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PREFACE

The state of transatlantic ties has been the subject of intense discussion—between governments, in the press, and among ordinary citizens—on both sides of the ocean in the wake of the U.S.-led war to topple Saddam Hussein. German-American relations have received particular attention in this discussion. How could allies who had cooperated so effectively for so long find themselves so divided? This question bears directly on the central concerns of the GHI. The history of German-American relations and of the post-1945 Atlantic community have long been focal points of the GHI’s research program. Building on this scholarly strength, the GHI organized several events that examined the German-American impasse over Iraq from a historical perspective.

It was as a long-time champion of close German-American political cooperation that former West German chancellor Helmut Schmidt came to Washington to speak his mind on the most important issues the international community currently faces, not least the tension in European-American relations. Schmidt’s talk on “The Global Situation: A European Point of View” was the fourth in the series of lectures dedicated to the memory of Gerd Bucerius, the politician-publisher who founded the influential weekly DIE ZEIT. Schmidt drew an audience of over 600 people that filled the hall rented for the occasion to capacity. The GHI is grateful to Chancellor Schmidt for accepting the invitation to speak in Washington and the Ebelin and Gerd Bucerius ZEIT Foundation for making this event possible.

German-American ties past and present figured prominently in the lecture “My Germany: Reflections on My Country Before and After 1989” that Jens Reich delivered at the GHI’s October 3 symposium on German unification. Professor Reich, a leading figure in the East German civil liberties movement and a candidate for the German presidency in 1994, recalled the importance of U.S. backing for East Germany’s peaceful revolution and German unification, and offered a thoughtful analysis of the differences in German and American foreign policy interests. The text of Reich’s lecture is available on the GHI’s website at www.ghi-dc.org/reich_text_2003.html. The GHI would like to thank E.ON North America for generously sponsoring the October 3 symposium and Georg O. Budenberg, president of E.ON North America, for joining us on that occasion.

The disagreement between Berlin and Washington was not the only German-American aspect of the discussion of Iraq. Even before the fighting began, the Allied occupation of Germany after 1945 was frequently cited as an example that could offer a lesson for remaking post-Saddam
Iraq as a liberal democracy. Just what that lesson might be was the subject of the symposium “How Valid Are Comparisons? The American Occupation of Germany Revisited,” jointly organized by the Washington office of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the GHI and hosted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The participants explored the situation confronting the U.S. as it attempted to foster the creation of a new democratic order following the collapse of the Third Reich. In the process, they called attention to some of the fundamental differences separating the German and Iraqi experiences. An overview of this discussion appears in this issue of the Bulletin.

In trying to explain the disagreement over Iraq, commentators in both Germany and the U.S. have pointed to deep-rooted differences in the two countries’ political cultures. One fascinating difference lies in the evolving and multifaceted understandings of freedom that have developed over the centuries, the subject of the GHI Annual Lecture delivered by Eric Foner of Columbia University and the response offered by Jürgen Kocka of the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin. Underscoring the mutability of the concept of freedom, Foner called attention to the vigorous debate over civil liberties and the meaning of freedom in the U.S. in the aftermath of the September 11 terror attacks. His lecture and Kocka’s observations on the German idea of freedom are featured in this issue of the Bulletin.

Another German-American comparison featured in this Bulletin centers on the interests, training, and roles of professional historians in the two countries. We spoke with James McPherson in November 2003 as his term as president of the American Historical Association was coming to a close and with Manfred Hildermeider, chairman of the Verband der Historikerinnen und Historiker Deutschlands, a month later. They were asked to comment upon the trends that have shaped historical study in recent decades and to describe the place of their respective organizations within the academic cultures of their countries. Set side by side, the interviews point to many shared concerns as well as some fundamental points of difference.

Finally, it is a pleasure to call attention to the contributions by Chad Carl Bryant and Jeffrey T. Zalar to this issue of the Bulletin. Bryant and Zalar were the 2003 recipients of the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize awarded annually by the Friends of the German Historical Institute for the best dissertations on German history submitted to North American universities. The Friends provide invaluable support to the GHI’s efforts to promote scholarly exchange between Germany and the United States. All of us on the staff of the GHI owe the Friends a debt of gratitude.

Christof Mauch
Director
Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for the invitation. I have been a guest in this country about a hundred times; this might very well be my 101st visit to the United States. Because I intend, among other things, to voice some opinions that will not sound convenient to every American in this audience, I would like to begin by quoting myself, so to speak, as a foreword to my remarks.

About twenty years ago, I wrote that if I ever had to leave my own country and emigrate, I would, without a doubt, try to go to the United States of America. I like this country. I have not changed my mind. I still feel strongly attracted to America’s vitality and generosity, to your hospitality.

Today, of course, I am speaking as a private citizen, and my remarks should in no way be understood as expressing the opinion of the German government. I plan to address five different topics. I will assess the current global situation, introduce some global certainties in the coming decades, raise some possibilities for the future, and discuss the future role of the United States as well as that of the European Union.

Twenty years ago, I gave a similar speech in Beijing, China. It was the time of Deng Xiaoping, Yuri Andropov (or it may have been Konstantin Chernyenko), and Ronald Reagan. I reread that speech this summer, and found that I had predicted that there would be three powers of global importance at the end of the twentieth century: namely, the United States, China, and Russia. It seems that this prediction has come true—so much for my otherwise limited abilities with respect to forecasting.

I. On the Present Situation

If you look around the globe today, the situation in Latin America differs little from two decades ago. One finds hunger and poverty in many places, domestic unrest in others, economic and debt problems from time
to time, but a quickly growing population as well. The same is true for Africa, but there, economic and social difficulties have assumed a more devastating character than in most places. Time and again, you will find tribal, ethnic, or religious wars as a result. From Nigeria to the Sudan, to Burundi, the Congo, and Liberia, Africa remains a deeply troubled continent. But neither Latin America nor Africa presently pose political dangers of global consequence.

The situation inside Europe is calm with minor exceptions, one being the Balkan Peninsula. Most European states have the usual social and economic problems, but the integration of Europe under the roof of the European Union is progressing slowly but steadily.

In Asia, the greatest economic progress right now is taking place in China. Somewhat slower progress is occurring in India. In Japan, there has been an economic standstill for about a decade and a half, but it might soon end. With the possible exception of the Kashmir conflict, it does not seem to me that the world today is faced with dangers originating from these three leading Asian countries. On the other hand, today one also finds an Asia with three new nuclear-weapon states: Israel, India, and Pakistan. And it is unclear whether Korea and Iran are developing nuclear weapons.

The only dangers of global importance at the moment seem to be in the Middle East. The American war against Saddam Hussein was won quickly, as expected, but the situation of the whole region is as unclear and as dangerous as before. The conflict between Israel and her immediate neighbors, Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria—with terrorist activities on all sides—has escalated in recent months, and could eventually burst into the type of open warfare already seen in that region in the past. The conflict is fueling anger and emotions in Israel and many Arab countries, particularly among the younger generations.

The Arabs understandably resent the Israeli forces of occupation in the West Bank and Gaza, and quite a few of them want to totally eliminate the state of Israel. But we also see that some Israelis tried to prevent the formation of a Palestinian state. Of course, Israel relies on the backing of the United States. The U.S. also has friendly relations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other Arab countries. For this reason, not to mention America’s military, technological, and financial leverage, Washington is in a unique position to improve the situation and exert pressure. But for decades, American policies in the Middle East have not been very consistent or rigorous. The so-called quartet has laid out a so-called road map, but today the map appears to be an outdated piece of paper.

Outside of the United States, very few people have accepted the concept of an “axis of evil” that supposedly reaches from North Korea via Iran to Iraq. These three states have almost no connection to one another.
The future American proceedings in Iraq appear as uncertain as those in Afghanistan, and it is unclear how much the moral authority of the United States might suffer from these uncertainties.

I must confess that I am one of the critics of the Bush administration’s strategies in the Middle East. But, on the other hand, I have also invited audiences—public audiences—in Berlin, Moscow, and other places on the globe to ponder the following question. If foreign terrorists were to hijack three fully occupied, wide-body passenger planes scheduled to fly from St. Petersburg to Moscow, and crash them into the Kremlin, thereby killing three thousand people, what would be the psychological and political reaction in your nation to such a colossal crime, one that came so entirely out of the blue? Or what if this were to happen in Berlin or Paris? As a result of World War II, these places have understood their own vulnerability in a way not known in America before September 2001. Nevertheless, it seems likely to me that, in such a case, any national government would try to bring all the power it could muster to bear. Time and again, I have invited audiences to imagine the impact of such a colossal crime on their own nation, on their own government, in order to gain some understanding of the American nation’s extreme psychological state, and the government’s resulting domestic policies, both of which obviously dominate American foreign policy at the moment.

The proclaimed “war on terrorism” can be wrongly understood as having just one enemy. In fact, we are witnessing many transnational terrorist activities across the borders of sovereign states, from Manhattan to the Middle East, and from the Basque region in Spain to Ireland. These activities are occurring inside India and other Asian countries, in several African regions, in Latin America, Chechnya, and on the Balkan Peninsula. Beginning in the early 1970s, we Germans had to endure murderous, transnationally assisted, organized terrorism for almost two decades. In most cases, however, national, transnational, and international terrorism has different social, psychological, and political origins. For example, many murderous terrorist organizations have nothing in common with Islamic extremism. These groups differ in their motivation, their organization, and their mode of operation.

Therefore, one needs different methods and means to fight different terrorists, depending on the specific circumstances of each case. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan were fought with military operations. But if, for instance, one were to detect clandestine Al-Qaeda pockets inside a sovereign state whose government had made concerted, albeit unsuccessful, attempts to eliminate them, then other nations might actually be reluctant to undertake military action against an otherwise well-functioning state. One cannot fight the Irish Republican Army in London with warfare in Northern Ireland. We Germans could not hope to win our
fight against the terrorist organization RAF (Rote Armee Fraktion) in Germany by waging war against the country that assisted it in the hijacking of a fully occupied passenger aircraft in an African country a thousand miles away.

Because of Al-Qaeda, the catch phrase “war on terrorism” has become an expression of the decisive will of the American government and the entire nation to use all of its capabilities and power to overcome this threat. Leaders, the media, and public opinion stand in solidarity in the interest of the nation. Many other countries expressed their solidarity with America, and cooperated with the American government in various ways.

The preventive war against Iraq, however, had almost nothing to do with the war against Al-Qaeda. The war was not based on a decision by the Security Council. In my view, it thereby violated the Charter of the United Nations. Thus, the oppositional abstention of Russia, China, France, Germany, and other states was, in my view, legitimate. Nevertheless, it was very unwise, to say the least, to let the impression arise that Moscow, Paris, and Berlin were forming an oppositional group against America. Britain and some other European states actively participated in the war, and a rift formed inside the European Union. What this may mean for the future, and in particular for the future of the United Nations or the European Union, remains uncertain. Before dealing with future uncertainties, however, allow me to speak first about some future certainties.

II. Some Future Certainties

I take it as a certainty that almost all Europeans, and Russians as well, share a vital interest in avoiding a clash of civilizations with Islam, since hundreds of millions of Muslims live in places that are geographically close to Europe and Russia. Millions live inside Russia’s borders, and even more live in cities such as London, Paris, Berlin, Hamburg, and Amsterdam. Today, more than one-fifth of the total population of this globe are Islamic believers, and their share is growing. Therefore, I take it as a certainty that Europe will try to resist any inclination toward a general clash with Islam.

Ominous certainties exist as well. The population explosion that has been underway since the early twentieth century will continue, reaching proportions unknown since the time of the Emperor Augustus and Jesus of Nazareth. Today, the world’s six billion inhabitants have only one quarter of the space per capita that they enjoyed just one hundred years ago. And by the year 2050, we will have only one-sixth of that space. And you only need to look at cities like Jakarta or Sao Paulo or Cairo in order to imagine what is going to happen.
There also is no longer any question about the advance of global warming. It will trigger climatic shifts, and it will certainly cause the sea levels to rise, not only as it has done in the twentieth century, but maybe also in the twenty-first century, and certainly in the centuries thereafter. As a result of overpopulation and climatic shifts, there will be an increase in local and regional wars in Asia and Africa. Immigration to Europe will certainly continue to increase significantly, and only by common action will the Europeans be able to regulate this movement. It is also certain that the globalization of financial markets is no longer reversible.

The greed and speculation of private financial institutions operating globally, subject only to inadequate regulation and world-wide supervision, are undermining and obstructing the economic and fiscal policies of governments of many sovereign states. The common currency, the Euro, and the European Central Bank are only the first steps in the defense against this.

Because of communications and the Internet, the globalization of almost all technologies is certainly unstoppable, and the proliferation of all kinds of weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, is just one of the consequences. Above all, jobs and the relatively high standard of living in industrially advanced countries will come under pressure as a result of competition from the outside. In terms of technology, this competition will be at our level. In terms of cost and price, however, it will be very much below our level.

For almost every sovereign country, it will no longer be possible to act in isolation to overcome cross-border epidemics. And the same is true for the transnational and international drug trade, and for all kinds of transnational terrorism. It is also true for transnationally organized crime and the international arms trade.

III. Possibilities and Probabilities

So far, I have enumerated some future problems that mankind will certainly have to face within the course of the next couple of decades. Let me now ask, “What are the possibilities? What is probable? What is likely beyond these certainties?” When we ask ourselves who is winning and who is losing as a result of globalization, the answer, in my view, is threefold.

First, the winners thus far are almost all of the highly developed industrialized countries and their populations, including America, most European countries, Japan, and Australia. As of yet, the relatively high rates of unemployment in Europe and America and the growing unemployment in Japan have very little to do with globalization.

Second, in the case of developing countries, only those governed by economically enlightened—but at the same time, strictly authoritarian—
governments will be among the winners. China is the outstanding example. The same can be said of a few oil-exporting countries. Here, one might point to the countries once called the “four little tigers,” Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan, all of which have done well for their size. They no longer fit into the category of “developing countries.” But the development we have seen in the “four tigers” over the last four decades has required authoritarian governments. For me, it is conceivable, but far from certain, that Russia may also land on the winner’s side.

Third, on the other hand, a great number of the developing countries that are trying to establish markets and democracies are failing socioeconomically. Therefore, in many cases, they are failing politically as well. In my view, it is a shameful mistake to urge them to open their borders to the import of manufactured products from our countries, while at the same time withholding the opportunity to export their own agricultural products, just as we saw in Cancun recently. The United States, the European Union, and Japan are still very egoistic sinners in this respect. They preach free trade, but they have not obeyed their own sermon thus far. Instead, they are indulging as deeply as ever in protecting their own farmers, their own steel-makers, and so on and so forth.

On top of that, many developing countries have been persuaded to open their economies in return for short-term foreign credit and short-term money, and to liberalize their current accounts, thereby opening up their countries to all kinds of speculation from the outside. As a result, they are getting into foreign debt, some of them quite deeply. The Southeast Asian credit and currency crisis of five years ago should have taught them a lesson. In my view, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank’s rescue operations, from Indonesia to Mexico and Russia, have only bailed out the recipient developing countries to a small degree. Private Western financial institutions received the interest payments and dividends due to them, and thereby got most of their money back—a situation that would not have arisen without the intervention of the IMF.

It might be a good idea to give the IMF the mission of developing a new concept for fair order and stability in global financial markets. Almost all of our states and economies need internationally compatible standards in order for regulations to advance. Likewise, they need compatible codes for bank forms, insurance, and so on. The IMF ought not to be regarded as an ever-ready lender of last resort all over the globe. Instead, its major roles should be monitoring and providing transparency and stabilizing the economic policies of sovereign states. The enormous currency flow, the enormous volume of capital and money moving transnationally, the wave of psychotic speculation, the manifold fraudulent manipulations aimed at boosting share prices, the transnational merger
mania, the feuds between private financial institutions—all of this calls for better surveillance and regulation, but I am not particularly optimistic here.

Certainly, with the process of globalization and the ongoing spread of information and technologies, global interdependence will continue to grow, whether we like it or not. And the country that tries to seal itself off from that process is likely to be left behind, with North Korea being a good example. Badly governed, poorly organized, undeveloped (or under-developed) countries will also be left behind or even left out. They will only partially benefit from globalization.

Some Asian countries, and almost all African countries, originated from former colonies and protectorates. Their borders and organization were arbitrarily determined by imperialist and colonialist powers with no regard to ethnic, religious, and cultural facts. Therefore, these developing countries embrace very heterogeneous populations. Stability plus good government will remain rare in such heterogeneous countries. It is therefore likely that the majority of developing countries will continue to suffer in the coming decades.

China

The greatest economic success in the past two decades has come in China. This success has resulted from the far-sighted, courageous, but cautious leadership of Deng Xiaoping. He did not introduce perestroika or glasnost overnight; instead, he created a steady development toward individual, private businesses and markets. My first visit to China, about thirty years ago, during the time of Mao Tse-tung, allowed me to experience a rather awful Communist society. The phrase “blue ants” was quite correct; everyone had to obey the orders of the Party, and the Party had no idea how to feed and create jobs for 700 or 800 million Chinese at that time. By the way, now, only thirty years later, there are more than 1.3 billion people in China. The population explosion in China is still one of the country’s greatest problems. But, on the other hand, these 1.3 billion people are clearly better off today than they ever were before. All of them are better off: some of them a bit better off, some of them quite a bit better off. And today, if you were to go to Kwantung, Shanghai, Beijing or other big cities in the east of China, you would think at first glance that you were visiting an American city with a very modern skyline, enormous traffic on the road, and a bustling private economy. The economic growth rate in China over the last ten years or so is an almost incredible 8 percent in real terms. Of course, they still have to overcome enormous problems. They still need decades of peaceful evolution.

One of their major problems is the ideological or philosophical void. The old ideology has lost its credibility and its attraction, but there is no replacement as of yet. Of course, the hundreds of thousands who return
from universities in the United States, Canada, and Europe bring the ideas of Western civilization back to their country. But when I ask young Chinese entrepreneurs or young Chinese scientists and intellectuals aged thirty to forty about their spiritual future, I get answers reflecting the hope for an amalgam of Confucianism and democracy. It sounds rather odd to a European. At any rate, I think that the outburst of vitality in this country with a history of more than four millennia is extraordinary. Presently, they are concentrating on economic progress. Given the almost unbelievable economic successes of the 1980s and 1990s, I deem it likely that China will carry on successfully in the next decades.

Politically speaking, China is already a world power. Industrially and economically, it is going to become a world power as well. If China maintains its stability and effective government, then its gross national product will surpass that of the Japanese within about three decades. And thereafter, its economy will achieve the same order of weight and magnitude as those of the United States and the European Union. Then there will be three major currencies in the world: the American dollar, the Euro, and the Chinese yen. Of course, I should repeat: The Chinese still have to overcome enormous problems in the meantime, and they will, of course, encounter setbacks as well.

The West would be well advised not to bother the Chinese nation with any ideological or spiritual tutelage. There is no need to hurt their pride. They are a proud nation, but I do not sense any signs of aggressiveness—not even in the case of Taiwan, as long as there is no provocation. And if this condition is met, and no provocations from the outside arise, then the Chinese can, and probably will, wait patiently until the attraction of a prosperous mainland becomes irresistible to the Chinese in Taiwan. I delivered this same prognosis in a large auditorium in Taipei, Taiwan, and nobody booed me out. Recently, tensions across the Taiwan Strait have subsided. If prudence continues on all sides, then the dangers of major conflict will remain under control. The same may apply to the Kashmir conflict.

Russia

Speaking of probabilities in the coming decades, I must make one remark about Russia. The Russian economy is not yet in good shape. I think it likely that Russia and Putin will find ways to become internationally competitive, to integrate Russia into global markets, and to expand its foreign trade beyond natural gas. The best thing that we in the West can do is to show respect for the thousand-year-old Russian nation and to offer cooperation on an equal footing, however long Russia’s domestic and economic problems may last.

Russia will remain a world power, whether we like it or not, as a result of her vast territory—try to count the number of time-zones in
Russia—her number of smaller neighbors, her riches in oil, gas, and other minerals, and her enormous military power, which includes thousands of nuclear weapons. Putin is obviously prepared for international cooperation, and is willing to be a dependable partner. Right now, his administration seems somewhat irritated by the number of East European countries that have joined NATO, and, to a lesser extent, the European Union. It would be both prudent of the West, and in its own best interests, to avoid slighting Russia, be it in matters of armaments, trade, or finances.

In the long term, it seems likely to me that we will see moderate—very moderate—economic growth in Russia. Of course, oil prices will continue to be a major factor in that development for a long time to come. The speed of institutional and domestic reform is the other major factor in that process. The creation of resilient institutions in that country will be difficult and will take time. And it will, of course, depend on the degree of domestic political stability. I would guess that sufficient stability can be expected there. In other words, for a period of many years, a relatively authoritarian type of government can be expected in Russia as in China. And like China, Russia will probably not become aggressive in the foreseeable future without being provoked.

By contrast, the future of Ukraine and Belarus appears uncertain. After all, for centuries both of these former Soviet Republics were integral parts of czarist Russia, and there are no great language barriers. Presently, the structures and economies of Ukraine and Belarus are much weaker than those of Russia. If I were to live long enough, I would not be astonished to see a re-merging of these countries within the course of the century.

One small footnote here from the German point of view: We Germans feel rather relieved that, despite two enormously bloody wars in the twentieth century, there does not seem to remain any hatred between Russians and Germans. This is very astonishing, but you feel it if you talk to people in Russia as well as to Germans. One senses the willingness for partnership on both sides.

Now, having named the United States, China, and Russia as the three powers of global importance, I am, of course, aware of the great future potential of India, which, by the middle of this century, will have 1.5 billion inhabitants. Indonesia, by then, will have about 300 million people. The next most populous states will be Brazil and Nigeria. The future development of these states seems a bit less predictable than the futures of China and Russia. Nevertheless, in the foreseeable future, I do not expect that their policies will set off worldwide conflicts or dangers. The presence of nuclear weapons on almost all sides makes a war between great states rather unlikely. But one cannot rule out another type of great conflict.
Islam and the West

Whether we believe in Samuel Huntington’s analysis of a clash between Islam and the West or not, no one can rule out the possibility of such a conflict. If we are not careful, it certainly cannot be ruled out. Such a conflict might not take the form of a great war, but in an atmosphere of general, ongoing animosity, it is conceivable that armed conflicts or wars, guerrilla activities, and terrorist activities, in particular, will be triggered time and again.

Of the nearly two hundred states on our globe, almost sixty are populated by Muslims. Most of these states are poor. Some of them are utterly poor, and, at the same time, rather difficult to govern. Very few of them enjoy boundaries with historical legitimacy—legitimacy, for example, that goes back further than World War I or II. Very few of them have historically evolved boundaries. Even fewer of these states enjoy a functioning democracy. Presently, most of them can only be ruled in an authoritarian or dictatorial way, just as they were in their beginnings. There is no use in avoiding this fact, or trying to paper over it.

The Western public, and even the Western political elite, has only a very limited knowledge of Islam and its history. We tend to forget, for instance, that concepts like universal individual rights and democracy are Western achievements of only the last two centuries. They are maybe only 250 years old or so. Thomas Jefferson still had slaves, just like Pericles in ancient Athens two thousand years before him. The Torah, the New Testament, and the Koran have only given us commandments. They have not given us democracy; they have not given us human rights.

The era of enlightenment in America and Europe, 200 or 250 or 300 years ago, was necessary to conceive of equal rights, to conceive of the rule of law, to conceive of the rule of democracy. These concepts evolved steadily in England, America, Holland, and France, and did so in my own country as well. But they did not develop in Arab regions, the Middle East, Iran, Indonesia, China, or Japan. The enlightenment has not yet reached most of the Muslim people, and it certainly has not reached the Islamic masses, all together about one-fifth of the global population. In the West, the process of enlightenment needed centuries, and this process cannot be condensed into a brief period of years or decades or brought to the Islamic world by way of military force.

I often wonder about our Western attempts to transform the Muslim masses into democrats. They will easily accept television and automobiles and Western technologies, which we export to them, along with modern weapons. But to convert them into democrats will take generations, if it ever happens. And it will also take understanding, economic aid, and tolerance on our side. I believe it would already be an enormous success.
if we could bring all of their states and governments to acknowledge and obey the rule of international law, and to obey the Charter of the United Nations. It would be quite something. But alas, in the meantime, we sell them weapons and military technologies.

I would hope that arms limitation remains on the international agenda. But poverty, the population explosion, and migration—not to mention oil and gas—will probably make for armed conflicts in the future. For all of these reasons, the Middle East will remain a region of unrest and conflict in the coming decades. The same holds true for great parts of Africa, and possibly central Asia as well. I will avoid, however, mentioning any states by name.

IV. The Superpower: The United States of America

Some Americans believe that September 11 changed the world. That is not quite correct. Instead, it deeply changed the way in which Americans perceive the outside world; this is the real change. Despite all of their power, Americans suffered a violent attack on their own soil. And this experience led the American leadership to use its enormous military power to fight the so-called war on terrorism. As a result, tendencies toward hegemonic behavior vis-à-vis other nations appear to have come to the forefront.

An imperialist element in American foreign policy has always coexisted with other elements, including isolationism, internationalism, and idealism (nowadays called multilateralism). Sometimes one of these elements prevailed, sometimes another. The history of imperialism goes back to the middle of the nineteenth century. It goes back to Commander Perry in the Bay of Tokyo, who brought about the vast, so-called Meiji Restoration in Japan. It goes back to the wars against Mexico and Spain. It goes back to Teddy Roosevelt, who was called an imperialist at a time when the term had no derogatory overtones. In modern times, we have heard catchwords like “rogue states,” and we have seen Presidents Reagan and Clinton, one after the other, bombing Grenada and Belgrade without a decision from the Security Council. Of course, America is not the only state that has violated the Charter of the United Nations, and American leaders are not the only ones to forcefully spread their own ideologies beyond their borders. A sense of mission has been part of American strategy for a long, long time. Think, for instance, of Woodrow Wilson; think of Franklin Roosevelt, George Marshall, and many others.

From a European point of view, it does not really make a great difference whether you are French or German or Italian or Dutch. One might characterize America’s present strategy by two principles: first, the belief that freedom of action should not be impeded by entangling alli-
ances, to use a very old phrase from American constitutional history; and second, the willingness to wage preventive wars.

Many Europeans take these principles to represent democratic imperialism. You do not hear this from them; people think that speaking their mind is politically incorrect. However, it seems conceivable to me that these guiding principles will persist longer than President George Bush Jr.’s term in office. Right now, only a minority of sovereign states is happy with America’s strategic attitude or the extension of the American fear of interference. Most people, particularly in Europe, would prefer America to act as a leader in internationalism or multilateralism, and they try to influence America in that direction. My own guess is that the world will have to live with a considerable degree of American unilateralism for a while. Such a situation will not necessarily entice other nations and governments to voluntarily engage themselves. Hearing these words, you will think only of France, but you are mistaken to do so.

In my view, it would be helpful for Americans today to analyze the reasons for the relatively quick, totally unforeseen disappearance of sympathy and solidarity that characterized public opinion all over Europe after September 11. It was really overwhelming in France, in Germany, and even in a number of non-European Arab countries. Are you aware that this undesirable change in the mood of public opinion was triggered by American unilateralism, and by some instances of verbal arrogance, as well?

Several possible answers to these questions lead to a basic question that many leaders outside America ask themselves: namely, will the United States stick to the Charter of the United Nations? Or will unilateralism determine America’s geostrategy for decades to come? It may be difficult to arrive at a clear-cut answer, but, then again, there are quite a few additional questions and choices to be made. I will only mention two of them. First, what is America’s policy vis-à-vis the more than one billion Muslims in Africa, Asia, and Europe? Is it really realistic to believe in your own ability to guide them toward democracy in their fifty-odd states? Second, is the United States prepared to accept the growing role of China? What is America’s policy toward this world power, with its current population of 1.3 billion, which will grow to 1.5 billion in just a couple of decades?

Right now, the U.S. appears free to make its own choices, and it will do so. Future historians may be able to decide whether the early years of the twenty-first century were a watershed or not. My private guess is this: Not quite soon, but somewhat later, Americans will again become conscious of the fact that this century will present mankind with dangers and challenges that no state or nation, not even the most powerful, can face on its own. Whether these challenges take the form of the global population explosion or global warming, whether mankind is confronted with global
environmental decay or global epidemics, global crime, globally operating terrorist organizations, or global monetary disorder—in none of these cases will America be able to unilaterally impose answers, provide means, or even shelter itself. And, of course, the same goes for all less powerful nations. It applies to the European Union, to Russia and China.

American leaders have long since realized that all of these cases require international cooperation. Whether it is the law of the sea, going back hundreds of years, or the law of the sky, going back two generations, whether it is the rules by which payments are managed—you have long since realized that international cooperation is needed. I trust that American leaders will again head in that direction. After all, it is the imperfect United Nations and its imperfect charter upon which the rule of law in international affairs is based. This imperfect world has no other globally binding constitution. The European nations will try to uphold the charter and the United Nations.

V. The European Union

In order to preserve their self-determination in the face of the global dangers and disorders of this century, Europeans will try to stick together; they will try to develop the European Union, try to shape it into a more competent entity. That undertaking was started half a century ago by just six West European states—France, Germany, Holland, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Italy, primarily under the guidance of French statesmen, and with benevolent assistance from America. Despite the aforementioned rift resulting from the member states’ differing positions on the Iraq War, the relationship that has grown among the European Union’s fifteen member states (and, in a short while, its twenty-five member states) can be considered an enormous success.

One need only look back at a millennium of devastating European wars, or at the two World Wars of the twentieth century, to realize that this is an enormous achievement, even if we are not totally satisfied at the moment. One need only remember that almost all of the European nations, and their corresponding national languages, have histories of around a thousand years. Ask an Englishman how long the English nation has existed; ask a German. The French may give you an answer that refers to a slightly longer history. The Italians may speak of an even longer history. With a few exceptions, including Poland, one thousand years is the approximate length of time over which these nations and their languages and their particular cultures have evolved.

It is this long history that made it so hard for many Europeans to sacrifice some of their national autonomy and establish a European Union. Particularly difficult is the task of arriving at a common foreign policy. I think it may still take anywhere between twenty-five and fifty
years to come to a common foreign policy. In particular, the role of Great Britain is still undecided, and a common defense policy might take even longer than twenty-five to fifty years.

And what of the half-century since the start of the European Union in 1950? If we only needed another fifty years to function as a fully operating entity, then that would not be too bad. Such a thing has never happened in any part of the world. We saw the Roman Empire, but its states, countries, and peoples did not always volunteer to become Roman provinces; rather, they were forced to join. In the history of mankind, sovereign nations with long histories have never before voluntarily given up part of their sovereignty to form a greater union.

Nevertheless, there is one big “if” standing in the way of our success in the coming twenty-five to fifty years. We will succeed only if our present and future leaders (and public opinion in two dozen nations) uphold the conviction that a well-functioning union is necessary in order to maintain the basic patriotic interests of individual nations. It is something that nobody conceived of in the nineteenth century, or in the first half of the twentieth century. It is something that only a few people thought about in the second half of the twentieth century.

We are slowly coming to realize the importance of that conviction. One cannot rule out the future possibility of an enormous enlargement of the European Union by the accession of ten states at once. One cannot rule out the possibility that this may challenge the competencies of the Union. One cannot totally discount the possibility that a small group of nations within that union will develop a closer cooperation.

It is also possible that deep disappointments with the EU will cause some countries to attach themselves, in one way or another, to the United States. I would not exclude that possibility—let us wait and see. In this case, it seems highly likely that the common market and the common currency would persist. But perhaps little more than these two institutions would remain functional. I am not an optimist; I am not a pessimist either, but realistically, one has to admit that right now, the European Union is not in the best of shape.

Europeans will continue to try to influence America’s foreign policy. They will attempt to discourage America’s hegemonic tendencies, and they will try to strengthen multilateral ones instead. Right now, the French and British elites are working most actively to create change, but they are pursuing it along quite different lines. In response to some unpleasant exchanges about Iraq that have taken place on the other side of the Atlantic, I have publicly urged my own government to maintain an attitude of composed dignity. In my view, it would have sufficed to remind our American friends and partners of the terms of the Two-Plus-Four Treaty upon which the unification of Germany was based thirteen
years ago. By the way, this treaty was conceived of in this very city by an American foreign secretary and his staff. According to the language of the treaty, a unified Germany can only use its military weapons in cases that are in “accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.” This treaty was ratified by the Soviet Union, France, Britain, the United States of America, and also by the former East Germany. This treaty, the result of James Baker’s initiative, should have been invoked to explain why the Germans could not participate in actions in Iraq. Without mentioning any names, there was a lot of fuss from the German side, and a lot of fuss from the American side.

Good neighborly relations and cooperation between America and Europe need to be maintained. Whether American or European, we stand upon the shoulders of common ancestors such as Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Voltaire, and all of us follow in the footsteps of the American Federalist Papers. The basic principles of democracy and human rights were created in America, England, Holland, France, and other European countries as the result of mutual collaboration. It was a long process that evolved slowly. And without Charles Darwin or Albert Einstein, modern science on both sides of the Atlantic would never have progressed so far. Both Europeans and Americans have inherited the same enormous wealth of insights into culture and civilization. It is desirable to remind the public of our common roots.

Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the U.S. is the only state with the power to operate militarily all over the globe. This is true today, and will also be true tomorrow. Americans have the power to act unilaterally, alone and without much respect for the opinion or advice of others. It is for Americans to decide whether they will listen and take advice. If you decide against it, then Europeans will have to accept it as a fact that they cannot change. But after taking unilateral action in Iraq, America can hardly expect Europeans to send troops and finances to clean up and rebuild the demolished houses and bridges and cities like we did in Bosnia and Kosovo.

**Conclusion**

Let me conclude with three points. First, growing dependence, or growing interdependence, in an ever more densely populated world means the growing potential for conflict, but, at the same time, it also means the growing necessity for compromise. Second, in the future, the conscientious will for compromise and tolerance will become more decisive than it has been in the past. And third, no one is morally entitled to exclusively pursue his or her own rights or claims or interests; everyone has duties and responsibilities vis-à-vis the others.
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THE IDEA OF FREEDOM IN AMERICAN HISTORY

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Eric Foner
Columbia University

I wish to begin today with a single episode in the history of American freedom. On September 16, 1947, the 160th anniversary of the signing of the U.S. Constitution, the Freedom Train opened to the public in Philadelphia. A traveling exhibition of some 133 historical documents, the train, bedecked in red, white, and blue, soon embarked on a sixteen-month tour that took it to over three hundred American cities. Never before or since have so many cherished pieces of Americana—among them the Mayflower Compact, the Declaration of Independence, and the Gettysburg Address—been assembled in one place. After leaving the train, visitors were exhorted to dedicate themselves to American values by taking the Freedom Pledge and adding their names to a Freedom Scroll.

The idea for the Freedom Train, perhaps the most elaborate peacetime patriotic campaign in American history, originated in 1946 with the Department of Justice. President Truman endorsed it as a way of contrasting American freedom with “the destruction of liberty by the Hitler tyranny.” Since direct government funding smacked of propaganda, however, the project was turned over to the non-profit American Heritage Foundation, whose board of trustees, dominated by leading bankers and industrialists, was headed by Winthrop W. Aldrich, chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank.

By any measure, the Freedom Train was an enormous success. It attracted over 3.5 million visitors, and millions more took part in the civic activities that accompanied its journey, including labor-management forums, educational programs, and patriotic parades. Unlike a more recent celebration, the 1986 Statue of Liberty centennial, the Freedom Train did not succumb to commercialism—there were no product endorsements or brand-name sponsorships.

The powerful grassroots response to the train, wrote The New Republic, revealed a deep popular hunger for “tangible evidence of American freedom.” Behind the scenes, however, the Freedom Train demonstrated that the precise meaning of freedom was hardly uncontroversial. The liberal staff members at the National Archives who proposed the initial list of documents had included the Wagner Act of 1935, which guaranteed labor’s right to collective bargaining, and President Roosevelt’s Four
Freedoms speech of 1941, listing freedom of speech and religion, freedom from fear, and the vaguely socialistic freedom from want as the Allies’ aims in World War II. These, however, were eliminated by the more conservative American Heritage Foundation. Also omitted were the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the constitution, which had granted civil and political rights to blacks after the Civil War, and Roosevelt’s order of 1941 establishing the Fair Employment Practices Commission. In the end, nothing on the train referred to organized labor or any twentieth-century social legislation, and of the 133 documents, only three related to blacks: the Emancipation Proclamation, the Thirteenth Amendment, and a 1776 letter criticizing slavery.

Black Americans indeed had virtually no voice in planning the exhibit, and many were initially skeptical about it. On the eve of the train’s unveiling, the poet Langston Hughes expressed the hope that there would be “no Jim Crow on the Freedom Train.” “When it stops in Mississippi,” Hughes wondered, “will it be made plain /Everybody’s got a right to board the Freedom Train?” In fact, with the Truman administration about to make civil rights a major priority, the train’s organizers announced that they would not permit segregated viewing. In an unprecedented move, the American Heritage Foundation canceled visits to Memphis and Birmingham when local authorities insisted on separating visitors by race. But the Freedom Train visited forty-seven other Southern cities without incident and was hailed in the black press for breaching, if only temporarily, the walls of segregation.

If the Freedom Train reflected a growing sense of national unease about overt expressions of racial inequality, its journey also revealed the impact of the Cold War. Conceived in the wake of World War II to underscore the contrast between American freedom and Nazi tyranny, the Freedom Train quickly became caught up in the emerging ideological struggle with communism. In the spring of 1947, a few months before the train was dedicated, President Truman had committed the United States to the worldwide containment of Soviet power. Soon, Attorney General Tom C. Clark was praising the Freedom Train as a means of preventing “foreign ideologies” from infiltrating the United States and of “aiding the country in its internal war against subversive elements,” and the FBI began compiling reports on those who criticized the train or seemed unenthusiastic about it. The Freedom Train inaugurated a period when the language of freedom suffused American politics and culture. At the same time, it also revealed how the Cold War subtly reshaped freedom’s meaning, identifying it with anti-communism, “free enterprise,” and the defense of the social and economic status quo.

The story of the Freedom Train is one episode in my recent book, The Story of American Freedom, which traces the idea of freedom in the United States.
States from the Revolution to the present. I begin with it today because it reveals in microcosm my major premise—that far from being fixed, the definition of freedom is the subject of persistent conflict in American history. It also points to the three major issues that debates about freedom have revolved around in the American past—the *meaning* or definition of freedom, the *social conditions* that make freedom possible, and the *boundaries* of freedom—who, that is, is entitled to enjoy it.

No idea is more fundamental to Americans’ sense of themselves as individuals and as a nation than freedom. The central term in our political vocabulary, freedom—or liberty, with which it is almost always used interchangeably—is deeply embedded in the documentary record of our history and the language of everyday life. The Declaration of Independence lists liberty among mankind’s inalienable rights; the Constitution announces as its purpose to secure liberty’s blessings. The United States fought the Civil War to bring about a new birth of freedom, World War II for the Four Freedoms, the Cold War to defend the Free World. The current war has been given the title “Operation Iraqi Freedom.” Americans’ love of freedom has been represented by liberty poles, caps, and statues, and acted out by burning stamps and burning draft cards, running away from slavery, and demonstrating for the right to vote. Obviously, other peoples also cherish freedom, but the idea does seem to occupy a more prominent place in public and private discourse in the United States than elsewhere. The ubiquitous American excuse invoked by disobedient children and assertive adults—“it’s a free country”—is not, I believe, familiar in other societies. “Every man in the street, white, black, red or yellow,” wrote the educator and statesman Ralph Bunche in 1940, “knows that this is ‘the land of the free’... [and] ‘the cradle of liberty.’” And as groups from the abolitionists to modern-day conservatives have realized, to “capture” a word like freedom is to acquire a formidable position of strength in political conflicts.

Perhaps because of its very ubiquity, the history of what the historian Carl Becker called this “magic but elusive word” is a tale of debates, disagreements, and struggles rather than a set of timeless categories or an evolutionary narrative toward a preordained goal. Rather than seeing freedom as a fixed category or predetermined concept, I view it as what philosophers call an “essentially contested idea,” one that by its very nature is the subject of disagreement. Use of such a concept automatically presupposes an ongoing dialogue with other, competing meanings. And the meaning of freedom has been constructed not only in congressional debates and political treatises, but on plantations and picket lines, in parlors and even bedrooms.

If freedom has been a battleground throughout our history, so too has been the definition of those entitled to enjoy its blessings. It is hardly
original to point out that the United States, founded on the premise that liberty is an entitlement of all humanity, blatantly deprived many of its own people of freedom. Efforts to delimit freedom along one or another axis of social existence have been a persistent feature of our history. More to the point, perhaps, freedom has often been defined by its limits. The master’s freedom rested on the reality of slavery, the vaunted autonomy of men on the subordinate position of women. By the same token, it has been through battles at the boundaries—the efforts of racial minorities, women, workers, and other groups to secure freedom as they understood it—that the meaning of freedom has been both deepened and transformed, and the concept extended to realms for which it was not originally intended. Time and again in our history, the definition of freedom has been transformed by the demands of excluded groups for inclusion.

These themes are powerfully illustrated by the changing meaning of freedom in American history, and especially during the past century—an era dubbed the American Century by the prominent American publisher Henry Luce during World War II. Americans in the twentieth century were inheritors of ideas of freedom forged in the previous century and, indeed, during the struggle for American independence. The Revolution gave birth to a definition of American nationhood and national mission that persists to this day, an idea closely linked to freedom, for the new nation defined itself as a unique embodiment of liberty in a world overrun with oppression. The rest of the world, proclaimed Samuel Williams, in *A Discourse on the Love of Our Country* (1775), was sunk in debauchery and despotism. In Asia and Africa, “the very idea of liberty” was “unknown.” Even in Europe, Williams claimed, the “vital flame” of “freedom” was being extinguished. The fate of liberty thus rested with what Thomas Jefferson would soon call this “empire of liberty.” The sense of American uniqueness, of the United States as an example to the rest of the world of the superiority of free institutions, remains alive and well even today as a central part of our political culture.

But the Revolution also revealed the persistent inner contradiction of American freedom by giving birth to a republic rhetorically founded on liberty but resting economically in large measure on slavery. Slavery helped to define American understandings of freedom in the colonial era and the nineteenth century. Even as Americans celebrated their freedom, the “imagined community” of the American republic—those entitled to enjoy the “blessings of liberty” protected by the Constitution—came to be defined by race. No black person, declared the Supreme Court on the eve of the Civil War, could ever be an American citizen. Yet at the same time, the struggle by outcasts and outsiders—the abolitionists, the slaves, and freed people themselves—reinvigorated the notion of freedom as a universal birthright, a truly human ideal. The principles of birthright citi-
zenship and equal protection of the law without regard to race, which became central elements of American freedom, were products of the antislavery struggle and the Civil War.

After decades of the slavery controversy, which had somewhat tarnished the sense of a special American mission to preserve and promote liberty, the Civil War and emancipation reinforced the identification of the United States with the progress of freedom, linking this mission as never before with the power of the national state. By the 1880s, the British visitor James Bryce was struck by the power not only of Americans’ commitment to freedom, but by their conviction that they were the “only people” truly to enjoy it. As the United States emerged, with the Spanish-American War of 1898, as an empire akin to those of Europe, traditional American exceptionalism thrived, yoked ever more tightly to the idea of freedom by the outcome of the Civil War.

At the turn of the century, what I have called its social conditions dominated discussions of freedom. American disciples of Herbert Spencer like William Graham Sumner argued that law by definition restricts freedom and that not politics but the free market is the true domain of liberty. Critics, however, raised the question whether meaningful freedom could exist in a situation of extreme economic inequality. In the nineteenth century, economic freedom had generally been defined as autonomy, usually understood via ownership of property—a farm, artisan’s shop, or small business. When reformers forcefully raised the issue of “industrial freedom” in the early years of this century, they insisted that in a modern economy, economic freedom meant not so much the ownership of productive property, but economic security—a living wage, the right to a say in management, or—in a phrase that became ubiquitous in these years—an American Standard of Living. To secure economic freedom thus defined required active intervention by the government.

This belief achieved a remarkable popular reach, especially during World War I and again in the 1930s. In the coal mines of West Virginia, company managers during the war worried that workers were “taking the idea of emancipation” too literally. “It has been impossible to fight Kaiserism abroad without some introspection at home,” one wrote. The rhetoric of democracy and liberty used to promote World War I echoed among workers seeking “industrial emancipation” at home.

During the 1920s, this expansive notion of economic freedom was eclipsed by a resurgence of laissez-faire ideology. But in the following decade, Franklin Roosevelt sought to make the word “freedom” a rallying cry for the New Deal. As early as 1934, in his second “fireside chat,” Roosevelt juxtaposed his own definition of “liberty” as “greater security for the average man” to the older notion of freedom of contract, which served the interests of “the privileged few.” Henceforth, Roosevelt would
consistently link freedom with economic security and identify entrenched
economic inequality as its greatest enemy. “The liberty of a democracy,”
he declared in 1938, was not safe if citizens were unable to “sustain an
acceptable standard of living.”

If Roosevelt invoked the word to sustain the New Deal, “liberty”—in
its earlier sense of limited government and laissez-faire economics—
became the fighting slogan of his opponents. The principal conservative
critique of the New Deal was that it restricted American freedom. When
conservative businessmen and politicians in 1934 formed an organization
to mobilize opposition to the New Deal, they called it the American
Liberty League. The fight for possession of the “ideal of freedom,” the
New York Times reported, was the central issue of the presidential cam-
paign of 1936. Opposition to the New Deal planted the seeds for the later
flowering of an anti-statist conservatism bent on upholding the free mar-
ket and dismantling the welfare state. But as Roosevelt’s landslide reeelec-
tion indicated, most Americans by 1936 had for the time being come to
accept the view that freedom must encompass economic security, guar-
anteed by the government.

If in the nineteenth century America’s encounter with the outside
world had been more ideological than material, the twentieth century
saw the country emerge as a persistent and powerful actor on the world
stage. And at key moments of worldwide involvement, the encounter
with a foreign “other” subtly affected the meaning of freedom in the
United States. One such episode was the struggle against Nazi Germany,
which not only highlighted previously neglected aspects of American
freedom, but fundamentally transformed perceptions of who was entitled
to enjoy the blessings of liberty in the United States. It also gave birth to
a powerful rhetoric which would long outlive the defeat of Hitler: the
division of the planet into a “free world” and an unfree world.

Today, when asked to define their rights as citizens, Americans in-
stinctively turn to the privileges enumerated in the Bill of Rights: freedom
of speech, the press, and religion, for example. But for many decades, the
social and legal defenses of free expression were extremely fragile in the
United States. A broad rhetorical commitment to this ideal coexisted with
stringent restrictions on speech deemed radical or obscene. Dissenters
who experienced legal and extralegal repression, including labor organ-
izers, World War I-era socialists, and birth control advocates, had long
insisted on the centrality of free expression to American liberty. But not
until the late 1930s did civil liberties assume a central place in mainstream
definitions of freedom. It was only in 1939 that the Department of Justice
established a Civil Liberties Unit, for the first time in American history,
according to Attorney General Frank Murphy, placing “the full weight of
the department . . . behind the effort to preserve in this country the bless-
ings of liberty.” In 1941, the Roosevelt administration celebrated with considerable fanfare the 150th anniversary of the Bill of Rights (whose fiftieth anniversary and centennial had passed virtually unremarked).

There were many causes for this development, including a new awareness in the 1930s of restraints on free speech by public and private opponents of labor organizing. But what one scholar has called the “discovery” of the Bill of Rights on the eve of American entry into World War II owed much to an ideological revulsion against Nazism and the invocation of freedom as a shorthand way of describing the myriad differences between American and German society and politics. During World War II, the Nazi counterexample was frequently cited by defenders of civil liberties in the United States, among them the Supreme Court when it reversed an earlier precedent to overturn the conviction of Jehovah’s Witnesses who refused to salute the American flag. Freedom of speech took its place as one of the “four essential human freedoms,” President Roosevelt’s description of Allied war aims endlessly reiterated throughout the conflict. Not only did the Four Freedoms embody the “crucial difference” between the Allies and their enemies, but in the future, Roosevelt promised, they would be enjoyed “everywhere in the world,” an updating of the centuries-old vision of America instructing the rest of mankind in the enjoyment of liberty.

If World War II presaged a transformation, in the name of freedom, of the country’s traditional relationship with the rest of the world, it also reshaped Americans’ understanding of the internal boundaries of freedom. The abolition of slavery had not produced anything resembling racial justice, except for a brief period after the Civil War when African-Americans enjoyed equality before the law and manhood suffrage. By the turn of the century, a new system of inequality was well on its way to being consolidated in the South with the acquiescence of the rest of the nation. This system rested on segregation, disenfranchisement, a labor market rigidly segmented along racial lines, and the threat of lynching for those who challenged the new status quo. At the turn of the last century, not only the shifting condition of blacks, but also the changing sources of immigration spurred a growing preoccupation with the racial composition of the nation. Of the three and a half million immigrants who entered the United States during the decade, over half hailed from Italy and the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires. Among middle-class, native-born Americans, these events inspired an abandonment of the egalitarian vision of citizenship spawned by the Civil War and the revival of definitions of American freedom based on race. In 1900, the language of “race”—race conflict, race feeling, race problems—occupied a central place in American public discourse, and the boundaries of nationhood, expanded in the aftermath of the Civil War, contracted dramatically. The
immigration law of 1924, which banned all immigration from Asia and severely restricted that from southern and eastern Europe, reflected the renewed identification of nationalism, American freedom, and notions of Anglo-Saxon superiority.

The struggle against Nazi tyranny and its theory of a master race discredited ideas of inborn ethnic and racial inequality and gave a new impetus to the long-denied struggle for racial justice at home. A pluralist definition of American society, in which all Americans enjoyed equally the benefits of freedom, had been pioneered in the 1930s by leftists and liberals associated with the Popular Front. During the Second World War, this became the official stance of the Roosevelt administration. The government self-consciously used the mass media, including radio and motion pictures, to popularize an expanded narrative of American history that acknowledged the contributions of immigrants and blacks and to promote a new paradigm of racial and ethnic inclusiveness. What set the United States apart from its wartime foes was not simply dedication to the ideals of the Four Freedoms but the resolve that Americans of all races, religions, and national origins could enjoy these freedoms equally. Racism was the enemy’s philosophy; Americanism rested on toleration and equality for all. By the war’s end, awareness of the uses to which theories of racial superiority had been put in Europe helped seal the doom of racism—in terms of intellectual respectability, if not its social reality.

Rhetorically, the Cold War was in many ways a continuation of the battles of World War II. The discourse of a world sharply divided into opposing camps, one representing freedom and the other slavery, was reinvigorated in the worldwide struggle against communism. Once again, the United States was the leader of a global crusade for freedom against a demonic, ideologically-driven antagonist, and American exceptionalism now suggested a national responsibility to lead the forces of the Free World in the containment of Soviet power. From the Truman Doctrine to the 1960s, every American president would speak of a national mission to protect freedom throughout the world, even when American actions, as in Iran and Guatemala in the 1950s and Vietnam in the 1960s, seemed to jeopardize freedom rather than to enhance it.

As the USSR replaced Germany as freedom’s antithesis, freedom from want, central to the Four Freedoms of World War II, slipped into the background. Whatever Moscow stood for was by definition the opposite of freedom—and not merely one-party rule, suppression of free expression and the like, but anything to which the word “socialist” could be attached, such as public housing, universal health care, full employment, and other claims that required strong and persistent government intervention in the economy. If freedom had an economic meaning, it was no
longer economic autonomy, as in the nineteenth century, “industrial democracy” (a rallying cry of the Progressive era), or economic security for the average citizen, as Roosevelt had defined it, but “free enterprise” and consumer abundance—the ability to choose from the cornucopia of goods provided by the modern American economy. To put it more precisely, the goal of the United States became to remodel Europe and eventually the entire world on the model of modern American capitalism, in which increased production and mass consumption, not governmental intervention aimed at economic redistribution, would constitute the definition of economic freedom. Among the slogans employed to popularize the Marshall Plan in Europe in the dark days of 1947 and 1948 was, “Prosperity Makes You Free.”

The high or low point of this equation of freedom with consumerism came in 1959 at the famous Kitchen Debate, an icon of Cold War America. Vice-President Richard Nixon’s speech opening a U. S. exposition in Moscow, “What Freedom Means to Us,” focused not on political and civil liberties but on the country’s 56 million cars and scores of labor-saving devices. Pointing to a little robot that swept the floor in the model of a suburban kitchen that was the exposition’s centerpiece, the vice president remarked, “In the United States you don’t even need a wife.” It was left to Khrushchev to suggest that freedom involved political ideals and national purpose larger than consumption. Yet in announcing that the Soviet Union would soon surpass the United States in economic production, Khrushchev in effect conceded the debate. If the battleground of freedom was the consumer marketplace, American triumph was inevitable.

The glorification of freedom as the essential characteristic of American life in a struggle for global dominance opened the door for others to seize on the language of freedom for their own purposes. Most striking was the civil rights movement, with its freedom rides, freedom schools, freedom marches, and the insistent cry “freedom now!” The movement greatly expanded the meaning of freedom. When Martin Luther King, Jr. ended his great oration on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial with the words, “free at last, free at last, thank God almighty, I’m free at last,” he was not referring to getting the government off his back or paying low taxes. Freedom for blacks meant empowerment, equality, recognition—as a group and as individuals. Central to African-American thought has long been the idea that freedom involves the totality of a people’s lives, and that it is always incomplete. Most white Americans believe that freedom is something which they possess, and which some outside force is trying to take away. Most African-Americans view freedom not as a possession to be defended, but as a goal to be achieved.

