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PREFACE

Amid the intensive public discussion of global tensions and global conflict during the fall of 2002, a leading German historian used the GHI's Annual Lecture as an opportunity to address the challenge of global history. Professor Jürgen Osterhammel of the University of Constance has written widely on the interactions between states and regions which are separated as much by political, economic, and cultural differences as by geography. He has proven himself a master at linking detailed analysis of specific regional phenomena to consideration of broader issues. His skill in moving between the local and the global was brilliantly displayed in his lecture "In Search of a Nineteenth Century." "Can the nineteenth century plausibly be construed as a period in world history?" Osterhammel asked. By way of response, he examined a number of competing chronological frameworks and, perhaps more importantly, raised a series of further questions that need to be addressed if we are to make generalizations on a global scale. In his comments on Osterhammel's lecture, Professor Ira Berlin of the University of Maryland offered a pointed reminder that world history is not simply "the sum of all national histories." The texts of Osterhammel's lecture and Berlin's comment appear in this issue of the *Bulletin*.

In addition to reporting on activities such as the Annual Lecture and recent conferences, this issue of the *Bulletin* takes a step toward repaying a debt of gratitude. The GHI owes its existence in no small part to the lobbying efforts of German Americanists. Germany's principal American Studies association, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Amerikastudien (DGfA), is celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of its founding this year, and we mark the occasion here with two features. "Between Political Reconnaissance Work and Democratizing Science: American Studies in Germany, 1917–1953," by former GHI Research Fellow Philipp Gassert, is based on a paper delivered at a panel devoted to "Amerika in Deutschland, Deutschland in Amerika" at the Historikertag in Halle last September. While the study of American culture, society, and history in Germany was by no means unaffected by political events, Gassert's essay makes clear that the history of *Amerikanistik* prior to the founding of the DGfA cannot be cast in terms of simple continuity or discontinuity: The postwar discipline of American Studies in West Germany owed much to both the intellectual traditions of the Weimar era and the institutional promotion of the field during the Third Reich. The subsequent development of the discipline is discussed in the series of interviews with four

noted German scholars of modern U.S. history conducted by GHI Research Fellow Astrid Eckert. Each offers an assessment of the current state of American studies in Germany and speculates on the future of the field.

The future is as much a concern as the past at the GHI. Supporting the work of younger scholars and assisting in the training of tomorrow's historians stand high on the list of the Institute's objectives, as the reports on its activities in this issue of the *Bulletin* attest. The GHI was proud to host the third annual Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize ceremony in November. The Stern Prize is awarded by the Friends of the GHI to the authors of the best doctoral dissertations in the field of German history submitted to North American universities in the past year. Julia Roos and Rebecca Wittmann, the 2002 Stern Prize recipients, outline their research in this issue. German and American students still working on their dissertations had the opportunity to compare notes and exchange ideas at the second meeting of the GHI's Medieval History Seminar, as research fellow Christoph Strupp explains in his report. The GHI is grateful to the Humboldt University, Berlin, for helping organize the Seminar and to the European Recovery Program for its financial support. In addition to its programs designed to bring younger scholars together, the GHI also awards a number of short-term fellowships to doctoral students and *HabilitandInnen* to undertake archival research. Several recent fellowship recipients presented their projects at the GHI Fellows Seminar; a list of their presentations is included in this *Bulletin*.

The GHI and the Friends of the GHI are especially proud to announce a new initiative designed to assist students of German history at all levels—as well as their teachers. Over the next five years, the German History Documentation Project will make a wealth of primary source materials—texts as well as images—available free of charge on the GHI's website. A generous grant from the Max Kade Foundation has made this project possible. The first installment of the German History Documentation Project is scheduled to go on-line in the fall of 2003.

In the meantime, readers of the *Bulletin* are encouraged to visit the GHI's newly redesigned website—www.ghi-dc.org—and to keep watch for another major initiative, our on-line Directory of German Studies in North America. The Directory will be a searchable database of North American scholars in all disciplines whose work touches on Germany and the German-speaking world. We expect the Directory to be up and running early in the coming summer.

Christof Mauch
Director

FEATURES

IN SEARCH OF A NINETEENTH CENTURY

Sixteenth Annual Lecture of the GHI, November 14, 2002

Jürgen Osterhammel
University of Konstanz

I.

Looking for a century, inquiring after it, investigating its whereabouts—that sounds like an odd idea. Who ever lost a century? Two different perpetrators come to mind: A century may have sunk into collective oblivion. This happens every now and then. Large chunks of time, deserted by posterity, can disappear from the memory of anyone but a small coterie of antiquarians and professional record-keepers. Sometimes, very long periods of time are erased from national consciousness. Thus, the Chinese—many historians among them—hate to be reminded of the nineteenth century, an epoch devoid of glamour and achievement, a time, or so it seems, of imperialist humiliation, abortive modernization, and cultural sterility. Whole peoples may prefer to forget parts of their own past.

The second potential mislayer and mishandler of a century is the historian. As an individual, he or she may fail to grasp their object of study, be unsuccessful in framing a narrative, an adequate research design, or even a good argument. Collectively, historians as an organized discipline neglect certain periods in favor of others. This is natural and not to be regretted. The cumulative choice of topics always reflects broader tendencies of public interest and academic preference. In the long run, periodic re-evaluations tend to do justice to forgotten centuries.

The hidden or purloined century in question here is number nineteen after the birth of Jesus Christ or of the “Common Era,” and it is difficult to believe that it was ever lost—China and a few other traumatized countries aside. True, historians seem to get a little tired of the time between the death of George Washington and that of Queen Victoria. The eighteenth century is dearer to current sensibilities, and, the twentieth century, after its calendric close, is now the focus of intensive study. Yet, a final reckoning would presumably arrive at the result that no other

period in world history has been more thoroughly explored by later generations than the nineteenth century. Historians have turned over almost every stone of the German *Kaiserreich* or the American Civil War, and the Victorians have never relinquished their powerful hold on the English imagination, just as the Meiji Period after 1868 is still being considered the fountainhead of all subsequent Japanese history.

In addition, much more survives of the nineteenth century outside museums than of any earlier period. Numerous great cities on every continent still bear the stamp of nineteenth-century planning and building. We still live on that epoch's great scientific and technological breakthroughs: Photography, the motor car, and the radio still rest on the principles discovered by their original inventors. Sociologists, linguists, psychoanalysts, physicists, logicians, and the handful of historically-minded economists revere the pre-1914 founders of their fields. If anything of Western classical literature is still alive today, the masterpieces of the novel from Jane Austen through Flaubert, Melville, and Tolstoy to the early Thomas Mann belong to that heritage. Nineteenth-century operas from Rossini to Puccini continue to dominate the repertoire in North and South America, Europe, and Japan.

The nineteenth century may no longer be the most propitious launching platform for a historian's career, it may even be—as Suzanne Marchand (a great expert on nineteenth-century German intellectual history) has recently characterized a fashionable attitude—“an embarrassment.”¹ But it remains vividly present in terms of the broader culture—an often strange, yet seldom alien element of modernity. Once in a while, great historians and biographers bring it to life again.

II.

What is there left to be searched for?

First, we need a plausible chronology: What do we mean, chronologically speaking, by “the nineteenth century”? This is, as I shall try to show, neither a trivial nor a pedantic question.

Second, one should try to look for a global definition: Can the nineteenth century plausibly be construed as a period in world history? And if it can, how might it be done?

Third: Is it possible, after having put up all the necessary defences against essentialism and woolly speculation about various *Zeitgeists*, to identify a few characteristics and basic tendencies of the age?

Curiously enough, the nineteenth century is a century without a name. How pleasing it would be to endow it with a personal name! *Schnitzler's Century*, as Peter Gay has called his latest book,² or—we have to choose a long-lived personage—“Gladstone's century,” or perhaps

“the age of Verdi.” Not even a major intellectual current—such as the “Age of Enlightenment” for an earlier period—has been agreed upon to express the quintessence of the nineteenth century in its entirety. Eric Hobsbawm, taking *almost* a global view, divides it into three “ages”: The Age of Revolution (1789 to 1848), the Age of Capital (1848 to 1875) and the Age of Empire (1875 to 1914).³ Other suggestions include “the age of industry,” “the age of improvement,” or “the age of nationalism.” None of them have found general acceptance. Even as far as Europe is concerned, there is no agreed terminology. National periodizations follow the caesuras of political and military, sometimes of dynastic history. They converge in the cases of France and Germany where 1815, 1848, 1871, and 1914 are dates of common destiny. Just across the English Channel, 1848 and 1871 are not of major importance. The term “Victorian Britain” continues to be popular among British historians, indicating less the personal impact of a long-lived head of state than the feeling that various slow-moving changes happened to accelerate in the late 1830s and again around the turn of the century.⁴ But none of these national periodizations leads to a more general one and to a denomination for the epoch as a whole.⁵ Nor can the nineteenth century (unlike the eighteenth) take shelter within a larger segment of time, something like a “late modern period.” It remains a nameless, free-standing century.

The most simple and elegant way of demarcating a century is to use its calendric boundaries as a formal frame—almost in the visual sense of a cinematographic “still.” This offers no principal difficulties. “Centuries,” of course, are mere conventions and constructions. And defining the nineteenth century as the temporal distance between the years 1801 and 1900 might be just as helpful as any more tortuously argued alternative. Cutting through the tissue of history at any given time allows startling insights into the much-quoted “simultaneity of the non-simultaneous.” When I recently did this for 1837, Year One of the Victorian age and the year when Samuel Morse took out a patent on the telegraph, but otherwise of little significance, I discovered in New York, of all places, a very old gentleman, still alive at the age of eighty-eight, Lorenzo da Ponte, decades earlier a libertin with a powdered periwig, friend of Mozart’s and librettist of his best operas, now bankrupted by a failed attempt to provide New York with an Italian Opera House⁶—a man born earlier than Robespierre and Mozart, witness to more than one bygone epoch. The world is full of such minor and major, personal and structural survivals and *Ungleichzeitigkeiten*, made visible by historical cross-sectioning.

So, why not be radically constructivist and define “the nineteenth century” as the sum total of all that happened between 1801 and 1900 as far as it possesses relevance in view of clearly stated values and perspec-

tives? This is not how historians really work. A small number of them believe that reflection on periodization is worth a sustained effort, that it produces valuable historical knowledge, that it is a principal way for historians to impose order upon and give meaning to the past. Among our classics, Lucien Fèbvre, R. G. Collingwood, and Ernst Troeltsch took such a view. A majority of historians treat periodization as a necessary evil, without, however, being content with the pure formalism of calendric centuries.⁷ Some even flatter themselves that they are able to grasp the “world-historical significance” of events not just in the past, but also in the present.

Thus, there is an overwhelming dissatisfaction with a purely mathematical or mechanical treatment of time. A century is expected to begin and end with meaningful caesuras. This also conforms to everyday experiences and expectations. Turns of centuries, like any other progress of physical time, tend to disappoint those who trust in the magic of round numbers. The world was still the same on January 1st, 2000 or 2001, and the day after one’s fiftieth birthday is very much like the day before. In many cases, the advent of a new calendric century went unnoticed. This was very much the case in 1800. The Western calendar spread with the extension of Christianity, it did not spread further—and it spread slowly. It had taken England 170 years to adopt the allegedly “Popish” Gregorian calendar in 1756 and an even longer time to introduce it to the colonies. In France, the powerhouse of political change, 1801 (or 1800), did not mark a new *siècle* according to the revolutionary calendar, decreed in 1792 and officially in use until 1805. The new Muslim century, the thirteenth since the flight of the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina, had already begun in 1786. In Bangkok, January 1st, 1800, was an ordinary day: the 6th day of the waxing moon in the 6th month of the year 2342 of the Buddhist era. China counted the fourth year of the Emperor Jiaqing’s reign.⁸ Few Chinese, even among the literati class, had ever heard of the French Revolution and of that remarkable man Bonaparte. The Japanese, busy with a far-reaching reform of their education, cared little, and many peoples in remoter corners of the world cared even less and completely missed the dawn of a new century. To the Australian Aborigines, something ominously new had already arrived on the 18th of January 1788 with the landing of about seven hundred chain-loaded individuals of strange appearance and rough manners. On that day began the Australian nineteenth century.

III.

The powerful urge for a meaningful order of time has led historians and their audiences to prefer substantive to formal periodizations. A

great number of historians believe that the so-called “long” nineteenth century from 1789 to 1914 is the most suitable frame of reference—at least for Europe. Many textbooks perpetuate this scheme. The arguments in favor of such a solution are too strong and too obvious to require reiteration. But do they hold good for a periodization in terms of world history?

War and revolution are still the most frequently used criteria of historical periodization. Even social and cultural historians often adopt, for the sake of convenience, the temporal structure of *l'histoire événementielle*, regardless of the fact that it does not derive directly from their own concept of history. Mega-events like the fall of Constantinople, the Declaration of Independence, or the military collapse of Germany and Japan in 1945 rest on the weight of their own evidence. The same is true for 1789 and 1914. Even if one peels away all sorts of later myth-making, the shock or relief experienced by the contemporaries reverberates through the ages. Such dates are seemingly precise, they provoke little controversy, they are much easier to pin down than the more intricate shifts in the social and cultural fabric of life with their infinitely finer chronologies. Still, those mega-events invite a kind of reflection that looks at them from two sides. A “long” nineteenth century automatically means “short” neighboring ones.

What about 1914 as the cut-off point for a period in world history? It would be silly to dispute that the First World War marked the end of an era for those who had lived in the security of a *belle époque*. In structural terms, it overturned a specific distribution of power in the world. The deeper meaning of the War became apparent when civil society began to disintegrate in various European countries from about 1916 onwards. The war was a global one long before the United States entered it, since Britain mobilized resources in all parts of its multi-continental Empire. The war in the Pacific and in Africa began almost at once, Turkey and Japan became active participants early on, and Germany embarked upon a global strategy of subversion.⁹ No continent was spared. The human losses incurred by the Dominions were greater than in the Second World War, and Sub-Saharan Africa was affected much more deeply than in the later conflict.

The postwar settlement, more than the beginning of the war, inaugurated a new epoch. It redrew the maps of Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the Middle East and sparked movements for independence in Egypt, India, Korea, and several other colonies. In China, it provoked the true start of a long-term process of social and cultural revolution, soon to be pushed ahead by Bolshevik agents. Within little more than a decade—from the fall of the Chinese monarchy in 1911 to the ultimate demise of the Ottoman Empire in 1923—monarchies disappeared from the greater

part of Eurasia. At the same time, however, European and Japanese colonial rule survived its great postwar crisis and showed few signs of weakness. The truly earth-shaking consequences of the First World War were limited to parts of Europe and the Middle East. For the United States, the War was perhaps too brief to have a deeply transformative effect on American society.¹⁰ Mexico experienced its own bloody revolution, unrelated to the events in Europe. For Africa, South and Southeast Asia the Great War was an *intermezzo*, partly disturbing, partly raising hopes for a post-colonial future.

African history and that of many parts of South East Asia is still best treated within the frame of an ongoing “colonial period” lasting from about 1880 to 1940¹¹—a very tenacious nineteenth century, or else, and less plausibly, a very precocious late modern period. The same time bracket makes sense for India, with an earlier caesura conventionally placed in 1857, the year of the Great Sepoy Rebellion. Many historians of South and Central America see the Great Depression of the 1930s rather than the year 1914 as the true end of the post-independence age, inaugurated more than a hundred years before.¹² We may conclude that only the end of the Second World War was an epochal event affecting every corner of the world. 1914 was of major, but not generally of overwhelming importance.

A different set of arguments, more attuned to social and cultural change, points to the *fin-de-siècle*—the years between, roughly, 1890 and 1910—as a period of concentrated innovation in social development and also in the arts and sciences. The case has been made persuasively for Europe.¹³ For the United States, different historiographical tendencies emphasizing the turn to imperialism, the rise of progressivism, or the emergence of corporate capitalism, highlight the *fin-de-siècle* as a time of the transcendence of earlier forms of politics, world-view, and social organization. The same is certainly true, for independent reasons, in the cases of Russia, China, and Japan. Throughout Africa, the period saw an advance from the turbulence of conquest to more peaceful and orderly forms of rule and colonial exploitation. Underpinned by a worldwide export boom for goods and capital after 1896 (Kondratieff’s “third upswing”),¹⁴ by intercontinental migration of an unprecedented magnitude, and by the large-scale provision of “international public goods,” the integration of the global economy took a leap ahead. In many ways, therefore, the years between about 1890 and 1910 transformed the world much more dramatically than any other previous twenty-year segment of time. In this light, the First World War can be seen as the first crisis of a new age rather than as the culmination of long-term tendencies.

IV.

The question of when a nineteenth century could plausibly be said to have begun is no less difficult to answer. Unless one focusses on the philosophical novelty of the *Declaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen*, the French Revolution was not an event of explosive significance. In terms of immediate and tangible effects, 1789 and the next couple of years did not change Europe a great deal. Even the execution of a king—no novelty in Europe—did not turn the world upside down.¹⁵ Only military expansion made a real difference. When Napoleon Bonaparte invaded Egypt and thereby rocked the entire Ottoman Empire, when insurgent ex-slaves repelled a French expeditionary force in Haiti, when Prussia and Austria collapsed, when the Portuguese court fled to Brazil, the Spanish crown disappeared from the scene, and the British conquered large parts of India in order to pre-empt a (highly unlikely) French take-over—only then did the potential of “1789” unfold with an almost global reach.¹⁶ And when, for once, Napoleon made a voluntary retreat, this was also of enormous consequence: The Louisiana Purchase of 1803 established the United States as a continental power with one stroke. Thus, Thomas Nipperdey was right not only for Germany with the famous opening sentence of his trilogy on nineteenth-century German history: “In the beginning there was Napoleon.”¹⁷

Political history marks out the Napoleonic period as a watershed for all of Europe, the Ottoman Empire, Latin America with Haiti, those regions of Africa which were to be affected by the British ban on the slave trade in 1808, and finally for all those parts of the world where Britain used the contest with revolutionary France to establish dominion, above all India, Sri Lanka, and the Cape of Good Hope.¹⁸ In a few cases, new political developments happened to occur at the same time without being caused or even influenced by the European turmoil. The reunification of Vietnam under the formidable emperor Gia Long in 1802 is a good example for such a home-made effort at early nation-building. I leave it to further discussion to include the United States in this picture. Here, the older concept of the “revolutionary” generation, much refined by Ira Berlin in his magisterial work on the first two centuries of slavery in North America, seems to be immensely helpful.¹⁹ The control of that generation over national affairs bridged the chronological divide between the centuries and ended, at the very top of politics, only when the sixth President, John Quincy Adams, left office in 1829.

As an alternative to an early beginning of a nineteenth century with the assault on a prison in Paris, one can, therefore, postulate a transitory age of crisis and renewal, lasting from the 1760s to the early 1830s and encompassing the revolutions in North America, France, and Saint-

Domingue (the future Haiti), as well as the destruction of the Spanish Empire on the American mainland. The European revolutions of 1830, the British Reform Bill of 1832, the legal abolition of slavery in the British empire two years later, and the onset of Jacksonian democracy in the United States are among the developments that signal the end of the eighteenth-century order. It is of some symbolic interest that five of the greatest minds who crystallized the experience of the transitory age died within months of one another: Hegel, Clausewitz, Bentham, Goethe, and Raja Rammohun Roy, the Bengal polymath with his unique vision of a cultural synthesis between East and West.²⁰

The suggestion put forward here is not entirely new. It pulls together at least three earlier proposals: first, the idea of a “revolutionary Atlantic,”²¹ second, Reinhart Koselleck’s characterization of that very age as an extended *Sattelzeit* when, under the impression of an acceleration of life and history, many of the concepts that still dominate the political language of today were formed,²² and third, the notion of a “first age of global imperialism,” during which “fiscal-military” states, based in Britain, France, and Russia, conquered large empires in Eurasia.²³

This periodization conforms with further observations of world-wide significance: 1830 approximately indicates the time when industrialization spread appreciably beyond the British Isles. Angus Maddison, perhaps the foremost authority on historical statistics today, sees the 1820s as a threshold between world-wide economic stagnation and “intensive” development.²⁴ In a similar vein, environmental historians consider the 1820s to mark the onset of a “fossil fuel age.” For the first time, the replacement of organic energy (that is, humans, animals, wood, peat) by mineral energy made a mark in the most advanced economies.²⁵ Coal powered steam engines, and steam engines drove machines and pumps, ships and locomotives. The real acceleration of life commenced with the railroad, not with the experience of revolutionary change alone. The following decades saw the entrenchment and extension of that new energy regime. “In terms of usable energy,” says John R. McNeill, “fossil fuels overshadowed biomass from the 1890s forward, even though the great majority of the world’s population used no fossil fuels directly.”²⁶ Thus, our idea of a “short” nineteenth century receives support from environmental history.

V.

In between the terminal dates of a century, however demarcated, individual national histories follow their separate trajectories. Some of the key dates in national histories have a stronger meaning than the temporal bracket in which they are encapsulated. For the United States, the year

1865 is probably more important than any other date since independence. For Japan, the beginning of the Meiji Restoration—in fact a “revolution from above”—in 1868 possesses a comparable founding significance.²⁷ For Italy and Germany, the unification in 1861 and 1871 of these countries and the ensuing construction of more or less integrated nation-states serves a similar function. None of these are, of course, dates of global significance.

What about the revolution of 1848/49? It was of central significance for a number of European countries, first among them perhaps France, where the revolution achieved a measure of success, and Hungary where it was dramatically defeated.²⁸ At the same time, it meant little to the only two European world powers, Britain and Russia. In contrast to the revolutionary decades of the 1770s to 1790s, the European crisis of the mid-century was not a transatlantic crisis. The United States at this time was much more inward-looking, or rather westward-looking, than it had been in the age of Franklin and Jefferson. It fought a war with and in Mexico and began to settle and develop its Pacific coast. At the other end of the world, the disastrous Taiping Revolution in China of 1850 to 1864, though involuntarily stimulated by missionary propaganda, was in no way initiated by revolutionary tendencies abroad.²⁹

What we see, then, in terms of political history, during the latter part of the nineteenth century, is not a world-wide coincidence or even convergence of revolutionary movements.³⁰ World revolution was confined to the fantasies of a few revolutionaries. The major episode of domestic violence in nineteenth-century European history, the Paris Commune of 1871, remained isolated and unique.

But something quite different happened: a series of almost simultaneous crises of *ancien régimes* and the subsequent creation of large-scale territorial units through the application of rationalizing state-power. It is still too early to move beyond mere description. Comparative history has yet to discover the subject.³¹ Whether after close scrutiny it will emphasize differences rather than similarities between the various individual cases remains to be seen. At any rate, the 1860s and 1870s were pivotal decades in the political evolution of the nineteenth century. The old sociological concept of “nation-building” still offers perhaps the best general characterization. The institutional build-up of a united Italy after 1861, the transformation of Japan from a feudal mosaic into a rigidly centralized and bureaucratized polity after 1868, the *innere Reichsgründung* in Germany after 1871: they all conform to the model.

