping in the dark.

In order to keep the project manageable, I decided to research only two original colonies rather than all thirteen, and to do so for ten distinct years during the eighteenth century. I chose Massachusetts and South Carolina. The former was one of few states whose militia, a major user of firearms, did not fall entirely into a state of decrepitude. The latter had by the early eighteenth century a slave population that outnumbered the free population; this, one would assume, put a premium on the possession of firearms. Furthermore, I dropped Barnstable, Plymouth, Middlesex, and Worcester counties in Massachusetts, as the universe for all the counties in all the years would have been close to four thousand cases for this state alone. For South Carolina, the situation was different insofar as all probate matters were handled centrally in Charleston before 1785, making a distinction between individual counties both unnecessary and impossible.

The Bellesiles controversy clearly demonstrated that careful adherence to the rules of historical social research and statistics is vital to survival in this minefield of modern-day political interests. In order to make the results as reliable as possible, I drew a random sample from a listing of all (as far as possible) probate inventories in a specific county and year. That listing, however, had first to be compiled, as nothing of the sort existed in most cases. The samples were drawn large enough to have a margin of error of +/− 5 percent and a confidence level of 95 percent, both standards widely accepted for purposes of historical statistics. Once the inventories were sampled, I then proceeded to examine for the presence of firearms and slaves, in the process encoding them in a format suitable for use with SPSS, a statistical analysis software program.

**Presence of Guns**

The analysis yielded interesting first results. On the whole, arms were more prevalent in South Carolina than in Massachusetts. There were differences, however, depending on whether the county was on the coast or in the backcountry: Nantucket County, an island off the Massachusetts coast, showed guns in only very few of the sampled inventories, while the incidence in Berkshire and Hampshire was high.

Some further insights are possible by taking into account the key-dates of the samples. There is no clearly observable general trend of rise or fall in the incidence of guns in inventories. However, occurrence in Essex seems to have been rising slightly but continuously, while in Suffolk it seems to have been in a slow but equally continuous decline. There
is one characteristic common to Massachusetts generally and its counties
individually: The frequency of guns enumerated in inventories peaks in
1759. This development might be due to British war efforts, which
became much more concerted after the recall of Lord Loudoun in 1758.
Massachusetts also cooperated much more willingly after William Pitt
had promised (partial) reimbursement for the cost of war borne by the
colonies.

South Carolina samples show three significant peaks, in the years
1740, 1743, and 1765. These coincide with important historical events. In
1739, South Carolina experienced the Stono Rebellion, a slave uprising
that cost dozens of lives and reinforced a climate of fear. When the first
rumors of insurrection surfaced, the colonial legislature mandated that
white male inhabitants of the state carry guns to church on Sundays.
The peak in 1765 is probably due to the Cherokee War, which engulfed
South Carolina in 1760 and 1761.

In addition to simple frequency distributions, statistics can also yield
more complex calculations. For example, they can be used to detect re-
lationships between different variables. Perhaps the single most interest-
ing question in this situation is whether or not there is a correlation
between the existence of slaves and the existence of guns in an inventory.
Answers to this question can be found by cross-tabulating the two vari-
ables and computing certain statistical indicators of correlation. For the
entire sample, there is indeed a rather weak correlation, which, however,
is very significant statistically. Interestingly, that correlation becomes
even weaker if only South Carolina is taken into account.

I am currently preparing the data gathered from Massachusetts and
South Carolina probate records for an analysis of social factors. To that
end, the total monetary values of the sampled inventories have been
included in the data matrix. However, because many different currencies
were used in both states during the eighteenth century, and because the
currency used in valuing the inventories was mostly not clearly stated,
careful preparations are necessary. First, I will need to determine which
currency was most likely in use in cases where it was not clearly stated.
Next, I will have to convert all values into sterling values to make com-
parison possible. For that comparison to make sense, I will then code the
total sterling values of the inventories for different wealth classes.

Gun Culture

The larger part of this project will be concerned with the “history of the
evolving role of guns in American culture” in the eighteenth century.
This question seems to present itself very strongly: If nobody used guns,
if nobody had any attachment to them, if they were of no value, where
did the Second Amendment come from? It certainly did not come out of the blue, but so far scholars’ focus has been mostly on the constitutional precursors, highlighting the incorporation of provisions from the English Bill of Rights into the revolutionary state constitutions and thence into the first ten American amendments. I will attempt to shed some light on the cultural link that kept the legal regulations alive throughout the century.

One of the first steps here must be to ask: What is understood by the term “gun culture?” In scholarly literature, the expression “gun culture” is frequently used but in most cases remains entirely undefined. Some authors understand “gun culture” as a group of people rather than a phenomenon: “The American gun culture is a seemingly unified aggregation of individuals, mainly white, small-town males who evidence a longstanding personal attachment to guns, gun ownership, and gun habits [. . .].” Still others reject the term entirely as “misleading,” though they do not offer better alternatives. Indeed, “gun culture” is a problematic term, not only because it has rarely been defined, but also because it often carries a strongly negative connotation.

I understand “gun culture” as a neutral term, and I believe it can be a useful analytical concept. Culture can be defined as “[. . .] a system of shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviors, and artifacts that the members of a society use to cope with their world and with one another, and that are transmitted from generation to generation through learning.” Applied to “gun culture,” this definition suggests that one must look for such shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviors, and intergenerational transmittance relating to one specific artifact—the gun. Accordingly, it will be necessary to look at what customs governed gun use and possession, what behaviors were associated with such use and possession, and whether guns served as status symbols or just as necessary tools of daily life. These are just some of the questions that come to mind, and many more will eventually be asked.

A historic culture is accessible to the historian through its remnants, which present something of a snapshot that can be examined long after the culture has changed or evolved. These remnants might be artifacts, such as the guns themselves, or written material that testifies to the beliefs, actions, feelings, values, and customs of a bygone age. The focus of this project will be on written sources, which will allow considerable insights. Laws, books, newspapers, pamphlets, and magazines, for example, allow the historian to peer into the public sphere of a historic society and to find out what occupied people in their daily lives. Transcripts of legislative and judicial debates illuminate the rationale behind certain decisions, while diaries and business and probate records permit insights into the private sphere. The picture these records present, and of
which I will attempt to show some examples, is anything but coherent at first glance.  

The laws of both Massachusetts and South Carolina are ambivalent about guns. On the one hand, guns were seen as necessary instruments of the militia in the defense of the colony. Hence, legislatures frequently enacted laws requiring able-bodied males—often between the ages of sixteen and sixty—to arm themselves for their militia service.  Musters and training were a regular part of these men’s lives, and even active duty was not infrequent during the many colonial and Indian wars of the century. These necessities also created a market for all sorts of manuals, instructing militiamen in the correct and efficient use and care of their firearms. In the Southern colonies, slavery was a major reason for the maintenance of the militia. In South Carolina, for example, in the context of the Stono Rebellion of 1739, the legislature required men to carry firearms not only to church on Sundays, but also into the church, and enlisted the help of parsons in prosecuting those who did not comply.  

On the other hand, however, there is ample evidence that guns were also seen as dangerous. Massachusetts specifically outlawed firing guns in Boston, when the General Court resolved that “[. . .] by the indiscreet firing of guns laden with shot and ball within the town and harbour of Boston, the lives and limbs of many persons have been lost [. . .],” ordering “[. . .] that no person shall [. . .] discharge any gun or pistol [. . .] within the town of Boston [. . .].” Hunting and fowling, too, came under regulation, as eager hunters decimated the populations of deer and birds.  

Duelling was yet another case in which practices of gun use occupied colonial legislatures at different times. Massachusetts outlawed the practice in 1719 because it disturbed the king’s peace, brought dishonor to God, and was contrary “to the precious life of man.” In addition to this legal ban, churchmen vocally condemned the practice, attacking the conviction that killing in a duel was legitimate: “How comes this [duel] not to be a murder? It is indeed an aggravated and complicated murder!” wrote the ministers of Boston after a mortal duel in 1728. Despite this opposition to solving affairs of honor in such manner, duels seem to have been a presence in public life during the 1700s. Not only were the details of duels occasionally published as pamphlets: They also were a common part of adventure stories such as The Amours and Adventures of Two English Gentlemen in Italy and compilations such as A Collection of Moral and Entertaining Stories, Calculated for the Instruction and Entertainment of Youth. While these various sources certainly overemphasize the importance of duels, they nonetheless underscore the extent to which duels captured the imagination of Americans during the eighteenth century.  

With a clearer picture of the role firearms played in American society throughout the eighteenth century, I will proceed to mine the papers of
the debate over the ratification of the Bill of Rights and, more specifically, the part of the Bill of Rights that was to become the Second Amendment. This analysis will allow a much better understanding of how early American gun culture influenced the conception, writing, and codification of this addition to the Constitution. It may also allow new insights into how the founding generation may have understood this amendment’s meaning, operation, and reach.

In the end, this project will shed light on gun use and gun possession, on contemporaries’ views of guns and their relevance to daily life in the eighteenth century. It will address legal precedence on the path to the Second Amendment. But it also casts a wider net: It will illuminate the ways in which cultural practices influenced the making of the Bill of Rights, and in doing so will bring us closer to understanding the lives, hopes, and fears of Americans in the late eighteenth century.

Notes

I would like to thank Nathan Fronk, Gudrun Löhrer, and Michael Schlüter for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this article.

8 Gloria L. Main has addressed these flaws in “Many Things Forgotten: The Use of Probate Records in Arming America,” William and Mary Quarterly 59, no. 1 (2002).
9 The different forms of probate records—wills, administrations and inventories—are discussed more fully in Gloria L. Main, “Probate Records as a Source for Early American History,” William and Mary Quarterly 32, no. 1 (1975). For further methodological considerations, see mainly Alice Hanson Jones, American Colonial Wealth: Documents and Methods (New York 1977); Alice Hanson Jones, “American Probate Inventories: A Source to Estimate Wealth in 1774 in Thirteen Colonies and Three Regions,” in Probate Inventories: A New Source for the Historical Study of Wealth, Material Culture, and Agricultural Development: Papers Pre-

10 I chose the years 1752, 1759 and 1765, being before, during and after the French and Indian War, as well as 1771, 1779, and 1786, similarly covering the Revolutionary War. Furthermore, I drew a random sample of four years out of the period 1732 (the year records in South Carolina begin to be denser) to 1743 (the year before the outbreak of King George’s War), resulting in the years 1735, 1739, 1740, and 1743. Berkshire County was carved out of Hampshire only in 1761. Accordingly, data is available only for the last four years.


12 Barnstable and Plymouth Counties represent the southeastern coastal counties which I believe, are sufficiently represented by Bristol, Dukes, and Nantucket Counties. Middlesex contains densely settled areas near Boston and rural areas further inland. These are very similar to Essex and Suffolk Counties. Worcester is a landlocked county very similar to Hampshire and Berkshire Counties. Furthermore, the records for both Worcester and Middlesex were in very bad shape: Those for Middlesex were organized alphabetically rather than chronologically, making the sampling process very complicated. The records for Worcester were too disordered to be of use.

13 The governor and secretary of the province acquired this power of ordinary during the proprietary period, creating a unique situation in the English colonies. In mainland North America, as in all other colonies, probate was administered locally. Charles H. Lesser, South Carolina Begins: The Records of a Proprietary Colony, 1663–1721. (Columbia, SC, 1995), 129, 290, 294.


15 Because there were too few cases per year, Dukes and Nantucket Counties have been sampled for the entire century and not for individual years (Dukes had 243 for the entire century, Nantucket 185). Hence, inferences about temporal dimensions are not possible here.

16 Hampshire and Berkshire have different peaks in 1740 and 1765, respectively. Most likely, these are outlier cases due to very slim statistical bases in those years.


19 An Act for the Better Security of this Province Against the Insurrections and Other Wicked Attempts of Negroes and Other Slaves [. . .], 1739 S.C. Acts No. 659. Also see note 33.

Cramer’s $V=0.284$, $p<0.001$.

Cramer’s $V=0.116$, $p=0.001$.


Tonso, Gun and Society, 3.


At the time of writing, much of the projected source material has not been sighted in depth. This is just a collection of interesting tidbits which presented themselves at first reading.


During the French and Indian War, for example, one third or more of eligible men participated in active service. Fred Anderson, A People’s Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the Seven Years’ War (Chapel Hill, NC, 1984), 3. For all of New England, Anderson sees the number as between 40 and 60 percent: Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754–1766, 1st ed. (New York, 2000), 288.


An Act for the Better Security of this Province Against the Insurrections and Other Wicked Attempts of Negroes and Other Slaves [. . .], 1739 S.C. Acts No. 659. This act is not printed in the South Carolina Session Laws, nor is it included in the Statutes at Large. See Thomas Cooper and David J. McCord (eds.), The Statutes at Large of South Carolina (Columbia, SC, 1836) III: 525. It is printed, however, in the South Carolina Gazette for August 11 to August 18, 1739.

An Act to Prevent the Firing of Guns Charged with Shot or Ball in the Town of Boston, 1746 Mass. Acts Chap. X. The Massachusetts legislature also banned hunting on Boston Neck, as “[. . .] the limbs and lives of several persons have been greatly endangered in riding over Boston Neck, by their horses throwing of [sic] them, being affrighted and starting at the firing of guns by gunners that frequent there after game [. . .].” An Act to Prohibit Shooting or Firing Off Guns Near the Road or High-way on Boston Neck, 1713 Mass. Acts No. 209.


An Act for the Punishing and Preventing of Duelling, 1719 Mass. Acts No. 299. No reliable statistics exist for the number of duels fought in America during the eighteenth century. Robert Baldick suggests that in America, duelling became a serious problem only in the nineteenth century. However, he also states that legislatures considered it sufficiently seri-

37 *He That Would Keep God’s Commandments Must Renounce the Society of Evil-doers: A Sermon Preached at the Public Lecture in Boston, July 18th, 1728* (=Evans 3102), iii. (Emphasis in the original.)