From what the political theorist Nikolas Rose calls a “formula of power,” the black movement made freedom once again “a formula of
resistance,” a rallying cry of the dispossessed. It strongly influenced the New Left and the social movements that arose from it, in which private self-determination assumed a new prominence in definitions of freedom. The expansion of freedom from a set of public entitlements to a feature of private life had many antecedents in American thought (Jefferson, after all, had substituted “the pursuit of happiness” for “property” in the Lockean triad that opens the Declaration of Independence). But the New Left was the first movement to elevate the idea of personal freedom to a political credo. The 1960s rallying cry, “the personal is political,” driven home most powerfully by the new feminism, announced the extension of claims of freedom into the arenas of family life, social and sexual relations, and gender roles. And while the political impulse behind 1960s freedom has long since faded, the decade fundamentally changed the language of freedom of the entire society, identifying it firmly with the right to choose not only in the consumer marketplace, but in a whole range of private matters from sexual preference to attire to what is now ubiquitously called one’s personal “lifestyle.”

Although Cold War rhetoric eased considerably in the 1970s, it was reinvigorated by Ronald Reagan, who effectively united into a coherent whole the elements of Cold War freedom—limited government, free enterprise, and anti-communism—all in the service of a renewed insistence on American exceptionalism and American mission. Consciously employing rhetoric that resonated back at least two centuries, Reagan proclaimed that “by some divine plan . . . a special kind of people—people who had a special love for freedom,” had been chosen to settle the North American continent. This exceptional history imposed on the nation an exceptional mission: “We are the beacon of liberty and freedom to all the world.”

Today, at least in terms of political policy and discourse, Americans still live in the shadow of the Reagan revolution. “Freedom” continues to occupy as central a place as ever in our political vocabulary, but during the 1990s it was almost entirely appropriated by libertarians and conservatives of one kind or another, from advocates of unimpeded free enterprise to armed militia groups insisting that the right to bear arms is the centerpiece of American liberty. The dominant constellation of definitions seemed to consist of a series of negations—of government, of social responsibility, of a common public culture, of restraints on individual self-definition and consumer choice. A search of the Internet for sites associated with freedom in the late 1990s yielded striking evidence of how fully the word had come to be associated with the free market and hostility to government. The largest number of sites were those of anti-government libertarians, groups promoting the sanctity of private property and the ideology of free trade, and armed patriot and militia organizations. Sites
promoting the virtues of “big government” were conspicuous by their absence.

At the same time, the collapse of communism as an ideology and of the Soviet Union as a world power made possible an unprecedented internationalization of current American concepts of freedom. The “free world” triumphed over its totalitarian adversary, the “free market” over the idea of a planned or regulated economy, and the “free individual” over the ethic of social citizenship.

American ideas of freedom now reverberate throughout the world, promoted by an internationalized mass media, consumer culture, and economic marketplace. As we enter the twenty-first century, the process of globalization itself seems to be reinforcing the prevailing understanding of freedom, at least among political leaders of both major parties and journalistic cheerleaders who equate freedom with the worldwide ascendency of American commodities, institutions, and values. A series of presidential administrations, aided and abetted by most of the mass media, have redefined both American freedom and America’s historic mission to promote it for all mankind to mean the creation of a single global free market in which capital, natural resources, and human labor are nothing more than factors of production in an endless quest for greater productivity and profit. The prevailing ideology of the global free market assumes that the economic life of all countries can and should be refashioned in the image of the United States—the latest version of the nation’s self-definition as model of freedom for the entire world.

Globalization is raising profound questions about the relationship between political sovereignty, national identity, and freedom. Indeed, the relationship between globalization and freedom may be the most pressing political and social problem of the twenty-first century. Historically, rights have been derived from membership in a nation state, and freedom often depends on the existence of political power to enforce it. Perhaps, in the future, freedom will accompany human beings wherever they go, and a worldwide regime of “human rights” that knows no national boundaries will come into existence, complete with supranational institutions capable of enforcing these rights and international social movements bent on expanding freedom’s boundaries. Thus far, however, economic globalization has occurred without a parallel internationalization of controlling democratic institutions.

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the language of freedom once again took center stage in American public discourse, as an all-purpose explanation for both the attack and the ensuing war against “terrorism.” “Freedom itself is under attack,” Bush announced in his speech to Congress of September 21, and he gave the title Enduring Freedom to the war in Afghanistan. Our antagonists, he
went on, “hate our freedoms, our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to assemble and disagree with each other.” In his June 2002 speech to the International Brotherhood of Carpenters, the president asked why terrorists attacked America. His answer: “Because we love freedom, that’s why. And they hate freedom.” As recently as mid-September 2002, in calling for increased attention to the teaching of American history so that schoolchildren can understand “why we fight,” Bush observed, “ours is a history of freedom, . . . freedom for everybody.” Naturally, the invasion of Iraq was called Operation Iraqi Freedom. The recently-released National Security Strategy opens not with a discussion of global politics but with an invocation of freedom, defined as political democracy, freedom of expression, religious toleration, and free enterprise. These, the document proclaims, “are right and true for every person, in every society.” There is no sense that other people may have given thought to the question of freedom and arrived at their own conclusions.

As during the Cold War, the invocation of freedom has proved a potent popular rallying cry, even as it subsumes local conflicts and complex motives throughout the world—in Central Asia, the Philippines, the Middle East, and elsewhere—into a simple either/or dichotomy. The war on terrorism also raises timeless issues concerning civil liberties in wartime, the balance between freedom and security, the rights of noncitizens, and the ethnic boundaries of American freedom. As has happened during previous wars, the idea of an open-ended global battle between freedom and its opposite has been used to justify serious infringements on civil liberties at home. Legal protections such as habeas corpus, trial by impartial jury, the right to legal representation, and equality before the law regardless of race or national origin have been curtailed. At least five thousand foreigners with Middle Eastern connections were rounded up in the aftermath of September 11 and more than one thousand arrested and held without charge or even public acknowledgment of their fate. An executive order authorized secret military tribunals for noncitizens deemed to have assisted terrorism, and in June 2002 the Justice Department argued in court that even American citizens could be held indefinitely and not allowed to see a lawyer once the government designates them “enemy combatants.” In the TIPs program announced in 2002, the government proposed to have cable television installers, pizza delivery men, UPS employees, and others report on anything “suspicious” they observed inside people’s homes.

Some of these measures—especially the TIPs program, which, if taken literally, would have resulted in a higher ratio of spies to citizens under surveillance than existed in East Germany before 1989—were curtailed after arousing public criticism. But one “surprise” of the last several months has been how willing the majority of Americans are to accept
restraints on time-honored liberties, especially when they seem to apply primarily to a single ethnically-identified segment of our population. Like other results of September 11, this needs to be understood in its historical context. That history suggests that strong protection for civil liberties is not a constant feature of our “civilization” but a recent and still fragile historical achievement. Our civil liberties are neither self-enforcing nor self-correcting. Especially in times of crisis, the price of freedom is eternal vigilance.

America, of course, has a long tradition of vigorous political debate and dissent, an essential part of our democratic tradition. Less familiar is the fact that until well into the twentieth century, a broad rhetorical commitment to this ideal coexisted with stringent restrictions on speech deemed radical or obscene. We ought to recall previous episodes—the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, the massive repression of dissent during World War I, Japanese-American internment during World War II—to realize the dangers of stigmatizing unpopular beliefs or particular groups of Americans as unpatriotic and therefore unworthy of constitutional protections. We need to turn our attention to once obscure Supreme Court decisions—Fong Yue Ting (1893), the Insular Cases of the early twentieth century, Korematsu during World War II—in which the Court allowed the government a virtual carte blanche in dealing with aliens and in suspending the rights of specific groups of citizens on grounds of military necessity. We should not forget the ringing dissents in these cases. In Fong Yue Ting, which authorized the deportation of Chinese immigrants without due process, Justice Brewer warned that the power was now directed against a people many Americans found “obnoxious,” but “who shall say it will not be exercised tomorrow against other classes and other people?” In Korematsu, which upheld Japanese-American internment, Justice Robert Jackson wrote that the decision “lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim to an urgent need.”

In the aftermath of September 11, it seemed for a time that the Bush administration had put aside the unilateralism that marked its first months in office in favor of a cooperative approach to international affairs. But the idea that the United States as the world’s predominant power can ignore the opinions of other nations soon reappeared. This outlook is rooted in the time-honored and newly reinforced American self-image as the sole embodiment and defender of universal freedom.

To the historian, such an attitude runs the risk of reproducing traditional American exceptionalism on a global scale. This is a special temptation in the wake of September 11, which has produced a spate of commentary by television pundits and political commentators influenced by Samuel P. Huntington’s mid-1990s book, The Clash of Civilizations. It is all
too easy to explain September 11 as a confrontation between Western and Islamic civilizations.

But the notion of a “clash of civilizations” is monolithic and essentialist. It reduces politics and culture to a single characteristic—race, religion, or geography—that remains forever static, divorced from historical development. It denies the global exchange of ideas and the interpenetration of cultures that has been a feature of the modern world for centuries. It also makes it impossible to discuss divisions within these purported civilizations. The construct of “Islam,” for example, lumps together over a billion people in diverse societies stretching from East Asia to the Middle East and Africa. And the idea that the West has exclusive access to reason, liberty, and tolerance ignores both the relative recency of the triumph of such values within the West and the debates over creationism, abortion rights, and other issues that suggest that commitment to such values is hardly unanimous. The difference between positing civilizations with unchanging essences and analyzing change within and interaction between societies is the difference between thinking mythically and thinking historically.

At the height of the Cold War, in his brilliant and sardonic survey of American political thought, The Liberal Tradition in America, Louis Hartz observed that the internationalism of the postwar era seemed in some ways to go hand in hand with self-absorption and insularity. Despite its deepened worldwide involvement, the United States was becoming more isolated intellectually from other cultures. Prevailing ideas of freedom in the United States, Hartz noted, had become so rigid and narrow that Americans could no longer appreciate definitions of freedom, common in other countries, related to social justice and economic equality, “and hence are baffled by their use.”

Today, Hartz’s call for Americans to listen to the rest of the world, not simply lecture it about what liberty is, seems more relevant than ever. This may be difficult for a nation that has always considered itself a city upon a hill, a beacon to mankind. Yet American independence was proclaimed by those anxious to demonstrate “a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.” It is not the role of historians to instruct our fellow citizens on how they should think about freedom. But it is our task to insist that the discussion of freedom must transcend boundaries rather than reinforce or reproduce them. From the admittedly early vantage point of 2003, it seems that the next hundred years will be even more of an American century than the last. This makes it all the more imperative that the forever unfinished story of American freedom become a conversation with the entire world, not a complacent monologue with ourselves. If September 11 makes us think historically, not mythically, about our
nation and its role in the world, then perhaps some good will have come out of that tragic event.

Suggested Reading


**THE IDEA OF FREEDOM IN GERMAN HISTORY**

*Comment on the Seventeenth Annual Lecture of the GHI, November 20, 2003*

**Jürgen Kocka**

*Free University Berlin and Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin*

Here at the German Historical Institute it may be appropriate to comment on Professor Foner’s lecture by using it as an invitation to reflect on some German parallels and contrasts to this American narrative. I shall not have time to become fully comparative, but I do want to take the American example as a point of departure for a view of the German case which, in turn, might throw some indirect light on the story that was just told so well.

In most respects the German case appears as a contrasting case. The German-American differences are overwhelming, certainly up to 1945, less so in the Cold War era, slightly more manifest again in the most recent period. The concept of *Freiheit*—freedom or liberty—did not play such a fundamental and central role in modern Germany’s self-understanding, politics, and symbolism. Other concepts were stronger: *Volk, Nation, Staat*, for a long time “class,” for a short while “race,” and perhaps most recently “peace.” At the beginning of modern German history, there was no Declaration of Independence, no revolution, no Bill of Rights, but—to borrow from Thomas Nipperdey—Napoleon, or rather, a period of skillful reforms led by the monarchs and well-educated civil servants of deeply challenged states, but without much mobilization of citizens from below. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a “German Idea of Freedom” had emerged that referred less to the rights of individual persons, than to the liberties—*Freiheiten*—of corporate entities, self-administered towns, self-regulating guilds, aristocratic estates, and rulers of small- and medium-size territories. This was a concept of *Freiheit* that was not antithetical to authorities, but was compatible with subordination to them, compatible with apolitical interpretations and with strong statist traditions, as long as these statist traditions were in accordance with the rule of law. Leonard Krieger has told this story.¹

The simultaneous quest for liberty and national unity failed in 1848, and a long decline of liberalism began. When the nation state was formed in the 1860s and 1870s, it placed unity before freedom and bureaucratic-military strength before civil society. In spite of its cultural modernity, strong market economy, and social dynamism, the Kaiserreich displayed strong elements of illiberalism, constitutionally, socially, and in the realm of mentalities. Fritz Stern has written about this.²
When the Germans celebrated their exceptionalism, it was not by stressing freedom, but the general good, their specific history, impartial and effective government, education, organization, their sense of nationhood and Volk. Contrast the “Ideas of 1914” professed by German intellectuals with the Western “Ideas of 1789” in which liberty had such a central place. When Germans reached beyond their borders and fought their wars, they did not do this with an ideology of freedom or a mission of liberation, as the Americans did when they fought Kaiserism, Hitlerism, and Communism. Consequently, the German wars could not have the partially liberating impact on the domestic scene which Professor Foner analyzed with respect to the United States in the twentieth century. Quite the opposite: German hyper-expansion in the Second World War went hand in hand with murderous repression at home and in the occupied territories. The practice of war and the idea of freedom have gone together in a certain way in twentieth-century American history—not without strong countertendencies, however, as we see again today—but such an alliance between war and freedom was totally lacking in late nineteenth- and twentieth-century Germany.

I could easily continue along this line stressing German-American differences, very much in the tradition of interpreting the German experience in the light of the critical Sonderweg thesis, in the light of what has been called the “German divergence from the West.” While I think that such an interpretation is by and large sound, it has its limits and problems, and it has been laid out so often that I do not want to elaborate on it further.

Instead, I want to propose three arguments and identify three constellations that were important in the history of freedom in Germany which Professor Foner did not address in today’s lecture or only touched upon a little bit, probably because they are not that important or absent in the history of freedom in America. To the extent that these three pieces of evidence relate at all to the Sonderweg view of German history, they tend to relativize it.

I.

First, a word on early modern traditions. Eric Foner could easily have mentioned the centuries-old European roots of American freedom, for example, the intellectual tradition of “classical Republicanism,” so intensively analyzed by Pocock and Baron, also with respect to the debates in the colonies. But it would not have made much sense for him to talk about the late medieval, early modern feudal and corporate traditions that recent German research has stressed as one of the roots of the emergence of rights and liberties in large parts of Europe, including Germany,
particularly its western and southwestern parts. Such late medieval and early modern feudal and corporate structures did not exist on the North American continent. Peter Blickle, among others, has argued this case. He has tried to show, and he partly does show, that in the late medieval, early modern towns and in the everyday arrangements between lords and peasants, and in the many conflicts between them, there existed and developed a social reality of limited, lawful, legitimate freedom, of rights and liberties, which led to local and regional demands and concessions, contracts and statutes, and, in the nineteenth century, ideas and practices of communal self-governance, liberalism, and constitutionalism. Thus, according to Blickle, modern freedom emerged not only from theories of natural law, the declarations of human rights, and the grand revolutions of the West, but also from feudal-corporate social reality.

This thesis can be overstated. After all, the rights and liberties stressed by Blickle and others usually lacked the universal claims so typical for the declarations of freedom and rights in the Western European tradition. It should also be admitted that many of these corporate liberal traditions were deeply weakened in large parts of the European continent, in Spain, France, Germany, and Scandinavia, under the absolutist ancien régime. One should not over-emphasize the Swiss example, which remained an exception. But the view has its merits. It brings into focus another German tradition of freedom that was overlooked by students of Prussia like Leonard Krieger, and points to the nineteenth- and twentieth-century effects of these early modern traditions. It is in the structure and culture of community self-government and of federalism that those older communal and corporate-liberal traditions continued to be effective. It is through community self-government and federalism that German constitutional arrangements differed—and still differ—from developments in both Western and in Eastern Europe. With American support and pressure, the German Basic Law of 1949 drew on this tradition, which also plays a role in the present discussions about the European constitution.

II.

Second, a few remarks on Social Democracy. Professor Foner spoke about social dimensions of freedom, mentioning freedom from want and the fight for industrial democracy. But with respect to the United States he had no reason to bring together the history of freedom, the history of socialism, and the history of the socialist or social democratic labor movement. This I want to do with respect to the German case.

When an independent labor movement emerged in Germany in the 1860s, including unions, cooperatives, and workers’ parties, this movement set itself apart from the liberal parties, which were increasingly
denounced as bourgeois. If one reads the classic texts from Weitling and Marx to Kautsky, Bernstein, and Hilferding, one does not find much sensitivity or praise for individual freedom. To the extent that concepts like Freiheit and Befreiung were used at all—they certainly were not central—they referred to the freedom and emancipation of a class, of the people, of mankind in general, while the freedom and liberty of the individual was not much problematized or regarded as a value to be protected against all collectivities.

As Susanne Miller has concluded, the classic socialist and social democratic texts have ignored the real problem of freedom. This is true of social democratic socialism, not to speak of socialism’s left wing, which, after the Bolshevik Revolution and later, moved toward supporting explicitly illiberal, authoritarian, and totalitarian positions in the communist camp.

But one arrives at a totally different picture if one assesses the less theoretical demands and the practical politics of Social Democracy since the 1860s. In practical matters, the SPD was always a liberal party as well, fighting for voting rights, judicial independence, parliamentary influence, and fighting against censorship and all kinds of repression, particularly since the party had suffered political repression itself, especially in the 1870s and 1880s. It is equally telling that it was the Social Democratic labor movement that publicly commemorated the Revolution of 1848-49 and its quest for freedom, at its twenty-fifth, fiftieth, and seventy-fifth anniversaries, when large parts of political liberalism and even greater portions of the middle classes had already turned away from what they now saw as their much too radical past.

Certainly, the social democratic labor movement pursued social, economic, and sometimes radical-democratic aims far beyond, and sometimes in tension with, the classical liberal program. But at the same time, it tried to preserve the core of the liberal demands and worked to realize them. It perceived democratic rights of co-determination and social rights like security and participation both as conditions and as dimensions of freedom. The Social Democratic Party aimed at the freedom of the many, not just of the few. It both reinterpreted the principle of freedom and it contributed much to its increasing—never perfect—realization beyond and below the elites. This could be shown for the Kaiserreich, Weimar Germany, and the Federal Republic.

In a country in which large parts of the middle class parties had ceased to give priority to the fight for generalized freedom early on, the Social Democratic Party filled part of the gap, pushed for politics with liberal elements, and became a major proponent of freedom, even though it did not make much use of the word. For it was only with the Godesberg Party Program of 1959 that Freiheit became the first of three explicitly
stated basic values to which the party subscribes: freedom, justice, and solidarity. Still, Willy Brandt could see himself as heir to one of the old Social Democratic traditions when he stated in his farewell speech as Party Chairman in 1987: “If I were asked what besides peace is more important to me than anything else, then I would have to say without qualification: freedom. Freedom for many, not just for the few. Freedom of conscience and of opinion. Freedom, too, from need and from fear.” We shall see whether the party in its present crisis, faced with the need to restructure and slim down the welfare state, can convince itself to adhere to this priority suggested by Brandt.

III.

Third, a few remarks on Nazi terror and World War II: The so-called Third Reich marked the low point in the history of freedom in Germany. It crushed the institutions that protected freedom. It negated the principle of freedom in nearly every respect. It took away life and liberty from millions of civilians in the prisons, camps, and the occupied lands. It also damaged the culture of freedom in less tangible but long-lasting ways. But here I want to emphasize another aspect of the connection between World War II, Nazi terror, and freedom.

In his recently published memoirs, Ralf Dahrendorf describes how he experienced the terror of those years, when he was a teenager and when his family lived in Berlin. He describes his family’s fear and desperation when his father, who belonged to the anti-Nazi resistance movement of July 20, 1944, was caught, sentenced by Freisler’s Volksgerichtshof, and imprisoned. The son would never forget the humiliated and oppressed appearance of his father in prison uniform and under the close surveillance of a prison guard when the family was finally allowed to visit him. The four grandparents, by the way, had been killed in the bombing raid on Hamburg in 1943.

Late in 1944, Dahrendorf, then fourteen or fifteen years old, was himself arrested after joining a circle of students critical of the regime. He was held in solitary confinement under harsh conditions in a Gestapo camp near Frankfurt an der Oder. During the last months of the war, the rest of the family lived in hiding in Berlin-Dahlem. The author recollects this period as a period of extreme confusion, as “anomie,” as the end of decent society. What consequences did he draw?

The ten days of solitary confinement awoke in me an almost claustrophobic urge for freedom, this visceral resistance to confinement, whether it be through the personal power of humans or through the anonymous power of organizations. . . . That cell in Frankfurt an der Oder probably rendered me immune to the
temptations of every kind of totalitarianism. It not only immunized me, it provided me with antibodies that would last a lifetime.\textsuperscript{11}

Perhaps this is a retrospective condensation of a process of learning that stretched over years, but the main point is clear. From the experience of oppression and catastrophe, Dahrendorf developed the central theme of his work and life: the topic of freedom, its social conditions, theoretical basis, and institutional forms.

In many ways this was clearly a non-representative reaction. Dahrendorf was not typical. But other actors and intellectuals of this generation (and of related generations) drew similar conclusions, stressing the importance of freedom after experiencing, suffering, and reflecting upon the deep loss of freedom in the catastrophic rupture of civilization brought about by National Socialism and World War II. In a way, this reaction can be seen as emblematic of broader changes in Germany in those years and the following decades when, in spite of many obstacles, distortions, and countertendencies, freedom was much advanced—from the Basic Law of 1949 to the non-violent revolution of 1989 and the resulting unification of the country.

Of course, I cannot even try to tell the story and analyze the situation of freedom in Germany during the last decades. Many factors played a role similar to those analyzed by Eric Foner with respect to the United States: e.g. anti-communism and the Cold War, particularly oppressive and pervasive in a country divided between East and West; but also economic growth and rising consumerism in West Germany, as well as the experience for the first time of real ethnic diversity with the arrival of South Europeans, Turks and others—a challenge to the constitution of freedom still to be met. In this respect we can and should learn from the Americans.

In all that, the memory of the recent—increasingly less recent—past plays a role. By and large, this is a productive role. The experience of the deep loss of freedom and the reflection upon this experience have led to a renewed stress on freedom, its gradual redefinition following Western standards, and its enhanced meaning in Germany’s constitution, intellectual climate, and ways of life. The American influence on all of this has been remarkably productive, and former emigrants from Germany to the United States have played a major role that will long be remembered with gratitude.

Times are changing. The totalitarian challenge that, in the final analysis, gave rise to the renewal and resuscitation of freedom is a matter of the last century, increasingly moving into the past. In Germany and most other parts of Europe, the so-called “war on terrorism” has not gained the importance that the fight against totalitarianism had in the twentieth century. Terrorism is murderous, it is unacceptable, and it is a transnational challenge. But sometimes one wonders whether the war on terror-
ism can become a bigger threat to freedom than terror itself. In any event, the relationship between terrorism, opposition to terrorism, and freedom is very different from the relationship between totalitarianism, opposition to totalitarianism, and freedom.

But the topic of freedom is as timely as ever. At the present time, it plays a major role in our discussions about civil society, Zivilgesellschaft, Bürgergesellschaft. A new revitalization of the quest for freedom is taking place, in the context of reform movements, changing social relations, and daily life—all of which need new dynamics, innovations, departures, and for all that: more freedom. This is a challenge in Europe, particularly in Germany, not so much in the United States. But this would be another topic, and would move me even further away from the splendid lecture by Professor Foner, whose stimulating thoughts have triggered my comments.

Notes
3 Klaus von See, Die Ideen von 1789 und die Ideen von 1914. Völkisches Denken in Deutschland zwischen Französischer Revolution und Ersten Weltkrieg (Frankfurt/Main, 1975).
6 Peter Blickle, Von der Leibeigenschaft zu den Menschenrechten. Eine Geschichte der Freiheit in Deutschland (Munich, 2003).
Bulletin of the GHI Washington

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1. How did you come to the study of history?

McPherson: In high school I did not have any particular interest in history and did not have very good history teachers. In the first semester of college I took a course—a typical course on the history of Western civilization—that really turned me on because it was the first time that I had ever really been challenged to try and understand something that at first was totally confusing to me. I wound up being more interested in American history, so by my junior year in college I decided that I might go on to graduate school. I guess my professors at college were a kind of role model for me.

Growing up in Minnesota and attending a small college there, I had never actually been to the American South, but in the late 1950s it seemed like an exotic, mysterious, puzzling, in some ways bizarre place. These were the years of Southern resistance to the 1954 Supreme Court decision. So I went to Johns Hopkins University to do my graduate work in Southern U.S. history under C. Vann Woodward, who was the foremost Southern historian at the time. While I was at Hopkins, the civil rights movement in Baltimore and in the South caused me to look at the roots of that issue in the Civil War period. Exactly a century earlier, in the 1860s, many of the same issues were being thrashed out. So I decided that I would look at the civil rights activists of a century earlier, the Abolitionists. Once
emancipation became a reality, what was their vision of the future of race relations? That became the subject of my dissertation and my first book, and from there, my interests in the whole question of slavery, the end of slavery, the Civil War, and Reconstruction broadened out to include political and military history as well as this reform group. And I think probably my own feeling is that most people who choose history as a subject and then choose a specialization within history do so because of something in their own contemporary world that motivates their curiosity.

Hildermeier: As was very common in the mid-1960s, I began my studies in history and German literature with the aim of becoming a secondary school teacher. I started my university studies in 1966 in Bochum and was at the time primarily interested in contemporary history. When Hans Mommsen came to Bochum, I worked for him as a research assistant. In 1969, following my fifth semester of study, I changed universities, and that step played a big role. I became a historian of Eastern Europe. In the final two years of my secondary schooling, I had enrolled in an elective course, a study group in Russian. Therefore, I had been exposed somewhat to the language, so that it was not completely foreign to me. Naturally, I had to relearn it completely, but at least I had a rough idea of what I was getting into.

I ended up working with Dietrich Geyer and became involved with Russia and the Soviet Union. I think he personally had a far greater influence on me than did the scholarly aspects of the field itself. At most, the scholarly influence consisted of the fact that certain new methodologies were being tried out in connection with Russia and the Soviet Union. In the 1970s, things like revolutionary theory and imperialism theory were very popular. And it is not a complete coincidence that I wrote my dissertation about the other political party in the Russian revolution, the party that lost.

After completing my dissertation and spending time in Stanford, Moscow, and Kiev, among other places, it suddenly dawned on me that I had become a specialist for Eastern Europe, and I remained one. I became an assistant professor (Assistent) in Berlin at the Free University and completed my habilitation thesis in 1983 under the direction of Hans-Joachim Torke. Immediately after this, as was still possible in 1984, I accepted a temporary position in Göttingen, where I was offered a professorship in 1985, and I have remained there ever since.

2. How has historical scholarship changed in the last thirty years, and what do you see as the major trends for the future?

McPherson: I think the most important change in the United States in the kind of history that is written and in methodology is what we might
broadly call the rise of social history in the last generation. When I was in
graduate school, I think the traditional fields of political, diplomatic,
economic, and military history had to some extent the focus on the po-
litical economy of a nation and on international relations as the dominant
themes. But starting in the 1960s and increasingly in the 1970s and 1980s
in this country, the emphasis began to be on history from the bottom up
if you will—that was one of the phrases used at the time. What were the
lives of non-elites like? And that broadened out into all kinds of sub-
specializations: black history and women’s history, which then became
gender history to some degree, and the history of the family, and the
history of minority groups, groups that were at the margins of society.
Now a big field in this country is gay history or queer studies as it is
sometimes called. And that would have been inconceivable to me in
graduate school. This would have been exotic and alien and a little bit
bizarre. But now it is a normal part of historical scholarship.

One consequence of the ascent of social history was the decline of
some more traditional fields, particularly diplomatic and military history,
and to some degree traditional political history. It was sort of like a pair
of scales. And the old-fashioned concept of history as a narrative, as a
story, also declined in popularity. Like everything else, there is an action
and then there is a reaction, and by the 1990s people in this country were
calling for a narrative synthesis of all these new specializations because
historical study had become so fragmented. Monographs on minority
groups or on some kind of social history seem to have little relationship
to any broader context sometimes. So you will find all kinds of articles in
the journals such as the American Historical Review or the Journal of Ameri-
can History in the 1990s calling for narrative synthesis, for a revival of
narrative. As a consequence, some of these traditional fields have made
something of a comeback. But now, people working on political, military,
or diplomatic history incorporate the findings of social historians. For
example, somebody doing diplomatic history does not just look at one
diplomat’s correspondence with another diplomat, but instead also looks
at the way in which social issues and public opinion and politics within
the societies actually influence diplomacy. So I think in a way that has
been a very healthy development in the last ten or twelve years.

Something else that happened in my own lifetime was the application
of the methodologies of the social sciences, of psychology, and of various
kinds of theoretical approaches to historical research. Not just Marxism,
which has a long-standing kind of historical framework for interpreta-
tion, but various theories of race, class, and gender were used to try to
gain some historical insight into the past. Sometimes these theories were
so abstruse and maybe even marginal that it turned a lot of people off.
There was a sense ten or twelve years ago that history was in a bit of a
crisis because we had lost a public audience because of this specialization and the jargon or theoretical frameworks in which a lot of historical monographs and articles were couched. And so part of this call for a narrative synthesis in the 1990s was an effort to reach out beyond the academy and beyond the professoriat and beyond specialists to reach a broader public audience because the fear was that professional historians were losing the public audience to popular historians. As a consequence, for a while the concept of popular history was a kind of stigma in the academy. If one tried to write in such a way that made one’s writings accessible to a lay audience, that somehow meant you were no longer at the cutting edge of historical scholarship. So there was a feeling that this had gone too far as well, and that it was time to reach out again to that broader public audience because historians have a kind of responsibility to make their specialized knowledge available to citizens. So I think that is where we are right now. Sometimes this mission is given lip service more than substance, but I have been one of those who feel that we really do have a responsibility to speak to a larger audience.

What we now call cultural history, which is a term that has developed in the last decade or so, is a kind of blending of what we used to call social history with what used to be known as intellectual history. People who called themselves intellectual historians often focused on the development of ideas and ideologies by elites in American society. And as the focus of much historical scholarship began to broaden to look at non-elites, I think intellectual historians saw that they were in danger of becoming marginalized. They came to recognize that in fact all peoples have a culture, and that cultural history can look at all kinds of artifacts, not just written artifacts, but public festivals, holidays, and other kinds of rituals that various ethnic groups or communities might have. And so intellectual historians became cultural historians in the process of looking at non-elites.

There is a tendency in predicting the future to project forward recent developments. But earlier I also talked about the way in which any kind of action spurs a reaction. I think that some of the traditional fields have been making a bit of a comeback. Maybe that is just wishful thinking on the part of the diplomatic historians and military historians and political historians. But there is a sense that there is new life now in some of these older fields, in part because they have incorporated some of these other developments. But military history has become much less the history of commanders and strategy. It is now the impact of wars on economic and social and political developments and vice versa. Diplomatic history has broadened as well, and this is a process that is going to continue. So one future development will be that some of these traditional fields will continue to be changed by the new focus on social and cultural history that
we were talking about earlier. Something else that is likely to happen is
that the continued interest in Asian history and Third World history will
become permanent. History in this country is not going to be just the
history of the United States and of Western Europe, as it was for the most
part until the 1950s and 1960s.

**Hildermeier:** I began my studies at a time when historical research
was dominated by political history. To a large degree, this was the history
of great men and absolutely no women. At the same time, though, the
1960s saw the beginning of social history. The twentieth century was still
shaped quite significantly by the work on Germany’s Nazi past, and the
Third Reich was a major field of research in the 1960s. Although I have
been observing the shift to cultural history since the 1980s, I am and have
remained primarily a social historian. I was socialized in this field and
wrote my major works using this approach. If asked to make interna-
tional comparisons, I would not be able to say what the major differences
were. We incorporated things here since the 1970s that perhaps appeared
somewhat earlier in French and Anglo-Saxon historiography. But because
most developments arrived here after a delay of five to ten years, I do not
have the impression that we now lag behind in any way or that there
remain any major differences.

However, there was a significant difference between German and
Soviet-Russian historiography. Russian historiography was not only im-
mensely ideological—something that can almost be disregarded because
we simply ignored it—but methodologically speaking, its orientation was
incredibly empirical, if not to say positivist. Historiography consisted
primarily of facts. And because intellectual freedom was strictly circum-
scribed and experimentation with new research methods was not per-
mitted, innovation consisted of finding more material in the archives and
presenting even more detailed facts. This was rather boring.

Since American research on Russia was so strong, also in terms of
quantity, and because the content and especially the methodology of
Soviet works proved fairly boring, research conducted in the United
States played a very large role for German historians of Eastern Europe.
Moreover, social history was also becoming increasingly popular in the
United States starting in the 1960s.

Certainly in the 1960s and 1970s, German historiography was
strongly focused on itself. German history truly was German history, and
seldom looked beyond its own borders. Then German historians began to
look in the direction of Anglo-Saxon history. After that, they established
a second pillar of research in English and American history, but rarely in
French history. Naturally, the nucleus remained German history. Eastern
European studies developed because of the Cold War. Even though the
Cold War has ended, we still suffer from the repercussions of, as mean

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tongues put it, this strictly political genesis of the field. Yet Eastern European history, which was institutionalized to a greater degree than American history, for example, has always remained far too isolated for my taste. A true convergence with general history did not occur. In my opinion, the main reason this never happened was a simple one, namely the language barrier, rather than methodological reasons. Many people in Eastern European history perceived themselves as regional historians, just as one is a French or Spanish historian, and not as historians who pursue their study through special methodological approaches.

I am a product of my times with regard to my academic socialization. I began as a social historian and probably still think primarily in terms of social history. I am critical of some changes and approaches found in cultural history. I think the danger is great that cultural history could lead to an extraordinary dissolution of the consensus as to what constitutes history. What we are experiencing is in my view a return to subjective experience and to processes of subjective filtering of what was once thought to be halfway objective reality. If we filter everything through subjective experience and place the processes of subjective analysis in the foreground, then the unavoidable result is more subjectivity, individualization, and consequently a diminishment of central perspectives. However, this is probably what the proponents of this approach strive for. They would argue that the discovery of such diversity represents an improvement over the far too homogenized perspective associated with social history. And rightly so, in my opinion. The question is, however, how to reestablish a balance that enables us to pull everything together. That is what I see missing at the moment. I suspect that things will unfold much as they did in social history during the 1970s and 1980s and that the outcome will perhaps be a somewhat different view of core or mainstream problems and areas of historical reality. Unconventional methodological interests will become marginalized. In 1973, Wolfgang Mommsen said in his famous lecture “Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des Historismus” (Historiography beyond Historicism) that social history is most effective where it links classic subjects of political history to social historical approaches. I think this is right, and can be applied analogously to cultural history.

3. How has the historical profession changed in the last thirty years?

McPherson: The rise of social history and the interest in the history of various minorities also reflected the changing nature of the demographics of the constituency of historians. In the United States, 40 percent of history Ph.D.s now are women. That is considerably different from what it
was when I was in graduate school. There is a far greater representation of the various minorities who are becoming historians now than was the case thirty to forty years ago. And so one reason for the focus on the history of various groups in American society has been because more and more historians come from this kind of background.

**Hildermeier:** The significant developments that have taken place here are the increased diversity in personnel and in their respective approaches. A major expansion took place, of course, at the end of the 1960s and particularly at the beginning of the 1970s, as evidenced by the many new universities and the new subdisciplines established at them. Academic life was definitely changed in connection with this expansion. We could perhaps summarize this change by describing it as a greater orientation toward what could be called the “consumers” of education. I think that the consideration of student interests has become much greater than what I experienced during the last period of “classic” academic life in the 1950s. In the older system, research and scholarly interests, that is things not considered part of education in the narrower sense, were much more dominant than has been the case since the 1970s. The diversity in programs of study (Studiengänge) and the incorporation of student interests into academic planning hardly existed previously. So, if I had to name two key developments, I would say the first was the quantitative expansion of the field of history combined with a much greater differentiation than existed previously, and the second was an increased emphasis on teaching rather than research.

4. **What is your organization’s relationship to the practice of history outside the universities, such as public history and the teaching of history in high schools?**

**McPherson:** The AHA has really broadened its sense of what it is doing and what it should be doing. It has changed from focusing primarily on higher education to trying to reach out and embrace a whole range of people who are historians. It has broadened the definition of historian from the professor who gets up in front of a class and writes articles for scholarly journals and books with footnotes to include secondary school teachers, public historians, independent scholars, people in museums and historical societies, and people working in the National Park Service. I think that has been a major development, certainly from the standpoint of the AHA, which over the last couple of decades has had so-called task forces in all of these areas, and now has three divisions within it. There is the professional division and the research division, which focus on the traditional areas of academic historians, but then there is the teaching division, which really tries to reach out to this broader constituency.
There has been a task force on public history, and there have been many sessions at the annual AHA meetings that try to reach out to all of these other constituencies. I think that the broadened inclusiveness of the AHA is a pretty good barometer of the kinds of changes that have been taking place in the profession over the last three or four decades or so.

There have always been historical societies and museums with some kind of historical focus, but I think that these have become much more professionalized. The Park Service has more professionally trained historians on its staff than it did a generation or so ago. So while those institutions have always been there, they have become more professional, more visible and salient in public life. The AHA and other historical associations have been responding to that change, but also consciously trying to be more inclusive in the concept of who is a historian and to whom we should be reaching out.

The AHA is also trying to incorporate teachers of history in secondary schools and two-year colleges into the organization as far as possible. That is what the teaching division, one of the three major divisions within the AHA, is primarily concerned with. This division sponsors all kinds of conferences in various states on the teaching of history at the secondary school or community college level. While there is obviously going to be some focus on curriculum, the focus is primarily on making sure that the teachers at this level are current with the latest historical scholarship and interpretations, that they feel they are part of the profession, sustaining their morale and their sense of identity as historians.

Whenever you get involved with the high school history curriculum there is always going to be a danger of succumbing to public pressure on how history ought to be taught, for example to emphasize patriotism or triumphalism or not to be critical of American institutions as they have evolved over the generations. And I think an organization like the AHA has to be careful not to take sides in controversies like that because it would undermine the organization’s influence and the sense of professional standards.

Hildermeier: Some public historians are represented through the head of regional history associations on the committee, but we do not include museum and other kinds of historians in the Historikerverband, and I do not even know whether they are nationally organized. They have not approached us, and we have never approached them, at least as long as I have been a part of this. The integration of public history takes place for the most part at the university level. Students are being trained not only for academic careers, but internships are being built into programs of study for the purpose of finding jobs for historians in a variety of fields, ranging from the media to professional organizations to museums. We have not yet addressed this issue within the Historikerverband,
and I would not know how to go about it because it is not something that can be regulated centrally. How do we integrate people? Well, the Historikerverband is open to anyone who has anything professionally to do with history broadly defined. A historian who works for a newspaper is welcome, as is someone from a museum. That is not a problem. It is the historians in the museums and in journalism who show little interest in participating in our association. I at least have not witnessed such participation; we are probably too strongly focused on the universities and academia. The Verband der Geschichtslehrer (Association of History Teachers) is a separate organization. The Historikerverband is comprised of university historians who hold positions above the academic level of university students. We do have doctoral candidates if they are regularly employed outside the universities. That is the requirement, the qualification for membership. People who are still studying cannot simply become members.

5. What are the major challenges facing your organization? In what ways does the AHA/Historikerverband address issues of graduate education and the difficult job prospects of younger historians?

McPherson: One of the biggest challenges for the AHA is professional opportunities for young historians, whether they are academic opportunities or other opportunities for either Ph.D.s or M.A.s. The AHA report on graduate education in history that is just about to come out is on Ph.D. training, but the AHA is now embarking on a second project on masters degrees, to be completed in two years. Regarding Ph.D. training: Here are people who spend five or six years and a lot of money to become highly trained professional historians. What is their career going to be like after that? How can we prepare them for that career? If they are going into teaching, how can we prepare them to be better teachers? That is another challenge. Ph.D. training focuses on research, but everybody complains that Ph.D.s come out without knowing very much about how to teach.

One of the problems is that those of us at research universities basically try to clone ourselves in our graduate students, and if somehow these students do not get a good job—at least at a good four-year college or university—then somehow we believe they have failed. This report by the AHA is an effort to begin to change that culture.

If you look at the data on the number of history Ph.D.s produced in the United States, it peaked in the early 1970s, and only now is again approaching that peak. The first crisis actually happened in the 1970s, and the biggest cutbacks in graduate admissions, and therefore a few years later in the number of Ph.D.s, did in fact occur then. There have
been fluctuations since then, but in 1989 the Mellon Foundation came out
with a report that there would be a shortage of the supply of new Ph.D.s
in the humanities and social sciences by the mid-1990s because of retire-
ments of the generation that came into the profession in the 1960s. This
report was produced by economists, and it turned out to be wrong,
because it did not take into account the cutbacks because of the recession
in the early 1990s. So graduate schools in history and in other disciplines
increased admissions in the early 1990s partly as a consequence of that
report, and the number of people who were then coming out in the
mid-1990s looking for jobs increased. But the number of jobs had shrunk
because of the cutbacks in the early 1990s as a result of the recession.

I think the same thing may be occurring again now. There is always
a two- to three-year lag between an economic recession in this country
and the cutbacks, mostly at the state universities, and we are seeing that
happening right now. So over the long term, I think the profession, the
AHA and other professional organizations, and graduate programs need
to avoid the temptation to increase the number of students in response to
things like the Mellon report until the trends become a little bit clearer. So
on the supply end, I think that graduate programs need to be responsible.
On the demand end, I am not sure what can be done. One of the things
in which the AHA has been increasingly involved in recent years is called
advocacy. This is a genteeel term for lobbying. The main offices of the
AHA are here in Washington. And one of the paid staff of the AHA is the
head of something called the National Coalition for History. Bruce Craig
is his name, and then there is Arnita Jones, who is the executive secretary
of the AHA. They spend a lot of their time on the Hill, talking to con-
gressmen. There is a close relationship with Robert Byrd, who has been
the champion in Congress appropriating money for improving high
school history programs, for example, and for more appropriations for
the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) and for the National
Historical Publications Commission. This commission gives money to
projects like the Thomas Jefferson papers, the Benjamin Franklin papers,
and the Woodrow Wilson papers. And the NEH of course funds a lot of
historical programs. So one of the things that the AHA has done and can
do is to advocate public support of history in Congress. Then of course at
the state level, all states have state humanities foundations, so members
of the AHA and especially members of the council and professional and
research divisions in the AHA who live in many different states can get
involved there.

The AHA has also tried to address the working conditions of adjunct
professors. The AHA is not an accrediting organization and so we cannot
say to college B or university C that we deny you accreditation because
you do not treat your adjunct faculty well, or you have too many adjunct

faculty in relationship to your full-time tenure track faculty. But we can
publicize what we call “best practices” in various levels of historical
practice. Adjunct teaching is one example of that, and two years ago, the
AHA and the Organization of American Historians formed a joint com-
mittee on adjunct and part-time employment in colleges, and just this
past spring, both organizations adopted a resolution spelling out best
practices or standards that we hope universities and colleges that use
adjunct faculty can measure up to in terms of salary, working conditions,
fringe benefits, and so on. The most the AHA can do is to publicize
standards that we would like to see institutions measure up to in what
they do about history, whether it is education in a university setting or
education in the setting of a museum or of a public facility of some kind.

Hildermeier: Our central task and the main focus of activity of the
committee is the organization of the Historikertag, the biennial history
congress. Our funds are basically an emergency fund from which to pay
for the Historikertag ourselves should no other sources of financial sup-
port be found. Nowadays such an event costs between €300,000 and
€350,000. This has become a mass event with 3,000 to 3,500 people atten-
ting. We might say the Historikertag is the classic function for an
academic, professional organization in the sense that it represents and
documents as much as possible that which is occurring in the entire field,
from ancient history to Eastern European history. This is the main pur-
pose of our activity.

However, I also see that there is an increasing need to engage in
lobbying. This will require another type of structure, specifically a thor-
oughly different type of attitude, in short “professionalization.” How
much energy we should put into this is something about which I myself
am unsure, particularly since we have the problem that we are a national
organization, but policy in this field is primarily made by the states
(Länder), and it is not so easy to coordinate the two.

Naturally, we wish publicly to represent the field of history as a
professional organization, especially when it comes to legislative propos-
als like those introduced in recent years, including the rule limiting tem-
porary university positions to twelve years. And we have done this al-
ready. We write letters, and our letters are usually answered, but our
influence is very limited. We do not have mass support—we are not a
trade union and we actually see ourselves not as a lobby but as a pro-
fessional organization that represents historians’ interests in a broad
sense.

The pressure to adopt American programs of study is creating a new
set of problems for German higher education. The German and American
systems are not comparable, and that will perhaps never be completely
understood by Edelgard Bulmahn, the Minister of Education and Re-
search, and others. You cannot simply import and transplant certain aspects; you must also transplant the entire foundation of the system. Now we have junior professorships, which are emulations of assistant professorships, but normally junior professors will not be granted tenure because this would be too expensive. This does not make sense. The junior professors are swamped with many more responsibilities and lose the protection of the 50 percent research time that they had as holders of C1 positions; they are qualified to apply for funding through the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Foundation) and other foundations, but are also compelled to do so; and they must take part in all examinations and participate in academic self-administration, which can be very time-consuming. Then, as a “thank you” for the job they have done, they will be dismissed after six years. There is a consensus within the executive committee of the Historikerverband, including the two representatives of younger historians, that the adoption of these measures is neither fish nor fowl, particularly if the aim is to guarantee scholars prospects for the future and security at an earlier age. It is necessary to take it one step further and to create tenure-track positions. Otherwise, all we have actually done is continue the limited-term positions while simultaneously piling more responsibilities on those who are only appointed for six years.

If B.A. and M.A. programs are going to be created out of Magister without truly revamping the programs as is being proposed throughout the Länder, then this is often nothing more than false labeling, and cannot work. And if this becomes the case in all of the Länder, then we will take a position on it. It remains to be seen how successful we would be in coming up with a position that enjoys unanimous support because, of course, we are not all necessarily of the same opinion. In light of this difficulty, we have been careful to withhold commentary so far, though I am not sure that will be possible for much longer. If not, it would mean distancing ourselves significantly from the current self-image and function of an academic professional organization. At the moment, everything is open and not at all simple.

With regard to the gathering of statistical data on the emerging generation of scholars, we have not progressed beyond the maintenance of an old card file of Privatdozenten (scholars who have passed the Habilitation) because we have seen that it does not work on a centralized, nationwide level. We have very few opportunities to make an impact as is, and would have no such opportunity within the Länder, I think, because this is the responsibility of each university. So, one cannot influence the opportunities for young scholars at all at such a level. We have been able to achieve something by way of a simple survey. Young historians proposed it at the Historikertag held in Aachen, and the proposal was gladly taken
up. We financed a survey, which found that job market chances vary considerably among the different historical fields. We knew that already, but it is nice to have this empirically documented. For example, for every Privatdozent, there are so and so many positions. For nineteenth- and twentieth-century historians, the situation looks rather bleak. It seems the more marginal the field, such as Eastern European history, the more favorable the chances of finding a job. We have not taken the initiative to do more than this survey; quite honestly, we did not know what we should do. It makes no sense to write letters to the responsible Ministers for Education and Science of the Länder. One would have to be represented in the universities, in the senates, in the really decisive planning and budgetary commissions of the universities. This is where it is possible to shape policy if one has not already done this at the party or government level.

This is also a problem of resources because all of this means additional voluntary work. We have a hard time finding people who will commit themselves to such work. The Historikerverband has no permanent positions, only part-time jobs to assist the chair, the treasurer, and the secretary. I have no idea how we could finance increased services on a permanent basis with our resources. But I do not think that it would work. To assume all of these functions, we would need a central office. But such an office would then eat up our budget.

What it boils down to is that we must make a decision. Do we wish to remain a professional organization that works to make the public aware of the problems facing academic history and historians and that sponsors the Historikertag as a showcase for what historians do? Or do we want to undertake a major effort to professionalize this organization for the purpose of doing more and more lobbying? This is an open question.

6. What role should the AHA/Historikerverband and individual historians play in politics and society?

McPherson: When there is a major issue that might involve historians, the president of the AHA or other historians who might be prominent in the AHA are sometimes called on by the media for comment. When that happens, other presidents and I have made it clear that even though we might at the moment be president of the AHA, we do not feel that we can speak for the AHA. It is an organization of 14,000 members with a whole range of viewpoints, so that what speaks for the AHA I think are decisions by the council or by the membership at its annual meeting. This rarely happens; few members attend the business meetings of the AHA, so it is really the council that may pass a resolution on some public issue.
and get it publicized. But for the most part the professional associations like the AHA are very chary of stepping into public controversies.

My president’s column in the September 2003 issue of the AHA *Perspectives* was a critique of the Bush administration’s policy. The handle I used there was Condoleezza Rice’s comment about revisionist history. But I got a lot of flak for doing that. In the October 2003 issue you can see three letters from members of the AHA saying in effect that the president of the AHA ought not to be out there writing an op-ed piece like Paul Krugman or William Safire. I responded in the November 2003 issue saying that I do not see these columns as speaking for the AHA, they are speaking for me. So I think it is a ticklish issue about the degree to which a professional association ought to get officially involved in public issues that are not directly connected with professional standards for historians.

Where there is clearly a professional issue, such as making historical records available for qualified researchers, the AHA has been very active. We have for instance joined with the National Coalition for History and with several other organizations as parties to a lawsuit to try to get the administration to change its declassification policy.

As far as individual historians are concerned, I think that historians do have a responsibility to try to be public intellectuals. We historians presumably have a field of expertise that often has relevance to public issues in the country. I think historians have a responsibility to speak out on those issues, even if two historians will articulate diametrically opposed positions. The reason this does not happen more may not be so much a reluctance on the part of historians themselves to speak out as it is a reluctance on the part of the media to call on or accept historians. Americans probably have less of a historical consciousness than Europeans. We are more oriented toward the present and the future, the immediate rather than the long-term.

**Hildermeier:** We do make an effort to be a part of all public discussions that affect the historical profession. We do this less by constantly writing the Ministers of Education and Science and more by writing letters to the press. I consider this very important, and the events of the past two years prove my point. In his capacity as a member of the Wissenschaftsrat, Ulrich Herbert set off a debate in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* regarding the twelve-year limit. Subsequently, we took a position. I wrote something and so did others. As this example illustrates, this debate was conducted almost exclusively by historians. I think we have to intensify this effort. These are issues of scientific and academic policy. With regard to general societal issues, we cannot speak with a singular voice and certainly not in the name of the association.

I think academic life, including the humanities—at least the field of history—still enjoys a much greater measure of prestige and social stand-
ing in Germany than it does in the United States, which has always been much more strongly commercialized. In Germany we still find traces of a culture deriving from nineteenth-century bourgeois society. This is, so to speak, the ZEIT readership of the 1960s and 1970s: people interested in taking part in public debate and in shaping public opinion. This is comparable to France, where this element is even more obvious, where this intellectual culture, the *hommes-de-lettres* culture, still thrives. Here the deviant case is the United States, which was very commercially oriented from the beginning.
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STERN PRIZE

ACTING CZECH, MARKING GERMANS: NATIONALITY POLITICS IN BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA, 1939–1947

Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize Presentation, November 21, 2003

Chad Bryant
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

In the first weeks of 1941, Heinrich Toušek, a retired railway worker from Brno, sent a letter to the leading Nazi official in Prague asking for help. Beautifully written in green ink, and addressed to “Your Excellency Sir Reich Protector,” the letter was a simple request to allow Toušek and his wife to move from their home in Brno to their small house with a garden in Znojmo. The request had to be made because Znojmo lay in the Sudetengau, an administrative area integrated into the Reich after the Munich agreement, and Brno lay within the Protectorate, a separately administered area consisting of the “rest of the Czechlands” in which the Reich Protector had jurisdiction. Toušek gave financial reasons for wanting to move. It was expensive to live in Brno, he wrote, and part of his pension had been stripped. Writing in the third person, Toušek complained that “these people have saved every little Groschen so that they in their last days can have a home which they themselves have built, and now, blameless, thanks to the intrigues of the Czech government, must wander around without shelter.” Now he was appealing to a “German” government, and Toušek made sure to point out that both he and his wife spoke German at home; his wife did not even know Czech, he wrote.