Within the same narrow time-bracket several other momentous developments occurred: After Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War, Tsar Alexander II launched an ambitious and quite successful program of legal and administrative reform. In 1861, eleven million serfs on crown estates

and noble latifundia were liberated—whatever that may have meant in practice. Other reforms in the Russian empire touched the military, the bureaucracy, education, and the administration of justice.³² Comparable reforms in the Ottoman Empire had begun as early as the 1830s. The results were noteworthy, but the reforms did not strengthen the empire enough so that it would have been able to withstand its modernizing neighbor to the north. The Ottoman defeat in the Russo-Turkish War of 1878 was much more dramatic than the Russian failure in the Crimea more than twenty years before.³³ China suffered a similar fate when its cautious efforts at reform, also launched in the early 1860s, were annihilated by a Japanese military victory in 1895. Among the more successful state reforms of the period was the reorganization of the Habsburg Empire in 1867—yet another response to a military fiasco. The same year saw the federation of the British colonies in North America—the constitutional birth of modern Canada. A few months later, King Chulalongkorn acceded to the throne of Siam—one of the most appealing monarchs of the nineteenth century.³⁴ He continued and extended the modernizing policies of his father Mongkut and managed to preserve Thailand's independence in the midst of a cockpit of competing European powers. In India, an early movement towards colonial reform was cut short by the great Sepoy Rebellion (so-called Mutiny) of 1857. The British reacted in a paradoxical fashion by tightening their grip on the instruments of coercion, while at the same time reducing their interference in Indian society.

These momentous transformations have a few points in common: First, they were projects of “modernization from above,” inspired by the enlightened self-interest of rulers and elites and were only indirect responses to popular pressure. While some of them advanced “civil society” in the sense of legal equality and the rule of law, the widening of political participation, to say nothing of democracy, was of secondary importance or, as in Russia, China, Siam, and India, was not at all a consideration. Second, they took account of growing international rivalry and aimed at military self-strengthening. Third, they were part of a tendency toward the internal integration of large political units through the development of territorially rooted bureaucracies, the rationalization of state finances, and the construction of nation-wide networks of communication. In each case, the new technologies of railroad and telegraph were powerful instruments in the hands of the reformers.³⁵

An internal periodization of the nineteenth century according to criteria of political evolution, state-formation, and nation-building reveals the 1860s and early 1870s to be a turning point. Several national (and imperial) histories are deeply marked by the concentration and redeployment of state-power taking place in those years. This is true, above all, for the United States, Russia, Japan, Italy, Germany, and the Habsburg Em-

pire. In a few cases, social institutions of a quintessentially “early modern” character survived well beyond the middle of the nineteenth century and disappeared only in what could be called the Great Cleaning-Up of the 1860s. American slavery (which in Brazil lasted until 1888), Russian serfdom, and the feudal order of Tokugawa-Japan are prominent examples. All these changes took place within fluid international contexts and were influenced by them in varying forms and degrees. They differ in the extent to which nation-building reforms were conscious responses to external pressures. All the modernizing projects in the “East,” from St. Petersburg, Istanbul, and Cairo to Peking and Tokyo, were basically defensive. They were deliberate attempts to ward off danger from imperial Britain and to catch up with the dynamic forces of capitalism and military-bureaucratic rationalization.

Returning to the question of periodization, it should have become clear that a complete congruence between global, continental, national or even regional chronologies is undesirable and elusive. Being aware of co-existing “layers of time” (*Zeitschichten*, as Reinhart Koselleck calls them)³⁶ with their specific rhythms and speeds is all that can reasonably be achieved. On a global scale, the two “very long” turns of centuries—the revolutionary age from 1760 to 1830, and the unfolding of full modernity between 1890 and the postwar realignment of the early 1920s—stand out as distinct periods. That leaves a kind of “Victorian” rump-nineteenth century, from 1830 to 1890, with the 1860s and 1870s forming a political center of gravity, or else a long overarching age of “emergent modernity” from around 1760 to 1920, following a truncated “early modern” epoch. This suggestion receives some backing from recent attempts to recast early modernity. Heinz Schilling, for example, considers 1250 to 1750 to be a viable unit for the periodization of European history.³⁷

VI.

After all this juggling with dates and leap-frogging across space and time, a strong desire may be felt to turn to the “real” nineteenth century. However we envisage the shape of the century—is there anything to be said about it that is not just an extension, an enlargement, or perhaps a trivialization of what is already known from the study of, say, Germany or the United States? In a recent survey of Germany during the “long” nineteenth century, forming part of the tenth edition of Bruno Gebhardt’s venerable handbook, Jürgen Kocka has identified four secular trends: It was the century of industrialization, of demographic explosion (and large-scale migration), and of the nation-state. Professor Kocka’s fourth trend is the rise of the *Bürgertum*, but with a cautionary question-mark

added.³⁸ His conclusion is that the bourgeoisie, though a “small minority,” “put its stamp” on the age.³⁹

I will leave aside the question of whether these tendencies apply equally to Europe as a whole, and move on to the problem of their validity for the world. Each tendency possesses its proper chronology. But enough has now been said about periodization.

(1) The age of industrialization? Jürgen Kocka’s own way of putting it provides a first answer. Those countries where a transition to industrial society was accomplished remained “a small minority,” but they “put their stamp” on the world at large. By 1890, the greater part of the surface of the earth was completely untouched by engine-driven industry; this is also true for several countries on the European periphery. A second wave of industrialization, with Japan and Russia in the lead, was just beginning.⁴⁰ None of these late-comers really caught up, in quantitative terms, with the early industrializers. At the same time, goods from the factories of the industrialized countries—Britain, the United States, Germany, and France foremost among them—penetrated the remotest quarters of the globe. Industrialization was accompanied by an equally important process: the construction of an international economy, consisting of overlapping networks of transport, trade, and (more and more importantly) finance. These networks were largely dominated by the City of London, a cosmopolitan clearing house of mobile wealth which maintained its paramountcy even after the relative decline of Britain’s industrial strength. Although the industrializing countries formed the core of the international economy, this economy also integrated newly emerging nuclei of agricultural and mineral export production everywhere in the world. Thus the Antebellum South, Egypt, South Africa, Argentina, New Zealand, Malaya, and other regions turned into important participants in an asymmetrical division of labor. The first secular trend may, therefore, be rephrased as: industrialization of a North Atlantic core within expanding structures of global exchange.⁴¹

(2) An age of a “demographic explosion”? The sensational rates of population growth experienced in the twentieth century must not be projected back into the earlier period. Moreover, the dichotomy between high growth in the “Third World” and slow increases in the rich societies is a fairly recent phenomenon. The population of huge countries like India and China increased throughout the nineteenth century on a level only slightly above stagnation and comparable to that of France, Europe’s slowest-growing country. Germany’s population growth was in a medium class where we also find Italy, Sweden, and Egypt. “Explosion” is the right word to characterize what happened in Great Britain, Java, and Latin America as a whole—an interesting trio of cases, since the population increased in Latin America largely because of immigration, in Java

in the absence of it, and in Britain despite an enormous loss of emigrants. The winners of the demographic race, however, were what used to be called the “countries of white settlement” and are nowadays in OECD parlance “Western offshoots”: the United States, Canada, Australia, and Argentina. All this adds up to a remarkable redistribution of demographic weight among the continents. By 1900, if we follow the best available estimates, Asia’s share of world population had dropped sensationally from 66 percent in 1800 to an all-time low of 55 percent in 1900. During the same 100 years, Europe’s proportion (Russia excluded) rose from 15 to 18 percent and that of the Americas from 2.5 to 10 percent.⁴²

The second tendency in its enlarged reformulation is, therefore, not really a “demographic explosion,” but the demographic ascendancy of the Occident, especially of the Neo-Europes in the New World. Long-distance movements of temporary or definitive emigration across the Atlantic, but also in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean decisively contributed to this outcome. One additional result—extremely important for social history—was the proliferation of an age-old type of social discontinuity: the diaspora.

(3) A century of the nation-state?⁴³ Giving a responsible answer to this question would presuppose the critical sifting of a mountain of theoretical approaches to nationalism, the nation, and the nation-state. I can only sketch a few conclusions. Not any political form adopted by a community that defines itself as a nation is a nation-state. The nation-state merges ideals of equality, elementary citizenship, cultural homogeneity, independence in a pluralist international system, superiority over others, and a common destiny with the organizational legacy of the early modern European territorial state. Moreover, the fully-articulated nation-state requires the integrative potential of modern communication technologies, above all printing for mass consumption (which in turn demands a certain level of literacy), railroads, and the telegraph. For all these reasons, the nation-state is a modern invention. Invariably, it comes about through lengthy processes of nation-building, welding together a multitude of smaller units—tribes, principalities, local communities, and so on—into a larger, bigger, and greater whole. This is what happened in Germany, in Italy, and in the United States after the Civil War.

Most nation-states in the contemporary world emerged from the disintegration of empires. There have been four waves of the post-imperial formation of nation-states:

- the revolutionary period in the Western hemisphere from the independence of the 13 American colonies to that of Bolivia in 1825;
- the immediate aftermath of the First World War (when Ireland and Egypt achieved autonomy);

- the peak period of Asian and African decolonization between about 1946 and 1962;
- and finally the crumbling of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Few cases of newly-won sovereign independence are recorded during the latter three quarters of the (calendric) nineteenth century, none of them in the non-western world. Quite to the contrary: The establishment of post-imperial republics in Latin America was more than offset, numerically, by the destruction of hundreds and perhaps thousands of independent polities in the course of colonial expansion. By 1913, the number of independent political units on the globe had reached a world-historical minimum.⁴⁴ The British Empire alone included one quarter of humanity, a trifle more than the Chinese Empire. China was a prenational agrarian empire, the Imperium Britannicum an empire with a modern nation-state—more precisely, an imperial nation-state—at its center. The United States, bent on the course of westward expansion, could probably be seen as yet another such imperial nation-state.⁴⁵

In short, the nineteenth century was an age not of nation-states proper, but of old-style empires (the Habsburg, Ottoman, and Romanov Empires) persisting alongside modernized and much more resourceful *imperial* nation-states. The fact that Germany joined the club of the latter rather late and with limited success, has, incidentally, lead German historians to underestimate the aspect of empire.

(4) A “century of the bourgeoisie”? Again, semantic difficulties are hard to overcome. The finer shades of meaning separating “Bürgertum” from “bourgeoisie” are by themselves a frightful challenge. National paths of societal evolution render difficult the transfer of concepts. It makes an enormous difference, for example, whether a bourgeois class emerged alongside an entrenched aristocracy (as it did in Western Europe and in Japan) or whether such an aristocracy did not exist—as was the case under widely differing circumstances, in China, the United States, or Australia. Still, a few general points can tentatively be made. Everywhere in the world, commercialization, itself a global trend, opened up social spaces for groups specializing in mercantile services. Their rise went parallel with a relative decline of landed property as a source of income and power. Prominent among these groups were ethnic minorities, for example, the Greeks and Armenians in the late Ottoman Empire or the Chinese in South-East Asia. In other words, “middling ranks” did not always grow from local and internal roots; they often had the vulnerable status of alien “guests.”⁴⁶ In each case, they were somehow touched by a parsimonious, rationalizing, and expansive “spirit of capitalism.”⁴⁷

A second tendency of almost world-wide scope was the rise of the “professions.”⁴⁸ Medical doctors and teachers in European-style institu-

tions of higher education proliferated. Wherever the British Empire gained a foothold (or more than that), it exported the rule of law and the instruments of litigation. By 1920, few major countries in the world were without lawyers—many of whom were to play leading roles in movements of national emancipation.

Thirdly, the nineteenth century saw the rise of a transatlantic, cosmopolitan bourgeoisie with close ties to an equally cosmopolitan aristocracy: a class of global operators, many of them in finance, and of wealthy rentiers. This class formed a thin layer above the various national bourgeois classes or *milieux* with whom it was linked in a multitude of ways. It had its offshoots in Latin America, in the richer colonies and in cities like Istanbul, Alexandria, or Shanghai.⁴⁹

A most interesting question is, finally, whether a *bürgerlicher Wertehimmel* (a “firmament of bourgeois values”) existed and spread independently of locally based bourgeois strata and *milieux*. There were strong impediments to such a globalization of values beyond the crude imperative of enrichment. Forms of the family, so important to *bürgerliche* attitudes towards the world, are highly culture-bound, and visions of the self are culturally encoded to no lesser degree and not at all easy to change. On the other hand, the quintessential bourgeois world-view—liberalism—found adherents on each continent, conspicuously so in the Americas, but also in India, Japan, and the Middle East.⁵⁰ If the nineteenth century is, on a world scale, not an age when the bourgeoisie became dominant socially and politically, it certainly saw the universalization of a central bourgeois creed.

Let me, by way of conclusion, add two more features of the nineteenth century to Jürgen Kocka’s list.

(5) It was a century of frontier expansion and of the assault on nonsedentary ways of life. Chris Bayly, the leading British historian of modern India, has pointed out that during the revolutionary period between the 1770s and the 1830s, “tribal break-outs” originating in Central Asia and Afghanistan caused serious trouble for the agricultural populations of the Eurasian lowlands for the last time in history. Much of the turmoil that facilitated the British conquest of India had been triggered by mounted warriors from the North.⁵¹ That, however, was the last gasp of pastoral power. Thereafter, the sedentary majority of mankind got the upper hand. President Andrew Jackson’s policy of Indian removal broke the military might of the Indian nations. At nearly the same time, the Russian state stepped up its offensive against the nomadic peoples of the Kazakh steppe—previously an independent force kept at bay by a string of fortifications.⁵² In several places in the world, mobile ways of life were pushed back by armed settlers with the help of an obliging state and, coming later, of the railway. The frontier was to be found almost every-

where outside Western Europe: in North America, Brazil and the Argentine Pampas, in Australia and New Zealand, in the Eastern parts of the Tsarist Empire, in South Africa, in India, colonial Burma and in Qing China, where the once-dreaded Mongols succumbed to the onslaught of land-hungry Han-Chinese peasants, money-lenders, and the bottle. By 1890 (the year when Sitting Bull was shot) all these processes had run their course. The heroes of indigenous resistance had gone down fighting or had been bought off. The frontiers were—in the idiom of the day—“closing.”

(6) Finally, the nineteenth century was a century of emancipation and new exclusion, of liberation, and of a retreat from cosmopolitanism and tolerance. The hardening of exclusive identities set in early in the century. Ira Berlin has traced “the degradation of black life in mainland North America” back to the revolutionary period.⁵³ In world-historical terms, the overthrow of systems of servile labor in the Atlantic sphere and in Eastern Europe (and a little later in many Muslim countries) counts as one of the signal accomplishments of the nineteenth century.⁵⁴ It ranks with Jewish emancipation and the disappearance of religious persecution from Western Europe. However, the celebrated century of progress—in this case my “short” nineteenth century—ends on a different and more somber note. It ends with the failure of Reconstruction in the United States and the rise of segregation in the South, with similar attempts to draw deep racial lines through South African society, with anti-Chinese and anti-Japanese exclusion in the United States, Canada, and Australia after 1882, with anti-Semitic pogroms in Russia from 1881 onwards, with the framing of Colonel Dreyfus in 1894 and an anti-Semitic groundswell in Germany and Austria, with the germs of a racist literature even in Japan and China.⁵⁵

Again, as so many times before in this lecture, I have merely arranged events instead of speculating about the reasons for their clustered occurrence. Unless one feels comfortable with world-system approaches or mono-causal models, be they of an economic, demographic, or environmental kind, explanations for the simultaneous appearance of similar phenomena in different contexts are very difficult to find. World history as a special way of looking at the past has long had, not undeservedly, a bad name for offering premature answers to questions little understood and less investigated. So, let us stay a while with the questions. At least the initial one: “Where is a nineteenth century to be found?” though far from being solved, has perhaps been shown to make a minimum of sense.

Notes

¹ Suzanne Marchand, “Embarrassed by the Nineteenth Century,” unpublished manuscript, 2002.

² Peter Gay, *Schnitzler's Century: The Making of Middle-Class Culture, 1815–1914* (New York, 2002).

³ Eric J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789–1848* (London, 1962); Eric J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital 1848–1875* (London, 1975); Eric J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire 1875–1914* (London, 1987).

⁴ See a long series of major historical syntheses from G. M. Young, *Victorian England: Portrait of an Age* (London, 1936) to A. N. Wilson, *The Victorians* (London, 2002). On twentieth-century responses to the Victorians, see John Gardiner, *The Victorians: An Age in Retrospect* (London, 2002).

⁵ In his magnificent textbook on nineteenth-century Europe, Jörg Fisch opts for a caesura around 1850 and characterizes the age through the dynamic polarity of “growth” and “equality”: Jörg Fisch, *Europa zwischen Wachstum und Gleichheit 1850–1914*, Handbuch der Geschichte Europas, vol. 8 (Stuttgart, 2002).

⁶ Edwin G. Burrows and Mike Wallace, *Gotham: A History of New York City to 1898* (Oxford, 1999), 585. Da Ponte wrote his memoirs between 1823 and 1827; their first complete edition was published in 1915. See Lorenzo da Ponte, *Mein abenteuerliches Leben: Die Memoiren des Mozart-Librettisten*, ed. Walter Klefisch (Reinbek, 1960); *Memoirs of Lorenzo Da Ponte*, translated by Elisabeth Abbott (New York, 1988).

⁷ Historians' views on the relevance of periodization are sampled in Johan Hendrik Jacob van der Pot, *Sinndeutung und Periodisierung der Geschichte. Eine systematische Übersicht der Theorien und Auffassungen* (Leiden, 1999), 52–57.

⁸ On the plurality of calendars and concepts of time, see Louis Gardet et al., *Cultures and Time* (Paris, 1976); Donald J. Wilcox, *The Measure of Times Past: Pre-Newtonian Chronologies and the Rhetoric of Relative Time* (Chicago and London, 1987); G. J. Whitrow, *Time in History: The Evolution of Our General Awareness of Time and Temporal Perspective* (Oxford and New York, 1988); Ákos Östör, *Vessels of Time: An Essay on Temporal Change and Social Transformation* (Delhi, 1993).

⁹ Hew Strachan, *The First World War*, vol. 1 of *To Arms* (Oxford, 2001), chapter 9.

¹⁰ David M. Kennedy, *Over Here: The First World War and American Society* (New York, 1980).

¹¹ Rudolf von Albetini, *European Colonial Rule, 1880–1940: The Impact of the West on India, Southeast Asia, and Africa*, translated by John G. Williamson, Contributions in Comparative Colonial Studies, no. 10 (Westport, CT and Oxford, 1982).

¹² *The Cambridge History of Latin America* follows such a periodization: Volumes 4 and 5 (1986) go as far as 1930, volume 6 (in two parts, 1994) takes over from there.

¹³ Paul Nolte, “1900: Das Ende des 19. und der Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts in sozialgeschichtlicher Perspektive,” in *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* 47 (1996): 281–300.

¹⁴ Peter Hall, “The Intellectual History of Long Waves,” in *The Rhythms of Society*, Michael Young and Tom Schuller, eds. (London and New York, 1988), 37–52.

¹⁵ Still a valuable survey: Rolf Reichardt und Eberhard Schmitt, “Die Französische Revolution—Umbruch oder Kontinuität?” in *Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung* 7 (1980): 257–320.

¹⁶ For Europe, see Stuart J. Woolf, *Napoleon's Integration of Europe* (London and New York, 1991); Michael Broers, *Europe under Napoleon 1799–1815* (London, 1996); for wider repercussions, see Stig Förster, “Der Weltkrieg 1792–1815. Bewaffnete Konflikte und Revolutionen in der Weltgesellschaft,” in *Kriegsbereitschaft und Friedensordnung in Deutschland 1800–1814*, ed. Jost Dülffer (Münster and Hamburg, 1995), 17–35.

¹⁷ Thomas Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte 1800–1866. Bürgerwelt und starker Staat* (Munich, 1983), 11.

¹⁸ See Michael Duffy, “World-Wide War and British Expansion, 1793–1815,” in *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. 2, *The Eighteenth Century*, ed. P. J. Marshall (Oxford and New York, 1998), 184–207.

¹⁹ Ira Berlin, *Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries of Slavery in North America* (Cambridge, Mass., 1998). See also Marshall G. S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization*, vol. 3, *The Gunpowder Empires and Modern Times* (Chicago and London, 1974), 176 seq. on the impact of “the generation of 1789.”

²⁰ On Rammohun Roy, the least known of that illustrious group, see *The Essential Writings of Raja Rammohun Roy* (Delhi, 1999).

²¹ The classic proponent of this view was Robert R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America, 1760–1800*, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1959–64); its leading German advocate was the late Manfred Kossok who had a keener sense of Latin American history than Palmer. See numerous references in his *Ausgewählte Schriften*, ed. Matthias Middell, 3 vols. (Leipzig, 2000). On cultural transfer across the Atlantic, see Roger G. Kennedy, *Orders from France: The Americans and the French in a Revolutionary World, 1780–1820* (New York, 1989); on differences between the respective revolutionary outcomes, see Patrice Higonnet, *Sister Republics: The Origins of French and American Republicanism* (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1988). See also the ambitious research program of Horst Pietschmann, *Geschichte des atlantischen Systems, 1580–1830: Ein historischer Versuch zur Erklärung der “Globalisierung” jenseits nationalgeschichtlicher Perspektiven* (Hamburg, 1998). A full picture would have to include the revolution in Saint-Domingue (Haiti). See Franklin W. Knight, “The Haitian Revolution,” in *American Historical Review* 105 (2000): 103–115.

²² See Reinhart Koselleck, “Einleitung,” in *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, ed. Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck, vol. 1 (Stuttgart, 1972), xv.

²³ See C. A. Bayly, *Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World 1780–1830* (London and New York, 1989), 164–192; C. A. Bayly, “The British Military-Fiscal State and Indigenous Resistance: India 1750–1820,” in *An Imperial State at War: Britain from 1689 to 1815*, ed. Lawrence Stone (London and New York, 1994), 322–354; C. A. Bayly, “The First Age of Global Imperialism, c. 1760–1830,” in *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 25 (1997): 28–47.

²⁴ Angus Maddison, *The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective* (Paris, 2001), 27.

²⁵ E. A. Wrigley, *People, Cities and Wealth* (Oxford, 1987), 10–11; John R. McNeill, *Something New under the Sun: An Environmental History of the Twentieth-Century World* (New York and London, 2000), xxiii, 298.

²⁶ McNeill, 14.

²⁷ An authoritative interpretation is Marius B. Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan* (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 2000), 333–70.

²⁸ *Europa 1848: Revolution und Reform*, ed. Dieter Dowe, Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, and Dieter Langewiesche in *Forschungsinstitut der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Reihe Politik- und Gesellschaftsgeschichte* 48 (Bonn, 1998).

²⁹ On the Christian sources of the Taiping leader’s prophetic inspiration, see Vincent Y. C. Shih, *The Taiping Ideology: Sources, Interpretations, and Influences* (Seattle and London, 1967), 147–164; Jonathan Spence, *God’s Chinese Son: The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan* (New York and London, 1996), 30–33, 56–68.

³⁰ Similar in its argumentative design is a cross-cultural study of state breakdowns during the early modern period: Jack A. Goldstone, *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1991).

³¹ For the development of the “Verwaltungsstaat” in Europe, we have at least Lutz Raphael, *Recht und Ordnung: Herrschaft durch Verwaltung im 19. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt a.M., 2000).

³² See *Russia’s Great Reforms, 1855–1881*, ed. Ben Eklof (Bloomington, Ind., 1994).

³³ A masterful survey of the Ottoman reforms is Roderic H. Davison, *Turkey* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1968), 67–90.