38 See for example Ralph Harding, *A Concise but Candid Relation of Circumstances, Previous, and Relative to a Duel, On Board the King George Transport September 2d, 1777* (=Evans 15257). New York, 1777; *The Amours and Adventures of Two English Gentlemen in Italy; With a Particular Description of the Diversions of the Carnival in Venice, Also the Duels They Fought, the Dangers They Escaped, and Their Safe Arrival in England* (=Evans 28188). (Worcester, MA, 1795); *A Collection of Moral and Entertaining Stories, Calculated for the Instruction and Entertainment of Youth [. . .]* (=Evans 33533). (Northampton, MA, 1798).
“THE NORTH BEGINS INSIDE”:
IMAGINING ICELAND AS WILDERNESS AND HOME LAND

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In 1937, W. H. Auden and Louis MacNeice published a whimsical account of their trip to Iceland undertaken the previous summer. The work, *Letters from Iceland*, was mostly written in the form of letters to family and acquaintances at home. Five of the letters were addressed to the poet Lord Byron, and in these, rather than reporting on their adventures or offering tourist tips, Auden and MacNeice playfully contrasted their northern travel with the Grecian and Italian voyages of nineteenth-century Romantic poets such as Byron. When so many other European artists had sought inspiration from southern travels, why, the authors repeatedly asked, did they choose to go north? Various answers are hinted at, and, in the final poem in the book, MacNeice reminisced about the trip after their return home, and addressed his companion:

And the don in me set forth  
How the landscape of the north  
Had educed the saga style  
Plodding forward mile by mile.

And the don in you replied  
That the North begins inside,  
Our ascetic guts require  
Breathers from the Latin fire.1

In posing the Northern journey as a welcome respite from the classical voyage, MacNeice linked the landscape of Iceland with the medieval Icelandic sagas, and suggested that the visual landscape of the country shaped the qualities of its literature. Such an idea was a fairly common assumption among travelers to Iceland by the time of MacNeice and Auden. For example, the British saga scholar and amateur painter, W. G. Collingwood, wrote forty years earlier, in his 1897 *A Pilgrimage to the Saga-Steads of Iceland*, that he intended landscape pictures in the book:

to illustrate the sagas of Iceland. It is intended to supply the background of scenery which the ancient dramatic style takes for granted. . . . the intense tenderness and the intense passion of the sagas could only be developed among scenery which, whether the actors felt it or not, reacted upon their sentiment. It was in this
belief that we undertook our pilgrimage. We went to see the very places where events so familiar in books occurred in reality; and we found that the belief was true.  

In repeating what had become a well-established trope, MacNeice, however, gave it an additional twist. His companion Auden apparently took issue with the standard interpretation: for him, the qualities of the “North” were not found in landscapes that travelers observe, rather, the “North” was located inside the travelers themselves. To elaborate this theme, the poem implied that what travelers see in landscapes is dependent upon their ideas about the place formed before their arrival.

My research project, “Narrating the North: Travel, Nature, and Cultural Identity in Iceland, Greenland, and the North Atlantic,” explores how European travelers interpreted Icelandic and other North Atlantic landscapes and nature from the mid-eighteenth century to the present. I take as a starting-off point that ideas about these landscapes and nature are located inside the travelers, and can be best understood when placed in the context of their assumptions and expectations about Iceland, rather than as transparent representations of their experiences there. In other words, their ideas about North Atlantic nature had as much to do with their experiences before and after their journeys as during them. The North Atlantic region—which includes not only Iceland, but also Greenland, Norway, and the Faroe, Orkney, and Shetland Islands—was often understood as a frontier or wilderness region by these travelers, as the borderlands of the civilized, European world. For them, it was, as Larry Wolff has commented about Eastern Europe in this same period, a place “within Europe, but not fully European.” The region was sparsely populated in comparison to the homes from which the visitors came, and seemed to have little to offer them in terms of material comforts or technological development. Another, more famous British traveler, Sir Richard Burton, wondered why anyone would go there at all, and derided the imaginations of those who, like Auden and Collingwood, found the landscapes thrilling. In his opinion, the only people who were entranced by Iceland were those who had limited experience outside their own countries, unlike Burton, who was famous from his travels in India, Africa, and the Near East. However, despite the litany of complaints about the poor hygiene and lack of accommodations and conveniences when traveling in Iceland and the North Atlantic, European travel to Iceland steadily increased from the time of the first visitors around the middle of the eighteenth century to the time of Auden and MacNeice, when regular ferry connections departed from Hull and Leith. In 1772, Sir Joseph Banks, who later became president of the British Royal Scientific Society, had to use his personal connections with the Royal Navy in order to
procure the boat for his trip to Iceland. Auden and MacNeice, on the other hand, advised the traveler to book passage on the boats “some time beforehand during the season” in order to ensure a place.  

“Narrating the North” asks why and in what ways Iceland and the North Atlantic was an important region for Europeans. In answering this question, the project focuses on the different conceptions of nature in the North Atlantic that emerged in several different but intersecting circles, including local authorities, foreign explorers, and distant officials. Was it merely for reasons of personal taste that Collingwood found Icelandic landscapes thrilling and significant for the reading of the sagas, while Burton found them banal, and was more interested in the potential for profit from Icelandic natural resources? One of the few Icelandic landscapes that Burton did deem worthy of comment was a landscape in a region of sulfur deposits, which he called “not pretty save to the capitalist’s eye.” Although certainly personal taste played a role in perceptions of Icelandic nature, I situate both reactions within a longer tradition of debate concerning the nature of the North Atlantic and its relationship to European nature. Since about the middle of the eighteenth century, a discussion had arisen among natural historians about whether Icelandic nature was “exotic” or “ordinary.” Was it different from nature in European countries, and therefore extraordinary, or was it just a poorer copy of what could be found at home, and therefore not worthy of much interest? Driven by the eighteenth century’s fascination with classifying, measuring, and calculating, scholars and officials entered into a debate about what kinds of plants and animals existed in the North Atlantic, whether the laws of nature were the same there as they were at home, and the relationship between this nature and the people who lived in it. For example, in one of the early attempts to set the record straight about nature in Iceland, in 1752 a Danish natural historian, Niels Horrebow, disputed the claim of Johann Anderson, the mayor of Hamburg, whose 1746 Nachrichten von Island, Grönland, und der Strasse Davis had described pools of burning water in Iceland that ignite spontaneously for fourteen days every year. There is no reason, argued the Danish naturalist, to think that water and fire in Iceland behave differently than in other countries, as “two opposite elements will not unite in this country any more than in any other.”

Anderson’s claim and Horrebow’s corrective represent, in my view, two poles of a European debate carried on about Iceland and the North Atlantic, one holding that Northern nature was exotic and unpredictable, the other that it was just the same in this country as in any other. Disagreements about nature in foreign places were quite common in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European travel literature, as travel to the Americas, the South Pacific, and Africa provided a wealth of previously
unknown specimens to discuss and classify. Often authors of natural histories used these disagreements over specimens in order to assert their claims of authority over other authors. Many of the places visited by the natural historians, however, were so distant and so far outside European boundaries that both the outlandish claims and the contesting of these claims seemed unsurprising. Precise knowledge about faraway places was understandably difficult to obtain. From a European perspective, Iceland and the rest of the North Atlantic, however, were not in the same category as Africa or Hawaii. However disgusting the food or rude the natives might be, the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century North Atlantic was still part of a European state. Iceland, Norway, the Faroe Islands, and Greenland remained provinces within the Danish kingdom, while the Shetland and Orkney Islands had been given to James III of Scotland as part of a marriage alliance between Scotland and Denmark in the fifteenth century. Therefore, understanding nature in these remote and sometimes peculiar provinces was not just an endeavor for scholars in scientific societies. Obtaining accurate descriptions of nature in the North Atlantic, and especially the sometimes catastrophic consequences of that nature, was a bureaucratic concern of the state.8

In this context, I argue, these descriptions of nature had political meanings, uses, and implications. By tracing the debate between the two poles of the “exotic” and the “rational” or “ordinary” nature over this period, I show how European descriptions of North Atlantic nature and of the people living within that nature often contained implicit or explicit commentary on state management. Long before National Socialism made a reference to the “pure” nature and Volk of Iceland a piece of its political agenda, British explorers interpreted Icelandic volcanic eruptions as symbols of the endurance of these people and their resistance to Danish oppression, an example of a “wild” nature that reflected the character of this people.9 Danish officials, on the other hand, saw the aftermath of a natural disaster as an opportunity to introduce alternative crops and better methods of animal husbandry, to overcome the resistance of the farmers to modern scientific agriculture and to compel them to adopt the practices that the officials imagined were accepted in other provinces of the kingdom.

As the pendulum swung back and forth between these two positions, what was ultimately at stake was whether the North Atlantic was conceptualized as a wilderness outside of Europe, or as part of Europe. This was by no means a clear-cut question. When travelers considered religion and state bureaucracy, the North Atlantic provinces seemed familiar and indisputably part of Europe. Eighteenth-century British, German, and French travelers understood very well that the correct procedure upon their arrival in Iceland was to present their letters of introduction to the
Danish governor, who would assist them in procuring horses and guides for their journey. As they left Reykjavík, however, and turned their attention to the technology, agricultural practices, and landscape around them they often found that, again in the words of Auden and MacNeice, “Europe is absent. This is an island and therefore/Unreal.” This was a contradictory and confusing experience for many travelers, and they often reported sensations of psychological or even physical discomfort on the journey. Carl Julian Graba, who traveled to the Faroes in 1828, spoke of the “homesickness” induced by the strange landscapes which were like those of the “New World” to a European. In this project, I concentrate on such moments of confusion and disorientation on North Atlantic journeys, and find that these tend to occur around the encounter not only with landscapes, but also with flora and fauna, with technology and material culture, and with language. From this, I argue that European travelers who commented on conditions in Iceland had certain standards and notions in mind about what constituted a “European landscape” or a “European tool.” In either a positive or a negative sense, Iceland and the North Atlantic did not match their expectations in this regard.

As the time span of this project is long, and because it deals with knowledge about the North Atlantic existing in different European circles, the primary sources are diverse. Images of the North Atlantic appeared in several different kinds of sources for my study. These include travel books, such as Auden’s and MacNeice’s; reports by officials, especially those in the Danish colonial administration on environmental conditions, including agricultural and fishing conditions; natural histories and other scientific reports, such as those of Horrebow and Anderson; studies of language and literature, especially of the Icelandic sagas; and fiction set in Iceland, such as Pierre Loti’s Pêcheur d’Islande and Jules Verne’s Voyage au centre de la terre. Naturally, the conventions of each genre have to be taken into consideration in analyzing the different types of sources. Reactions to Icelandic landscapes expressed in fiction are quite different from those in the reports of government officials. It is, however, noteworthy that the same themes and characteristics of Iceland—the landscape, the technology, and the language—that foreigners considered remarkable in travel books also appear in administrative documents. This suggests a certain continuity of assumptions about European culture and nature, and Icelandic exceptions to those norms.

Did this history of European visions of the North Atlantic have any lasting legacy? Can any European or American still think of the North Atlantic as exotic when a direct flight departs every day from the Washington, D.C. area to Iceland during the summer months? How is Iceland perceived today? The country, along with the other North Atlantic
nations, modernized rapidly following World War II. It was a beneficiary of Cold War politics, as its geographical location was considered strategically ideal by the Americans, who financed the construction of the country’s transportation infrastructure, including its highways and international airport.\(^\text{12}\) The airport where one arrives from that direct flight from the Washington D.C. metro area is a legacy of the U.S./NATO base at Keflavík, about 50 kilometers outside of the capital. This base, of course, was also the entry point for other kinds of modernity, about which the Icelanders were much more ambivalent: American television and rock music.\(^\text{13}\) With Iceland’s high standard of living and new technological modernity, it would appear that the discussion is now closed, and that the country, independent of Denmark since 1944, has become indisputably part of Europe (although not of the European Union). The anthropologist E. Paul Durrenberger declares decisively that

Iceland is not exotic. It has electricity and central heating and cars and buses. It has telephones that work and supermarkets and electric milking machines and tractors. People live in high-rise apartment buildings or modern single-family houses. Icelanders have credit cards, money machines, color TV. Except for a couple of letters the alphabet is the same as we use for English. Iceland is a thoroughly modern country.\(^\text{14}\)

In most respects this is true. While Iceland is still routinely spoken of as “Europe’s last wilderness,” this language is mostly used in tourist literature, where such exoticism is a marketable commodity. In the conclusion of “Narrating the North,” however, I concentrate on a few contemporary episodes in which the definition of North Atlantic nature is again a contentious issue. One of these is the whaling controversy, which came to international attention following the introduction by the International Whaling Commission (IWC) of new regulations and a ban on commercial whaling in 1986. In this dispute, some North Atlantic inhabitants, including many Norwegians, Icelanders, Greenlanders, and Faroe Islanders, argue for a certain relationship to nature—the right to hunt and eat whales—that most European countries, including Great Britain, France, Germany, and also the United States, have rejected in international discussions at the meetings of the IWC. Today, all four of these countries kill and eat whales, although these hunts are classified and treated in different ways under the IWC guidelines. Thus, the choices made in the North Atlantic about the human relationship to nature conflict with values that an international community wishes to establish as normative. While the rhetoric of some pro-whaling organizations, such as the World Council of Whalers, claims that whale meat is an essential and necessary element in the North Atlantic diet, whaling is actually an in-
significant part of the North Atlantic economy, less than 2 percent of the GDP of any of the whaling nations. What is at stake in the whaling issue, however, is an expression of cultural values and national sovereignty.\textsuperscript{15} According to this argument, North Atlantic people have historically experienced a struggle for survival against the harsh realities of nature. Having survived this struggle, they as a nation have a different relationship with nature than foreign urban dwellers who are removed from the realities of life and death. Therefore, a person’s national identity as an Icelander or Norwegian—although he or she lives in a major city, buys meat from the supermarket, and has never fished or whaled—endows this individual with certain rights, including the right to eat whale meat when it is served at a fashionable restaurant in Oslo. Furthermore, the opposition to the accepted position on whaling is an important piece of this identity in the political realm. Smaller nation-states consider it necessary to take a strong stance against what they perceive as unfair pressure from larger nation-states through the domination of the IWC; otherwise, they would appear manipulable, and their national sovereignty would be at risk.