Nazi bureaucrats in Prague promised to look into the matter and sent a letter to the local head administrator of the Brno region, Oberlandrat Westerkamp. Westerkamp complicated the picture painted by Toušek. Toušek, indeed, was of “German origin,” spoke German in his daily life, and had even lived in Znojmo until 1938. But he had been a member of a Czech club for construction workers and was a secretary for the Czech youth group. Worse, all three of his children had been raised as “Czechs.” After some prodding from the central office in Prague, Toušek later admitted that one daughter was married to a Czech bureaucrat in Brno and that a son had become a Czech teacher, who now lived in Jihlava.
Westerkamp suggested that the offer be declined, “although I in every respect greet the withdrawal of members of the Czech nation from the city of Brno,” he wrote. The central office declined Toušek’s request, and we can assume that this German (or Czech?) remained in Brno.¹

Toušek’s case serves as a reminder that many people of indeterminate nationality inhabited the Bohemian crownlands before 1947, and that individuals—called “amphibians” by Nazi anthropologists and nineteenth-century Bohemian citizens—often claimed to be one nationality or another according to situation.² Writers as disparate as post-war German expellees and the pre-war Social Democrat Emanuel Rádl noted that tens of thousands of supposed Germans began to identify themselves as Czechs after the establishment of Czechoslovakia.³ During the occupation, an estimated three hundred thousand so-called Czechs, about 2 percent of the Bohemian crownland’s supposed Czech population, registered as German citizens.⁴ These amphibians often lived in places where bilingualism was common—in towns along the ever-shifting Czech-German language border and in so-called German language islands surrounded by a sea of Czech-speakers.

Amphibians confused and frustrated Nazi officials in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, a legal area carved from the former Czechoslovakia six months after the October 1938 Munich agreement.⁵ Seven million people, the majority of whom were Czechs, inhabited the Protectorate’s forty-nine thousand square kilometer territory, a remnant of the First Republic stripped of its mostly German-speaking areas and Slovakia.⁶ In the Protectorate, Nazi officials like Westerkamp faced a simple, yet befuddling, set of questions: What made, or could make, a person German, and who had the power to decide the matter? These questions became even more pressing, and complicated, once Protectorate leaders decided to make Bohemia and Moravia entirely German, which entailed expelling half the Czech population and “Germanizing” the rest. From here we might ask our own set of questions. How was nationality defined, expressed, and marked on the individual in Bohemia and Moravia before, during, and after the occupation? We find that nationality, once something acted out in public, had by 1941 become a label assigned by the state. The Nazi regime changed the rules of the game and transformed the character of face-to-face interactions, the individual’s relationship to the state, and the very meaning of “Czechness” or “Germanness.” Ultimately, Czechoslovak officials decided what made a German, sealing the fates of millions.

One way in which people expressed “Germanness” or “Czechness” in public before 1939 was by speaking, reading, and writing a certain language. For both Toušek and Westerkamp, language usage was key; even Westerkamp admitted Toušek’s language of everyday usage was
German, one reason why he might have had “German origins.” Language difference had separated German- and Czech-speakers since the former’s large-scale emigration to Bohemia in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, but it was in the early nineteenth century that Czech “national awakeners” associated language usage with membership in the nation. Early patriots wrote dictionaries and grammars that standardized the language; actors performed Czech plays and literary lights wrote in Czech. Lesser known patriots published Czech-language cookbooks, songbooks, calendars, and newspapers. Later in the century, marking a certain “language of everyday use” during census counts associated the individual with the Czech or German nation, as did reading certain newspapers and eventually seeing German- or Czech-language films. Sending one’s children to a Czech- or German-language school, or as in the case of Toušek’s son, working as a teacher in one of these schools, also constituted an expression of national loyalty. Language usage in the bureaucracy became one of the most heated political issues in the decades before the First World War; in times of heated nationalist rivalries, speaking a language on the street placed individuals in one of two mutually hostile camps.

Toušek’s story also hints at some of the structures and imagined spaces within which Czechs and Germans acted nationally before the occupation—clubs like the Czech club for construction workers and a Czech youth group. A civil society, which Valerie Bunce describes as a “legally protected freedom of associational life, with associations understood to be independent of the state and to exist in the space between the family and the state,” had begun to flower in the Bohemian crownlands in the 1860s. German and Czech patriots established gymnastics clubs, which counted 1.4 million members by 1936—more than one-tenth of Czechoslovakia’s interwar population. Other clubs worked to build schools, protect business interests, organize boycotts, lead patriotic marches, and erect public monuments and buildings. Local archives are filled with records of other seemingly apolitical, yet nationally organized, clubs—from the German Lovers of the Alps to Czech reading circles. By the mid-1890s in Bohemia and 1905 in Moravia, diverse Czech and German political parties had begun to form, and these new, locally influential political parties entered and transformed the field of civil society. As in most European countries, nearly all clubs, associations, and media in Bohemia and Moravia were somehow associated with a certain political camp. Yet while questions of nationality had become politicized, the Habsburg and Czechoslovak states, for the most part, set the rules of the game and played the role of referee. Nationality, legally speaking, was a choice. For many living in bilingual towns, where marches and economic pressures tended to pull fence-sitters to one side or another, nationality was a daily decision.
Remarkably, in the spring and summer months of 1939, Nazi authorities did little to prevent public displays of Czechness. Czech patriots would later recall the first months of occupation as a unique moment when co-nationals came together and “protected the nation.” Opera classics by Smetana and Dvořák played to packed halls during Prague’s “musical May” festival. In June, Nazi authorities had to issue a decree forbidding people from singing national songs in restaurants, wine bars, and other public spaces. Bookstores reprinted classic Czech texts, and for every Protectorate inhabitant, 1.3 books rolled off publishers’ presses in the first year of the occupation. Organizations like the Czech Aviation Club and the Czech National Auto Club continued to convene. Czech gymnastics clubs and members of the Catholic Church played a large role in organizing marches and gatherings. An estimated eighty thousand people met for a celebration of Czech mothers in Ostrava, and nearly ninety thousand people participated in a pilgrimage that ended near Terezín, the future site of the Protectorate’s only concentration camp. Members of underground organizations drew upon strategies learned during the nineteenth century to organize boycotts and publish illegally. Getting individuals to remember their ties to the nation and to “act nationally” was their primary goal. Only when the war began did they concentrate on gathering military intelligence for allies, sabotage, and armed violence.

Nazi citizenship laws in the Protectorate, too, provided many people with a choice among nationalities. To become a Reich German citizen, Protectorate inhabitants had to register with local state agencies, which approved the vast majority of applications. Only pre-1938 Sudeten German Party members automatically became Reich German citizens; Jews as defined by the Nuremberg laws were excluded from the German legal community.

By the end of 1940, Nazi officials had not only decided to change the rules, but also to dictate play. After Germany invaded Poland, the Gestapo immediately arrested thousands of intellectuals, priests, Communists, Social Democrats, and others. The arrests continued through the end of the year, netting public figures and key members of legal and underground organizations. By the end of 1942, nearly all resistance groups had been infiltrated, their members arrested, and their activities stopped. In 1939, Nazi leaders had either undone or harnessed for their own purposes associations that had been part of German civil and political society before the occupation. Czech universities were closed, and by the end of 1942, Nazi police had forcibly disbanded most Czech organizations and, in the case of the Czech Sokol gymnastics club, arrested their leaders. By 1943, their resistance movements devastated and shows of public opposition often leading directly to arrest and possible execution, Czechoslovak loyalists transmitting messages to their exiled leaders.
in London could only point to jokes, rumors, and language usage to assure the government-in-exile that national sentiment and patriotism still existed. In a way, the history of acting nationally had come full circle—language usage had once again become the primary, indeed the only, means by which individuals expressed their association with the Czech nation.

Meanwhile, as in Alsace, Lorraine, incorporated Poland, Luxemburg, and, later, parts of Slovenia, Protectorate leaders had decided to make the Protectorate lands and their people entirely “German.” Influenced by economic necessity, demographic realities, and ideological correctness, SS leaders and other Nazi officials in the Reich Protector’s office drew up plans to create a society of productive, efficient, and obedient Germans possessing the same racial composition and the same world view. Planners estimated that 3.5 million Czechs were to be expelled, while another 3.5 million were to become Germans. Hitler gave his approval to the plans in October 1940. Translating policy and vague dreams into reality would prove difficult, however. Various branches of the SS, the Nazi party, and administrative structures battled for the right to determine and mark current and potential Germans. And the question “What makes a German?” never received a definitive answer. In fact, as the occupation dragged on, definitions of Germanness became increasingly confused and contradictory.

“Race” would seem to have been the most logical marker, but it proved unreliable. In a report commissioned by Reichsprotektor Reinhard Heydrich in 1940, SS anthropologist Hans Joachim-Beyer found that local Czechs had, on average, more “German” racial characteristics than local Sudeten Germans. In fact, race was only one of many criteria upon which racial experts and others based their judgments. And when officials did measure so-called racial characteristics, they often looked at things other than physiognomy. As an SS official within the Reich Protector’s office wrote in November 1940, racially valueless Czechs could be seen by their “markedly disorderly and careless family life, demonstrating a complete lack of feeling for order, for personal and domestic cleanliness, and of any ambition to advance oneself.” Writing to Heydrich in January 1942, Oberlandrat von Watter of Prague claimed to see only “partial traces of German blood” among German citizens who failed to reproduce themselves, or among those who maintained contact with Czech friends. Many local Germans said that Czechs would never truly assimilate; “Germanness” came from a spiritual feeling of belonging that Czechs would never embrace. Others argued that the best potential Germans were the most fanatic Czech patriots—people who displayed the “fighting spirit,” health, vigor, leadership, and military characteristics lauded by SS leaders. Acting Reich Protector Reinhard Heydrich stated
that Czech Minister of Justice Jaroslav Krejčí’s “beautiful blue eyes” betrayed a suppressed German background, despite the latter’s carefully patriotic speeches and subtle attempts at administrative sabotage.  

These inconsistencies and ambiguities aside, the marking of individuals had been gaining momentum by the spring of 1942. In March 1942, Berlin extended its law requiring Kennkarten (identity cards) to the Protectorate, Alsace, Lorraine, and Luxemburg. By the end of the month, a Protectorate decree demanded that all eight-year-olds apply for cards at local offices, where they would be subjected to racial screening. Plans were made to test all seventeen- to eighteen-year-old Czech males as they were called up for mandatory work duty. Also in May, experts from the Race and Settlement office spread out across the Protectorate with five X-ray machines. Heydrich’s assassination in 1942 slowed the process of testing, registering, and marking potential Germans. Wehrmacht defeats at Stalingrad and El Alamein ended them for good; thereafter, priority lay with winning the war. “Germanizable” young Czech men were still marked and sent to work duty in the Reich. The children of Lidice, a town wiped out in retribution for Heydrich’s assassination, were tested and placed in German homes. Still, relatively few gentle Czechs became victims of Nazi attempts to make the Protectorate German. (Many inhabitants of Poland, Slovenia, Alsace, Lorraine, and Luxemburg who counted among the 30 million Europeans transplanted from homes from 1939 to 1943 were less fortunate.) Yet in the Protectorate, the rules had changed. Now it was left to the post-war Czechoslovak government to answer the question “What is a German?”

At first, mobs, many of them led by Czechoslovak partisans and provoked by Soviet troops, marked, killed, or drove away thousands of so-called Germans in the “wild transfer” immediately following liberation in 1945. Later that summer, the Great Powers approved Czechoslovakia’s request to undertake an “organized transfer” of Germans from the country. Germans wore special armbands marked with an “N” for “Němec,” the Czech word for “German.” These individuals were rounded up, placed into camps, and eventually put on trains headed west. Using vague criteria designed by the Ministry of the Interior, court judges appointed by the country’s 162 newly established national committees looked at associational and party membership, census responses, language usage, Nazi citizenship, behavior during the occupation, and supposed heritage, among other things, to mark nationality on individuals whose nationality was still in question. The decisions were inconsistent, but they were permanent. When police forced the last of Czechoslovakia’s three million Germans onto trains to the west in 1947, the final round in an old game had been played out. The lands that now constitute the Czech Republic had become almost entirely “Czech.” Choice among
nationalities no longer existed; a rivalry that had infused energy into a dynamic civil society ended. Nationality was no longer something expressed in public, but was now a label that the state affixed on the individual. The meaning of what it meant to be Czech or German had been changed forever.

Notes

1 Gruppe III 4 to Gruppe I 1, 12 Feb. 1941, Státní ústřední archiv, Prague (Hereafter SÚA), Úrad Ríšského Protektora (hereafter URP) sign. I-1b 2200, 1940–1944. 


3 Bundesarchiv Bayreuth, Ost-Dok 20, Hans Kaiser, p. 5; Emanuel Rädle, Václav Čechů a Němci (Prague: Melantrich, 1993), 213.


6 Brandes, Tschechen I, 160.


10 Statistická příručka Československé Republiky (London: Československé ministerstvo zahraničních věcí, informační oddělení, 194–7), 156–7; on the largest of these clubs, the Czech Sokol gymnastics organization, see Claire Nolte, The Sokol in the Czech Lands to 1914: Training for the Nation (New York: Palgrave, 2002).

12 “Citoyen,” “Poměry v Čechách a na Moravě od německé okupace do počátku června 1939,” 11 June 1939, Vojenský historický archiv, Prague (hereafter VHA, fond 37, 91/1, I. díl, 24; Mastny, 64; Jan Gebhart and Jan Kuklík, Dramatické i všední dny protéktorátu (Prague: Themis, 1996), 13.


14 “Die politische Entwicklung im Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren seit 15 März 1939,” SD report 15 March 1940, 24–36; Brandes, 1, 82.


17 Inž. Šáprera, “Zpráva z domova,” 2 Sept. 1944, VHA, fond 37, sig. 91/7, 2; Albert Kaufmann, “Zpráva z domova,” 22 Apr. 1943, VHA, fond 37, sig. 91/6, 1; [Anonymous informant], “Spojencký nálet na Most a zprávy z domova,” 5 June 1944, VHA, fond 37, sig. 91/7, 2; Oskar Krejčí, Země ústupu, 1939–1945 (Prague: Gustav Peter, 1945); Aleš Dubovský, Kroměříž ve štítu lákavého klíče (Kroměříž: Muzeum kroměřížská, 1995), 127.

18 For a pan-European view of Nazi racial politics and, specifically, the role of the Race and Resettlement Office’s racial experts, see Isabel Heinemann, “Rasse, Siedlung, Blut.” Das Rasse- & Siedlungshauptamt der SS und die Rassenpolitische Neuordnung Europas (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2003).


21 Mastny, 130.


23 Kárný and Milotová, 34.


25 Kárný and Milotová, doc. 79, 257, 252.


27 A Czech-German historical commission recently estimated that between 19,000 and 30,000 people died during the “wild transfers” of 1945. Approximately 6,000 died due to acts of violence and 5,000 committed suicide. Iva Weidenhofferová, ed., Konfliktivé společen-

On the national committees and their role in the determination of nationality after the war, see Benjamin Frommer, “National Purification: Retribution against Nazi Collaborators in Postwar Czechoslovakia” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1999).

According to census results from 1950, Czechs made up almost 94 percent of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia’s population. Statistická ročenka Republiky československé (Prague: Orbis, 1957), 42. Little has changed in the last fifty years. During the March 2001 census, 94 percent of the Czech Republic’s more than ten million citizens declared themselves to be “český” (which doubles as both “Czech” and “Bohemian” in the Czech language), Moravian, or Silesian. The next largest nationality group consisted of Slovaks, with 193,190 people. Less than 40,000 citizens counted themselves as Germans. See the Czech Statistical Office’s tables on nationality counts at http://www.czso.cz/cs/ediciplan.nsf/p/4114-03. For a description of the preliminary 2001 census results, which differed only slightly from those published on the Statistical Office’s website, see Radio Prague’s project report “Minorities in the Czech Republic” at www.radio.cz/en/article/26138.
My dissertation is a history of Catholic reading practices in the Rhineland
and Westphalia from the beginnings of popular literacy in the Napoleonic
era to the onset of the First World War. I came to this study because I was
excited about new theoretical approaches to “book history,” which at-
ttempt to describe not only what people read, but how and why they read,
and the values that they invested in the act of reading.1 I also came to this
study because conclusions about Catholic reading culture during the
“long nineteenth century” seemed to rest more on assumptions than
research. The Catholic press specialized in religious news, devotional
tracts, and moralistic literature. And because Catholics socialized in the
“ultramontane milieu” must have obeyed the cultural guidance of their
priests, who opposed the spread of modern ideas in their parishes, histor-
ians have concluded that Catholics read this confessional literature
exclusively. Reinhard Wittmann, for example, writes that from the 1850s
to 1914, Catholics in both urban and rural areas read mainly “naive”
religious literature, a conclusion for which he cites no evidence.2 More
recently, Olaf Blaschke observes that in Imperial Germany, lower-class
Catholics restricted themselves to anti-modern devotional books. He pro-
vides no research to support this claim beyond some publishing data and
his own belief that since priests dominated the cultural behavior of their
parishioners, they must have determined reading habits.3

This picture of popular reading practices seemed incomplete to me.
Lower-class Catholics must have consumed a great volume and variety
of religious literature; the book market catering to their spiritual needs was
indeed enormous.4 And yet theorists of reading behavior caution against
relying upon publishing data as a foundation for studies of cultural con-
sumption.5 These data tell us only what Catholics likely purchased from
their own confessional sources, not what they obtained from non-
Catholic neighbors, public libraries, bookstores, auctions, fairs, hawkers,
clubs, military barracks, tradesmen’s groups, professional associations,
women’s sodalities, relatives at Christmastime, even factory collections,
which developed rapidly in industrial areas. And if these sources
broaden our understanding of what Catholics read, we still do not know why they read what they chose to read, the location, manner, and rhythms of their reading, the social ambitions that shaped their patterns of book consumption and display, or the fears, prejudices, and ideological commitments that informed their engagement with the most dynamic print culture in Europe. My doctoral advisor, Roger Chickering, and I concluded that a study of Catholic reading practices might make a helpful contribution to German cultural history. By attending to changes in these practices over time and in investigating the social and cultural contexts of private reading on the popular level, the study might challenge basic features of the master narrative that structures histories of the Catholic “milieu.” It might also shed new light on the vexed question of Catholics’ integration into German society and contribute new information on their attitudes toward the German nation.

The sources I have just described, and others, including clerical reports on intellectual discipline, letters from Catholics to their bishops asking for permission to read forbidden literature, accounts of home libraries, and records of confessional book associations, expand and sharpen the contours of Catholic literary life significantly. Historians are right to this extent: lower-class Catholics read religious literature. This included spiritual tracts, lives of saints, Marian devotionals, prayer cards, sodality readers, pious stories of every kind, and church histories that condemned the Reformation and what one critic termed the “half-true, half-false ideas of the Enlightenment.” Such literature facilitated private devotion in a now literate church. It also played a vital role in the formation of the Catholic minority’s religious culture, marking conceptual boundaries against Protestants, Jews, and secular liberals and emphasizing Catholic distinctiveness and strength in corporate unity.

Yet it would be a mistake to conclude too much from this literature. From the moment they became literate, it was clear that religion did not control Catholics’ reading practices. In both rural and urban areas they read religious literature, but they also read astrology, sawbones medicine, irreverent social commentary, Nostradamus-like forecasting, and tip sheets on how to win the lottery or divine dreams. They took up such material in hospitals, train depots, and work stations, purchased it from itinerant peddlers, or, in one of the surprises of this study, received it from their Protestant neighbors in mixed confessional communities, which abounded in the region.

Lax reading discipline in the Vormärz, in fact, justified the bishops’ attempt to impose an exclusive regime of pious books at mid-century. Their vanguard institution was the Association of Saint Chares Borromeo, or Borromäusverein, which was founded in Bonn in 1844. The Borromäusverein was supposed to replace the increasing volume of “dirty
and trashy literature” in Catholic communities with “good” religious texts and moralistic fiction. To this end, it distributed catalogues of suitable books from which members made choices and stocked reading rooms as cultural resources in parishes. The organization, at least in its first three decades, was relatively successful. By 1846, ninety-six chapters with almost ten thousand members had been established. Fifteen years later, in 1861, there were 989 libraries in over twenty Catholic dioceses in Germany, with the largest and most vibrant located in the region’s sees of Cologne, Trier, Münster and Paderborn. The Borromäusverein’s approach to popular reading had struck a chord among the lower-class laity. These readers wanted religious books, certainly to nourish their spirituality, but also to define their identity against Protestant liberals, who in the era of national unification thundered against popular Catholic culture as a critical impediment to overcoming regional, confessional, and class differences on the basis of shared symbolic texts, aesthetic tastes, and literary Kultur.8

But Catholics continued to hunger for more than pious books. To the chagrin of the bishops, who inveighed repeatedly against the consumption of forbidden literature, reading discipline after national unification was even more relaxed. The average Catholic reader, like the average German, took advantage of an ever-expanding press by indulging in large quantities of colportage literature, in direct contravention of the book rules of their church: secular calendars, serialized stories of love and adventure, tracts on the occult, songsheets complete with “suggestive pictures,” and ubiquitous daily newspapers, which threatened the Catholic effort in dailies begun during the Kulturkampf.9 Dime novels were popular as well, especially the so-called “behind the stairs novels,” or Hintertreppenromane, whose themes of social democracy, violence, suicide, and easy morals provided grist for so many ethical mills after 1900. Some of the books found in the hands of male Catholics caught in flagrante by their priests included Death on the Island of Love, The Pirates of the Spree, Poison and Dynamite, The Prince’s Beloved, The Beautiful Nihilist and, more attractive still, The Beautiful Woman of the Harem.10

If they read for religion, then, Catholics also always read for entertainment. These preferences located them firmly in the mainstream of the German Alltag. As one observer of book lending in non-Catholic libraries remarked in 1902, German readers most often went for “an interesting crime novel,” a “story about robbers,” or they “demanded a racy novel either from high society or from the demimonde.”11 Goethe and Schiller, apparently, were not the only German authors. Nor were the content and habits of popular culture the only forces that shaped lower-class reading behavior. Catholics in the German Empire lived in a punishing regime of discrimination. Protestant liberals reminded them repeatedly that their
outmoded religion, their apparent unwillingness to recognize the epistemic privilege of *Wissenschaft*, and their humble social condition left them culturally incompetent and intellectually unfurnished for national participation. And it was according to this nexus of faith, knowledge, and respectability that Catholics were excluded from public institutions and denied the status they craved as authentic Germans. A number of studies by Thomas Mergel, Martin Baumeister and, most recently, Michael Gross, to say nothing of the pioneering work done by David Blackbourn, document the efforts of bourgeois Catholics to overcome their alleged *Bildungsdefizit* and establish a place for themselves in the national community. This discourse of assimilation reached beyond their circles. Lower-class Catholics, too, explicitly asked for and obtained books that would demonstrate their suitability for full participation in the life of the Empire, not least because so many of them, like Germans on the margins of the economy generally, feared descent into the ranks of the laboring and wretched poor.

Showcasing one’s regard for books as a strategy for social leveling—making public goods one’s private possessions—implied the development of tastes approved by the dominant elites. Books reflecting these tastes found their way into Catholic homes. Such books included histories that established Germany’s national superiority, popular scientific readers, and canonical literature. Because the consumption—or at least display—of these texts was a requirement for inclusion in the culture, their purchase by Catholics was an attempt to accumulate cultural capital for negotiating social acceptance.

And lower-class Catholic readers, like their bourgeois coreligionists, were unwilling to allow the church’s reading restrictions to stand in the way of their social mobility. They routinely ignored the Index of Forbidden Books, for example, or petitioned for dispensations from its rules. Maria Höfener, a science instructor at a middle school in Essen, wrote in 1910 that it was “useful, perhaps even downright necessary, to read books that are forbidden by the Index,” especially when studying for promotional exams. Indeed, the hope of avoiding the social stigma of ignorance was a powerful inducement for seeking a dispensation. One petitioner felt that he simply had to read modern novels, because “association with believers of a different kind” had become “indispensable.” This association, he observed, depended upon his freedom from the embarrassment that attached to cultural illiteracy. Some writers were more expressive. In April 1908, a petitioner from Aachen wrote:

> Herewith I would like to request most courteously and with all respect in the name of God to be released from reading restrictions and be granted general reading freedom. As I have a lively
interest in art, literature, and philosophy, I would therefore like to ask Your Reverence most submissively for a free hand to study the works in question, so that I can properly inform myself about modern artists, literati, and philosophers, . . . speak about them in secular society, and distinguish between their pros and contras. I am a businessman, twenty-three and a half years old, from the best family, Roman Catholic born, and as educated as possible for my age. Since I do not wish to remain in my current state of education . . . once again I ask [for permission to read forbidden books].

Diocesan offices were so overwhelmed by the volume of such correspondence that in August 1906, every bishop in Germany endorsed a letter to the Holy See citing the “wish stemming namely from lay circles for expanded permission to read forbidden books,” and asking that parish priests be permitted to exercise the “full power dispensandi ad legendum libros prohibitos.” The negotiation of faith, knowledge, and respectability through book consumption and display had become one of the most pressing pastoral dilemmas of the Imperial era.

Which brings us back to the Borromäusverein. By 1890, the organization had withered on the vine. From 1870 to 1890, only fifty-eight new chapters had been founded in all Germany, less than three per annum. Over the same period, membership had dropped from 54,013 to 49,071, or 9.1 percent. Catholics now wanted little to do with the bishops’ exclusive regime of pious books. They repeatedly requested that the Borromäusverein respond to their updated reading preferences, but the organization balked. Unable to locate in their confessional libraries the reading material that satisfied their desires for entertainment, increased their chances for social mobility, enhanced their profile as cultural consumers, and established what they believed to be their rightful place in the nation, they bolted, and began patronizing secular collections in significant numbers. So many Catholics in Cologne used public libraries, for example, that in 1903 the Cologne Pastoral Conference recommended closing Borromäus libraries altogether.

The church’s effort to shape popular reading behavior on the basis of ultramontane exclusivity had clearly failed. Then something really interesting happened. In 1897, the leaders of the Borromäusverein decided to abandon the regime of pious books and shift the Catholic reading paradigm to more closely approximate lay desires. It was a strategy of survival. While the organization continued to offer religious fiction, devotional texts, and church histories, to which Catholic readers remained attached, it now insisted that chapter leaders overhaul their outdated and moribund collections, throw out unwanted fire-and-brimstone texts from...
the 1850s, discard books with smudged covers that frightened status-conscious readers away, and restock their libraries with attractive, well-bound secular histories, classic novels and poetry, biographies of national heroes, *Heimat* literature, and popular scientific works. It also restructured its annual book lists, adding the kinds of texts that could stand in the Catholic home “in a place of honor,” as one promotional put it. Some chapters disdained the new imperatives. Their collections moldered, their patrons drifted away. But most underwent a fundamental renewal, and attempted to present the kind of socially sophisticated and culturally competent profile that confronted prejudice and cultivated status. Father Johannes Braun, the general secretary of the Borromäusverein in 1911, wrote, “Given our difficult position, given the many efforts of the other side to make the Catholic folk out to be enemies of cultivation and dumb, it is extremely important for us to say to all these people: we have so and so many libraries, so and so many books, so and so often were they read.”

The laity’s response to the Borromäusverein’s transformation was spectacular. From 1890 to 1914, membership in the organization skyrocketed 434 percent, from 49,000 to 262,000. The number of chapters also increased to over 4,600. New members came from every social group and all walks of life, including the bourgeoisie, who were always nervous about associating too closely with Catholics beneath them. In the western provinces alone, membership among middle-class men and women in the ten years preceding the First World War jumped 43 percent, to almost thirty thousand. One society lady in Xanten remarked in 1913: “I must say, that the Borromäusverein has come along. While one earlier thought and said that the organization is not for us, it is only for the humble people, today belonging to it seems like the most natural thing in the world. It has become truly modern.”

The Borromäusverein did best, however, among Catholics in the lower middle class, for whose interests in entertaining, religious, instructional, and nationalistic books it now provided. The organization targeted all Catholic readers, but its appeal resonated loudest among the churchgoing, status-hungry, patriotic petite bourgeoisie.

This dissertation, then, draws several major conclusions. In the era 1815–1914, lower-class Catholics avidly read religious literature. Religion, however, did not dominate their outlook. As the century progressed, they read more often by inclination and fancy, exploiting, by the First World War, what Peter Fritzsche calls the “heteroglossia of modern print culture” to the full. And contrary to assertions about the clergy’s ability to maintain standards of cultural taste, the lower-class laity ignored or disobeyed these standards. Increasingly fragmented, diverse, ephemeral, and personal, their reading tastes did not submit easily to clerical disci-
pline, nor were priests, who complained constantly of rebellia littera
among the laity, deluded in the belief that they did.22
Catholics also read to overcome stereotypes of their intellectual
“backwardness,” to relax institutional barriers to their inclusion in society, and to broadcast their suitability for full participation in German
culture. Exasperated with the narrow devotional readings offered by
their bishops, they forced Catholic associations, like the Borromäus-
verein, to accommodate their desire to cultivate status by means of their
reading preferences. The Borromäusverein responded by affirming these
preferences for popular science, modern histories, and the classic texts of
the German canon. It did so, however, with reference to the church’s
intellectual heritage, in an effort to promote assimilation without effacing
central features of Catholic identity.23 It recognized that lower-class
Catholics read to satisfy not only the demands of faith, but now also the
demands of knowledge and respectability. Its success in the Wilhelmine
era had to do primarily with this recognition.

Finally, the study of popular reading behavior provides little evi-
dence of a rigid, exclusive Catholic “milieu” in nineteenth-century Ger-
many.24 In fact, lay reading at all levels of the population was a symboli-
cally charged action that attempted to redefine the boundaries of national
participation. In reading practices both in public and at home, the laity
demonstrated that they sought a balance between spiritual allegiance and
cultural respectability. This study of Catholic book culture describes the
shape and characteristics of this compromise, which involved the harmo-
nization of faith with the attitudes, ideals, and axioms of the dominant
German culture. It therefore offers a fresh interpretation of modern Ger-
man cultural history and enlarges the analysis of national integration.

Notes


4 See, for example, Rudolf Pesch, Die kirchlich-politische Presse der Katholiken in der Rhein-""


9 In 1897, censors in Rome added a catch-all “lascivious or obscene” category to the normal list of condemned heretical and schismatic books, which embraced all such literature. Frightening penalties awaited the rule-breaker: “Omnes et singuli scienter legentes, sine auctoritate Sedis Apostolicae, libros apostatarum et haereticorum haeresim propugnantes, nec non libros cuiusuis auctoris per Apostolicas Literas nominatim prohibitos, eosdemque auctoritate Sedis Apostolicae, libros apostatarum et haereticorum haeresim propugnantes, incurrent, Romano Pontifici speciali modo reservatam. Frightening penalties awaited the rule-breaker: “Omnes et singuli scienter legentes, sine auctoritate Sedis Apostolicae, libros apostatarum et haereticorum haeresim propugnantes, nec non libros cuiusuis auctoris per Apostolicas Literas nominatim prohibitos, eosdemque libros retinentes, imprimentes et quomodolibet defendentes, excommunicationem ipso facto incurred, Romano Pontifici speciali modo reservatam.” See the “Decreta Generalia de Prohibitione et Censura Librorum,” Kirchliche Anzeiger für die Erzdöpfe Köln 37, 7 (1897): 48.


14 Höfener to Generalvikariat, Historisches Archiv des Erzbistums Köln (hereafter, AEK) Generalia I, 20.6, 6, 5 February 1910.

15 Darl to Generalvikariat, AEK Generalia I, 20.6, 6, 28 July 1911.

16 Bolle to Generalvikariat, AEK Generalia I, 20.6, 5, 4 April 1908.


21 Fritzsche, Reading Berlin, 235.
22 Letters written by parish priests to their diocesan authorities document this rebellion. In AEK alone, see the letters to the General Vicar in Generalia I, 20.6, 1–4: W. M. Pastar, 26 August 1825; Peter Schürger, 24 August 1826; W. H. Vest, 6 September 1826; Bierdranger, 1 December 1826; Breuer, 5 April 1865; Fasbender, 14 March 1856; Neu (Mönchen-Gladbach), 12 March 1858; Wahsong (Gadorf), 15 August 1860; Schmehling (Krefeld), 25 February 1861; Pollerberg, 12 October 1863; and Kraeger, 22 May 1869.
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From 1893 to 1960, political leaders in Hamburg completed several ambitious measures to improve the quality of water used by local residents for drinking, cooking, washing, and recreational purposes. Most importantly, they protected the city’s drinking water supply from harmful germs by constructing a filtration plant in 1893, at a cost of seven million marks. Hamburg’s political leaders also established an entirely new and highly proficient public health bureaucracy, staffed by professional physicians, chemists, and other experts, all charged with monitoring water quality in the River Elbe and recommending laws to protect Hamburg’s one million citizens from disease. Such measures—established hurriedly in the wake of a cholera epidemic that killed 8,600 people in 1892—succeeded dramatically, eliminating threats from cholera, typhoid fever, and other illnesses carried in water contaminated by human wastes. Over the next seventy years, the city’s political elites also considered policies to make drinking water more palatable for daily use, to protect fisheries from noxious chemical pollutants, and to reduce the discharge of raw sewage into the Elbe. These programs culminated in 1961, when Hamburg’s Building Department completed the gigantic state-of-the-art Köhlbrandhöft sewage treatment plant, a facility that some observers considered to be the most advanced in Europe at the time.

Historians often explain such environmental improvements in Hamburg and other European cities as part of a broad modernizing project involving technological breakthroughs, the increasing role of the state in daily life, economic considerations, and the progressive function of professionally-trained municipal elites. There is much to be said for this general constellation of factors. In the late 1800s, successful experiments in the United States and England persuaded politicians in many large Western cities to finance and construct expensive sand-filtered water supplies. Almost immediately, mortality from typhoid fever and other
diseases fell sharply, vindicating this technological choice. Financial concerns also determined the timing and scale of many projects. In Germany, for example, most cities funded expensive new sewage treatment systems during times of prosperity, especially during the 1950s, when the "economic miracle" filled municipal coffers. Finally, as Brian Ladd, Joel Tarr, and other historians point out, sanitary engineers and public health experts played a crucial modernizing role in the daily administration of large, complex cities like Hamburg, Frankfurt, London, and New York, especially during the early years of the twentieth century. Asserting their competence in municipal administration, professional bureaucrats adopted sophisticated strategies for improving public health by upgrading water supplies, removing sewage from crowded urban areas, and issuing new regulations on hygiene.3

More directly related to Hamburg, Richard Evans has argued that this process of modernization coincided with the decline of old styles of amateurish governance and with the erosion of particularistic loyalties among urban elites. Prior to the cholera epidemic of 1892, he charges, a small number of wealthy notables dominated city government, determined to guarantee Hamburg’s prosperity as Germany’s major port city and to limit state spending on any services unrelated to this goal. As a consequence, city government was often incompetent and completely inadequate to deal with typical urban problems like polluted water, crowded slums, and other maladies. According to Evans, to mollify thousands of working-class residents who suffered most from this style of administration, Hamburg’s bourgeoisie promoted a "hegemonic ideology" that emphasized "the paramount importance of trade for the well-being of all Hamburg’s inhabitants."4 Consistent with this ideology, all residents were supposed to recognize the benefits of hard work, diligence, and Hamburg’s distinctive economic role as Germany’s preeminent port city.5 This ideology also reinforced Hamburg’s tradition as a former member of the Hanseatic League and its position as an independent city-state in the German Empire, and reflected a certain animosity toward and autonomy from the Kingdom of Prussia.6

The cholera epidemic was one of the primary forces that motivated Hamburg’s governing elites to shed portions of their archaic political system and their sense of local identity. Shamed by world opinion, with its shipping quarantined in the harbor during the outbreak, the city established a modern professional bureaucracy along Prussian lines to deal with public health issues, while accelerating construction of a new filtration system for the waterworks. Over the next ten years, Hamburg modernized other features of government as well, legislating a more streamlined decision-making process in the city council and opening its political system to the city’s more prosperous working class.7 For the first time,
decisions regarding the most important urban services—like water supply—would be handled exclusively by professional experts rather than unpaid volunteers or merchant councilmen with no administrative training. Furthermore, according to Evans, the adoption of an interventionist, “Prussian” system of municipal government in Hamburg reflected the replacement of long-standing, local allegiances among the city’s bourgeoisie in favor of a national consciousness.\(^8\)

While fundamentally accurate in its emphasis on the modernizing influence of professional elites, Evans’s analysis also demonstrates at least one shortcoming. He suggests that a sense of local identity—emphasizing Hamburg’s distinctiveness from the rest of Germany and expressed through a “hegemonic ideology”—was a retrograde force, impeding progress in political affairs and municipal administration. Evans cites Hamburg’s refusal to establish a Prussian-style civil service prior to the 1890s, a policy that hindered an effective response to the cholera epidemic.\(^9\) Yet recent scholarship by Celia Applegate, Alon Confino, and others challenges this assertion. These scholars argue that regional loyalties, often represented through the concept of “Heimat,” served both to articulate national allegiance and to make the processes of rapid urbanization, industrial development, and environmental transformation comprehensible for residents of the newly-founded German Empire.\(^10\) More recently, Jennifer Jenkins and Maiken Umbach make the same argument for Hamburg, emphasizing the modernist nature of public buildings, warehouses, museums, and urban planning concepts, all of which incorporated elements of Hamburg’s distinctive identity as a center of trade and a traditionally independent city.\(^11\) I would agree with this assessment. Indeed, a sense of local identity among bourgeois elites in Hamburg continued to influence the provision of urban amenities as fundamental as wastewater services well into the twentieth century. Moreover, that sense of identity could either thwart or encourage progressive policies to improve the urban environment.

Debates surrounding the proper method of sewage disposal in Hamburg illustrate the potentially modernizing influence of a distinctive sense of identity among Hamburg’s residents. On one side of this argument stood the Hamburg City Council (comprised of an upper house called the Senate and a lower body called the Citizens’ Assembly) and sanitarians in the city’s Hygienic Institute. As in several other Western cities, Hamburg discharged its sewage into the nearest large waterway with little or no treatment. This policy corresponded with the prevailing belief among sanitary experts that the discharge of raw sewage into a stream was permissible, in some cases, if a city properly shielded its drinking water supply from harmful pathogens through a system of filtration. As stated above, Hamburg protected its own municipally owned water supply.
with a sand filtration plant. In addition, experts in Hamburg shared a widely held belief in the ability of large rivers like the Elbe to “self-purify”: that is, to neutralize the noxious presence of raw sewage and other pollutants through exposure to cold water, wave motion, and air. In the early 1900s, a growing number of municipal health experts and engineers in Europe and North America were beginning to accept this approach to drinking water and sewage disposal, especially because it was usually cheaper to protect water supplies at the source than to disinfect raw sewage through advanced treatment.13

On the other side of this debate stood a hodgepodge of scientists, commercial fishermen, politicians, and members of the general public concerned about stream pollution. From their perspective, the negative consequences of dumping raw excrement in the Elbe far outweighed any benefits to Hamburg and other cities that chose a similar approach. Referring to riverbanks along the Elbe, one local resident complained of an “ugly, black, rotting, smeared slick, where at the most some reeds but no flowers grow, and where hardly an eel lingers in the stench, let alone any fish.”14 Local fishermen were especially vocal opponents of the city. Each summer, they alleged, water in the Elbe “blossomed” (blühte) as hot weather combined with reeking pools of waste to kill sturgeon, salmon, eels, and other commercially valuable species of fish, many of which floated to the surface or suffocated in nets when towed to shore.15

An important lobbying group, the International Society Against the Pollution of Rivers, Soil, and Air, also took up the cause of local fishermen through a notoriously energetic spokesperson, Dr. Georg Bonne. A resident of one small village slightly downstream from Hamburg, Bonne and the International Society generally opposed any use of sewers, arguing that the unchecked discharge of human waste was transforming German waterways from “rivers into cesspits.”16 According to Bonne, faith in the Elbe’s ability to purify itself of human waste was also misplaced, especially because of powerful tides that surged back and forth through the harbor each day. Bonne also warned local politicians that infectious disease could still spread to the population through Hamburg’s sewer system.17 As an alternative, Bonne and the International Society usually advocated that cities either recycle all of their sewage as fertilizer through large collecting reservoirs, or that they construct a series of canals and clarifying basins where raw wastes would be exposed to the benefits of fresh air. Once heavier solids settled out, the resulting clarified water would be pumped back into the nearest large river. For that portion of the Elbe near Hamburg, Bonne advocated a single massive system to gather and purify the combined sewage of Hamburg, Altona, and surrounding towns in the Kingdom of Prussia. Only then would residents of Hamburg
be freed from the noxious presence of so much domestic sewage in the Elbe and the fear of infectious disease. 18

Despite the gravity of these charges, politicians and public health experts in Hamburg maintained their faith in the existing system. From the late 1890s and into the early 1900s, Dr. William Dunbar, Director of Hamburg’s Hygienic Institute, conducted numerous scientific studies of bacteriological conditions in the Elbe. The results buttressed Hamburg’s official position on sewage treatment, demonstrating that while some local swimmers had contracted typhoid fever by ingesting river water, the threat of disease did not justify constructing an expensive new treatment plant. Water in the Elbe was unobjectionable from a public health standpoint, according to Dunbar. 19 Members of Hamburg’s various state ministries agreed: At the height of complaints about sewage in the Elbe in 1911, city legal advisor Karl Friedrich Zellmann reported to the Senate that experts from the Medical Board, Hygienic Institute, and Department for Trade and Shipping all concurred that criticisms of the city by Dr. Bonne were unjustified. 20

Reflecting their traditional allegiance to Hamburg as a commercially oriented, autonomous city, local officials were also reluctant to construct a large sewage treatment plant if it meant cooperation with municipalities in the Kingdom of Prussia. As Wilfried Voigt pointed out in a history of the region’s sewer systems, Hamburg competed economically with the adjacent Prussian harbor cities of Altona, Harburg, and Wilhelmsburg, and this competition thwarted plans to build a wastewater treatment plant for the region. 21 Constructing an expensive new facility would have meant higher taxes in Hamburg and Altona, and Altona hoped to defray those taxes by joining with Hamburg on this project. 22 For their part, officials in Hamburg probably believed that their own taxes would have increased, a policy likely to cost Hamburg its commercial advantage over Altona. Given the traditional determination of local elites to maintain Hamburg’s position as Germany’s preeminent harbor, politicians in Hamburg had little incentive to cooperate with their Prussian neighbors. 23 Although not explicitly stated, Hamburg’s long-standing tradition of political autonomy also contributed to its refusal to participate in such a cooperative scheme. In one 1900 publication, Georg Bonne alleged that “local patriotism” impeded efforts to rid the Elbe of water pollution. 24 Ten years later an angry contributor to the Hamburger Nachrichten echoed that sentiment, writing, “The purification of the Elbe is an overall task of the cities in the . . . region,” and “city particularism” was impeding efforts to achieve that goal. 25 This was undoubtedly true: Professor Ehrenbaum, one of Hamburg’s own professional experts, reminded other officials in the city that Georg Bonne was acting in the interest of Altona and not Hamburg. 26
In fact, both sides in this argument appealed to notions of local patriotism in order to influence public opinion. Alluding to Hamburg’s growing reputation as one of the world’s busiest, most prosperous harbors, George Bonne called attention to the crucial role of the Elbe “for world commerce,” a role endangered by river contamination. In 1901 he used more provocative language to shame Hamburg’s Senate into action, questioning in another publication whether “the old Hanseatic spirit of enterprise of the citizens of Hamburg had made local politicians too absorbed in their large merchant fleet to deal with the administration of a modern city.” Lest he be seen as disloyal to the city-state of Hamburg, Bonne referred years later to the Elbe as his “Homeland River” (Heimatstrom) and to Hamburg as his “Father City” (Vaterstadt), a city he had served faithfully since the cholera epidemic. With these patriotic references and allusions to the catastrophe of 1892, Bonne reminded his supporters, the city, and the public at large that he was both a loyal resident of Germany’s greatest seaport and a man deeply concerned about Hamburg’s future.

Defending themselves against these charges, Hamburg’s own spokesmen appealed even more overtly to patriotism and to the city’s commercial tradition. In a notable exchange before the Citizens Assembly in 1912, Senator Arnold Diestel leveled the charge, by then familiar, that Georg Bonne was “exaggerating.” He added, “If Dr. Bonne truly considers himself a citizen of Hamburg, then he should pay a little attention to the old English phrase: ‘Right or wrong, my country!’” a proclamation that drew loud “bravos!” from the Assembly. Referring to Bonne’s warnings about pollution in the Elbe, Diestel indignantly huffed that Bonne “must concede that he [Bonne] is harming his beloved father city in the eyes of the public.” Assemblyman Franz Ferdinand Eisse was more blunt, warning that one of Bonne’s recent publications could “harm Hamburg as a commercial city (Handelsstadt) quite badly…. He then labeled Bonne an “idealist, fantasizer, and fanatic.”

By that time, the city’s attacks had broken the resolve of Georg Bonne, the main advocate of a new sewage treatment system in Hamburg. Branded an “enemy of Hamburg and a traitor to his fatherland” by the Citizens’ Assembly and shamed into silence by the Senate, Bonne gave up his campaign in the region and left the city. He continued his crusade to rid German rivers of pollution elsewhere over the next few years, joining with members of the Association for the Protection of the Homeland (Bund Heimatschutz) to lobby for improved sewage treatment in Hildesheim and other regions. For the time being, Bonne’s efforts and those of the International Society Against the Pollution of Rivers, Soil, and Air had failed. By 1910, many large cities in Germany and other western nations had already renounced comprehensive sewage recycling.
in favor of sewer systems and treated water supplies, and it would be years before those cities were in a financial position to consider a different approach to wastewater treatment. In Hamburg, the decision not to build a new sewage treatment plant was a “modern” decision by contemporary standards, reflecting the latest developments among municipal engineers and the very realistic cost constraints faced by the city.

A long-standing tradition of commercial trade and political autonomy helped to justify Hamburg’s actual approach to this urban environmental problem and its response to critics. While city leaders obviously relied upon scientific experts who claimed there was no real threat of infectious disease in the Elbe, they still appealed to elements of Hamburg’s distinctive identity in order to make their case to the public. Afraid that rumors of another epidemic would devastate the city’s economy, they attacked their main opponent—Georg Bonne—as disloyal to Hamburg’s mission as a Hansestadt. A “hegemonic ideology” may not have been the only factor that influenced a decision not to construct a new sewage treatment plant, but it was certainly the rhetorical device used by city elites to silence their most persistent critics.

During the next fifty years, overt appeals to a well-defined ideology emphasizing commercial trade and political autonomy gradually dissipated in Hamburg. The city’s increasing economic and political integration with the rest of Germany obviously undermined such expressions of particularist loyalty among local elites and the public. Yet elements of a distinctive identity continued to inspire a modern approach to wastewater treatment in the region.

Proposals for the creation of a political entity known as “Greater Hamburg” demonstrate this point. During the 1920s, city elites like the senator (and future mayor) Carl Petersen, the banker Max Warburg, and City Planning Director Fritz Schumacher promoted the annexation to Hamburg of all the surrounding Prussian communities in order to create one large, economically powerful city. Experts in the Building Department portrayed the “Greater Hamburg” plan as a necessary precondition for the city to recapture its commercial preeminence on an international level, shattered by British blockades of German shipping during World War I. Amid public debates on the “Greater Hamburg” concept in 1927, Mayor Petersen lamented Prussian politicians’ resistance to the plan, and remarked, “This is a moment . . . that is of great importance for all Germany, since Hamburg alone carries the burden of the greatest German seaport.”

The “Greater Hamburg” plan also held out the possibility of improving the urban environment through modernizing the local infrastructure. Social Democratic advocates of a “Greater Hamburg” argued that such a large political entity would enhance the lives of local working class fami-
lies by better linking workers and their housing to the dockyards along the Elbe. They also maintained that “Greater Hamburg” would include such advantages as a better drinking water supply, more space devoted to parks, and improved systems of sewage treatment. In a reversal of their position on this issue from ten years earlier, local elites also announced their willingness to consider building a comprehensive wastewater treatment system for the region. Indeed, some officials in the Hygienic Institute now conceded that tidal conditions in the Elbe prevented self-purification from occurring, exacerbating the noxious effect of dumping thousands of kilograms of waste into the river each day.

For a variety of reasons, the city was unable to construct a new wastewater treatment plant during the 1920s. Among other things, the “Greater Hamburg” plan, which promised both to enhance the city’s trade prospects and to improve urban infrastructure, foundered on opposition from Prussia. Politicians from neighboring Prussian communities feared that elites in Hamburg intended to use “Greater Hamburg” to dominate the region commercially and politically. In addition, subsequent discussions with Prussia about building a region-wide sewage treatment plant failed because such a major project would have taken up land needed for valuable harbor development, a cornerstone of Senate policies to restore commercial trade in the late 1920s. Finally, the generally poor economic climate of the 1920s undermined efforts to complete such an expensive infrastructure project.

The construction of such a facility remained on hold during the Third Reich as well, despite some efforts to rejuvenate this idea. In the 1930s and especially after a catastrophic fish die-off in the Elbe during the summer of 1933, officials in the Hygienic Institute became increasingly convinced of the need for a region-wide sewage treatment plant. One of the city’s experts, Dr. Otto Kammann, captured their view when he stated:

As a commercial city of world importance, Hamburg could no longer come to terms with the increasingly poor ability of the river to purify itself of wastes over the years. Rather, for hygienic reasons we must purify the city’s sewage through further treatment such that no harm to hygiene, public health, or the fishery can be expected any longer.

Aside from references to Hamburg’s commercial importance, Kammann’s remarks also reflected a growing consensus among sanitary engineers in Europe and North America that river self-purification had limits, and that for many reasons, cities should employ biological, mechanical, and chemical treatment of human wastes to prevent stream pollution. Due to a variety of factors—but mostly because of the be-
The beginning of World War II—engineers in Hamburg were also unable to construct a new sewage plant under the Third Reich.\(^\text{43}\)

Nevertheless, the “Greater Hamburg” plan, predicated on guaranteeing the city’s commercial success, held a key to achieving this goal. Attempting to appeal to business elites in Hamburg who opposed Nazi Germany’s autarkic economic policies, and in order to make Hamburg a center of armaments manufacturing and heavy industry, Reich Marshall Hermann Goering proclaimed the creation of a “Greater Hamburg” with the stroke of a pen in 1937. Overnight, the Nazi regime forcibly annexed formerly Prussian cities of Altona, Harburg, and Wilhelmsburg to the city-state of Hamburg, giving Hamburg political and economic domination of the region and adding five hundred thousand citizens to its population.\(^\text{44}\)

This political action by the National Socialist regime enabled city planners, engineers, and politicians in Hamburg to more easily conceive of a region-wide system of sewage treatment plants in the period after World War II. Firmly convinced by its experts that Hamburg needed to purify its domestic wastewater, the City Council authorized a 100-million-mark “Ten Year Plan” to construct new sewer lines and to build new treatment facilities across the entire “Greater Hamburg” area.\(^\text{45}\) Undoubtedly, the city’s much-improved financial situation also enabled local politicians to conceive of and authorize such a massive program of infrastructure improvement.\(^\text{46}\) Yet the political unification resulting from the “Greater Hamburg” plan abolished some of those key factors that impeded such improvements to the region’s sewer system in past years. When Hamburg Building Senator Rudolf Büch proclaimed the in-service date of the giant, highly modern Köhlbrandhöft plant in 1961, it culminated fifty years of intense debates and failed efforts to improve water quality in the River Elbe through better wastewater treatment.\(^\text{47}\) By that time, Büch’s action was also fully consistent with both Hamburg’s role as the dominant commercial seaport in Germany and the city’s traditional identity.

Attempts by the city of Hamburg to improve its system of wastewater treatment suggest several conclusions about the modernizing potential of local identities in German history. Above all, elements of Hamburg’s distinctive identity as a major seaport and an independent city-state remained important into the early 1900s, in this case for the provision of sewage treatment services. This implies some revision of Richard Evans’s argument that modernization of municipal government in the 1890s and 1900s mostly ended the influence of old, regional loyalties on municipal administration in Hamburg. These loyalties remained relevant, and they encouraged a solution to the city’s wastewater needs that was modern by the standards of the period before 1914, if not for the
1930s, forties, and fifties. References to such allegiances also enabled local elites to win public support for their decision not to build a new sewage treatment plant.

In later years, Hamburg’s identity as Germany’s preeminent seaport continued to remain important and to inspire progressive improvements to the region’s wastewater treatment needs. The “Greater Hamburg” plan—emphasizing the city’s commercial and political domination of the region—also held out the possibility of improving numerous features of the urban environment, including the disposal of sewage for Germany’s second largest city. Once created in 1937, “Greater Hamburg” enabled elected leaders and professional experts to modernize their approach to wastewater treatment and to begin the arduous process of cleaning up the River Elbe. From the late nineteenth century to the 1950s, the perception among Hamburg’s citizens that they lived in a great harbor city was a force for gradual improvement to the urban environment and for modernization. In this case, an important source of regional identity remained relevant, even for the provision of services that most citizens take for granted.

Notes


4 For a complete discussion of Hamburg’s style of government, see Evans, Death in Hamburg, 1–49. See specific quote regarding Hamburg’s alleged “hegemonic ideology” at 33. See more complete discussion of this concept at 553.

6 Evans, Death in Hamburg, 33–34. See also Comfort, Revolutionary Hamburg, 1–19.


8 Evans, Death in Hamburg, 566.

9 Ibid., 566.


12 Maiken Umbach, a senior lecturer at the University of Manchester, has suggested to me that Evans’s fundamental portrayal of particularistic leanings among Hamburg’s governing elites as a retrograde force is a flawed concept. Umbach argues instead that particularism or localist traditions could be very much a part of the project of modernity.