- ³⁴ See Niels P. Petersson, "König Chulalongkorns Europareise 1897: Europäischer Imperialismus, symbolische Politik und monarchisch-bürokratische Modernisierung," *Saeculum* 52 (2001): 297–328.
- ³⁵ See Charles Maier, "Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era," in *American Historical Review* 105 (2000): 807–31.
- ³⁶ Reinhart Koselleck, *Zeitschichten: Studien zur Historik* (Frankfurt a.M., 2000).
- ³⁷ Heinz Schilling, *Die neue Zeit: Vom Christenheitseuropa zum Europa der Staaten 1250 bis 1750* (Berlin, 1999). Hagen Schulze, contributing to the same series of books, has "modern" Europe begin around 1740: *Phönix Europa: Die Moderne. Von 1740 bis heute* (Berlin, 1998).
- ³⁸ Jürgen Kocka, *Das lange 19. Jahrhundert. Arbeit, Nation und bürgerliche Gesellschaft* (Stuttgart, 2002).
- ³⁹ *Ibid.*, 138.
- ⁴⁰ On the three phases of industrialization (1760–1880; 1880–1950; since 1950), see Peter N. Stearns, *The Industrial Revolution in World History* (Boulder, San Francisco, and Oxford, 1993); see also Sidney Pollard, "The Europeanization of the International Economy 1800–1870," in *Europe in the International Economy 1500–2000*, ed. Derek H. Aldcroft and Anthony Sutcliffe (Cheltenham, 1999), 50–101.
- ⁴¹ For a superb sketch of the world economy in the nineteenth century, see Wolfram Fischer, *Expansion, Integration, Globalisierung. Studien zur Geschichte der Weltwirtschaft* (Göttingen, 1998), especially 36–48.
- ⁴² Calculated on the basis of data from Massimo Livi-Bacci, *A Concise History of World Population*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1997), 31, table 1.3.
- ⁴³ See also Jürgen Osterhammel, "Der europäische Nationalstaat des 20. Jahrhunderts. Eine globalhistorische Annäherung," in Jürgen Osterhammel, *Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des Nationalstaats. Studien zu Beziehungsgeschichte und Zivilisationsvergleich* (Göttingen, 2001), 322–41.
- ⁴⁴ See also Charles Tilly, "Geography of European Statemaking and Capitalism since 1500," in *Geographic Perspectives in History: Essays in Honor of Edward Whiting Fox*, ed. Eugene D. Genovese and Leonard Hochberg (Oxford, 1989), 158–181.
- ⁴⁵ D. W. Meinig, *The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History*, vol. 2, *Continental America, 1800–1867* (New Haven and London, 1986), 170–188.
- ⁴⁶ Christine Dobbin, *Asian Entrepreneurial Minorities: Conjoint Communities in the Making of the World Economy 1570–1940* (Richmond, 1996).
- ⁴⁷ This aspect is missing from a new treatment of the subject which emphasizes the close proximity of capitalism and national development: Liah Greenfeld, *The Spirit of Capitalism: Nationalism and Economic Growth* (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 2001).
- ⁴⁸ It should be noted, however, that nowhere outside the Occident did the expansion of a non-capitalist segment of the middle-classes assume such a significance as to speak of a "professional" or "corporate" society in the sense of Harold Perkin, *The Rise of Professional Society: England since 1880* (London, 1989).
- ⁴⁹ There are as yet few studies of this social group. An early, and still valuable, outline was provided by Charles A. Jones, *International Business in the Nineteenth Century: The Rise and Fall of a Cosmopolitan Bourgeoisie* (Brighton, 1987), following in the footsteps of still earlier pioneers such as Henrietta M. Larson, *Guide to Business History* (Cambridge, 1948).
- ⁵⁰ In Japan, 1881 saw the founding of a "Liberal Party" (Jiyūtō); in India, the Indian National Congress, established in 1885, confronted the colonial state in a spirit of critical liberalism. At least for the Middle East there is a first-rate intellectual history: Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798–1939* (London, 1962). The story of how Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* or John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty* were translated into a great number of languages provides insight into cases of world-wide intellectual dissemination and adaptation. See

Adam Smith Across Nations: Translations and Receptions of the Wealth of Nations, ed. Lai Cheung-chung (Oxford, 1999).

⁵¹ Bayly, *Imperial Meridian*, 33–54.

⁵² Andreas Kappeler, *Rußland als Vielvölkerreich: Entstehung, Geschichte, Zerfall* (Munich, 1992), 158–159.

⁵³ Berlin, *Many Thousands Gone*, 96.

⁵⁴ Seminal studies of comparative scope include Peter Kolchin, *Unfree Labor: American Slavery and Russian Serfdom* (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1987); Robin Blackburn, *The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776–1848* (London, 1988); Seymour Drescher, *From Slavery to Freedom: Comparative Studies in the Rise and Fall of Atlantic Slavery* (Basingstoke, 1999); M. L. Bush, *Servitude in Modern Times* (Cambridge, 2000), 177–99.

⁵⁵ These developments are well documented in many works. Another question would be *when* the tide began to turn. As Catherine Hall has recently argued for Britain, the 1850s may have been a crucial time for the spread of “a form of racial thinking which assumed hierarchy and inequality”: Catherine Hall, *Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination, 1830–1867* (Cambridge, 2002), 436; see also Hall’s contribution to Catherine Hall, Keith McClelland, and Jane Rendall, *Defining the Victorian Nation: Class, Race, Gender and the British Reform Act of 1867* (Cambridge, 2000).

COMMENTS ON JÜRGEN OSTERHAMMEL'S "IN SEARCH OF A NINETEENTH CENTURY"

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History used to be a growth industry. There was, after all, more everyday. Lately, like much else in the modern world, there is reason to call this bad joke into question. In fact, more and more history seems to be disappearing. First, it was the French Revolution, as historians turned against the great climacteric, dissolving the differences between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie and finding more to say about the Counter-Revolution than the Revolution itself. By the time the revisionists were through—and, mercifully, I think they are through—it was hard to know why folks were writing so much about the Counter-Revolution if there was no Revolution in the first place. The Industrial Revolution suffered the same fate, as the period of manufacture blended so easily with the rise of the factory, and the factory itself became a series of workshops not commanded by the great captains of industry, but by some rude foremen, who ruled imperiously over workers and bosses alike. Finally, it was the transition to capitalism that at first could not be located—was it in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries?—and then could be located everywhere and nowhere. Here was a train that may have left the station but never arrived at the terminal.

Yet the magicians who have done away with these great watersheds of history have nothing on Jürgen Osterhammel, whose prestidigitation has far exceeded their cheap magician's tricks, for he threatens to do away with a whole century.

Historians of Africa, China, India, and Europe or even antiquity might shrug this off, after all they have lots of centuries. Who would really mind if we somehow misplaced the fourth century or some of those before the common era. But American historians do not have many centuries with which to work. Take away one century and you reduce the history of the mainland North American settlement at least by a full quarter and the history of the American Republic by nearly a half. It took far less than that to tip Enron and WorldCom, so if you hear my voice get a little strained you know I fear for all of American history, perhaps all of history. With university budgets collapsing everywhere, Jürgen Osterhammel may have struck a nerve. So let me look behind that curtain.

Like the great magicians who vanquished the French Revolution, routed the Industrial Revolution, and have so hidden the transition to capitalism that we cannot locate it, Jürgen Osterhammel begins by dem-

onstrating that the chronology of those great markers is not nearly as obvious as we thought. When did the nineteenth century begin and when did it end? Those neat century-long periods, Jürgen Osterhammel shows, have little reality. However nice the roundness of the figure of one hundred years is, it has no independent reality. Switch from the decimal system to another, centuries do not seem as round; switch from the Gregorian calendar to some other calendric system, and dissolve those round dates entirely.

But even when scholars get on the same page, the same calendar page that is, they disagree about when the century begins, and when it ends. Indeed, as Professor Osterhammel reminds us, if Eric Hobsbawm has made the case for the long nineteenth century beginning with the Age of Revolutions—aforesaid (and previously lost) French as well as American and Haitian revolutions—others have made the case for the nineteenth century beginning in the 1820s or later. Likewise, if some think the nineteenth century ended with World War I, others have maintained that the 1870s and 1880s might be an appropriate end point. Still others have a much longer nineteenth century, beginning with the great imperial wars of the mid-eighteenth century (1756) and ending with the Great Depression of the 1930s. And there are still shorter versions. Is the nineteenth century really 150 years, or is it 50, or is it more or less?

Moreover, Osterhammel demonstrates that not only do scholars disagree about the boundaries of the nineteenth century, they also disagree on its internal chronology. Here the number of permutations grows larger and larger, as Osterhammel, with ingenuity, insight, and seemingly limitless depth, views the nineteenth century from various perspectives. Like a shadow box, each perspective provides a different vision. That, I presume, is the point of Jürgen Osterhammel's wonderful, erudite essay. History, after all, is a matter of perspective, and perhaps nothing is more determinate of perspective than chronology. Indeed, chronology is the high ground of interpretation: seize it and you command the field, lose it and you will forever work in someone else's garden. That is precisely why this struggle for the high ground is so intense and there are so many contenders. Periodization is not simply a necessary evil, but the very essence of historical interpretation. Let us therefore accept Osterhammel's reminder of the critical importance of chronology in history. Let us concede his point that the nineteenth century has no more reality than race, gender, or nationality—social constructions all. What of *a* nineteenth century, if not *the* nineteenth century? It is hard to fault Osterhammel's review of the evidence, the different perspectives which lead us to bound the nineteenth century variously, and divide it internally. It is hard not to be amazed by Osterhammel's learned reach, pulling us into the reunification of Vietnam under Gia Long and connecting Gia's rule to that of the

disastrous tenure of John Quincy Adams. But does any “nineteenth century” tell a meaningful story? If it does, which of these many contenders best explains that story? Or, as Osterhammel suggests, have we paid such great attention to the nineteenth century because we live among its rubble (material and intellectual) or because, of all centuries, it marks the birth of the modern historical profession, hence is ground zero for historical understanding?

So let me rise to the bait and join Jürgen Osterhammel in a search for a plausible, global nineteenth century. Naturally, I enter the contest with no pretension of success, as I understand the contest between the Age of Fossil Fuel and the Age of Revolutions is an uneven and unstable one which can be overturned by the transfer of power in Siam or the liberation of serfs in Eastern Europe, or trumped by the elevation of some event previously deemed insignificant. Does embourgeoisement top proletarianization or are they encompassed by class formation? Is the Atlantic trumped by the interior continental developments? Does the definition of manhood or womanhood (defining gender) take precedence over citizenship? If Arno Mayer has demonstrated that the landed classes survived very well into the twentieth century, does that deny the centrality of the middle class? It is small wonder that Osterhammel ends his talk with questions.

To make a case for a nineteenth century, one would have to develop criteria to measure one nineteenth century against another. If one is preferred to another, there must be a reason or logic, a standard to be met, criteria that can be measured. That reason cannot simply be inclusiveness. History is made and interpretations constructed as much by what is left out as by what is put in. To include everything is to make a chronology that can start or end at whatever point is chosen, but not to make a history. On the other hand, history gains value by its inclusiveness. A nineteenth century constructed to explain the rise of the nation state, industrialization, urbanization, the emancipation of women, or the triumph of free labor have their own value. But a nineteenth century that could encompass all of them would have still greater value. It is here that much of the problem lies in finding a global nineteenth century. For the chronologies (or histories) of these phenomena—the rise of the nation state, industrialization, urbanization, the emancipation of women, the triumph of free labor or some of the others Osterhammel mentioned—have mutually exclusive or conflicting chronologies. Indeed, many of these phenomena, like the rise of the nation state, for example, militate against the construction of a global history. In short, world history is not an additive phenomenon. It cannot be the sum of all national histories, any more than the history of industrialization can be derived from putting the history of all factories end to end, or histories of wars back to back, or history of sexuality. . . . (I won’t go there).

Let me instead try my hand and make a case for a nineteenth century by looking not at what the nineteenth century was, which Osterhammel has done with consummate skill, but by looking at what it was not; that is, by examining how the nineteenth century differs from the eighteenth and the twentieth centuries, short or long. I would begin this discussion by speaking to the presumption of equality, a presumption that is put into effect and acted upon with ferocious energy after the Age of Revolutions. The nineteenth century was a century of inequality, extraordinary and enormous inequality that in some ways outdistanced anything previously known, as the distance between rich and poor and the differences between men and women, white and black, colonizer and colonized, and perhaps most significantly, civilized and uncivilized, expanded. Yet, even as the massive hierarchies grew, they had to be explained away since the normal order of things was now presumed to be equality. Indeed, it was precisely that presumption that drove the creation of new ideologies to explain subordination or superordination by race, sex, or class. New forms of racism, gendered understandings, and social Darwinist configurations had not been needed when inequality was the normal run of mankind. It was the presumption of equality that mandated their presence and which required a reconfiguration of social relations. Unlike any century in the past (certainly the eighteenth century), the nineteenth century struggled with the matter of equality.

So, too, the distinction that more than any other separates the twentieth century from the nineteenth is the advent of modernity. Here I define modernity—even more slippery than equality—by a new universality that comes from a mixing of people. Here, I think of the cultural diversity of the Harlem Renaissance or postwar Weimar, the mixing of architectural styles in Rio de Janeiro, or the movement of peoples as a result of a century of warfare.

Employing the ubiquity of equality and modernity as the lower and upper boundaries of the nineteenth century fits in some places, perhaps in the larger Atlantic world and other areas touched by the west. However, does it fit a global history? I am not sure. Certainly it does not if we mean the portions of the world unconnected by ties of trade, communication, exchange of goods, ideas, or even disease. But what is global history if not the history of those parts that are connected? That, of course, brings us back to Professor Osterhammel's largest point that chronology is a function of interpretation. If that is a truism, it is one which we often forget. Professor Osterhammel has reminded us of its importance with particular power, elegance, and poignancy. It also provides confidence that not only does the nineteenth century survive this exercise, but it will survive others as well.

BETWEEN POLITICAL RECONNAISSANCE WORK AND DEMOCRATIZING SCIENCE: AMERICAN STUDIES IN GERMANY, 1917–1953

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Almost fifty years ago, on June 12 and 13, 1953, the German Society for American Studies (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Amerikastudien, DGfA) was launched. With the founding act of Marburg, a new chapter was opened in the varied history of German research on the United States. For the first time, Germans specializing in American Studies joined together in an organized representation of interests, creating an interdisciplinary association exclusively dedicated to the study of American civilization, with elected officers, its own conferences and annual meetings, as well as its own scientific periodical, the *Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien* (Yearbook of American Studies).²

In this endeavor, German scholars of America were not alone. They could count on the energetic support of American organizations, especially the American High Commission to Germany (HICOG), which assigned the cultivation and institutionalization of American Studies at German universities a very high political priority within its policies of higher education.³ In this respect, the founding of the DGfA shows a strong American influence. It was an integral part of the American reorientation efforts geared toward West Germany after World War II. In this sense, like political science, the study of America was meant to be a “democratizing science.” Simultaneously, the DGfA was a product of the Cold War since the study of America was seen as a supporting measure in the competition of the West with the Soviet Union and its allies.

In light of the transatlantic connection of the DGfA’s establishment, it is easy to overlook that there was a study of America in Germany prior to the founding of the DGfA. Unlike German political science, which only existed in rudimentary form before 1945, American Studies in Germany were rooted in prewar developments, both in terms of personnel and content. Whereas postwar political science recruited its members from the émigré scholars who had been forced to flee Nazi Germany and developed relatively free of National Socialist connotations, the history of West German American Studies presents a more complex picture.⁴ Like most disciplines in the humanities and social sciences in Germany, the study of American and English literature, whose representatives dominated the DGfA since 1953, showed a high degree of personal and intellectual continuity with the time before 1945.⁵

The vicissitudes of American research done by Germans in the first half of the twentieth century, and the problems of continuity and discontinuity encapsulated therein, are mirrored in the biographies of its most prominent representatives. This is already apparent in a brief glance at the editorial committee of the *Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien*. On the one hand, the inclusion of two well-known American representatives of American Studies, Professors Tremaine McDowell from the University of Minnesota (the “father” of American Studies) and Ralph L. Rusk from Columbia University, highlighted the transatlantic influence on the recasting of American Studies in Germany. This was further underscored by the inclusion of two returning émigrés, the political scientist Arnold Bergstraesser and the philosopher Helmut Kuhn (also Deputy Chairman of the DGfA 1956–57 and Chairman 1957–59).⁶ However, Arnold Bergstraesser, the driving force of German postwar American Studies (besides the founding editor Walther Fischer), was not a typical representative of the emigration. After completing his *Habilitation* with Alfred Weber in Heidelberg in 1928, he accepted a position as professor of political science and foreign studies (*Auslandskunde*) at the University of Heidelberg. He made a name for himself as an expert on France and sympathized with the “Conservative Revolution” of the Weimar era. After falling victim to expulsion on “racial grounds,” Bergstraesser emigrated to the United States, but annoyed Americans with his tone of German nationalism. He was even interned for a time as an alleged spy. In 1951–52, he was a guest professor in Frankfurt, afterwards in Erlangen. In 1954, he accepted the offer of a chair in political science and sociology at the University of Freiburg, where he had a lasting influence on the development of German political science, not least through his large group of students.⁷

On the other hand, however, the editorial committee and board of the DGfA were dominated by professors whose academic careers had *not* abruptly ended after 1933. Walther Fischer, the first editor of the *Jahrbuch* and the first chairman of the DGfA (from 1953 to 1956), professor of English and American literature in Giessen from 1926 to 1946 and thereafter in Marburg, had applied for Nazi party membership, but refrained from any political activity during the Third Reich, concentrating on teaching within the narrow boundaries of his discipline.⁸ Three other members of the editing committee of the *Jahrbuch*, the political scientist Eduard Baumgarten, the English Studies scholar Theodor Spira (Chairman, 1956–57), and the historian Egmont Zechlin (Deputy Chairman, 1953–56), had researched and taught in Germany during the National Socialist period. Spira, a scholar of Shakespeare who was involved in foreign studies activities at the University of Königsberg, was forced to retire in 1940 due to his religious views. He was regarded as not having been implicated in

National Socialism.⁹ Baumgarten, a nephew and one of the editors of the estate of Max Weber as well as a former assistant of Martin Heidegger, had outlined a combative study of America at the beginning of the Third Reich. By understanding the nature of a foreign country, Baumgarten wanted to contribute to the “self-contemplation and self-disciplining” of the German people, thereby making foreign studies an integral part of the “political school” of the nation.¹⁰ His major, two-volume work, published during the Third Reich, *Die geistigen Grundlagen des amerikanischen Gemeinwesens* (The Intellectual Foundations of American Society) shows more than just outward concessions to National Socialist ideology. According to Hans Jaos, Baumgarten did not support the Nazi seizure of power simply out of opportunism and self-protection, but reinterpreted the American “Spirit of Pragmatism” in a National Socialist sense.¹¹ Zechlin was by far the most seriously compromised member of the editorial committee. He taught in Berlin during the Third Reich as a scholar of foreign studies and belonged to a group of pro-Nazi scholars who signed the 1933 “University Professors’ Declaration of Loyalty to Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist State.” In 1945, Zechlin was only one of 24 history professors who were dismissed from their positions as “politically compromised.”¹²

Whereas some of the founding fathers of the DGfA embodied an element of personal continuity from Weimar through the Third Reich into the Federal Republic, it is instructive to see who was not present at the creation of the DGfA in 1953. Thus, one would search in vain on the list of the DGfA’s founding fathers for the name of Friedrich Schönemann, the most well-known German *Amerikanist* in the two decades before 1945. Schönemann, who had originally received his Ph.D. in German Studies, had taught at various American universities from 1911 to 1920, in the end at Harvard University, and was one of the few German nationals who had remained in the United States during World War I. After returning to Germany in 1920, he became the first German to complete his *Habilitation* in the field of “North American Literary and Cultural History” in 1924. In 1936, he was appointed to the first official chair of American Cultural and Literary History in Germany.¹³ Schönemann joined the NSDAP in 1933 and frequently put his scholarly authority at the party’s disposal. During critical phases of German-American relations, for example, he commented on U.S. foreign policy in the *Völkischer Beobachter*, the main Nazi party newspaper.¹⁴ In the German Institute of Foreign studies (*Deutsches Auslandswissenschaftliches Institut*), a think tank modeled after the Council of Foreign Relations and closely related to the SS, Schönemann was the leading specialist on America. He played the same role at the Faculty of Foreign Studies at the University of Berlin, where he became director of the American Department.¹⁵ In 1951, at the first meeting of German scholars

of America in Munich after the war, he gave a keynote speech, calling for more jobs, more books, and more attention to American themes in schools and universities.¹⁶ Yet as a prominent American Studies scholar who was deeply involved in National Socialism, he embodied the ambivalences of German research on America too prominently to be welcomed into the founding circle of the DGfA two years later.¹⁷

Schönemann's absence at the initial conference of the DGfA signifies more than just a superficial cleansing of postwar American Studies from its personal burdens of the past. Zechlin's presence at the conference meant that the founding members of the DGfA included at least one prominent scholar who, like Schönemann, had taught at the Foreign Studies Faculty in Berlin and who had strongly supported National Socialism. Other formerly National Socialist researchers were among the founding members of the younger generation. Therefore, I would argue that the exclusion of Schönemann was not only due to his National Socialist past but also to differences over the content of research. Schönemann's cultural approach to an integrated field of American Studies, which he had tirelessly propagated since the early 1920s and successfully implemented in the Third Reich, had no future in the early Federal Republic. In light of the reconstruction of the traditional, pre-National Socialist order of academic disciplines and the elimination of the "reform subjects" of the Third Reich such as "newspaper science" (*Zeitungswissenschaft*), "war history" (*Kriegsgeschichte*), and "foreign studies" (*Auslandswissenschaften*), an all too obvious connection to the foreign and American Studies of the Nazi era represented by Schönemann would have sent the wrong political signal.¹⁸ The propagated formula of American Studies as a "cooperative experiment" therefore demonstrated a clear distancing from Schönemann's conception of an *integrated* "super"-discipline of American Studies that was meant to transcend traditional disciplinary borders. At the same time, "cooperation" was also a concession by the DGfA's philologists, who were led by Walther Fischer, to those, such as Arnold Bergstraesser, who wanted a close collaboration of all scholars of America from different disciplines. "Cooperation," however, did not mean "integration" of various approaches into a new type of discipline—*American Studies*—such as one could observe in the United States and as was repeatedly demanded by the more radical representatives of transdisciplinary collaboration.¹⁹

In the following paper I will therefore ask to what extent the debates of the 1920s about an integrated American Studies in Germany still lingered at the time of the founding of the DGfA in 1953? What were the concerns in the 1920s? How did German research on America develop in the era of the World Wars? How and under what circumstances did a transdisciplinary discipline of "American Studies" take shape under Na-

tional Socialism? How was this legacy handled after 1945? These questions can, of course, only be answered provisionally and would merit a more concerted research effort on the history of twentieth-century American Studies in Germany and Europe. In one of his last essays, the recently deceased historian of America Willi Paul Adams highlighted the need for a history of American Studies in Germany after 1945 and criticized the fact that until now, no article about the “coming to terms with the past” in West German American Studies has been published.²⁰ Any such investigation into the history of West German American Studies would have to address the lines of tradition stretching from National Socialist immigration research into the postwar era, or from colonial and “overseas” history (*Überseegeschichte*) to present day American history.²¹ Finally, it would be useful to have a systematic investigation into how the German foreign studies of the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s and American Studies and Area Studies (the regional studies of the 1950s and 1960s) are related to one another.