As self-serving and politically motivated as this argument appears when it is elaborated in full, at its core is the long history of European debate about North Atlantic nature. Once again, one side understands the North Atlantic as a place of unique nature that, like a wilderness, must be preserved. The other side conceives of the animals of the North Atlantic as being similar to large game or domestic animals of other regions of the world, and routinely compares them to cattle, elk, kangaroos, and elephants in their efforts to argue that several species of the North Atlantic whale population are sustainable and should be subject to the same regulatory structures that facilitate the consumption of animals elsewhere in the world. The arguments of these pro-whaling advocates tend to shift the emphasis away from the whales, and focus instead on the characteristics of the people hunting or consuming whales. A Greenlandic indigenous rights activist, Finn Lynge, for example, claims that the indigenous peoples of Greenland intuit their connection to nature and perceive a direct relationship between their imagination and the landscape. He elaborates this argument into a defense of Inuit hunting practices against the opposition of international non-governmental organizations such as Greenpeace, claiming that, since the Inuit relationship with nature is not accessible to people who have separated their consciousness from the natural world, it is not morally legitimate for people operating within one type of relationship to nature to evaluate the actions of people operating within another.\textsuperscript{16}

This understanding of the relationship between humans and nature in the North Atlantic is not fundamentally new, but is a reformulation of
the sentiment expressed in the poem by Auden and MacNeice: Nature does exist inside. North Atlantic nature is not understood from a transparent reading of a biological analysis of whale populations, but from a complex array of assumptions and expectations about the qualities of the place. Studying the history of these ideas helps to place such contemporary conflicts as the whaling debate in better context and to understand the driving forces behind the different positions. What has changed over the two-hundred-year history of this European discussion about North Atlantic nature is not so much the positions as the participants. Rather than European visitors commenting on nature in the distant hinterlands, the inhabitants of independent Iceland, Norway, and autonomous Greenland and the Faroes (with home rule governments within the Danish state) now have the voices to enter into debates about nature in their homelands.

Notes
2 W. G. Collingwood and Jón Stefánsson, A Pilgrimage to the Saga-Steads of Iceland (Ulverston, 1899), v.
4 Richard Burton, Ultima Thule; or, A Summer in Iceland (London, 1875).
5 Auden and MacNeice, Letters from Iceland, 38.
6 Burton, Ultima Thule, 295.
7 Niels Horrebow, Tilforladelige efterretninger om Island (Copenhagen, 1752). This quotation is from the English translation, The Natural History of Iceland (London, 1758), 19–20. An abridged version of Johann Anderson’s Nachrichten von Island, Grönland, und der Strasse Davis (Hamburg, 1746) was translated into Danish in 1748.
8 I discuss one of these natural catastrophes, the 1783 volcanic eruptions in Iceland, and its contested interpretations in more detail in my “Imagining Iceland: Narratives of Nature and History in the North Atlantic,” The British Journal for the History of Science 35, no. 3 (September 2002): 313–34.
10 Auden and MacNeice, Letters from Iceland, 26. As Eugene Weber has pointed out, Europeans who traveled into their own provinces and compared conditions there with the urban centers also often experienced the sensation of having left Europe behind. The difference between the experience he describes and those of the Icelandic travelers is that the nature
and landscape of rural France and Germany were rarely thought of as “exotic,” and the general impressions are overall much less positive than those of the saga enthusiast who went to Iceland. See his Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914 (Stanford, 1976).

11 Carl Julian Graba, Tagbuch geführt auf einer Reise nach Färö im Jahre 1828 (Hamburg, 1830), 244. For Graba’s compatriot, the German legal scholar Konrad von Maurer, who visited Iceland in 1858, this was a particularly perplexing situation because von Maurer considered medieval Icelandic law to be an exemplar of European traditions. On the other hand, he noted the poor condition of Icelandic gardens and their lack of basic agricultural implements in his travel diary, published as Islandsferð 1858, trans. Baldur Hafstein (Reykjavík, 1997), 44–45. Von Maurer’s main work on Iceland is a history of medieval Iceland, Island von seiner ersten Entdeckung bis zum Untergange des Freistaats (Munich, 1874) and a treatise on medieval Icelandic law, Die Entstehung des Isländischen Staats und seiner Verfassung (Munich, 1852).


13 The tensions and place of the military base in Icelandic society during the Cold War is the subject of Einar Káráson’s black comedy Djöflaeyjan rís (Devil’s Island), which was made into a film by Friðrik Þór Friðriksson in 1997.


16 Lynge, Arctic Wars.
REPORTS ON CONFERENCES,
SYMPOSIA, SEMINARS

BUCERIUS SEMINAR 2004:
AMERICAN ARCHIVES AND AMERICAN HISTORY

Conveners: Kathleen Conzen (University of Chicago), Andreas Etges (Free University of Berlin), Christof Mauch (GHI). Made possible by a grant from the ZEIT Foundation Gerd and Ebelin Bucerius, Hamburg.

The first Bucerius Seminar on American History and American Archives took place from September 6–18, 2004. Based on the GHI’s highly successful archival summer seminar in Germany, the GHI, the department of history of the University of Chicago, and the John F. Kennedy Institute for North American Studies of the Free University of Berlin designed the new summer archives course. Ten doctoral students—seven from different German universities and three from the University of Chicago—visited American archives and libraries in Chicago, Madison, Washington, DC, and Boston.

The goal of the seminar was to prepare Ph.D. students in American history for their prospective dissertation research trips. They learned how to contact archives, use finding aids, and identify important reference tools, and they became acquainted with a dozen American research facilities. They gained insight into how historical materials are acquired, stored, and made accessible to scholars. In addition, the group met a number of prominent scholars who discussed their research strategies with them.

The program started with a reception on Labor Day. Kathleen Conzen, who had suggested such a seminar to the GHI, invited the group as well as colleagues and graduate students to her house. To our great pleasure, Oliver Gnad of the ZEIT Foundation was able to come to Chicago for a couple of days to say some words of welcome and to describe the foundation’s programs.

The first two days of the seminar were organized by the excellent staff of Chicago’s Newberry Library, led by Jim Grossman, Hjordis Halvorson, and Martha Briggs. Their task was both to give a general introduction to the American archival system, major finding aids, and research strategies, as well as present the large collections of the library. In one of the sessions on the second day, Kathleen Conzen, a specialist on urban history and German-Americans, and her colleagues Mae Ngai, who recently published a book on illegal aliens and American immigration policy, and Thomas Holt, one of the most prominent African-American
historians and a former president of the American Historical Association, shared their experiences and the unexpected trails they followed doing research. The most memorable credo was Mae Ngai’s: “I believe in xeroxing everything.”

The last day in Chicago began with a visit to the archive of the Circuit Court of Cook County in downtown Chicago, where Philip J. Costello described how social history can profit from using court records. Before taking the bus to Madison, the group was welcomed at the Special Collections Research Center of the University of Chicago’s Regenstein Library. Daniel Meyer and his colleagues discussed the peculiarities of their archive, which includes many of the papers of famous professors who taught at Chicago.

The day in Madison included a very full program. Michael Edmonds and Harry Miller presented the immense library and archival collections of the Wisconsin Historical Society, and eloquently and impressively described the public mission of the institution. Stanley Kutler joined the group for lunch at the University Club and talked about “Chasing Sources”: his fight for the Nixon tapes. In the afternoon, John Kaminski introduced the “Ratification of the Constitution Project,” a major editorial project centered at the University of Wisconsin. The day had been very interesting, but long. Nevertheless, Jack Holzhueter, a former editor of the Wisconsin Magazine of History and arguably the expert on the history of Wisconsin, was able to revive the group with his many stories of sometimes difficult and unexpected discoveries, as well as some ingenious tips for someone doing local history. Trying to find descendants of a person? One way is to go to the cemetery and find out who is still sending flowers. Exhausted but full of ideas, the group enjoyed the student union’s terrace on Lake Mendota, and more than one decided to come back to Madison for research.

After passing through major security on Saturday, September 11, 2004, the group flew to Washington. Sunday was free, but most of the participants met for an extended tour of monuments on and near the National Mall. Led by Kristina Scholz and Andreas Etges, the tour started at the National Japanese American Memorial and ended at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall.

Monday was spent at the National Archives and Records Administration building in College Park, Maryland. Bob Coren had put together sessions on divisions of the archive, including Textual and Electronic Records, Records of Congress and Congressional Committees, Presidential Libraries, and the Nixon Presidential Materials. A highlight was the tour of the Special Media Division, where Bob Richardson showed Civil War battlefield maps, aerial photographs of Germany during World War II, and the original patent of Eli Whitney’s cotton gin.
In the late afternoon, Robert Dallek, author of the best-selling Kennedy biography and a leading expert on the American presidency, came to the GHI to talk about doing research in Presidential Libraries. Every president tries to fool the public in order to create a certain image, Dallek argued, and one of his goals is to look behind this image. Since it takes several decades for enough relevant documents to be opened, Dallek’s books on Lyndon Johnson and John F. Kennedy will be followed by a study of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. A reception at the GHI gave the group a chance to talk to Dallek in more detail and to get to know the GHI, its director, and some of its research fellows. On Tuesday, the group visited three different institutions in Washington. John Fleckner of the archive of the National Museum of American History presented the large holdings in business, engineering, communications, and advertising history, and also gave a brief overview of the Smithsonian Institution and its other collections. Later that day, William Burr, senior analyst at the National Security Archive, expertly discussed the intricacies of the Freedom of Information Act and strategies to gain access to classified documents. The day ended with a visit to Howard University and its famous Moorland-Spingarn Research Center, one of the largest collections on the history of African Americans. This was followed by a reception organized by Howard University’s history department, where the group met faculty members and graduate students and was given a brief overview of the history of this important educational institution by the chairperson, Emory Joel Tolbert.

On its final day in Washington, DC, the group visited the Library of Congress. Daun Van Ee gave a behind-the-scenes tour of the stacks of the Manuscripts Division. Sara Duke and Martha Kennedy of the Prints and Photographs Division impressed everyone with the material they presented relating to the participants’ topics. Next, Kathy Kerst talked about the vast and diverse holdings of the American Folklife Center. In addition, the group got a tour of the building and an introduction to the library’s ever-expanding website.

At the John F. Kennedy Library in Boston, the group got an in-depth look at a Presidential Library. Stephen Plotkin, Maura Porter, and James Hill described the textual and audiovisual collections, discussed questions of declassification, and presented photos as well as audio recordings, among them a couple of hilarious telephone conversations of John F. Kennedy about the reporting of the military’s purchase of a special bed for his pregnant wife. He had not authorized this action, was rather angry, and enjoyed showing his anger.

The next and final day, the group visited the Massachusetts Archives. Michael Comeau and Martha Clark gave a tour of the archives and presented some of its treasures, among them the charter of the Massachusetts
Bay Colony, the Massachusetts copies of the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights, and Paul Revere’s bill for his famous ride. In the afternoon, the group was welcomed at the Arthur and Elizabeth Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in America. Even though the main building was under construction, Ellen M. Shea and others had prepared a wide selection of the library’s holdings.

The Bucerius Seminar ended with a farewell dinner in Boston at the home of the parents of one of the American participants. Everyone agreed that the seminar had been enormously helpful, and expressed their hopes that other doctoral students will have a chance to take part in a similar summer course in the future.

The group and the organizers would like to thank the ZEIT Foundation and the GHI for their generous support, as well as all those institutions and individuals involved in making this first Bucerius Seminar a big success.

Andreas Etges

Participants and Their Projects

JULIA BROOKINS (University of Chicago), “White racial identities within the mobile societies of nineteenth-century America”
LEVKE HARDERS (Humboldt University Berlin), “Gender—Discipline—History: Female Graduates of German and American Studies from the 1920s to the 1950s”
GWENNAN ICKES (University of Chicago), “Changes in conceptions and understanding of American selfhood in the years surrounding the turn of the twentieth century”
TINA KÜHR (University of Bonn), “Imperial Propaganda and Education in the United States and the German Kaiserreich, 1889–1914”
RICHARD MERTENS (University of Chicago), “Stockbridge Indians”
MARTINA PURUCKER (University of Regensburg), “Monstrosities in Seventeenth-Century New England”
RALF RICHTER (University of Göttingen), “Innovation Clusters and Flexible Specialization: The Networks of the Machine Tool Industry in Chemnitz (Germany) and Cincinnati (U.S.), 1870–1930”
STEFANIE TROJA (University of Göttingen), “Squatters in the Northwest Territory/Ohio, 1763–1812: A study in cultural and social history”
DAVID WIRTH, (University of Duisburg), “Western Diplomacy during the second Berlin Crisis (1958–1963)”
ACCESS—PRESENTATION—MEMORY: THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES AND THE MEMORIAL FOUNDATIONS OF GERMAN POLITICIANS

Conference at the GHI, September 8–11, 2004. Conveners: Astrid M. Eckert (GHI), Christof Mauch (GHI). Co-sponsored by the GHI and the Office of Presidential Libraries at the National Archives (College Park, Maryland), the Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus (Rhöndorf), the Bundeskanzler-Willy-Brandt-Stiftung (Berlin), the Reichspräsident-Friedrich-Ebert-Gedenkstätte (Heidelberg), the Otto-von-Bismarck-Stiftung (Friedrichshruh), and the Stiftung Bundespräsident-Theodor-Heuss-Haus (Stuttgart).