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21 For more detailed discussions of this plan and its supporters, see Büttner, *Politische Gerechtigkeit und sozialer Geist: Hamburg zur Zeit der Weimarer Republik* (Hamburg: Hans Christian Verlag, 1985); Klessmann, *Geschichte der Stadt Hamburg* (Bloomington, Indiana: University of Indiana Press, 1992), 12–15, 47. For specific proposals regarding Hamburg, see Bonne, *Die Notwendigkeit der Reinhaltung der deutschen Gewässer*, 112–120.


25 For evidence that the city’s politicians or bureaucrats often accused Bonne of exaggerating, see minutes of the Senate from 1911 in “107. Sitzung der Abteilung II der Senat,” 30. Oktober 1911; Cl VIII, Nr. X, Band 2, 1911; StaHH, Hamburg. For the discussion of Bonne in the Assembly, see “20. Sitzung der Bürgerschaft,” 24. April 1912; MK II 0 3, Band 6; StaHH, Hamburg: nos. 68–71.

26 For evidence that cost factors had a great effect on the development of sewage treatment systems in German cities, see Hendrik Seeger, *The History of German Waste Water Treatment,* European Water Management, Vol. 2, No. 5 (1999): 51–56.

27 For basic facts on these cities in the early 1900s, see Eckart Klessmann, *Geschichte der Stadt Hamburg* (Hamburg: Hoffmann and Campe, 1981) 531–554.

28 This conclusion is based on my reading of secondary and primary sources which reveal few references to an explicit, “hegemonic ideology” such as the one identified by Richard J. Evans. See for example Ferguson, *Paper and Iron*; Ursula Büttner, *Politische Gerechtigkeit und sozialer Geist: Hamburg zur Zeit der Weimarer Republik* (Hamburg: Hans Christian Verlag, 1985); Klessmann, *Geschichte der Stadt Hamburg*. See also various primary sources such as minutes of the Hamburg Citizens’ Assembly at *Stenographische Berichte über die Sitzungen der Bürgerschaft zu Hamburg im Jahre 1955* (and various other years) (Hamburg: Druck von Auerdruk, 1956); and various files of the Hamburg Medical Board, Health Department, and Hygienic Institute maintained at the Staatsarchiv Hamburg.

29 For general discussions of this plan and its supporters, see Büttner, *Politische Gerechtigkeit*, 200–201; Ferguson, *Paper and Iron*. For more detailed discussions of the plan, see letter from Dr. Wendemuth, Hamburg’s Director of Stream and Harbor Building, “Die Erweiterung des
Hamburger Staatsgebiets . . .” (no date specified, probably December 1921); Files of the Bureau für Strom und Hafenbau (Hereafter SH), A 68, Band 2; StaHH, Hamburg; nos. 66–69.


36 Büttner, Politische Gerechtigkeit, 200–201; Gross Hamburg (Hamburg: Echo Druckerei, 1922), 1–24; in SH, A 68, Band 2; StaHH, Hamburg; nos. 66–68.

37 For details on Hamburg, see Umweltbehörde, 150 Jahre Stadtentwässerung, 17–19; “Die Sanierung des Elbestromes bei Hamburg,” exact date unspecified, MK II 0 28, Band 1; StaHH, Hamburg; no. 24.


41 See quote in Dr. Otto Kammann, “Die Sanierung des Elbestromes bei Hamburg,”; MK II 0 28, Band 1; StaHH, Hamburg; no. 24.


47 See Endnote #2 regarding public perceptions of the new treatment plant.
I. Turning Point 1964/65: “Coalition Politics or Nonviolent Revolution”

In 1964 the American student movement slid into a deep crisis of identity causing a massive change in ideology and strategy. After more than four years of activism in numerous grass roots projects and non-violent direct action protests, the young radicals of the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) appeared exhausted: “We can demonstrate until we are in jail, but neither the inconvenience we cause nor the moral witness we present will alter the situation. The trouble is, we just aren’t reaching the centers of power.” The editor of the newly created student periodical The Activist, Jonathan Eisen, stated: “Students are becoming more aware of their own limitations at the same time their intellectual and ‘programmatic’ horizons are expanding. The ‘crisis in tactics’ is a very real and honest admission that nobody seems to know where the movement is going or how ‘to catch up with it.’”

Not only the SNCC worried about tactics. The Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) had set up the “Economic Research and Action Project” (ERAP) in 1963 in order to organize an interracial movement of mostly unemployed poor people in the north of the country, but during the summer of 1964 the ERAP staff found “the people” harder to organize than they had expected. Now the SDS had to come to terms with the limitations of the poor as an “agent of social change.” Although they failed to transform the poor into a new vanguard of a massive social movement, there was one crucial lesson students in ERAP learned—their disillusionment with liberalism. The SDS had started on the assumption that liberals “are the most interested and committed of all our institutions, and we must find a close but critical relationship to them.” But after months of discouraging results ERAP had the opposite effect on the activists: “We are now enemies of welfare state capitalism, with little faith or desire that the liberal-labor within this system be strengthened vis-à-vis their corporatist and reactionary allies,” the long-term SDS member Richie Rothstein wrote in retrospective in 1969. The rejection of liberal-
ism first became apparent at the National Council Meeting of the SDS in December 1964, when a majority of the delegates refused to vote for the electoral strategy of the so-called “coalitionists,” the faction within the SDS which had supported the reelection of Lyndon B. Johnson with the slogan “Part of the Way with LBJ.”

Around 1964/65, the enthusiasm of the college generation that had begun to change society with the sit-in movement in 1960 vanished and the optimism for voter registration and community organization disappeared. Reforms seemed to be more and more an attempt to integrate radical ideas into the “system,” and the young activists started to deride supporters of a liberal-labor-progressive coalition as “corporate liberals.” Fueled by outrage about the beginning war in Vietnam, the development reached its temporary peak with Staughton Lynd’s essay on a future strategy, in which the peace activist demanded a clear decision: “Coalition Politics or Non-violent Revolution?”

Just two months later, in November 1965, Bruce Payne began to call into question the theories of the “godfather” of the New Left:

It is possible to defend C. Wright Mills’s ‘power elite’ thesis as an honest radical perspective on the existing social order; the forces of which he speaks could and would act collusively against any attempts to alter the entire social structure. But the SNCC argument lacks the important conditional implied by Mills. The power structure, in the SNCC view, acts collusively, conspiratorially, on its own behalf and against the poor whether or not there is any present threat to the order. Moreover, the ranks of this monolithic elite include liberal as well as conservative groups and individuals.

This was the situation in which Herbert Marcuse published his book *One-Dimensional Man.*

II. The Project

The following essay is part of a dissertation project that focuses on the protest movements in West Germany and the United States in the 1960s. Among historians, the year 1968 is considered a decisive watershed with a worldwide impact, not only in Western countries but also in Latin America and behind the Iron Curtain. All protest movements in Europe and overseas developed in a similar way, supported liberation movements in the Third World, and regarded Che Guevara and Ho Chi Minh as international icons of protest. Nevertheless, the movements of the sixties were characterized by a significant tension: global orientation on
the one hand, specific circumstances of local phenomena on the other. One glance at the core topics in both countries, West Germany and the United States, reveals unique national conflicts. For one, the American student protests were deeply rooted in the civil rights movement struggling for racial equality. The campaign against the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) and the protests against the foreign policy of the Kennedy administration generating the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC) were important topics as well. On the other hand, the German SDS (Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund) directed its criticism at the National Socialist past of Germany, and from 1964 on, at the new German emergency laws (Notstandsgesetze).

The extensive historical research on the 1960s has mainly focused on national circumstances. Even scholarly work following an international comparative approach and the sophisticated comparisons of the German and the American movements take the perspective of national movements and relate them to each other. As a result, these studies identify more differences than similarities, which leads to a separation rather than a connection. The research on cultural transfer developed by Michael Werner and Michel Espagne offers an excellent methodological concept for analyzing intercultural transfer beyond national borders. Their approach gives priority to the context of how and why cultural elements of another country are introduced. Emphasizing the dynamics of cultural exchange and the specific circumstances of both countries, Werner and Espagne consider intercultural transfer as a process of productive adoption, known as “acculturation.” This term enables researchers to interpret the special local phenomena of two nations in a flexible, reciprocal social context—especially in an analysis of the intellectual constitution of social movements.

This essay concentrates on Herbert Marcuse and his role in the American movement. The philosopher became an international symbol for youth as one of the few intellectuals who supported the uprising of the protest movements. Many of his writings in the 1960s connected him in an analytical, critical, or encouraging way to the developments, changes, and strategies of the international protests. His books gave orientation to the New Left in the United States and the Neue Linke in the Federal Republic of Germany. One-Dimensional Man, in the American movement simply called “the book,” was essential in transforming the cognitive landscape of the New Left in the United States during a specific period under specific circumstances. It replaced the pragmatic strategy and reformist ideology of the early phase, led to the breakthrough of a new kind of activism in the United States, and created the preconditions for the transfer of new methods of protest into other countries.
III. Radical Reformism—The American Movement Until 1964/65

American society was completely unprepared for the new wave of activism. Nobody could have foreseen the great success of the spectacular sit-in movement that began in Greensboro on February 1, 1960 when four black college students ordered a cup of coffee at a segregated Woolworth lunch counter. It prompted a movement which inspired more than seventy thousand young people to take part in non-violent direct action in several American states. Nobody expected the hundreds of new activists who started to protest not only against racial segregation in the “Jim Crow” states, but also against HUAC and the atomic bomb in the next years. This new activism caught everyone by surprise—especially the few tiny, somewhat sectarian student groups that had managed to stay alive during the McCarthy Era, a period of drought for radical thinking. The late fifties and early sixties saw the sudden founding and rapid development of numerous organizations. Established in 1958, the Student Peace Union’s growth, for instance, was “simply fantastic:” “Everywhere we strike,” wrote Ken Calkins, the founder of this midwestern organization, “we strike fire.”

Moral outrage, not a reawakening in party politics after an era of political apathy, fueled the outburst of new activism. Disgusted young people started to fight the consequences of the Cold War in small but very active groups, declaring a “New Era” and demanding nothing less than the reassertion of “moral politics.” But their demands hardly would have made it into the newspapers without a new method to get public attention: direct action. With the “Americanization of Gandhi,” small groups were able to attract media attention to issues such as racial segregation or the arms race. The direct action campaign started by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) in Birmingham in 1963 demonstrated the efficacy of this method. The massive violence of southern white policemen using hoses and dogs against demonstrating black children was broadcast on international television and forced the Kennedy administration to act. Although direct action was a method that sometimes sparked violence, the driving force was moral outrage and the aim was social change. It was a tactical means to create a democratic public and inspire liberal support against abortive developments of the American society.

The belief that society both needed and was capable of reform was an essential part of American New Left thinking in the early sixties. Two intellectual departures around 1960 clearly marked a break with the Old Left and its doctrinaire Marxism: the student magazine Studies on the Left and the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Both Studies on the Left...
and the SDS harshly criticized American society, but neither promoted a revolutionary theory. While with Studies on the Left, published in the fall of 1959, an academic journal tried for the first time to establish a new platform of radical thought, or as it put it a “Radicalism of Disclosure,” SDS was both an organization of radical pamphleteers and an action group. SDS was an expanding network of activism and a kind of New Left think tank trying to combine the different topics of the early sixties in a variety of influential writings. The most famous pamphlet—the “Port Huron Statement,” mainly written by Tom Hayden in 1962—offers the best insights into radical thinking in this organization, because in this comprehensive approach of new radicalism, the SDS connected radical analysis of the society with a new strategy of activism. Although a radical document in its time, the Port Huron Statement was not a declaration of revolutionary changes. Including the main left-wing concerns of the decade—civil rights, civil liberties and disarmament—the statement criticizes the American political system from a militantly democratic point of view. The main idea, the change of society through “participatory democracy,” seems to be the re-creation of a vision of a face-to-face democracy, an ideal of community deeply rooted in American history: the town council.

Not surprisingly, SDS picked C. Wright Mills, Paul Goodman, and Arnold Kaufman as their most influential intellectual sources. The influence of the intellectual maverick Mills on the emerging New Left is obvious. His more scholarly writings like The Power Elite and White Collar or pamphlets like The Causes of World War III and Listen Yankee or the milestone “Letter to the New Left” inspired the young intellectuals the same way that Paul Goodman’s Growing Up Absurd or Arnold Kaufman’s theory of “participatory democracy” did. It was Kaufman who presented his idea at the Port Huron Conference in July 1962. Despite different traditions of radical thought, their commitment to social activism, and their judgment on the New Left, the three intellectuals shared an interest in rational and reform-minded political transformation of the political system. Their radicalism was, of course, partly influenced by Marxism, but their theories chiefly drew on American leftist political thought.

Many young activists grew with their experiences and gradually changed their views. Doubts came with the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, which left the young radicals disillusioned with the Kennedy administration. The consequence was a new SDS statement, endorsed in June 1963, “America and the New Era.” It clarified New Left thinking about liberals, distinguishing “corporate liberals” from democratically oriented liberals. The document argued that domestic reforms could not be pursued while the country maintained its international interventionism, and that an agenda of reformism for America was not possible without the
end of the Cold War. Following the test ban treaty and the period of détente in 1963, SDS leaders Tom Hayden and Richard Flacks announced the “End of [the] Cold War” in numerous articles. A period of social change seemed to be possible, and the movement endorsed new activities.

With the renewed escalation of the Cold War, the increasing international tension caused by the war in Vietnam, and the disillusionment with countless projects in 1964 and 1965, the movement reached a new position—and needed new theories to analyze the changing situation. The new intellectual guiding force was Herbert Marcuse.

IV. A New Orientation: Herbert Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man

Marcuse’s meteoric rise in 1965 was breathtaking. Since the media had discovered him, countless interviews and discussions all over the world had made him a star in a protest movement of the young. The movement had announced they would not trust anybody over thirty, and Marcuse, then in his sixties, was far beyond this age. Still, he was more than well respected, and he began to gain the status of a father of the New Left. Nevertheless, his prominence was totally unexpected, and his new fame concealed the fact that this German immigrant was an outsider in the academic world. Marcuse emigrated to the United States in the 1930s with Max Horkheimer’s Institute for Social Research. Unlike fellow members of the Frankfurt School, Marcuse stayed in the United States, yet never gave up his intellectual roots, even after more than twenty years in his new home country. His philosophy was thoroughly influenced by the late Hegel, and Marcuse shared Theodor W. Adorno’s emphasis on “negative dialectics.” Perhaps this was the reason for his infrequent activities on the American Left. Politically never involved, Marcuse avoided commitment to one of the leftist magazines such as Liberation, Dissent, Monthly Review, or New Politics, not even as a member of their editorial boards, which would have been merely an act of solidarity. In contrast to the prominent peace activist Abraham J. Muste or Erich Fromm, Marcuse’s former colleague at the Institute for Social Research, Marcuse also avoided activities in the numerous peace groups. Until 1965, he had never written articles for student magazines, although the Madison magazine Studies on the Left, for example, tenaciously tried to involve him.

With the publication of One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse’s reputation within the New Left increased tremendously, and he began to direct his own energies toward the young radicals with growing interest. As Paul Goodman remarked: ‘I can remember talking to Marcuse a year ago and I put it to him that the student revolt was very serious and he said, ‘Ah,
no, no. It will all be co-opted.’ But now since the episodes in Paris [the student revolts of May 1968], he has changed entirely. […] He just doesn’t read it right, and he just doesn’t know the American scene at all; […] he doesn’t realize that the Americans have a long history of this populism.”26

But why did the young radicals turn to Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man from 1964/65 onward? It is obvious that the reason was not his analysis of liberalism. William Appleman Williams had already coined and defined the term “Corporate Liberalism,” which was well known in New Left circles and which gained—the more the rebellion advanced—an increasing quality as an insult to moderates or liberal critics. Likewise it was not the notion of the American society as a technocratic one. In The Power Elite, written in 1956, C. Wright Mills had identified the political, economic, and military powers that structured American society. Even Marcuse’s thorough belief that the working class had lost its function as the agent of social change and was now totally integrated into capitalist society was not the important point. Years before—in his “Letter to the New Left”—Mills had demanded the farewell to the “labor metaphysics” of the orthodox Marxists.27

Without question, many of Marcuse’s ideas had precursors in books that were written in a more appealing style and in much more concrete terms. But his approach to explaining the “advanced industrial society” as a system of manipulation was much more appropriate to the circumstances: In One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse portrayed a society totally mobilized against its own liberation. In contrast to orthodox Marxists, this heretic of pure doctrine did not consider the economy as the source of social repression; the origin of injustice was technical rationality in itself. “As the project unfolds,” Marcuse says in his introduction, “it shapes the entire universe of discourse and action, intellectual and material culture. In the medium of technology, culture, politics, and the economy merge into an omnipresent system which swallows up or repulses all alternatives.”28

But the system was much more elaborate: In a one-dimensional society, Marcuse argued, the domination was so total, the manipulated satisfaction of the masses in superfluous abundance so complete that the society both allowed and absorbed alternative understandings of that society. People were free to think whatever they wanted, but could be sure that nothing would change.29 Even worse, capitalism offered forms of pseudo-liberation. A state of well-being created new materialistic desires—for example, commercialized sexual excitement—which the system in turn satisfied. In this welfare state of consumerism, alternative concepts were almost unthinkable. But more important, advanced capitalism co-opted all opposition. As the manipulated working class had
been integrated into the system of advanced capitalism, society would absorb each and every revolutionary movement, even the tiniest critical impulse. Reforms that appeared revolutionary in fact served to uphold the status quo. And this "containment of social change," Marcuse wrote, "was perhaps the most singular achievement of advanced industrial society."

Thinking of a society as one-dimensional led to a specific conception of politics. Strategies became obsolete because conventional politics as Marcuse interpreted them would be absorbed. They would be integrated into the ruling system and thus lose their critical impulse. Therefore, politics were only thinkable in categories of confrontation, captured between two extremes, integration or overthrow in a revolution. This tendency militated against traditional political activism and a politics of rational persuasion.

For many young radicals, the structure of thought sketched in One-Dimensional Man corresponded to their experiences. The ideas reflected the frustrations suffered in ERAP, the Mississippi Summer, and other community organizing projects. Perceiving that they were living a one-dimensional existence, Marcuse’s book was a key component in the beginning process of self-constitution and self-comprehension of the movement during the years before 1968.

At first sight, this was surprising, for the new father of the New Left provided no instructions on how to shape a new political strategy. One-Dimensional Man pessimistically denied praxis. On the one hand, political praxis would be co-opted and stabilize the system. On the other hand, as Marcuse saw it, a revolution to overthrow the system was also impossible, for there was no revolutionary subject. Ironically, here Marcuse argued like an orthodox Marxist of the Old Left. However, Marcuse described this vicious circle as a self-expanding and self-perpetuating system. The only chance to escape seemed to be the “Great Refusal.”

Although the movement, like the student movements in Germany and other countries, ignored this aspect of his philosophy, the idea that praxis could be absorbed by a manipulative society was absorbed by the activists themselves. During the next five years, SDS dropped all questions about strategy and organization. SDS conventions after 1965 usually ended in chaos, and proposals for the endorsement of new projects never passed the conventions. Even important projects such as a new Vietnam campaign were turned down. The SDS’s style since 1965 cannot be described as “politics.” Anxiety about co-optation led to the conscious rejection of everything connected to the system or its politics. The style of former SDS project-oriented “politics” was replaced by a new style: “prefigurative politics.” Spontaneous, local, uncoordinated, and individual in character, “prefigurative politics” rejected traditional politics.
As a result, reform projects such as ERAP and, of course, traditional election campaigns were replaced by a diffuse and abstract struggle for one’s own liberation. Greg Calvert, National Secretary of the SDS, explained the differences and defined the new values in a speech in February 1967:

The liberal reformist is always engaged in ‘fighting someone else’s battles.’ [. . .] The liberal does not speak comfortably of ‘freedom’ or ‘liberation’, but rather of justice and social amelioration. He does not see himself as unfree. [. . .] Revolutionary consciousness leads to the struggle for one’s own freedom in unity with others who share the burden of oppression. It is, to speak in the classical vocabulary, class consciousness because it no longer sees the problem as someone else’s, because it breaks through individualization and privatization, of the oppressed, because it posits a more universally human potentiality for all men in a liberated society.35

V. Contagious Confrontation: The Transformation of Direct Action and the Internationalization of “Obstruction Politics”

The way to achieve liberation was not quite clear and the abandonment of strategy had left a gap. In his writings, Marcuse avoided offering any advice, and this absence, as well as anxiety about becoming co-opted, resulted in a form of activism that rejected a long-term strategy, but also led to spontaneous actions confronting the system. Although most of these actions were directed against American aggression in Vietnam, the SDS was engaged in several other activities. Students protested on campus, organized demonstrations against governments, or planned sit-ins in segregated shops and restaurants. In New York, SDS organized the first mass protest against the Chase Manhattan Bank for its loans to South Africa. Indeed, activities and topics increased in number and variety. For the generation of Old Leftists, the activism of the young appeared arbitrary and meaningless. But this judgment was superficial, because the young New Left radicals viewed all their activities as a single struggle against the same threat: manipulation. “The issue was not the issue”36 anymore, and a single issue was just one part of the enemy: “The name of the system was ‘Corporate Liberalism’ and its opposition is radical.”37 This shift led to a change in methods, means, and aims, for direct action had lost its special character.

Americanized by radical pacifists and used with great success against racial segregation in the South, direct action was a method to achieve social change in reformist campaigns. Without a doubt, direct action
sometimes provoked violence to stimulate public attention, but it was always a tactical measure, subordinate to strategy. With the significant change in the mood of the SDS and other parts of the movement in 1964/65 and the abandonment of strategy in the wake of Marcuse’s theories, direct action became a substitute for strategy. Advanced capitalism, the enemy in Marcuse’s works, justified activism everywhere, and the identification with oppressed people in Vietnam made even more activism possible. The theme was interchangeable, but not the tactic, which therefore became a new form of activism against the totality of an abstract system—“symbolic activism.” This form of activism was typical for the time after 1964/65 and was characterized by permanent escalation, because the lack of strategy and the excessive emphasis on symbolic activism led to rapidly escalating conflicts that ended as fast as they started. In 1968/69, with the cumulation of massive confrontations—the Democratic Party Convention in Chicago or the crisis at Columbia University in New York—symbolic activism almost became an end in itself.

The first sign of a shift to symbolic activism could be seen in the Free Speech Movement (FSM) at the University of California at Berkeley.38 It was no accident that this university erupted first. Since the early 1960s, Berkeley had many active students, some of whom were organized in an umbrella organization called SLATE, which anticipated later New Left campus organizations. Berkeley, one of the most liberal universities in the country, was run by a prototype of the bureaucratic “corporate liberal.” Clark Kerr was a former member of the League for Industrial Democracy (LID), the parent organization of SDS. The rebellion at Kerr’s “knowledge-factory” was triggered by a ban on political campus activities in fall 1964, but for further developments, another factor was much more important. A handful of Berkeley students had taken part in the Mississippi Freedom Summer. After their return, they combined these experiences and the real problems at Kerr’s “multiversity” with a Marcusian perspective:

There is a time when the operation of the machine becomes so odious, makes you so sick at heart, that you can’t take part, you can’t even tacitly take part. And you’ve got to put your bodies upon the gears and upon the wheels, upon the levers, upon the apparatus, and you’ve got to make it stop. And you’ve got to indicate to the people who run it, to the people who own it, that unless you’re free, the machine will be prevented from working at all.39

The escalation in Berkeley—the spectacular Sproul Hall sit-in marked the peak with its almost 800 arrests on December 2, 1964—was representative of the new style of “obstruction tactics” and introduced a new
phase in the history of the American movement. Spontaneous direct actions triggered protest that escalated rapidly and then vanished. In many confrontations, student tactics were successful, and mobilized many of their fellow students. But without a long-term strategy, the outburst of symbolic activism had almost no effects on the structure of the confronted institution. The Free Speech Movement, for example, was without a significant successor at the universities for almost three years.

Nevertheless, the Free Speech Movement proved the transferability of symbolic activism, a precondition for the transfer into other countries. German students were in the same situation as American students: The awakening of the German SDS (Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund) started in the early sixties, and like its American counterpart, the German organization, although Marxist in its ideology, had a reformist orientation. Despite being deeply interested in American methods of protest, the German SDS was unable to adopt methods of the early period of the movement, which were deeply embedded in the national context of American society. ERAP and national campaigns for voter registration were not transferable at all. But this changed when the American movement transformed itself and its methods and gave up its specific national context by using “obstruction politics” during the Free Speech Movement. “Symbolic activism” was abstract, hence transferable. Students abroad and in the United States found themselves in comparable situations. Young people at the universities in Berlin, Paris, London, Rome, and Tokyo proved that the Free Speech Movement and its methods became one of the most successful exports of the American movement.

Notes

1 This essay is a revised version of a paper presented at the Young Scholars Forum at the German Historical Institute on May 30, 2003. I would like to thank all participants for their excellent comments and the stimulating discussion.


3 Ibid., 108.


19 The best scholarly book on the SDS and its ideas: Miller, Democracy is in the Streets.


22 SDS, America and the New Era, 1–4.


26 Quoted in ibid., 139.
28 Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, xlvii.
30 Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, xlv.
33 Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 34.
36 Quoted in Breines, *Community and Organization in the New Left*, 18.
Nearly every study of anti-Americanism begins with the caveat that criticism of the United States is legitimate, but it is rare to find satisfactory guidance as to what exactly distinguishes such “legitimate” criticism from expressions of “illegitimate” anti-Americanism. In one of the earliest scholarly treatments of the phenomenon, Ludwig Marcuse referred in passing to an anti-American tradition he called a “noble” one because, in highlighting inconsistencies between American values and practices, “it measures America against the principles of the Declaration of Independence.” In Marcuse’s eyes, criticism of the United States for failing to live up to American core values was legitimate. The mere utterance of a disparaging word should not in itself be enough to establish the speaker as anti-American. Otherwise, as Ronald Pruessen has pointed out, one would have to condemn as anti-American such diverse figures as Sinclair Lewis (the United States is “a force seeking to dominate the earth”), Henry James (“no literature, no novels, no museums, no pictures, no political society”), Aldous Huxley (Americans are satisfied with “existence on the lower animal levels”), and Anthony Eden (“they want to run the world”).2

Yet anti-Americanism exists, and scholars have produced studies solidly based in cultural and intellectual history or sociological research to try to explain its source. The typical investigation of anti-Americanism plays down the political content of foreign complaint while focusing on the symbolic meanings of America to foreigners or offering psychological explanations for critical statements.

Restoring the political to a study of foreign critiques of U.S. foreign policy could help us meet the conceptual and evidentiary challenges of distinguishing foreign criticism from anti-Americanism. This article appraises a variety of approaches to the problem of anti-Americanism, its definition and causes, and then suggests some promising avenues for further investigation, including attention to the purpose of the statement, the position of the speaker in personal biography and domestic political context, and the role of U.S. foreign policy itself in drawing comment from overseas.

Defining anti-Americanism should be a starting point for analysis, but the term is maddeningly flexible. In the hands of different scholars, it can mean negative assessments of aspects of American society, the gen-

**COLD WAR CRITIQUES FROM ABROAD: BEYOND A TAXONOMY OF ANTI-AMERICANISM**

Max Paul Friedman  
*Florida State University  
Thyssen-Heideking Fellow, 2003–2004*

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eralization of such specific complaints to imply a total rejection of the United States, or more broadly, hostility toward freedom and democracy themselves. Dan Diner warns of the danger of overapplying the term anti-American “to frustrate any justified opposition to United States policies and the negative aspects of the American way of life, and thus to stigmatize the critics.” Two standard studies seem to exemplify this misuse. Paul Hollander does much to stigmatize critics in his five-hundred-page work on the subject, in which he locates everyone from AIDS activists to George Kennan as part of a destructive, anti-American “adversary culture,” undermining the country from within. Although Hollander claims he “did not equate all criticisms of this country with hostility toward the United States, nor did I intend to discredit or dismiss all critiques of the United States with the term ‘anti-Americanism,’” almost anyone who has a thoughtful question to raise about U.S. society or foreign policy seems to fall into his anti-American category. To Hollander, indulging in those particularly American traditions of dissent and the exercise of free speech is often the offending act. He finds negative assessments of American society or foreign policy unrelated to any conditions that might need improving, because criticism originates instead in “an irrational dynamic . . . that springs from the need of human beings to explain and reduce responsibility for the misfortunes in their lives.”

Stephen Haseler’s brief treatment similarly argues that foreign critiques are rooted in “envy” and resentment of America’s “excessive individualism.”

Diner hopes to avoid this trap and therefore tries to identify the problem more clearly in a study of German views of the United States. Anti-Americanism is not merely criticism or prejudice as such, he argues, but a collection of “deep-seated and long-lasting ideas, images, and metaphors that assume the character of a comprehensive interpretation.” The romantic tradition is evident in much European complaint about America, that “land without nightingales,” in the frequently-invoked words of Nikolaus Lenau; a cosmopolitan, rootless nation, it lacks a unified ethno-national narrative, and law rather than blood determines who belongs. An unsurprising focus on capitalism and materialism is the strongest, but not the only, parallel between anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism, as well as conspiracy theories that blend the two. “Anti-Americanism resembles anti-Semitism structurally (as well as in the selection of metaphors),” writes Diner. “In some respects, anti-Americanism can even be understood as a further stage in the secularized hostility towards Jews. Even though the two phenomena, on account of their different developmental histories, could never be considered identical, they both represent ideologically shaped reactions to modernity.”

The picture is not entirely one-sided, of course. Thinkers on the Left such as Karl Kautsky and Wilhelm Liebknecht celebrated the American
potential for social equality or praised the U.S. Constitution, while those on the Right lauded the nation's central role in combating radical political movements, sometimes cast in terms of defending the West against the East. But Left and Right often cast America as a materialistic Mammon, an inhuman Moloch whose machinery would crush spiritual or communal values, the exemplar and exporter of all that was wrong with the modern world. The Left further worried about the power of finance capital, the Taylorist regimentation of the proletariat, and military adventurism abroad. The Right abhorred what it saw as the tendency toward social leveling, a mass culture that appealed to common tastes, an emasculated male population lacking a martial tradition and controlled by women who had lost their femininity; above all, rampant racial mixing in a country whose vulgar music (jazz) was black and whose economic power (Wall Street) was, naturally, in Jewish hands. Most important, to the apprehensive critics, America represented the likely future for their own societies, a source of hope when positive aspects were stressed, but a nightmare for those who saw American society taking the shape of their own fears, as shown in figure 1.

Figure 1. America as a concept: images from left and right
Determining when these and related metaphors and images represent mere rhetorical devices deployed in the service of constructive criticism, and when they are “comprehensive” indictments intended to be destructive, however, is a tricky business. It is the rare author who, like Rolf Winter and Alfred Mechtersheimer, openly acknowledges his own anti-Americanism. Drawing on the same stock of metaphors and images can produce “an expression of ideology and hostility,” but it can also serve what Diner—more sincerely than Hollander—welcomes as a “critique of excesses in the United States that are truly worthy of criticism, of problems in the political culture, of social structures and economic conduct.” Writing and understanding history requires “remembering the bloody sides of American history,” not avoiding them, he says, but just as crucial is “rejecting their instrumentalization for the purpose of defaming the United States.” Criticism, then, is welcome, but the instrumentalization of negative aspects of U.S. society to “defame” it is not.

Defamation is an interesting concept. Under American law, it is a difficult charge to prove because plaintiffs must show not only that the defamatory statement is false, but that it was made with full knowledge of its falsity. Diner is not calling for a jury trial of alleged anti-Americans, but this concept does point the way toward a possible analytical approach that considers both the source and the truth value of the statement in question. An example should help make this clearer.

One can find most of these themes contained in a succinct and frequently cited observation by Max Horkheimer from 1967, which offers a glimpse of the debate he would soon have with Herbert Marcuse over criticism of the United States in the context of the Vietnam War:

America, regardless of its motives, saved Europe from complete enslavement. The response today from everywhere, not only in Germany, has been widespread and profound hostility towards America. There has been a great deal of puzzling over the origin of this. Resentment, envy, but also the errors made by the American government and its citizens, all play a role. It is especially startling to notice that everywhere where one finds anti-Americanism, anti-Semitism also flourishes. The general malaise caused by cultural decline seeks a scapegoat, and for the aforementioned and other reasons, it finds the Americans and, in America itself, once again the Jews, who supposedly rule America.

Despite this analysis, Horkheimer himself provides a perfect example of the ambiguity involved in trying to distinguish anti-Americanism from legitimate criticism of the United States. He knew the country well: he sought refuge from Nazism there and, after the war, retained a part-time
position at the University of Chicago for a decade. Although he cast himself as a defender of the United States against its critics, not all of his remarks were favorable, as when he attacked McCarthyist excesses in unusually strong language: “A few years ago it was dangerous in America to show sympathy for its recent ally Russia. Today the mere suspicion of being ‘neutral’ means economic ruin. And that just confirms the irresistible historical tendency making America resemble terroristic Russia.” By casting the issue in these terms, rather than, for example, deploring the American Right-wing, or calling for adherence to America’s core democratic values of freedom of speech and due process, Horkheimer defined the problem as so generalized as to affect all of American society, with the United States as a totality “irresistibly” moving toward a copy of the Soviet system. These words appear to represent a broad condemnation (and a rather sloppy comparison) that, in its seemingly “comprehensive” rejection of America, sounds like a statement that Horkheimer surely would have attacked had it been voiced by a student protester in the streets of Frankfurt.

Further complicating his stance, Horkheimer at times expressed sentiments about America’s and Americans’ cultural poverty squarely in line with romantic traditions of America-bashing he, like Diner and other scholars, considered illegitimate, not to say dangerous. Consider his comments on “Culture in the U.S.A.”:

1. Small talk and jokes are typical for every party. Serious topics are immediately derailed.
2. Moreover everyone complains about everyone else.
3. American civilization cannot bring forth anything new. It has no depth. Thought is powerless.
4. That does not mean that it presents nothing new as a civilization. But the newness is over. (Needs further elaboration.)
5. Why is thought powerless? Because it does not serve specific interests. In the United States only that may prosper which is directly aimed at furthering interests.
6. Enormous personal achievements of a technical character are typical. Example: the professor’s wife who runs a household with two children and still manages to practice piano four hours a day.

These are acute observations of a social critic who lived in exile in a society different from his own. The fact that some of these comments arguably echo the complaints of German romantic nationalists as well as anti-capitalists should not automatically delegitimize Horkheimer as a commentator, or lead us to fix upon him an anti-American label. Not only would that be a pointless exercise; in this case it would be an absurdity.
Horkheimer cannot be called anti-American, because he took a strong stance defending the United States against its critics at the height of the Vietnam War (even as he privately acknowledged it to be a “dirty war”). His comparison of America to “terroristic Russia” was not meant as an equivalence of the two societies or a whitewash of the Gulag, but rather reflected his view that political systems in the modern era are cursed by an instrumental rationality that places ends above means, inevitably producing victims and suffering in what he and Theodor W. Adorno called the “dialectics of Enlightenment.” All-or-nothing categories like “anti-American” do not leave room for a sensitive observer of a country to which he was grateful and whose faults he noted with sorrow.

One could name other ambiguous figures. Jean-Paul Sartre famously complained that “America has rabies,” but his critiques of America were inspired by writers in the United States such as John Dos Passos, Upton Sinclair, Herbert Marcuse, C. Wright Mills, and Michael Harrington. He also loved jazz, Poe, Faulkner, and Hemingway, and named his magazine Temps Modernes after Charlie Chaplin’s film Modern Times. His own answer to the question was unequivocal: “I am not anti-American.” Sartre cannot be easily packaged either.

Martin Walser, too, was capable of attacking U.S. policy in Vietnam and ridiculing West Germans’ excessive philo-Americanism in Tintenfisch (1969), then a few years later writing a Whitmanesque tribute containing these lines:

Think of it, one can become an American. Europe is, I believe, a funereal culture that overestimates itself. Could my homesickness for America be homesickness for a future?

Examining brief statements in isolation from Horkheimer, Sartre, Walser, or anyone else, for that matter, would not seem to be a sufficient guide to whether one may characterize them as anti-American, nor a useful way of understanding the points they are trying to make about the United States. The existing scholarship on the phenomenon would guide us along two possible avenues of investigation: first, to consider the purpose of the statement, its intended “instrumentalization” (Diner); and second, to focus on the position of the speaker, including personal biographies, activity and aims in the domestic political arena, and so on.

Purpose of the Statement

Gesine Schwan, in a study of postwar West German attitudes, noted that the charge of anti-Americanism was often used, especially beginning in the late 1970s, as a way to discredit one’s opponents in intra-German political conflicts. This practice is hardly limited to Germany. “All mod-
ernizing societies comprise factions within their intelligentsia that struggle with one another to impose an authoritative interpretation of political and cultural reality on their respective public spheres,” explains A. Dirk Moses. “In this rivalry for cultural capital—prestige and influence—they deploy an ensemble of rhetorical devices to discredit the opposition and enhance their own position in the public-intellectual field.”

Whereas in the American culture wars the most common rhetorical clubs have been the charge of “political correctness” (in political discourse and the mass media) or “revisionism” (in the academy), accusations of anti-Americanism have served the same purpose in West Germany, especially against the Left. Schwan therefore sought to maintain a strict divide between defining certain expressions or opinions as “criticism” and assigning others to an “anti-” position only on the principle that the latter must represent “a basic, normative rejection” of the core concept of America as understood by the speaker.

Peter Krause developed this idea into a clear formula for distinguishing legitimate criticism of the United States from the always implicitly illegitimate anti-Americanism. In a study of German press coverage of the 1983 invasion of Grenada and the 1991 Gulf War, he offers this litmus test: “The criticism should not be so encompassing and far-reaching as to suggest that the conditions and actions held up for scrutiny and criticized are necessary outcomes of American traditions and values or the American social system itself.” Anti-Americans judge and reject America “as a totality,” interpreting individual negative aspects as “immutable characteristics of the United States.” Mere criticism of individual policies, on the other hand, is legitimate.

Applying this formula to German news coverage of the invasion of Grenada, Krause reaches a number of surprising conclusions. When a writer in Stern castigated the “fairy tales” recounted by the White House and the Pentagon and accused President Ronald Reagan of having no regard for democracy, human rights, or the truth, Krause judged this not to be anti-American because the accusations were directed at the U.S. government and particularly at Reagan himself, not at the “totality of all Americans.” Nor did the Stern writer claim that lying was an American trait. On the other hand, an article appearing in the same magazine that analyzed American foreign policy as the outcome of historical developments is placed in the anti-American category. The author of this article, Klaus Liedtke, traced an American sense of mission back to the Puritan settlers and attributed an important impulse for U.S. military interventions since 1898 to an effort to further the interests of American business. “The anti-Americanism here lies in Liedtke’s claim of detecting a tradition of imperialism in the United States that goes back to the Puritans,” writes Krause, because Liedtke presents the Puritan messianic tradition...
as “an existential characteristic, . . . a historically developed trait of the United States” that goes well beyond any transient administration in Washington.27

This formula has the appeal of simplicity. In determining whether a given text or statement is anti-American, we need not consider the background or position of the speaker or even the accuracy of the comment; we need only assess to what extent the criticism is directed against a narrow group of government officials, or against what is perceived as an enduring American characteristic.

However, this approach is ultimately too schematic. Under the formula, no rhetorical attack against the president of the United States or his administration, no matter how severe, can be called anti-American unless the attack is broadened to include every American. Where Stern suggested that President George Bush Sr. attacked Iraq in order to erase his image as a “wimp,” that charge is not labeled anti-American, because the insult was aimed “solely at the president as an individual . . . but not against America or the political system of the United States itself.”28 A different reading of the charge is possible. An American political system that functioned so as to permit a president to launch a war, with Congressional support, in order to improve his masculine image would itself clearly be unworthy. The “wimp” interpretation thus can be understood to contain an anti-American element. Comparably, an article in the tageszeitung comparing the invasion of Grenada to the far bloodier Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and denouncing the “American aggressor” is not anti-American, according to Krause, “because the description ‘aggressor’ here is not meant to be an attribute of the United States itself, but refers rather to a concrete action judged by the taz as an act of aggression.”29 This assessment, too, is open to debate, but one need not resolve it in order to see the flaw in the formula. One can imagine the freedom a writer genuinely hostile to the United States would enjoy under Krause’s rules, sitting down to compose a vicious screed that, as long as it did not condemn the entire population of the country at once, could not be deemed to be anti-American.

If that standard seems too permissive, Krause’s evaluation of Liedtke’s historical analysis is too strict. It renders the kind of scholarship well-established among American diplomatic historians for at least four decades illegitimate because it identifies long-term causes behind foreign policy, rather than attributing events merely to transient actors at the highest levels of government.30 Krause similarly faults a Stern article by the American writer Norman Birnbaum that attributed Bush’s intervention in the Gulf to America’s “unquenchable thirst for oil.”31 This is anti-Americanism, we are told, because “if this ‘thirst for oil’ truly is unquenchable, then the United States will continue forever to wage wars

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to satisfy this demand, and therefore war would be a necessary outcome of the economic structure of the United States—clearly an anti-American position. But that iron chain of logic is Krause’s, not Birnbaum’s. Assuming that the “unquenchable thirst” is not a figure of speech (writers use colorful or metaphorical language about the United States at their peril here), Birnbaum no doubt expects that the U.S., perhaps under different leadership, would be able to reduce its oil consumption, or find access to energy supplies on fair terms without resorting to war. If he believed in the fatal inevitability of resource wars as the only possible future for the United States and was himself committed to a fundamentally anti-American stance, Birnbaum presumably would not have devoted a lifetime to teaching at leading universities in five countries, advising members of Congress and the National Security Council, working for major presidential candidates, and writing in favor of social reform.

Under Krause’s strict schema, to say that the Second Gulf War was provoked by Bush’s son for the sake of his friends in the oil industry would not be anti-American, since such a claim would be directed only at a small group of people, but to say that the war was intended to secure long-term access to oil supplies essential for the United States economy would be. Thus if analysts and scholars are to escape the label of anti-American, apparently they must avoid looking at structural factors altogether and return to the “great men in history” approach last in vogue in the 1950s. Something more is needed if we are to avoid a conceptual straitjacket.

Position of the Speaker

Knowing a little about Horkheimer or Birnbaum seems to help steer one away from a too-hasty and inaccurate accusation of anti-Americanism. In the same way, Johannes Heesch’s study of Helmut Schmidt’s evolving position toward the United States concluded that Schmidt’s fundamental Atlanticist commitment to cooperation with Washington made it impossible to qualify his critical statements as anti-American, even though if the same remarks had been made by someone else, they might have been so.

Schmidt’s political biography apparently granted him a safe margin for making critical remarks even though “in content they are constructed comparably to the virulent conservative anti-Americanism that emerged from the wartime defeat and re-education in the postwar years.” If he was personally immune to charges of right-wing anti-Americanism, so, too, he could not be accused of left-wing anti-Americanism, even though Heesch found Schmidt’s complaint about the “astonishing simplicity” of Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy to have “provided aid and comfort to anti-American currents in the peace movement.” Presumably someone
lacking Schmidt’s bona fides who made identical remarks would be assigned to the anti-American category.

This may be too heavy a burden of explanatory weight for a personal biography to bear. Is it wise to make the analysis of an utterance so dependent on the speaker, thirty years after literary theory announced “the death of the author,” and given that texts take on a life and impact of their own once they are produced? Moreover, many working diplomatic historians today would question whether a uniformly celebratory assessment of United States foreign policy is automatically more accurate than a critical one. One might wonder what actually delivered more fodder for anti-American sentiment in the European peace movement of the early 1980s: Schmidt’s criticism of Reagan, or Reagan’s own policies, which seemed to many to increase the chance of war, and on balance certainly do seem to have been characterized by a high degree of simplicity. One may compare, for example, the level of complexity inherent in the nuances of realpolitik and détente to the more straightforward concept of an “evil empire.” Biography may be useful in understanding the position of the speaker, but it cannot on its own substitute for an analysis of the statement.

Impact of United States Foreign Policy

This leads us to a third, neglected avenue of exploration: examining the content of the criticism itself. To take another example from Horkheimer: One could choose to read either a defense or an attack into a single paragraph of his from 1966 that begins with the statement “America . . . is the most hated country because everyone envies it,” and ends by predicting America’s likely demise because, in addition to the perils of rising nationalism and anti-Semitism, its “foreign policy is grounded in lies.” Instead of focusing on the first sentence and placing Horkheimer in the camp of those who dismiss criticism of America as rooted in human neurosis, or brandishing the last phrase in order to accuse him of attacking the United States, we could depersonalize the exercise somewhat and assess the veracity of his observation about a “foreign policy . . . grounded in lies,” at a moment when Lyndon Johnson was rapidly increasing the number of U.S. troops sent to Vietnam on the basis of a congressional resolution passed in response to an alleged incident in the Gulf of Tonkin that never took place. It is not clear how comprehensive Horkheimer meant his criticism to be, but it cannot be judged defamatory if it was true.

That U.S. foreign policy has an important impact on foreign opinion seems only logical, but it is a factor often absent from studies of anti-Americanism that emphasize continuity in imagery, prejudice, and psy-
chology among foreigners (often working from the implicit if hardly empirical assumption that an unqualified embrace of America is more legitimate or accurate than a critical view). Given a consistent cultural context, enduring structures of prejudice, and the symbolic meanings of America that have been with us for more than a century, how do we account for temporal variations in foreign opinion of the United States? It seems possible that some critical foreigners are prompted to speak out not only by certain established tropes or irrational resentments that are always with them, but also in response to U.S. actions.

Consider changes in West German public opinion during the Cold War as measured in surveys. Asked if they generally "like the Americans," West Germans replied with remarkable consistency over a thirty-year period from the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s: year in and year out, about half of those polled said yes. Responding to a question about "your overall opinion of the United States," however, German views fluctuated widely over the years, reaching highs over 80 percent and lows below 35 percent. Gebhard Schweigler argues that this shows that the German public generally distinguishes between Americans as a people and the policies of the American government.37 This distinction has further implications, as shown in figure 2.

The contrast between the two trends in figure 2 is crucial. If foreign views of the United States were rooted only in envy of American wealth and power, or emerged from a collective cultural memory of negative

![Figure 2. West German views of the United States](image)

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images and metaphors, the favorable rating would not be expected to change so much from year to year, since American wealth and power have remained at impressive levels since the Second World War and the stock images of the United States appearing in German writing also have shown remarkable consistency over the past century.\textsuperscript{38} If an unfavorable opinion of the United States were the same as anti-Americanism, those surveyed would presumably express dislike in equal portions for Americans and America. Instead, Schweigler points out that in a context of a steady emotional response to “the Americans,” the temporal variations in German opinion of the United States closely track developments in U.S. foreign policy. The favorable rating peaks in the early 1960s, when President John F. Kennedy made clear his commitment to West Germany and took his famous trip to Berlin. Beginning in 1965 there is a precipitous decline that accelerates after 1968 as the legitimacy of the U.S. war effort in Vietnam came more and more into question. A low point comes in the early 1970s, the era of Watergate and revelations about CIA covert actions, including assassination attempts, in the Third World. The election of Jimmy Carter, who promised to restore morality and respect for human rights to the U.S. government, coincides with a revival of favorable German opinion toward the United States, but then Ronald Reagan’s confrontational stance toward the Soviet Union, and his advisers’ loose talk about limited nuclear war, seem to precipitate another rapid decline.\textsuperscript{39}

Here is promising support for an approach that restores the political to the investigation of foreign views of the United States. Cultural analyses are essential for providing context, but do not explain temporal variations. Biographical attention to individuals can be helpful in suggesting motives, but ultimately is insufficient. What is needed is a combined approach that considers the position of the speaker, the symbolic meaning of the United States in his or her home culture and domestic political conflicts, and—and this is the aspect usually missing—the substance of the critique. Each of those tasks is challenging, and especially the last will not be an exercise comparable to laboratory work. There is no unitary historiographical consensus to use as a gauge. But that is not to say that there are no standards for evaluation.

It may be that looking back at European opinion of the United States in the second half of the twentieth century we see a fairly widespread, “soft” cultural anti-Americanism, a storehouse of negative stereotypes and associations that come readily to hand when one wishes to criticize the country, and a marginal, “hard” anti-American fringe that takes its rhetoric literally and is dangerous beyond its numbers because of the ease with which certain metaphors and concepts can flow between the two groups. Identifying and distinguishing among these aspects will continue
to be an important focus for research. To go beyond a general taxonomy of a phenomenon that waxes and wanes, however, we will need to restore the crucial element of the political, in order to account for critiques of the United States that are linked to how the U.S. makes its presence felt abroad.

Notes


14 Diner, America in the Eyes of the Germans, 12.
15 Diner, America in the Eyes of the Germans, 24.
16 Max Horkheimer, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 14 (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1988), 408.
17 Horkheimer, Gesammelte Schriften 14: 63.
18 Horkheimer, Gesammelte Schriften 14: 288.
19 Horkheimer, Gesammelte Schriften 14: 474.
21 Kuisel, Seducing the French.
22 Martin Walser, "Versuch, ein Gefühl zu verstehen," Dimension 9 (1976), quoted in Ott, Amerika ist anders, 442.
24 Schwan, Antikommunismus und Antiamerikanismus, 18–19.
30 See, for example, the summaries of various schools of analysis in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations (NY: Cambridge UP, 1991).
32 Krause, 266.
33 Heesch, “Antikommunismus, Pro-Amerikanismus und Amerikakritik,” 246.
34 Heesch, “Antikommunismus, Pro-Amerikanismus und Amerikakritik,” 239.
36 Horkheimer, Gesammelte Schriften 14: 364. Along with “nationalism” and “anti-Semitism,” Horkheimer also worried here about growing “inflation” in the United States—a combination that must have seemed especially alarming to someone who had lived through the Weimar Republic.
38 Ott, Amerika ist anders, 442–3; Diner, America in the Eyes of the Germans, passim.
“MAKE IT A GREEN PEACE”:
THE HISTORY OF AN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATION

Frank Zelko
Research Fellow, GHI

In the early 1970s, the United States Congress’s House Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation held a series of hearings on the subject of marine mammal protection. Among those who testified were representatives of America’s oldest and most established wilderness protection groups, such as the Sierra Club, the Audubon Society, and the National Wildlife Federation. Although it was important to ensure that the world’s populations of whales and seals remained as healthy as possible, these organizations argued, they did not support a policy of absolute protection. As long as the survival of the species was ensured, they believed, it was legitimate to use its “surplus” members for the benefit of people. In his testimony before the subcommittee, Thomas Kimball of the National Wildlife Federation employed phrases such as “renewable resources,” “stewardship,” and “professional wildlife management.” The “harvesting of surplus wildlife populations,” his organization felt, was an “important management tool if the continuing long-range well-being of an animal population is the ultimate objective.”

A few years later, a group of environmental protesters off the coast of California came across a fleet of Soviet whaling boats. Using motorized inflatable dinghies, the activists positioned themselves between a whaler’s harpoon and a fleeing pod of sperm whales, acting as human shields to protect the defenseless giants. Whaling, these activists insisted, was not merely an issue of wildlife preservation or resource stewardship. Rather, it was an unconscionable act of violence perpetrated against a species whose intelligence and sensitivity put them in the same biological category as human beings. In short, whaling was an act that was the moral equivalent of murder. Who were these activists? How did they come to hold such uncompromising views? What inspired them to take such drastic and dangerous actions to protect another species? These are some of the major questions that I address in my research on the history of the organization with which this new breed of activists were associated: Greenpeace.

Today, Greenpeace is a genuinely international organization, as well as being the great icon of the environmental movement. Its logo, at least in Western countries, is almost as recognizable as those of Coca-Cola and
McDonald’s. Its headquarters are in Amsterdam and it has branches in over thirty countries. It has a complex hierarchical structure with multiple administrative bodies located throughout the world. Though still largely associated with direct action, Greenpeace involves itself in a variety of activities, from lobbying governments and inter-governmental organizations, such as the International Whaling Commission, to sponsoring the production of new technologies, such as environmentally friendly refrigerators and automobiles. While holding on—just barely—to a radical and hip image, Greenpeace has become, in reality, a part of the environmental establishment. However, this was not necessarily the kind of organization that its founders had in mind. Furthermore, throughout its early history, there were moments when Greenpeace could have turned down a number of different roads. Some of these might have led to oblivion, while others may have allowed the organization to develop as more of a grassroots social movement rather than an international environmental “corporation.”

The high profile and international renown that has resulted from Greenpeace’s spectacular style of direct action means that there is no shortage of literature dealing with the organization. The existing works can be broken down into several broad categories. 1) Memoirs and autobiographies of prominent figures throughout Greenpeace’s history. These seem to have become something of a cottage industry, indicating the unique role that Greenpeace has occupied in the environmental movement. Perhaps no other environmental group has inspired so many of its members to write about their experiences in the movement. 2) Official and semi-official histories of the organization. These, naturally enough, tend to be generally sympathetic to Greenpeace and its aims, and rarely situate it in a broader historical context. 3) Studies of Greenpeace and the media. Not surprisingly, given Greenpeace’s emphasis on media-oriented campaigns, there are several studies that analyze how the organization has attempted to use the mass media to its advantage and how this, in turn, has helped shape the organization. 4) Treatments of Greenpeace’s strategy and structure. There are also countless studies that attempt to analyze Greenpeace’s strategies and its structure, as well as using it as a vehicle to test or promote various sociological theories. 5) Accounts of individual campaigns. Finally, there are the numerous journalistic accounts—both critical and supportive of Greenpeace—which try, with varying degrees of success, to describe how the organization functions and to analyze some of the more prominent campaigns and events in which Greenpeace has been involved.