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At the time of the founding of the DGfA in 1953, German research on America could look back on more than half a century of intensive intellectual engagement with the United States. American Studies had reached their first high point before World War I as a result of America's rise to world power and the internationalization of intellectual communication.²² Distinguished scholars began to study the history and present state of American civilization. Max Weber inevitably came to discuss the United States when he investigated the connection between the spirit of capitalism and protestant ethics. The legal scholar Georg Jellinek compared American and French constitutional thought and attempted to trace the development of basic and human rights until the time of the American colonies. Werner Sombart asked himself the famous question why there was no socialism in the United States; the industrialist Ludwig Max Goldberger coined the phrase “land of endless opportunity” in a report on his travels. Erich Kaufmann completed his *Habilitation* on the use of force in U.S. foreign policy; and the historian Hermann Oncken, who taught in Chicago as a guest professor in 1905-06, reflected on the role of the United States in the international system, not without attempting to find similarities in the foreign policies of Germany and the United States. In 1904, the psychologist Hugo Münsterberg, teaching at Harvard, wrote the first German-language synthesis on the culture and society of the United States.²³

Given the boom of German research on America after the turn of the century, the entrance of the United States into the First World War had a sobering effect. The political usefulness of American Studies had proven to be very limited. Basic knowledge of the American political life was lacking in Germany, as Max Weber reflected self-critically in 1916.

"The fact that *no one* in Germany knows what an American election campaign is about and what results it has, in spite of all the examples from history, is an unprecedented scandal."²⁴ Their traditional cultural arrogance led the Germans to interpret American society as the "cultural grade zero" of a mechanized civilization "devoid of any spiritual qualities."²⁵ This feeling of cultural superiority was combined with a lack of understanding of the geopolitical realities of the North Atlantic region and of the political interests of the United States. President Woodrow Wilson's defense of the rights of neutral nations and his (quite one-sided) reaction to submarine warfare were dismissed as a "technical denial of necessities,"²⁶ although one should have considered that the submarine warfare, with its costs to American private property and above all else to American lives, represented a grave injury to the interests of the United States.²⁷ In addition, the illusory hope that German-Americans would have some influence on American politics during World War I turned out to be a false perception, because their primary loyalty no longer lay with their old homeland, but rather with the country that had accepted them as immigrants.²⁸

The ignorance about America (and other non-German cultures) that Max Weber and others complained about was fuel for the fire for Foreign Studies (*Auslandswissenschaft*) in Germany, which began to emancipate themselves from modern-language philology during World War I. In the last years of the Kaiserreich, under the influence of the political turmoil of the war, the political usefulness of foreign studies was intensely debated. Carl Becker, originally a professor of Middle Eastern Studies and a senior official in the Prussian Ministry of Education (as well as reform-oriented Minister of Education during the Weimar years), claimed in a 1917 memorandum that while the non-philological studies of foreign cultures had to date served only the training of experts for state and economy, the knowledge of foreign countries had now become an "indispensable component of national education" for a "world nation" (*Weltvolk*). With violent force, he argued, the First World War had revealed the importance of a sound international education and the necessity of strengthening foreign studies inside and outside the universities. According to Becker, foreign studies should not be limited to the domain of colonial civil servants, business people, and diplomats. Rather it was meant to create a people educated in world politics.²⁹

The reform of foreign studies was primarily directed against established modern-language philology, which the reformers regarded as too withdrawn and too theoretical. For the reformers, knowledge of other cultures was to be incorporated into civil education and to become politically applicable by helping to renew Germany's international standing. Pure philology seemed hardly suitable for this utterly political project.

The nationally conservative philosopher and educator Eduard Spranger, who had been involved in the discussions in the Prussian Office of Education, strongly supported the idea of freeing foreign studies from its philological constraints in order to make it politically applicable. To Spranger, foreign studies was the analysis of a culture, combining a historical, geographical, and sociological viewpoint. For Spranger, the aim of this interdisciplinary method was to uncover and systematically determine the characteristics and traits of the "soul" of foreign people.³⁰

During the 1920s, Wilhelm Dibelius, then professor of English language and literature from Bonn, became the driving force behind culturally and sociologically oriented English Studies.³¹ Like Spranger and Becker, he had been in government service during World War I. Based on his work in the war press office, he published his two-volume work entitled *England*, which served as a model for an analogous publication about France by Ernst Robert Curtius, a romance languages and literature scholar, and his co-author Bergstraesser, as well as for Friedrich Schönmann's synthesis on America, which appeared in 1932.³² In the introduction to his book, Dibelius wrote of the deeply disturbing impression that the German people had given "their best" in World War I in the "struggle against an enemy," whom they did not know, "although for decades the best teachers of English" had been educated in Germany. The German people did not have the faintest idea about the "tremendous political will of England," which pervaded "its entire state and cultural life." Therefore, according to Dibelius, "the Prussian school master," not the army had lost World War I because he had failed to implant "the political ability that would make Germany an international power in the generation after 1870."³³

As becomes clear in Dibelius' remarks, the military collapse of 1918 and the November revolution gave the development of foreign studies a different direction than was the case during the war. After 1919, academically based foreign studies were meant to pave the way for the revision of the Versailles Treaty: "In the desperate condition of our state, which is under multiple constraints, besides the strengthening and purification of our own national will, a fundamental knowledge of the foreign environment is of utmost importance," wrote the Berlin geographer Walther Vogel, who had been entrusted with the formation of a "committee for foreign studies at the Friedrich-Wilhelms University in Berlin."³⁴ Since it had "tipped the scales," America received much attention in the foreign studies discussion. "We faced the fact," recalled Walther Fischer in 1929, "that the participation of a country toward which we had only the friendliest of feelings had been the decisive factor in our defeat. [. . .] How had this been possible? Which political, economic, and psychological questions had forced the United States onto the side of our opponents? How

did it happen that the German public knew practically nothing about these things? It was within such a train of thought that the programmatic demand for American Studies in schools and colleges emerged. For the universities, one demanded special professorships or at least some lecturers for the newly established 'study of America' and for the schools, increased attention to American themes in English lessons."³⁵

These demands for an intensification of American Studies in the context of Weimar revisionism were echoed by Friedrich Schönemann in the title of his programmatic essay *Amerikastudien—Eine zeitgemässe Forderung* (American Studies—a Contemporary Demand, 1921).³⁶ Just as Dibelius would argue a short time later with reference to England, Schönemann saw the main reason for Germany's defeat in the First World War as a lack of political insight into American society: "We finally lost the World War because we were not familiar enough with the United States. We neither knew their people, nor did we grasp their culture, their natural power, nor their national strength. For this reason, we also underestimated their will to go to war."³⁷ Had the Germans examined the inner and outer conditions of American politics, Schönemann argued, they would neither have been surprised by the entrance of the United States into World War I, nor would they have fallen for Wilson's "infamous fourteen points." Unlike contemporary public opinion, which perceived Wilson's "betrayal" as the foreign policy counterpart to the "stab in the back" of the 1918-9 Revolution,³⁸ Schönemann argued that it was wrong to react to the defeat with emotional nationalism. Like the founders of the Berlin *Hochschule für Politik* (College of Politics), who took up the cause of political education with the goal of German "liberation and renewal,"³⁹ Schönemann called for the sustained study of foreign countries as a prerequisite for Germany's rebirth. For Schönemann, the political situation of the world required "soberness," not national zeal. Germans possessed the "best historical education in Europe," yet they were the "worst politicians of the world": A deep "knowledge of America can only make us more sensible and political. It would sober us and place us in the only mental state in which we could pursue politics."⁴⁰

Therefore, it was its character as a political instrument and "applied science" that made American Studies a "contemporary" demand to Schönemann. Like Spranger, Dibelius, and many other representatives of a culturally oriented, interdisciplinary approach to foreign studies, Schönemann pursued his American Studies agenda with a clear political target: "In order not to remain the political amateurs we were during the previous decade and who we are still today, we must cultivate applied historical studies more than ever."⁴¹ Furthermore, American Studies would combine the "research methods of history and literary studies with the sharp observation and interpretation of economics," it would

“productively unite study and experience,” and thus create “a truly stimulating field of study,” uncovering “the relationships of life, culture, and literature and leading to practical action on an intellectual basis.” Therefore, American Studies “would directly contribute to the rebuilding of Germany while destroying all possible prejudices against the United States, thereby leading the way to improving German diplomacy in Washington and in Germany itself. The proper knowledge of America would create a true interest in all things American and provide Germans with the proper internal orientation toward American society as well as toward German-Americans.”⁴²

The applied character of American Studies corresponded to its specific method—the amalgamating of several disciplines into a new, integrated field. Whereas literary studies had focused on an intrinsic interpretation of foreign-language texts, Schönemann attempted to analyze literature in its historical, social, economic, and cultural contexts, with the goal of a better understanding of the present. Therefore, Schönemann saw little advantage in studying modern American literature “without being fairly familiar with the present times in America. [. . .] More than other literatures of the world, American literature has the advantage of a fresh, political tone, which is completely in tune with the present. Everything is steeped in a self-confident and convincing republicanism.”⁴³ Placed into its socio-cultural context, American literature, “a true mirror of the lives and entire culture of the people,” would lead to an understanding of the characteristics of the American “soul of the people.” Whoever was familiar with American literature would come “close to the spirit of America.”⁴⁴

By making a plea for his approach to American Studies, Schönemann confronted two well-established traditions at the same time. First, like all specialists on America since the 1920s, he opposed the one-sided privileging of British English and English literature at German schools and universities. He wanted to restrain the intellectual snobbery of traditional English literary studies, which was clearly detectable even in “modern” works taking a cultural approach such as Dibelius’ *England*.⁴⁵ Secondly, Schönemann’s integrated approach to foreign studies was also directed against the epistemological premises of English Studies. As a result of the great “Americanism”-debate of the Weimar years, it had been understood at least among the experts that American literature should not be treated as a mere appendage of English literature.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, Schönemann’s comprehensive American Studies program met with vehement resistance not only from a few anglocentric traditionalists. Even Schönemann’s professional colleagues in the American Studies field maintained that an *integration* of literary historical, economical, and socio-intellectual approaches to the topic, as well as an expansion of American Studies into

a comprehensive cultural analysis of the USA, was impractical and intellectually unsound. It was argued that cross-disciplinary professorships, such as Schönemann was demanding for American Studies, would be purely receptive and not productive because those responsible for teaching and researching in such an integrated discipline would be forced to rely on second-hand knowledge for the variety of information they had to digest.⁴⁷

In light of these resistances it is not surprising that during the Weimar era American Studies led a marginal existence within English departments as well as in the social and historical sciences. Despite an intensification of German-American relations during the 1920s and despite a growing number of classes in American history and culture taught at the universities of Göttingen, Hamburg, Leipzig, and Berlin, where smaller centers of American Studies emerged, American Studies was not successfully institutionalized at German universities.⁴⁸ Only in Berlin, where Friedrich Schönemann began to establish an American section within the English Department around 1926, a slow institutionalization of American Studies became apparent in the middle of the 1920s. Because not everyone could agree on Schönemann's integrated study of America, his career as a university teacher was hindered rather than helped by his avid promotion of American Studies. That Schönemann so willingly jumped on the National Socialist bandwagon in 1933 also had to do with the fact that because of the deeply rooted disciplinary particularism at German universities, the "father of American studies" had not been successful with his reform concepts in the 1920s. Therefore, National Socialism offered him the first chance to put his plans into action.⁴⁹

The expansion of research on the United States in the Third Reich thus took place against the resistance of the established scholars of English. Schönemann's appointment to the first chair for American Literary and Cultural History was in no way welcomed by the representatives of modern languages and literature.⁵⁰ Furthermore, despite the growing interest of the Nazi authorities in foreign studies, the average number of relevant classes taught at German universities during the prewar years of the Third Reich remained constant. When Sigmund Skard took stock of American Studies in Germany during the 1950s he counted a total of 252 courses for the years 1933 and 1939, with an average of 22 classes per semester, which corresponded exactly to the average of the Weimar years. Only during the Second World War did a significant expansion of the class offerings relating to America occur: a total of 371 courses, which increased the average number per semester to 34.⁵¹ This considerable increase can be explained by the growing significance of the United States for Nazi Germany as well as by the ideologically, economically, and politically motivated expansion of foreign studies in several institutes

...serving “the needs of state and economy,” such as the German Foreign Institute in Stuttgart, the America Institute, and the Foreign Studies Faculty in Berlin.⁵² Because the American experts of the Third Reich increasingly provided “political advice” to the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Propaganda, the SS and the German Army, there was an even heavier concentration of scholarly American activities in Berlin during the war years than ever before. In 1939, 53% of all courses related to America were taught in Berlin, whereas it had been only 35% before 1933.⁵³

The expansion of American Studies in the Third Reich put into practice some of the demands that Schönemann and others had raised during the 1920s. In a politically charged speech at the *Deutsche Hochschule für Politik* (German College for Politics) in 1933, Schönemann welcomed the fact that this institution had established a department for foreign studies, stressing the point that “the assessment of America as the biggest and most powerful country in the world” would be one of the most pressing tasks of any foreign studies program.⁵⁴ In the Third Reich, however, the institutional implementation of American Studies did not lead to the intensification of scholarly research for which Schönemann had originally hoped. The price to be paid was emigration and expulsion, as well as an increasing alignment with the pedagogical aims of the Nazi state and an almost exclusive orientation toward applied research. As formulated by Karl-Heinz Pfeffer, one of the leading foreign-studies scholars of the Third Reich, the study of America became an integral element of foreign studies as “political reconnaissance (*Geländekunde*) [. . .], which had to do pioneering work” for the foreign, business, and cultural aims of Nazi Germany.⁵⁵ Because the future great German empire would “grow even more powerful as the decisive country in international relations,” as a programmatic essay from 1940 stated, the task of foreign studies had become “giving the emerging generation a consistent, intellectually sound, very concrete conception of the world.”⁵⁶

It is therefore only superficially ironic that the institutionalization of an autonomous American Studies did not take place in a phase of intensive German-American cooperation, such as the 1920s or 1950s, but rather in an era in which the political relations between the two countries had cooled considerably.⁵⁷ The expansion of American Studies after 1933 was carried out within the framework of a foreign studies paradigm that had subordinated itself to the political goals of the National Socialist state. Schönemann’s conception of the study of America as a form of interdisciplinary “integration” threatened the existence of Anglo-American modern-language philology, which he criticized as too withdrawn and not sufficiently application oriented. With Schönemann’s appointment to the Berlin chair for American Cultural and Literary History, only one faction within Germany’s American Studies had been successful, while the stron-

ger consideration of American themes in the lesson plans and textbooks for English, history, and geography lessons in the Third Reich met with the approval of all American Studies experts.⁵⁸ Therefore, the development of American Studies in the Third Reich was a highly selective and one-sided innovation process that was clearly subordinated to the political goals of National Socialism.

* * *

Because integrated American Studies as they had been promoted by Schönemann had proven to be compatible with the anti-western, anti-democratic goals of National Socialist ideology, it is not surprising that they were met with resentment inside German universities after 1945. Therefore, the privileging of American research by the occupying power, which, as Willi Paul Adams has written, was “envied by the established disciplines,” was not the only cause of the resistance to American Studies.⁵⁹ In his investigation of the perception of the Third Reich in the immediate postwar era, the Heidelberg historian Eike Wolgast has recently argued that the universities reacted to the experience of National Socialism by taking a deliberately apolitical stance.⁶⁰ Therefore, the criticism voiced at the founding of the America Institute in Munich whose “size and extravagant provisions,” provoked “suspicion[s] of injustice,”⁶¹ is not to be explained only by organizational problems, internal power struggles, and an anti-American reflex of the West German elite, but also by a general resentment of any political intervention in academic affairs. These reservations fed off of the experiences of the National Socialist era as well and were not exclusively directed against the American military government. The suspicion of “ulterior political motives” was part of the historical baggage that American Studies carried with it because of its institutionalization under National Socialism, even though the occupying power fostered American research in the interest of a diametrically opposed political objective.

In light of this dual historical background one can begin to understand the meaning of the compromise formula of American Studies as a “cooperative attempt,” which was proposed by Arnold Bergstraesser at the founding conference of the DGfA in 1953. Bergstraesser defended the gains that American Studies had made in the 1920s and 1930s under the auspices of the foreign studies paradigm and argued against a return to a purely philological way of studying American society. He even defended the cultural-sociological approach to foreign studies of the interwar period against critical objections which they had attracted because of their involvement with National Socialism. For Bergstraesser, American Studies was necessary as a “cultural analysis of countries” because the encounter with foreign cultures had intellectually, economically, socially, and politically taken on unprecedented levels of importance. Furthermore, the role of the US as the politically, economically, and technologi-

cally leading country of the Western world made it imperative to study the impact of American civilization. In order to adequately assess America, he asked for a methodologically innovative approach in the shape of a "cooperative attempt of various disciplines." That comparable attempts had fallen on fertile ground during the Third Reich was not a valid objection for Bergstraesser. Under National Socialism, "intellectually, politically, and ethically wrong and corrupting conclusions had been drawn" from accurate knowledge of the "actual relations of the world."⁶²

As Bergstraesser's programmatic speech at the founding congress of the DGfA reveals, the interwar debates over the epistemological premises of an integrated, transdisciplinary, and culturally oriented American Studies were very much present in the minds of the founders. Whereas Walther Fischer took a critical stance, fearing that the intensification of American Studies could come at the expense of modern language philology,⁶³ Bergstraesser attempted to take these reservations into consideration by distancing himself from the integrated synthesis called for by Schönemann since 1921. He therefore rejected the idea of intervening in the traditional organization of the disciplines. On the other hand, Bergstraesser argued that individual disciplines should show "greater flexibility in receiving ideas and actively seeking out ideas from other disciplines" and strive for interdisciplinary collaboration.⁶⁴ Therefore, Bergstraesser's conception opened a new perspective for interdisciplinary cooperation in American research, while rejecting a synthetic merger of different disciplines in the form of regional studies. Bergstraesser pleaded for *interdisciplinary* American research, not for a new *integration* of disciplines. The latter had been promoted by Schönemann, who could no longer prevail due to his prominent role in the Third Reich, although one could argue that his concept of integrated American Studies was probably closer to the *American Studies* as they were favored by HICOG and his American colleagues than by the philologically aligned *Amerikanistik*⁶⁵ that Walther Fischer defended.

Recently, interdisciplinary regional studies have met with increasing skepticism in Germany. In its recommendations for the structural planning for the Berlin universities on May 12, 2000, the German National Science Board (*Wissenschaftsrat*) criticized the regional approach, because all scholarship should approach its subject from a disciplinary point of view and categories such as "area" and "region" stand in no relation to scientific disciplines, methods, or theory formation in the relevant subjects.⁶⁶ As we have seen, the reservations of the *Wissenschaftsrat* have a long prehistory. Comparable arguments were advanced against American Studies in the 1920s and 1950s, particularly by the representatives of modern-language philology. Nevertheless, there has been noteworthy progress since the 1950s, even though the DGfA, dominated by philolo-

gists, has addressed the issue of theoretical and methodological premises of interdisciplinary American Studies with some hesitancy.⁶⁷ During the 1960s and 1970s, American Studies were increasingly institutionalized. Of particular importance are the John F. Kennedy Institute für Nordamerikastudien (John F. Kennedy Institute for North American Studies) in Berlin and the Zentrum für Nordamerikaforschung (Center for North American Research) in Frankfurt-am-Main, which have contributed substantially to the establishment of American Studies in Germany not only within the humanities and social sciences but also outside of academia. At heart, both institutes represent a realization of Arnold Bergstraesser's plans. In the area of teaching, the situation has also substantially improved since 1953 because disciplinary limits are less apparent in education than in research. Today integrated *American Studies* programs, modeled after American and international programs, exist in Bonn/Cologne, Berlin, and Munich. Erlangen and Frankfurt offer majors in North American Studies, and an "Atlantic Studies" program exists in Erfurt. Furthermore, there are concrete plans in Heidelberg to integrate American Studies more strongly into research and teaching in interdisciplinary ways. In light of this success, the fifty-year anniversary of the DGfA offers an occasion to reflect once again about the meaning and scope of interdisciplinary cooperation in the field of American Studies. In this sense, Arnold Bergstraesser's programmatic thoughts at the DGfA founding conference in 1953 still represent an important point of departure.

Translated by Janel B. Galvanek and Richard F. Wetzell.

Notes

¹ I would like to thank Astrid Eckert, Egbert Klautke, Axel Schildt, and Richard Wetzell for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

² Walther Fischer, "Zur Einführung," *Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien* 1 (1956): 5.

³ Gisela Strunz, *American Studies oder Amerikanistik? Die deutsche Amerikawissenschaft und die Hoffnung auf Erneuerung der Hochschulen und der politischen Kultur nach 1945* (Opladen, 1999), 233f.

⁴ See Wilhelm Bleek, *Geschichte der Politikwissenschaft in Deutschland* (München, 2001) 263f.; Hubertus Buchstein, "Wissenschaft von der Politik, Auslandswissenschaft, Political Science, Politologie: Die Berliner Tradition der Politikwissenschaft von der Weimarer Republik bis zur Bundesrepublik" in *Schulen der deutschen Politikwissenschaft*, ed. Wilhelm Bleek and Hans J. Lietzmann, (Opladen, 1999), 183–211.

⁵ See Peter Schöttler, ed. *Geschichte als Legitimationswissenschaft 1918–1945* (Frankfurt am Main, 1997); Winfried Schulze and Otto Gerhard Oexle, eds. *Deutsche Historiker im Nationalsozialismus* (Frankfurt am Main, 1999); Johannes Weyer, *Westdeutsche Soziologie 1945–1960: Deutsche Kontinuitäten und nordamerikanischer Einfluß* (Berlin, 1984). On the problem of "coming to terms with the past" in American literary studies, see Hans-Peter Wagner, "Stepping out of Hitler's Shadow to Embrace Uncle Sam: Notes toward a History of American Literary

Studies in West Germany," in *As Others Read Us: International Perspectives on American Literature*, ed. Huck Gutman, (Amherst, Mass.: 1991), 96–113.

⁶ Kuhn, born 1899, emigrated to the United States in 1937, after he was denounced as an anti-Nazi when he was traveling abroad, see *International Biographical Dictionary for Central European Emigrés*, vol. II, Part 1: A–K, The Arts, Sciences, and Literature (München u.a., 1983), 672.

⁷ Hans Maier, "In Memoriam Arnold Bergstraesser," *Zeitschrift für Politik*, 11 (1964): 97–99; Claus-Dieter Krohn, "Der Fall Bergstraesser in Amerika," *Exilforschung* 4 (1986): 254–275; Horst Schmitt, "Die Freiburger Schule 1954–1970. Politikwissenschaft in 'Sorge um den deutschen Staat'" in *Schulen der deutschen Politikwissenschaft*, Bleek and Lietzmann, 213–244.

⁸ Horst Oppel, "Walther Fischer zum Gedächtnis," *Die Neueren Sprachen* 10 (1961): 143–145; for more detail on Fischer's biography, see Philipp Gassert, *Amerika im Dritten Reich: Ideologie, Volksmeinung und Propaganda, 1933–1945* (Stuttgart, 1997), 127ff., the committee positions according to *DGfA-Mitteilungsblatt* 48 (2001): 3.

⁹ On Spira, see *Kürschners Deutscher Gelehrtenkalender*, 1961; Strunz, *American Studies*, 227.

¹⁰ Eduard Baumgarten, "Vom Sinn der Auslandskunde," *Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung* 10 (1934): 41–48, here 43.