Participants: David E. Alsobrook (Clinton Presidential Library), Thomas S. Blanton (National Security Archive), John Brademas (New York University), Frank G. Burke, Richard Claypoole (Office of Presidential Libraries, NARA), Bruce Craig (American Historical Association), Michael J. Devine (Truman Presidential Museum and Library), Heinrich-Dietrich Dieckmann (Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus), Dieter Dowe (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung), Astrid M. Eckert (GHI), David Eisenhower (University of Pennsylvania), Sharon Fawcett (Office of Presidential Libraries, NARA), David Greenberg (Rutgers University), Gerhard Gross (Bundeskanzler-Willy-Brandt-Stiftung), Liselotte Gross (Bundeskanzler-Willy-Brandt-Stiftung), Jay Hakes (Jimmy Carter Library), Thomas Hertfelder (Stiftung Bundespräsident-Theodor-Heuss-Haus), Andrea Hopp (Otto-von-Bismarck-Stiftung), Wolfram Hoppenstedt (Bundeskanzler-Willy-Brandt-Stiftung), Konrad H. Jarausch (Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung, Potsdam), Christof Mauch (GHI), Sam McClure (Office of Presidential Libraries, NARA), Hans-Peter Mensing (Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus), Walter Mühlhausen (Reichspräsident-Friedrich-Ebert-Gedenkstätte), Gabriele Müller-Trimbush (Stiftung Bundespräsident-Theodor-Heuss-Haus), Michael Naumann (DIE ZEIT), John C. Powers (Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, NARA), Bernd Rother (Bundeskanzler-Willy-Brandt-Stiftung), Martin Sabrow (Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung, Potsdam), Bernd Schaefer (GHI), Wolfgang Schmidt (Bundeskanzler-Willy-Brandt-Stiftung), Barry Schwartz (University of Georgia), Thomas A. Schwartz (Vanderbilt University), Hans-Peter Schwarz (Bonn University), Andreas von Seggern (Otto-von-Bismarck-Stiftung), Nancy Smith (Office of Presidential Libraries, NARA), Gary Stern (Office of Presidential Libraries, NARA), Martin Teasley (Eisenhower Library), Hartmut Weber (Bundesarchiv Koblenz/Berlin), Karl Weissenbach (Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, NARA).
Franklin Delano Roosevelt was the first U.S. president to recognize his presidential papers as part of a “national heritage” and to preserve them for posterity. His predecessors had considered their own papers to be private property, and had simply taken them home. Roosevelt’s decision in December 1938 to set up a library at his private estate in Hyde Park, New York, and to donate his papers to the American public marks the beginning of the Presidential Library system. Subsequent presidents followed suit, and Roosevelt’s innovation expanded. With the Presidential Libraries Act of 1955, the system became part of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Its Office of Presidential Libraries today administers eleven Presidential Libraries and the Nixon Presidential Materials, and supports a staff to assist with the current administration’s preparations for opening its own library.

By contrast, in Germany, there is no law that would establish a foundation for a former chancellor or federal president. In principle, the Federal Archive (Bundesarchiv) is in charge of preserving politicians’ papers. But the Bundesarchiv faces stiff competition from party foundations, private institutions, and, to a lesser degree, from the various memorial foundations of German politicians. There are only a few such foundations. Funded by public money, they were set up to honor a select group of German statesmen, including Otto von Bismarck, Friedrich Ebert, Konrad Adenauer, Theodor Heuss, and Willy Brandt.

As different as the systems may be, there is nonetheless a pressing need for transatlantic communication. From September 8–10, 2004, the GHI hosted a conference bringing together for the first time practitioners and scholars from the eleven Presidential Libraries, the five German memorial foundations, and NARA. They were joined by historians studying American presidents and German chancellors, archivists, and representatives of public interest groups working to promote access to presidential records. The conference did not simply compare the two systems, nor did it merely present each institution. Instead, it was structured along topical lines, covering issues of mutual interest ranging from historiographical, academic, and practical concerns to archival history, issues of memory, and problems of archival access.

David Eisenhower opened the conference with his keynote speech, “The Past in Trust for the Future: The Presidential Library System.” He analyzed the impact of the libraries on the interpretation of American political history. In his view, the institutions looked bright indeed: The libraries and their museums are “the best expression of the American political tradition,” and they are fulfilling their mission to make the presidency accessible to the people.

The first panel took a comparative look at the history of the Presidential Library system and the various memorial foundations of German
politicians. Frank Burke illuminated the development of the Presidential Library system. His paper “Pride or Protest: Community Responses to Presidential Libraries” focused on the different reactions of local communities to the prospect of hosting a Presidential Library. Whereas the Truman Library in the president’s home town of Independence, Missouri was something of a grassroots project with widespread community support, the plan to locate the Kennedy Library on the campus of Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts met with strong resistance. The Kennedy papers moved to Columbia Point, overlooking Boston’s harbor, instead. The potentially fruitful cooperation between a university campus and a Presidential Library also did not mean that such an arrangement was necessarily a good match: Stanford University refused to host the Reagan Library, and Duke University in Durham, North Carolina turned down the Nixon Library. Over the years, the legal status and the means of financing a Presidential Library evolved, too. Roosevelt considered his papers to be private property, but donated them to the United States. The controversy over the ownership of the Nixon papers and the famous tapes led to the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act of 1974 and the Presidential Records Act (PRA) of 1978, settling the ownership question in favor of the state. NARA thereby became the designated custodian of presidential and vice-presidential papers.

Dieter Dowe presented the corresponding story for the German memorial foundations. As much as the American Presidential Libraries were the model for the creation of the foundations, a quick look at the respective budgets, exhibition space, personnel, and visitors is humbling, and drives home the point that comparing the American system to the German system is like comparing apples and oranges. The first foundation, the Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus in Rhöndorf, was set up under the Grand Coalition in 1967 as a non-profit organization, and in 1978, it was turned into a federal institution. The same procedure was applied in the late 1980s to the Reichspräsident-Friedrich-Ebert-Gedenkstätte, first founded in Heidelberg in 1962. The Bundeskanzler-Willy-Brandt-Stiftung in Berlin, the Otto-von-Bismarck-Stiftung in Friedrichsruh, and the Stiftung Bundespräsident-Theodor-Heuss-Haus in Stuttgart were additions of the 1990s. Of these five, only the Bismarck foundation sparked political controversy. Historians with a Social Democratic background questioned whether a democratic society should honor the “Iron Chancellor” with a foundation, and set off a heated debate in the Bundestag. The influence of party politics on the decision to finance a memorial foundation with federal money is indeed one of the major ways the German system differs from the American system. In Germany, a parting chancellor or president does not automatically see a foundation named after him. Who decides whether a statesman is “wor-
thy” enough, and what accounts for “worthiness” or historical “greatness” in the first place, remain difficult questions.

The second panel focused on the role of biography as a genre in historiography. Moderator Jay Hakes pointed to the commercial success of biographies on the American market. History, he held, reached a broader audience primarily by way of historical biographies. Presidential biographies in particular could not be written without the Presidential Libraries and the documents in their archives. To Thomas A. Schwartz, the popularity of presidential biographies comes as no surprise, since the office of the president stands at the core of the political system. The presidency provides one easy way of structuring political history. Abstract issues and processes can be boiled down and explained from the White House perspective. However, reducing complexity and focusing on presidents alone comes at the expense of a multifaceted analysis of American politics. The role of Congress and other political players tends to become marginalized.

In his paper “The Statesman’s Biographer: Hunting for Fame, Fortune, and the Truth,” Hans-Peter Schwarz offered a tour d’horizon of the current scene of biographies of German statesmen. Schwarz likened the biographer to a hunter searching for the secrets a politician wants to hide. Those secrets, once unveiled, become the meat of the biography and, in no small amount, account for its readability. The reason why comparatively few biographies are written by German historians lies, according to Schwarz, in the thirty-year rule regarding archival materials and in the lack of interest on the side of potential readers. Popular interest focuses on only a few lives, with Hitler still leading the list. Federal presidents are not the biographer’s first choice—their role is too representative, and they have too little an impact on “real” politics. Chancellors make for better objects of study. The biographies of Adenauer, Brandt, Schmidt, and now Kohl will most likely be rewritten for many years to come. These four statesmen are “powerful competitors” to the historian: They published their memoirs and hand-picked their first biographer, and thus set the tone for how and for what they want to be remembered. Yet Schwarz predicted a bright future for German biographers. With the current chancellor and his foreign minister, two colorful political and private lives await the hunter.

The third panel moved to one of the driving forces behind the development of the Presidential Library system: the question of access to presidential papers. The contested issue of access is also a sore point in some German cases. In opening the session, the director of the newly opened Clinton Library in Little Rock, Arkansas, David E. Alsobrook, drew attention to what has become and will remain the main problem for NARA in the future: the dramatically increased quantity of material.
After the transfer of his files from the White House to Arkansas, Bill Clinton’s first question to Alsobrook was, “How much stuff do I have? Is it more than LBJ’s?” In fact it was: The Clinton Administration left 80 million pages of documents, approximately 20 million email messages, and 2 million photographs, amounting to 35,686 cubic feet of records. This makes Clinton’s library the biggest thus far, revealing one of the major headaches for the library’s custodians: processing the material.

Nancy Smith elaborated on this theme and discussed various problems relating to the release of documents to the public. One major hurdle lies in determining whether material was public or private in nature. White House tapes of the 1960s and 1970s, for instance, pose a special problem because political discussions might be interspersed with a private comment, only to lead back into official business. Unlike paper, text on tapes cannot simply be blacked out. By law, presidents themselves have a say over their papers. So far, every president has chosen to postpone the release of confidential material from presidential advisors.

When it comes to leading politicians’ papers, the German Bundesarchiv has a different set of problems. Its president Hartmut Weber regrets the unclear meaning of the Federal Archives Law in this regard. When leaving office, politicians often hand their papers over to the private archives of the party foundations, regardless of whether the material addressed official or private matters. For official state papers, however, the Bundesarchiv is the legally designated repository. The federal government finally addressed the issue in a cabinet resolution in July 2001, ordering the heads of ministries not to remove original papers and to distinguish between party business and official business. Whether this resolution will be adequately honored remains to be seen.

Michael Naumann, publisher of the German weekly DIE ZEIT and former State Minister for Cultural and Media Affairs, returned to this issue in his keynote address that evening. He shared his views about the loss of files and data at the Federal Chancery in Berlin upon the change of government in 1998, with Christian Democrat Helmut Kohl and his close aids moving out, and Social Democrat Gerhard Schröder moving in. Upon taking over his own office, for instance, Naumann found the computer hard drives wiped clean. What he alternately called an “adventure story” or “a tale of transition” led into a discussion of the scandals of the outgoing Kohl administration over party finances, sales of government property, and various connections between the two. Naumann speculated about the true motives for the truncated parliamentary and judicial investigation of the events, and the agenda of those officials involved. The lively and controversial debate over Naumann’s paper drove home the point that the story was part of recent history and that the last word had yet to be spoken.
Martin Sabrow delivered a case study of the history of access to the Stasi files. What started out as an unprecedented “success story”—public access to the files of a defunct regime’s secret service—turned into a highly charged situation that ran counter to historical scholarship and the right to know. The turning point came in 2000, when former chancellor Helmut Kohl challenged the right of the Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the former GDR to make public the information the Stasi had assembled about him. Sabrow blamed the subsequently worsening access situation on two factors. First, the CDU party finance scandal increased the interest in the Stasi tapes of Kohl’s telephone conversations. Second, there was the personality factor, i.e. the uncompromising stance of the personalities involved, namely Kohl, Minister of the Interior Otto Schily, and Federal Commissioner Marianne Birthler. Historical scholarship is paying the price: The latest court rulings on the case further increased the web of restrictions already in place, thereby finally grinding to a halt the revolutionary and cathartic act of throwing open the files of an oppressive secret service.

Thomas S. Blanton moved the discussion to current issues of access to presidential papers. The National Security Archive was founded in 1985, and is simultaneously a research institute on international affairs, a library and archive of declassified U.S. documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), a public interest law firm defending and expanding public access to government information through FOIA, and an indexer and publisher of the documents. By constantly applying FOIA to pry loose governmental documentation, the Archive is the natural enemy of any attempts at government secrecy. Blanton discussed one of the Archive’s most famous cases, the litigation over White House email referring to the Iran-Contra deal during the Reagan administration. Whereas the National Security establishment wanted to get rid of these high-level electronic exchanges, the email survived, thanks to a six-year lawsuit brought by the National Security Archive. Henceforth, White House emails would be considered part of presidential records, covered by the respective legal provisions for their preservation.

Bruce Craig discussed recent attempts of the Bush administration to redefine the Presidential Records Act (PRA) of 1978. In November 2001, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order (EO) 13233 that purported to “further implement” the PRA. The EO gives former presidents the right to prevent the release of presidential papers and allows a sitting president to block the release of a predecessor’s records, even after that former president has signaled his approval. Because of concerns stemming from the Bush administration’s effort to delay the release of some of Reagan’s records, a coalition of scholars, historical and archival associa-
tions, and organizations seeking more transparency in government filed suit in federal court holding that the EO was an impermissible exercise of executive power. The implications of EO 13233 have been widely covered in the national press because the EO so clearly smacks of an agenda that tries to undo the post-Watergate legislation that was crafted to safeguard presidential papers and to reconfirm the public’s democratic right to know. The EO, Craig held, violates the spirit of the PRA. NARA’s General Counsel Gary Stern countered these positions by pointing out that the Reagan documents that were the subject of litigation had meanwhile been released, with the exception of only eleven documents totaling seventy-four pages. While EO 13233 might have slowed down the process of release, it did not fundamentally change the PRA’s implementation.