While journalists and sociologists have devoted considerable effort to understanding this unique environmental organization, historians have conspicuously ignored it. This may be due in part to the fact that Green-
peace, formed in 1972, is a relatively young organization, and hence is seen by historians as the preserve of sociologists and political scientists. Also, most historians continue to specialize in the history of a particular nation. This means that Greenpeace, with its international focus and complex origins in both Canada and the United States, does not fit neatly within the narrow parameters of American history, unlike groups such as the Sierra Club or Earth First! Since Greenpeace has generally been viewed as an environmental organization, it has almost entirely escaped the attention of scholars of the peace movement. Yet the people who founded Greenpeace had deep roots in the American peace movement. Indeed, the trait for which Greenpeace is most famous—its use of non-violent direct action—stems from the radical pacifism that emerged in the United States after the Second World War. Only by situating Greenpeace within this context can historians begin to develop a solid understanding of the origins of Greenpeace’s brand of radical environmentalism.

To historians of the American environmental movement, Greenpeace has presented something of a paradox: Despite the fact that it has become one of the major environmental outfits in the United States, its Canadian origins seem to put it outside their bailiwick. A closer examination of the organization’s history, however, reveals that while Greenpeace sprouted from Canadian soil, its roots were deeply American. The movements and ideas that influenced it the most—radical pacifism, popular ecology, the counterculture, and the New Left—emerged from the swirling currents of a broader oppositional subculture that was formed in the United States in the post-war era. These movements shared several fundamental traits that can broadly be described as anti-modern: a fear, represented most vividly by the atom bomb, that science and technology had run amok; a deep antipathy toward rampant consumerism and the shallow materialistic culture they felt it produced; and a strong opposition to what they saw as the United States’ increasingly imperialistic and militaristic foreign policy. While Canada had its own versions of these movements, they were all strongly influenced by their American counterparts. This is not to suggest that Canada was merely a stage for what was otherwise a purely American production. Certain Canadian traits—such as a latent but pervasive anti-Americanism and the work of the Canadian social theorist Marshall McLuhan—were also important elements in Greenpeace’s early history. Nevertheless, from a historical perspective, it is fair to say that Greenpeace owed more to its American heritage than its Canadian.

The early chapters of my study attempt to demonstrate these American origins, as well as analyzing the historical circumstances, or, in more theoretical terms, the “political opportunity structures” that explain why Greenpeace emerged from Vancouver, British Columbia. While broad
social and intellectual trends form a vital part of this history, it is important not to forget that social movements are also the result of groups of individuals whose interactions, both with each other and with their society as a whole, determine the movement’s values, tactics and priorities—in short, its culture. As the sociologist C. Wright Mills writes, “neither the life of an individual nor the history of society can be understood without understanding both.” Hence I devote considerable space to the stories of the individuals who founded Greenpeace and who determined its actions and shaped its culture during its early years.

After examining the historical context from which Greenpeace emerged, I focus on the early voyages that established Greenpeace as a primarily sea-based protest group. The first of these, in 1971, was a protest against U.S. nuclear testing in the Aleutian Islands in the far North Pacific. Although the maiden voyage failed to reach its target, it was nonetheless important in helping to forge Greenpeace’s identity, as well as revealing fundamental tensions that would remain with the group for many years. The most obvious of these was the split between the older generation of protesters who were inclined toward scientific rationalism and a group of younger activists who embraced various countercultural beliefs and values. The participants labeled this dichotomy the “mechanics versus the mystics,” and it would remain a fundamental cleavage within the organization throughout the 1970s. The Aleutian voyage also inspired the birth of one of Greenpeace’s core myths—the idea that they were the “warriors of the rainbow,” a reference to a Native American prophecy that foretold the coming of a band of earth warriors who would save the world from environmental destruction.

From 1972 to 1974, Greenpeace directed its attentions toward French nuclear testing in the South Pacific. This time, their boat successfully reached its target—twice—and proved to be a considerable headache for the French military. Although the young organization came to the brink of collapse, it nonetheless survived a difficult period. An important result was the establishment of the first Greenpeace group outside Canada—in New Zealand—a step toward the creation of an international organization. These campaigns also marked Greenpeace’s tentative entry into the arena that Paul Wapner has called “world civic politics”: a level of politics where the promotion of broad cultural sensibilities represents a mechanism of authority that is able to shape human behavior.

In 1975, Greenpeace underwent a dramatic change in its campaign focus, its philosophy, and its membership base. Until then, it could best be described as an anti-nuclear group with an environmental emphasis. By deciding to mount a direct action campaign against whaling, however, the organization embraced a biocentric philosophy that challenged the idea that humans were the supreme beings on the face of the planet. They
vividly illustrated their commitment to this notion by placing their bodies between pods of fleeing whales and the harpoons that were being used to kill them. In the process, the activists captured a series of spectacular images that would make them renowned throughout the world, giving them entraée into the world’s most lucrative environmentalist market—the United States. There was, however, a problematic element to their campaign. By arguing that all whales deserved to be saved because of their supreme intelligence, Greenpeace perpetuated a hierarchical view of species that was incompatible with ecology and biocentrism, in which nature has an intrinsic value that is independent of humans. This would lead to a particularly awkward situation when members of the Inuit population in Alaska—the inspiration behind the “warriors of the rainbow” myth—demanded that they be allowed to continue their traditional practice of hunting whales.

In the wake of the successful anti-whaling campaign, new Greenpeace branches began springing up throughout North America. Then, in 1976, the organization embarked on another campaign, this time against the slaughter of harp seals on the ice floes off the coast of Newfoundland and Quebec. It was an early example of the kind of conflict that environmentalists have had to face countless times over the past few decades: one in which their interest in saving a species or a habitat conflicts with local working people for whom that species constitutes a resource. Along with the whale campaign, the anti-sealing protests attracted a substantial number of animal rights activists to Greenpeace, a situation that made the idea of compromise increasingly difficult. From an animal rights perspective, there can be no question of compromise when it comes to the killing of whales or seals—abolition is the only goal worth pursuing. Therefore, those within Greenpeace who were willing to take a more pragmatic, ecological approach to sealing found that they had almost as much trouble with some of their own supporters as they did with the sealers. Despite these problems, Greenpeace’s leaders did make a concerted effort to work with the mostly impoverished Newfoundlanders who constituted the sealing industry’s labor force. The fact that they failed was due as much to the intransigence of the sealers and their supporters within the Canadian government as to Greenpeace’s shortcomings. Another outcome of the campaign was that as a result of the questionable actions of some of its activists, Greenpeace was forced to define the acceptable boundaries of its direct action approach.

By 1978, Greenpeace began to experience severe growing pains. The Vancouver group, the members of which considered themselves to be the leaders of the rapidly expanding, though loosely controlled, organization, found themselves facing a mountain of debt from several years of non-stop campaigning. Meanwhile, the various American offices, particularly...
the relatively wealthy San Francisco branch, were beginning to chafe at what they perceived to be Vancouver’s authoritarian leadership style. Furthermore, the controversy that the seal campaign was causing in Canada had led to a significant diminution of donated funds to the Vancouver group, thereby making them even more reliant on the San Francisco office to finance their major campaigns. Thus when Vancouver tried to tighten its control over the various Greenpeace branches throughout the world, it met considerable resistance from the Americans, who felt that they were being used as mere cash cows. The resulting conflict ended in an acrimonious legal battle in which the Vancouver branch of Greenpeace sued its brethren in San Francisco. While the various North American sections of the organization were engaged in this in-fighting, the nascent European groups took advantage of the opportunity to consolidate their power. After a complex series of deals, the European offices emerged as the leaders of Greenpeace, and the organization’s center of power shifted from the Pacific coast of North America to the countries bordering the North Sea. The result was that Amsterdam, Hamburg, and London replaced Vancouver and San Francisco as Greenpeace’s most important offices, a situation that has continued to the present day.

The German section of Greenpeace was not established until 1980, the same year that the German Green Party was officially born. Like other Greenpeace groups throughout the world, the German branch emerged as a result of various grass-roots environmental campaigns. Unlike other branches to that point, however, the establishment of Greenpeace Germany was heavily influenced by the newly-formed Greenpeace International. By 1980, there were two German groups that claimed to be acting in the name of Greenpeace. The first was a band of animal rights activists in Bielefeld who were mostly interested in campaigning against sealing; the second was a more direct-action oriented group, based in Hamburg, that was involved in various campaigns to combat water pollution in the Elbe and Weser Rivers. In countries such as the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands, where Greenpeace offices had emerged before the formation of Greenpeace International, such groups had largely been left to their own devices, either competing or cooperating until a dominant group emerged to proclaim itself the official Greenpeace organization in a particular country. In the German case, however, the newly-formed Greenpeace International played a decisive role in ensuring that it was the Hamburg group, rather than the Bielefeld one, that would become the official representative of Greenpeace in Germany. There were two main reasons for this decision: First, the anti-sealing campaign, which had always had more support from the North Americans than the Europeans, was seen as a lower priority issue by the Europeans who largely controlled Greenpeace International. Second, the Hamburg protesters, with
their willingness to use disruptive direct action tactics such as maneuvering rubber dinghies into the path of chemical dumping ships, were engaged in actions that closely resembled those that were being used by the other European Greenpeace branches.

In contrast to the United States, which already had a well-established environmental movement with myriad organizations representing a host of environmental philosophies and issues, the Federal Republic of Germany was virgin territory. With their high-profile, attention-grabbing actions, Greenpeace Germany quickly became the most well known environmental group in the country. This success rapidly translated into power at the international level, and by the early 1990s, when Greenpeace USA underwent a considerable decline, the German branch became the wealthiest and most influential member of the Greenpeace International family, a position it continues to occupy to this day. The strength of Greenpeace Germany has had a considerable impact on the rest of Greenpeace, particularly in the United States, where Greenpeace situated itself firmly on the left of the environmental spectrum. However, Greenpeace USA’s involvement in grass roots campaigns such as the environmental justice movement, as well as its willingness to occasionally collaborate with more radical organizations such as Earth First!, set off alarm bells among the Germans, who felt that such actions risked sulllying Greenpeace’s more mainstream image in Europe. Thilo Bode, the German economist who became the head of Greenpeace International in the mid-1990s, launched an aggressive campaign against Greenpeace USA’s environmental justice campaigns, arguing that such grass roots activities were better left to other groups and that Greenpeace should concentrate on its traditional media-driven campaigns. The schism, in which the Germans eventually prevailed, is an example of how some American environmentalists have come to see environmental and social justice issues as being inextricably bound, a view that has not yet gained much currency in Germany or in Europe as a whole.

The Greenpeace story is worth telling merely for its abundant drama, pathos, and absurd moments of comic relief. Beyond that, however, it has much to teach us about environmentalism, as well as enhancing our understanding of how social movement organizations develop. In one sense, it represents another example of compromised idealism. For all its successes, Greenpeace never became the revolutionary, world-changing movement that its more optimistic founders had planned. Various structural constraints, personality conflicts, and unexpected developments closed certain doors while opening others. Most of these, however, led the organization down progressively narrower corridors, thereby further constricting its options. Nevertheless, there is much that is inspiring and uplifting about Greenpeace’s story. Whatever the organization’s short-
comings, there is no doubt that it has highlighted environmental problems in ways that no other group has managed. In the process, it has revealed some of the cracks in the broad structural constraints—such as global capitalism and Cartesian dualism—that have dominated the ways in which people think and act in the modern world. As some of the organization’s founders have quipped during their more optimistic moments, this was quite an achievement for a bunch of peaceniks and hippies from a provincial city on the west coast of Canada.

Notes


2 In fact, Der Spiegel once referred to Greenpeace as the "McDonald’s of the environmental movement." See “McDonald’s der Umweltszene.” Der Spiegel, 9/16/1991, 87.


SEXUALITY IN MODERN GERMAN HISTORY

Conference at the German Historical Institute, Washington, DC. October 25–27, 2002. Conveners: Edward Ross Dickinson (University of Cincinnati) and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI). Participants: Claudia Bruns (University of Kassel), Catherine Dollard (Denison University), Greg Eghigian (Penn State University), Jennifer Evans (Carleton University), Geoffrey Giles (University of Florida), Elizabeth Heineman (University of Iowa), Dagmar Herzog (Michigan State University), Maria Höhn (Vassar College), Simone Lässig (GHI), Britta McEwen (UCLA), Kristin McGuire (University of Michigan), Tracie Matysik (Harvard University), Bernd Schäfer (GHI), Sara Ann Sewell (Virginia Wesleyan College), Scott Spector (University of Michigan), Annette Timm (University of Calgary), Lisa Todd (University of Toronto), Karl Toepfer (San Jose State University) Cornelia Usborne (University of Surrey), Christine von Oertzen (GHI), Tilmann Walter (University of Heidelberg), Thomas Weber (Oxford University/University of Glasgow).

This conference brought together scholars from the United States, Canada, England, and Germany who are working on the history of sexuality in Modern Germany from 1870 to the present. All participants reported on research that is currently in progress.

The first panel discussed female sexuality in Imperial Germany. Catherine Dollard’s paper “The Alte Jungfer as New Deviant: Sexualwissenschaft and the Single Woman in Imperial Germany” examined how the emerging field of sexology transformed the cultural stereotype of the “old maid” into an updated, “scientific” portrait of unwed women as sexually deviant. The extensive sexological literature portrayed single women as sexually repressed, oversexed, lesbian or engaged in bestiality with their pets, and thus provided new grounds for the continued condemnation of unwed women. Turning from sexual science to the sex reform movement, Kristin McGuire’s paper “A Decade of Sex, Love and Reform: Helene Stöcker’s ‘Neue Ethik’ from 1905–1915” examined a major women’s activist who worked to provide help for unwed mothers and to reform the system of sexual morality. Stöcker’s call for the legitimation of sexual relations outside of marriage provoked attacks from critics across the political spectrum, many of which accused her of promoting a
“sexual anarchy” that would destroy the foundations of society. Stöcker’s defense of individual sexual freedom and her belief in the power of love, McGuire argued, “created a different space to rethink the meanings of equality and democracy” that was profoundly threatening to her opponents.

Tracie Matysik’s paper “The ‘Female Homosexual’ and the Criminal Code in Germany, 1909” examined the controversy surrounding the proposal to criminalize sexual relations between women in the 1909 draft for a revised German penal code. Opponents of the proposal argued not only that homosexuality was innate and therefore should not be punished, but that it was impossible to define “beischlafähnliche Handlungen” (acts similar to intercourse) between women. The female homosexual, Matysik concluded, “proved to be a social entity particularly resistant to legal categorization” and thus revealed the fragility of several key categories in the debate: the individual, the social, and the moral. Another aspect of sexual deviance was the subject of Lisa Todd’s paper, “The Married Woman Who Ran Away With the Russian: The Public Discourse on Marital Infidelity in Germany during the First World War,” in which she examined sexual relations between German women and French and Russian prisoners of war, primarily through newspaper reports and the commentaries of contemporary sexologists. By punishing the extramarital affairs of women on the home front while facilitating extramarital sex for soldiers in the field, German civil and military authorities were trying to reinforce a sexual double standard that had already come under serious attack from reformers like Helene Stöcker in the years before the war.

The comment on the first panel was delivered by Dagmar Herzog, who raised a number of key questions concerning the study of female sexuality. When exactly did the new discourse about sex that Foucault talked about emerge in Germany? Was there a liberalization of hetero-sexual practice before 1914? How did the availability of birth control change the practice of intercourse, especially for women? How does one reconcile the repressive advice offered by turn-of-the-century sexology and its exhaustive cataloguing of perversities, which indicated that everyone was a potential pervert? Finally, Herzog suggested that the controversy over orgasm in current feminist theory should make historians of sexuality expand their definitions of “sexuality” beyond a narrow focus on orgasm or sexual intercourse. The ensuing discussion raised the question to what extent the discourse on sexuality was connected to modernization and to anxieties about modernization. Were anxieties about other aspects of modernization displaced onto women’s bodies and female sexuality? Or were male anxieties about the changing role of women in society projected onto other targets, such as male homosexuals? The discussion also called attention to the connection between sexu-
ality and religion at a time when most people saw marriage as a sacrament. It was pointed out, too, that because heterosexual sex at the turn of the century carried a significant risk of pregnancy, it was much more closely connected with reproduction in people’s minds than it is today. Moreover, the late nineteenth century witnessed the efforts to interfere in reproduction through eugenics and population policy, which politicized sexuality in a very direct way. Finally, the discussion featured reflections on the methodological challenges involved in doing the history of sexuality, including the roles of secrecy and shame, which make it virtually impossible to know a person’s innermost sexual desires. Sexuality is situated at an even deeper level than the private, and yet this very secrecy makes it more vulnerable to being instrumentalized for political purposes.

The second panel was devoted to male sexuality in the fin de siècle. Thomas Weber’s paper “Student Sexuality in pre-1914 Heidelberg and Oxford: National Differences Compared” argued that Heidelberg was sexually much more permissive than Oxford. In both places, class was a crucial variable in heterosexual relations: Male students had hardly any interactions with women of their own social class, but had sexual relations with women of the lower and lower middle classes. In Heidelberg, such liaisons took place in the open, whereas in Oxford they had to remain secret. While Weber rejected the homoerotic image of Oxford as exaggerated, he argued that the greater repression of heterosexual sexuality at Oxford contributed to a more homoerotic culture at Oxford, even though the extent to which romantic friendships involved homosexuality is difficult to determine.

The remaining three papers on this panel dealt with male homosexuality at the turn of the century. Whereas much of the historical literature on homosexuality in this period has focused on the emergence of medical discourses of homosexuality or the homosexual emancipation movement, these three papers called attention to different aspects of the history of homosexuality: the self-perceptions of a homosexual worker, masculinist theories of homosexuality, and the association of homosexuality with power and corruption. Sara Ann Sewell’s paper “Sexuality and Class: The Case of Franz Siedersleben” examined the posthumously published autobiography of a homosexual worker who committed suicide in 1908 after having been prosecuted under Germany’s sodomy law (article 175). Unlike most workers’ autobiographies, Siedersleben’s text said little about work, political activism or family, and focused almost entirely on his sexual experiences. Sewell showed that Siedersleben saw his homosexuality as innate and perceived it as a feminine trait, but did not regard it as an illness.
Claudia Bruns’s paper “(Homo-) Sexuality as Virile Social Principle: Sexological, Antifeminist, and Anti-Semitic Strategies of Hegemonic Masculinity in the ‘Masculinist’ Discourse, 1880 to 1920” examined the theories of the so-called “masculinists,” who argued that—far from being ill, femininized or members of a “third sex”—homosexuals were especially virile men who played a particularly useful role in national life. Bruns’s analysis of how masculinists like Gustav Jäger, Benedikt Friedlaender, and Hans Blüher redefined homosexuality and “normal sexuality” in order to have homosexuality included in hegemonic masculinity demonstrated that definitions of sexual desire, gender, and normality were (and are) socially constructed and malleable. The masculinists, she argued, sought to achieve their own inclusion in the category of “normal masculinity” through an exclusionary strategy directed against women and Jews.

Scott Spector’s paper “Sexual Sensations and the Social Order in Vienna, 1900–1910” explored the identification of the homosexual with power and corruption in turn-of-the-century sex scandals. The German Krupp scandal of 1902, the Viennese Beer affair of 1905, and exposes of homosexual life in the Oesterreichische Kriminalzeitung (1907) all transformed a private perversion into a public affair by hinting at corruption in high places. In doing so, Spector shows, those who “exposed” these scandals—be it the German SPD or the Austrian Gerichtszeitung—were usually enmeshed in two contradictions: advocating the legalization of homosexuality while simultaneously criticizing the police for not sufficiently enforcing the existing anti-homosexual law; and trying to link a supposedly “modern” degeneracy to the corruption of premodern elites.

Richard Wetzell’s comment on the second panel questioned the distinction between homosexuality and “romantic friendship” in Weber’s paper, arguing that friendships between men who went on to heterosexual lives might have included homosexual behavior during their college years. He placed Sewell’s paper in the context of recent work which has argued that the construction of a “homosexual subject” was the result not just of a medical discourse imposed on homosexuals, but of autobiographical discourses with emancipatory elements. Finally, Wetzell wondered whether the current state of research allows us to draw up a map of the competing discourses on homosexuality at the turn of the century, which might include: moral purity movement, medical discourse, intermediate sex theory, homosexual rights movement, masculinists, and autobiographical discourses. The ensuing discussion raised the question whether public discourse about marginal sexuality, such as homosexuality, was not also about sexual self-knowledge. Taking this argument further, it was argued that many readers undoubtedly derived voyeuristic pleasure from reading about sexual “abnormalities” in Krafft-Ebing’s books or the Austrian Kriminalzeitung. Drawing on George Chauncey’s
work on New York, discussants also suggested that the world of homosexuality was one in which momentary sexual roles—including the participation of married men in clandestine homosexual encounters—were more important than a fixed homosexual identity.

The third panel addressed the topic of sex reform, sexual culture, and the regulation of sexuality in the 1920s and 1930s. Cornelie Usborne examined the “Representation of Abortion in Weimar Popular Culture” through a study of several mid-1920s films and serialized novels. These films and novels associated women’s sexuality with danger, death, and criminality, and uncritically accepted the medical claim that the aborting woman was safe in a doctor’s hands, whereas lay abortionists were portrayed as negative characters. Usborne noted that these fictional narratives contradicted the actual experiences of working-class women, who often turned to lay abortionists and regarded abortions as fairly routine events rather than tragedies. Despite these discrepancies between fiction and reality, Usborne concluded that these films and novels played a major role in raising public awareness of the abortion issue view during the Weimar years.

Moving from fictional narratives to sex manuals, Britta McEwen’s paper “Popular Sexual Knowledge for and about Women in Vienna, 1918–1934” charted a transformation in the content and dissemination of sexual knowledge. Whereas prewar sex manuals were written by doctors, after the war psychologists, sex reformers, and advice columnists all began to participate in the popularization of sexual knowledge for a wider audience. Furthermore, whereas prewar sex manuals had focused on sexual abnormalities and diseases, interwar texts focused on heterosexual partnerships with a mutually satisfying sex life, female pleasure, basic anatomical knowledge, and contraceptive methods. The popularization of sexual knowledge was a process of de-medicalization, replacing the medical discourse with melodramatic stories.

A different aspect of the shift from a medical to a popularized discourse on sexuality was the subject of Karl Toepfer’s paper “German Monumentalization of Perverse Eroticism, 1928–1932,” which examined the large, lavishly produced, and encyclopedic tomes on eroticism and sexual aberration that were published in the last years of the Weimar Republic. Whereas scholarly works on sexuality before 1928 usually took a medical-anthropological approach, with images functioning to document the text, the works published in 1928–1932 displayed a profusion of autonomous images that connected perverse eroticism to aesthetic experience rather than medical or anthropological theories. The dissemination of erotic fantasy in these works played a crucial role in establishing the political significance of feminism, sex reform, racial hygiene, and nudism. They also marginalized normal heterosexual intercourse by suggesting
that the true “art of love” was revealed in sexual climaxes outside intercourse.

Geoffrey Giles’s paper “Legislating Nazi Homophobia” examined the “radicalization of prosecution against homosexuality” that resulted from the revision of article 175 of the penal code in June 1935 and a Reichsgericht ruling in August 1935. The original article 175, in effect since 1871, had proscribed “unnatural indecency” (widernatürliche Unzucht) between men, and the courts had established the interpretation that only anal intercourse was punishable. The revised article 175 of 1935 criminalized simple “indecency” (Unzucht) between men, and that same year the Reichsgericht interpreted the new provision to mean that any touching of another man’s body (even if clothed) with sexual intent was punishable, thus declaring “open season” for the hunt for homosexuals. Because the meaning of “indecency” was never publicly explained and court cases involving homosexuality were subject to a news blackout, the Nazi campaign against homosexuality was deprived of any deterrent effect and therefore led to the arrests of tens of thousands of men who had no idea that their behavior (sex between men other than penetrative sex) had become illegal.

Edward Ross Dickinson’s comment on the third panel addressed the theme of change in several of the papers: from medical discourse to melodramatic stories; from a cataloguing of sexualities to the activist project of helping people understand their sexuality; from the dominance of the medical treatise to a variety of media (films, lectures, advice clinics) for the dissemination of sexual knowledge; from the study to the evocation of perverse sexuality; and finally, a shift in the audience from bourgeois men to women and the working-class. He also noted that these developments undermined the pose of the detached sexologist, as authors began to identify themselves as participants and practitioners of perverse sexuality. Since all these changes appeared to have a liberating effect, Dickinson asked whether the authors were ready to replace Foucault’s emphasis on discipline with a new stress on a democratic regime of power. In the discussion, Geoffrey Giles noted that the law could influence self-perception: Because article 175 (in its pre-1935 version) punished only anal sex, many young men regarded mutual masturbation between men as perfectly normal, and those who engaged in it did not consider themselves homosexual. Karl Toepfer noted that the monumentalization of sex amounted to an industrialization of sexual discourse. The catalogue of perverse acts in Toepfer’s books and the careful distinctions between sex acts drawn by the men in the Giles’s court cases led one discussant to challenge Foucault’s thesis that sexuality was transformed from a multiplicity of sexual acts into fixed sexual identities (especially homo- versus heterosexuality) starting in the late nineteenth century.
Finally, the discussion raised the question of the distinction between sexual enlightenment and pornography. Whereas some suspected that Toepfer’s works were simply titillating to most readers, others argued that titillation could also be a form of enlightenment. If reading the text and looking at the images involved not only knowledge but also arousal, it was suggested that historians of sexuality pay closer attention to the connection between knowledge and arousal.

The fourth panel examined the history of sexuality in postwar West and East Germany. The first two papers, on West Germany, challenged the widespread image of the 1950s as a period of sexual repression, calling attention to a liberalization of some sexual norms and the rise of a sexual consumer culture. Maria Höhn’s paper “The Struggle for Wohlanständigkeit: West German Debates on Premarital Sexuality during the 1950s” examined the failure of a national morality campaign targeting the relationships between West German women and American GIs. The deployment of more than 200,000 GIs following the Korean war led to a proliferation of sexual relationships of GIs with German women, which could take the form of long-term relationships akin to common-law marriage, more casual relationships with girlfriends, and sexual encounters with prostitutes. Unconcerned with such distinctions, the Deutscher Verein für öffentliche und private Fürsorge convinced the Federal Government to call on local authorities to prosecute all German women who had relations with GIs as prostitutes. This morality campaign, however, met with resistance at the local level, as local officials and judges refused to prosecute women just because they lived with GIs. While this public tolerance had an economic aspect (local girlfriends ensured that the GIs’ dollars went spent locally), Höhn argued that this relaxation of sexual norms also shows that Germans no longer recognized any right of church or state to regulate private sexuality. Nevertheless, the Nazi legacy of racism was alive and well: by the second half of the 1950s, the morality campaign focused almost entirely on women who had relationships with black GIs.

Elizabeth Heineman’s paper “Sex Objects: Sexual Consumer Culture and the Society of Affluence” discussed the entry of Germans into the marketplace of sexual consumer goods during the 1950s. Critical of zero-hour narratives, Heineman stressed postwar continuities with Weimar and Nazi-era developments, revealing different stories for men and women. Since women were subject to the Nazis’ highly repressive population politics, a focus on women suggests that the postwar sexual consumer industry was fueled by women’s desire for the contraceptives they had been denied during the Nazi years. Heineman showed, however, that even under the Nazis the back pages of popular magazines advertised mail-order catalogues through which condoms and erotica could be ob-
tained. As for men, since the Wehrmacht disseminated condoms and even erotic literature to every soldier, postwar men’s demand for these products was nothing new, but a matter of renewed access after a brief disruption. Thus the major change after 1945 was the equalization of sexual consumer opportunities (in the form of mail-order catalogues) for men and women—not because opportunities for women expanded, but because the demise of the Wehrmacht curtailed men’s access. Heineman concluded that the triumph of the mail-order catalogue as the main site of sexual consumption in the 1950s made for a more domestic sexual consumer culture.

Jennifer Evans and Greg Eghigian explored aspects of the history of sexuality in East Germany. In her paper “The Moral State: Sex, Normality, and Socialist Personhood in the GDR,” Evans drew on Foucault’s work on governmentality to examine the treatment of homosexuality in GDR 1950s legal theory and practice. Although a 1952 draft for a reformed penal code called for decriminalizing consensual sex between adult men, the repression following the June 1953 uprising not only aborted this reform, but led to an intensified prosecution of homosexuals. Whereas SBZ and GDR had previously used the pre-Nazi version of article 175, in 1954 the GDR reverted to enforcing the 1935 version with its Nazi-era legal interpretation, which did not require evidence of penetrative sex for convictions of homosexuality (see Giles paper above). Evans’s analysis of court cases in Chemnitz from 1952–1956 showed that, ironically, the effort to forge a “socialist morality” by prosecuting homosexuality as a remnant of “bourgeois degeneracy” mobilized bourgeois notions of morality that were indistinguishable from those current in West Germany.

Greg Eghigian’s paper “Socialism and the Limits of Desire” examined the development of “East German Forensic Psychology’s Encounter with Sex Crime.” Initially, in the 1950s and early 1960s, party officials rejected criminology and forensic psychology altogether. One of the first GDR studies of sex crime, published in 1961, explained child molestation as a bourgeois remnant that would disappear as socialism developed. By the early to mid-1960s, however, party officials, judges, and legal scholars began to take an interest in psychopathological approaches to sex crime, leading to a rebirth of criminology and forensic psychology in the GDR. By the mid-1970s psychopathological research was gradually eclipsed by the more sociologically oriented field of victimology, and in the 1980s psychological tests became more prominent. All these changes, Eghigian concluded, show that after the 1950s, the GDR’s human sciences were not exclusively determined by political ideology and were in fact significantly influenced by international trends in East and West.

In her comments, Christine von Oertzen urged the authors to adopt a comparative perspective regarding East and West Germany. She also
asked what impact the rise of a sexual consumer culture had on sexual behavior and whether economic factors, such as the money that the G.I.’s spent in the local towns, changed the population’s moral views only temporarily or in the long term. The discussion explored the ambiguous relationship of the sexual consumer culture to the sexual revolution of the 1960s and the women’s liberation movement. On the one hand, the sexual revolutionaries aimed their criticism not only at the repression of sexuality but also at the commercialization of sex; on the other hand, enterprises like Beate Uhse anticipated a central topos of the women’s movement by stressing the importance of female orgasm.

The conference’s concluding discussion was introduced by two papers, by Tilmann Walter and Annette Timm. Walter’s paper “Veränderte wissenschaftliche Blickwinkel auf die Sexualität im 20. Jahrhundert” (Changed scientific approaches to sexuality in the twentieth century) provided an overview of the history of sex research from Karl Heinrich Ulrichs to Masters and Johnson. The late-nineteenth and early twentieth-century pioneers, including Ulrichs, Richard von Krafft-Ebing and Sigmund Freud, practiced sexology as a “Geständniswissenschaft” (confessional science) that focused on sexual deviance. Almost all of Krafft-Ebing’s and Freud’s cases were patients whose sexuality led to suffering or failure and who told their case histories in the hope of finding relief. By contrast, sex research in the second half of the twentieth century, exemplified by Alfred Kinsey and Masters-Johnson, shifted its focus to “normal” sexuality, which it increasingly reduced to orgasm. According to Walter, the key characteristic of “bourgeois sexuality,” influential to the present, has been the belief that the individual must control (Selbststeuerung) and take responsibility for his or her sexuality. In her paper “The Politics of Fertility or the Politics of the Body? Methodological Speculations on the History of Sexuality in Twentieth-Century Germany,” Annette Timm surveyed the recent historical literature on “body history” in order to assess its strengths and weaknesses as an approach to the history of sexuality. While recognizing that historians such as Ute Planert and Gunilla-Friederike Budde have made profitable use of body history in their work, Timm concluded that body history is of little use to historians who seek to study the relationship between “sexual systems” and civil society by examining the implementation of social policy in the area of human sexuality.

The concluding discussion focused on the question of how to write the history of sexuality. After many papers that had explored connections between sexuality and politics, Tilmann Walter led off with the statement that, in his view, the history of sexuality ought to be about sex and not about something else, such as gender relations, politics or the state. He also argued that the role of power in sex is fundamentally different from
other power relations: a sexual desire for someone makes us weak, and sex always involves emotions, which are power-laden. This statement met with different reactions. Some endorsed the call to focus on sexuality itself, noting how rarely beauty, love or ecstasy had been discussed during the conference. Others argued that sexuality was inextricably connected to social and political conditions. Still others worried that attempts to write the history of sexuality as a history of pleasure would result in a male-centered history, because an exclusive focus on pleasure ignored women’s fear of pregnancy. This claim, in turn, elicited different reactions. On the one hand, it was pointed out that pregnancy was not always perceived as a threat, since it was sometimes a desired outcome. On the other hand, it was argued that sexuality always involves fears for both genders—not only of pregnancy, but also of sexually transmitted diseases. At the end of the conference, it was clear that the history of sexuality is work in progress and that historians of sexuality face a number of challenges. Among them: How to recover something as private as sexual experience? And: How to explore the connection of sexuality to social and political forces without losing sight of the experience of pleasure that is a crucial part of sexuality?

Richard F. Wetzell
Gendering Modern German History: Rewritings of the Mainstream

Conference at the Munk Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto, March 21, 2003. Conveners: Karen Hagemann (University of Toronto/Technical University of Berlin), Christine von Oertzen (GHI). Co-organized by the Joint Initiative in German and European Studies at the Munk Centre for International Studies and the GHI-Washington. Co-sponsored by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), the GHI-Washington, and the University of Toronto. Participants: Ann Taylor Allen (University of Louisville), Maria B. Baader (University of Toronto), Doris Bergen (University of Notre Dame), Kathleen Canning (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor), Jane Caplan (Bryn Mawr College), Roger Chickering (Georgetown University), Belinda Davis (Rutgers University), Margit Eichler (University of Toronto), Geoff Eley (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor), Atina Grossmann (The Cooper Union, New York City), Young-Sun Hong (SUNY, Stony Brook), Marion Kaplan (New York University), Wiebke Kolbe (University of Bielefeld), Claudia Koonz (Duke University), Thomas Kühne (University of Konstanz), Thomas Lindenberger (Center for Contemporary History, Potsdam), Michael Marrus (School of Graduate Studies, University of Toronto), Mary Jo Maynes (University of Minnesota), Robert Moeller (University of California, Irvine), Merith Niehuss (University of the Bundeswehr, Munich) Ronald W. Pruessen (University of Toronto), Jean Quataert (SUNY, Binghamton), Till van Rahden (University of Chicago/University of Cologne), James Retallack (University of Toronto), Carola Sachse (Max Planck Institute for the History of the Sciences), Edith Saurer (University of Vienna), Angelika Schaser (University of Hamburg), Susan Solomon (Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto), Hanna Schissler (University of Hannover), Irmgard Steinisch (York University), Richard Wetzell (GHI).

Writing on the history of women has undergone remarkable expansion and change since it began in the late 1960s. Not only have the questions become more varied and complex; there has also been an increasing emphasis on writing the history of women as part of a broader history of gender, pushing forward the move from traditional political history to social and cultural history. To what extent have studies on women and gender influenced our knowledge of German history in general? What are the differences between North America and Germany in this respect?

This conference brought together distinguished scholars from Canada, Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom to reflect...
on the state of historiography on gender in German history. Each of the eleven panels consisted of a main speaker and a commentator. In order to promote a lively exchange across the “Atlantic divide,” each panel paired German and American presenters. The speakers covered a broad range of fields in German history.

Geoff Eley opened the first panel, speaking on nation, national identity, and collective memory. Eley noted that female voices were marginalized in the nineteenth-century public sphere, because German nation building created particular obstacles to the development of a strong women’s suffrage movement, such as strong anti-Catholicism, anti-feminism, and anti-Semitism. But in contrast to their English counterparts, German women in his view also failed to develop a radical feminism, so that in Germany, a gendered analysis of nation-making had to broaden its focus far beyond the merely political. Eley’s presentation was challenged by numerous participants for its narrow definition of politics. Commentator Angelika Schaser (University of Hamburg) pointed out the irony that Eley, who played a prominent role in challenging the thesis of a German Sonderweg, emphasized German peculiarities in the case of gender and nation-building.

Likewise, Thomas Kühne’s presentation on the state, parties, and politics was criticized for its narrow understanding of gender as a concept and category of historical research. On the one hand, Kühne pledged to “bring the state back in” to the historical analysis of gender. On the other, he contended that in many areas of politics and the state, gender played little or no role. Instead of focusing on gender-based power relations, he suggested focusing on the state as a masculine world held together by male bonds. In his comment, James Retallack acknowledged the challenge of integrating gender in the historical analysis of the state, but he also referred to well-known historiographical work that had successfully met this challenge. Several participants, most prominently among them Jean Quataert, questioned the extent to which Kühne had moved away from traditional “mainstream” political history.

Karen Hagemann provided the audience with an overview on gender, military, and war in German historiography. She noted that German military history belonged to the fields that until most recently resisted taking gender into account. Recent works, among them her own, have changed this picture. In particular, studies on masculinity have broadened our understanding of the interrelation between warfare, identity, and society. Roger Chickering expressed his appreciation of these findings; however, he was less optimistic than Hagemann about the innovative impact that recent studies on gender, masculinity, and the military had on mainstream military history. In his view, the overwhelming ma-
majority of military historians in Germany and the United States failed to address the challenge of a gendered analysis in their field.

Belinda Davis discussed the outcomes of three decades of research on protest and social movements in German history that correspond with international findings. Female political activists and their activism seem more successful when they address conventional “women’s” issues within conservative networks; in the transition from protest to power, women tend to “disappear” from the political platform unless they pursue “women’s issues.” Once protest movements gain influence and establish a standing, women tend to lose status within these movements. Davis maintained that despite their merits, most studies of gender in protest and social movements did not result in methodological or theoretical innovation. Nor did they stay true to the original principle of women’s history: serving political aims. Approvingly, Thomas Lindenberger pleaded for the inclusion of microhistories of the everyday as in the study of “history from below,” an approach that has proved open to the feminist challenge.

Edith Saurer examined the impact of gender research in the areas of religion and ethnicity. Important studies have shed light on the denominational women’s movement and emancipation, on the feminization of religion since the late eighteenth century, and on the ambiguities of women’s place within organized religions. Saurer stated, however, that studies on religion and gender in early modern times have not only been far more numerous but also more attentive to methodological and theoretical innovation. She especially encouraged scholars of modern German history to focus more closely on the gendered language of religion, for example in women’s religious writings. Ann Taylor Allen supported this plea by adding that the history of organized religion in modern times has for too long been ignored by gender historians because it was considered “anti-emancipatory.” Marion Kaplan emphasized that religion provided more than just a study of beliefs. “Behavior” and “belonging” also had to be taken into account, whereby the research on religion would become a complex task as well as a useful tool to further explore the gendered dimensions of social and cultural history.

Maria Baader presented an excellent account of the state-of-the-art of German-Jewish history. The historiography on Jews in Germany has only recently attracted greater interest on the part of non-Jewish German historians. Baader stressed that in contrast to any other field of German historiography, studies on women and gender have found their way into the mainstream of German-Jewish and German “general” history. Gender played a pioneering role in German-Jewish social history, namely through Marion Kaplan’s pathbreaking studies on German-Jewish middle-class women, which in turn made considerable inroads into Ger-
man national narratives. In Baader’s view, younger German scholars of both sexes seem to integrate the category of gender into their work with ease, and, as Till van Rahden pointed out, major publication series and journals devoted to German Jewish Studies publish more essays on gender than most of the leading German history journals.

In contrast to Baader’s optimistic account, Doris Bergen stated the opposite for the use of gender as an analytical category in most studies of the Holocaust. Even though it is widely agreed that Nazi Germany was a “male state” explicitly organized along gender lines, gender has barely found its way into mainstream analysis, either in Germany or in the United States. Important and innovative work on topics like the interrelations between fascisms and sexualities or on the gendered reevaluation of the categories “perpetrator,” “bystander,” and “victim” is flourishing in niches. Bergen presented a striking example of how the analysis of gender can deepen our understanding about the inconsistencies within Nazi ascriptions of racial or ethnic classifications and thus reshape the perception of Nazi Germany. When during the war years courts had to decide whether or not to grant the status “Volksdeutscher,” they often referred to fitness for duty, to reproductive capacities, or to household skills instead of emphasizing racial criteria.

Kathleen Canning traced the chronological relationship between gender, class, citizenship, and the welfare state in Anglo-Saxon historical writing during the last four decades, and she compared this development with the changes in German historiography. She reminded the audience that in England and the United States, the feminist focus on women and gender emerged from the field of labor history, which in turn had a crucial impact of the so-called “demise” of class as an undisputed category in social history. The focus of studies on labor and gender widened to a whole range of areas such as welfare, state and social policies, social hygiene, production and consumption, body history, and citizenship. The study of gender clearly fostered mainstream knowledge about the welfare state, but Canning argued for moving beyond this stage. She suggested further historicizing citizenship by viewing it as a multidimensional discursive practice that includes individual experience. The subjectivity of citizenship should be moved to the center stage of historical research to understand more about social interactions and the dynamics of the shaping and the limits of the welfare state.

Merith Niehuss provided the audience with reflections on gender, the family, and consumption. She argued that over the last decades, a growing number of studies have concentrated on the gendered impacts of labor market policies, on the discourses of the male breadwinner and the female housewife model, as well as on women’s experiences of family- and work-related labors. For future research, Niehuss made suggestions
as to how historians might further engage in interdisciplinary approaches. For example, she felt that statistics were neglected in recent historical research. Also, disciplines like psychology and sociology provided tools to better understand processes of decision-making in areas like employment, population politics, and household management. Robert Moeller (who was unable to deliver his comment in person; instead it was read by Robin Ostow from the University of Toronto) replied to Niehuss’s account that all history should begin at home, i.e. with individual stories and issues relevant to personal experience. His statement was in some ways echoed by the audience, which was reluctant to accept Niehuss’s quantitative approach. Instead, discussants urged the forum to consider carefully the differences in the notion of “family.” On the one hand, it should be regarded as a subject for historical research. On the other hand, it had to be historicized as a concept that helped shape norms, which in turn marginalized alternative forms of cohabitation.

In the last session of the conference, Atina Grossmann presented a thorough and amusing analysis of the role of gender in the history of bodies, sexualities, and reproduction. Grossmann reaffirmed calls made earlier in the conference to implement concepts of subjectivity, experience, and everyday life, also in order to reexamine current assumptions of periodization. In particular, liberating and repressive tendencies during the Weimar period needed to be reconsidered, as well as continuities and discontinuities after 1933. Wiebke Kolbe added approvingly that work was also left to be done for the nineteenth century and on the conceptualization of men’s bodies.

Hanna Schissler and Jane Caplan wrapped up the discussions that had unfolded during three days of intense debate. They both returned to the overarching question of this workshop: whether or not gender history has found its way into the mainstream of “universal” German history. Both of them agreed that this question marked an “Atlantic divide” between the academic cultures in Germany and North America. History-writing on women and gender started a decade earlier in the United States, where feminist historians faced fewer institutional barriers than in Germany. Also, master narratives were less powerful in the decentralized and culturally diverse American educational system. As a result, American gender historians were among the first to begin to question the mainstream in many areas of German historiography, and, as the conference in Toronto showed, they oppose the model of “mainstreaming” gender history.

Kathleen Canning rejected taking the mainstream as a means for measuring the success of gender history, for this would certainly limit innovative potential and prevent scholars from asking important questions and developing interdisciplinary approaches. Atina Grossmann
provided personal recollections to avoid an overly pessimistic view. She drew attention to the fact that in the United States, gender historians had moved from the margins into good positions: informal meetings had grown into powerful networks, which was particularly true of the German Women’s History Group in New York. Younger historians also challenged the view of those who believed they had been left on the margins. They considered the presenters at this workshop as representing the mainstream of German gender history.

Christine von Oertzen
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NAZI CRIMES AND THE LAW

Conference at the University of Amsterdam Law School, August 16–18, 2003. Conveners: Henry Friedlander (City University of New York), Nathan Stoltzfus (Florida State University, Tallahassee), Richard F. Wetzell (GHI). Participants: Michael S. Bryant (University of Toledo), Jonathan Bush (Columbia University Law School), Dick de Mildt (University of Amsterdam), Geoffrey J. Giles (University of Florida), Patricia Heberer (U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum), Eric A. Johnson (Central Michigan University), Hans Safrian (Institut für Zeitgeschichte, University of Vienna), Annette Weinke (independent historian, Berlin), Elizabeth D. White (U.S. Department of Justice).

Scholarly and public discourse have long viewed the trials of Nazi criminals as a litmus test to assess the relative success of Germany’s efforts to deal with its Nazi past. The way the Federal Republic pursued prosecution of Nazi criminals came to be seen as indicative as to whether Germans had advanced to embrace democracy. This conference on law and state-sponsored crimes focused on Germany as a case study. The presentations examined various successes and failures of German and Austrian postwar trials, as well as of early United States trials of Nazi criminals, and considered the use of historical evidence and the role of historians as expert witnesses. What was the place of German law in relationship to Nazi crimes? How did it work to facilitate crimes? To what extent were Nazi crimes illegal according to German law? After the war, the German judicial system charged with prosecuting Nazi perpetrators was embedded in the society that, as a whole, had perpetrated Nazi crimes. Yet this story, relative to all other pertinent cases, is generally a success story. How does this German record compare with records of the use of international law in recording and redressing state-sponsored crimes? To what extent can the Nuremberg trials, carried out by powers that had totally defeated the enemy, serve as the cornerstone of future international legal attempts to redress state-sponsored crimes?

Henry Friedlander opened the conference with his presentation, entitled “Legal and Extralegal Persecution in the Nazi Era.” Among other subjects, Friedlander examined the role of courts in relation to Nazi political crimes. Ninety percent of all German judicial officials had belonged to the Nazi Party, welcoming the proclaimed law and order state following the disaster of Weimar. The judicial system was one reason the Holocaust resembled machine-like mass murder rather than a Czarist pogrom, and helped establish a sense of security and order for the majority. The dictatorship preferred to convey to the masses a sense of Rechtsicher-
heit, of stability and legal predictability. Nazi mass movement politics required large parts of the population to feel secure. Sensitive to popular opinion, the dictatorship claimed to create a situation that reflected popular sentiment. This did not aim to make an ideological enthusiast of everyone, although it did go beyond mere concern with morale. The regime needed to keep the “Aryan” majority satisfied and endowed with a sense of safety. This explains why the regime struggled so much with the issue of Jews married to Aryans, in particular what to do about their children, and ended up compromising “racial purification” in their case.

The law helped mobilize the consensus for Hitler, and mobilized criminal acts as well. It was widely believed that what Hitler said had the force of law, and some judges even made reference to this. Of course the range of activities the regime could undertake openly with popular approval expanded under the conditions of war and demands of patriotism. When its concern with the appearance of public security and fairness conflicted with goals the regime knew would cause controversy, the regime turned to deception of the public. This included secrecy, extralegal activities, non-public actions, false confessions, and deaths attributed to natural causes or “attempts to escape.”

Geoffrey Giles presented a paper on social norms and laws regarding homosexuality. The campaign against homosexuals was part of the Nazis’ attempts at consensus building. The prioritizing of measures dealing with homosexuality, within a much more sweeping (and in fact never accomplished) penal reform, reflects a desire to impress the public that the regime was getting things done, especially in cleaning up the country after the perceived ghastly libertinism of the Weimar Republic. This short-term political expediency in 1933 grew in June 1934 during the Röhm Purge into an alleged national crisis to shore up support from conservatives. Hitler personally cared little about homosexuality. But as Himmler became more and more obsessed with the issue, lawyers laid the groundwork for an unprecedented purge of sexual outsiders. As the situation grew direr for homosexuals during the Second World War, legal experts continued to work toward ways to streamline the conviction and punishment, under the broadest possible definition of a homosexual act, of the hundreds of thousands of homosexuals who had so far eluded them. The Führer did nothing to interfere.

Yet the radicalized prosecution of homosexuals during the Nazi period illustrates that the spirit of the law as defined by Party leaders was more decisive than the letter. The theme of law and society was elaborated, showing that laws followed and expressed social customs. Nazi legal guidelines called for laws to be written in clear, easily understandable language that reflected the “national feeling for justice and morality.” Germany during the decades preceding the “Third Reich” had the
largest movement for homosexual emancipation in Europe. In Germany, where acceptance of Freud was most advanced, both homosexuality and tolerance of it were central to the rapid transition to modernity and the general emancipation of instinct. This did not mean popular opinion supported homosexuality. When at the end of June 1935 the regime tightened the penal code, including laws against homosexuality, “the public could be relied upon to condemn sodomy.” Most Germans, in any case, believed for much of the Third Reich that the prisons and concentration camps were filled with criminals who fully deserved to be there.

Eric Johnson presented a closer look at Nazi perpetrators he characterized as “Local Eichmanns.” He discussed the identities of two local Gestapo officers and their fates in post-Nazi West Germany, comparing them with Hannah Arendt’s characterization of Eichmann. Johnson concluded that two officers, Karl Löffler and Richard Schulenburg, from Cologne and Krefeld respectively, were particular types of people—elderly, calm, and outwardly friendly, yet loyal Nazis and ardent anti-Semites—that Nazi authorities selected for the most important project of deporting German Jews. These men had been central figures in the persecution, deportation, and death of thousands of Cologne and Krefeld Jews.

Johnson then inquired into the impact of the vital support Jews and church officials gave these Gestapo officers after the war. Löffler and Schulenburg, like every Gestapo agent from Cologne and Krefeld Johnson has researched, had “Persilscheine,” letters from influential church leaders and Jewish survivors amounting to clean bills of political health that portrayed them as humane career police officers. In addition to asking what impact this had on their prosecution, Johnson also raised questions about why these persons wrote letters of support, and whether they should influence our own opinion of the Gestapo agents they praised.

Certainly these letters influenced the German judicial system. Although one might argue that these Gestapo officers’ guilt was greater than Eichmann’s even if the number of victims they were responsible for was smaller, denazification processes initially classified them as Category III “minor offenders.” Thanks to supportive testimony and letters, however, Löffler and Schulenburg successfully appealed. Löffler joined the ranks of the “exonerated” with Category V status in November, 1949; Schulenburg’s status was lifted to Category IV in July 1950. Both were thus eligible again for police pensions, with the caveat that their years in Gestapo service could not be counted. By the end of 1955, through further appeals, both men were allowed to count their years with the Gestapo in the calculation of their pension, but not the promotions they had received as Gestapo officers. In 1958 their promotions in the Gestapo were in-

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cluded too, and both men lived comfortably to a ripe old age. Johnson concluded by noting that “their experiences were repeated across Germany.”

In the first afternoon presentation, Annette Weinke argued for a greater historicization of the effort to study postwar trials as a test of Germany’s success in coming to terms with its past, casting her interpretations in a broad social and political perspective and seeking to take East German history equally into account along with that of West Germany. To what extent did a formalized strategy of confronting the past based in criminal law end up shaping society’s idea of Nazi perpetrators? How did this promote or block a broader confrontation with the Nazi past? Weinke showed that the Federal Republic’s renewed prosecution of Nazi criminals in the late 1950s cannot be explained simply by a general rise in moral standards; rather she finds the logic of this in the context of German-German Cold War conflict.

Weinke illustrated the degree of mutual influence between the two German states in memory politics by examining two different phases of the prosecution against Nazis, in the late 1950s and in the 1960s. The “treatment of the past” and the historiographic perception of this process, she found, were largely influenced by the East-West conflict, as the two Germanys attempted to gain legitimacy and in turn cast aspersions on the other. She revealed how the GDR, in addition to domestic and other international influences, shaped the FRG’s investigations of the Nazi past. In the end, Weinke’s approach permits a view of the history of anti-Nazi prosecution in postwar Germany not only as an indicator, but also as a medium of the politics of transformation from Nazism to democracy.

Jonathan Bush spoke on the history and consequences of a Nuremberg trial, United States v. Wilhelm List et al. (1947–48). The trial was known informally as the Hostage Trial, with senior military officials charged with killing of dozens of civilian hostages in reprisal for what the Wehrmacht deemed to be partisan killings of its members or other Germans. Beginning with its invasion of the Balkans in the spring of 1941, the German army terrorized Yugoslavia and Greece with hostage killings numbering in the hundreds of thousands.

Of the ten generals tried, eight were convicted of various war crimes and crimes against humanity, mainly related to the murder of civilians. The trial was not politically motivated, although Bush interpreted the trial as a key factor in ending the Nuremberg trials program and exacerbating tensions at the outset of the Cold War, and related it to important developments in international law. Soviet bloc and international lawyers heavily criticized the decision on List. They condemned the court’s holding that some military destruction had been lawful not because it was necessary but because it had been perceived to be a military necessity by
one of Hitler’s favorite generals. More appalling to civilians throughout the Balkans who had struggled to resist uninvited German aggression was the court’s conclusion that in resisting as partisans, they had violated the law of war. The court had also found that there were acceptable levels of hostage murders, and some were deemed within the range of lawful actions.

Responses to the List case are found in the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949. Although most national military codes allowed reprisals, including the taking of hostages under limited conditions, new Geneva provisions prohibited pillage, wanton destruction, and all collective punishments and reprisals, whether against POWs or civilians. Bush concluded that this strong rejection of collective punishment marked the repudiation of traditional views that reprisals in war were a useful tool for ensuring compliance with war laws, as the court had held in the List decision.