¹¹ Hans Joas, *Pragmatismus und Gesellschaftstheorie* (Frankfurt am Main, 1992), 130ff.; the attempt of the National Socialist reinterpretation of pragmatism is especially apparent in an early essay, Eduard Baumgarten, "Die pragmatische und instrumentale Philosophie John Deweys," *Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung* 10 (1934): 236–248; see also Baumgarten, *Benjamin Franklin: Der Lehrmeister der amerikanischen Revolution* (Frankfurt am Main, 1936) (*Die geistigen Grundlagen des amerikanischen Gemeinwesens*, vol. 1); *Der Pragmatismus: R.W. Emerson, W. James, J. Dewey* (Frankfurt am Main, 1938) (dto., vol. 2).

¹² See Winfried Schulze, *Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft nach 1945* (München, 1989), 35, 127; on Zechlin (1896–1992), who made a name for himself as a media researcher in the postwar era, see *Deutsche Biographische Enzyklopädie* (hereafter quoted as *DBE*).

¹³ On Schönemann (1886–1956), see Earl R. Beck, "Friedrich Schönemann, German Americanist," *The Historian* 26 (1963/64): 381–404; Christian H. Freitag, "Die Entwicklung der Amerikastudien in Berlin bis 1945 unter Berücksichtigung der Amerikaarbeit staatlicher und privater Organisationen" (Phil. diss., Berlin, 1977), 102ff., 121ff., 172ff.; Gassert, *Amerika im Dritten Reich*, 119ff.

¹⁴ See *Völkischer Beobachter*, 17 July 1933, "Dem neuen amerikanischen Botschafter zum Gruß;" February 6, 1941, "Amerika und England: Geschichtliche kritische Vergleiche."

¹⁵ See Ernst Haiger, "Politikwissenschaft und Auslandswissenschaft im 'Dritten Reich': (Deutsche) Hochschule für Politik und Auslandswissenschaftliche Fakultät der Berliner Universität, 1940–1945," in *Kontinuitäten und Brüche in der deutschen Politikwissenschaft*, ed. Gerhard Göhler and Bodo Zeuner, (Baden-Baden, 1991), 94–136; Lutz Hachmeister, *Der Gegnerforscher: Die Karriere des SS-Führers Franz Alfred Six* (München, 1998), 117–143.

¹⁶ See Schönemann's report "Amerikanisten-Tagung in München" in *Die lebenden Fremdsprachen* 3 (1951): 217–218.

¹⁷ See the list of the 33 founding members, DGfA Archive, Mainz. I am indebted to Anke Hildebrandt of the University of Halle-Wittenberg who is working on a dissertation about the history of the DGfA and made this document available to me.

¹⁸ See, in passing, Hans Galinsky, "American Studies in Germany" in: *American Studies in Transition*, ed. Marshall W. Fishwick (Philadelphia, 1964), 232–252, here 241.

¹⁹ On this defining conflict of the 50-year history of the DGfA, see the articles by Hans Galinsky und Hans-Joachim Lang in *America Seen From the Outside. Topics, Models, and Achievements of American Studies in the Federal Republic of Germany*, eds. Brigitte Georgi-Findlay and Heinz Ickstadt, (Berlin, 1990).

²⁰ Willi Paul Adams, "Amerikastudien in der Bundesrepublik," in *Die USA und Deutschland im Zeitalter des Kalten Krieges, 1945–1990. Ein Handbuch*, ed. Detlef Junker u.a., (Stuttgart/München, 2001), vol. 2, 451–465, here 452.

²¹ This continuity was prominently embodied by Heinz Kloss, who was a researcher at the German International Institute (Deutsches Auslands-Institut) in Stuttgart and who completed his work started in the Third Reich with the publication of *Atlas der im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert entstandenen Siedlungen in den USA* (Marburg, 1975); see Gassert, *Amerika im Dritten Reich*, 128ff.; Cornelia Wilhelm, *Bewegung oder Verein? Nationalsozialistische Volkstumspolitik in den USA* (Stuttgart: 1998), 152–157.

²² On academic exchange, see Bernhard vom Brocke, "Der deutsch-amerikanische Professoren-austausch," *Zeitschrift für Kulturaustausch* 31 (1981): 128–182; Eckhardt Fuchs, "Räume und Mechanismen der internationalen Wissenschaftskommunikation und Ideenzirkulation vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg," *Internationales Archiv für Sozialgeschichte der deutschen Literatur* 27 (2002): 122–140; on the study of the USA, see Willi Paul Adams, "Die Geschichte Nordamerikas in Berlin," in *Geschichtswissenschaft in Berlin im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert: Persönlichkeiten und Institutionen*, ed. Reimer Hansen and Wolfgang Ribbe, (Berlin, 1992), 595–631, here 612ff.

²³ Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, 9th ed. (Tübingen, 1988), 31ff.; Georg Jellinek, *Ausgewählte Schriften und Reden*, vol. 2 (Berlin, 1911), 384ff.; Jellinek, *Die Erklärung der Menschen und Bürgerrechte: Ein Beitrag zur modernen Verfassungsgeschichte* (Leipzig: 1895); Ludwig Max Goldberger, *Das Land der unbegrenzten Möglichkeiten: Beobachtungen über das Wirtschaftsleben der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika* (Leipzig, 1903); Werner Sombart, *Warum gibt es in den Vereinigten Staaten keinen Sozialismus?* (Tübingen, 1906); Erich Kaufmann, *Die Auswärtige Gewalt und Kolonialgewalt in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika: Eine rechtsvergleichende Studie über die Grundlagen des amerikanischen und deutschen Verfassungsrechts* (Leipzig, 1908); Herrmann Oncken, "Amerika und die großen Mächte," in *Studien und Versuche zur neueren Geschichte: F Schr. für Max Lenz*, (Berlin, 1910), 421–480; Hugo Münsterberg, *Die Amerikaner*, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1904).

²⁴ In a letter to Friedrich Naumann dated February 7, 1916: Max Weber, *Gesammelte Politische Schriften* (München, 1921), 461 (original emphasis).

²⁵ Ulrich Ott, *Amerika ist anders: Studien zum Amerika-Bild in deutschen Reiseberichten des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Frankfurt am Main: 1991), 65ff., 94ff.

²⁶ Peter Berg, *Deutschland und Amerika, 1918–1929: Über das deutsche Amerikabild der zwanziger Jahre* (Lübeck/Hamburg, 1929), 10.

²⁷ Reinhard R. Doerries, *Imperial Challenge: Ambassador Count Bernstorff und German-American Relations, 1908–1917* (Chapel Hill/London, 1989), 210ff.

²⁸ As a characteristic example, see Erich Brandenburg, "Die Vereinigten Staaten und Europa," *Deutsche Rundschau* 172, July–September 1917, 21–45, 175–200; see also Torsten Oppelland, *Reichstag und Außenpolitik im Ersten Weltkrieg: Die deutschen Parteien und die Politik der USA, 1914–1918* (Düsseldorf, 1995), 52ff.

²⁹ "Die Denkschrift des preußischen Kultusministeriums über die Förderung der Auslandsstudien," *Internationale Monatschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik* 11, Issue 5, February 1917, 513–531, quotes on 514, 517; see also the parliamentary discussion about the memorandum: "Die Auslandsstudien im preußischen Landtag," in *ibid.*, Issue 7, April 1, 1917, 770–819; on Carl Becker (1876–1933), the founder of the study of Islam in Germany, who in 1921 and from 1925 to 1930 acted as non-party Prussian Minister of Education, see DBE.

³⁰ Eduard Spranger, "Denkschrift über die Einrichtung der Auslandsstudien an den deutschen Universitäten," *Internationale Monatschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik* 11, Issue 9, 1 June 1917, 1025–1063; see Sigmund Skard, *American Studies in Europe: Their History and Present Organization*, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, 1958), I:259. On Spranger (1882–1963), see DBE; on a discussion on the psychology of the masses, see Christian Jansen, "'Deutsches Wesen', 'deutsche Seele', 'deutscher Geist': Der Volkscharakter als nationales Identifikationsmuster im Gelehrtenmilieu," in *Transformationen des Wir-Gefühls. Studien zum nationalen Habitus*,

eds. Reinhard Blomert, Helmut Kuzmics, and Annette Treibel, (Frankfurt am Main, 1993), 199–278.

³¹ On Dibelius (1876-1931), see DBE; Thomas Finkenstaedt, *Kleine Geschichte der Anglistik in Deutschland* (Darmstadt, 1983), 141ff.

³² Ernst Robert Curtius and Arnold Bergstraesser, *Frankreich*, 2 vols. (Berlin/Leipzig, 1930); Friedrich Schönemann, *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika*, 2 vols. (Stuttgart/Berlin, 1932).

³³ Wilhelm Dibelius, *England*, 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1923), 1: xi.

³⁴ Walther Vogel, "Der Beirat für die Auslandsstudien an der Universität Berlin," *Weltpolitische Bildungsarbeit*, 4 (cited by Freitag, *Entwicklung*, 85).

³⁵ Walther Fischer, "Amerikakunde und die deutsche Schule," *Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung* 5 (1929): 54–64, here 56.

³⁶ Friedrich Schönemann, "Warum wir eine wissenschaftliche Amerikakunde brauchen," in his *Amerikakunde: Eine zeitgemäße Forderung* (Bremen, 1921), 3–14.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 3.

³⁸ Ernst Fraenkel, "Das deutsche Wilsonbild," in *Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien* 5 (1960): 66–120.

³⁹ According to Bleek in *Geschichte der Politikwissenschaft*, 200f., citing Theodor Heuss.

⁴⁰ Schönemann, *Amerikakunde*, 5, 13.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 7; Schönemann gives an example of such related historical studies with his essay *Die Kunst der Massenbeeinflussung in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika* (Stuttgart, 1924).

⁴² *Ibid.*, 12.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 9f.

⁴⁵ Out of the extensive literature that supports a heavier consideration of American literature, see Wilhelm Franke, "Amerika in der Schullektüre," *Neuphilologische Monatsschrift* 3 (1932): 354–363; on Dibelius's traditional English Studies viewpoint of the United States as a "new England," see Dibelius, *England*, vol. 1, 115.

⁴⁶ For example, see especially the efforts of Walther Fischer, *Geschichte der nordamerikanischen Literatur* (Leipzig, 1926); see also Heinrich Mutschmann, "Die Bedeutung des Amerikastudiums," *Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung* 5 (1929): 46–53; on the Americanism debate, see Gassert, *Amerika im Dritten Reich*, 46–77; Egbert Klautke, *Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten? Amerikanisierung in Deutschland und Frankreich (1900–1933)*, Stuttgart (forthcoming).

⁴⁷ Cited by Freitag, "Entwicklung," 115f.; see also Gunta Haenicke, *Zur Geschichte der Anglistik an deutschsprachigen Universitäten, 1850–1925* (Augsburg, 1979), 70–90.

⁴⁸ See Skard, *American Studies*, I, 264ff.; on the German-American cooperation efforts of the 1920s, see Manfred Berg, *Gustav Stresemann und die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika. Weltwirtschaftliche Verflechtung und Revisionspolitik 1907–1929* (Baden-Baden, 1990); Michael Wala, *Weimar und Amerika: Botschafter Friedrich von Prittwitz und Gaffron und die deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen von 1927 bis 1933* (Stuttgart, 2001).

⁴⁹ See Freitag, *Entwicklung*, 115; Beck "Friedrich Schönemann," 388ff.; Freitag refers to a former assistant of Schönemann; the resentments against an integrative American Studies are touched upon in Schönemann's programmatic essay, *Amerikakunde—Eine zeitgemäße Forderung*; Beck refers to information from Schönemann's wife as well as former colleagues; until 1936 Schönemann had only an assistant position.

⁵⁰ See Strunz, *American Studies*, 171f.

⁵¹ See Skard, *American Studies* I, 283f.

⁵² Herbert Scurla, "Die deutschen wissenschaftlichen Auslandsinstitute," *Zeitschrift für Politik* 32 (1942): 545–558, here 548.

⁵³ See Skard, *American Studies* I, 283

⁵⁴ Friedrich Schönemann, *Amerika und der Nationalsozialismus* (Berlin, 1934) (Schriften der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik), 5.

⁵⁵ Karl Heinz Pfeffer in *Nachrichten des Deutschen Auslandswissenschaftlichen Instituts*, 1942, cited in Findbuch Bundesarchiv Berlin, R 4902 (Bestand DAWI), 3; on Pfeffer (born 1906), who taught as a sociologist in Münster after World War I, *Kürschmers Deutscher Gelehrten-Kalender*, 1966.

⁵⁶ Bruno Kiesewetter, in *Der Beuth-Tisch*, 1940. Bundesarchiv Berlin, 4902 DAWI 48.

⁵⁷ Detlef Junker, *Kampf um die Weltmacht: Die USA und das Dritte Reich, 1933–1945* (Düsseldorf, 1988); Michaela Hönicke, "Das nationalsozialistische Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, 1933–1945," in *Deutschland und die USA im 20. Jahrhundert: Geschichte der politischen Beziehungen*, eds. Klaus Larres and Torsten Oppelland, (Darmstadt, 1997), 62–94.

⁵⁸ Not only was English planned as the first foreign language, but the treatment of American cultural themes was explicitly designated in the lesson plans since 1938; see Alwin Paul, "USA im Englisch-Unterricht unserer Oberstufe," *Die Neueren Sprachen* 46 (1938): 360–369; Paul Hartig, "Die Vereinigten Staaten im englischen Unterricht," *Neuphilologische Monatschrift* 13 (1942): 98–108; see also Reiner Lehberger, *Englischunterricht im Nationalsozialismus* (Tübingen, 1986), 160ff.

⁵⁹ Adams, "Amerikastudien," 454.

⁶⁰ Eike Wolgast, *Die Wahrnehmung des Dritten Reiches in der unmittelbaren Nachkriegszeit, 1945–1946* (Heidelberg, 2001), 325.

⁶¹ Ursula Huber, "Von der Amerika-Kunde zum Amerika-Institut der Universität München," in *Amerika-Institut 1949–1989: 40 Jahre Amerika-Studien an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. Eine Institutsgeschichte* (München, 1989), 1–39, here 27.

⁶² Arnold Bergstraesser, "Amerikastudien als Problem der Forschung und Lehre," *Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien* 1 (1956): 8–14; my emphasis.

⁶³ Walther Fischer, "Die Amerikanistik im gegenwärtigen Universitätslehrplan und in den Prüfungsordnungen der deutschen Länder," in *Neuphilologische Zeitschrift* 3 (1951): 412–417.

⁶⁴ Bergstraesser, "Amerikastudien," 12.

⁶⁵ On the concepts of the HICOG, see Strunz, *American Studies*, 181f.

⁶⁶ See www.wissenschaftsrat.de, Pressemitteilung 10/2000.

⁶⁷ In the first year's volumes of the *Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien* Bergstraesser's lively reflections about interdisciplinary cooperation were not continued except for a contribution from the American side, see Robert E. Spiller, "Value and Method in American Studies: The Literary versus the Social Approach," in *Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien* 4 (1959): 11–24; see also Adams, "Amerikastudien," 459; only in the 1970s did German Americanists begin to lead methodological and theoretical discussions, see for example Olaf Hansen, "American Studies. Zur Theorie und Geschichte der Disziplin," in *Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien* 18 (1973): 130–172; "Amerikastudien. Theorie, Geschichte, interpretatorische Praxis," eds. Martin Christadler and Günter H. Lenz, *Amerikastudien*, special issue 1977; Günter Moltmann, "The 'Deutsche Gesellschaft für Amerikastudien' and Interdisciplinary Cooperation," in *America Seen From the Outside*, eds. Georgi-Findlay and Ikstadt, 119–133.

AMERICAN HISTORY IN GERMANY: THE VIEW OF THE PRACTITIONERS

Norbert Finzsch, Hans-Jürgen Grabbe, Detlef Junker, and
Ursula Lehmkuhl interviewed by Astrid M. Eckert

In spring 2002, the *GHI Bulletin* featured an interview article with leading American scholars on the practice of German history in the United States. This article takes up the question in reverse and asks four leading German scholars of American history to share their thoughts on the state of their field in Germany. GHI Research Fellow Astrid M. Eckert interviewed Norbert Finzsch, Hans-Jürgen Grabbe, Detlef Junker, and Ursula Lehmkuhl separately last fall.

Norbert Finzsch teaches North American history at the University of Cologne, where he is the director of the Anglo-American Institute, the largest institute of this kind in Germany. He previously taught at the University of Hamburg (1992–2001) and the University of California at Berkeley (1999–2000). His interests in North American history are mainly focused on the social history of the United States in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, gender history, and African-American history. His current research projects deal with the history of the Black Panther Party, African-American nationalism, and the development of biological warfare in eighteenth-century North America.

Hans-Jürgen Grabbe holds the chair for British and American Studies at the Martin-Luther-University Halle. Prior to his appointment in Halle, he taught American history at the University of Kassel and the University of Oldenburg. He is a former President of the German Association for American Studies (*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Amerikastudien*, 1996–1999) and the founding director of the Center for USA Studies at Leucorea Foundation in Wittenberg (1995–1999). He currently serves as the German representative on the board of the European Association for American Studies. His interests focus on German-American relations and transatlantic migration. He is currently working on a general history of German-American relations from the seventeenth century to the present.

Detlef Junker is the Curt-Engelhorn Professor for American history at Heidelberg University and is currently establishing the Heidelberg Center for American Studies (*Heidelberger Amerikazentrum*). He is the founder of the Schurman Library for American History at Heidelberg's history department (1986) and from 1994 to 1999 he was the director of the German Historical Institute in Washington, D. C. His main fields of research are U.S. foreign policy, German-American relations, and, most

recently, U.S. identity and the politics of memory.¹ The translation of his handbook, *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1990: A Handbook*,² is currently being completed. His next project is to write a history of American-German relations from 1871 to 1990.

Ursula Lehmkuhl is professor for North American history at the John F. Kennedy Institute for North American Studies at the Free University of Berlin. The Kennedy Institute is the largest interdisciplinary center for American Studies in Europe. She has previously taught at the universities of Erfurt, Bremen, Bochum, and Konstanz.³ Her fields of interest in North American history are twentieth-century international history, American-Canadian relations, Anglo-American relations, and the cultural history of the Atlantic World in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Her current research project is entitled “Constructing Uncle Sam” and aims at explaining the rapid and thorough change in the Anglo-American relationship from hostility to friendship during the nineteenth century.

1. AND HOW DID YOU GET INVOLVED?— BIOGRAPHICAL REASONS FOR THE STUDY OF NORTH AMERICAN HISTORY

- *What drew you to studying and teaching North American history? Why did you turn to American instead of German (or any other European) history?*

Finzsch: When I grew up as a kid in Cologne during the 50s and 60s, the United States was very much the one nation I looked upon as our guiding nation, the big brother taking care of West Germany. I remember especially the day President Kennedy was shot. I was twelve years old, and it was a deeply felt shock. Only a couple of years later, when I was a teenager, America got entangled in the Vietnam War. In my perception, those were two contradicting developments, and therefore I didn't really understand what to make of the U.S. When I started with my studies in Cologne in 1970, the first seminar I took was on North American history in order to solve that riddle, in order to see what was the secret behind being a great democratic country on the one hand and an aggressor in South East Asia on the other. This contradiction has stuck with me ever since. So, in order to answer your question: I was drawn into the study and teaching of American history because I wanted to solve the riddle of American democracy. Of course, studying American history was also a way of not dealing with Germany's past in the twentieth century, especially if your father, like mine, was a professional soldier in the Nazi Army. He was a noncommissioned officer but he joined the Army in 1935

and stayed on until 1945. He was someone who was deeply influenced by the ways the Nazis perceived the world. I had discussions about Nazi history up to my neck with my parents every Sunday over dinner for at least ten years. I was sick and tired of German history.

Grabbe: I think it was already in high school that I wanted to become a historian. For family reasons—we had so many connections with the United States through relatives, etc.—my interests in the U.S. developed at a very early age. I still remember packages coming from America in the early 1950s, and because of this relationship I wanted to become an exchange student. I applied for an American Field Service (AFS) scholarship, which I received in 1965/66. I took an advance placement U.S. history course at my American high school in Park Ridge, Illinois, and since that time it was clear to me that I would focus on history, on modern history in general, but with a particular emphasis on the United States.

Junker: It basically goes back to my experiences at the end of the Second World War and in postwar Germany. Being born in 1939, my very first experience with the United States was the terror bombardment of Hamburg in 1943. I lived 15 kilometers from the city center. One of my deepest memories is this red sky over Hamburg. And I asked my mother: “What is this?”— “These are the American and the English bombers.” The second experience was a lot more benign, and I remember it quite vividly. We belonged to the British zone of occupation, but somehow, an American detachment passed through our small town Quickborn. And I am not kidding, it is almost archetypical, there was an American negro, as it was said at the time, a very friendly man. For the first time in my life I had white bread with cheese and butter. This was a miracle! I had never tasted such a thing. And, of course, in 1945 and 1946, we had one hot soup a day sponsored by the Hoover Foundation, the “Chocolate Soup.” In 1948, on June 20, my birthday, we had the currency reform. My father and I went to a restaurant somewhere, a public place, and received these 40 Deutsch Marks. I asked him: “From where did we get this?”— “I think from the Americans,” he said. Later, I became politicized during the debate on German rearmament. Thus, from the very beginning, there was a genuine interest in the United States prompted by personal experiences. During my study at the university, it did not surface yet. I studied German history, and my first book was on the German Center Party and Hitler,⁴ the end of Weimar Republic—this was the thing to do at the time. The important crossroad of my life came in 1968. I became a *Wissenschaftlicher Assistent* (assistant professor) to the chair of Eberhard Jäckel in Stuttgart. I wanted to go back to journalism because I had been trained as a journalist. But Jäckel told me: “There is one option for you. If you would like to stay at the university, you had better make up your mind whether you would like to finish your *Habilitation*. You can either choose a different

century or different country [different from the dissertation]." And I said: "I choose the United States." So I applied for funding and received the Max Kade Fellowship. I crossed the Atlantic for the very first time on a ship called *Europa* and arrived in New York in August 1971. Since then I have lived in the U.S. for more than eight years. I became more and more interested in American history. My second book was on the *Unteilbarer Weltmarkt*.⁵ Upon my return to Germany, I passed my *Habilitation* at the University of Stuttgart. My *venia legendi* was for *Neuere Geschichte und Theorie der Geschichtswissenschaften* (Modern History and Theory of History/Historiography). I got my first professorship at Heidelberg in 1974 with this specification. But I turned more and more to American history. After a while, I spent 60 or 70 percent of my teaching on American history, and increasingly, my scholarly activity turned to U.S. history, too.

Lehmkuhl: I was drawn into the study and teaching of North American history by my academic teachers and mentors, above all by Gustav Schmidt. Since during my high school years we had covered the period of the Third Reich, the Holocaust, and German reconstruction after the Second World War extensively, during my university education I focused on the history of Germany's neighbors, especially France, the social and cultural history of the European enlightenment, and the international settings that influenced German political and social developments during the Cold War. Historians such as Winfried Schulze, Hans-Ulrich Gumbrecht, and Jörn Rüsen influenced the way I work as a historian as well as my academic career. Eventually, Gustav Schmidt asked me to participate in a research project on the North Atlantic Triangle, which also became the research perspective of my doctoral dissertation on Canada and the Colombo Plan.⁶ With this research project, I refocused my academic interests once again and got more and more attracted by political science theories in general and international relations in particular. It was again Gustav Schmidt who offered me a position as an "assistant professor" (*Wissenschaftlicher Assistent*) for international relations. As such I had to teach courses on American foreign policy, international organizations, European integration, regional and global conflicts, etc. I was very much intrigued by America's role in the postwar reconstruction process and the way Washington cooperated with other international actors, above all Great Britain. This became the subject of my second book, entitled *Pax Anglo-Americana*.⁷ In this book, I reconstruct the structural power basis of the Anglo-American relationship in the 1950s. I passed my *Habilitation* at the University of Bochum in Political Science in 1997. A year later I was offered the position of Full Professor for North American history at the University of Erfurt. With the decision to take a position in a history department with a special emphasis on North American history, I refo-

cused my research and teaching again, this time on nineteenth and twentieth-century American and Canadian history exclusively.