The fourth panel took a closer look at how the general public comes into contact with the Presidential Libraries and the German memorial foundations. In the United States, it is the attached museums that get the most attention from the non-scholarly public, with more than 1.5 million annual visitors to the exhibitions. As part of this conference, the exhibitions underwent an unusual assessment: An associate of one of the German foundations traveled to various Presidential Libraries and examined how biographies were exhibited in the presidential museums, while a historian from the Presidential Libraries’ side went to Germany to visit the memorial foundations. Each side thus offered a fresh perspective on the other’s exhibitions.

Thomas Hertfelder visited the exhibitions at the Roosevelt, Kennedy, Johnson, and Bush Libraries, and discovered “a whiff of Royalism.” The exhibitions show idealized biographies of white males who were sports buffs in their youth, lifelong patriots surrounded by their large, happy families. The potential tension between a critical analysis of the historical background of a presidency and the celebration of a president’s legacy is usually avoided simply by emphasizing the latter. The museum locations contribute heavily to this through their connection to the biographies exhibited inside. Roosevelt in Hyde Park, Kennedy in Boston, Johnson in Austin—the presidents are remembered far away from the site of their political power in Washington and reembedded into their local points of origin.

John Powers visited all the German foundations and found them to contribute substantially to political education. The exhibitions strive to combine the biography of the statesman with the political background of his life and times. The history of National Socialism features prominently in these exhibitions, but they also attempt to show the political transformation of Germany from the Kaiserreich into the Federal Republic. However, Powers found that party politics receives too much attention at the expense of a more private view of the exhibited statesman. Also, some
major historical occurrences have not yet been incorporated into the exhibitions, such as the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall, the political change after 1990, and long-term processes like migration. He recommended including more interactive and audio-visual elements and moving away from printed text in order to make the exhibitions livelier.

Michael J. Devine, director of the Truman Library, introduced the conference participants to the broad outreach program of the Truman Presidential Library that seeks to involve high school and college students as well as their teachers. One prominent outreach feature is the White House Decision Center. In this experiential program, students take on the roles of President Truman and his advisors as they face real-life historical decisions. Another cornerstone is the library’s website with more than 30,000 pages, visited by more than 250,000 users every month.

The last panel focused on the interaction of cultures of memory and the political culture in Germany and the United States. Barry Schwartz examined the history of the public holiday Presidents’ Day, observed on the third Monday of February. Presidents’ Day replaced the celebration of Washington’s and Lincoln’s birthdays in February, which had been gradually marginalized by the more popular Valentine’s Day on February 14. The decision in 1971 to make Presidents’ Day a federal holiday stemmed less out of a desire to show reverence to the presidents than an attempt to unify a divergent practice of observing the various February holidays. Schwartz doubted whether every president deserved to be remembered by a federal holiday, and saw the introduction of such a holiday as being at odds with the overall waning respect for the office of the president since the mid-1960s.

Konrad H. Jarausch connected the remembrance of Germany’s leading statesmen with the country’s dense memory culture that shoulders the double burden of two dictatorships and their respective crimes. After years of denial and evasion, Holocaust memory became an integral part of West German memory culture. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 added the task of researching the causes, history, and impact of the East German dictatorship and remembering its many injustices. While these two elements of German history will not diminish in importance, Jarausch pointed out that there are hardly any positive points of reference in German memory culture to commemorate democracy and freedom in Germany.

The section closed with three case studies that examined the shifting image of a statesman over time. Andreas von Seggern outlined the history of public remembrance of Otto von Bismarck. Already during his lifetime, Bismarck became the subject of popular adulation, a sentiment that took on mythical dimensions after his death, as evidenced by the many Bismarck memorials in Germany. A radical new assessment of the
“Iron Chancellor” came after World War II, when nationalistic approaches to German history were finally delegitimized. It was only in the 1980s that Bismarck remembrance again entered public debate, when the West German minister of the interior suggested saving part of the decaying Bismarck estate near Friedrichsruh. The Bismarck Foundation itself was founded only after unification, with major backing from Chancellor Kohl. The foundation relates to Bismarck only as a subject of historical inquiry, and steers clear of older strands of personal reverence.

David Greenberg discussed “Richard Nixon in American Memory.” Many people speculated about the real Nixon, already controversial during his lifetime. Two recent interpretations try to reinvent Nixon: one as the experienced elder statesman in his conduct of international affairs, the other as a foreign policy advisor to Bill Clinton. Similarly, they try to paint him as a liberal in domestic policies. Greenberg rejected both these interpretations as attempts to distract from the defining event of Nixon’s presidency, the Watergate crisis, and to replace the image of Nixon as crook. In domestic policies, Nixon did not generate a progressive agenda, but only reacted to the dominant, liberal political climate in the country. Greenberg predicted that the image of “tricky Dick” will prevail in the future, despite the recent revisionist attempts. Nixon’s negative, manipulative personality weighs too strongly in the public memory.

Walter Mühlhausen concluded the case studies with an analysis of perceptions of Friedrich Ebert. Even in his own party, Ebert became controversial due to his role during the revolution of 1918–1919. The Weimar Republic never developed much of a loyalty toward its first president, either. Ebert himself did not work to polish his image or popular perception. His death in 1925 dramatically changed the situation. The Social Democrats turned him into a political icon, named a foundation after him, and made his grave a pilgrimage site. Once the National Socialists were in power, public remembrance of Ebert came to a halt, with only Social Democrats in exile trying to keep the flame burning. The GDR viewed Ebert as a traitor of his class, while in the Federal Republic, the left wing of the SPD grew critical of him during the 1960s for having missed the chance of 1918–1919. Only after unification in 1990 did Ebert join the ranks of those considered to be the leading German statesmen, and he was honored with a memorial foundation.

_Astrid M. Eckert_
THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY UNRAVELING?
STATES, PROTEST MOVEMENTS, AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF U.S.-EUROPEAN RELATIONS,
1969–1983

Conference at Vanderbilt University, September 17–19, 2004. Co-sponsored by the GHI and Vanderbilt University. Conveners: Bernd Schaefer (GHI), Matthias Schulz (Vanderbilt University), Thomas A. Schwartz (Vanderbilt University). Supported by a grant from the DAAD New York.

Participants: Michael Bess (Vanderbilt University), David C. Geyer (U.S. Department of State), Greg Donaghy (Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, Ottawa), Ronald J. Granieri (University of Pennsylvania), William Gray (Purdue University), Mary N. Hampton (Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell, AL), Donald Hancock (Vanderbilt University), Claudia Hiepel (University of Essen), Fabian Hilfrich (Institut für Zeitgeschichte im Auswärtigen Amt, Berlin), Imtiaz Hussain (Universidad Iberoamericana, Mexico City), Werner Lippert (Vanderbilt University), Daniel Möckli (Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule, Zürich), Gottfried Niedhart (University of Mannheim), Alastair Noble (British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London), William Odom (Hudson Institute, Washington, DC), Rowena Olegario (Vanderbilt University), Raj Roy (Slaughter and May, London), Paul Rubinson (University of Texas, Austin), Joachim Scholtynseck (University of Bonn), Sarah B. Snyder (Georgetown University), Daniel Usner (Vanderbilt University), Robert Wampler (National Security Archive, Washington, DC), Hubert Zimmermann (Cornell University).

The question of whether transatlantic political and military relations were truly based on shared values has always been merely rhetorical. As past and present events demonstrate, alliances might be in jeopardy even if their foundation on common values can be taken for granted. What really matters is the international framework and its different perception in terms of assessing crises and threats. The Cold War with the Soviet Union and its allies, together with a geographical dividing line right through the heart of Europe, had a lasting effect on discipline within the Western alliance. Despite all fissures, frictions, and divergent interests, which existed to a much larger extent than realized at the time, at the end of the day, overarching quests for cohesion prevailed on both sides of the Atlantic until well into the 1990s.

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Scholars from Vanderbilt University and the GHI recently convened a conference to examine these postwar efforts to keep the transatlantic alliance intact. After a reception hosted by the Robert Penn Warren Center for the Humanities on the Nashville campus the night before, Richard McCarty, dean of Vanderbilt’s College of Arts and Sciences, welcomed all participants to his sprawling university in Tennessee’s state capital. He expressed particular satisfaction that scholars with transatlantic backgrounds had decided to hold such a conference away from traditional venues along the U.S. coasts. Greetings by the three conveners were followed by the first session, opened with Gottfried Niedhart’s remarks on parallels and frictions between American détente and German Ostpolitik. He described West Germany since 1969 as both a latecomer to and a pioneer in the process of détente in East-West relations. The Federal Republic’s desire for more independence in international affairs resulted in Henry Kissinger’s telling quip that he liked Ostpolitik, but wished it had been undertaken by a different country. Only when Bonn’s strategy played into superpower interests after 1970 did the United States realize how American détente and German Ostpolitik could become complementary and mutually beneficial.

In her examination of NATO’s responses to the Soviet call for a European Security Conference, Sarah Snyder outlined America’s efforts to balance its commitment to Western Europe with its bilateral détente interests toward Moscow. Particularly during the final phase of negotiations in Geneva between 1973 and 1975, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger played a mediating role between Moscow and Western Europe, obfuscating the extent of American commitment to Western interests. American-Soviet diplomacy during the negotiation of the Helsinki Final Act indeed reached a state of collusion that, fortunately for the cohesion of the Western alliance, remained mostly secret at the time. “Odd man out” in Western Europe’s euphoric Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process were the West German opposition parties CDU and CSU. Ronald Granieri followed their trajectory between Atlanticism and neo-nationalism in the 1970s, in particular how the more extreme anti-détente views of the Bavarian CSU and its leader Franz Josef Strauss tended to shape their policy. Ironically, only the double-track decision on intermediate nuclear forces, initiated by SPD chancellor Helmut Schmidt, allowed the CDU/CSU to regain its lost influence as a result of the fragmentation of West Germany’s center-left coalition. David Geyer looked at the early years of Richard Nixon’s administration and its fresh start with the presidential trip to Europe in early 1969. Transatlantic relations improved temporarily, especially vis-à-vis France. With de Gaulle out of power in Paris and Brandt coming into office in Bonn, however, currents shifted. After all, like his predecessor, Nixon had to
realize how the war in Indochina determined U.S. priorities and tended to overshadow other aspects of American foreign policy. In addition, on the European end other developments were neglected by the United States at its own peril. Claudia Hiepel talked about the 1969 European Community (EC) enlargement summit in The Hague and the subsequent implementation of its agreements. Britain’s entry and the foreign policy framework European Political Cooperation (EPC), following the Davignon Report, set the stage for a “new” Atlantic partnership in the years to come.

Four presentations examined the U.S.-proclaimed “Year of Europe” (YoE) and its repercussions on transatlantic relations in 1973–1974. Based on extensive scrutiny of American records, Robert Wampler, in a paper jointly conceived with William Burr, credited Henry Kissinger for his attempt to establish an “agreed framework” between the United States and the EC. Domestically, this strategy targeted American tendencies toward protectionism and calls for troop withdrawals from Western Europe. However, Kissinger’s subordination of economic issues under grand strategic-political schemes, conducted in his usual secretive style, clearly preordained limits of the YoE endeavor. Subsequently, the United States preferred multilateral summits of major economic Western powers. Analyzing British, French, and German records, Daniel Möckli showed how Nixon and Kissinger’s YoE initiative initially strengthened EPC and a common EC foreign policy. When the European front began to crumble in the wake of the oil crisis, however, Washington as well as Paris wanted to force the EC to choose between American or French concepts. In the end, only a face-saving declaration on Atlantic relations in June 1974 could defuse the tensions.

Fabian Hilfrich portrayed YoE as a recurrent crisis in transatlantic relations triggered by American posturing and policy, thereby exposing deep and insoluble conflicts between the United States and Europe. Washington’s initiative, according to Hilfrich, ended up seriously dividing the transatlantic community, and accentuated problems and differences in a way comparable to current transatlantic discontents surrounding the Iraq war. Scrutinizing British documents, Alastair Noble was able to outline Britain’s uncomfortable position when torn between Washington’s misguided expectations of London as a Trojan horse in the EC and France’s almost paranoid opposition to anything remotely resembling European subordination to the United States. Eventually, the most pro-European British government in history fell, and gave way to a long line of Euroskeptic and Washington-leaning prime ministers in London.

Four papers took a closer look at transatlantic and European dynamics of business and financial markets during the early 1970s. In his case study of the “Politics of Planes and Engines,” Raj Roy pointed out how
the special Anglo-American business relationship was scrupulously preserved during the Rolls Royce-Lockheed crisis of 1970–1971, despite the pro-European inclinations of Prime Minister Edward Heath’s government. Werner Lippert interpreted the West German-Soviet natural gas pipeline deal of February 1970 as a unilateral and lopsided sellout of Western technology to a regime in Moscow opting for détente because of its own economic weakness. Considering Osthandel as complementary to Ostpolitik, Lippert repeated arguments of contemporary opponents, and defined the 1970 gas pipeline treaty as Bonn’s alleged “starting point in a foreign policy paradigm shift” toward the Soviet Union.