Nathan Stoltzfus focused on a Wehrmacht massacre on the Greek island of Cephalonia, in General List’s territory, of around six thousand Italian officers and soldiers after they had surrendered. In September 1943, following the fall of Mussolini, the Wehrmacht took over military positions of occupation previously held by the Italians. Germans presented Italian troops with an ultimatum without basis in international law: join the Wehrmacht, surrender unconditionally, or face forcible disarmament. A combative spirit arose within the Italian troops, especially after they perceived that the Germans were not fulfilling their guarantees. Italian General Gandin, despite being a firm Mussolini supporter, followed the general opinion of his troops and decided to resist a German attack.

The sheer brutality of the unlawful murder of POWs spurred discussion among conference participants about motivations for mass murder in World War II. There seemed to be general agreement that there were a variety of motives, if perhaps no rational reasons. Also, the Wehrmacht murderers were mountain troops from Bavaria and Austria: practiced killers, barbarized by warfare, perhaps frustrated and increasingly ruthless as Germany’s goals were not met. It was common to view retaliation as a matter of German honor.

Dick de Mildt opined that perpetrators could not admit to their crimes because doing so would have rendered it impossible to live with themselves. A commanding officer in charge of troops on Cephalonia wrote in 1987 that accusations of Wehrmacht criminality were defamatory. Cephalonia had been just another great German military campaign, and in any case, the Italians had turned treasonous just as they had done in World War I, and the German “embitterment” was great. In the Federal Republic, the social, political, and judicial aftermath of this massacre
illustrated the limits of national justice, not just due to domestic influences like the myth of an untainted, professional Wehrmacht, but also due to the Western Cold War alliance. Michael Bryant’s discussion of early postwar trials of concentration camp officials was a wrenching exposé of the brutality of Nazi criminality. Low-ranking camp workers clearly received the most severe legal sanctions, compared to “operational perpetrators,” who committed their crimes as part of an organized scheme far from the physical crime. Defendants from Dachau were farmers, factory workers, glasscutters, and bakers in minor positions that guaranteed them daily exposure to their victims and boundless opportunities to torture and murder them with their own hands. Based on their direct commitment of the criminal act, criminal law identified them as “direct perpetrators.”

The absence of a proximate relationship between the facilitator’s actions and the violence of his crime, on the other hand, attenuates the impression of culpability. International Military Tribune judgments identified as “facilitators” men such as the former leaders of the Nazi regime on trial simultaneously at Nuremberg. Bryant elaborated on the impact of social images in postwar German prosecutions. The lawyer with a doctorate charged with mass shootings on the eastern front or the general indicted for shooting hostages often went unrecognized as Nazi perpetrators because they did not resemble the profile of the “common” murderer. Adenauer and many others tended to exonerate professionals who worked in the bureaucracy connected to the Final Solution.

In December 1945, in the wake of the trial of “major” Nazis at Nuremberg, the quadripartite Allied Control Council promulgated Law Number 10 authorizing military authorities in the four zones of occupied Germany to level charges of crimes against peace, war crimes, membership in an illegal organization, or crimes against humanity for wartime offenses committed in their respective jurisdictions. Patricia Heberer explored policies and procedures of the United States military commission in those few postwar months before Law Number 10. Through case studies, she examined how United States military authorities wielded international law both to judge traditional war crimes and to confront Nazi policies of mass murder, in America’s first effort to punish Nazi criminality before the charge of “crimes against humanity” greased the wheels of post-war adjudication.

These military commission trials regularly led to swift, relatively stiff sentences. Viewing these sentences in the perspective of the entire postwar period, Heberer concluded that genuine justice for the victims of Nazism was a possibility only in this immediate postwar period. Throughout, in her estimation, perpetrators who could lie low, living on false papers or enjoying the protection of German professional commu-
nities, might escape prosecution altogether. And those criminals who had carefully organized and implemented Nazi crimes, yet whose links to those crimes required time-consuming investigation and tenacious prosecution, could get away with murder, as indicated especially by Heberer’s case study of the Hadamar killing center.

Dick de Mildt spoke on postwar German trials, drawing on several cases to illustrate deficiencies in “the overall success story of West German postwar prosecution.” In May 1943, the Supreme SS- and Police Court in Munich tried SS-Untersturmführer Max Täubner in connection with large-scale executions of Jewish civilians in the Ukraine in 1941. Täubner had ordered photographs taken during one of the executions that had included torture. The SS court indicted Täubner for violations of military duty, not for murder or manslaughter, but rather on the basis of his “offense to troop discipline.” He had allowed himself to engage in cruelties that were deemed unworthy of a German man and SS officer. He failed his men by not protecting them from emotional degeneration. Furthermore, the court found Täubner guilty of endangering the security of the Reich with photographs that could have fallen into enemy hands and used as propaganda. Moreover, showing such pictures to “persons with a weak mental constitution could paralyze the will to fight of the German people.” Making the tasteless and shameless pictures expressed an inferior character. Himmler confirmed the SS court’s ten-year prison sentence for Täubner and his expulsion from the SS.

De Mildt contrasted the experience of Täubner in postwar German courts with that of an army officer Manfred Blume, who during the summer of 1942 randomly killed a number of Soviet prisoners of war by shooting, beating, and bayoneting. A military court sentenced him to two years in prison plus demotion for manslaughter. Hitler, however, quashed the sentence and terminated the proceedings, opining that one cannot reproach “vital natures” in the unique fateful struggle of the German people, who reject all humanitarianism. Ironically, Hitler’s appreciation of Blume landed him in enormous trouble. Instead of the relatively privileged convict status of a somewhat overzealous military officer, Blume took charge of a battalion at Stalingrad, and was taken prisoner and sentenced in the USSR to twenty years forced labor.

After the war, there were several attempts to re-indict Täubner, living in Bavaria, for massacres. But as the trial verdicts of the military courts, those of the SS- and Police Courts were considered legally valid German verdicts. When a state’s attorney in 1960 sought to indict Täubner for his crimes, the attempt was rebuffed by the District Court for renewing prosecution of someone for crimes that had already been duly tried by a German court. Thus, thanks to Himmler’s signature under a trial judgment that loudly applauded the “Final Solution” as “the necessary exter-
mination of the worst enemy of our people,” Täubner was protected by the West German constitution from being tried again.

Manfred Blume, pardoned by Hitler, suffered a contrasting fate that was equally just under postwar German law. The USSR turned him over as a war criminal to the West German authorities in 1956. Ten years later, now a war-disabled pensioner, he was again tried for unlawful wartime killings. Despite his harsh fate and in contrast to Täubner, Blume received no protection from the double jeopardy clause, since due to Hitler’s reprieve he was considered never to have been punished for his crimes. On January 25, 1966, the Hamburg court sentenced Manfred Blume to fifteen years for murder and attempted murder.

Hans Safrian’s examination of postwar trials in Austria concentrated in its analysis on those accused of “improper enrichment”—illegally expropriating property during the Nazi period. He focused on the immediate postwar trials before the People’s Courts, which judged perpetrators as traitors to Austria as well as war criminals. Lust for Jewish property “was one of the most distinguishing characteristics of the anti-Semitic mass movement in Austria in 1938.” These acts of theft were illegal, although authorities had difficulty stopping the thieves. After the war, they also had difficulty prosecuting them. During the first postwar years, the People’s Court of Vienna opened investigations of 5,914 persons thought to have expropriated property illegally. Only a small number of people faced trial, of which a mere fraction were found guilty. Most of these were convicted due to membership in the Nazi party before 1938, which under postwar Austrian law constituted treason. Safrian stated that this followed a pattern that he illustrated by a specific verdict. The court concluded that a defendant had stolen property from Jewish victims. Nevertheless, according to the court, he did it “in a personally upright manner.” Although the court did not accept a survivor’s statement as evidence for the prosecution, the judges accepted the defendant’s assertions that he had stolen only on orders to do so. In the end, like so many others who had “improperly enriched” themselves, he was sentenced (in his case to eighteen months in prison) for having been a member of the Nazi party.

One reason that individuals suspected of improper enrichment were instead tried and sentenced for party membership was that party membership and rank could easily be determined by searching the surviving Nazi personnel files. Historians are familiar with trials of Nazi perpetrators primarily through their use of documents accumulated by the courts in the course of these trials. Elizabeth White concluded the conference by comparing the use of documents with the use of expert witness testimony as the basis of evidence for convictions. White discussed the use of historical evidence in U.S. courts since the late 1970s to denaturalize, deport,
or extradite Nazi criminals, showing how the treatment of alleged Nazi criminals in the United States relies more on expert testimony than in Germany. German prosecutors must prove that a defendant committed the elements of a specific crime, and conviction hinges on proving what the accused has actually done. Prosecutors in the United States, on the other hand, must show the role that a defendant played in the Holocaust and also disprove the defendant’s claims, which commonly distance himself from the activities of his unit. Thus the government’s Office of Special Investigations (OSI) has to show the historical context of the alleged activities in order for a judge to weigh accurately the credibility of the prosecution’s evidence against the credibility of the defendant’s claims.

As a result of these requirements, United States prosecutions of Nazi crimes feature far more of the history of the Holocaust than do similar prosecutions in Germany. In this task, expert testimony from historians has often proved to be a better tool than archival documents. The challenge of collecting documentary evidence of the activities of the accused from fifty or sixty years ago is daunting if it is to persuade the judge to give more weight to the government’s interpretation of the evidence than to the defendant’s. Expert testimony from historians, on the other hand, has contributed “in significant part” to the successes of United States government prosecutions. White demonstrated that the greatest contribution by historians to OSI’s prosecutions probably lies in implicating non-Germans. Given the small number the SS and the police could deploy in the occupied Soviet territories, as well as the linguistic limitations of those men, their success in identifying, isolating, and murdering hundreds of thousands of Jews within a short time span depended upon their ability to recruit indigenous forces who were willing to assist the Germans in the Holocaust and in some instances to carry them out with very little supervision.

Nathan Stoltzfus
Forty years after John F. Kennedy’s death on November 22, 1963, his presidency continues to fascinate both the public and historians. Commemorating the fortieth anniversary of Kennedy’s memorable visit to Berlin on June 26, 1963, the German Historical Museum in Berlin and the Free University’s Kennedy Institute organized a special exhibition on the life, legacy, politics, and myth of John F. Kennedy. The conference “Great Expectations: John F. Kennedy and the ‘Thousand Days’” in Berlin was the major academic contribution to the exhibition, attempting to take a fresh look at Kennedy’s presidency from a transatlantic perspective. Additional support came from the German Historical Museum in Berlin and the American Embassy in Germany. Hans Ottomeyer, the director of the German Historical Museum, Ursula Lehmkuhl, head of the Kennedy Institute, and Richard J. Schmierer, Minister Counselor of the U.S. Embassy, welcomed the participants to Berlin.

The first panel discussed the policy of the Kennedy administration toward Germany and Western Europe. Germany, and in particular Berlin, was a major trouble spot in 1961, with events culminating in the building of the Berlin Wall. Rolf Steininger described how United States policy changed under Kennedy, shifting the emphasis from Germany as a whole to West Germany, or even to the western half of Berlin. Kennedy was ready to compromise the interests of the Adenauer government and
give up the idea of German unification. He readily accepted the Berlin Wall as a “solution” to the Berlin problem, which was better than a war. Next, David C. Geyer analyzed the origins of Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, showing that Brandt and Kennedy thought along the same lines, and that Brandt and Egon Bahr felt sure that their new approach was “rooted in the West.” The “Atlantic Partnership” that Kennedy had declared on July 4, 1962 was the subject of the analyses by Andreas Daum and Ralph Dietl. Taking an enlightening cultural perspective, Daum emphasized the performative aspects of alliance politics. Kennedy was a master of a “politics of visibility”—most memorably during his visit to Berlin on June 26, 1963. Dietl argued that in spite of the rhetoric about “partnership,” the Kennedy administration practiced hegemony. Following the view of Sir Pierson Dixon, the former British ambassador to Paris, he described the “Atlantic Partnership” as a “cleverly concealed maneuver to keep Europe dependent on America.”

The second panel continued the discussion of transatlantic relations during the Kennedy presidency. Erin R. Mahan described the contrasting perspectives of Kennedy and de Gaulle on the merits of détente with the Soviet Union. While they worked at cross-purposes, the German question played a major role for both of them. Widening the focus to NATO and its members, Christian Nünlist also discussed intra-Western differences about opportunities for and the risks of a policy of détente during Kennedy’s presidency. In his view, West-West tensions were largely responsible for the fact that the Limited Test Ban Treaty did not become a real starting point for a policy of détente. Andrew J. Priest looked at another field of transatlantic differences, the Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF). Picking up an idea from the Eisenhower administration, Kennedy quickly ran into internal and external difficulties. As in many other areas of foreign policy, Priest argued, Kennedy was hesitant to make a firm decision with regard to the MLF issue.

The third panel opened with Bradley S. Zakarin’s paper on the Cuban Missile Crisis, in which he argued that surprisingly, the Monroe Doctrine was a non-factor in the policy making of the Kennedy administration, even though there was public pressure to apply it. Opting instead for an internationalist approach, a policy based on multilateral institutions and treaties, and the mobilization of world opinion against the Soviet Union, Kennedy took a huge domestic risk, but was ultimately rewarded with diplomatic success. Next, Douglas E. Selvage and Bernd Greiner discussed whether there was a window of opportunity for a policy of détente during the Kennedy presidency. In the case of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, Selvage described how Kennedy and his advisors failed to pick up nuances in the Soviet position that might have made negotiations worthwhile. Misinterpretations on the American side and a lack of
clarity in Moscow’s official position in Selvage’s view killed a true opportunity for détente. Focusing on the relations of the two superpowers after the Cuban Missile Crisis, Greiner denied that opportunities had been missed, revising a view he had formerly held. Kennedy pursued a policy to appease hardliners, and even among his advisors he had few allies ready to break with the Cold War’s logic. This strongly limited the president’s options at a time when the national security elite was in the prime of its political and bureaucratic power. In many ways, Kennedy was a captive of his time and his own indecision, and it is rather doubtful that he would have taken the necessary political risks. A weakened Krushchev made success even less likely. Looking at American-Cuban relations after the Cuban Missile Crisis, Mark A. Lawrence sees some attempts at deescalation by the Kennedy administration. In the end however, when it seemed less likely that it would cause a major conflict with the Soviet Union, the confrontational course became dominant again. Instead of marking a clear turning point in the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis intensified the Cold War in the Third World, he concluded.

Vietnam and the question whether Kennedy would have sent regular troops or not is still heavily discussed. The panelists in the fourth section focused on Iran, Indonesia, and Thailand, countries that are much less studied. Kennedy’s inaugural promised a new policy for Latin America and other parts of the developing world. Democratic reforms were high on the agenda, but the Kennedy administration proved to be quite willing to align itself with repressive regimes as long as they were anti-communist. Iran is a case in point. Roland Popp showed that while the Kennedy administration initially pushed for domestic reforms in Iran and was critical of the Shah, by 1963 it supported the monarch, who had been able to portray himself as a pro-Western reformer and the best option for stability. In Indonesia, Kennedy tried to improve relations with the Sukarno regime, offering diplomatic support in the West Irian conflict with the Netherlands. Another regional conflict—the planned creation of Malaysia—disrupted hopes for closer cooperation, with Kennedy caught between Britain and Malaya on the one hand and Indonesia on the other. Matthew C. Jones refuted the idea that this was a “lost opportunity” and that the Kennedy administration could have significantly changed the development of Indonesia in the mid-1960s. But he blamed the Americans for having strengthened the army to counter the influence of the Communist Party. During 1963 the war in Vietnam gained more and more importance for American foreign policy in Southeast Asia. Thailand became a crucial military base for the United States. Arne Kislenko showed how the Kennedy administration significantly increased economic and military aid and established even closer political relations with Thailand.
In May 1962, Thailand was the scene of the first overt deployment of American combat soldiers in Southeast Asia since World War II. Foreign policy and international crises dominated the Kennedy presidency. This is also reflected in the historiography, and accordingly, most of the presentations at the conference dealt with Kennedy’s foreign policy. It is nevertheless worth taking a new look at his domestic record. Many of the “great expectations” with regard to his inauguration were in the field of civil rights and social policy. To be sure, it was Kennedy’s successor Lyndon B. Johnson who steered a major domestic reform program and civil rights legislation through Congress. But as Petra Dolata-Kreutzkamp and Georg Schild showed, it was the Kennedy administration that made poverty a national issue, and it was active in a large number of fields and in many ways paved the road for the “War on Poverty.” But both Dolata-Kreutzkamp in her paper on Kennedy’s “War on Poverty” and regional development in Appalachia and Schild in his discussion of Kennedy’s social policies raised doubts that even in a second term Kennedy would have turned these ideas and initiatives into a large-scale program. But precisely because a Kennedy program probably would have been more in line with the New Deal than with Johnson’s War on Poverty, it might have averted the serious backlash against the welfare state that characterized the eighties and nineties, Schild argued.

Next, Christopher Klemek looked at debates on urban renewal of the 1960s and the role of intellectuals. Again it was Johnson who implemented an item from Kennedy’s domestic agenda: the creation of a cabinet-level department for urban issues. Finally, Manfred Berg discussed Kennedy’s civil rights record, giving both a historiographic overview as well as a balanced assessment. For Berg, Kennedy took a much stronger stand than Eisenhower before him and moved away from gradualism to racial liberalism. The Kennedy years do not amount to a Second Reconstruction, but they mark the beginning of the crucial stage in the struggle against white supremacy in the United States.

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COLD WAR MEMORY: 
INTERPRETING THE PHYSICAL LEGACY 
OF THE COLD WAR

Conference at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., September 8–9, 2003. Conveners: Keith Allen (Wilson Center) and Christian Ostermann (Wilson Center). Co-sponsored by the Boeing Company, the Cold War Museum, the Eisenhower Foundation and Eisenhower Presidential Library, the GHI (Washington), the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. Participants: Dave Berwick (U.S. Advisory Council on Historic Preservation), Thomas Blanton (National Security Archive), Chen Jian (University of Virginia), Michael Devine (Truman Presidential Library), Jeffrey Engel (University of Pennsylvania), Skip Gosling (Department of Energy), Hope Harrison (George Washington University), Carol Hegeman (National Park Service), Dan Holt (Eisenhower Presidential Library), Arnita Jones (American Historical Association), Annette Kaminsky (Stiftung zur Aufarbeitung der SED-Diktatur), Cindy Kelly (Atomic Heritage Foundation), Axel Klausmeier (University of Cottbus), Karl Kleve (Norwegian Aviation Museum), Sue Lamie (National Park Service), Douglas Lantry (U.S. Air Force Museum), Roger Launius (Smithsonian Institution), Melvyn Leffler (University of Virginia), Roger Lotchin (University of North Carolina), Paul Lusignan (National Park Service), Craig Manson (Department of the Interior), Kris Mitchell (Department of Energy), Anna Nelson (American University), Carol Neves (Smithsonian Institution), Leonid Obukhov (Perm-36 Gulag Museum), Vladimir Pechatnov (Moscow State University), Dwight Picaithley (National Park Service), Francis Gary Powers Jr. (Cold War Museum), Constance Ramirez (National Park Service), Donald Ritchie (U.S. Senate), Romulus Rusan (Sighet Memorial), Bernd Schaefer (GHI, Washington), Carol Shull (National Park Service), William Taubman (Amherst College), Jay Thomas (U.S. Navy), Troy Wade ( Atomic Testing Museum), Janelle Warren-Findley (Arizona State University), and Rebecca Welch (Office of the Secretary of Defense).

In 2004, Congress is expected to enact legislation directing the National Park Service “to conduct a study to identify sites and resources, and recommend alternatives for commemorating and interpreting the Cold War.” Other pending legislation would require the Secretary of the Inte-
rior to consider Cold War property inventories completed or currently underway at the Departments of Defense and Energy, in addition to the constituent discussions specified in the National Park Service’s National Historic Landmark program. It also calls for the publication of an interpretative handbook, as well as the establishment of an advisory board to consult on the study. This legislation and the resulting National Historic Landmark theme study mark a new chapter in the public memory of the Cold War, a story unfolding in the context of the era’s “museumification” at former missile installations, prison camps, and new museums around the world.

With this in mind, the organizers invited ninety museum directors and curators, scholars, historic preservation professionals, veterans’ advocates, government officials, media and foundation representatives, and others to consider the physical legacy of the Cold War. Conference participants discussed the most recent historical scholarship; explored how United States government agencies are determining the significance of Cold War properties; examined how the Cold War matters to veterans, scholars, and those charged with preserving the conflict’s artifacts and places; and assessed museum treatments of the Cold War in the United States and abroad. The pending National Park Service theme study, limited funding, and our location in Washington led us to focus on expressions of Cold War consciousness in the United States rather than to survey the full range of Cold War memory work in the northern (to say nothing of the southern) hemisphere.

In convening this conference, we sought to promote cooperation among those engaged in interpreting the Cold War. A secondary objective was to underscore the international dimensions of the global ideological and military struggle. These goals fit in well with the conference’s host and co-sponsor: Since its establishment a dozen years ago—just after the failed hard-line coup in Moscow in August 1991—the Woodrow Wilson International Center’s Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) has become internationally recognized as the leading scholarly project in exploiting new opportunities for research in the previously inaccessible archives of the former communist world. Through its multifaceted activities, CWIHP has created a global network of individuals, institutions, and projects dedicated to the collegial exploration of new sources and opportunities for understanding the Cold War.

This project is particularly timely. As we heard from one of the leading scholars of the Cold War, University of Virginia historian Melvin Leffler, a global outpouring of new archival materials during the past decade has led Cold War historians to a vastly new interpretation of the Marshall Plan and its impact on the Kremlin; new understandings of the first major battlefield confrontation during the Cold War, the Korean
War; extraordinary new perspectives on the Russian and Chinese involvement in Indochina during the 1950s and 1960s; a huge accumulation of knowledge about the Cuban Missile Crisis, as well as the Cuban role in Africa and the Soviet-American competition in that part of the world; the impact of the Helsinki agreements in Eastern Europe; as well as Soviet embroilment in Afghanistan and the importance of this conflict to the conclusion of the Cold War. Leffler hinted that this new knowledge is not entirely driven by the release of new documentary evidence. Analysis of non-state actors, gender theories, the power of ideas, and simply the distance we are gaining on these events are all shaping interpretations that recast our understanding of this period. Nevertheless, as Leffler’s response to a question about when exactly the Cold War began and ended showed, a growing multiplicity of sources and perspectives has not produced a consensus on this central question.

What opportunities exist to shape public memory of the Cold War? One answer is that it depends on where you live. As University of Virginia historian Chen Jian noted, in China, no public space is devoted to the most devastating exercise in Cold War domestic mobilization, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. In Hanoi, the Vietnam Army Museum displays Chinese-made guns and Russian-made missiles without mentioning foreign support in that country’s wars of liberation. In Pyongyang, an exhibit room set aside as a tribute to the million-plus Chinese “volunteers” in the Museum of the Victorious Patriotic War for Liberation is only unlocked for the occasional Chinese visitor. Memorials to Soviet-style repression such as the Perm-36 Memorial Museum of Political Repression and Totalitarianism, the only extant historic site devoted to the history of the Gulag, located eight hundred miles east of Moscow, and the Memorial Museum of the Victims of Communism and of the Resistance in Sighet, Romania, benefit from the support of Western governments and foundations. (It is no coincidence that the Perm-36 Museum debuted an English-language travelling exhibit in the Russell Senate Office Building Rotunda three weeks after our conference.) More colorful endeavors in this region include the Soviet Sculpture Garden at Grutas Park, also known as “Stalin World,” a seventy-five-acre theme park located eighty miles southwest of Vilnius that mimics a Soviet prison camp, as well as the House of Terror in Budapest, located in a mansion once home to Hungary’s communist-era secret police. In Germany, as in several other Central European nations, a government-supported foundation supports scholarly research, assistance to victims, and the creation of archives and exhibits with a view toward coming to terms with the region’s communist past.

Interest in the Cold War is also strong throughout the United States. In New York, State Parks Commissioner Bernadette Castro has re-
sponded enthusiastically to veterans’ calls to establish a Long Island Cold War Heritage Trail; Castro feels the trail would be popular because of the post-September 11 focus on homeland security. In South Florida, another group of veterans wishes to include in the National Register of Historic Places the surface-to-air Nike nuclear missile sites in the Everglades they once manned, while visitors at the nation’s oldest nuclear museum in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, board an “atomic train” to the K-25 Gaseous Diffusion Building, a Manhattan Project engineering marvel that sprawls across forty-four acres. In Washington, D.C., a Victims of Communism Memorial Museum, to be built on the Mall with a proposed budget of $100 million, has been authorized by an act of Congress and approved by then-President Clinton.

High-priced tours of Cold War sites also indicate that the buying and selling of the Cold War is far from over. Since 1991, the National Atomic Museum has offered a $40 day trip to the normally off-limits location of the world’s first atomic explosion, the Trinity Site. Brisk demand led the museum’s director in 2000 to include a stop at the Nevada Test Site. Created in 1951, the desert area sixty-five miles northwest of Las Vegas includes a vast expanse of basins and ranges larger than Rhode Island, where mock towns, bridges, bomb shelters, bank vaults, underground parking structures, and railroads were exposed to nuclear explosions. Six years ago, the success of these tours encouraged a broad coalition of Nevadans to create the Nevada Test Site Historical Foundation. In 2004, their ten-thousand-square-foot Atomic Testing Museum will open just off the Strip in Las Vegas. In southern West Virginia, since 1995 more than two hundred thousand visitors have paid $25 to tour the 153-room concrete bunker where Congress might have reconvened had Soviet ICBMs incinerated the capital. In 2000, the Smithsonian Institution put together a weeklong tour of Manhattan Project sites in Albuquerque and Los Alamos. Participants spoke to descendants of the Los Alamos greats, visited the dark rock obelisk at the Trinity Site (imagine a miniature dark cousin to the Washington Monument), and received primers on the construction of “the device.”

The federal government’s role in identifying and preserving Cold War era properties quickly became a central focus of our discussions. Besides Congress, the Secretary of the Interior, the Departments of Defense and Energy, and a host of other federal agencies where preservation rarely ranks high in a long list of priorities, in conducting the theme study, the National Park Service must work closely with a lesser-known, though highly important, federal entity, the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation. Established in 1966, the Advisory Council is charged by Congress to balance historic preservation concerns with federal project requirements, as outlined in the National Historic Preservation Act of
that year. As the head of the Navy’s Cultural Resources Office Jay Thomas explained, site managers are only required to offer the Advisory Council an opportunity to comment on projects that appear to threaten properties eligible for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places. (Also created by the 1966 Act, the Register seeks to promote greater appreciation, though not necessarily protection, of historic properties).

Charged with encouraging federal agencies to consult with state and local preservation officials, Indian tribes, applicants for federal assistance, and influential members of the public when making final project decisions, the Council’s views on Cold War properties carry weight. For this reason, we asked Dave Berwick, the Advisory Council’s Army Affairs Coordinator and one of the authors of a May 2002 review of the Army’s stock of Cold War housing, to share the Advisory Council’s perspectives on some of these properties. The Army’s Capehart-Wherry housing is one example of such property. These housing units were constructed between 1949 and 1962 to house new career soldiers immediately following the Second World War. According to the Army’s 2002 blanket review, Berwick reported, all of the nineteen thousand Capehart-Wherry family units may now be renovated or sold as the Army deems necessary. Aside from the considerable expense in conducting a preservation review of each building, Berwick reported that the housing failed to qualify for protection because the expansion of the military’s housing stock would have occurred whether or not there had been a Cold War.

An individual preservation review of each building would have been costly, no doubt, and the Advisory Council’s decision may or may not be precedent setting for future attempts to preserve other Cold War structures. As we learned from Jannelle Warren-Findley, Professor of Public History at Arizona State University, a micro-level focus on individual homes and communities can lead one to think in new ways about the methods and goals of historic preservation. Warren-Findley reported that in the arid American Southwest, many Cold War homes arrived on the flatbed of a truck. During the early 1960s, houses were constructed in Gila Bend near Phoenix by setting them on footers and inflating a balloon to push out the walls, creating suburban communities in some of the most inhospitable places in North America.

Social and cultural historians will yearn to know more about Gila Bend, as well as the crabgrass frontier of Capehart-Wherry housing that the Advisory Council has decided should not be preserved. For Berwick, Thomas, and many others, the overriding concern is one they acknowledge is a source of heartache to colleagues in these academic sub-fields. In establishing priorities among resources, mission must take precedence.
Thomas insisted that site managers rarely have the luxury or the inclination to go beyond the requirements of legal compliance, instead focusing their attention on properties built fifty years ago, or, more important, current facilities needs. Sites such as the Washington Navy Yard have multiple historical contexts, forcing managers to balance the interests—and interest groups—of different historical eras. Much of what the Navy has done historically—such as building ships and housing sailors—is now outsourced. Larger ships require bigger, more elaborate piers, making preservation impractical. Base closures, new fleet distributions, and of course the problems of public access after September 11 add to the woes of the site manager. Finally, striking a chord resonant with Berwick’s analysis, Thomas asserted that knowing what is special about historic properties, even assuming one had full access to available documentation, is no easy matter, as the Navy’s historical relevance lies beyond the horizon.

Although for historians the Cold War has barely ended, the tug-of-war between mission, preservation, and interpretation is nothing new. While the struggles surrounding the 1995 Enola Gay exhibit at the Smithsonian Institution’s National Air and Space Museum have become legendary, few are aware that as early as 1991, Congress directed the Department of Defense to establish a Legacy Resource Management Program to “inventory, protect, and conserve the physical and literary property and relics of the Department of Defense” associated with the Cold War. This “Legacy Project,” according to Rebecca Welch, now a historian in the Historical Office of the Secretary of the Defense and the project’s second task manager, was one that the Department neither asked for nor wanted. Initially, her project staff visited installations in the continental United States, Asia, and Europe, consulted with counterparts within the government and historical experts, examined existing federal and state laws and regulations, and began drafting the mandated report to Congress. Welch’s objective—to take guidelines developed by Paul Green, the preservation officer at the former Air Force Combat Command, and extend them to all installations of the Department of Defense—remained unfulfilled, though she deserves much credit for encouraging the Army and Navy to move toward servicewide guidelines on Cold War properties. Beyond the report submitted to Congress, Welch and her team of contractors produced a series of multi-service studies, as well as a database of Cold War material culture assets. Uniting civilian preservationists and military operators, the services, as well as headquarters offices and the field, and finally scholars in a common effort to define the significance of Cold War places and things proved difficult for Welch, and will no doubt challenge the theme study’s authors as well.
Notwithstanding the differences of opinion and approach our meeting brought to the fore, one of the most striking aspects of our discussions was enthusiasm for the power of Cold War places and artifacts. In thinking about the Cold War, one site to which the mind almost invariably races is Berlin. George Washington University historian Hope Harrison demonstrated how the building of the Berlin Wall was more a product of East Germans’ desire to shape their own destiny than a calculated move on the part of the Soviet leadership in a larger struggle against the West. Archaeologist Axel Klausmeier of the Technical University at Cottbus showed us what is now being done, nearly a decade and a half after its fall, to identify features of the Berlin Wall, Europe’s Cold War relic par excellence, and possibly conserve them as a UNESCO World Heritage Site.

While all participants acknowledged that the Cold War was much more than a mere military struggle restricted to any one nation’s borders, no one addressed explicitly the thoughtful questions raised by Assistant Secretary of the Interior Craig Manson in his introduction: How much preservation is too much? What should the balance be? Two examples illustrate this dilemma. Dan Holt, director of the Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum, explained that the civil rights movement is embedded in the story of international ideological competition, and thus his museum’s new exhibit on the Eisenhower presidency considers Little Rock alongside Operation Solarium. Similarly, according to University of North Carolina historian Roger Lotchin, in a sense, we should put California cities in the display cases as well, since as he explained, broad municipal coalitions coalesced there around successful drives to secure Cold War manufacturing and research assets.

Preserving land- and cityscapes is unrealistic, and as the Advisory Council’s solution to the dilemmas of Capehart-Wherry housing indicates, the wind may be blowing in the opposite direction. Other types of documentation, such as oral history testimonies, video documentation, or museum exhibits featuring these and other media offer ways to compensate for lost sites and structures, though exactly how these sources might convey the state of mind those of us over thirty-five associate with the Cold War remains unclear. Whatever is kept, and certainly whatever is exhibited, should connect personal stories and places to global developments. One forerunner here is the Norwegian Aviation Museum, located in Bodø, a town some one hundred miles north of the Arctic Circle, where, as we learned from curator Karl Kleve, museum professionals and historians are seeking to explain community change and international politics through large, complicated objects. Cold War scholars, too, are increasingly working at the intersection of localities and transnational developments: a conference organized in April 2003 by historian Jeffrey
Engel, “Lives and Consequences: The Local Impact of the Cold War,” shows that the interdynamics of high politics and place is now becoming a focus of scholarly research, while a series of conferences at Germany’s Institute for Social Research in Hamburg is engaging what the historian Bernd Greiner is calling the “societal history of the Cold War.” Linking these ventures in popular and academic history-making will, as Kleve and National Park Service historian Sue Lamie indicated, require practitioners to decipher the tribal languages of science, arms, and preservation; to address the power of stereotypes; to draw together civilian participants and military veterans; and, last but not least, to come to terms with the subjects of Cold War secrecy and document declassification. Kleve asked how one might exhibit intelligence during the Cold War when most important documents remain classified, a question some of us took up after a post-conference tour of Washington’s new International Spy Museum.

Few places in the United States are more secret than the Cold War “signature facilities” of the Department of Energy, and arguably few places deserve more the status of Cold War emblems. The physical impression of sites almost none of us will actually see ranges from the stunning to a massive hole in the ground (the Sedan Crater was the product of an experiment to develop engineering uses for nuclear explosives directed by Troy Wade, now the driving force behind the new Atomic Testing Museum in Las Vegas). Skip Gosling’s description of his trip to the Pantex Plant near Amarillo, Texas, where for over a quarter of a century all U.S. nuclear weapons have been assembled and disassembled, demonstrated that truth is stranger than fiction. Remarkably, Gosling’s description was topped by the Pantex plant historian Kris Mitchell, who described to us something he and his colleagues called “gravel gerties” (the name comes from a Dick Tracy cartoon character). The gerties contain seventeen feet of dirt and gravel suspended in a dome over the workroom, above the heads of the workers. In the event of an accidental high explosive detonation, Mitchell explained that the dirt and gravel would collapse into the workroom and provide a measure of containment against the spread of special nuclear material beyond the facility. When he showed us an image of the gerties, someone asked where the exit was, whereupon Mitchell replied without missing a beat that the only exit from this structure in the event of an accident would be in the form of a gas. Pantex may be the site least likely to become a Cold War museum, though its relevance to any scientific, economic, and cultural understanding of the Cold War is indisputable.

As the Cold War takes shape as public memory, emotions, agendas, and scholarly arguments are colliding with concerns over representation, community economic development, life-and-death environmental issues,
and a host of governmental regulations (from design codes to property rights to preservation requirements). Much like the Cold War, these battles are waged simultaneously on different continents, all too often with the chief protagonists unaware of lessons learned in other places. Respected for their knowledge of the past, in the business of Cold War memory, historians will ultimately be judged by their ability to thoughtfully engage unfamiliar professional questions. This conference has attempted to contribute to this process.

Keith Allen and Christian Ostermann
THE PRIVATE SPHERE AND PUBLIC ORDER:
WEST GERMAN DEBATES ABOUT EDUCATION, FAMILY,
AND SEXUALITY IN THE 1950s AND 1960s


During the past decade, interest in the history of postwar West Germany has shifted from the reconstruction of the political and economic system to issues of gender and ethnicity, culture and memory, and thus to a much broader notion of national identity. Within this framework, recent studies have examined both the continuities with the Nazi past and the beginnings of the liberalization and democratization of West German mentalities. The three papers of this panel made a novel contribution to this discussion by addressing hitherto neglected issues at the borderline between the private and the public sphere. Through examining debates about schooling, family upbringing, and sexuality, they explored how gender roles and individual and parental rights were defined vis-à-vis the right of the state to intervene in the private sphere. Legal issues figured prominently in these debates. Thus, the papers shed new light on the evolution of West German democratic culture in the 1950s and 1960s.

Dirk Schumann’s paper “Authority in the ‘Blackboard Jungle’: Parents and Teachers, Experts and the State, and the Evolution of West German Democracy” examined the heated debates about school discipline in the 1950s. Centering on the issue of corporal punishment, the debates pitted “traditionalists” against “reformers,” who included otherwise staunchly conservative as well as liberal politicians and academic pedagogues. As classes were large and unruly, many poorly trained or recently denazified teachers failed to command authority, and many parents wanted corporal punishment to remain a regular practice at home as well as at school. Hence the reformers’ efforts to abolish corporal punishment met with fierce resistance, not the least from most teachers. By invoking the idea of parents’ rights to block the reformers’ agenda, traditionalists could rightly claim to be distancing themselves from the Nazi regime, which had denied parents any say in school education. This made the situation all the more difficult for reformers, who had to call for renewed state intervention through legal measures to bring about the desired change. Trying to walk a fine line between the entrenched posi-
tions of teachers and parents and their own goals, reformers met further resistance from the courts, which declared that mere decrees abolishing corporal punishment were insufficient to change the unwritten customary law that for decades had allowed a moderate form of corporal punishment. The highest West German criminal court in 1957 upheld this decision. Thorough change began only around 1960, and it was completed only in the early 1970s, with legal regulations now banning corporal punishment in all the West German states. Thus, the paper shed new light on the fits and starts of the liberalization of West German political culture and mentalities in the 1950s and 1960s.

In his paper “Dismantling Patriarchy: Democracy, Fatherhood, and Judicial Politics—the *Stichentscheid* Decision of 1959,” Till van Rahden looked at how the reconstruction of the West German family in the 1950s eventually turned away from the conservative path taken by the governing Christian Democrats. In their view, the nuclear family in which fathers worked for the family income and in which mothers cared for the children was a central component of a natural order ordained by God. Hence, they advocated the restoration of paternal authority within the family, although the Basic Law of 1949 would have supported an egalitarian distribution of responsibilities. Yet, as van Rahden argued, a focus on the patriarchal federal and state family policies of the 1950s misses the fact that concepts of increasingly egalitarian gender relations played an important role in West German popular culture. The “father” became an important symbol in the debate about the problems of modern “mass society” and about the democratization of West Germany and the meaning of authority in a democratic society. Between the early 1950s and the mid-1960s, a hierarchical concept of authority based on tradition, order, and obedience gave way to an idea of authority based on trust embedded in egalitarian social relationships. In this context, the Federal Constitutional Court’s decision of July 1959 to declare unconstitutional the paternal *Stichentscheid*, i.e. the legal sanction of a father’s ultimate determination of his children’s welfare, played a crucial role. Now the conservative identification of authority with the role of the father had become obsolete, and, by implication, the widely held belief that authority in and of itself was a conservative idea. Thus, the decision helped reconcile democracy and authority and helped make West Germans feel at home in their “liberal republic.”

Dagmar Herzog showed in her paper “Sexuality and Crime: Ex-Nazis, Reemigré Jews, and the Liberalization of West Germany” how the moral terms of debate about sexuality in postwar West Germany were redirected and the postwar culture of sexual conservatism was liberalized in the 1960s. The anthology *Sexualität und Verbrechen*, published in 1963, played a crucial role in this process, bringing together Jews who had
returned to Germany with ex-Nazis. It challenged a new draft of the criminal code, the so-called “Entwurf 1962,” which was profoundly conservative in maintaining the criminalization of adultery, male homosexuality, and abortion, and in constraining the marketing of birth control and products to prevent venereal disease. The draft also invoked the idea of “popular sentiment” [das gesunde Volksempfinden] as a legitimate reference point for legal rulings. Sexualität und Verbrechen vigorously challenged the criminalization of male homosexuality, advanced the legal ideals of consent and privacy, and invoked the Third Reich as a particularly pernicious example of what could happen when the law took its cue from “popular sentiment.” Herzog pointed out that the debate about the criminal code foregrounded the lingering impact of Nazism on postwar culture in a complex way. On the one hand, the conservative draft of 1962 itself offered a key example of postwar sexual conservatism in its double nature as both a backlash against some elements of Nazism and a continuation of other elements. On the other hand, the energetic liberal and New Left reaction against the draft marked the moment that an utterly new (and ultimately enormously influential) interpretation of Nazism as thoroughly sexually repressive entered public discussion, an interpretation that drew its moral force not least from the return to public discussion of the details of the Holocaust as these were made public in the Auschwitz trials.

In her succinct commentary, Maria Höhn raised the question as to what extent the legal profession argued and acted in accordance with popular attitudes, and suggested looking more closely into how American arguments influenced debates in West Germany. Contributions to the animated discussion that followed called for a revised periodization of the 1950s and 1960s that clarifies when the change toward liberalization began as well as to what extent legal changes caused or merely reflected change in society at large. They also cautioned against overstating West German liberalization in the 1950s so as not to make it appear as an all-encompassing and unstoppable democratization. In sum, the papers, the commentary, and the discussion showed that the mix of Nazi and democratic elements in 1950s West Germany requires much closer scrutiny, for which the papers provided productive insights and questions.
GERMAN UNIFICATION SYMPOSIUM
JENS REICH, “MY GERMANY: REFLECTIONS ON MY COUNTRY BEFORE AND AFTER 1989”


In convening its third “German Unification Symposium” on October 3, the “Day of German Unity,” the German Historical Institute now appears to have established this event as a tradition. The featured speaker for 2003 was Jens Reich, one of the leaders of the GDR citizens’ movement in 1989-1990, and together with Bärbel Bohley the most prominent face of “Neues Forum” during those months. After serving as a delegate for “Bündnis 90” in the GDR’s first, and last, freely elected parliament of 1990, Reich left politics after German unification and returned to his profession as a molecular biologist. Nonetheless he continued to deliver public speeches and to write widely noticed essays in books and major newspapers. He even briefly ran a well-received “campaign” for Germany’s federal presidency in 1994 after having been jointly endorsed by the youth organizations of the SPD, FDP, and the Greens.

By coming to Washington to deliver the lecture at the GHI’s German Unification Symposium, Reich returned to the place of his “biggest success as an orator,” as he noted in his introductory remarks. As one of the very few English-speaking East German dissidents, in early 1990 he had accepted an invitation by the German Marshall Fund and the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies to come to Washington as a representative of the GDR’s citizens’ movement, which had just toppled a dictatorial regime and facilitated the end of German division. During this initial visit, Reich spoke to a large audience of several hundred people. He was so overwhelmed by his first trip to the West after the fall of the Berlin Wall that he exclaimed, “Hail to you, inhabitants of a distant star!” Returning to the American capital more than thirteen years later, he now expressed sovereign familiarity with the globalized world. One constant remained, however: Again he spoke in front of a packed auditorium, one of the largest crowds the GHI has hosted for a lecture. Among the listeners were many who had attended his 1990 Washington speech.

Briefly reflecting on the enthusiasm of 1989/90 in East Germany and Central Europe, Reich credited the “nameless members of the public who actually did not want anything to do with politics” for causing the downfall of incompetent and repressive communist regimes all across the former Warsaw Pact territory. The speaker then shifted to personal re-
marks about his life in the GDR. He defined the GDR as his and his family’s “Heimat,” but stated unequivocally that he “felt no emotional tie to this state, no sense of gratitude, no sense of belonging,” and described his decision to enter a rather non-ideological profession in the area of natural sciences as an “arrangement.” Otherwise he retreated into “inner emigration,” but beneath the surface he felt depressed over “what I saw as my stolen life.” Thus “the wonderful year 1989” had brought his “release from the cage” and “personal liberation,” the desired return “to the Germany of our common language, culture, and history,” and to the Europe his mother had talked about enthusiastically while he was growing up in the GDR.

Musing about the ensuing difficulties turning liberation into a process of renewal in East Germany and Eastern Europe, Reich admonished that this should make us realize “what a difficult process ‘nation-building’ is.” In regions with different traditions with “no hint of self-liberation,” such a task would be hard to accomplish in a rush or by outside arrangement. For Central and Eastern Europe, and for Germany itself, Reich nonetheless expressed his optimism that “things are going to turn out well” as long as they are embedded in the major framework of an expanded European Union.

In terms of foreign policy engagement, Reich took exception with current trends in his country, and advocated a “modest range” of German involvement even during times of globalization. Describing the FRG as a “medium-sized power,” he warned against stretching limited military capabilities too far, and advised the country to focus on establishing political stability in the immediate vicinity of the Balkans and Eastern Europe. This way, Germany could respond to recent American attempts to differentiate between “Old Europe” and “New Europe” along rather arbitrary lines. Accepting different priorities on the part of Germany as a medium-sized power and of the United States as a military superpower would soften clumsy reproaches of “cowardice” on the one hand and adventurist “lust for world domination” on the other.

Reich concluded by emphasizing his emotional ties to the United States. In his view, three factors had been indispensable in achieving German unification peacefully: non-violence on the side of East German protesters; Gorbachev holding power in Moscow; and the unconditional support of the United States, in contrast to most countries of Western Europe. The latter is even more remarkable, according to Reich, since Washington acted not only for reasons of self-interest, but unmistakably displayed an emotional element when firmly embracing German unification. “In the defense of our freedom against totalitarian and terrorist threats,” the speaker confessed, he will stand on the side of the United States. However, he expressed uncertainty about what form this defense
should take, and expressed his hope that the U.S. would find a way to bring peace to the world “without turning into an aging Roman Empire.” Ending his reflections by mentioning his son’s family, which has settled on the American East Coast, with his two grandchildren now U.S. citizens, Jens Reich expressed his sincere wish that all goes well for the United States, and that friendship between Germany and America will be preserved and defended.

In his comments, Bernd Schaefer drew on his personal experiences with a rather frustrated Jens Reich in late 1990, noting that it was “good news” when an eminent intellectual like Reich was confident that things would turn out well for post-1990 Germany and Eastern Europe. As reassuring as it was to listen to Reich’s remarks on European and transatlantic currents, Schaefer characterized as worrisome the application of lessons from post-communist Europe to the present Middle East. Taking October 3 as a day of reflection on “nation-building,” Schaefer mused about the direction of imperial United States foreign policy and the willingness of the U.S. to follow up on its commitments. Similarly, Germany’s tendency to turn toward introspection and to ignore the need for reform in the Middle East is equally unhelpful. The wealth of common values between the U.S. and Germany would be better preserved by working together than by playing primarily to domestic audiences for political gain.

Bernd Schaefer

The full text of Jens Reich’s lecture can be accessed on the GHI website at www.ghi-dc.org/reich_txt_2003.html.
Reflecting on the Past, Envisioning the Future: New Perspectives in German-Jewish Studies


Through its library and archival collections, its ongoing collection of relevant materials, and its constant effort to facilitate access to its holdings, the Leo Baeck Institute has been promoting the study of German-speaking Jewry for almost fifty years. Only recently however has the field of German-Jewish Studies attained the status of a separate area of scholarship, recognized along with Jewish Studies and German Studies as an independent field of inquiry. The first annual joint lecture of the Leo Baeck Institute, New York, and the German Historical Institute in Washington, D.C., featured Professor Liliane Weissberg, who teaches German and comparative literature at the University of Pennsylvania and who has lectured widely on both sides of the Atlantic. Professor Weissberg began her talk by describing a paradox in the current situation in Germany, where the Jewish community is among the fastest growing in the world and yet Jewish culture is largely upheld and maintained by non-Jews. In a similar fashion, Jewish Studies in Germany is a discipline largely pursued by non-Jewish scholars. And yet, Professor Weissberg suggested, German-Jewish Studies could be described as Jewish Studies par excellence. Over the past several decades, a number of research institutes in the U.S., the U.K., Germany, Austria, and Israel were set up to promote the study of this small but significant group of people, their history, achievements, and influences, which have always seemed disproportionate to their numbers. Professor Liliane Weissberg pointed to Moses Mendelssohn’s translation of the Hebrew Bible into German as the initial call for the emancipation of the Jews and the beginning of their becoming a more modern, assimilated people. Giving the study of Judaism and especially Jewish history importance along with the eternal truths of religion would recognize the suffering of Jews throughout history as a common experience of the diaspora. German Jews became a subject of study to the Jews themselves, at least for a time. Heinrich Grätz’s eleven volume “History of the Jews,” published between 1853 and 1876, and the later works of Simon Dubnow and Salo Baron gave little mention to Jews in Germany. To them, Jewish history remained an undivided field, and
German Jews themselves were not eager to think of themselves in that context, but rather as Germans of Jewish religion. It was only after the Holocaust that German Jewry began to define itself in terms of a separate ethnic group.

When the Leo Baeck Institute was founded in 1955, its purpose was to preserve the legacy of Jewish life particular to the German-speaking lands of Central Europe and to document this heritage, whose people, institutions, and papers were decimated in the Holocaust. Professor Weissberg pointed out that German-Jewish studies was defined as a work of mourning (Trauerarbeit)—for instance, in the early works of Hannah Arendt. Yet at the same time, in the United States, German-Jewish Studies became one of the earliest fields of ethnic inquiry along with Latino Studies, African-American Studies, and Asian-American Studies.

Professor Jeffrey Peck pointed out in his subsequent commentary that the newly emerging fields of Diaspora Studies, Post-Colonial Studies, and other multicultural concepts derived from the study of globalization are very applicable to the study of German Jews, especially when looking at the changes since 1989. He agreed with Professor Weissberg’s thesis that German-Jewish Studies is Jewish Studies par excellence. In his focus on Diaspora Studies, an even newer field, he provided the audience with a glimpse of how the recent developments of the fast-growing Jewish community in Germany encompass transnational and multi-ethnic issues within the context of an emerging European community where the traditional boundaries of academic disciplines (as well as regional and national territories) are rapidly changing. When looking at German Jewry, he cautioned that one must make careful distinctions between Jews living in Germany before 1933 and Jews in Germany now in terms of both identity and self-definition. Insofar as Jews are being studied in Germany today (mainly by non-Jews), the perception of Jewishness allows also for new insights into German identity and its relationship to minorities in general.

Professor Weissberg pointed out that the post-World War II study of German Jews was begun by scholars such as Selma Stern and Jacob Katz. Only in the 1970s, however, beginning with the study of Jewish women, Jewish workers, the entrance of Jews into the academic professions, and the study of urban life versus small towns and rural life, did German-Jewish Studies emerge as a field that cuts across different countries and different academic disciplines. The study of German-Jewish literature followed and in turn gave impulse to many innovative approaches in history and interdisciplinary fields such as Cultural Studies.

Professor Peck’s commentary picked up at the point of disciplinary influence and cross-fertilization of fields of study. His focus on Diaspora Studies suggested questions such as what and who is the
“Jewish voice” and how is identity constructed, especially in light of the fact that Jews in Germany today have different backgrounds and traditions than pre-war German Jewry. German-Jewish Studies, and subsequently Jewish Studies, must look at this international context of Jewish life in Germany and the resultant cultural hybridization that seems to render the often expressed desire for “normalization” pointless. The two speakers provided the notion of a strong impulse for change and reorientation for the field of German-Jewish Studies, which the Leo Baeck Institute began to engage in with its move to the Center for Jewish History in New York and the opening of a branch at the Jewish Museum in Berlin almost fifty years after its founding.

Frank Mecklenburg
ATLANTIC CROSSINGS? TRANSCULTURAL RELATIONS
AND POLITICAL PROTEST IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED
STATES, 1958–1977

Conference at the GHI, October 17–18, 2003. Co-sponsored by the GHI
and the Volkswagen Foundation. Conveners: Belinda Davis (Rutgers
University), Astrid M. Eckert (GHI), Wilfried Mausbach (University of
Heidelberg). Participants: Mererid Puw Davies (University of London),
Michael Frey (University of Bochum), Martin Klimke (University of
Heidelberg), Carla MacDougall (Rutgers University), Dieter Rucht
(Social Science Research Center, Berlin), Kristina Schulz (Université de Genève), Bonnie Smith
(Rutgers University), Jeremy Varon (Drew University).

This conference brought together junior and senior scholars to discuss the
significance of cultural transfer and transnational networks in political
and social protest movements in the Federal Republic of Germany and
the United States. Its goal was to open up new paths of inquiry into the
protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s by utilizing recently advanced
concepts of transnational history and intercultural exchange. The confer-
ence aimed to provide a forum in which the applicability of these con-
cepts could be tested, and offered an opportunity for a stimulating exchange
of ideas among various scholars from different disciplines.