- *How would you summarize your own “socialization” as a historian of American history? Did you receive the major impulses in the United States or in West Germany?*

Finzsch: I was not lucky enough to go to the United States at an early stage. I graduated from Cologne University in 1976, and I had never been to an English speaking country before. The first time I ever went to England—both England and the United States—was in 1977 after I had passed my M.A. in order to prepare my Ph.D. So you can say I received my major impulses within the Federal Republic.

Grabbe: I received my first and important impulses already in my American high school, as I have explained. However, I never studied at an American university. I received my professional training from the scholars at the overseas history division of the history department in Hamburg. Looking back after so many years, I still rate my academic teacher Günter Moltmann very highly. I always fought with him when he was still alive, yet looking back I see that his mode of practicing history greatly influenced me.

Junker: I received the major influences in Germany, exclusively. I didn't have a particular mentor in American history but became interested myself. It was a kind of self-teaching later in life. I acquainted myself with the literature on the specific topic, and I found out—this was in 1970/71—that the archival material for the years 1940/41 was just being opened at that time. That is why I went to the United States and worked on the origins of the Second World War. My *Doktorvater* was Michael Freund (Kiel), and my *Habilitationsvater*, so to speak, was Eberhard Jäckel (Stuttgart). He was very much interested in international relations, but he is not a U.S. historian.

Lehmkuhl: I never studied North American history proper but I got involved by serendipity. As I mentioned above, I was asked to work as a Research Assistant in a project on the North Atlantic Triangle which after some detours eventually drew me into North American history.

2. THE PAST, PRESENT & FUTURE OF AMERICAN HISTORY IN GERMANY

Anniversaries are a moment for taking stock. When the John F. Kennedy Institute celebrated its 25th anniversary in 1988, members of the Institute reflected upon “America Seen From the Outside—Topics, Models, and

Achievements in the Federal Republic of Germany.”⁸ Similar questions are now being asked on the occasion of the upcoming 50th anniversary of the German Association for American Studies (*Deutsche Gesellschaft for Amerikastudien*, DGfA).

- *Looking back on the postwar practice of American history in Germany, what do you consider to be the major achievements of German historians doing American history? What are their contributions to the understanding of American history? Which books do you regard as the “landmarks” of German scholarship in American history?*

Finzsch: Let’s try to deal with one after the other. It would be much easier to point out the setbacks and the negative aspects in the study of American history by Germans than to name the highlights. Because, in my understanding, German historians doing American history have dealt far too much with history of German immigration. This has been a major point of interest for a lot of my colleagues over the last fifty years, especially if you look at the Hamburg school: Günther Moltmann and his students have done a lot of studies of German immigration. I think it did not help the development of American history in Germany that the majority of German historians dealt with German immigration. It would have been more helpful if German historians of the U.S. had dealt with things that had nothing to do with hyphenated “German-American” issues.

That leads me to the next part of the question. The best studies done so far in Germany are in early modern and colonial history. There are some original contributions to our understanding of American history in the eighteenth century. To name a few names, Hermann Wellenreuther in Göttingen is the first to come to mind. The first volume of his American history in the early modern period is an outstanding example of what German scholars can achieve in American history because that is something you would not find on the American market. It is written from a European perspective, it is written with a transatlantic perspective, and that makes it unique even in comparison to good handbooks that have been written by American authors.⁹ On the other hand, there are some remarkable studies of twentieth-century American history done by younger students of American history, like Olaf Stieglitz,¹⁰ who have dealt with American problems proper—leaving out the German part. It is my understanding that recently there are more and more students who write their Ph.D. theses on original American topics. This is *not* supposed to mean that I disregard German-American history. There are some remarkable things done in this area, for instance, the collection of letters by Wolfgang Helbich in Bochum is an outstanding example of how German-American history should and could be done.¹¹ But most of German mi-

gration history focusing on nineteenth-century immigration is not helping us to develop a—how should I phrase this?—a critical mass of American historians in the Federal Republic.

Grabbe: I don't want to mention particular works because then I would have to exclude others and might perhaps hurt somebody's feelings. But I would like to single out Jürgen Heideking's life work. I think that in scope and quality this is an *oeuvre* that we have not had before nor perhaps since. Lately the field has become quite diversified, and more and more younger scholars return from the United States with an American Ph.D. and a much larger exposure to American history than those who were basically German-trained ever received. The field is expanding because of this phenomenon. The topics studied and researched are also becoming more and more diverse, almost as diverse as in the United States. It is very much a generational question.

When talking about contributions to the understanding of American history, it depends on whether you are talking about contributions to American history as they are perceived in the United States, or whether you are talking about the perception of American history here in Germany. I would say that the monographs written since the 1960s in Germany have received attention by specialists here and there. Of course, it makes a great difference whether these works were written in English or in German, and it even makes a difference—when they have been written in English—whether or not they were published by an American university press. Only the combination of English language and an American publisher leads to a wider exposure and recognition in the United States, and the other works are for the specialist.

Junker: It's a bundle of questions and not easy to answer. In general, I would say that German historians have contributed to the knowledge of American history *in Germany*. The impact on the general audience in the United States, on the American market, is very hard to assess. We all know that scholars of American history—even scholars who are working in the field of international relations—hardly take notice of books written in foreign languages. I was very naive when I began my career. In 1975, I published my *Habilitation, Der unteilbare Weltmarkt*, and discussed funding options for a translation with Inter Nationes. They said "No, we don't publish books on the United States, only on Germany." At that time I could not find the money that I needed for a good translation. In retrospect, I think I should have borrowed some money for a translator. But at that time I thought all sophisticated and learned American historians, especially historians of American foreign relations, would read German. This was, of course, a misperception. So, coming back to the point in question: Unless your book is published in English, they would not notice. German historians have published on all major subjects: the Ameri-

can Revolution, the American Constitution, topics in the nineteenth century, like immigration or the American Civil War, on American foreign policy in the twentieth century, and on American-German relations. On the same topics, there is an abundance of American scholarship as well. You are always part of a broader endeavour. And I really don't know what impact in general the German historians have had on the general public. I would say that even the American historians are partly marginalized as far as the overall shaping of the consciousness about their own past in the United States is concerned.

I can't think of any landmark book by a German in the sense that it really had a big impact on the general public in the U.S. There are some books that have been noted by colleagues in a certain field. That depends on the specific field. That is logical because we are part of an international scientific community. I have recently discovered that a collection of essays that I co-edited is selling surprisingly well: *1968: The World Transformed*.¹² The book is part of a series edited by the German Historical Institute. In general, the Institute publishes two very successful book series, one in German (Steiner Verlag Stuttgart) and one in English (Cambridge University Press). Of the latter, the series on Total War deserves attention.¹³ But if "landmark" is meant to be a German book on the U.S. that has really shaped the American public—I don't know of any.

As to achievements, I note them in several fields: the American Revolution, the American Constitution (our colleagues Erich Angermann, Willi Paul Adams, Jürgen Heideking, Horst Dippel, and others), and recently, if you think about the two volumes published by Wellenreuther, in the prerevolutionary era as well. Then you have this range of scholars working on the nineteenth century (Willi Paul Adams, Hans-Jürgen Grabbe, Wolfgang Helbich, Jörg Nagler, and others). Once you get to the twentieth century, the amount of scholarship has grown significantly. I don't want to name everybody involved, but I would say the biggest contribution by German historians on the United States is in U.S. foreign policy, German-American relations, and what you might call the "Americanization of Europe" with a cultural approach. It is my impression that more than half of the productive historians are today engaged with the twentieth century, especially the younger scholars.

Lehmkuhl: These are difficult questions. To start with the achievements: I think it is uncontested that German scholars were very much involved in shaping the study of American history in the general field of German-American and European-American relations, especially immigration history or postwar diplomatic and cultural history. German and European scholars introduced a European perspective on American history because they used the European sources pertaining to their research subjects. Bringing in the "European" perspective especially enhanced re-

search on the history of the Cold War and on American-European political, social, and cultural relations.

With regard to specific contributions to the understanding of American history I would like to mention the research efforts in comparative history undertaken by German historians like Erich Angermann, Hartmut Lehmann, and not least the German-Historical Institute in Washington, whose publications have a strong comparative focus.

Thinking about "landmarks," the two volumes recently published by Hermann Wellenreuther come to mind.¹⁴ These two books offer a synthesis of the history of the colonial period. With regard to their level of analysis, the interpretive density, and the specific "Atlantic" perspective, they are a "landmark." They are written in German for a German audience, but in my opinion they deserve a translation. Then, of course, Willi Paul Adams' dissertation, published in German in 1973 and in an English translation in 1980, was without doubt a "landmark" that has to be mentioned.¹⁵

- *The traditional topics of American history as practiced in Germany have often been chosen from the periods of intense German-American contact: German (voluntary or involuntary) migration to the United States; the American occupation of Germany after the Second World War; Westernization/Americanization. One could argue that these German-American topics have by now been thoroughly, even exhaustively studied. At the same time, the end of the Cold War has dissolved the peculiar political climate in which American Studies in Germany have thrived for decades. Against this backdrop, how would you respond to the thesis that the scholarly study of American history in Germany is in a state of crisis?*

Finzsch: I don't think so, because, as I said earlier, there is a young generation of students doing completely different things. For instance, there is one study under way on the history of cotton. Very interesting topic. As far as I know no one has ever written anything that you could compare to a history of cotton. We also need studies that provide an equivalent to the existing studies in German history on the development of the *Bürgertum* (bourgeoisie). Not much has been done in that area. I think American history could profit from the input of scholars like Jürgen Kocka and others who have dealt with *Bürgertumstudien* in Germany. And you could transfer this area to the United States and see how *Bürgertum* as a notion but also as a class developed during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. So far no one has really dealt with that.

Grabbe: I don't think it is. First of all I could answer as I would in a *Proseminar* "Introduction to Modern History": Every generation creates its own history. So, even areas that you would consider overstudied can take new research, and that research will come. Secondly, I would answer

that we still lack wider research on the nineteenth century. Books on the nineteenth century are really few and far between, and some have been published in the 1950s and 1960s. The nineteenth century is difficult because there was no German nation state prior to 1871. But even the 1871–1900 period has not been studied extensively. I see a serious gap in scholarship regarding comparative research on modernization and economic development in the United States and the German Empire, the Bismarck Empire. We have had some work on the Civil War but it has tended to focus on Germans in the Civil War. Prior to the 1860s, we ought to look at the *Länder*, at Prussia, and other important German states of that period—no work has been done on Bavaria, for instance. We have the diplomatic studies of Günther Moltmann, but they are of 1960s and 1970s vintage.¹⁶ Our methodological approach has changed tremendously since that time. We now tend to integrate political, economic, social, and cultural history. And so I think that with this new awareness of state-of-the-art methodology, the nineteenth century is an interesting period. What holds for the nineteenth century is true for the eighteenth century, albeit to a lesser degree. The twentieth century, though, has been thoroughly studied. There, perhaps, we should move on to other topics. I would like to point out, however, that the focus on these particular periods that you have mentioned is understandable in a twentieth-century context where World War I led to World War II, and World War II led to the Cold War. I see a new situation since 1989, and I would combine this with the remark that I made before, that there is a new generation of historians who have no first-hand memory of the Cold War and therefore have no obsession with certain periods of German-American relations.

Junker: I don't believe it for a minute. On the contrary, the widening gap over the Atlantic and the widespread criticism of the U.S. in Germany and other parts of the world has increased the interest of German students in American history. I can see it in my current lecture course on German-American relations. I am desperately looking for a bigger lecture hall which I cannot find. No, no way, I don't think so, the opposite is true.

Lehmkuhl: I don't think so! On the contrary, since German historians are becoming more and more interested in international history, American history enters the field of German history in many respects. You find elements of U.S. history or references to U.S. history in the course offerings and research of scholars of German or European history. Topics stemming from North America are "intruding" on many historical sub-disciplines. To a certain extent this development is the historians' reaction to the globalization thesis. Especially the younger generation in the German history profession is trying to move away from an exclusively national approach by putting their research into an international or global

perspective. This trend towards international contextualization is especially prominent in historical sub-disciplines like media or film history, or environmental history. We are facing a move towards horizontal integration in the history profession. Various historical sub-disciplines on both sides of the Atlantic are converging because they are interested in the question how national, international, and global processes interact.

- *What are the themes of the twenty-first century? Where do you see the field going?*

Finzsch: Environmental history will be a very hot topic. I think Germans can contribute a lot to this area because—it may be a very arrogant way to put it—because I think ecological thinking is highly developed in Germany. In everyday life, people talk about ecological problems. Europe, as a densely populated area with, so-to-speak, less “nature” available for exploitation, is closer to the issue of ecological reform. And therefore I think with the changes in the climate that we are starting to feel in this country—more than I think anybody else in Europe—you cannot avoid looking at ecology as a scholarly problem, too. When did the exploitation of natural resources turn into something that was damaging the natural habitat of different species and of humans, for instance? The ecological consciousness influences the way history is written in this country.

In addition, postcolonial history will be important. And by postcolonial history I do not mean the history of the United States after the Early Republic. I mean postcolonial in the way Anne McClintock interprets postcolonialism;¹⁷ to examine how race, class, gender—the three major categories of American social history—tend to be intertwined in mediated categories or a mediated category after the demise of European colonialism in the 1950s and 1960s; how far that tends to shape the way twentieth-century foreign and internal policies have developed; how instead of a formal domination by colonial powers, Third World countries are increasingly dominated by financial influence, and how that financial influence translates into a cultural domination of a specific postcolonial culture. It is the bringing together of race, class, gender, and culture into what you could label a “cultural history of late capitalism.” So I think—and that is something that is being done in Great Britain more than in the United States or Germany—in the long run American historians as well as German historians writing American history will have to adopt the postcolonial school of McClintock and others. In general, I am very optimistic concerning the future of the field. Once we get rid of the hyphenated “German-American” topics I think it will be great.

Grabbe: I would be hard pressed to mention a topic genuine to German interest in American history. In keeping with my earlier point

that a new generation of true generalists, well-versed in all aspects of American history, is coming to the fore: these scholars will follow the trends that arise in the United States. That has been the case for quite a while in the study of literature. I do not see a critical mass of scholars of the U.S. in Germany to generate a trend. Among American historians there has been a lot of talk about public diplomacy, for instance, bringing in aspects of culture or merging cultural history with diplomatic history. I think sooner or later scholars will come back—if I may say that somewhat boldly—to my understanding that political history is mainly about questions of life and death. Cultural predilections and perceptions do play a role, but I think this research has been overdone.

Junker: First of all, there will be a continuation of what you might call cultural history. It has been institutionalized, and it is very near to the heart of the younger generation. It took them some time to establish their own identity. Thus, this will go on. I don't expect a revival of social history, though, as it was in the 1960s and 1970s. But what will certainly come is—and this has to do with international developments, globalization, terrorism, war—a revived interest in international relations and diplomatic history because this interconnected and globalized world cries out for this approach. For example, one of the most classic topics is war and peace. If we don't respond to the basic problems of our times—and war and peace is one—we will marginalize ourselves. Economic history is becoming more and more important: the problems of the world economy, globalization, and this kind of thing. By the way, I have the feeling that because race, class, and gender dominate the field in the United States so strongly, the American historical profession is already marginalizing itself as far as the general public is concerned. And I already see a revival of diplomatic history, and diplomatic historians themselves are trying to reshape this field. This will be a great concern for scholars and for students as well. That's my present impression.

Lehmkuhl: I think at the moment the field is moving towards addressing new methodological and theoretical questions and research perspectives, like the cultural approach to diplomatic history or emotional history. One field of future research will be studies addressing problems of cultural transfer, ways and means of cultural adaptation, of exporting specific ideas from one culture to another. This perspective adds and complements to a certain extent the comparative approach and the research tradition focusing on *Beziehungsgeschichte*, the history of relations between cultures. The history of transfers between cultures takes into account the willingness of a society to adopt ideas from other cultures or societies. The point is not to show how a hegemonic power is influencing another one but how, in the process of interaction, both sides receive impulses. To a certain extent, this approach can be related to questions

addressed by American cultural studies, for example in the borderland concept, where you also have the perspective of amalgamation replacing previous hierarchical concepts.

Research addressing the question of “Americanization” will be influenced and is already influenced by transfer analysis. In Germany, the conceptualization of “Americanization” as cultural transfer can be traced back to the research project on Westernization initiated by Anselm Doering-Manteuffel in Tübingen.¹⁸ He was trying to overcome the one-way street approach to the analysis of Americanization by asking how the sending society is also receiving elements from other cultures. He and his research team analyzed the numerous and multi-faceted interaction processes between Germany and the United States in the postwar period.

Then, interdisciplinarity will be crucial for defining the themes and research perspectives of the twenty-first century, and in this regard, German historians of American history will play a leading role. German historians—more than their American counterparts—try to integrate social-science approaches or approaches from literary and cultural studies into their framework of analysis. In the United States, historical research is still much more confined to the discipline and its methodology, except perhaps in sub-disciplines like media and film studies or in environmental history.

3. THE PECULIARITIES OF DOING AMERICAN HISTORY IN GERMANY

During the 1990s, the Organization of American Historians (OAH) and especially the editor of its *Journal of American History* (JAH), David Thelen, undertook major efforts to alert *American* Americanists to the study of American history abroad.¹⁹ The JAH opened its pages to various non-American perspectives on American history and established a review policy that aimed at getting American reviewers for books written by foreign authors.²⁰ It sponsors foreign-language book and article prizes. It seems that, more than once, American historians of U.S. history were surprised to find books that were “completely up-to-date in their scholarship, asking the same questions and citing the same books and articles as similar essays published in the United States.”²¹ They had thus come across a tendency among non-American Americanists to “go native” and make themselves indistinguishable from their American colleagues in their scholarly writings; a tendency proven by the effort to publish in English instead of one’s native language.

- *If the above observation is correct, why have German interpreters of American history? Why don’t we simply translate American authors?*

Finzsch: Well, the fact that you are trying to pass as an American, writing in English, doesn't mean you are losing your German perspective. I think you can try as hard as you wish, it will never be possible to do away with one's national culture even if Germans speak English fluently and have read all the American authors. It does not mean that they lose their background.

I am very grateful for the efforts undertaken by American scholars to internationalize American history. We will feel the impact of that policy only in the future, but I am sure it will have an impact on the development of the field in Germany. So, I think that is a very good and wise policy. I only wish we could do the same for German history because American history in Germany would benefit from the internationalization of German history as a whole. The efforts of the German Historical Institutes in that regard are not enough. The GHIs—I worked in one of them—lead a very, how would I phrase this?—they are islands, obvious islands, and people working there are privileged in many ways. The impact those institutes have on both the American and the German field are not reflected by the efforts taken by those institutes. The institutes do a lot more than what really trickles down to the level of everyday activity, both in the United States and Germany. Trying to rephrase it more critically, I'd say: The GHIs are a showcase, a very important showcase, but the impact they have could be greater.

Grabbe: Very good question, but first of all let us focus on the OAH. I have always been somewhat critical of their effort, not that it was made but how it was made. I deplore that the internationalization effort was not institutionalized, that the OAH did not approach, for instance, the German Historical Association or the German Association for American Studies. It was developed, rather, on a personal level. Americans chose Germans they thought could serve as a liaison to German scholarship. Generally speaking, the effort to make American scholars aware of research done abroad is a laudable one. It is also very difficult. Some years back and some time after the OAH initiative had been started, the *Journal of American History* printed a review that was supposedly about German textbooks on American history.²² It reviewed the *Fischer Taschenbuch* by Willi Paul Adams, Angermann's *Geschichte der Vereinigten Staaten im 20. Jahrhundert* and Guggisberg's *Geschichte der USA*.²³ All of these books were described to an American audience as textbooks of American history. They were then compared to the American textbooks, and, of course, did not pass the test. The reviewer apparently did not know, or did not draw attention to the fact, that all of these books were geared towards a general audience, and that they were most likely not to be used in a university environment; that we and our students read the original American scholarship.

There is a strong feeling that I have: What is our purpose as Germans in this country dealing with American history? I think our main task is to explain developments in the United States to our own nation, to our own students, and to the German public, if it were to listen. But if it will not listen, then we must ask ourselves: have we written the right books? Should we leave the interpretation of all things American to foreign correspondents, to journalists, or to some outsiders who then use such books as a vehicle for their anti-American feelings? That ties in with the question whether we should publish in English or in German. That is a real dilemma for the reasons that I touched upon a moment ago. Only an article or a monograph written in English will receive scholarly recognition. On the other hand, that book will be lost for most potential readers in this country. Although English is the first language taught in most German schools, I do not think that the level of comprehension even among university students is such that they—excepting Americanists—are likely to cope with a big English reading load.

Junker: Now you might be surprised, but I have always found this whole question totally irrelevant. We are part of an international scientific community, and there are common standards of scholarship. If you study, for example, the origins of the Second World War, all historians, irrespective of where they live, struggle with the same problem of objectivity, causality, and value judgements. What could be a special German contribution to that? Perhaps, in this case, a better understanding of German history because Germans have more intimate knowledge of that. But that does not mean, on the other hand, that a “native” American historian with language skills who works hard to see the world from a German point of view might not be able to come up to the knowledge and erudition of a German scholar. So, the whole thing about a German or an American perspective is irrelevant, and if you see this, then it is not a *qualité de faute* but a *faute de qualité*. What I am really flabbergasted about is that there are old epistemological problems involved in this question that have been with us for 500 years since the beginning of modern times, and nobody seems to be aware of this. I think the question is irrelevant.

Lehmkuhl: I think this question needs to be answered from two perspectives, a historical one and an academic one. Looking at the development of German history departments during the twentieth century, one can identify a correlation between the democratization policies of the U.S. in the 1950s and the establishment of chairs in North American history. Most of these chairs were established after 1945. German history professors were meant to be cultural brokers, transmitting the message of democracy and liberalism to German academia as well as to a non-academic audience. The establishment of a German tradition of North American history was part of this re-education and democratization pro-

cess after World War II. Since German historians of North American history are one of the strongest segments in the European Association of American Studies and since German universities are very much involved in establishing exchange programs and partnerships with Central and East European universities, historians of North American history are, to a certain extent, still involved in re-education and democratization processes. Hence my first answer to the question whether we need German interpreters of American history is yes, we need non-American Americanists as cultural brokers.

From an academic point of view, we need German or non-American interpreters of American history for epistemological reasons. America is different, and we need people who are able to recognize and discern these differences, to analyze and interpret them. A mere translation of American authors would not help in coming to terms with the experience of alterity that Europeans almost always feel when they are confronted with the peculiarities of American history or the "American character." And this would be my second answer: We need the German or European 'view' to understand U.S. history in order to overcome or to avoid misunderstandings.