In his presentation on the “Deutsche Mark between European and Atlantic Priorities,” William Gray noted a revival of Gaullist and Atlanticist debates in the realm of West German monetary policy since 1969. Despite suspicions about French Gaullism and dirigiste impulses, Gray argued, the Federal Republic grudgingly accommodated French economic views for the sake of European identity. From a different angle, Hubert Zimmermann showed in his paper “Challenging the Dollar: Monetary Crises and European Integration” how the European monetary order eventually replaced transatlantic cooperation. Such a development was triggered by the Nixon administration’s unilateral dismantling of the Bretton Woods system pegging the dollar to gold in favor of floating exchange rates. Though this benefited the American economy and American trade, it also eased global access to dollars by “people with a decidedly unfriendly attitude towards the U.S.”

A public keynote lecture at Vanderbilt University by William Odom, former military assistant to National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski during the Carter administration and director of the National Security Agency in Ronald Reagan’s second term, concluded the first day of the conference. Introduced by Gordon Gee, chancellor of Vanderbilt University, and moderated by Daniel Usner, chairman of the history department, Odom, who had served several terms with the U.S. Army in Germany, talked vividly about “German-American Relations in Historical Perspective” and beyond. He recalled lasting German influences on the United States like migration and the post-1945 trajectory from occupation to friendship and close alliance. For Odom, American-German military cooperation constituted the heart of the transatlantic alliance during the Cold War in Europe. Working closely with the Atlantic Alliance would still be the best current American option to manage stability and contain or fight common threats. Unsurprisingly in this context, Odom chided the second Bush administration for pursuing a policy of degrading this alliance, as well as thwarting U.S. global interests and security by a needless and strategically ill-advised military intervention in Iraq.
In the next day’s session, Matthias Schulz portrayed West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt as oscillating between Europeanism and Atlanticism during his tenure in office, preferring to bind the United States in multilateral frameworks and coordinate European strategies and responses independently. According to Schulz, Schmidt was a reluctant European and centered on Franco-German coordination only when the United States had not reacted to his initiatives according to his expectations. Joachim Scholtyssek’s study of NATO’s double-track decision, from its origins in 1977 through the resolution in 1979 and implementation in 1983, told a story with many details still murky due to lagging declassification. Effects of the vast European peace movement, both in the short and long run, also still warrant further research and interpretation beyond mere facts of mass protests and eventual deployment.

Based on extensive interviews and recently declassified documents, Greg Donaghy presented a fascinating case study of such effects. His paper on “Canada’s Peacenik Prime Minister,” Pierre Trudeau, related the efforts by Ottawa’s prime politician in 1983–1984 to convince NATO, India, China, and the Soviet Union to embark on nuclear disarmament. With the world seemingly plunging ever deeper into the Cold War, it was the peace movement that actually convinced Trudeau that it was time to act. Though the increasingly frustrated prime minister could hardly win over his own foreign policy apparatus to the idea and was loathed in foreign capitals for his unconventional diplomacy, the Canadian public loved him for the sincerity of his commitment. Paul Rubinson examined the transnational, trans-bloc disarmament movement of nuclear scientists called “Pugwash,” named after the Canadian location of the initial 1957 gathering, mostly focusing on its heyday in the early 1960s. Increased hostility from both the American and the Soviet government, dwindling public interest in disarmament, and increased emphasis on local at the expense of global concerns led to the movement’s later loss of focus. Grassroots activism in the late 1970s and beyond provided Pugwash with a second life.

In a presentation on potential origins of current “terrorism” issues, Mary Hampton addressed allegedly different American and European definitions of, and responses to, “militancy” and “terrorism” during the decade of the 1970s. Imtiaz Hussain narrated U.S.-Muslim clashes and convergences (Israel, OPEC, Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Gulf Wars), and noted contrasts between confrontational American and moderating European styles in interpreting and challenging Islam. Discussing such issues demonstrates the historic uniqueness and the extraordinary nature of the transatlantic Cold War consensus, something the current U.S.-proclaimed global war on terror is unlikely to achieve.

Bernd Schaefer
COMPETING MODERNITIES: THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND GERMANY SINCE 1890

Conference at the American Academy Berlin. Conveners: Christof Mauch (GHI) and Kiran Klaus Patel (Humboldt University, Berlin). Made possible by a grant from the Robert Bosch Foundation, Stuttgart, and the Humboldt University.

Participants: Thomas Bender (New York University), Manfred Berg (Leucorea Foundation, University of Halle), Tobias Brinkmann (University of Southampton), Colleen A. Dunlavy (University of Wisconsin, Madison), Philipp Gassert (University of Heidelberg), Michael Geyer (University of Chicago), Dieter Gosewinkel (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung), Christina von Hodenberg (University of California, Berkeley), Simone Lässig (GHI), Daniel L. Letwin (Penn State University), Gabriele Metzler (University of Tübingen), Paul Nolte (International University, Bremen), Christine von Oertzen (GHI), Kathryn Olesko (Georgetown University), Annemarie Sammartino (Oberlin College), Dirk Schumann (GHI), Christoph Strupp (GHI), Thomas Welskopp (University of Bielefeld).

What sorts of commonalities, differences, and connections can be uncovered through a comparative study of Germany and the United States in the twentieth century? The project “Competing Modernities,” a cooperative effort between the Humboldt University and the GHI, is dedicated to these comprehensive questions. As we reported in the previous issue of the GHI Bulletin, in the project, pairs of experts work together as a “tandem” on fundamental questions such as the role of the state, law, religion, or migration. The tandems will write essays that are accessible to a broad audience. Thus, the texts can offer insight into both societies’ paths to modernity.

To lay the groundwork for these essays, a first workshop took place on September 18, 2004 at the American Academy in Berlin-Wannsee. Twenty participants from Britain, Germany, and the United States presented and discussed their first working hypotheses. The workshop served to introduce the project participants to one another, to provide an opportunity to discuss the project on a conceptual level, and to address potential omissions or areas of overlap. This resulted in lively and productive debates about the working theories of the various subprojects.

The empirical results of each tandem will be the subject of a second workshop that will be held at the GHI in Washington in September 2005.
In the following, we will detail four of the most important conceptual foundations of the project.

In the first place, there was a broad consensus among the participants that in order to comprehend the route of these two societies into modernity, it would make sense to conceive of a “long” twentieth century. In contrast to the conventional periodization, which takes the First World War as a starting point, our studies will commence with the 1880s or 1890s. It is not only the history of industrialization that reveals crucial modernizing developments in those decades, but also the histories of fields such as conservation or art. For that reason, “Competing Modernities” will employ the periodization that is increasingly used for global history. At the same time, we will investigate lines of continuity that extend further into the past. It is self-evident, for example, that one cannot understand the history of religion or the state without a longer temporal perspective.

Originally, we planned to conclude our investigations with the late 1960s and early 1970s. This was the beginning of a new era of globalization that had a significant impact on Germany and America. However, the workshop concluded that it would make more sense to extend the study up to the present in order to allow the parallels, connections, and contrasts between the two societies to emerge with full clarity.

In the second place, we discussed in great detail our conceptual concern that, on many points, American history in this period is characterized by a relatively high degree of homogeneity, whereas German history is replete with ruptures and new beginnings. To compare the United States with Imperial Germany, the Weimar Republic, the National Socialist regime, the “old” Federal Republic and the GDR, and reunified Germany is an enormous challenge. Interestingly, the consensus of our discussion was that the greatest problem was not posed by the question of how to integrate the study of the Nazi period into our analysis, even though it was clearly a “breakdown of civilization” that goes beyond the boundaries of any comparison with American democracy. Conceptually, it will be even more difficult for the various subprojects to adequately consider the GDR. For the Cold War era, a comparison of America and Germany is difficult because American history must be related to the history of both German states. Nonetheless, there was broad consensus that the history of the GDR cannot be excluded without risking a deceptive teleological narrative in which a divided Germany would appear as merely an interlude.

Thirdly, the workshop clarified how important it is to consider transnational interactions together with a comparison of the two societies. The history of science, of consumption, or of the media cannot be discussed without taking stock of the complex, multisided transfers and mutual
influences. The phrase “Americanization of German society,” understood here as the specific adaptation of elements of American society, can only be a shorthand for this nuanced process. There are especially interesting questions about the GDR in this regard—for example, when one considers media history and the impact on eastern Germany of American programming broadcast by West German television. This is but one instance of the multifaceted interconnections that transcend the boundaries of the Cold War system.

Finally, the workshop was productive in identifying and correcting possible areas of overlap or omission between the various subprojects. Additionally, we discussed the question of how to present themes not covered by any of the subprojects. Twelve main themes were presented at the workshop: Empire and Nation (Thomas Bender and Michael Geyer); Religion (Simone Lässig and Rainer Prätorius); Law (Manfred Berg and Dieter Gosewinkel); Discipline and Order (Dirk Schumann and Judith Sealander); the Welfare State (Daniel Letwin and Gabriele Metzler); Migration (Tobias Brinkmann and Annemarie Sammartino); Gender, Work, and the Family (Eileen Boris and Christine von Oertzen); Markets and Consumer Culture (Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Paul Nolte); Labor and Industry (Colleen A. Dunlavy and Thomas Welskopp), Environment (Christof Mauch and Kiran Klaus Patel); Science and Education (Kathryn Olesko and Christoph Strupp); and Media (Philipp Gassert and Christina von Hodenberg).

At the next workshop in September 2005, we will discuss the results of the individual tandems. Abstracts of these are available on the GHI website, which will also feature regular updates on the status of the project.

Christof Mauch and Kiran Klaus Patel
The life and career of Adolf Cluss (1825–1905) was the subject of this symposium, part of a binational effort to mark the one-hundredth anniversary of his death that will include exhibitions and public events in autumn 2005 in Heilbronn, Baden-Württemberg, Cluss’s hometown, and Washington, DC, where he made his mark. The commemoration also will involve multimedia and internet projects and an illustrated book of essays, for which the symposium presented preliminary research.

As a youth, Cluss was a member of the Communist League and a leader of the 1848 Revolution in Mainz. He gradually put aside his personal allegiance to Karl Marx and political identification with left-wing socialism after emigrating to the United States. In Washington, he built a career as an architect and civil engineer, responsible for innovative schools, museums, and other public buildings, along with churches, businesses, and residences. The dimensions of Cluss’s life and career offer an unusual opportunity for collaboration not only between German and American scholars, but also between scholars of nineteenth-century radical politics, German-American ethnic life, architecture, and urban design and planning. When published, the result will be a memorable story of how for one émigré to the United States, the German radical republicanism of 1848 transformed into a vision of the civic-minded architecture appropriate for the capital of a representative democracy.

Richard Longstreth, an urban and architectural historian and author of numerous works on Washington, DC, began events with an evening keynote speech that examined how Cluss, the first professional architect of stature to make his career mainly in the capital, performed for Wash-
ington the function of “pioneer” architect, the figure who adapted cosmopolitan practices and ideas to the local environment as the city itself entered a phase of rapid development. Most American cities, particularly in the Midwest and West, had a figure equivalent to Cluss, Longstreth explained. Cluss’s dozens of buildings were vulnerable because of their prime locations and because of swings in architectural fashion and building methods. Only eight survive into the twenty-first century. Yet his influence persisted subtly, especially in the expansive neighborhoods of tree-lined streets and red-brick Victorian rowhouses that characterize residential Washington, where contractors followed fashions Cluss helped to set with his highly visible residential and public commissions.

The daylong symposium consisted of three sessions that followed Cluss from his youth in Heilbronn through his foray into revolutionary politics and then through the dimensions of his career in the United States. Peter Wanner began the first session with a paper co-written with Christhard Schrenk, his colleague at the Stadtarchiv Heilbronn. This paper recounted Cluss’s background as part of a family of master builders in the Neckar River port, where rapid economic, social, and political change during Cluss’s youth shaped the future architect’s notions of urban design and of political and material progress. Sabine Freitag followed with a paper that employed, among other sources, Cluss’s essays in radical publications and his correspondence with Karl Marx, Joseph Weydemeyer, and other left-wing figures of the 1840s to explain the young engineer’s activities on behalf of the Communist League during the Revolution of 1848 in Mainz. Freitag speculated about the evidence for Cluss’s early disillusionment with the Frankfurt Parliament and with the prospects for constitutional government in Germany. This disillusionment probably prompted Cluss’s emigration in the summer of 1848, even before the revolution’s full collapse. Sabina Dugan picked up the story upon Cluss’s arrival in New York in September 1848. The correspondence of Marx’s circle of émigré communists in England and the United States supplied raw material for Dugan’s vivid narration of Cluss’s efforts to renew his involvement with radical politics in the republic across the Atlantic, his recognition that the class and ethnic structure of American cities fostered a different political climate from what he knew at home, and his drift away from his youthful radicalism and even his old friendships as he established himself first as a technician for the United States government during the 1850s and then as a private architect after 1862.

In the second session, immigration and ethnic historian Kathleen Conzen examined Washington, DC’s small German community, which during Cluss’s early years in town Germans jokingly labeled a Residenz-stadt, similar in grandiosity and provincial atmosphere to the capitals of their homeland’s duchies and petty kingdoms. Like Darmstadt and Kas-
sel, Washington provided opportunities for emigrants such as Cluss who possessed technical or professional skills. Yet until after the Civil War, die Residenzler, as Washington Germans mockingly called themselves, complained that the capital was more of a cultural backwater than even the most provincial German Residenz. As in his architecture and civil engineering, Cluss set out to help make Washington appear and function as a real Hauptstadt, so through participation in the city’s Turner, Sängerbund, and other aspects of Washington’s Vereinsleben, Cluss and his compatriots endeavored to enliven a sleepy town. The session’s second essay, by Alan Lessoff, dealt with Cluss’s role in Washington’s non-ethnic civic affairs, which culminated in the most controversial episode of his American career: his service as chief engineer to the Board of Public Works, an agency created by Congress in 1871 to oversee an ambitious effort to quickly upgrade Washington’s public works and beautify its appearance. In May 1874, Cluss made newspaper headlines across the United States by revealing to a congressional investigating committee the financial machinations and influence peddling that had riddled this improvement effort and bankrupted the city, leading to a federal takeover of the municipal government that would last until the 1970s. Lessoff argued that the technical and political problems that plagued the sewer- and street-paving programs that Cluss oversaw were on a grander scale but not different in kind from problems that plagued urban infrastructure projects throughout the Americas and Europe in these years of unprecedented urbanization and rapid technological change.