The opening panel, “Framing Internationalism: Interculturality, Trans-
nationality, Social Movement Theory,” introduced the main theoretical
questions of the conference and framed the debate for the subsequent
panels, which then focused on specific case studies. The first paper, by
Bonnie Smith, provided a broad overview of the history of European
cultural borrowings from other parts of the world, suggesting a more
porous concept of culture and a history of modern Europe that is not
linear, but rather a circuitous process of exchange. Referring, among
other things, to non-European sources of the philosophy of the Enlight-
enment, Smith’s analysis called for a reconsideration of the paradigm that
uses national boundaries as the focus of historical inquiry, and persuas-
ively demonstrated the incompleteness of a historiography based solely
on autonomous national cultures. Dieter Rucht’s presentation then fo-
cused on the structure of social movements, which enables them to trans-
mit and receive items from abroad and to produce a sense of collective
identity across national borders. He reminded participants of earlier his-
torical instances of transatlantic transfer, such as the anti-slavery, socialist,
and women’s movements. Rucht identified four characteristics of so-
cial movements: (1) They strive for a fundamental change in society; (2) They constitute “mobilized networks of networks”; (3) They share a collective identity, a sense of belonging, supported by a common cause; (4) They use various forms of protest, often as a means to achieve visibility and attention. Elaborating on the second of these characteristics, Rucht explained that networks may incorporate organizations but have no overall membership requirement, and are not arranged in hierarchical order. The strength of ties among them varies, and there are no clear boundaries to a particular movement, but rather “clusters of cores.” This observation led Rucht to compare social movements to gravity centers of interaction. Geographically distinct, they are linked and overlap with each other at these centers of exchange and communication. Through these “fishnet-like” connections, they would also be able to organize themselves with the help of further interpersonal or interorganizational channels. Johannes Paulmann, after sketching the development of historiographical interest in questions of transnationality and interculturality, defined intercultural transfer as a transfer among cultures, not of culture itself. He also stressed that the borders of culture are being constantly redefined. Distinguishing between levels of perception and influence in intercultural transfer, Paulmann elaborated on the costs of these transactions, various paths of transfer, their directions, and the existence of blind spots in these processes of exchange. In his view, these processes not only demonstrate a crossing of borders, but the creation of intermediary spaces, of which he enumerated four, namely the periphery of territories, particular spaces within territories (e.g. McDonald’s in Beijing), institutionalized international organizations and professional networks, and the media. Paulmann cautioned, however, that the historical nature of these spaces constantly changes. Drawing on such intermediary spaces as reservoirs of ideas and practices, historical actors themselves would then selectively adopt and reframe knowledge for their own purposes or cultural backgrounds.

The second panel, “Appropriating Ideas, Appropriating History,” commenced the series of case studies dealing with transnational relations and social protest. Jeremy Varon’s paper compared the theoretical trajectories of the German Red Army Faction (RAF) and the Weathermen in the United States, and identified their ideological similarities and differences. By examining the two groups’ profoundly divergent attitudes toward violence, his analysis underscored the importance of paying close attention to national and historical specificity in analyses of transcultural exchange. In the end, domestic terrorism in Germany evolved as a public drama in which Germans played out ambivalent notions of democracy, whereas in the United States it remained a fringe phenomenon. Wilfried Mausbach opened his paper by demonstrating how West German protesters turned the Vietnam War into a contemporary representation of
Auschwitz. He argued that antiwar activists in the Federal Republic read the experiences of Americans and Vietnamese through the filter of their own collective memories, thus appropriating others' experiences as a means to arrive at a new understanding of themselves. Mausbach then asked whether this kind of “appropriating history” was a unique phenomenon, and went on to illustrate how a similar process occurred virtually at the same time in the opposite direction, when Americans began to incorporate the Holocaust into their own history. Mausbach concluded that as a consequence of the process of globalization, the exposure to other cultures’ experiences and memories has dramatically increased since the end of World War II. Through modern telecommunications and the spread of popular culture, the preconditions for “importing” others’ memories have been greatly expanded. The protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s, among others, utilized these novel possibilities for intercultural exchange.

In the third panel, “The Student Protest of the 1960s from a Transatlantic Perspective,” Martin Klimke offered another example of transnational exchange in the transatlantic context with his examination of personal interactions between various activists of the West German and American student movements throughout the 1960s. Focusing on the two most influential student organizations in the United States and Germany, the Students for a Democratic Society and the Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund, he examined the long-term impact of the various levels of direct and indirect personal contact between the two, and referred to examples of cultural appropriation, reframing, and resultant misperceptions. By including governmental reactions to (transnational) protest in his analysis, Klimke stressed the need to incorporate the 1960s protest movements into the more comprehensive international historical framework of the Cold War, based on a multicultural as well as multidimensional transnational history. Michael Frey’s presentation emphasized the crucial significance of the peace movement for the development of the protest movement of the 1960s. Illuminating the transnational networks of the peace movements after World War II, he argued that the bloc confrontation of the Cold War provided fertile ground for the spread of these personal and organizational networks. Regarding these movements as a necessary precondition for the emergence of a New Left in the United States, Great Britain, and West Germany, Frey accordingly defined this emergence as an awakening of a new protest generation in 1958–59 with non-organizational forms loosely bound together by the common advocacy for a “third way.”

Carla MacDougall’s presentation on the panel “Transnational Links and the Politics of Feminist Activism” brought to the foreground translation, appropriation, and reception in the transcultural movement of
ideas to reveal the multiple dimensions that must be considered in analyses of transnationality and intercultural transfer. Thus she demonstrated the one-sided nature of the flow of exchanges from the United States to Germany in her examination of the first lesbian feminist group in Germany. However, these transfers and the ways in which their reception transformed ideas and made them very specific to the West German political-cultural context might well have contributed to the nationally specific contours of lesbian feminism in the Federal Republic. At the same time, her paper revealed that processes of transfer can sometimes be quite unidirectional or even shrink to a barely discernible trickle. Similarly, Kristina Schulz in her examination of the women’s movements in Germany, France, and the United States demonstrated that although the slogan “sisterhood is global” pointed to a transnational orientation of second-wave feminism, there is hardly any evidence of intercultural transfer of movement ideas at the local or even national level. Taking Dieter Rucht and Doug McAdam’s model of cross-national diffusion as a starting point for her analysis, she interrogated the notion of transnationality to demonstrate its limitations as a way to explain shared cognitive orientations of Western feminisms. By way of example, Schulz pointed to the reception—and lack thereof—of Simone de Beauvoir in the German context, despite Alice Schwarzer’s efforts to give her ideas the kind of prominence they had had in the French context, from which Schwarzer had come in the early 1970s. Schulz also stressed the pitfalls of misperception. Thus the French essentialist position of the 1980s, though only one current of French feminism, was taken for the entire thing in the United States. Schulz therefore urged scholars to pay close attention to the conditions for the reception of ideas from abroad.

During the final panel, “Public Sphere/Political Imagination,” both Belinda Davis and Mererid Puw Davies examined the symbolic practices of social movements in the 1960s. Davis’s paper asserted that scholars must look not only at major theoretical figures and movement leaders in assessing intercultural transfer and impact, but must also look at a broad range of activists, including “middle-” and “low-level” protesters, examining their lived experience of cultural influences, from high theory to objects of popular consumption. She argued that “interculturality” must not only include reference to nations as cultural units, but should be understood far more broadly, as West Germans from all over the country (as well as East Germans and others) came together at universities and in big cities, bringing a range of cultures to bear. Davis looked at the ways in which the range of activists acted on these influences, transforming them toward particular—and sometimes particularly salutary—ends. Mererid Puw Davies then expanded the “symbolic and cultural battlefields of social practices and lifestyles” by giving an overview of the
numerous sources available but still largely untouched by historians of the 1960s protest movements, such as the massive amount of underground literature, posters, chants, etc. Focusing her presentation on the graffiti artist “Eiffe” from Hamburg, among others, she successfully demonstrated the significance of his provocative slogans as texts of provocation that were able to open up spaces of public discussion. Arguing for fresh approaches with the help of these unexplored sources, Davies persuasively showed the porous nature of the boundary between political speech and theatrical act, and advocated including these two mutually intertwined spheres in future historical research.

The conference concluded with a roundtable discussion that initially focused on the tension between the theoretical and methodological approaches presented here and their applicability to the historical treatment of transatlantic protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s. A major point in this regard was the assessment of the actual “transnationality” of these phenomena and their grounding in national or local historical traditions. Some participants argued that the networks discussed during the conference were not necessarily only transnational in the sense of downplaying the significance of the nation state, but would often better be defined as “transborder” movements, as they crossed boundaries of all kinds, including regional, urban/rural, and race, class, and gender.

In a similar vein, the question of national variables and the global dimension of protest brought up the distinctiveness of both decades. It was pointed out, for example, that whereas in earlier periods young people migrated unidirectionally, in the 1950s, they began to go back and forth across boundaries. Comparisons were also made to the transnational efforts of today’s protest movements, non-governmental organizations, and other social activist groups. This accompanied a discussion of the historical development of the transnational spaces described earlier, including their key actors, their reference systems, and the expertise needed to sustain them. The role of governments and the nation state led back to the emergence of the New Left in the historical setting of the Cold War and the specific relationship between the United States and West Germany. Panelists agreed that in order to fully understand the mechanics and the transnational orientation of protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s within their own countries, more emphasis should in the future be placed on governmental or, more broadly, “establishment” reactions to and interaction with these movements on a national and international level. Such interactions might well have affected or even exacerbated several dichotomies that seem, as one participant observed, to have always marked social movements, e.g. dichotomies between strategy and identity, doctrine and pragmatism, personal and public roles, and lead-
ership/hierarchy and democracy. It seems that the strongest social movements can combine these dichotomies and withstand the tension.

Overall, the conference provided a glimpse into the huge amount of work that still lies ahead before scholars can really come to grips with the multi-colored yet kindred social movements of the 1960s and 1970s. But in a most cordial and stimulating atmosphere, it also outlined some of the more promising and exciting avenues to travel toward this end.

*Martin Klimke, Carla MacDougall, and Wilfried Mausbach*
IS THE EU COMPLETE WITHOUT TURKEY? OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR EUROPE’S IDENTITY AND THE FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES


The expansion of the European Union (EU) has been a widely discussed issue in Germany and Europe in recent years. The possible inclusion of Turkey seems to pose a particular challenge. Turkey would be one of the largest members, and it would add a very substantial Islamic element to a Europe that so far has defined itself as based on cultural foundations of primarily Christian origin. The issue of Turkey’s membership in the EU thus includes political as well as historical aspects.

Following a well-established tradition of cooperating with German political foundations, the GHI co-organized and co-hosted a panel discussion on Turkey’s relationship with Europe together with the Heinrich-Böll Foundation. This was also the first event involving cooperation between the GHI and the Orient Institute of the Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft (German Oriental Society) at Beirut/Istanbul, one of the GHI’s partner institutions in the new foundation Deutsche Geisteswissenschaftliche Institute im Ausland (German Humanities Institutes Abroad).

Cem Özdemir, the son of Turkish immigrants and a popular former member of the Bundestag for the Green Party, addressed the concerns that many Germans have articulated with respect to Turkey’s possible membership. He also drew attention to the differing views about the issue in Turkey itself. Özdemir warned that the debate could only move forward if popular attitudes were taken seriously. Many Germans feared that Turkey’s joining the EU would exacerbate the problems of integrating an Islamic minority, import terrorism, and fail to turn Turkey into a democratic state that would live up to European standards. While many Turks welcomed joining the EU, others opposed it, fearing that it would jeopardize their Islamic identity. On balance, Özdemir regarded the hopes that Turkey’s potential membership has created as outweighing the fears it has raised. Pointing to the many reforms that had been started by the Turkish government in recent years, he was convinced that if the EU were to offer Turkey the prospect of becoming a
member and began serious negotiations about it, this momentum would gain further strength and substantially change Turkish politics and society.

Claus Schönig pointed out that history did not provide an unequivocal lesson as to whether or not Turkey should join the European Union. Turkey had been a player in the European system of great powers, and had been linked to Europe by processes of cultural exchange since the late Middle Ages. After the First World War, Turkey had its first experiences with democracy and a secular society. Schönig wondered however to what extent this had led to comprehensive changes of Turkish institutions and values, citing stark differences between some profoundly westernized areas and large parts of the countryside. He also called into question the concept of Turkey serving as a bridge between Europe and the Islamic world. In contrast to the Arab states, Turkey had a tradition of integrating substantial Christian and Jewish minorities; it had not been subject to colonial rule; and it had won its statehood after 1918 by mobilizing its population as citizens, not as subjects of a feudal regime. Even though Islamists were now gaining influence in Turkey, they seemed to operate within the Kemalist framework and not to strive for a theocratic state. Hence, the issue of Turkey’s membership in the EU had to be decided strictly on political grounds, Schönig concluded.

Henri J. Barkey stressed that the revolutionary character of the European Union called for including Turkey. He also saw a close link between the Cyprus conflict and Turkey’s membership. Europeans should not make unification of Cyprus the necessary precondition of Turkey’s membership. Instead, Turkey’s joining the EU could bring closure to the conflict on the island. The prospect of this outcome could serve as a strong incentive for Turkey to bring its legal and institutional framework in line with European standards once negotiations about membership begin.

Omer Taspinar also emphasized the positive results that Turkey’s joining the EU would have for Europe, for Turkey itself, and for the Middle East. Dismissing the concept of a “clash of civilizations,” he pointed out how multiculturalism had become a key feature of both the present European member states and of Turkey. This made Turkey’s EU membership the logical next step. It would give a major boost to democratic forces in Turkey, further contributing to their reconciliation with moderate Islamists and thus enhancing Turkey’s chances to serve as a model for Arab states. If Europeans were to reject Turkey’s bid, however, Taspinar warned, the consequences might be disastrous for all sides.

Not all members of the audience were convinced by the general
optimism the panelists expressed. Audience members asked critical questions about the Turkish military’s commitment to democracy and human rights, although Cem Özdemir and Omer Taspinar in particular were convinced that this commitment would be strengthened by membership negotiations. There was a general feeling that the panelists had addressed the manifold aspects of Turkey’s relationship with (the rest of) Europe in a comprehensive fashion.

Dirk Schumann
Bulletin of the GHI Washington

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FORMS OF RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY CREATION IN MODERN SOCIETY

Conference at the University of Chicago, October 23–25, 2003. Conveners: Michael Geyer (University of Chicago), Lucian Hölscher (Ruhr University, Bochum), Simone Lässig (GHI), Hartmut Lehmann (Max Planck Institute for History). Participants: Rebecca Bennette (Harvard University), Jim Bjork (Cornell University), Manuel Borutta (Free University Berlin), Susan Crane (University of Arizona), Tobias Dietrich (University of Trier), David Ellis (Augustana College), Ulrike Gleixner (Technical University Berlin), Derek Hastings (Oakland University), Dagmar Herzog (Michigan State University), Lena Inowlocki (University of Frankfurt am Main), Alexander Joskowicz (University of Chicago), Daniel Koehler (University of Chicago), Thomas Mittmann (Ruhr University, Bochum), Rita Paneschar (University of Hamburg), Mark Ruff (Concordia University, Montreal), Thomas Schmidt (University of Leipzig), Tony Steinhoff (University of Tennessee, Knoxville), Todd Weir (Columbia University), Cornelia Wilhelm (Institute for Contemporary History, Munich).

This conference was one in a series focusing on selected aspects of religion and religiosity in modern history. The first two conferences in the series addressed subjects including “Religion and Modernity” and “Religion and Nation.” Concentrating on Europe and Germany, this fall’s event examined the “Creation of Religious Communities” in its diverse forms. Twenty-two American and German historians addressed the question of to what extent religion and religiosity in modern societies can be understood as a continuous process of creation, dissolution, and new formation of religious communities. The conference also strove to find both a methodological approach and a theoretical concept that would allow processes earlier—not always successfully—squeezed into the paradigm of “secularization” to be interpreted in a more sophisticated and appropriate manner. Thus the conference strove to do more than merely reflect the most recent state of scholarship; it also aimed to reveal new dimensions of religious-historical and sociological discussion.

For all presentations, the thematic and methodological point of reference was the trend toward informalization of religious groups, seen for quite some time in nearly all Western nations and in part traceable to the time of the Enlightenment. Based on the recognition that the long-established secularization paradigm has reached its limits and thus can no longer serve as the sole approach to explaining changing religious communities, the conference sought to determine how the never-ending process of new formation and reconstruction of religious communities appears historically, and how this can be appropriately analyzed beyond
the use of traditional social historical methods such as counting the number of formal members (as indicated by baptisms and new church members). Furthermore, conference participants discussed how religious and non-religious communities could best be distinguished in light of the many definitions of “the religious.” All participants agreed that a reasonable delimitation of “religious” groups is needed so that not every form of community building is categorized as religious community building. At the same time, the concept should be open enough to allow research on entirely new forms of expressing a sense of religious belonging and for the inclusion of groups generally not considered religious, such as the Freidenker or professed atheists in the GDR.

In order not to limit the scope of future research by adopting overly hasty and excessively rigid delineations, and as a first step toward the development of an appropriate conceptual framework, the conference initially concentrated on the analysis of the cultural and linguistic practices by which the groups separated themselves from their environment. These included above all 1) the changing ways in which each group identified itself and the “other”; 2) the forms and practices associated with the search for a “transcendent”; 3) the extent and the kind of creation through ritual of a sense of constancy and symbolism through which—going beyond individual experiences and needs—‘communities’ are established; 4) the social organization that builds on this; and 5) the type and function of these processes of institutionalization, which in turn yield insights regarding the form and requirements of community building. Such an approach makes it possible to identify the benefits people find in religion as well as what specific services religious groups furnish for their members and adherents in modern society.

With these questions as a starting point, all papers concentrated on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Nearly all were limited to the field of German history. The first panel, “Forms of Religious Community Creation in the Nineteenth Century,” focused on religious outsiders or marginal movements. Susan Crane’s contribution “Holy Alliances: Real and Imagined Religious Communities After the Napoleonic Wars” examined Franz von Baader and Ignaz Lindl, two men in czarist Russia who experimented with the formation of new kinds of religious communities that located themselves outside the realm of the Romantic cultural national state. In the end, while Crane’s examples were a story of failure, their value comes from their revelations about a social, political, and cultural-religious alternative to the Holy Alliance “from below.” This was also true for David Ellis’s contribution. His paper, “Re-Enchanting Modernity: The Erweckungsbewegung and Rationality in Pomerania in the 1810s and 1820s,” presented another ecumenical movement that understood itself as trans-confessional, trans-Atlantic, and even trans-class.
movement, centered in Prussia’s rural and provincial eastern region, consisted primarily of Protestant peasants and handworkers, but also some aristocrats.

Next, Daniel Koehler addressed a Protestant community of an entirely different sort, though he too was interested in a special case. In his paper “Enchanted Protestantism: A Restyling Orthodoxy at Bad Boll, 1850–1880,” he analyzed the phenomena of a Protestant place of pilgrimage and a fragile Lutheran-Orthodox “substitute parish” (Ersatzgemeinde) whose attractions transcended borders. Both phenomena were the results of the efforts of the Württemberg pastor Johann Christoph Blumhardt, who during a time of individualization of belief and secularization of religious values offered orthodox Protestants special spiritual experiences and new forms of worship that were both pious and innovative.

Manuel Borutta’s paper, “Zur Orientalisierung des Katholizismus im 19. Jahrhundert (1781–1924)” (On the Orientalization of Catholicism in the Nineteenth Century), also examined Protestant responses to modernity. Whereas secularization theory views the separating of politics and religion, of the public sphere and religion, and the state and the church as a process inherent to modernity, Borutta views this differentiation in the context of the European Kulturkampf, the roots of which he traces back to the discourse of the Enlightenment. According to Borutta, the orientalization of Catholicism since the end of the eighteenth century had become part of the self-description of modernity, while at the same time Catholicism was excluded from modernity. In this connection it became clear how central a role Catholicism played as a negative model for the self-understanding of the Enlightenment and the liberal movement.

That this phenomenon, by 1870 at the latest, was no longer an exclusively Protestant one was demonstrated conclusively by Alexander Joskowicz in his paper, “The Religion of Humanity in the Fight Against Ultramontanism: Jewish Identity Politics and anti-Catholicism in the German Kulturkampf.” The German Reform Jews, too, used Catholicism as a symbol of the “other” in order to create a positive image of Judaism, which just a few decades before had been burdened with similar stereotypes as Catholicism. Like Borutta, Joskowicz was interested less in the cultural practice in the parishes than in the discourse expressed in selected organs of Reform Judaism and in Jewish neo-orthodoxy. It was significant that Jewish anti-ultramontanism, which before 1871 already played an important role in Jewish identity formation, was given a further-reaching function in the Kulturkampf. This anti-ultramontanism was a version of liberal anticlericalism, but it was also something more: As the Jewish press portrayed Catholicism as a hierarchical, party-political, and authoritarian enemy of every true religion, an individual vision of a
Jewish religion took form that was to a large degree compatible with modernity. In his comments, Hartmut Lehman called attention to the great fluidity of new forms of religious communities in the nineteenth century and addressed the role of pronounced non-conformists. He also gave some first thoughts regarding a typology of processes of community creation.

In the next panel, entitled “Weibliche und männliche Formen religiöser Vergemeinschaftung” (Masculine and Feminine Forms of Religious Community Creation), the perspective provided by gender history took center stage. Masculine forms, however, played only a secondary role in the presentations; for the most part, the panel was shaped by the issue of the feminization of religion, which has barely begun to be explored in research on Catholicism or Judaism. Remarkably, though this did not shape the discussion, the findings varied clearly for the individual denominations. Ulrike Gleixner’s presentation “Vom familialen Totengedenken zur männlichen Genealogie: Pietistisches Bürgertum und Traditionssstiftung in Württemberg” (From Family Commemoration of the Dead to Masculine Genealogy: The Pietist Middle-Class and the Creation of Tradition in Württemberg) concluded that, with the formation of middle-class society, women were systematically “written out” of the masculine meta-narrative and hence lost to the religious memory of the community. Simone Lässig’s presentation “Religiöse Modernisierung, Geschlechterdiskurs und kulturelle Verbürgerlichung” (Religious Modernization, Gender Discourse and Cultural Bourgeoisification) showed that for the German Jews of the early nineteenth century, the process worked in the opposite direction. The Jewish religion’s modernization and establishment as part of bourgeois society rested on a devaluation of the masculine culture of Talmudic study and on an increase in value of aspects of religious practices such as emotionality that contemporary discourse categorized as feminine.

Gender symbols also played a central role in Rebecca Bennette’s presentation, though she was less interested in cultural practice than in the gender images shaping the characteristics that nineteenth-century German Catholicism ascribed to itself and to the other. In her paper “Role Reversal: Feminine Imagery and Activity among Catholics During the Nineteenth Century,” Bennette showed that negative stereotypes such as those formed by Prussian Protestantism about Catholics were gradually adopted by the Catholic side, transformed, and reinterpreted. Now it was Catholics themselves who self-confidently and even positively defined and portrayed themselves and their ideal of the nation as feminine.

This process of reinterpretation also found reflection in Derek Hastings’s report on “Nation, Race, and Gender: The Formation of Progressive Catholic Identity in Imperial Germany,” in which the limits of the
established milieu concept clearly came to light. At the center of analysis stood the “progressive Catholics” of Munich, a group rooted in the university-educated bourgeoisie and doubtless on the margin of the Catholic “milieu.” The analysis of such a fringe group demonstrates how geographically, socially, and culturally diverse German pre-war Catholicism was, and shows how ill-suited the old milieu concept is for illuminating the complex processes of Catholic community formation in the Kaiserrreich.

The third panel was entitled “Formen religiöser Vergemeinschaftung in der Wende zum 20. Jahrhundert” (Forms of Religious Community Creation in the Transition to the Twentieth Century). The seven papers presented in this panel covered a very wide field of study originally dominated by Protestants. The spectrum ranged from the Nietzsche cult to the Freidenker in the Kaiserrreich to Volkish groups around 1900 and Jewish fraternal orders to the phenomenon of “village religion,” from popular piety in Upper Silesia to a paper that brought a European perspective to bear. Thomas Mittmann’s paper “God is Dead—Long Live Religion: Ernst Honeffer’s Concept of Neopaganism as an Example of Nietzschean Religion in Fin-de-Siecle Germany” showed the high degree to which the radical atheist Nietzsche was read “religiously” and thereby became a source of religious reformation and renewal. The resultant “religion of this world” with no place for a transcendent God was particularly attractive to the Protestant educated middle class, which sought not secularization, but an individualized religiosity beyond the established Protestant churches.

This search for new forms of community creation outside the narrow limits that, as a result of theological controversies, threatened to become institutionalized in Judaism too provided the theme for Cornelia Wilhelm’s paper, “Fraternal Organization as Model for Modern Jewish Community.” The paper focused on Jews in America, showing their German roots. Here, the Order of B’nai B’rith was charged with an exceedingly important integrative function: the formation of a Jewish identity that took place parallel to the individualization of the life world and transcended religious fault lines, that promoted communal cooperation as well as the integration of all Jews into the American nation.

In his paper “The Secularization of Religious Dissent: Anticlerical Politics and the Freigeistige Movement in Germany,” Todd Weir gave broad insights into the development of political and civil religions from 1844 to 1933. Weir advanced the provocative thesis that a relational model is clearly superior to the secularization approach. According to this view, the anticlericalism and the secular religiosity typical of the Free Religious movement must be understood as “negative dependence” on the dominant order. As long as the dominant order united state and clerical authority, neither the Free Religious movement nor the radi-
cal utopian political communities could truly become secularized. Rita Paneschar’s contribution “Bund, Hochschule, Kulturrat oder Orden? Religiöse Vergemeinschaftung in völkischen Zeitschriften um 1900” (Association, University, Cultural Council, or Holy Order? Religious Community Creation in Nationalist Newspapers around 1900) examined the German Christian periodical Volkserzieher, which exemplified the many new cultural offerings of a sense of purpose to life that emerged from German society around 1900 and moved beyond mere discourse to establish community.

Jim Bjork was less interested in exploring the new developments that emerged out of the confrontation with modernity; instead, he analyzed real or supposed inertial forces in the field of religion. In his contribution “Black Silesia: Popular Piety and the Industrial Landscape,” Bjork adopted a grassroots perspective that allowed him to explore everyday religious practices in a Catholic industrial region and to question old assumptions about the “natural” religious obedience of the Upper SileSIans as well as assumptions equating religiosity with loyalty to and affiliation with the church.

Tobias Dietrich posed the question “Village as Religion or Religion in the Village? Some Remarks on Rural Life (1850 to 1930).” Drawing on the concept of civil religion, Dietrich developed the idea of “village religion” as a suitable concept to describe the village life world, where he was able to uncover parallels to phenomena generally associated with large cities. This applied above all to the stubbornly independent character of religious culture, which increasingly removed itself from the control of the church as an institution and developed special rites and practices, as well as the denominational neutrality typical for many village parishes. In light of this, Dietrich called for the application in future research of “village religion” as a new and original analytical concept.

Anthony Steinhoff’s paper, entitled “Building Religious Community in Modern Urban Europe,” provided a precise overview of the essentials of the relevant research controversies and located them in their European context. In contrast to Dietrich, Steinhoff in his paper primarily examined the urban environment. Here, too, urbanization did not mark the end of religion, as suggested by secularization theory, but rather provoked a change in form and a concomitant pluralization of the religious that occurred via the creation of new forms of “community.” This in turn made it possible—as Dietrich found for the village—to live “religiously” without attending church and without direct contact with priests, pastors, or rabbis, and to form a feeling of religious belonging outside traditional institutions. Here, as with most of the other papers in this panel, it became clear that the concept of religious community creation is currently
most suitable for those groups with roots in Protestantism or the Protestant milieu.

This also was shown in the final panel, entitled “Formen religiöser Vergemeinschaftung nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg” (Forms of Religious Community Creation After the Second World War). In her paper “Believing in God as Atheist: Left Wing Theology and the Confrontation with Secularization,” Dagmar Herzog examined Dorothee Soelle, the fascinating figure whose work Herzog interpreted as a key example of the creation of new religious communities and the revitalization of Western Christianity in the modern era. Among the fundamental issues Herzog raised was the tendency toward secularization inherent in Christianity and the interwoven “Christian defensiveness,” without which the phenomenon of anti-Semitism is difficult to explain, as well as the revitalized connection between politics and religion on both the Left and the Right.

In the broadest sense, this issue was also addressed in Thomas Schmidt’s paper “Civil Religion in the GDR,” in which Schmidt applied the concept of civil religion to “the most secularized region in the world.” In his view, secularization was so far-reaching and so apparently lasting because the state supplied the functional equivalent of traditional Christian religion. Above all, this was the intent of rituals such as the Jugendweihe (the GDR ceremony in which fourteen-year-olds were given the social status of adults), while the formation of a civil religion sanctifying labor and justice must be judged to be more of an autonomous process not intentionally controlled by the state. Nevertheless, with the end of the GDR, its basic structures disappeared as well. Although central values and rituals are demonstrating a remarkable staying power, still, the transcendental dimension and with it the religious character of the civil religion were lost upon the collapse of the socialist system.

The topic of dissolution was further explored by Mark Ruff. In his paper “A Religious Vacuum: The post-Catholic Milieu in Germany,” he agreed with proponents of secularization theory in their description of Western Europe as a wasteland as seen from a Christian perspective. But according to Ruff, the religiosity of many non-Christian immigrant groups proves that this was not a result of secularization resulting as a necessary consequence of modernity, but at the most a de-Christianization of Lebenswelten. But Ruff also criticized an excessively one-dimensional understanding of “form change”: Contrary to the thesis that church ties decline, but not faith, he pointed to the example of German Catholics, especially in the realm of sexuality, where Christian values as represented by the church no longer have much impact on daily life. According to Ruff, Catholics too have long been on the path from collective faith to individualism.
Processes working in the opposite direction, namely the rise of a new orthodoxy, were portrayed in Lena Inowlocki’s paper “Covering Hair, Disclosing Identity: Individual and Collective Aspects of Religious Practice.” Her study was based on interviews with women from three generations of Jewish families who came to Germany or the Netherlands by way of Displaced Person Camps. In this connection, she pointed to the seemingly paradoxical phenomenon of a turn to orthodoxy that obviously was not expected or in any way imparted by the previous generation. Inowlocki did not describe this turn to orthodoxy as a mere return to discarded cultural practices, but rather as a fitting answer to a phenomenon described in many other conference contributions: individualization and, above all for minority religions, the passing on of the responsibility for the continued existence of the community as a whole.

In the concluding panel of the conference, the discussion centered on the value of different theoretical approaches from which the community building paradigm necessarily derives. While the concept of confession-alization was hinted at, but not systematically discussed, secularization theory provoked a debate that would have been a meaningful and useful starting point for the conference as well. While Geyer and Hoelscher declared the hitherto dominant paradigm dead and asserted that the community building approach had much greater analytical power, Schmidt saw in secularization theory—which Steinhoff described as an “invincible gorilla”—an approach that now as before could continue to be useful. In this respect, the concluding discussion left a similar impression as the meeting as a whole: Hoelscher’s question regarding the forms of religious community formation presented a stimulating new concept, and the participants illuminated the process of religious community creation between 1800 and 2000 in stimulating ways. Likewise, the approach to “community/parish” outside of the typical understanding of the church must be seen as an important result of the debates, and the cultural and symbolic dimensions of the formation and stabilization of religious groups were given a gratifyingly prominent status. Nevertheless, the individual papers and panels remained somewhat unconnected. It seems that the consistent application of religious-historical analyses to the paradigm of religious community creation that served as the subject of this conference must remain a project for the future. Nevertheless, the conference performed very important advance work for this task.

Simone Lässig
The third meeting of the Medieval History Seminar took place in Washington on October 23–26, 2003. Following a public lecture by Professor Johannes Fried (“Remembered Facts: Bohr and Heisenberg in Copenhagen”), nine German and seven American Ph.D. candidates and recent Ph.D.s discussed predistributed papers together with mentors Michael Borgolte, Caroline Walker Bynum, Johannes Fried, and Patrick Geary.

Participants encountered some significant differences in how medieval history is pursued in Germany and America. In general, the American contributions tended to be more conceptually driven and rhetorically elaborated, while the German papers were more focused on the examination of specific sources and their possible meanings. Americans tended to draw more significantly on theories and models derived from postmodernism, gender studies, and feminism, while Germans were more influenced by communication theory, memory theory, and anthropology. Germans found the style of American participants more informal and indirect, while Americans noted the tendency of German participants to defer to mentors. Such differences were however less significant in many cases than the gender of the participants themselves and the differing stages of their research.

Moreover, participants from both countries found considerable convergence in the kinds of issues and topics under investigation. A number of papers focused on the formation and representation of social groups. These included Gesine Jordan’s investigation of self-donations to the monastery of St. Gallen as a middle ground between lay and monastic life in the ninth century; Milena Svec Goetschi’s analysis of appeals to the papacy from apostate monks and nuns as well as from religious wishing to change religious houses; and Katherine Clark’s study of widows and the religious discourse exhorting them to continuing obligations of prayer for their deceased husbands.

The construction of memory and transformation of the past were themes of John Romano’s statistical analysis of the ninth century martyrology of Ado of Vienne; Markus Späth’s examination of images, chronicles and archives in the elaboration of monastic memory in central
Italy; and Olaf Schneider’s reconstruction of how Hincmar of Reims invented the myth of the pluralist bishop Milo of Reims and Trier in the ninth century.

The body as metaphor and as object was the subject of Kristin Marek’s study of French and English royal effigies; Jacqueline E. Jung’s analysis of the statues of the Wise and Foolish Virgins in the north porch of the Magdeburg Cathedral; and Thomas Kortmann’s explication of the fifteenth century German translation of the Spiritual Rosegarden, the life of Catherine of Siena.

Issues of image and identity and norm and behavior combined in Andrew J. Romig’s exploration of altruism and Christian ethics in the early Middle Ages; Gillian B. Elliott’s analysis of the portrayal of the Traditio Legis in Alsatian monastic sculpture during the reign of Frederick Barbarossa; Kerr Houston’s deconstruction of received ideas concerning artistic representations of sanctity and canonization; Rosalind J. Reynolds’s survey of the portrayals of Mathilda of Tuscany in terms of biblical models of female authority; and Ines Hensler’s investigation into the image of the Saracen in German and French epic and romance.

Finally, two papers explored the ways that local communities integrated external norms and authority within the continuity of local interests. Jörg Peltzer presented the gradual penetration of canon law in the election of bishops in the diocese of Sées in the later twelfth century; and Jörg Feuchter analyzed the extraordinary continuity in social and political structures with the community of Montauban across the period of the Albigensian Crusades.

Both during formal sessions and informal discussions, participants found that in spite of differing styles, German and American medievalists of the rising generation are moving in very similar directions and that even across the divide of language and university tradition, sharing and discussion were not only possible but natural. Younger scholars on both sides of the Atlantic are incorporating each others’ scholarship into their work, and the differences between German and American scholarship show signs of disappearing. The convergences of interest only underlined the importance for American medievalists, regardless of research interests, of attaining fluency in German and for Germans to be proficient in English. The chance to participate in the Medieval History Seminar, which is conducted on a rigorously bilingual basis, should be an additional stimulus.

The next meeting of the Medieval History Seminar is being planned for October 2005 in Venice, Italy. For further information, please contact Dr. Christoph Strupp, e-mail: strupp@ghi-dc.org.

Patrick J. Geary
Participants and Their Topics

KATHERINE CLARK, Fort Lewis College, “Purgatory, Punishment, and the Discourse of Holy Widowhood in the High and Later Middle Ages”

GILLIAN B. ELLIOTT, University of Texas, Austin, “Frederick Barbarossa and the Traditio Legis”


INES HENSLER, Universität Konstanz, “Der Ritter und der Sarrazin: Die Beziehung von Fremdem und Eigenem in der höfischen Epik des Hochmittelalters”

KERR HOUSTON, Maryland Institute College of Art, “Late Medieval Canonization Dates as Art Historical Evidence”


GESINE JORDAN, Universität des Saarlandes, “In ipso sacro loco: Untersuchungen zu den Schenkungen an geistliche und monastische Einrichtungen im frühen Mittelalter und zum Wohnen von Laien in den Klöstern St. Gallen und Redon”

THOMAS KORTMANN, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, “Körpererfahrung und Heiligkeit im ‘Geistlichen Rosengarten’”

KRISTIN MAREK, Staatliche Hochschule für Gestaltung, Karlsruhe, “Die Effigies als Bildphänomen”

JÖRG PELTZER, Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg, “Die Bischofswahl im Spannungsfeld von Interessensgruppen und Rechtstraditionen: Der Fall Séës (1144/5–1228)”

ROSALIND J. REYNOLDS, University of California, Berkeley, “Praise for a New Deborah: Debating Female Rulership in the Investiture Controversy”

JOHN F. ROMANO, Harvard University, “How to Read a Martyrology: Ado of Vienne’s Venerabile et Perantiquum Martyrologium”

ANDREW J. ROMIG, Brown University, “The Religious Experience of Kindness in the Early Middle Ages”
OLAF SCHNEIDER, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt, “Auf der Suche nach Milo von Reims und Trier, oder: Die Konstruktion eines Bischofs”


MILENA SVEC GOETSCI, Universität Zürich, “Vagabundierende Mönche, flüchtige Nonnen! Apostasie und Transitus im Deutschen Reich des Spätmittelalters”
HOW VALID ARE COMPARISONS?
The American Occupation of Germany Revisited


During this half-day symposium, participants examined comparisons and parallels between the American occupation of Germany 1945-1953 and that of Iraq beginning in 2003. Before, during, and after the war against Iraq, President George W. Bush, leading members of his administration, and supporters of the war often compared Hitler’s tyranny with Saddam’s and the liberation of Germany fifty-eight years ago with that of Iraq today, arguing that as freedom, democracy, and prosperity had come to Germany in the wake of the war and occupation, so too would they come to Iraq.

The first panel, on the early years of the occupation of Germany, dealt with security threats to the American occupiers, with local and state elections and the new democratic elite, and with reeducation, democratization, and denazification. Timothy Naftali pointed out that resistance after Germany’s formal capitulation in early May 1945 was negligible, even though American generals had expected it to be strong. Once Hitler’s death became known to Germans, there was no obvious successor around whom SS or Hitler Youth fanatics could rally. The crushing reality of defeat and the massive Allied military presence in Germany took the heart out of would-be resisters, so that there were almost no attacks on the occupation troops.

Rebecca Boehling explained that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Directive 1067, in force from 1945 to 1947, attempted a compromise on denazification: it changed top personnel but gradually disavowed the program’s punitive and repressive aspects. Although Americans and Germans committed to a fundamental purge and democratization of society were dissatisfied with such compromises, congressional committees believed denazification was impeding Germany’s economic recovery, and pressured administrators to halt it. American occupiers tended to
place efficiency and experience above democratic alternatives in their personnel decisions. Boehling described how the occupiers helped build postwar German democracy from the bottom up, holding first local, then Land elections before national elections in 1949.

“Reeducation” of society was a watchword in the early occupation years in Germany, James Tent recalled, but it is not a guideline in Iraq. The pace of institution-rebuilding is moving faster in Iraq than it did in Germany, the aim today being to establish Iraqi institutions that promote democratic initiatives rather than “reeducation.” In Germany, real help for higher education was not forthcoming until 1947, when Indiana University President Herman B. Wells instituted ambitious programs of cultural exchange and more resources for the universities. In Iraq, promises of assistance for the universities came just six months after the occupation began.

The second panel focused on the later years of Germany’s occupation, and dealt with the constitution, national elections, war crimes trials and transitional justice, and economic revival and the Marshall Plan. Donald Kommers devoted his presentation to the political stability lent to the electoral system by the compromise between proportional representation and a single-member-district system arrived at by German political leaders. The constructive vote of no confidence was an additional stability-enhancing feature. Frank Buscher noted that American military justice after World War II provided for extensive review of sentences, even though there were no appeals courts. The trials of war criminals in Nuremberg and Dachau had reeducational purposes in the broadest sense. From an early date, German elites, including prominent figures such as Cardinal Frings, criticized the war crimes trials and the sentences. The U.S. Army conducted these trials until 1948. Hughes thought that the Marshall Plan, like the Berlin airlift, was more decisive politically than economically, demonstrating as it did that the United States would stand by the new Germany. Refugees from the eastern part of Germany had a greater economic impact than the Marshall Plan on the economy of western Germany.

The two speakers of the final panel considered the validity for Iraq 2003–2004 of the occupation experiences in Germany described by speakers at the first two panels. David Schoenbaum stressed the unique leadership qualities of the military governor in Germany, Lucius Clay, and pointed out the many differences between Germany of 1945 and Iraq of today, not the least of which was the availability to Iraq of a major natural resource, petroleum. He urged that German non-governmental organizations such as the Friedrich Ebert Foundation initiate projects that contribute to Iraqi reconstruction. James Dobbins drew on a recent RAND study on American “nation-building” in eight countries since World War
II (Germany, Japan, Haiti, Somalia, Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq). He observed that a substantial and lasting presence of American and allied armed forces had proven key in underpinning enduring transitions to democracy. Where there had been plenty of troops, such as in Germany and Japan, such transitions had succeeded, but in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, Washington had substituted firepower for manpower. Precedents such as Kosovo and Bosnia were more applicable to the Iraq case than Germany, but the Bush administration seemed disinclined to draw on them. A lively discussion ensued, with most participants emphasizing the differences rather than the similarities between the American occupations of Germany fifty-eight years ago and of Iraq today.

Robert Gerald Livingston
IMMIGRANTS AND THE REPUBLIC:
GERMAN CATHOLICS IN NINETEENTH–
CENTURY AMERICA


On November 9, 2003, Kathleen Neils Conzen of the University of Chicago delivered the first annual Edmund Spevack Memorial Lecture at Adams House, Harvard University. The series was inaugurated to pay tribute to the memory of Edmund Spevack (1963–2001), a former fellow of the German Historical Institute and resident of Adams House at Harvard University. (See Obituary in the Fall 2001 issue of the GHI Bulletin, pp. 3–4).

Professor Judy Palfrey, Master of Adams House, welcomed the audience and pointed out that focusing on the history of transatlantic exchange in a lecture series could contribute significantly to our own understanding of diversity. Witold K. Potempa, a representative of the Edmund Spevack Memorial Trust, reported about the activities of the Trust, including the establishment of a small library of Edmund Spevack’s books at Adams House. Christof Mauch, in introducing the featured speaker, emphasized that the topic of Conzen’s lecture reflected Spevack’s research interest in the experience of nineteenth-century German immigrants in America. He also pointed out that Conzen’s focus on religion, or more precisely Catholicism, was another connecting element between Conzen and Spevack. During the last weeks of his life, Edmund Spevack had begun work on a study of the cleric Neils Stensen, and when he was at Harvard and resident of Adams House, he had been the founder of the Catholic-Jewish Dialogue.

In her lecture, entitled “Immigrants and the Republic: German Catholics in Nineteenth-Century America,” Conzen discussed four aspects of nineteenth-century ethnicity and Catholicism, all of which contributed to the distinctiveness and endurance of this German-Catholic “subculture”: the success of transplanting Catholic institutions and settlement systems from Germany to America; the diaspora consciousness of German Catholics; the political differences between German-American Protestants and Catholics; and the Kulturkampf mentalité of German-American Catholics. The next issue of the GHI Bulletin will feature the full text of Kathleen Conzen’s talk.

Christof Mauch
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DEATH IN MODERN GERMANY

As the twentieth century recedes into history, historians take stock of its legacies. Isaiah Berlin, who lived through most of the century, noted that, although he had not suffered personal hardship, “I remember it only as the most terrible century in Western history.” In a century characterized by wars, mass death, and genocides, Germany predictably occupies a special place. A spate of recent publications on the Third Reich and the Holocaust has put death and destruction at the center of Nazi worldview and practice. But while we know a great deal about the Nazi death cult and the killing fields of Nazi-occupied Europe, the broader understanding and meaning of death for Germans both before and after the Nazi period—with the possible exception of soldiers’ experiences in the First World War—are still quite unknown.

The aim of this conference was to think through some of the problems, connections, and approaches of the history of death in modern German history, particularly in the twentieth century. Is it possible to imagine a more comprehensive history of death in this century, a history that does not begin and end with the Third Reich? If—as Paul Celan famously wrote—“death is a master from Germany,” what developments and forms did death take over the decades? What were the rituals of death in the private sphere, in the family, in cemeteries, near the patient’s bed at the hospital? How important were the churches and synagogues—that is, religion—in framing the understanding of death, identity, and citizenship? When and how was death politicized, when and how was it privatized? Did these changes necessarily follow political events? How did the short-term cataclysmic violence of the world wars affect long-term patterns of mourning, burial, and grief? The conference organizers invited junior and senior scholars from Germany, Great Britain, and the United States to explore these clusters of topics. Most of the papers fo-
ocused on the twentieth century, with several papers discussing earlier periods. They examined a wide range of themes.

Kerstin Rehwinkel explored the origins of a new attitude toward death during and after the Enlightenment in her paper on “‘Apparent Death’ Discourse in Germany in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century: Body, Science, and Society.” Rehwinkel noted that the discourse about “apparent death” began in Paris in the 1740s, leading to the creation of life-saving institutions and methods of treating the “apparently” dead all over Europe, with Hamburg being the first German city to implement them. Reformers only gradually succeeded in overcoming the general public’s fear of becoming contaminated by touching the dead, however, particularly the corpses of suicides. Rehwinkel pointed out that as physicians replaced priests as the final authority on death, the question of how exactly to define dying and death took on a new meaning. Simone Ameskamp examined the rise of cremation in her paper “Phoenix and Prometheus—Cremation in Imperial and Weimar Germany.” The first crematorium in modern Germany was built in Gotha in 1878. Urban Protestants constituted the backbone of the cremation movement. They emphasized the modernity, cleanliness, and dignity of the practice, and linked it to German values. While their Protestant opponents rejected cremation mainly as not in line with tradition, Catholics until 1963 were supposed to heed a papal decree banning it. Drawing upon statistical evidence that showed a steady growth of cremation, Ameskamp argued that the world wars had little impact on its acceptance.

Michael Geyer’s paper “Death and Killing on the Western Front” pointed to the difference between the actual experience of killing and dying in the First World War and the way killing and dying were subsequently narrated and commemorated. While Verdun has served throughout the century as the defining image of death in the Great War, in reality, the highest death rates occurred during the war of movement in 1914, and also especially on the Eastern Front into the summer of 1915 and again in the spring and summer of 1918. Moreover, the idea of death taking place in one dramatic moment did not reflect reality: most men died slowly, from shrapnel wounds caused by artillery fire. Geyer showed that German soldiers were tremendously effective killers, far more so than their counterparts. This resulted from a change from parade-oriented to combat-oriented training. Learning how to survive on the battlefield meant learning how to overcome fear, the dominant soldierly emotion, and how to fight aggressively and efficiently. It resulted in a “defensive aggressiveness” that, Geyer concluded, came to be the basis of the modern practice of war.

Martina Kessel discussed how humor served as an instrument to cope with death in her paper “Laughing about Death: Humor in both

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World Wars.” Over the course of the nineteenth century, she argued, a particular German concept of humor had developed that explicitly rejected irony and focused on telling the truth. The humorous soldier became part of this concept from the 1860s on. In World War I, German propaganda used jokes to counter stories of German atrocities and to help soldiers come to terms with the unpredictability of death by inverting the stereotypes used by enemy propaganda and emphasizing the value of order. Following the Nazi stormtroopers’ keeping of this tradition of humor during the Weimar Republic, Nazi propaganda in World War II largely avoided referring to the different character of that war. At the same time, a culture of oral jokes (Flüsternetze) emerged among the population that included addressing the murderous policy of the regime, albeit indirectly and leaving out Himmler.

Habbo Knoch examined problems and strategies of representation in his paper “Pictures of Death after both World Wars.” He argued that the experience of World War I had created a “crisis of representation.” Pre-war portraits of soldiers stood in stark contrast to the depersonalized images of destruction that the war had produced, rendering the integration of violence into its visual representation impossible. Strategies to cope with this problem focused on the “spiritual,” the “heroic,” and the “realistic presence” of the dead. Moreover, as Knoch pointed out, images of the dead were used for political purposes from the very beginning of the war, aimed at evoking strong emotions for and against fighting it. When the Spanish Civil War added the motif of wounded children to the images of civilians harmed by war, all elements of the imagery used later to depict World War II and the Holocaust were already in place.

Alon Confino’s paper “Death, Spiritual Solace, and the Afterlife between Nazism and Religion” explored the tension and the com mingling between the Nazi attempt to build a revolutionary cultural system and the traditional, mostly religious, rites of death that were notoriously resistant to change. As the Second World War dragged on and the losses mounting, who and what provided spiritual sustenance to the bereaved? Here, argued Confino, were the limits of Nazi ideology and death rituals: the party offered a general truth, and a national, collective cause, but for many religious Germans, it could not quite offer personal redemption and promise of an afterlife. The Nazis could not monopolize the spiritual element in death in a society that was largely religious, while the church provided spiritual assistance in death, but in language that often provided support to the regime. The point is not that Nazism “lost” or “won” against religion; it is rather that “lived” Nazism—the way people actually experienced it—successfully blended Nazi and religious practices.

Attitudes toward and experience of death in and immediately after 1945 were the focus of Richard Bessel’s paper, “Death in Germany: The
Shock of 1945,” and Monica Black’s contribution, “A Dialectic of Loss: Death in Postwar Berlin.” Bessel described the German landscape of 1945 as littered with corpses, and speculated on the meaning for Germans of confronting these corpses. While the Allies attempted to confront the Germans with the death they had wrought, the general German response in the “shock of 1945” was a heightened sense of the Germans’ own victimhood, even in the face of the corpses that were the product of crimes committed “in the name of the German people.” Black discussed the forced coexistence of death and life in postwar Berlin, and the various ways in which, long after the death and killing associated with the war were over, death continued to stalk the Berlin landscape and the imaginations of Berliners. The coexistence of death and life prevented the war from being “properly over” in the minds of many Berliners, faced as they were with the ongoing prospect of the exhumations of their loved ones or the uncertainty of the fates of the war missing.

Svenja Goltermann’s paper “The Imagination of Disaster: Death and Survival in Postwar Germany” and Dagmar Herzog’s contribution “Sex and Death” explored the tortuous mix of acknowledgment and denial toward mass death during the 1950s in West Germany. Goltermann critiqued historians for treating the concept of trauma as self-evident, although it has a history and postwar contemporaries did not yet use it. Drawing upon psychiatric case files of former soldiers, women on the homefront, and Jewish survivors, Goltermann pointed out that their memories of the war experiences were constructs, mediating past elements by postwar language, imagination, and ex post knowledge. German society in the 1950s, Goltermann argued, was a “society driven by Angst” that expressed this fear in multiple and dissonant voices. Herzog posed the question of why West Germany directed so much energy toward policing sexual behavior in the 1950s. She argued that policing sexuality was a displacement of moral discourse from “genocide to genitals,” as part of the attempted rechristianization of postwar Germany. Sex became, according to Herzog, a site of “memory management” that sought to redress the sexual license of the Nazi period and, by extension, the Nazi past altogether by reaffirming conservative sexual mores and condemning premarital sex and abortion in particular.

Werner Kremp outlined his project of a yearbook on political thanatology with the aim of elucidating the effects of death on politics and political behavior during the past five decades. He suggested that generational differences in political styles were directly linked to the experience of war and mass death and the lack thereof, and he defined the change over time from religious to non-religious forms of public mourning as a major object of research. Paul Betts explored a different perspective of the official postwar culture of death in his paper “When Cold
Warriors Die: The Commemorative Deaths of Konrad Adenauer and Walter Ulbricht,” about the funerals of Adenauer and Ulbricht as a means of state self-representation. Adenauer’s funeral allowed for a public confirmation of Germany’s integration in the West, rapprochement with France, and Wiedergutmachung with Israel. Adenauer was styled as a redeemer, but more importantly, as a civil servant of the state to which he bore allegiance. In the case of Ulbricht, although at the time of his death he had fallen from the party’s grace and become an Unperson, the resonance of his death with the people of the GDR was remarkable and had to be recognized by the SED. His funeral both affirmed his status in the history of German Communism and confirmed his status as private citizen devoted to public work. Significantly, narratives of aggrieved nationalism, tragedy, and heroism were absent in both funerals. These ceremonies were not about nation-building; rather, they represented the internalization of the division of Germany and the allegiance of each man to his state.

In his paper “Death in Munich: The 1972 Olympic Games,” Kay Schiller examined the conflict between the intended image of the 1972 Olympics and the tragedy of the massacre of the Israeli athletes. The Munich Games used an aesthetic approach that eschewed politics in their attempts to overcome the 1936 Berlin Olympics precedent. The image projected at the Munich Olympics stressed a cosmopolitan, peace-loving Germany, and wedded technology to aesthetics that placed emphasis on clarity, lightness, and transparency. This aesthetic was the inversion of the monumental, ponderous scale of Berlin in 1936. In the aftermath of the murder of the Israeli athletes, Schiller argued, the discourse that arose conflated the victims and their Olympic hosts—hosts whose technocratic “mega show” had been spoiled by politics. Felix Robin Schulz discussed in his paper “Death in East Germany, 1945–1990” the changing burial practices under communism. Why were these practices, so notoriously resistant to change, so thoroughly transformed in East Germany? The war, argued Schulz, had little impact on them, as they returned to traditional forms almost immediately after the war had ended. While there was a desire in the SED to create burial practices that were socialist in content, Schulz suggested that the dramatic changes that eventually occurred in East Germany (resulting, for example, in the development of Urnengemeinschaftsgräber) were largely caused by material constraints rather than ideological motives.

Daniel Steuer explored the writings of the late W.G. Sebald in “European Melancholy: Sebald and Death.” Sebald, argued Steuer, presents us with a unique case of a German writer who, through the use of an aesthetic strategy that Steuer refers to as “critical melancholy,” was able to write from the perspective of the victims of Nazi terror. The issue of
finding the appropriate language for talking about death associated with the war is key; after all, Jörg Friedrich was not attacked for the historical content of his work but for its tone and his use of emotive language in his account of the air war against Germany and the fire bombings of German cities. Steuer was critical of historians attempting to write about subjects like death in an aesthetically neutral language, and was critical as well of the ‘68 generation that failed to listen to the war generation and then accused it of not having anything to say about the Nazi past.