- *If national perspectives have not altogether vanished, how does American history as practiced in Germany differ from its cousin "made in the U.S.?" Is there a "typical" German take on American history?*

Finzsch: What's typical? If you teach a seminar on, let's say, the 1950s or the 1960s, and you have students taking your seminar, the underlying assumption that you have to work against all the time is that Americans in a way are bad, are inherently bad and therefore, anything they do in terms of politics is perceived under the rubric of anti-Americanism. So, first of all we cannot rely, as most of our American colleagues can, on a deep inside knowledge of American culture and on the assumption that American national history is inherently good. We have to work against a totally different notion of the United States. And as you know, anti-Americanism in this country is something that comes from both the political right and the political left. I think in the 1980s, the two wings of anti-Americanism came together and formed a new combination. You have to be aware of the fact that both your students and maybe you yourself come with cultural baggage that implies that Germans are the *Kulturnation* and that is *Kultur* with a capital K; and Americans lack that quality of *Kultur* with a capital K. And therefore, we start from very different points even if we read the same literature, even if we speak the language, even if we have all the connections with American colleagues that we need. We come from a very different angle and therefore I think

it is important to reflect that position every time you write on American history.

Let me give you an example: We presented a panel at the *Historikertag* this year on violence in the 1960s.²⁴ And we got nasty reactions from people by email. Americans wrote to us: "Why don't you sweep in front of your own door? Why do you have to talk about *American* violence or violence in America when you are the main perpetrators of violence in the twentieth century?" I think that's totally correct. It's a fact that you cannot dispute that a lot of the violence that happened during the twentieth century emanated from this country. So, when doing a panel like that, usually I try to reflect on why I am doing it, why I write about violence in the United States; whether this has something to do with well-hidden feelings of cultural superiority or whether there is a value in a reflection on American violence that transcends this perhaps hidden agenda. Same thing when I write on African-American history. Very often I am critical of African-American organizations like the Black Panthers. Well, I am a white, middle-aged, middle-class, German guy writing about a radical African-American organization in the 1960s, and of course, I have to, in a way, reflect on that position every time I am writing. I have to ask myself whether, when I deal with a given source or with books that are written by people like Huey P. Newton or others, my perspective is free of bias. And most of the time, it is not. There is always a bias, and you have to come to terms with that bias and try to deal with it.

Grabbe: There are large differences between the two. This has to do, I think, with a question that is often overlooked: the general organization of German universities. I belong to a department of British and American studies with four full professorships and one associate professorship; five scholars are expected to cover Great Britain, Ireland, the British Empire and its successor nations, the United States—language, literature, culture, history, the political system. So, in other words, you are a generalist because here in Germany you are responsible for just about everything in your field, and you cannot allow yourself the luxury to say: My field is the New Deal, or twentieth-century history. When I speak of "my field," I mean United States or American history, and I mean *all of it* from Columbus to the present. And I think it is this situation that prevents the development of an academic situation here that is in any way comparable to the United States, where American history departments have a specialist for every 20 to 30 years or so of American history. Because of that you need not discuss the matter further. It ties in with another question that you raised: what are the chances of young Ph.D.'s, and will we get more positions? Given Germany's financial situation, the structure of German universities, and the decision makers in the academic councils

and the ministries of culture, it is quite clear that our universities and our departments will not expand. We have seen new positions in American history created here and there—the number has not really been significant—and there still will be the need everywhere for an expert in ancient history, one or two in the Middle Ages, one in early modern history, two or three in modern history, and all that you can expect is that we see an advertisement: “Modern history with special emphasis on . . .” And even if it were more strongly phrased, those in the selection committee will ask very simple questions: If we hire someone who has written a dissertation on an internal American topic, and a *Habilitation* also strictly within a U.S.-American context, will that person help to carry our load of teaching, examining, advising diploma and M.A. theses, or not? In other words, among the available candidates, they will be more likely to choose someone who has a strong record in German history as well, and brings in American history as an extra. I think that those who have built their careers exclusively on American themes will have a hard time finding permanent positions.

Lehmkuhl: I am not sure whether there is really a “typical” German take or twist on American history, because most German historians of American history are “Americanized.” They have received their undergraduate or graduate education in the U.S., they are organized in American historical organizations like the OAH, AHA, or SHAFR, and they compare themselves with their American peers when it comes to research and teaching. Only a few of the German historians of American history regularly attend the conferences of the German *Historikerverband*. Even fewer participate actively in the biannual meetings of the German historians by preparing panels or papers. There exists, however, a very active group of historians in the German Association of American Studies (DGfA) who once in a while also invites a German historian who is not a member of the DGfA and whose research and teaching do not focus exclusively on American history. But these are rare occasions, and we need more of them. For the future of U.S. history in Germany, the interchange and communication with the professional organizations of German historians or historians in Germany may become crucial. We should try to get a voice in the *Historikerverband*. The interchange, especially with the younger generation of German historians, would help to establish new (German?) research perspectives on North American history, and it would also help the younger generation of German historians of North American history to find jobs in German history departments.

- *The Americanist Ron Robin from the University of Haifa came to the conclusion that “we who study the American past from abroad are professionally marginal. [. . .] With few exceptions, most [U. S.] scholars of*

the American past would be hard pressed to name more than one book on American history written by an international scholar.”²⁵ What is your opinion on this rather pessimistic statement? Which books by German authors have made an impact on the study of North American History in the United States?

Finzsch: Well, I think it is a pessimistic statement, yes. But I would turn the question around and ask: do you know any American historian who is studying medieval German history and has written a book on medieval Cologne in the twelfth century? Do you know any of them? No, you probably don't.

If you leave aside the specific problems of German historiography dealing with the period 1933 to 1950, there are a few books written by Germans that Americans know, especially if you look at the colonial period. There are some books that have been translated or have been written in English in the first place. Dirk Hoerder's book on crowds,²⁶ for instance, was written in English. Willi Paul Adams has published in English, and his books are well known in the field.²⁷ There are other examples of Germans who have been translated or at least are being reviewed, and that is a way of dealing with the reception of international scholars in the U.S. as well. A book doesn't necessarily have to be translated in order to be noticed by American colleagues. It may suffice that it has been reviewed, and then people who are able to read German or whatever the language may be tend to acknowledge that there is literature on that specific problem written by an international scholar. But I must subscribe to the statement by Ron Robin. I think most American historians would be hard pressed to name a book that was written by an international scholar even in their own field. The problem is the way publishers deal with translations. My own dissertation, which came out in 1980,²⁸ was supposed to have been translated by the University of California Press. UC Press made an offer, but my German publishing house wouldn't have it. They were trying to sell the few copies they had in German, and they thought that a translation would hinder them in the sales of the book abroad. So they flatly denied me the right to sign a contract with UC Press. I think that is very common, at least in the early days. Translations usually mean that you can forget about the German edition.

Grabbe: If you turned the question around for a moment, and asked German historians, generalists, who hold chairs in, say, *Zeitgeschichte*, or *Neuere Geschichte* to name the five most significant English-language books by American historians, I don't know what would come out of that. So, you really can't blame these American historians. If a book is published in Israel it will have a print run of 50–100 copies, perhaps. It may

not even make its way into American libraries. We have again arrived at the language question. Books in French, in Italian, in Spanish won't be noticed much. So, in a way, Ron Robin is right, but I find this inevitable. Perhaps we could differentiate between book-length studies—where the situation will remain difficult because it is difficult to find a publisher even in Germany now—and articles. When we look at articles we find that Germans, too, submit their work to American journals, and hence, are recognized. I could name a number of examples: the *William & Mary Quarterly*, the *Journal of American History*, the *American Historical Review*, and *Diplomatic History*, where German scholarship has been printed, and hence has been recognized.

I am the German representative on the Board of the European Association for American Studies. Therefore I can say—and I think it is safe for me to say—that when we deplore the German situation we should look at Italy, France, Spain, Greece, Romania. There are only a few scholars in those countries who could be described as specialists in American history. There is little impact that these people can have. I see an impact coming from Great Britain for reasons that I need not explain, and also from Germany. Here, over the past twenty years or so, a fairly significant pool of scholars has developed. It is often deplored that the number of practitioners is small, but when I include those writing their doctoral dissertations I see perhaps some 90 people whose primary interest is American history, and perhaps another 100 or so who take *some* professional interest in American history. That is miniscule when you compare it to the numbers of the United States, but I don't think it gets us very far to compare the situation in the two countries.

Junker: I basically agree with Ron Robin's statement. The best you can hope for in regard to the American academic community is that you have some impact on other scholars in your field by being cited and all that. Of course, the prerequisite is the English translation of your work. If you look through American books even on American foreign policy, the publishers don't like any foreign-language titles in the bibliography. I have hundreds of books on foreign policy, and hardly anyone nowadays mentions foreign-language titles because it does not sell. A very open question for me at the moment is: Will our massive Cold-War handbook become a landmark on the American market?²⁹ It brought together 146 contributions from 132 contributors from both sides of the Atlantic. This is a completely new conception, it has never been done to cover all these five fields (politics, security, economics, culture, society). People have often talked about it, asked for it, but it has never been done. I hope, of course, that it will become a landmark, but I am not quite sure.

Lehmkuhl: Again, a hard question. How to measure "impact?" We could look at the citation index or evaluation reports. Since I wasn't able

to do this for this interview, I can only guess. And my guess would be that German authors who use a comparative approach or write on topics that are not exclusively American had more of an impact on the study of North American history in the U.S. than German or European authors of books focusing on a niche in the history of North America. To give an example: I think that the book "1968—The World Transformed," edited by one American and two German historians has had such an impact.³⁰ This book is definitely well known on both sides of the Atlantic. It is used for teaching the history of the 1960s in the U.S. and in Germany alike.

I would also like to point out two book series that might have had an impact on the United States. One is the *Publications of the German Historical Institute* series with Cambridge UP. The other is the series that is published by the Academic Council of the City of Krefeld with Berg Publishers.³¹ I think from the very first volume that Hartmut Lehmann published in cooperation with James Sheehan,³² the GHI series tackled issues related to Germany/Europe on the one hand, and the United States on the other hand by pinpointing interdependencies, processes of cultural transfer, and other topics of special relevance to both sides of the Atlantic. The same holds true for the publications of the conference proceedings of the tri-annual "Krefeld Historical Symposia." These symposia are organized in a comparative way. Methodologically, this approach has to be traced back to Erich Angermann, who published widely on questions of comparative history, among other places in the *GHI Bulletin*.³³ Angermann underlined the need to find so called "skeleton topics" in German and American history that can be analyzed in comparative perspective, thereby bringing to the fore commonalities and differences. Topics such as German and American constitutional thought,³⁴ Germany and the U.S. in the era of World War I,³⁵ reconstruction and *Wiederaufbau* in Germany and the United States,³⁶ German and American nationalism,³⁷ the visions of the future in Germany and the United States,³⁸ and Atlantic communications³⁹ have been covered so far. Like the Cambridge series of the GHI, these books are published in English. Using English is and remains a prerequisite for communicating with our American colleagues.

- *Where do you see the German practitioner of American history vis-à-vis the German historical profession? How do you assess the role of American history and its German practitioners in the German historical profession? Is the historian of North America fully integrated with his/her fields of interest, or is s/he "the odd one out?"*

Finzsch: The odd one out, I'd say. They are still marginal to a large extent. Part of this problem has to do with a lack of critical mass. There are just not enough professorships in American history, which I think has to do with the Cold War in a way. You don't study your friends, you study

your enemies. Every major university in Germany did have at least one or two professors in Eastern European history, Russian history, or the history of the Soviet bloc. And that was the result of the Cold War, of course, whereas American history was notoriously lacking, as are French history, English history, or Italian history for that matter. History in Germany tends to be national history—still, until today. With, let's say, nine full professors doing American history—I think that's about the figure—it just cannot influence the field in a sufficient way. For every historian doing American history, there are 30 or 40 who do German history. And I don't know how we can change this. We just lost further positions in American history. So, if there is reason for pessimism, it has to do with the way positions are assigned in the field. Another issue is the openings that we can offer to younger students: How can we attract good, young historians in the field of American history if there are just not enough positions to be filled? That is the question. There is no critical mass. With nine full professorships it is not there, especially if the colleagues that hold the chairs in American history are relatively young. And it is foreseeable that for the next 10 or 15 years not much will be happening.

Grabbe: The overall number of positions in American history is not remarkable. It is, however, even less remarkable when you consider the academic hierarchies at German universities and take into account that many of those positions are "C3," or the equivalent of an American associate professorship. And when you take into account further that under the German system an associate cannot be promoted to full but will always remain in that position. The positions of power in German academic councils, *Fachbereichsrat*, *Fakultätsrat*, etc.—you may deplore it, it is simply a fact—are the "C4" positions. Most of our universities do not have a single one of those C4 positions reserved more or less for American history—even Tübingen doesn't, Bochum doesn't—it is just Berlin, Cologne, Erfurt, Hamburg, Heidelberg, and Halle-Wittenberg. How can these people make a difference within the *Historikerverband*? There is an initiative from within the membership of the *Historikerverband* of improving the recognition of non-European history. I haven't been present at their recent meetings but one of my associates has, and she reported to me that they didn't talk about American history at all, and they didn't even welcome American historians because these overseas historians were interested in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Their fear was that the inclusion of—from their perspective—the many historians of U.S. history would mean that their interests and their focus would be ignored. There has often been talk of whether German historians of the United States should form their own organization. I have always advised against it and thought that we should remain—problematic though that may be occasionally—in the pool of the German Association for American Studies, a

multidisciplinary association, because thereby—with about 800 members—we have much more clout in questions regarding the presentation and representation of the United States at German universities.

Junker: I think it depends. It differs from university to university. Here in Heidelberg we are completely integrated into the history department. My colleagues and I wanted it this way from the very beginning. A German student studying history here can either take a *Hauptseminar* (graduate course) on Hitler or on Roosevelt; he can study the French Revolution or the American Revolution. It is up to the professors to attract students to come to their seminars. I have heard complaints from other colleagues that they feel a bit marginalized but it really differs from university to university. Of course, the historians of the U.S. have complained for 30 or 40 years about the lack of chairs in American history. It is still true that you have four or five times as many professors of Eastern European history than of North American history. On the other hand, the situation has improved slightly. The few chairs we have seem to be here to stay. So, it is no longer marginal but compared to the big body of scholarship that goes into German history, the American past is nonetheless still a side-show at German universities.

Lehmkuhl: This question leads us back to the point already mentioned above: the way German historians of North American history organize themselves professionally. For many German historians of North American history, the DGfA—an interdisciplinary organization with a strong focus on literature and cultural studies—is the main academic forum. Historians present their findings to an interdisciplinary academic community that is exclusively interested in North America. Historians do not communicate their research findings to their “German” peers enough. This is perhaps one reason why we are marginalized to a certain extent. I would plea for a re-integration into the professional organizations of historians in Germany. We should try to use both the *Historikerverband* and the annual meetings of the DGfA as forums to present “German” research on North American history. Only continuing academic communication with the historical profession in Germany will help to overcome professional marginalization, which almost always has repercussions on job opportunities for young scholars specializing in a marginalized field.

4. TEACHING AMERICAN HISTORY IN GERMANY

- *From my personal observations at the John F. Kennedy Institute for North American Studies at the Free University of Berlin, and from remarks by colleagues teaching elsewhere, it seems that the history of the United*

States remains a highly popular subject for German (under)graduates. Provided this observation is accurate, what, in your opinion, accounts for the popularity of American history in German universities? Why do German (under)graduates turn to the study of North American history?

Finzsch: Less and less for political reasons, like in my own case, and more and more because of the products of popular culture. I can see this in connection with the seminars I teach. I try to teach seminars that offer topics for papers, term papers, etc., dealing with American popular culture. I always find far more applicants for those topics than, let's say, diplomatic history, political history, social history, or economic history of the United States. It is nowadays almost impossible to find someone for a paper on economic history of the U.S. No one is interested. Whereas if you offer something on hip-hop, you can be sure to have at least twenty people willing to write a paper on hip-hop. I am advising two people who are writing on the "Riot Grrrls" and on hip-hop in the United States. It has become very fashionable. Other things come to mind as well. You can easily find someone who's willing to tackle a problem of minstrel shows. Whereas if you give them the minutes of the Abolition Societies that are dealing with racism, no one is really interested. The impact of popular culture in Europe these days is just tremendous. You can see this from the choice of seminars and the choice of subjects picked for papers written for seminars.

Grabbe: It is not easy to find a satisfactory answer to this question. When you look at the *Mitteilungsblatt der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Amerikastudien* (Newsletter of the German Associations for American Studies) and take notice of the U.S. history courses listed at German universities, the number is fairly low. Where would you say is that interest that you observed—if you exclude Berlin, Cologne, Munich, and a few other universities? I see a genuine interest in Germany in American culture. (Let's not open this Pandora's box about culture; I don't want to make a distinction between popular culture and other forms of culture, let's simply say "culture.") You can make the observation when you leave the field of history and go into literature that whenever American literature is offered, students tend to flock to American literature classes more than to English literature classes. And I think one reason for this is the attempt at interdisciplinary study in American Studies. This is recognized by the British Embassy, by the way, and they are pushing British Studies with all their might. Concerning the attractiveness of American history, I think generalizations are difficult because it is not taught everywhere.

In my department, I advise about 70 percent of our M.A. and diploma theses which means it is a pretty heavy load. Since student enrollment at this school is not what it would be in Western Germany or in Berlin, I still

survive. However, this is in the context of a British and American Studies department. It would be different in a history department. I held a position as professor of North American history in the history department of Oldenburg University. There I acted as advisor on two M.A. theses on U.S. history over a two-year period. I only stayed for two years, so I don't know what would have happened in the long run. I am perhaps not the right person to answer this question. You should ask someone who is affiliated with a history department.

Junker: A lot of us have been influenced by the American style of teaching history. We have learned to become more effective and accessible teachers: witty, informal—you start with an ice-breaker and you end with a soul-shaker. I think this makes a difference. Second, German students are not stupid. They know that the U.S. is the only remaining superpower in the world. They know that the fate of the world, of Europe, and of Germany is being shaped by what the American administration does or does not do. And of course, they are affected by American popular culture. They have this intimate relationship with American pop culture, so there is a genuine interest irrespective of whether they criticize the U.S. or not. You either have the U.S. as a *Schreckbild* or as a *Vorbild*. They know this, so there is a genuine interest. And nowadays I even see an increase of interest in the United States. Very simple.

Lehmkuhl: First of all, a comment on your observation that American history is “highly popular”: Maybe it is highly popular at centers like the Kennedy Institute, but if you look at “normal” history departments you will find a maximum of 30 or 40 students in a *Hauptseminar* (graduate seminar) on North American history. Whereas you have 80 to 100 students in a *Hauptseminar* on the Holocaust or related topics. So, there is a difference. Maybe it is popular but I doubt whether it is really “highly” popular.

Why do German undergraduates turn to the study of North American history? To answer this question I have to refer to my own experience at the University of Erfurt. As you know, the history department in Erfurt is organized according to the study of world regions. North America is one out of six regions that are represented by chairs. Besides, there is Latin America, East and West Asia, and Central and Eastern Europe. Students have to choose two world regions as a focus of their history major. As it turned out, the combination of European and North American history is the most popular one. From the perspective of teaching, this trend correlates with what I said in the context of German research in North American history. German-American or European-American topics are important. Students want to learn something about common problems or differences in the history of Germany and the United States. In this respect, I would say that American history is popular. Students re-

alize that many developments in contemporary European history cannot be understood properly without putting them in the context of European-American relations or the context of the Atlantic World. This is why Erfurt also offers an interdisciplinary M.A. Program in Atlantic Studies, including course offerings in Political Science, History, Literature, Linguistics, and Media Studies. With this program, the University of Erfurt tries to react to students' desire to learn something about the nation that shaped European history during the nineteenth and, above all, the twentieth century more than any other. Students in Erfurt are eager to learn something about the Cold War. They ask for courses in diplomatic history, for information on Israeli-American relations, or the East-West conflict in general; students want to learn something about the way the U.S. shaped our international system.

- *Do you think that the teaching of American History is adequately represented in German History Departments? Is it a well-established subject in the curriculum or does it still figure as an odd subdiscipline ("Orchideenfach")?*

Finzsch: It is underrepresented stemming from the fact that there are so few colleagues in American history. It is also underrepresented because we still tend to see history as national history instead of seeing it as supranational or international history. Of course, you will always find someone who is writing on the impact of the relationship between Dulles and Adenauer but that is firmly focusing on German history proper, and John Foster Dulles only comes in when he has a personal relationship with Adenauer. He is not a subject per se.

Grabbe: I would certainly say that it is underrepresented. Is it an *Orchideenfach*? That isn't true either. I recently talked to Peter Lösche (University of Göttingen) who is a political scientist with a special interest in the United States. And he said, looking at his field, that there has been a trend over the last decade or so that he described thus: There is hardly a scholar in Germany focusing exclusively on the American political system. When you take this into account, you will find that all the political science departments in Germany in one way or another teach the American constitution, the American system of government, but they do it in a comparative perspective. And the same is true of a variety of other subjects: music, geography. There is a tremendous interest in anthropology, for instance. When you look at it that way, you are able to satisfy your interest in America at German universities because of this phenomenon. Scholars whom we as specialists don't necessarily think of and whom we may not even know are simply there. Every now and then my attention is drawn to this, particularly when I have to prepare a report on American Studies activities at the University of Halle for the *Mitteilungsblatt*

(newsletter) of the GAAS. The questionnaire on which it is based asks to list “courses on American Studies in departments other than your own.” And you find that there are courses of that type, and by people whom you have never heard about.

Junker: It really depends. At the schools that you mentioned where American history is represented by a chair, there, of course, it is no longer an *Orchideenfach*. It is a vital part of the curriculum. The problem is that there are so many universities that do not have American history at all. At those schools, American history is not an *Orchideenfach*, there is not even an *Orchidee*, there is simply nothing. This is the problem. Gerhard Weinberg always likes to cite the comparison with North Carolina.⁴⁰ And I think it still holds true. We have more professorships for German history in North Carolina than you have chairs on U.S. history in the whole of Germany—even united Germany.

Lehmkuhl: Compared to East European history, North American history in Germany is an *Orchideenfach*. There are only eight chairs in North American history in German history departments; another four are part of social science departments; and another three are integrated in cultural studies or literature departments. In comparison, we have about 26 or 27 chairs in East European history in German history departments. So there is a clear misfit between the political and cultural importance of the United States and North America and the institutionalization of North American history as an academic discipline. The same is true for the history curriculum. Since it is still predominantly shaped by the exigencies of teacher education, the prerogative or even monopoly of the state governments with regard to the examination of future high school teachers and the definition of what they have to learn is reflected in the history curriculum. This explains to a certain extent the dominance of German history and medieval or early modern *Landesgeschichte* in German history departments. We are facing a sort of *Deutungsmacht* of the States Ministries for Education. Via this soft power, a certain, I would say more traditional, way of doing history is perpetuated, which may be one reason why it is so hard to establish an American or any other non-European focus in German history departments. And it may also explain why positions in North American history are perceived to be redundant as soon as financial constraints make it necessary to reduce the number of professorships in German history departments.

5. THE GERMAN ACADEMIC JOB MARKET FOR PRACTITIONERS OF AMERICAN HISTORY

- *At the Historikertag in Halle in September 2002, data on the general job situation of German historians at the level of the Habilitation were pre-*

sented. As expected, the market especially in contemporary history is highly competitive. However, scholars of Eastern European history and non-European history still seem to be in a relatively better position than their colleagues in German history.⁴¹ Are these results in sync with your own perceptions? What, in general, do you think about the job prospects for junior scholars on the academic market, i.e. those who wish to remain or become teachers and scholars of American history?