The final three papers focused on genres of public architecture for which Cluss won acclaim in his lifetime and for which he remains best known. Cynthia Field, architectural historian at the Smithsonian Institution, used Cluss’s most prominent surviving building, the National Museum on the Mall (now known as the Arts and Industries Building), to illustrate how the architect drew upon and experimented with contemporary theories about design, construction, and lighting. Although on the surface his designs and those of other Victorian architects were idiosyncratic, consistent principles lay behind them that later critics of Victorian eclecticism failed to appreciate. The final two papers dealt with architectural forms into which Cluss poured the civic idealism he had once devoted to radical politics. Like many German 1848ers an advocate of universal education as the linchpin of social and political progress, Cluss became Washington’s leading designer of public schools at a time when school design generated enormous interest in Europe and the United States. As Tanya Edwards Beauchamp explained, Cluss’s “prototypical” schools, such as the surviving Franklin and Sumner schools, exemplified contemporary ideas of education and its place in urban life. Similarly, as Helen Tangires recounted, Cluss’s public markets, such as the Center
Market, an enormous facility on the site of the current National Archives, and the Eastern Market, still popular with residents of Washington’s Capitol Hill neighborhoods, drew upon discussions on two continents about the cheap and convenient provisioning of food to modern, urban populations.

Discussions during the sessions and in a summary session held the following day focused on the challenges of addressing the varied audiences to which Cluss’s story will appeal: South Germans and Washingtonians interested in their own local histories, scholars of the ideas and events of 1848, students of the German-American experience, and urban studies experts with an interest in capital cities and in nineteenth-century urban design. Cluss’s dramatic life crossed political and professional boundaries that later came to seem rigid. The scholars who now wish to present him to contemporary audiences have found that they must above all recapture and convey the fluid, mid-nineteenth-century sensibility evident in Cluss and his work: the feeling that the modern city and modern civic life were as yet unformed and full of possibilities.

Alan Lessoff
GERMAN UNIFICATION SYMPOSIUM
THE ROLE OF GERMANY AND EUROPE IN THE WORLD:
15 YEARS AFTER THE END OF THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT


A German Unification Symposium in recognition of October 3 as the “Day of German Unity” has now become an annual tradition at the GHI. This year’s event was the fourth of its kind at the GHI. In previous years, the GHI has been able to feature distinguished figures such as Jens Reich, Joachim Gauck, Michael Mertes, and Regine Hildebrandt as featured speakers. This year, as in 2003, a generous grant from the E.ON corporation enabled us to bring an equally eminent speaker to the GHI. Markus Meckel, presently a member of the German Bundestag and the foreign policy spokesperson for the SPD in the Bundestag, served as foreign minister of the German Democratic Republic and represented the GDR at the “two plus four” negotiations that led to reunification. He presented a talk entitled “Die Rolle Deutschlands und Europas in der Welt – 15 Jahre nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts” [The Role of Germany and Europe in the World: 15 Years after the End of the East-West Conflict]. A simultaneous translation made his talk accessible to both English and German speakers in the audience.

Meckel began his assessment of united Germany’s role in a changing world with a reminder of the twin poles of post-war German foreign policy: European integration and the transatlantic alliance. He took stock of the remarkable recent successes such as EU expansion and the establishment of a single European currency. On the other hand, Meckel provided insight into many of the new developments in international relations that have resulted from the war on terrorism, including the tensions that have emerged over the American-led invasion of Iraq. In the aftermath of the Madrid bombing, Meckel dismissed any notion that Europe does not take seriously its central stake in the war on terrorism, and he regretted that NATO was not used as a forum where differences could be aired and compromise sought.

Taking stock of related factors in the changing international situation, Meckel commented on Turkey’s application for EU membership as well as on evolving relations with Russia in light of EU expansion and the struggle against terrorism. For Meckel, central to the complexity of both
of these issues is the continued quest for what he called a “common set of values.” He emphatically noted that Russia’s conduct in regard to Chechen separatism continues to show that these common values are elusive, despite his recognition that Russia and Europe are partners in combating international terrorism.

Meckel took time to answer questions from the audience, most of which concerned German-American relations and the war in Iraq. He concluded with a wish that transatlantic relations could be both strengthened and refocused. Although on that October day, no one in the audience could have anticipated how significant the term “values” would become in the wake of the American election, when reconsidering Meckel’s judicious consideration of long-term trends, one wonders if a “common set of values” might be a subject for discussion if transatlantic relations are reassessed along the lines he suggests.

Jonathan Skolnik
CITIZEN ACTIVISM AND THE QUEST FOR THE SUSTAINABLE CITY: BERLIN, 1900 TO THE PRESENT


As environmental historians and political scientists have searched for models of environmental sustainability, one of their tasks has been to describe and analyze environmental protest movements. What sparked environmental activism? How did political and social institutions respond to protests and incorporate environmental concerns? What were the implications of environmental protests for other historical and social processes? This panel sought to address these and other questions.

The papers examined three examples of environmental activism in Berlin. Jeffrey Wilson’s paper, “‘Save the Grunewald’: Environmentalism in the Kaiserreich,” focused on efforts to protect the Grunewald from development. In the face of rapid urban growth in the early twentieth century, the Prussian state attempted to take advantage of the increased real estate values of its property near Berlin, trying to sell it for development. Berliners reacted by mobilizing a campaign to preserve the forest. By 1914, the campaign had succeeded in pressuring the state to sell the Grunewald to the city of Berlin for a small percentage of what the state would have received from real estate developers. Wilson asserted that the campaign was not a reactionary attempt to turn back the clock on processes of modernization, but instead represented a progressive attempt to address their outcomes. Moreover, far from fitting the weak image of early environmental protection efforts, the movement to save the Grunewald united a broad coalition of groups and individuals in a campaign that foreshadowed future environmental preservation efforts.

Keith Alexander’s contribution, “Green-Alternative Politics in West Berlin, 1978–1990,” addressed the role of environmental issues for the Alternative Liste für Demokratie und Umweltschutz (AL), the West Berlin affiliate of the West German Green Party. Initially, the AL’s radical left-wing founders seized upon environmental issues as a “green train” that they felt they could ride to power. Later, green issues provided the common ground for a diverse gathering of groups. Green ideas helped hold these groups together and avoid the fragmentation that plagued the Left in the 1970s. In the last phase of the AL’s development, the AL sincerely
embraced environmental ideas. The AL viewed environmentalism as a unifying concept for its political program that informed its other policy initiatives. For the individuals involved in the AL during the 1980s, environmental issues proved profoundly integrative rather than radicalizing.

Carol Hager’s presentation, “Citizen Participation, Land-Use Planning, and Community: Berlin and Beyond,” examined the responses of local planning authorities to demands from citizens for a voice in planning decisions in Berlin from the 1970s to the present. In particular, her paper focused on the battle over the siting of the Reuter West power plant, as well as city planning in post-Wall Berlin. She showed that citizens’ groups have given grassroots participation in land-use planning new legitimacy and have breathed new life into the parliaments as the forum for discussing policy making. Hager also pointed to indications that the emphasis on citizen participation with roots in the 1970s continues to play an important role in the west and appears to be spreading to the east as well. Finally, Hager noted a correlation between implementing planning that is sensitive to local conditions and the ability of communities to maintain their identities.

In his comments, Thomas Lekan examined the question of how the papers challenged conventional ideas regarding the development of environmentalism in Germany. He noted that urbanites were just as willing to fight environmental destruction as members of the Heimat- or Naturschutz movements typically associated with more rural surroundings. Also, urban environmental concerns appeared to attract support from a broader social spectrum than rural preservationism. During the discussion, presenters noted the common importance of ideas of Heimat to their respective research subjects.

Overall, the panel yielded important insights regarding attempts to create livable, sustainable cities in modern Germany. At the same time, it linked environmental protest to larger issues in modern German history, including processes of democratization and the shaping of political participation.

Keith Alexander
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: CULTURES OF INNOVATION IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES


Participants: John A. Alic (Avon, NC), W. Bernard Carlson (University of Virginia), John Cloud (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Central Library, Silver Spring, MD), Arthur Daemmrich (Chemical Heritage Foundation), Michael Eckert (Deutsches Museum, Munich), Lars Heide (Copenhagen Business School), Martina Heßler (RWTH Aachen), Ulrike Kissmann (Berlin), Wolfgang König (Technische Universität Berlin), John Krige (Georgia Institute of Technology), André Müller (University of Bielefeld), Michael J. Neufeld (National Air and Space Museum, Washington, DC), Dominique Pestre (Centre Alexandre Koyré, Muséum National d’Histoire Naturelle, Paris), Michael B. Petersen (University of Maryland, College Park), Carsten Reinhardt (University of Regensburg), Philip Scranton (Rutgers University), Thomas Steinhauser (University of Regensburg), Ulrich Wengenroth (Technische Universität, Munich), Stephan Wolff (Deutsches Museum, Munich), Thomas Zeller (University of Maryland, College Park).

The so-called linear model of the relationship between science and technology states that basic science drives technological change. As a 1963 article in *The Economist*, quoted by John Krige in his presentation, put it, “Prosperity depends on investment, investment on technology, and technology on science. Ergo prosperity depends on science.” The linear model, the roots of which are usually traced back to Vannevar Bush’s landmark report of 1945 entitled “Science: The Endless Frontier,” has entered a state of crisis, requiring new models of interpretation and a better understanding of the role of science and technology within innovation processes and innovation cultures.

The first session of the conference, chaired by Helmuth Trischler, aimed at a broader understanding of science-technology relations “beyond the linear model.” John Alic mainly dealt with agricultural research, more heavily funded by the U.S. government before World War II than any other technology, in order to emphasize the role of diffusion-oriented policies. Federal spending through the U.S. Department of Agriculture for research rose roughly parallel to that for extension from the 1920s to
the 1970s. Alic criticized policymakers in other areas. While public support of research is generally accepted, there is a widespread lack of understanding concerning the importance of diffusion. The second speaker, Bernard Carlson, focused on innovation processes in the private sector rather than on government policies. From a number of diverse innovations such as heat-tolerant and shock-resistant glass (Pyrex, Chemcor) developed at Corning, or the invention of the transistor at Bell Labs, he concluded that the linear model fails to apply in these cases. Firms generally invest in research and development in order to maintain the status quo or to improve their position on the market. The emergence of innovations in the private sector should be considered primarily a demand-side story. André Müller’s presentation analyzed the discourse on academic-industrial relationships in Germany and in the United States based on policy documents in the late twentieth century. The discourse displayed different national attitudes about knowledge transfer across the academy-industry divide. For the American case, university-industry relations were found to be subject to established rules and regulations, for example, while such a reference was missing in the German case. But there were also common features. Both the American and the German national systems displayed a tendency to blur the boundaries between academia and industry. The last speaker of the first session, Philip Scranton, used the history of the development of jet propulsion in the United States after 1945 to probe the validity of the linear model, and found little to no support for it. In critical areas of technology, basic science could not offer help because it was in too rudimentary a state. Jet engine innovation was “Edisonian,” Scranton concluded, as “it was a contingent, negotiated struggle with the material world’s capabilities and limits, a fierce effort to defeat failure along with the Soviets, a political conflict between and within powerful organizations, and a collective, secret, industry-state project whose interior messiness merits our attention.” Ulrich Wengenroth in his comment broadened the view and displayed a modification of the linear model as used by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1970 (the “Frascati Manual”). In this model, science still was viewed as playing a crucial role, but it was not viewed as simplistically as it was during the immediate postwar era.

The second session, chaired by Christoph Strupp, focused on transatlantic discourses. John Cloud presented the parallel developments of cartographic innovations before and after World War II as an example. The complex computer mapping and geo-referenced database management systems that became known as Geographic Information Systems (GIS) had a precursor in Military Geographic Intelligence Systems (MGIS). The MGIS were based on advanced military and intelligence technologies utilizing top-secret reconnaissance imagery and data
coupled to advanced American and European data processing, geo-
positioning, and computer mapping systems. These Cold War geographic
technologies were rooted in pre-war analog map overlay systems. A
transatlantic discourse took place when, at the end of the Second World
War, Allied Intelligence captured German overlay sets developed and
used by planning units of the SS for the infamous Generalplan Ost. The
second speaker of the session, Arthur Daemmrich, reported about health
and safety regulations of pharmaceutical drug development in the United
States and Germany. He observed that the legal frameworks and national
styles for regulating new medicines differed significantly between both
countries, reflecting differences concerning the authority of public inter-
est groups, the medical profession, and the pharmaceutical industry. John
Krige considered the influence of two German émigrés (Richard Courant
and Natalie Artin) on the Marshall Plan. At the request of the Office of
Naval Research, Courant and Artin were sent to Germany in order to
assess the quality of the work done there during the war and to establish
whose knowledge “deserves more exploitation.” The rehabilitation of
science in Germany, as well as its support by Marshall funds, was to a
considerable extent influenced by their reports. Commentator Carsten
Reinhardt pointed to the cultures of innovation and regulation in Ger-
many and the United States as the unifying topic behind these transat-
lantic discourses. He noted that judging from Daemmrich’s presentation,
quite different systems of innovation and regulation can prove remark-
ably successful as a consequence of long-term adaptation and co-
evolution. Reinhardt also noted how the old historian’s rule to “follow
the money” applied in Krige’s presentation.