These diverse papers stimulated animated discussions. Participants agreed that the topic’s crucial issue was how to link long-term trends and short-term disasters on the theoretical as well as on the empirical level. The findings of the papers suggested that continuities were predominant. Neither the two World Wars and the Holocaust nor the changes of political regimes seem to have fundamentally changed burial practices and the language and rites of mourning. “Dignity” remains the key value. As one participant put it, Philip Ariès was perhaps right when he emphasized that long-term trends in the history of death are not directly affected by political events. Given the primacy of the Holocaust in professional and public discourse, this is a point that calls for further scrutiny, not the least with respect to Judaic traditions, which were not explicitly addressed during the conference. Another fundamental issue that emerged in the discussions was the need to explore the changing definitions of death and dying: in other words, to historicize them. The ever-growing influence of medicine over these definitions in the past two centuries would deserve particular attention, as several participants noted. A third major point of discussion was the relationship between the death of soldiers and the representation of the state. Here, at least in Germany, traditional narratives—nationalist and National Socialist—centered on the sacrifice of the fallen were no longer tenable after 1945. How this void was filled and the dead and the living linked in private and public discourse is another topic that deserves further examination.

Dirk Schumann, Monica Black, and Desiree Hopkins
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AMERICAN MUSEUMS: PUTTING VISITORS FIRST

ICOM-Germany Annual Meeting, at the GHI. Conveners: Hans-Martin Hinz (President, ICOM) and Christof Mauch (GHI).

Why did one hundred German museum directors, curators, educators, and marketing experts set out for Washington in November 2003? In cooperation with and hosted by the German Historical Institute, they came to America’s capital to find out more about developments in America’s museums.

Do American museums have an edge on German institutions? In Germany, as in many other European countries, museums have been affected by the progressive decline of public funds, which in turn has endangered the very foundations of their work. Although these public contributions formed the basis for Germany’s rich and varied museum landscape, times of budgetary crisis require new strategies for dealing with the repercussions of decades of dependence. To secure their institutional futures, German museums must aim to discover new sources of funding. In the last twenty years, America’s museums have succeeded in massively transforming their financial structures, transitioning to a reported average earned income rate of close to 50 percent, compared to a German rate of only 5 percent.

The philosophy of the International Council of Museums (ICOM) promotes international dialogue on fundamental questions whenever possible, encouraging individual members to learn how others have tackled similar problems. This form of analysis and debate makes it easier to assess, or even to change, one’s own positions. Building on the programmatic work of ICOM-Germany over the past years and the contemporary relevance of the topic, the German national committee decided to schedule its first ever non-European annual meeting, with the help and support of the GHI in Washington. Working together, ICOM-Germany and ICOM-USA formulated the conference theme: “America’s Museums—Putting Visitors First!” (For a list of the American panelists and the program please see www.icom-deutschland.de.)

The respective frameworks for museum work in Germany and America differ: a considerable number of American museums were built with educational policy goals in mind and have concentrated heavily on visitor services, whereas in Europe, collections play a pivotal role. In the United States, this educational focus has led museums to treat visitors as clients rather than as guests, putting them at the center of conceptual reflections. As a quantitative result, this has produced higher rates of attendance in America than in Germany—only a third of Americans do
not go to museums—but it has also had a qualitative effect on museum organization. Making increased attendance a goal has created a greater balance between museum administrators, curators, educators, and marketers, both in professional relationships with one another and in the availability and emphasis on positions in each field. More so than in Germany, American museums have improved spatial, material, and supervisory conditions so that their institutions can promote goal-oriented learning and the practice of “learning by doing.” However, American society’s high opinion of museum volunteering has also made it possible for large national museums to train, employ, and integrate several hundred volunteers as colleagues. Program developers take visitor expectations seriously: most Americans plan their visits as family excursions, whether to children’s museums or to art museums. Visitors are motivated by subjective experiences, in other words, by the desire to put themselves in other temporal or spatial situations. American visitors prefer specific presentations, and like the aura of objects as historical evidence. In part, American museum visitors attend exhibits to see their values confirmed and to reflect on them. Thus, many presentations allow visitors to use their life experiences as jumping-off points.

Perhaps this is where exhibit presentation differs most markedly between the United States and Europe. While intellectual and thematic approaches dominate European exhibits and more questions are asked of history than answers given, American museums of history and culture strive to present historical narratives—“stories.” These museums integrate elements of successful theme parks into their exhibit design much more boldly than in Europe, and visitors seem to enjoy this form of learning. European experts attending the meeting reflected on these practices and about the limits of the educational missions of museums.

Conference attendees also noticed differences in the way that exhibits deal with identity-forming messages—how people perceive themselves as Americans or Europeans or Germans. Immigrant societies like America seem to feel more at ease with notions of belonging, group-identification, and patriotism than certain European societies, where these topics tend to be critically reflected and questioned.

In their desire to draw in and sustain audiences, American museums consider their institutions to be crossroads for communication, recreation, and commerce. In addition, many museums have been able to cooperate and network with other community organizations. Museum programs held off-site, not only in schools, but also in libraries and churches, have made museums accepted social venues.

Due to favorable legal conditions, American museums have greater access to funds from corporate sponsors and foundations than do German institutions. German professionals often suspect that accepting these
funds opens the door to external influence on project development. American museums do face conflicting situations when public or private sponsors influence or want to influence exhibits, as evidenced in recent years, especially in Washington, D.C. There are also examples to the contrary, however, which as yet lack German counterparts. In late 2003, for instance, the National Museum of American History opened a twenty-thousand-square-foot, $25 million-dollar exhibit called “America on the Move.” Almost all of the funds for the exhibit came from private donations, but only after museum professionals had determined the exhibit concept.

In sum, ICOM-Germany’s annual member meeting in Washington offered German museum professionals sufficient opportunities to get to know some American “survival strategies.” In many ways, American museums are doing better than German institutions. Learning from and if appropriate applying these strategies to solve some of Germany’s museum problems would be a wonderful outcome of this German-American museum dialogue.

Hans-Martin Hinz
TWELFTH ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM OF THE FRIENDS OF THE GHI AND AWARD OF THE FRITZ STERN DISSERTATION PRIZE

Symposium at the GHI, November 21, 2003. Convener: Gerald D. Feldman (President, Friends of the GHI) and Christof Mauch (GHI). Participants: Jeffrey T. Zalar (Valparaiso University), Chad Carl Bryant (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill), Keith D. Alexander (GHI), and Charles E. Closmann (GHI).

The Friends of the German Historical Institute organized their twelfth symposium, chaired by Gerald D. Feldman, in Washington on November 21. The morning session featured the presentation of the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize, awarded annually for the two best dissertations in German history at a North American university. This year, the Stern Prize Selection Committee awarded prizes to Jeffrey T. Zalar, who earned a Ph.D. at Georgetown University, for his dissertation, “Knowledge and Nationalism in Imperial Germany: A Cultural History of the Association of Saint Charles Borromeo, 1890–1914,” and to Chad Carl Bryant, who earned a Ph.D. at the University of California at Berkeley, for his dissertation, “Making the Czechs German: Nationality and Nazi Rule in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, 1939–1945.” This year’s awards were generously funded by the German Marshall Fund of the United States. The Stern Prize Selection Committee consisted of Professor Celia Applegate (University of Rochester), Professor Jonathan S. Wiesen (Southern Illinois University at Carbondale) and Professor Jerry Z. Muller (Catholic University), who chaired the committee.

The committee’s prize citations commended Zalar for a gracefully written study that “challenges existing historiographical paradigms, providing a rich portrait of Catholic life fully intertwined with German social and cultural life as a whole,” and Bryant for using “newly accessible primary resources” to provide a “nuanced portrait of the difficulties and paradoxes of defining national identity along Czech/German lines.” The presentations by Professors Zalar and Bryant are featured, in revised form, in the “Stern Prize” section of this Bulletin.

Keith Alexander’s research examined the origins and evolution of the Alternative Liste für Demokratie und Umweltschutz (AL), West Berlin’s Green Party affiliate. His presentation focused on the AL to show how, from the late 1970s through the end of the 1980s, a significant segment of the radical West German Left grew to accept and embrace parliamentary democracy. Charles Closmann’s presentation is featured in the “GHI Research” section of the Bulletin.

Charles E. Closmann
RIVERS IN HISTORY: DESIGNING AND CONCEIVING WATERWAYS IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA

Conference at the GHI, December 4–7, 2003. Conveners: Christof Mauch (GHI), Thomas Zeller (GHI/University of Maryland). Co-sponsored by the Center for Historical Studies, University of Maryland, College Park and the GHI. Participants: Isabelle Backouche (Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris), Wendy Bigler (Arizona State University), David Blackbourn (Harvard University), Charles Closmann (GHI), Timothy Collins (Carnegie Mellon University), David Ekbladh (SAIS, Johns Hopkins University), Jacky Girel (Joseph Fourier University, Grenoble), Elmar Henrich (York University, Toronto), Uta Hasenöhrl (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin), Elmar Henrich (York University, Toronto), Steven Hoelscher (University of Texas, Austin), Eva Jakobsson (Stavanger University College, Norway), Tom Lekan (University of South Carolina), Vera Lind (GHI), Patrick Malone (Brown University), Meredith McKittrick (Georgetown University), Bernhard Müller (Institut für ökologische Raumentwicklung, Dresden), Edward K. Muller (University of Pittsburgh), David Neufeld (Parks Canada, Western Service Center), Harold L. Platt (Loyola University of Chicago), Guido Poliwoda (University of Bern), Martin Reuss (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers), Dan Ringrose (Minot State University), Francisco Jorge Rodríguez (European Common Law Institute, Murcia, Spain), Helena Ruotsala (University of Turku), Eva-Maria Stolberg (University of Bonn), Joel A. Tarr (Carnegie Mellon University), Erik Törnlund (Umea University, Sweden), Christine von Oertzen (GHI), Dorothy Zeisler-Vralsted (University of Wisconsin, La Crosse), Frank Zelko (GHI).

Rivers have served different purposes, had different social functions, and have been assigned different cultural meanings over the course of time. Fear and control, individual submission and professional exuberance have been hallmarks of the shared history of humans and rivers. European and North American societies have come up with a variety of answers to economic and environmental questions posed by river use; for example, questions about fishing, log driving, water supply, and flood control. This international and interdisciplinary conference brought together a number of scholars working on these issues. While often seen as a backdrop to human development, rivers have in fact played an important role in human history, influencing the location of cities, causing devastation through floods, or merely generating drinking water. The conference aimed at obtaining a clearer picture of the ways in which humans and rivers have interacted by comparing the findings of histo-
rians of technology, the environment, and culture, as well as of anthropologists and geographers.

The conference began with a keynote address by David Blackbourn, which was held at the University of Maryland, College Park and co-sponsored by the University’s Center for Historical Studies. James F. Harris, Dean of the College of Arts and Humanities, welcomed the conference participants to campus, while Arthur Eckstein, Director of the Center for Historical Studies, spoke on behalf of the Center. In his speech “‘Time is a Violent Torrent’: Constructing and Reconstructing Rivers in Modern Germany,” Blackbourn introduced the topic of the conference by examining a few case studies, including the remaking of the Oder in the eighteenth century under Frederick the Great. Blackbourn noted that the construction of a new landscape went hand in hand with the construction of the myth of “taming” the river. When writing river histories, Blackbourn concluded, historians are well advised to avoid a narrative of benign modernization as well as a narrative of decline and disaster. “There is no baseline from which to measure a ‘lost’ natural world,” Blackbourn insisted. However, it is still possible for historians to register processes of cumulative degradation. “Paradise lost,” he concluded, “is an agreeable human myth, but it is a myth all the same.”

The rest of the conference was held at the German Historical Institute. In a methodologically rich survey of the field, Eva Jakobsson asked, “How do Historians of Technology and Environmental Historians Conceive the Harnessed River?” She categorized the literature under rubrics such as “The Exterminated River” and “The Conquered River,” and traced the influences of Richard White’s seminal “The Organic Machine,” a study of the Columbia River in the Northwestern United States, on other historians. She pointed out that despite White’s efforts to overcome the nature/culture dichotomy in favor of a larger continuum, historians are still wrestling with these issues, and for good reason. In the end, Jakobsson asked historians to look beyond rivers and see them as parts of larger water systems.

In her contribution “Cultural and Technological Responses to Dryland River Variability,” Wendy Bigler contrasted the management of the Salt River by the Akimel O’odham (Pima Indians) to that of the city of Phoenix today. While flexibility and mobility marked the Akimel O’odham’s response to the river, the city of Phoenix has almost obliterated the river; most Phoenix residents today are not even aware that a river used to flow through the city. Bigler pointed out that the Native Americans quite skillfully and profoundly adapted their lives and livelihoods to the river, but obviously to a lesser degree than later inhabitants of the region.
The second panel, “Early Modern Cities,” contrasted case studies of river management in Italy, Spain, and France. Elmar Henrich presented “Negotiating the Serchio: An Early Modern River System between Conflict and Cooperation.” He highlighted the conflicts over resources such as fishing and transportation possibilities offered by the Serchio, a river in northwest Tuscany, and analyzed the power relationships between villagers and representatives of the Lucchese, Medici, and Estense territories. Among the most useful sources for Henrich’s research were legal documents and complaints by law enforcers, toll collectors, and executors, which he analyzed regarding their statements on river usage and river conflicts. Francisco Jorge Rodríguez examined the different ways in which the city of Murcia tried to control the Segura river in his paper “The Domestication of a Terrible River: The Model of the Segura River and the City of Murcia.” He paid particular attention to ordinances and institutional frameworks for addressing riparian conflicts, and underlined the sustainable character of the local irrigation system, which has been in place for some one thousand years. Murcia offers a vivid example of a legal superstructure that has been governing usage of an urban waterway and mediating conflicts for many centuries, and Rodríguez underscored the endurance of this waterboard. In her presentation “From a Parisian River to a National Waterway: The Changes of the Social Functions of the Seine River (1750–1850),” Isabelle Backouche argued that Paris gradually turned its back on the Seine with embankments, railways, and roads. For Backouche, these changes amounted to a “vulgarization of the river-space” in the city by softening the physical boundary which the Seine had earlier represented. Riverine spaces mattered less and less to the city and its bourgeoisie. In her paper, she stressed that this transformation was not the result of concerted town planning, but rather evolved through the reorganization of practices on the river and the interventions in river design.

The two papers in the panel “Urban Rivers and Canals” dealt with case studies from the United States. Patrick Malone presented a paper entitled “Surplus Water in Lowell: Engineering the Merrimack River for Profit.” Malone showed how the availability of surplus water in nineteenth-century Lowell, Massachusetts, provided an important advantage for Lowell as it competed with other growing textile centers in New England. He detailed how the “Proprietors of Locks and Canals” became a private service company, selling water to the town’s industrialists. The utility’s managers were opposed to the “waste” of water and therefore objected to fishways, the lack of which greatly impeded the downstream and upstream movement of fish. Edward K. Muller, Joel A. Tarr, and Timothy Collins examined two centuries of change in “Pittsburgh Rivers: From Urban Industrial Infrastructure to Environmental Infrastructure.”
The Allegheny, Monongahela, and Ohio Rivers were profoundly changed in the half-century after 1870, turning them into “industrial infrastructures—engineered and utilitarian.” Progressive elites tried to refashion the rivers, often unsuccessfully. For example, a 1911 plan for Pittsburgh by the landscape architect Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr. lamented the dilapidated condition of downtown riverfront lands. Olmsted’s proposals for pedestrian walkways, lookouts, and park development were never realized. Only in the last few years has the city rediscovered its river, as the “panoramic aesthetic” is now seen as both pleasing and economically useful. Pittsburgh’s recently opened Convention Center, unlike its predecessor, no longer turns its back on the river.

“Risk and Disaster” was the topic of the fourth panel. Guido Poliwoda examined “Disaster Management and the Social Response to Catastrophic Floods: The Example of Saxony (1784–1845).” Poliwoda detailed the Saxon state’s responses to a flood catastrophe in 1784 on the Elbe in the form of bureaucratic and technological infrastructures. Locals were involved in the new systematic river management by measuring the river and reporting unusual activities to authorities in an example of spatially distributed state power in the early modern era. Bernhard Müller argued that the same river’s floods of 2002 were not simply a natural catastrophe, but also the result of human intervention. Müller pointed out how flash floods from the uplands and mountains combined with slow swell floods of the Vltava River (Moldau) to cause major damage. Previous efforts to exclude floodplains from human development had often been ignored in the 1990s, thus increasing the material damage during the 2002 floods. Risk assessment and zoning are therefore necessary to prevent future damage.

In a panel entitled “Imperial Rivers,” Eva Maria Stolberg and Dorothy Zeisler-Vralsted discussed changing notions and roles of two major rivers, the Volga and the Mississippi. Stolberg (who unfortunately could not attend the conference herself, but whose paper had been submitted to all participants before the meeting) emphasized the socio-cultural role of the Volga as a border of friction and conflict between different ethnic groups. The politics of “russification” and xenophobia were the main factors that contributed to social instability in the Volga region. Stolberg emphasized that the Russians, the Tartars, and the Volga Germans who inhabited the river valley each had their own notions of the Volga. In the mind of Russian intellectuals, such as Trotsky, the anti-autocratic upheavals that took place in the Volga region symbolized the rejuvenation of the Russian nation. For the Tartars, who traditionally dominated trade on the river, the Volga was a symbol of intercultural exchange between the worlds of Islam and Christianity. Finally, the Germans, who dominated
agriculture, identified the landscape of the Volga with notions of German nationalism.

In her comparative paper on the Mississippi and the Volga, titled “Engineering Rivers,” Dorothy Zeisler-Vralsted analyzed the shared traditions and common developments of the two rivers. According to Zeisler-Vralsted, both the Mississippi and the Volga served as major transportation arteries, both were idealized through art and literature, both were the sites of a thriving tourist industry, and both underwent large-scale transformation during the era of industrial growth. Despite considerable pollution and heavy development, idealized views of the two rivers have persisted throughout Russian and American history. One of the central questions of Zeisler-Vralsted’s paper concerned the fact that the outcome of river engineering was very similar in Russia and the United States, even though the political and economic systems of the two countries were different. She argued that by the 1930s, despite different models of local participation (“top-down” decision-making in the Soviet Union vs. engagement of local actors in the United States), Americans realized that the adoption of large-scale water projects required a large federal government role. Furthermore, the two countries “shared similar views toward modernization and industrial growth and the potential utopias that could result.”

In a panel on “Nordic Rivers,” David Neufeld, Helena Ruotsala, and Erik Törnlund discussed the history of “wild rivers” in Canada and Scandinavia. According to David Neufeld’s presentation “People of the River,” the Yukon River has been a central and unifying element in the world of the Athapaskan people of Canada and Alaska. Throughout history, the Athapaskan people have drawn subsistence from the river, they have applied meaning to it, and they have established spiritual relationships with rivers and their natural surroundings. Neufeld demonstrated how the Athapaskan languages set stories in a specific riparian geography. He explained how these place-based stories have for centuries been the mnemonics for a “complex value system and moral order.” Thus rivers have provided a framework not only for topographic orientation, but also for the moral and spiritual guidance of the Athapaskan people.

In her paper “Rivers in the North—Symbols of Free Nature or only for Energy Production?” Helena Ruotsala discussed the socio-cultural impacts of the construction of waterways in Northern Finland over a period of two hundred years. Ruotsala pointed out the different and often conflicting functions and meanings that rivers have had for the Sami fishers, the reindeer herders and energy companies. She also focused on the battles against the construction of waterways throughout the twen-
tieth century, and on discussions about cultural values of rivers in Finnish society.

In a paper titled “Making Wild Rivers Wilder?” Erik Törnlund discussed the history of log driving and exploitation in Northern Sweden during the log-driving era of 1850–1980. He described the development of the log-driving system—the clearing of streams and increased canalization—essentially as an attempt “to control nature,” and he explained that rivers have been undergoing restoration in recent years. Technological structures have been removed and boulders placed back into the channel in order to reconstruct a “more natural” or “wilder” appearance of Swedish waterways.

Panelists discussed projects in France and the United States in the next panel, entitled “Engineering Developments.” In his paper on “River Diking, Canalizations, and Floodplain Drainage,” Jacky Girel focused on the engineering developments of the Alpine Isère River in France. In the wake of a major flood in 1816, a large-scale diking scheme was developed which concentrated the various water flows into one deep channel. The project was successful in giving work to a great number of people in an otherwise impoverished region, but it failed in its more important goals of protecting soils, reclaiming large areas of land, and eliminating marsh fevers. Girel distinguished two major periods of nineteenth-century engineering in the French Alps. Until 1830, physiocrats and agronomists intended to transform wetlands for utilitarian reasons, whereas from 1830 to 1880, engineers and physicians promoted the removal of standing water for health reasons.

In a paper on watershed practices in provincial France, Dan Ringrose claimed that nineteenth-century French engineers developed a “national style” or “national policy” for water management. In his examination of the technical and political decisions of engineers who managed the Canal de Bourgogne and those who worked in France’s industrial north, Ringrose found that engineers were forced by local interests to acknowledge specific interests and concerns about ecology, agriculture, pollution and economic opportunity. “The compromises, practices and solutions associated with managing watersheds reveal a powerful local dynamic in each region of France,” according to Ringrose. “As the Corps’ engineers sought to accommodate local interests they established themselves as an access point to a national state, effectively drawing diverse regions of France together into a nation.”

In his paper “The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) as a Symbol for U.S. Overseas Development, 1933–1973,” David Ekbladh focused on the cultural construction of the TVA and its significance as an international symbol of modernization. The “grass-roots” participation of local populations was promoted around the globe as a distinct American model that
would set it apart from projects in communist or fascist states. It took until the late 1960s before the failures of this big project were exposed by environmentalists and researchers, who discovered the profound ecological consequences of this and other large-scale technological projects.

In a panel about “Control and Restoration,” Charles Closmann and Thomas Lekan discussed issues of water management and national identity in postwar Germany and England. Closmann examined political efforts to limit pollution within Britain’s Humber Estuary Watershed and along Germany’s Elbe. He argued that there were two different national styles of riverine management at work in England and Germany, both connected to broader social, economic, and political goals. While the British established local river boards as intermediary bodies between the national government and local institutions and movements, the German system ensured the authority of the German states. According to Closmann, Germany’s postwar focus on quick economic recovery exempted heavy industry from tough pollution laws. The result was “a confused muddle that stimulated economic growth, but allowed the Elbe to deteriorate.” In his paper “Restoring the Rhine: Ecology, Culture and the Reinvention of German Identity, 1945–1970,” Thomas Lekan tried to explain the rapid change in the fortune of the Rhine between the immediate postwar era, when the Rhine was labeled “the sewer of Europe,” and the 1990s, when it was declared “the cleanest river in Europe.” In contrast to conventional explanations that viewed the public anxiety of the 1960s over the intolerable conditions of the Rhine and the rise of the green movements as major factors in this transformation, Lekan argued that environmental demands of the decade between 1955 and 1965 centering on pollution control were responsible for the change. Above and beyond that, the turn toward “post-material” ecological values and international cooperation served broader political and cultural purposes that came to symbolize a new era, as they replaced the political and economic tensions symptomatic of the period before World War II.

The last two papers presented at this conference were part of a panel on “Picturesque Rivers.” In her presentation on “Perceptions of Natural and Designed River Landscapes,” Ute Hasenöhrl explored the relationship between nature conservation, energy companies, and tourism between 1945 and 1980. She took her examples from the Lech River in Bavaria. In the conflict over the establishment of hydroelectric power plants, tourism was employed as an argument from both energy companies and conservationists. However, while energy companies pointed out the prospects and benefits of mass tourism and water sport activities, conservationists argued against the establishment of dams and reservoirs, instead propagating a concept of “green tourism” that offered peace and solitude. Hasenöhrl claimed that most energy projects could not be
stopped, particularly because they were generally backed by a strong commitment of state governments to local energy production.

In his paper “Viewing the Gilded Age River,” Steven Hoelscher examined photography and forms of early tourism in the Dells of the Wisconsin River. Hoelscher pointed out that Gilded Age Americans used rivers not only as arteries of transportation; they also began to envision them as areas of recreation and leisure. The photographic image that created imaginative and sublime landscapes played a powerful role in the cultural construction of a “wild and morally uplifting” geography. Late nineteenth-century photographic views of the Wisconsin Dells constructed a picturesque “post-frontier space” that contributed to the promotion of bourgeois tourism and eventually to “mass culture forms of entertainment.” The conference ended on Sunday afternoon after a roundtable discussion with comments by Meredith McKittrick, Harold L. Platt, and Martin Reuss.

Christof Mauch and Thomas Zeller
ADORNO IN AMERICA: GERMAN EXILES AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

Symposium at the GHI, December 9, 2003. Co-sponsored by the Heinrich Böll Foundation and the GHI. Conveners: Keith Alexander (GHI), Helga Flores-Trejo (Heinrich Böll Foundation). Speakers: Detlev Claussen (University of Hannover), Jeffrey Herf (University of Maryland College Park).

This symposium brought together scholars from the greater Washington D.C. area to focus on Theodor W. Adorno. Professor Detlev Claussen, author of Ein letztes Genie, a recent biography of Adorno that used Adorno’s original texts to illuminate his life and intellectual development, shared his knowledge of Adorno with the group. Professor Jeffrey Herf commented on Claussen’s presentation and placed it in a broader perspective of postwar intellectual history.

Claussen emphasized the decade Adorno spent in the United States, asserting that Adorno would not have been Adorno if not for his American exile from Nazi Germany. According to Claussen, it was during his time in exile that Adorno matured intellectually, and the fact that he spent these years in the United States steered his intellectual development in a certain direction. Adorno came to America a German philosopher of the old school, while his scholarly and personal experiences in the United States equipped him with modern techniques of social research and new insights into himself and his European culture. This fusion of German philosophy and American empirical methods “freed traditional philosophy from dogma” and allowed Adorno to contribute to pioneering works such as The Authoritarian Personality. Another legacy of American exile that applied to both Adorno and Max Horkheimer was what Adorno termed “the experience of substantive democratic forms.” This aspect of the American experience, captured in Adorno’s Minima Moralia, was completely unfamiliar to the Germans reading this work in the postwar era. Furthermore, Claussen noted that Minima Moralia “reads like an inverted tourist guide, in which the European begins to understand himself through exile.”

Claussen also attacked many of the stereotypes about Adorno’s American exile. He refuted the oft-repeated myth that the exiles from Nazi Germany fled to a culturally barren United States only to return to the Land of Poets and Thinkers once they no longer faced a mortal threat in Germany. By the same token, however, Adorno was not the conservative critic many painted him to be. Claussen traced the origins of these myths to both the anti-Americanism and the anti-intellectualism of the postwar period.
Also, while intellectuals increasingly looked to the “radically bourgeois” United States as a source of progress and change, exiles living there simultaneously kept themselves at arm’s length from their host nation. Claussen compared the pressure to adapt to the host country and blend in to its society to the pressure to assimilate historically experienced by Jews. While Adorno undoubtedly felt this pressure from the American “melting pot,” he observed that America also nurtured one utopian hope: “of being able to be different without fear.” According to Claussen’s interpretation, Adorno’s American exile enabled him to bring this hope back to a Germany that only recently had been very hostile to such an ideal.

Jeffrey Herf’s commentary on Claussen’s talk focused on what Herf identified as a central paradox inherent in the Frankfurt School’s thought as expressed by Adorno. Adorno was a strong defender of the particular and the individual against the general and the collective; however, his analysis of Nazism and the Holocaust relied on a general interpretation of the Enlightenment rather than a specific treatment of Germany. Instead of the Holocaust being a German catastrophe, from Adorno and Horkheimer’s perspectives, it was the Enlightenment that “radiated disaster triumphant.” This was quite compatible with the “multiple restorations” of the postwar period. As Herf put it, “the theoretical strategy of generalization, the indictment of abstractions rather than particularities of German history, made critical theory a much less bitter pill to swallow for generations seeking a usable past with which to fashion a new and decent society.”

Herf also singled out Claussen’s treatment of Adorno’s relationship with Thomas Mann as a particularly insightful part of the book, and noted that this relationship is important to understanding both Adorno and Mann’s metamorphosis during their time in America. Unlike Adorno, Mann’s work, especially *Dr. Faustus*, did not shy away from exploring specifically German guilt for Nazi atrocities and the resulting implications for being German in the future.

Nevertheless, Herf emphasized that Adorno made critical contributions to breaking the silence regarding the Nazi past that prevailed in the Germany to which he returned in 1949. Unlike Thomas Mann, Adorno and Horkheimer did not “give up” on Germany, but rather worked to restore a “different Germany” based on freedom and tolerance. Moreover, they created in Frankfurt an environment that produced a number of influential postwar academic and political figures who embodied the Left’s shift from embracing radical anti-fascism to espousing a culture of debate and discussion. Herf concluded his comments by noting that “it was no accident” that Claussen, himself a student of Adorno, became the most vociferous non-Jewish voice to condemn the extremes of the West.
German Left during the 1970s and 1980s and to argue in favor of embracing liberal democratic values.

The discussion touched upon such themes as Adorno’s legacy in post-war West Germany’s process of coming to terms with the past; the reasons for the previous neglect of Adorno’s American years in understanding and analyzing Adorno’s life; and the special relationship between Adorno and his students. Claussen noted the importance of supplementing philosophical ideas with experience, and Herf noted the role of Adorno’s frank discussions of Nazism in cementing the bond between Adorno and his students. Claussen wrapped up the discussion by reiterating the importance of Adorno’s time in America for enabling him to combine social theory and social research. According to Claussen, this was the new element in Adorno’s approach, and was the unique legacy of his “American experience.”

Keith Alexander
GHI FELLOWS SEMINARS FALL 2003

The GHI’s Fellows Seminars are a forum in which fellowship recipients and other visiting scholars present their research to the Research Fellows of the Institute and interested scholars from local academic institutions. The Fellows Seminars are organized by Deputy Director Dirk Schumann.

The GHI awards doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships for the duration of one to six months. These fellowships are designed for doctoral candidates and postdoctoral scholars whose research deals with a topic in one of the following fields: German history, the history of German-American relations, the role of Germany and the United States in international relations, and American history. For the application process, see the “Announcements” section of this Bulletin.

October 30  Alexander Scho ßer, Universität Eichstätt-Ingolstadt
Die USA, das Papsttum und “Parallel Endeavors for Peace”:
Die Mission Myron C. Taylors beim Vatikan 1940–1950
Katrin Pieper, Technische Universität, Berlin
Memory Cultures regarding the Museumification of the Holocaust. A Comparison of the Jewish Museum Berlin and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C.

December 18  Christoph Jahr, Humboldt Universität, Berlin
Antisemitismus, Recht und Justiz in Deutschland, 1871–1960
Anne Sudrow, Universität Göttingen
Die Geburt des “modernen” Schuhs im Nationalsozialismus?
Eine Produktgeschichte im deutsch-amerikanischen Vergleich
ANNOUNCEMENTS:
PRIZES, FELLOWSHIPS, INTERNSHIPS

Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize

Each year, the Friends of the German Historical Institute award the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize for the two best doctoral dissertations submitted in German history, German-American relations, or the history of Germans in North America. The award is generously sponsored by the German Marshall Fund and by individuals. The winners are invited to the GHI to present their research at the annual symposium of the Friends in November. The prizewinners receive an award of $2,000 and reimbursement for travel to the symposium in Washington, D.C. Their dissertations will be considered for inclusion in the “Publications of the German Historical Institute” series published by Cambridge University Press.

Candidates are nominated by their dissertation advisers. Their dissertations must have been completed, defended, and authenticated between January 1 and December 31 of the calendar year preceding the award ceremony. This year, the prize committee is composed of Vernon L. Lidtke (Johns Hopkins University, chair), Kees Gispen (University of Mississippi), and Atina Grossmann (Cooper Union). It has accepted nominations through March 20, 2004, and will announce the prize winners at the end of the summer. This deadline, earlier than in previous years, better accommodates the needs of both the candidates and the committee members. Nominations were solicited through announcements in the AHA Perspectives and on the GHI website.

Doctoral and Postdoctoral Fellowships

The GHI awards short-term fellowships of one to six months to German and American doctoral students as well as post-doctoral scholars/Habilitanden in the fields of German history, the history of German-American relations, and the role of Germany and the USA in international relations. These fellowships are also available to German doctoral students and post-doctoral scholars/Habilitanden in the field of American history. The GHI will give clear priority to those postdoctoral projects that are designed for the second book. The research projects must draw upon source materials located in the United States. The monthly stipend is approximately €1,480 for doctoral students and €2,650 for post-doctoral
scholars. In addition, fellows based in Germany will receive reimbursement for their roundtrip airfare to the U.S. All fellows are required to present their research at the GHI in Washington during their grant period. Depending on the funds available, it may be possible to extend the scholarship by one or more months (up to a maximum duration of six months).

The deadlines for applications are May 31 and October 15, 2004. Applications should include cover letter, curriculum vitae, proof of academic degree, project description, research schedule for the fellowship period, and at least one letter of reference. While applicants may write in either English or German, we recommend that they use the language in which they are most proficient. They will be notified about the outcome within two months after the deadline. Please send applications to:

German Historical Institute
Doctoral/Postdoctoral Fellowships
1607 New Hampshire Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20009-2562

INTERNSHIPS

For the last several years, the GHI has had a highly successful internship program that has served the career goals of our interns and greatly benefited the Institute’s operations. We are always looking for new interns from Germany and the United States. The program provides German and American students of history, political science, or library studies at all levels an opportunity to gain experience working in an academic research institute. Interns provide research assistance for individual research projects, work for the library, take part in planning and hosting conferences, and assist in the preparation of our publications. The internship does not provide a stipend, but the program is very flexible; the GHI tries to accommodate each intern’s abilities, interests, and goals. A two-month minimum stay is required. Applications are accepted on an ongoing basis, and should include a cover letter, a curriculum vitae, and an academic transcript or—if available for German applicants—a Zwischenprüfungs- or Abschlusszeugnis. Applications may be submitted in English or German. For further information, please contact Astrid M. Eckert at eckert@ghi-dc.org.
NEWS

GHI Email List

The GHI is creating an email list for those who would like to receive email notifications of lectures and other public events at the GHI in Washington. If you would like to join this list, please go to http://www.ghi-dc.org/mailinglist and sign up there. This list is for event notices only. The Bulletin will continue to be sent out by mail.

Environmental History Project

We are pleased to announce that the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) will sponsor a GHI research project on “Natural Catastrophes in Comparative Perspective: Responses to Flooding in Germany and the United States.” The project will be jointly conducted by Uwe Lübken (University of Cologne) and Christof Mauch (GHI); the project will start in May 2005. More information will follow in the upcoming issue of the Bulletin.

Library Report

The GHI is happy to inform our readers about a large donation by the Stiftung zur Aufarbeitung der SED-Diktatur. The gift includes about 250 volumes, and is an important addition to our collection of books on post-1945 German history. Among the major works in this donation is the series Verträge der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Serie A Multilaterale Verträge, published by the Auswärtiges Amt. It documents treaties concluded by the Federal Republic from its founding to 1977. There are also five volumes of the forerunner to the yearbook Berlin in Geschichte und Gegenwart, the Schriftenreihe zur Berliner Zeitgeschichte, a chronicle history of Berlin, several volumes from the 1960s and 1970s of the Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR, and several volumes of the journal Deutschland Archiv: Zeitschrift für das vereinigte Deutschland that complement our collection. We want to thank Dr. Anne Kaminsky, the director of the Stiftung zur Aufarbeitung der SED-Diktatur, for this generous gift.
Our collection of the collected works of important German writers was expanded to include the works of Heinrich Böll, Erich Fromm, Oskar Maria Graf, Friedrich Hebbel, Martin Heidegger, Heinrich Heine, Johann Gottfried Herder, Hermann Hesse, Stefan Heym, Carl C. Jung, Ernst Jünger, Franz Kafka, Erich Kästner, Gottfried Keller, Siegfried Lenz, Christian Morgenstern, Erich M. Remarque, Martin Walser, and Christa Wolf. We also added works on Berchtesgaden, Cologne, Marbach am Neckar, and Vienna to our collection of German city histories.

Another acquisition worth mentioning are the eleven volumes of the *Schriftenreihe der Enquete-Kommission “Zukunft des Bürgerschaftlichen Engagements” des Deutschen Bundestages*. These volumes analyze civil engagement in Germany from different angles. We also added two new journals to our collection: the *Journal of Modern European History / Zeitschrift für moderne europäische Geschichte*, a cooperative venture by renowned European historians; and the journal *Rechtsgeschichte*, published by the Max-Planck-Institut für Europäische Rechtsgeschichte.

We would like to express our gratitude to the following people and institutions that donated books to the GHI library: Hans-Joachim Christe, Bis-Verlag, Suzanne Brown-Fleming, Bundesarchiv, Professor Detwiler, Matthias Deutsch, Astrid M. Eckert, Axel Gayko, Michaela Hönicke Moore, Dieter Hoffmann, ICOM, Institut für Kulturforschung, Sven Felix Kellerhoff, Christof Mauch, Gisela Möllenhoff, Wolfgang Rathje, Andreas Rauch, R. W. Ritzmann, Bernd Schaefer, Herbert Schellenberger, Dirk Schumann, Christoph Strupp, Richard von Weizsäcker, Westfälisches Archivamt, Richard Wetzell, Jana Wüstenhagen, and Thomas Zeller.

**NEW PUBLICATIONS**

Publications by GHI Research Fellows


“Publications of the German Historical Institute,” published in collaboration with Cambridge University Press

PETER BAEHR and MELVIN RICHTER, eds., *Dictatorship in History and Theory: Bonapartism, Caesarism, and Totalitarianism*
Information on ordering this title is available on the Cambridge University Press website, www.cup.org.

Transatlantische Historische Studien, published in collaboration with the Franz Steiner Verlag

ANSGAR REISS, Radikalismus und Exil: Gustav Struve und die Demokratie in Deutschland und Amerika

ANJA SCHÜLER, Frauenbewegung und soziale Reform: Jane Addams und Alice Salomon im transatlantischen Dialog, 1889–1933

ANKE ORTLEPP, “Auf denn, Ihr Schwestern!” Deutschamerikanische Frauenvereine in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 1844–1914

Information on ordering these titles is available on the Franz Steiner Verlag’s website, www.steiner-verlag.de.

RECIPIENTS OF GHI FELLOWSHIPS FOR 2004

Postdoctoral / Habilitation Fellowships


MARCUS GRÄSER, University of Frankfurt, “Bürgerliche Sozialreform und welfare state building in den USA und in Deutschland 1880–1940”

INES KATENHUSEN, University of Hannover, “Biographie des deutsch-amerikanischen Kunsthistorikers Alexander Dorner”

JOCHEN KIRCHHOFF, University of Munich, “Deutsch-amerikanische Beziehungen in der Wissenschaftspolitik”


Doctoral Fellowships

BJÖRN MICHAEL FELDER, University of Tübingen, “Lettland im Krieg 1941–1947.” Adviser: Prof. Dr. Dietrich Beyrau

NADINE KLOPFER, University of Tübingen, “‘Beautiful Surroundings’: Stadtverschönerungskonzepte in Montreal und New Orleans, 1880–1920: Städtischer Raum und gesellschaftliche Ordnungsvorstellungen.” Adviser: Prof. Dr. Udo Sautter
CHRISTINE KNAUER, University of Tübingen, “Die Desegregation des amerikanischen Militärs und der Koreakrieg im öffentlichen Diskurs der afroamerikanischen Community.” Adviser: Prof. Dr. Udo Sautter


SANDRA KRAFT, University of Heidelberg, “Wir haben sie so geliebt, die Revolution!” Die Radikalisation der ’68er in vergleichender Perspektive: Deutschland, Frankreich und die USA.” Adviser: Prof. Dr. Detlef Junker

DANIEL KREBS, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, “Approaching the Enemy: German Prisoners of War in the American War of Independence.” Adviser: Prof. Dr. James Melton

JÖRG MUTH, University of Potsdam, “Die Wehrmachtoffiziere im Spiegel der Erinnerungen und Dokumente der amerikanischen Generalität 1935 bis 1955: Auswirkungen auf die Wiederbewaffnung und das Geschichtsbild in der Bundesrepublik.” Adviser: Prof. Dr. Manfred Görtemaker

KEVIN OSTOYICH, Harvard University, “Fear and Passage” (examination of support networks that aided the emigration of German Catholics during the latter half of the nineteenth century). Adviser: Prof. Dr. David Blackbourn

LAURA PIPPEL, University of Bonn, “Studium hinter Stacheldraht: Die deutschen Lageruniversitäten des Zweiten Weltkrieges.” Adviser: Prof. Dr. Klaus Hildebrand

BRIAN PUACA, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Education Reform From Below in Postwar West Germany, 1945–1965.” Adviser: Prof. Dr. Konrad Jarausch

ALEXA STILLER, University of Hannover, “Die Volkstumspolitik der SS 1939–1945.” Adviser: Prof. Dr. Claus Füllberg-Stolberg

EVELYN ZEGENHAGEN, University of the Bundeswehr, Munich, “Zwischen Emanzipation und Integration: Die ökonomische, soziale und politische Kontextualisierung deutscher Sportfliegerinnen der Zwischenkriegszeit.” Adviser: Prof. Dr. Merith Niehuss

RECIPIENTS OF GHI INTERNSHIPS

The GHI was again fortunate to have a number of excellent interns who made valuable contributions to our work. The interns conducted research in libraries and archives, helped prepare and run conferences, assisted editors and librarians, and cheerfully performed all other tasks that came their way. Two of them even extended their stay at the GHI for another month. We would like to thank Ryan Fogle (American University), Michael Grimm (University of Munich), Helena Johnson (Williams College), Jan Köckritz (University of Freiburg), Katja Köhr (University of Dresden), Gudrun Löhrer (University of Cologne), Symi Rom-Rymer (Boston University), Michael Schmiedel (RWTH Aachen, now Berlin), and Rebekka Weinel (University of Heidelberg).

STAFF CHANGES

SONJA DÜMPELMANN joined the GHI in December 2003 as a GHI/NEH Research Fellow. In May 2002, she received her Ph.D. in Landscape Architecture from the Universität der Künste in Berlin, where she completed her dissertation on the Italian landscape architect Maria Teresa Parpagliolo Shephard (1903–1973) and her contribution to the development of garden culture in Italy in the twentieth century. Before joining the GHI, she worked for the Stiftung Preußische Schlösser und Gärten Berlin-Brandenburg and as a landscape architect in Switzerland. In 2001 she researched the exhibition and wrote the catalogue on the horticulturalist Karl Foerster for the display at the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin and in Potsdam.
This series of five lectures, co-organized and co-sponsored by the GHI and the Goethe-Institut Washington, explores the interrelation between history and film. Distinguished scholars of film will share their views on the ways in which history is presented in film and on what film can tell us about the past. Each speaker will focus on one film, which will be shown directly following the lecture.

Please note: All lectures will take place on Mondays. All lectures will be held at the Goethe-Institut Washington, 812 Seventh Street, NW, Washington, DC 20001-3718. Metro: Red, Yellow or Green line to Gallery Place/Chinatown (Use 7th and H Street Exit)

Lectures begin at 5:30 p.m. Refreshments will be served at 6:15 p.m. Screenings will start at 6:45 p.m.

March 22  Johannes von Moltke, University of Michigan  
Heimat, Heritage, and the Histories of German Cinema  
Followed by the screening of: Jewboy Levi (Viehjud Levi)  
Germany, 1998, 97 min., English subtitles

April 5  Thomas Saunders, University of Victoria, British Columbia  
Hollywood’s Great War and Weimar Germany  
Followed by the screening of: What Price Glory?  
USA, 1926, 120 min., silent with musical accompaniment

April 19  Piers Armstrong, Dartmouth College  
Cannibalizing History: Recastings of the European-Indigenous Encounter in Brazil  
Followed by the Screening of: Hans Staden  
Brazil, 1999, 92 min., English subtitles

May 3  Christoph Strupp, GHI  
How the West Was Sold: Karl May’s America and the German Cinema
Followed by the screening of: *Apache Gold (Winnetou I)*  
Germany, 1963, 91 min., English version

May 17 Sabine Hake, University of Pittsburgh  
*At the Movies: Film Audiences in the Third Reich*  
Followed by the screening of: *Request Concert (Wunschkonzert)*  
Germany 1940, 100 min., English subtitles

For further information on the films see also: [www.goethe.de/uk/was](http://www.goethe.de/uk/was) and [www.ghi-dc.org](http://www.ghi-dc.org)
EVENTS SPONSORED BY THE GHI

For a regularly updated calendar of events, please check our website at www.ghi-dc.org.

2004

January 8–11  “Reconstituting Public Realms: Archivists, Librarians, and Journalists in Postwar Germany.” Panel at the 118th Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, Washington, DC. Conveners: Astrid M. Eckert (GHI) and Michaela Hönicke Moore (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill)

February 19  “The Spatial Turn in History.” Symposium at the GHI. Convenor: Thomas Zeller (GHI/University of Maryland)

February 19–22  “Natural Catastrophes in Global Perspective.” Conference at the GHI. Conveners: Christof Mauch (GHI) and Christian Pfister (University of Bern)

March 4–7  “Pietism in Two Worlds: Transmissions of Dissent in Germany and North America, 1680–1820.” Conference at Emory University. Conveners: James Melton (Emory University), Dirk Schumann (GHI), and Jonathan Strom (Emory University)

March 18–20  “Taxation, State, and Civil Society in Germany and the United States, 1750–1950.” Conference at the GHI. Conveners: Alexander Nützenadel (University of Cologne) and Christoph Strupp (GHI)

March 25  “Biography and the Historian: Opportunities and Constraints.” Public lecture at the GHI. Speakers: Ian Kershaw (University of Sheffield) and John Röhl (University of Sussex)

March 25–27  “Toward a Biographical Turn? Biography in Modern Historiography—Modern Historiography in Biography.” Conference at the GHI. Conveners: Volker Berghahn (Columbia University) and Simone Lässig (GHI)


April 14  “A New History of Germany.” Lecture and Discussion with Steven Ozment (Harvard University) at the Goethe-Institut, Washington, D.C. Conveners: Silvia Blume (Goethe-Institut) and Christof Mauch (GHI)

April 24  “Civil Society and the Public Sphere in Germany, 1800–1850.” Mid-Atlantic German History Seminar, at the GHI. Presenter: Professor James Brophy (University of Delaware). Conveners:
Marion Deshmukh (George Mason University) and Christof Mauch (GHI)

April 28–May 1 “German History in the Short Nineteenth Century, 1790–1890.” Tenth Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar in German History, at the University of Tübingen. Conveners: Roger Chickering (Georgetown University) and Richard F. Wetzel (GHI)

May 7–8 “War and the Environment: Contexts and Consequences of Military Destruction in the Modern Age.” Conference at the GHI. Conveners: Charles Closmann (GHI) and Christof Mauch (GHI)

May 17 “Germany and America in the Age of the Cold War.” Symposium at the GHI. Conveners: Detlef Junker (University of Heidelberg) and Christof Mauch (GHI)

May 20 Helmut Schmidt Prize Symposium at the GHI. Conveners: Christof Mauch (GHI) and Dirk Schumann (GHI)

May 24 “Beyond Anti-Semitism and Philo-Semitism: Searching for Normality in German-Jewish Relations.” Roundtable Discussion at the GHI. Conveners: Jeffrey Peck (American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Washington, D.C.) and Simone Lässig (GHI), in cooperation with Dagmar Weiler (Bridge of Understanding, Munich)

May 26 “The Origins of Green Parties in Global Perspective.” Symposium at the GHI. Conveners: Frank Zelko (GHI) and Helga Flores-Trejo (Heinrich Böll Foundation)

May 27–30 “Environment, Culture, Politics: Transatlantic Perspectives.” Young Scholars Forum at the GHI. Conveners: Frank Zelko (GHI) and Charles Closmann (GHI)

May 31–June 12 Summer Seminar in Germany. Convener: Astrid M. Eckert (GHI)

June 3–4 “Environmental History and the Oceans.” Conference in Copenhagen. Conveners: Frank Zelko (GHI) and Poul Holm (University of Southern Denmark)

June 3–5 “Alexander von Humboldt and North America.” Conference at the GHI. Conveners: Andreas Daum (SUNY, Buffalo) and Simone Lässig (GHI)

Fall “Competing Modernities: Germany and the United States, 1890–1960.” Conference at the Humboldt University, Berlin. Conveners: Christof Mauch (GHI) and Kiran Patel (Humboldt University)

September 6–18 Bucerius Seminar: American History and American Archives. Conveners: Cathleen Conzen (University of Chicago), Andreas Etges (Free University), Christof Mauch (GHI)

September 8–11 “Access—Presentation—Memory: The American Presidential Libraries and the Memorial Foundations of German Statesmen.” Conference at the GHI. Conveners: Astrid M. Eckert (GHI) and Christof Mauch (GHI)
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<th>Event Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>September 27</td>
<td>“German-American Relations in Historical Perspective.” Fifth Gerd Bucerius Lecture, Washington, DC. Speaker: Michael Blumenthal (Former Secretary of the Treasury of the United States)</td>
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<td>September 30–October 2</td>
<td>“Adolf Cluss, Architect: From Germany to America.” Conference at the GHI. Conveners: Christof Mauch (GHI), Cynthia Field (Smithsonian Institution), Laura Schiavo (Historical Society of Washington, DC), and William Gilcher (Goethe Institute, Washington)</td>
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<td>October 3</td>
<td>German Unification Symposium at the GHI. Conveners: Christof Mauch (GHI) and Bernd Schaefer (GHI)</td>
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<td>October 15–16</td>
<td>“Science and Technology in the 20th Century: Cultures of Innovation in Germany and the United States.” Conference at the GHI. Conveners: Christoph Strupp (GHI) and Helmut Trischler (Deutsches Museum, Munich / DFG-Research Group 393)</td>
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<td>November 18</td>
<td>18th Annual Lecture at the GHI. Speaker: Ute Frevert (Yale University)</td>
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<td>November 20</td>
<td>Symposium of the Friends of the German Historical Institute and Fritz Stern Dissertation Award Ceremony at the GHI. Convener: Gerald D. Feldman (University of California, Berkeley)</td>
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**2005**

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<th>Event Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>Spring</td>
<td>“Revolutionary Wars.” Conference at the GHI. Conveners: Roger Chickering (Georgetown University), Stig Förster (University of Bern), Hagen Schulze (GHI, London), and Christof Mauch (GHI)</td>
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<td>March 3–6</td>
<td>“Teaching World History.” Conference at the GHI. Conveners: Eckhardt Fuchs (University of Mannheim), Christof Mauch (GHI), and Benedikt Stuchtey (GHI, London)</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 7–10</td>
<td>“Raising Americans and Germans in the Twentieth Century.” Conference at the GHI. Convener: Dirk Schumann (GHI)</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 16–18</td>
<td>“Turning Points in Environmental History.” Conference at the Center for Interdisciplinary Research, Bielefeld. Conveners: Christof Mauch (GHI) and Joachim Radkau (University of Bielefeld)</td>
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GHI PUBLICATIONS

PUBLICATIONS OF THE GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. Currently edited by Christof Mauch with David Lazar:


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Volume</th>
<th>Editors/Eds.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Publication Place</th>
<th>Publication Year</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vol. 17</td>
<td>Stig Förster and Jörg Nagler</td>
<td>On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification, 1861–1871</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>1997</td>
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<td>Vol. 18</td>
<td>David E. Barclay and Elisabeth Glaser-Schmidt</td>
<td>Transatlantic Images and Perceptions: Germany and America Since 1776</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>1997</td>
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<td>Vol. 24</td>
<td>Roger Chickering and Stig Förster</td>
<td>Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914–1918</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>2000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vol. 26</td>
<td>Manfred Berg and Martin H. Geyer</td>
<td>Two Cultures of Rights: The Quest for Inclusion and Participation in Modern America and Germany</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>2002</td>
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<td>Vol. 27</td>
<td>Elisabeth Glaser and Hermann Wellenreuther</td>
<td>Bridging the Atlantic: The Question of American Exceptionalism in Perspective</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vol. 28</td>
<td>Jürgen Heideking and James A. Henretta, with the assistance of Peter Becker</td>
<td>Republicanism and Liberalism in America and the German States, 1750–1850</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>2002</td>
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<td>Vol. 29</td>
<td>Hubert Zimmermann</td>
<td>Money and Security: Troops, Monetary Policy, and West Germany’s Relations with the United States and Britain, 1950–1971</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vol. 31</td>
<td>Richard Bessel and Dirk Schumann</td>
<td>Life After Death: Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of Europe During the 1940s and 1950s</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>2003</td>
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Copies are available for purchase from Cambridge University Press, 40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-0495. Phone orders: (800) 431-1580. Website: www.cup.org.

TRANSATLANTISCHE HISTORISCHE STUDIEN. Published in conjunction with the Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart. Currently edited by Christof Mauch with Christine von Oertzen and Christoph Strupp:


Copies are available for purchase from Franz Steiner Verlag, c/o Brockhaus/Commission D-70803 Kornwestheim. Phone orders: (07154) 13270. Website: www.steiner-verlag.de.

BULLETIN. Published semiannually, in spring and fall, and available free of charge from the Institute; currently edited by Richard F. Wetzel.


REFERENCE GUIDES


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