The third session, chaired by Michael Eckert, dealt with transatlantic
comparisons. Lars Heide presented the case of IBM and the Deutsche
Hollerith-Maschinen AG (Dehomag), IBM’s German affiliate. While
IBM’s office machine technology, in particular its punch-card technology,
flourished in the United States as a consequence of considerable support
by the federal government, Dehomag did not attract much interest in
Germany. German government institutions between 1911 and 1945 used
punch cards extensively, but the institutions never had significant influ-
ence on the shaping of this technology. Wolfgang König shed light on the
fundamental difference of a German culture of design and an American
culture of production. In American industry, design work was inter-
preted as a means and not as an end. The goal was design for production
and economy. In Germany, design was more formalized as a result of
the engineers’ education in Ingenieurschulen and Technische Hoch-
schulen, which taught more theory than did engineering schools in other
countries. Thomas Steinhauser compared two instrument suppliers that
provided nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) technology for chemical
analysis: Varian, a Silicon Valley firm, and Bruker, a Swiss-German
termplate. While Varian remained a local product of Silicon Valley, Bruker
“de-localized” into a network. Stefan Wolff contrasted the German and
the American academic environments of the physicists who emigrated to
the United States after 1933, when American universities were in a phase
of transition. The role of physicists educated at European universities,
particularly in the new field of theoretical physics, was crucial for the
coming-of-age of physics in the United States. With the emigrants, two
different scientific cultures met and often clashed. In his commentary on
these four presentations, Michael Neufeld called for a broader analysis
rather than a focus on special cases. He noted that Lars Heide’s case of
punch-card development contradicts the dominant interpretation of a
weak U.S. federal government and a strong German state, and issued a
plea for cautious historical differentiation. Finally, he criticized the fact
that the papers on the German case had not examined the innovation
culture of the German Democratic Republic.

The final session was dedicated to “Cultures of Producing and Con-
suming Knowledge,” and was chaired by Thomas Zeller. The first
speaker, Michael Petersen, reported on the mentality of scientists and
engineers in Peenemünde before and during World War II. He described
them as a community totally dedicated to their mission, forged in secrecy,
held together by deep personal and professional bonds, and reinforced by
the tasks carried out there. They pursued this mission as “a distinct social
and professional unit in which individuals found a high level of accep-
tance, solidarity, and happiness.” This proved to be an important reason
for the rapid and successful development of the A-4 rocket. The regime of
secrecy shaped a specific culture of innovation, and the move of the
Peenemünde team to the United States after 1945 eventually transferred
this regime across the Atlantic. Dominique Pestre’s talk was broadly
oriented toward the production and regulation of the sciences in late
twentieth-century society. Pestre pointed to “a process of profound re-
composition affecting science as well as society” beginning in the 1970s
and characterized by a growing privatization of knowledge on a global
scale. He asserted that science has moved from a system of science in
society “dominated by an equilibrium between science as public good
and science as industrial good to a system in which a financial and mar-
ket-oriented appropriation of scientific knowledge is now in the ascen-
dant.” This radical regime change of knowledge production, which he
followed on five different levels, is most visible in new definitions of
intellectual property rights and rules for patenting. Ulrike Kissmann, the
final speaker of the session, presented results from a psychosocial study
on the biographical reconstructions of researchers working on nuclear
energy in Germany. Her key concept was Bourdieu’s notion of “habitus.”
She concluded that the nuclear scientists were disassociating themselves from society. They constructed the affiliation with their own professional community by projecting the military potential and its risks onto “the others.” Thus, they expressed the historically grown habitus of scientists as working in a societal vacuum. Martina Heßler, who commented on this session, took up the question of a considerable change around the 1970s, and asked how helpful three additional categories might be to describe and understand this change: first, the topic of a new culture of scientific communities, as Petersen described for the case of Peenemünde for the 1930s and 1940s; second, the question of whether the change since the 1970s coincided with a generational turn; and finally, if this change could be described as a “pragmatization of science.”

The discussions after each session addressed more problems and raised further questions. Wolfgang König, for example, missed a broader historical approach concerning the emergence of the linear model. He argued that in Germany, the emancipation of the Technische Hochschulen around 1900 offered a first case where the notion of the linear model became publicly disputed, and he suggested that discourse analysis would provide a suitable starting point for further research. Michael Eckert pointed to the problems faced by those interested in analyzing science-based innovations due to the lack of cooperation between historians of science and historians of technology. John Krige issued a plea for closer historical analyses, and Phil Scranton asked for thick descriptions of specific cases of innovation processes. A number of participants, especially Dominique Pestre, stressed the importance of secret knowledge and regimes of secrecy, which historians usually tend to neglect in their research based on public sources. The general discussion, led by Helmuth Trischler at the end of the two-day conference, focused on three main questions. First, it asked for appropriate, or simply interesting, historiographical frameworks, if not explanatory models, to better understand the dynamics of innovation systems and innovation cultures beyond the linear model. Second, it stressed the differences of regimes of knowledge production and consumption discussed during the conference (open science or knowledge as a public good, private science or proprietary knowledge, and secret knowledge). Finally, it addressed the question of the specific place and space of science within innovation processes.

Michael Eckert and Helmuth Trischler
HAPPENING WITH A ROYAL TOUCH: 
JOHN F. KENNEDY AND THE GERMANS


Andreas Daum’s lecture presented a cultural interpretation of German-American relations in the twentieth century. Daum focused on the social dynamics that marked President Kennedy’s visit to Germany in June 1963, and situated them at the intersection of diverse and much older traditions of publicly staging politics. Following the example of the French historian Marc Bloch and his seminal work on the “royal touch,” Daum argued that medieval and early modern practices of turning encounters between rulers and their people into visible events marked by immediate physical contact survived into the modern era, no less than hopes for miracles, which were revitalized in the age of mass politics and served as vehicles to express a longing for change.

Physical presence and visibility played a major role in the United States’ strategy after 1948/49 to secure the cohesion of the transatlantic alliance and to reaffirm West Germany’s political alignment with the United States. In 1963, the tendency to dramatize the necessity of transatlantic bonds culminated in the staging of Kennedy’s visit to Germany. The U.S. administration and its counterparts in Bonn and Berlin had planned the event minutely. The popular reaction, however, transcended both the expectations of the planners and the constraints that the security forces had imposed upon the population. The public enthusiasm for Kennedy revived older traditions of unrest and street theater and turned the event into a mass happening. This occurred at a time when the concept of “happenings” as an interactive form of artistic production was gaining prominence in the western world. In their public veneration of Kennedy, the Germans articulated hopes for political redemption that were reminiscent of forms of popular Catholicism. This “happening with a royal touch” remained ambivalent for observers. Some saw parallels to the mass enthusiasm for Hitler that the world had watched not even a generation before 1963. Yet the cheers for Kennedy articulated approval for a democratic order. They expressed a desire for social and political change in the Federal Republic, which was beginning to leave the Adenauer era behind, and domesticated Kennedy’s charisma as an embodiment of this hope.

The lecture thus suggested a new departure in the study of international relations and alliance politics and the testing of diverse research
strategies. In particular, historical anthropology and sociology, political science and cultural history might contribute to gaining a deeper understanding of how international relations maintain or lose the balance between consensus and conflicts, and how alliance systems can create a certain degree of cohesion among people situated in very different societies. Questions such as these, Daum suggested, might be especially relevant today, as the Atlantic community is undergoing a dramatic process of redefining the bonds that may hold it together, the values and political objectives that its members can share, and the interests that often enough diverge.

Richard F. Wetzell
THIRTEENTH ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM OF THE FRIENDS OF THE GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE AND AWARD OF THE FRITZ STERN DISSERTATION PRIZE

Symposium at the GHI, November 19, 2004. Conveners: Gerald D. Feldman (President, Friends of the German Historical Institute) and Christof Mauch (GHI). Participants: Christopher J. Fischer (Loyola College), Erik N. Jensen (Miami University), Dorothee Brantz (GHI), Frank Zelko (GHI). Made possible by a generous grant from the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

The Friends of the German Historical Institute convened in Washington on November 19, 2004 for their thirteenth annual symposium, chaired by Gerald D. Feldman. The morning session featured the presentation of the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize, which has been awarded for five years in a row for the two best dissertations in German history at a North American university. Fritz Stern, the eminent historian after whom the prize is named, attended the award ceremony. This year’s prizes were offered to Christopher J. Fischer, who received his Ph.D. at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, for his dissertation “Alsace to the Alsatians? Visions and Divisions of Alsatian Regionalism, 1890–1930,” and to Erik N. Jensen, who earned his Ph.D. at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, for his dissertation “Images of the Ideal: Sports, Gender, and the Emergence of the Modern Body in Weimar Germany.” The Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize Committee was composed of Atina Grossmann (Cooper Union), Kees Gispen (University of Mississippi), and Vernon L. Lidtke (Johns Hopkins University), who chaired the committee.

The committee’s prize citations commended Fischer for “a significant and highly original case study of regionalism, nationalism, and the problems of identity construction,” as well as “a many-layered and persuasive analysis of Alsatian regionalism as a complex and sometimes contradictory set of fragmented, fluctuating, and contested ideas and practices.” They praised Jensen for “a pioneering inquiry into the popular representations of male and female athletes in the Weimar Republic and how these images shaped new conceptions of masculinity and femininity,” which constitutes “a major and exciting advance in rethinking the cultural, social, and political history of the Weimar Republic.” Both papers are printed in revised form in the Stern Prize section of this Bulletin.
In the afternoon, the audience heard presentations by GHI Visiting Research Fellows Dorothee Brantz and Frank Zelko about their dissertation research. The talks were entitled “How Parasites Make History: On Pork and People in the Nineteenth Century” and “Erst wenn der letzte Fluss vergiftet ist: The Origins of Direct Action Environmentalism in Hamburg.” Dorothee Brantz’s slightly modified paper is published in the GHI Research section of this Bulletin.

Birgit Zischke
On December 6, the GHI held a symposium that took another look at the German war against the Hereros in the former German colony of German South West Africa. The capacity audience included Namibians and representatives from the German embassy. Isabel Hull began the panel by summarizing the 1904–07 revolt against German rule on the part of the Herero peoples of central Namibia (then German South West Africa), joined later by Nama peoples from the southern part of the country. Initially placed on the defensive, Germany ultimately committed 14,000 troops to the field and spent 40 times the annual budget for South West Africa to suppress the uprising. Two thousand German troops died, most due to disease, with a far smaller number of battle deaths, as was usual for colonial campaigns. The Herero and Nama paid a far higher price: the death of as much as 80 percent of the Herero population and 50 percent of the Nama population through the killing of male combatants as well as women and children, forced exile in a waterless desert with no possibility of surrender, and internment of survivors in camps where the death rate was about 45 percent.

Hull then turned to the military aspects of this war, addressing the question of whether this was a genocidal campaign planned in advance, and thus whether the events in Namibia were in some ways a direct precursor to the Holocaust. Hull argued that the way the war was fought by German troops in Namibia was in some ways a typical European military campaign, and in other respects very much in keeping with an emerging Wilhelminian military culture. Within Germany at the time, enemy civilians were seen as legitimate military targets, the army was emerging as a punitive institution that embodied state authority, civilians and prisoners of war were routinely neglected or mistreated, and negotiated solutions were giving way to an insistence on complete and absolute victory over the vanquished at any price.

Jürgen Zimmerer, too, tackled the issue of the direction that ideas and precedents flowed, with a somewhat different set of conclusions. After arguing that the Herero War fits the definition of the 1948 UN Convention on Genocide and was thereby “the first genocide of the twentieth century and the first genocide in German history,” Zimmerer drew a
conceptual linkage between colonial wars and genocide, arguing that they were similar in their motives and execution. Hitler explicitly drew on colonial analogies (largely from British India) in outlining his ambitions to gain Lebensraum in Russian, Ukrainian, and Polish territory, and it was not uncommon within Germany to view the campaign in the East as a colonial project. Further, the concepts of race and space underpinned both colonial wars and Germany’s World War II campaigns: people were dehumanized through “binary encoding” in order to justify removing them through deportation or murder to make space for those classified as the higher races. The biggest distinction traditionally drawn between colonial wars and the Holocaust—the dominance of state bureaucracy in the violence of the latter—was rooted not in a qualitative difference, Zimmerer argued, but rather simply in the differential capacities of the state in each context. He concluded by saying that the link between European colonialism and Nazi campaigns is not “monocausal”; nevertheless, “the Namibian War is on the one hand, the culmination of colonial genocide and on the other hand the first step towards the bureaucratized murder of the Third Reich.” For this reason, the Herero genocide has “world historical significance.”

Gesine Krüger considered contemporary debates about the war. The centennial has brought some renewed attention to the event within Germany; also in 2001, a group of Herero filed a claim for reparations in a U.S. court. After expressing some doubts (as did Isabel Hull) about whether the Herero War meets the intentionality test of genocide, Krüger focused on the implications of the symbols chosen in people’s quest for an official German apology and material reparations. The explicit link the claim makes between the 1904 war and the Holocaust “places the claim in the center of a worldwide, global debate on justice and history, on human rights and memory.” But it also, Krüger contended, takes the Herero War out of African history, insisting on its fundamental difference from other colonial wars, and allows Germans to avoid contemplating their broader colonial guilt. At the same time, the Hereros’ ethnically based claim has tapped into a broader pattern of ethnicizing Namibian history.

The lively discussion that followed addressed the nature of the German government’s recent apology to the Herero and the extent to which Germany’s colonial behavior was unique. It also noted the difficulty of determining linkages between colonial violence and the Holocaust.

_Meredith McKittrick_