Finzsch: Well, if I look at the younger students of American history who are preparing a *Habilitation* right now, there are at least four at this institution. If you think of a major place like Erfurt or Berlin, I think there are at least as many as here in Cologne. And there are quite a number of *Privatdozenten* waiting for an opening. So, I am very pessimistic. I think that maybe not a whole generation but a substantial part of a scholarly generation will be sacrificed. They will not find a job in American history in Germany. As you probably know there are now a couple of younger colleagues who have found positions in the United States.

Grabbe: That is absolutely true but yet it is not as simple as that. When I sat on search committees as an assistant professor (*Wissenschaftlicher Assistent*) in Hamburg and we had openings in German history, the application numbers were far greater than the ones you have quoted from the *Historikertag*. 100 to 120 people, even when you took into account there were always those applying no matter what and whom you could discard right away, leaving still 50 more or less serious contenders. Nowadays the numbers are somewhat down but they are still fairly high. In our field, six to eight applicants is a fair number, and perhaps you could invite six people. Of those six perhaps four would deserve to be included in the short list of three. The ratio between applicants and successful candidates in our field is excellent. But the flipside of the coin is that a chance of being one of six contenders, and of making it to the short list of three comes once every two to three years at best. And that means that there are among the current *Privatdozenten* perhaps one or two who may not make it because of the age factor. All of our history departments currently have a fairly high age average but the way this is resolved is tragic for some because search committees will say: our age average is 55, or in some departments it is even 60. Will they consider someone who is 48 or 51, or will they choose someone who is 38 or 42? My observation is that they tend to go back 20 years. And by the way, the situation regarding positions in the history of Great Britain, France, or any other major foreign country is not dissimilar.

Junker: The situation is not bleak but extremely competitive. It is less competitive, though, than the job market for historians of contemporary German history. Statistically speaking, the historian of the American past

has a higher chance of finding a position than his or her colleagues studying twentieth-century Germany. The big problem from my perspective is the current economic crisis and the way the *Länder* in Germany will react to it; whether they will keep the existing chairs or not. This is a very open question. It is not necessary, but likely that we will run into an even deeper economic crisis that will lead to additional cuts by the government—then the situation might become desperate. But this is a worst-case scenario. Otherwise, I would say it is tough competition but you do have a fighting chance. You always take great risks if you start an academic career at a German university. Go back to Max Weber's *Wissenschaft als Beruf* where he adequately describes the hazards of an academic career. We still have the same hazards. Everybody should be aware that this academic career has an enormous amount of hazards. Even if you are a first-class historian—in the end, you need luck and connections as well.

Lehmkuhl: In certain respects, I think that the job prospects for junior scholars of German history are even worse. The job situation for junior scholars for American history is better insofar as the numerical relationship between positions at universities on the one hand and qualified junior scholars on the other is better than the respective figures in the field of German history. The latest numbers that were presented at *Historikertag* with regard to German history are frightening: there are 13 historians on the level of the *Habilitation* for one open position. In American history, it is less than half of this number. The figures are thus better for Americanists. However, you have to consider the fluctuation. At the moment the job market is very good for young scholars in American history. As you know we are undergoing a generational change. There are three schools right now in the process of hiring: Bochum, Tübingen, and Hamburg. Maybe next year Erfurt might be open again as well. If these positions are filled, however, then we will have a *Durststrecke* because the new jobholders will be relatively young. But then again, historians of American history always have the opportunity also to consider the American job market.

- *Do you as an academic teacher feel that you can encourage graduate students to try to make the study and teaching of American history their career?*

Finzsch: I don't! I don't! If they approach me about a Ph.D., I always tell them that it is a very risky business. I don't encourage them at all. I try to explain to them that there are very few positions that can be filled. And I always tell them to have at least a major publication in the area of German history. Within the old system that was easy. You would typically pass your Ph.D. in American history, and then the *Habilitation* would be in German history, or vice versa. That's how I dealt with the

problem myself. My second book was in German history;⁴² it was not in American history. Now with the *Habilitation* gone, it will be difficult. You don't have that safety net anymore that you used to have with the *Habilitation*, firmly establishing another area of expertise and research. And therefore, even if I, as a rule, support the new junior professorships, and the abolition of the *Habilitation*, it is now a very risky business because it tends to locate younger scholars within a field that they cannot leave anymore once they have settled. But I am certain that the junior professorships will become firmly established. I am not fighting for one in American history here, though, because it is Cologne's policy not to have junior professorships. Partly because the Ministry for Education and Research in Düsseldorf sells junior professorships by packets of ten positions. You cannot just open one junior professorship in one area. You have to buy a package of ten junior professorships if you want to make them available. And that is something you cannot do, especially if you have a shortage of professorships to begin with. Not only in history but all over a place, like Cologne. It is the policy of University of Cologne not to apply for the junior professorships that are financed by the Ministry.

Grabbe: Career here is the word that we need to define. Should I encourage only those who will make it to the position of university professor? Günter Moltmann, my teacher, reminded me at the dissertation stage when I spoke of a possible career: "We do not have the career of a university professor." It might change now with the introduction of the junior professorship. But in the traditional system there may be a hiatus after your *Wissenschaftliche Assistentenzeit*, you may be forced to leave the university, or you may have this career that is called a *Drittmittelexistenz* where you jump from one research grant to the next. That is not fun. But no, I would always encourage students to study American history and to build careers by really opening up to what German society has to offer in the radio and television stations, the print media, new media, in public administration, in the ever increasing bureaucracies of the European Union, and so on and so forth. It would surely help to have more experts on the United States in this country, whatever they may do eventually.

Junker: I basically gave the answer already. I would not say "encourage" but I would say: "You still have a sporting chance." When I talk to younger scholars about this topic, I try to be as realistic as possible. Then they have to make their decision. I would not say that I "encourage" them, but I give them a realistic assessment of the possible future—though we don't know the future.

Lehmkuhl: Generally, I am very hesitant and selective in encouraging graduate students to pursue an academic career. I think that only a few are really qualified in the sense of being at the same time intelligent, innovative, communicative, good teachers, and having the stamina to

stand the pressure that exists in the academic world. I think for almost all young graduates it is better to look for alternative job opportunities like in organizations, private corporations, adult education, etc.

- *For professional or personal reasons, not all of the younger scholars trained in American history will find their place on the German or the North American academic job market. Where do you see alternative professional fields for these young people? Or put another way: what's American history good for in life?*

Finzsch: Especially in Hamburg where I taught before 2001, students of American history would traditionally become journalists. I think that is also true for Cologne. I don't really know but as a rule, one could probably say the following for American history: that a lot of the students of American history tend to become journalists. And the Ph.D. is something that looks nice on your door and your business card, and it helps promote your career within a TV station or an academic press. But basically I think American history should be studied as one of several fields, not just by itself. It should be combined with a deep knowledge of international affairs in order to allow people, talented young people, to become journalists, join the diplomatic service, or any other areas. To really ask students to concentrate on American history proper is not good advice at the moment.

Junker: For many things! Journalism, politics, publishing, public relations, political parties, adult education—what have you. There they compete with Ph.D. or M.A.s from other fields but I think they have as good a chance, even a better chance, to get a job here than the others, especially if they have lived and studied in the United States for some time.

Lehmkuhl: Students of North American history generally have a good knowledge of political, economic, and cultural developments in the United States. They very often have studied abroad and are fluent in English; they usually have established personal contacts in the United States. All this will enhance their job opportunities in political organizations, journalism, adult education, museums, even in private corporations in human resources. Private companies very often ask for people who have a broad general knowledge, international experiences, and who read and write English.⁴³

Notes

¹ Detlef Junker, *The Manichean Trap: American Perceptions of the German Empire, 1871–1945*. With an introduction by Klaus Hildebrand and a comment by Paul W. Schroeder (Washington, D. C.: GHI, 1995, Occasional Papers, Nr. 12).

² *Die USA und Deutschland im Zeitalter des Kalten Krieges 1945–1990: Ein Handbuch*. Detlef Junker, ed., in cooperation with Philipp Gassert, Wilfried Mausbach, and David B. Morris, 2 vols. (Stuttgart: DVA, 2001).

³ Further information on the programs in North American history represented by these scholars can be found at: www.uni-koeln.de/phil-fak/histsem/anglo/—www.amerikanistik.uni-halle.de—www.schurman.uni-hd.de—www.fu-berlin.de/jfki/geschichte/

⁴ Detlef Junker, *Die Deutsche Zentrumspartei und Hitler 1932/33: Ein Beitrag zur Problematik des politischen Katholizismus in Deutschland* (Stuttgart: DVA, 1969).

⁵ Detlef Junker, *Der unteilbare Weltmarkt: Das ökonomische Interesse in der Außenpolitik der USA 1933–1941* (Stuttgart: Klett, 1975).

⁶ Ursula Lehmkuhl, *Kanadas Öffnung nach Asien: Der Colombo-Plan, das "New Commonwealth" und die Rekonstruktion des Sterlinggebietes, 1949–52* (Bochum: Universitätsverlag Dr. N. Brockmeyer, 1990).

⁷ Ursula Lehmkuhl, *Pax Anglo-Americana: Machtstrukturelle Grundlagen anglo-amerikanischer Asien- und Fernostpolitik in den 1950er Jahren* (München: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1999).

⁸ *America Seen From the Outside—Topics, Models, and Achievements in the Federal Republic of Germany*. Proceedings of a symposium held at the John F. Kennedy-Institut für Nordamerikastudien, December 1–4, 1988, ed. Brigitte Georgi-Findlay & Heinz Ickstadt (Berlin: JFKI, 1988).

⁹ Hermann Wellenreuther, *Niedergang und Aufstieg. Die Geschichte Nordamerikas vom Beginn der Besiedlung bis zum Ausgang des 17. Jahrhunderts*, vol. I (Münster: Lit, 2000). Wellenreuther, *Ausbildung und Neubildung. Die Geschichte Nordamerikas vom Ausgang des 17. Jahrhunderts bis zum Ausbruch der Amerikanischen Revolution 1775*, vol. II (Münster: Lit, 2001). The books are the first two volumes of the series *The History of North America from an Atlantic Perspective from its Beginnings to the Present*, edited by Norbert Finzsch, Ursula Lehmkuhl, and Hermann Wellenreuther.

¹⁰ Olaf Stieglitz, "100 Percent American Boys": *Disziplinierungsdiskurse und Ideologie im Civilian Conservation Corps, 1933–1942* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1999).

¹¹ Wolfgang Helbich, ed., *Briefe aus Amerika. Deutsche Auswanderer schreiben aus der Neuen Welt, 1830–1930* (München: Beck, 1988).

¹² Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert, and Detlef Junker, eds., *1968: The World Transformed* (New York: Cambridge UP, 1998).

¹³ The GHI's publications are listed at the end of the *Bulletin*. The latest book from the series on Total War is: Roger Chickering, Stig Foerster, eds., *The Shadows of Total War: Europe, East Asia, and the United States, 1919–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002).

¹⁴ See note 9.

¹⁵ Willi Paul Adams, *First American Constitutions: Republican Ideology and the Making of the State Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era*, trans. by Rita Kimber and Robert Kimber (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1993).

¹⁶ Günter Moltmann, *Atlantische Blockpolitik im 19. Jahrhundert: Die Vereinigten Staaten und der deutsche Liberalismus während der Revolution von 1848/49* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1973).

¹⁷ Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest* (New York: Routledge, 1995). See also Anne McClintock, Adamir Mufti, and Ella Shohat, eds., *Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation, and Postcolonial Perspectives* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).

¹⁸ Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, *Wie westlich sind die Deutschen? Amerikanisierung und Westernisierung im 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: V&R, 1999).

¹⁹ See, for example, David Thelen, "The Practice of American History," in *JAH* 81:3 (1994): 933–960. The article analyzes a survey conducted among the readers of the *JAH* on the

practice of American history. It pays special attention to the responses from abroad. The same volume of JAH contains articles by practitioners of American History outside the United States, reflecting on their subject and their "external" perspective. See also the special issue of *Reviews in American History* 14: 4 (1986) devoted exclusively to "The View from Abroad," here especially Willi Paul Adams, "Personal Reflections on the Conditions of Scholarship in West Germany," 557–568; Donna Merwick, "Being There': Some Theoretical Aspects of Writing History at a Distance," 487–500.

²⁰ Thelen explains the review policy in the appendix to his article: "Of Audiences, Borderlands, and Comparisons: Towards the Internationalization of American History," in *JAH* 79 (1992): 432–462, here 451–453.

²¹ James Henretta reviewing Jean Heffer and François Weil, eds., *Chantiers d'histoire américaine* (Paris: Belin, 1994), as quoted in François Weil, "Do American Historical Narratives Travel?" in Thomas Bender, ed., *Rethinking American History in a Global Age* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2001), 317–342, 331.

²² Dirk Philipsen, "Test the West: American History through the Lens of German Survey Texts," in *Journal of American History* 82:2 (September 1995): 651–657.

²³ Willi Paul Adams et al., *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika*, Fischer Weltgeschichte, Bd. 30, (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1977, rev. ed. 1991); Erich Angermann, *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika seit 1917*, dtv-Weltgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts (München: dtv, 1966, 8th ed. 1987); Hans R. Guggisberg, *Geschichte der USA* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2nd revised and expanded edition, 1988).

²⁴ 44. Deutscher Historikertag, Halle a. d. Saale, 10.–13. September 2002. Panel 5.10: "Gewalt in den USA. Traditionen und Visionen in den 1960er und 1970er Jahren." See the report on the panel by Jürgen Martschukat under: <http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/> (Tagungsberichte, September 18, 2002).

²⁵ Ron Robin, "The Outsider as Marginal Scholar: Reflections on the Past, the Foreign and Comparative Studies in American History," in *American Studies International* 31:1 (April 1993): 117–125, quote 118.

²⁶ Dirk Hoerder, *Crowd Action in Revolutionary Massachusetts, 1765–1780* (New York: Academic Press, 1977).

²⁷ See note 15.

²⁸ Norbert Finzsch, *Die Goldgräber Kaliforniens. Arbeitsbedingungen, Lebensstandard und politisches System um die Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Göttingen: V&R—Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft, vol. 53, 1982).

²⁹ See note 2.

³⁰ See note 12.

³¹ Further information at: <http://www.krefeld.de/kommunen/krefeld/fb17.nsf/pages/>

³² Hartmut Lehmann, James J. Sheehan, eds., *An Interrupted Past: German-Speaking Refugee Historians in the United States after 1933* (New York: Cambridge UP, 1991).

³³ Erich Angermann, *Challenges of Ambiguity: Doing Comparative History* (New York/Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1991).

³⁴ Hermann Wellenreuther, ed., *German and American Constitutional Thought* (The Krefeld Historical Symposia 1, New York, 1990). Hermann Wellenreuther, Claudia Schnurmann, eds., *Die Amerikanische Verfassung und Deutsch-Amerikanisches Verfassungsdenken. Ein Rückblick über 200 Jahre* (Krefelder Historische Symposia: Deutschland und Amerika 1, New York, 1991).

³⁵ Hans-Jürgen Schröder, ed., *Confrontation and Cooperation - Konfrontation und Kooperation—Germany and the United States in the Era of World War I. 1900–1924—Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten in der Ära des 1. Weltkrieges* (The Krefeld Historical Symposia 2, Providence/Oxford: Berg, 1993).

³⁶ Norbert Finzsch, Jürgen Martschukat, eds., *Different Restorations: Reconstruction and "Wiederaufbau" in the United States and Germany: 1865–1945–1989* (The Krefeld Historical Symposia: Germany and the USA 3, Providence RI, Oxford, 1996).

³⁷ Hartmut Lehmann, Hermann Wellenreuther, eds., *German and American Nationalism: A Comparative Perspective* (The Krefeld Historical Symposia 4, Oxford/New York, 1999).

³⁸ Norbert Finzsch, Hermann Wellenreuther, eds., *Visions of the Future in Germany and the United States* (The Krefeld Historical Symposia, Oxford/New York: Berg, 2001).

³⁹ Norbert Finzsch and Ursula Lehmkuhl, eds., *Atlantic Communications: Political, Social, and Cultural Perspectives on Media and Media Technology in American and German History from the 17th to the 20th Century* (Krefeld Symposium, May 2002; forthcoming).

⁴⁰ Gerhard L. Weinberg, "Wo bleibt amerikanische Geschichte an deutschen Universitäten?" in *Zeitschrift für Weltgeschichte* 2:2 (Fall 2001).

⁴¹ "Das Verhältnis von Bewerbern auf die jährlich freiwerdenden Stellen in den nächsten ca. 5 Jahren beläuft sich im gesamten Fach auf etwa 1:8, wobei sich dieses Verhältnis in den jeweiligen Teilgebieten höchst unterschiedlich gestaltet. Der Konkurrenzdruck fällt in der Neueren Geschichte mit ca. 1:13 extrem aus, und auch in der Alten und Mittelalterlichen Geschichte sind die Verhältnisse mit ca. 1:7 bzw. 8 angespannt. [. . .] Relativ günstig scheinen die Berufungsaussichten in der außereuropäischen und der osteuropäischen Geschichte liegen (1:3 bzw. 4), wengleich hier angesichts der geringen Fallzahlen Vorsicht bei längerfristigen Vorhersagen geboten ist." Panel presentation entitled "Verband der Historiker und Historikerinnen Deutschlands: Situation des wissenschaftlichen Nachwuchses im Fach Geschichte: Erste Ergebnisse einer Erhebung 2002." (Historikertag Halle, 11. IX. 2002), presented by Prof. Dr. Sylvia Paletschek (Freiburg). The complete essay with illustrations and tables (46 pages total) is available at: http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/daten/2002/lincke_paletschek_2002.pdf

⁴² Norbert Finzsch, *Obrigkeiten und Unterschichten. Zur Geschichte der rheinischen Unterschichten gegen Ende des 18. und zu Beginn des Jahrhunderts.* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1990).

STERN PRIZE

WEIMAR'S CRISIS THROUGH THE LENS OF GENDER: THE CASE OF PROSTITUTION

Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize Presentation, November 15, 2002

Julia Roos

Princeton University

Key Objectives

A central objective of my study of the history of prostitution in the Weimar Republic is to highlight the role of gender in the crisis and ultimate demise of Germany's first experiment in liberal democratic government.¹ My dissertation aims to show that German attitudes towards prostitution during the 1920s and early 1930s represent a microcosm of Weimar society's major problems and tensions. Thus, the key question focuses on the impact of the rhetoric of Weimar's alleged "moral decline" on the stability of the new democratic order, and on the links between anxieties over shifts in established gender relations after the First World War and political struggles about prostitution in the Weimar period.² Prostitution, I argue, served as a potent symbol of a more general and fundamental crisis in gender relations, and fears about the loss of a stable sexual and moral order played a key role in Weimar democracy's fall. The decriminalization of prostitution in 1927 entailed vital gains in prostitutes' rights and marked a radical break with their precarious legal status under the old system of police-controlled prostitution. Despite certain limitations, the 1927 reforms represented a major political victory for liberal feminists, socialists, and sexual reformers. This explains why prostitution became such a central target of right-wing (and ultimately Nazi) attacks on Weimar democracy.³

Another key goal of my dissertation is to re-assess the achievements of woman's emancipation between 1919 and 1933. My own work builds on the seminal scholarship on women in Weimar by historians such as Atina Grossmann, Renate Bridenthal, and Claudia Koonz.⁴ These authors have emphasized the centrality of struggles over gender in the history of the Weimar Republic. In what has become the dominant line of interpre-

tation among women's historians, they argue that heightened class conflict, economic instability, and political chaos ultimately buttressed patriarchal gender hierarchies and effectively blocked real progress in women's rights during the Weimar years.⁵ My study offers a more complex picture of the extent of changes in gender roles. Whereas many historians have interpreted Weimar's crisis as a factor that reinforced and stabilized asymmetrical gender relations, my own analysis of struggles over prostitution during the 1920s and early 1930s suggests that gender itself was at the root of Weimar's crisis. As the example of Weimar prostitution reforms shows, feminists and left-wing sexual reformers successfully challenged the sexual double standard and misogynistic rationale inherent in state-regulated prostitution. The Law for Combating Venereal Diseases (anti-VD law), which introduced the prostitution reforms, also lifted the ban on the advertisement and display of certain contraceptives that could function as prophylactics. After 1927, many cities installed vending machines for the sale of condoms in public lavatories. For women, the improved access to certain contraceptives marked an important gain in reproductive rights. Such shifts in established gender roles and sexual mores precipitated a powerful conservative backlash that played a fateful role in the destruction of the Weimar Republic. This suggests that gender was as important a factor in the demise of Weimar as class antagonism and the bitter political divisions between Left and Right. Because much of the existing scholarship on women in Weimar tends to stress the failures of woman's emancipation during this period, conflicts over gender have often been seen as less crucial for explaining Weimar's demise than the impacts of economic crisis and class struggle. With my study, I aim to show why such an approach risks missing key dynamics in the ultimate decline of Weimar democracy and the triumph of Nazism.

My dissertation contends that gender analysis can offer us vital new insights into central questions and turning points of Weimar political history. In this sense, the history of Weimar prostitution reforms is of interest not only to the relatively limited number of gender historians, but to all scholars of twentieth-century Germany. In the individual chapters, I use the topic of prostitution to explore key problems in twentieth-century German history. Among the issues addressed are: the extent of democratization of German society after the First World War, the nature of the Weimar welfare state, the peculiarities of German feminism, the divisions within the Weimar Left, the origins of 1920s right-wing populism, the anti-democratic backlash from within the state bureaucracy, and the rise of Nazism. In the following, I will discuss the connections between prostitution reform and the *Preußenschlag*, the coup against Prussia's Social Democratic government engineered by Chancellor von Papen

in July 1932, to illustrate how gender analysis adds to our understanding of this crucial event in the destruction of the Weimar Republic.

Prostitution Reform and the *Preußenschlag*

In 1927, the Law for Combating Venereal Diseases (Reichsgesetz zur Bekämpfung der Geschlechtskrankheiten) abolished state-regulated prostitution (*Reglementierung*, or regulationism).⁶ Until 1927, prostitution in general had been illegal in Germany. However, cities with *Reglementierung* tolerated registered prostitutes.⁷ State-regulated prostitution subjected prostitutes to compulsory medical exams for sexually transmitted diseases as well as to numerous other restrictions on their personal freedom. Thus, regulated prostitutes were banned from major public areas, could only reside in lodgings approved by the police, and had to obtain permission if they wanted to travel. A special section of the police, the morals police (*Sittenpolizei*), was responsible for the supervision of prostitution. Registered prostitutes' exceptional legal status marked them as social pariahs.⁸ Women arrested for street soliciting and registered by the police generally had no recourse to the courts. The legal principle of due process did not apply to prostitutes. By abolishing the arbitrary powers of the morals police, the 1927 reform introduced key gains in prostitutes' rights.

A year after the implementation of the anti-VD law, the Council of German Cities (Deutscher Städtetag) conducted a survey among local health offices.⁹ One important question focused on public reactions to the reform. Of the twenty-four cities included in the survey, only three (Hamburg, Berlin, and Stettin) reported generally positive responses from the population. In a range of cities, the perceived rise in prostitution mobilized citizens against the anti-VD law. This was true especially of the overwhelmingly Catholic cities of Munich, Nuremberg, Augsburg, Cologne, and Münster.¹⁰ In subsequent years, religious conservatives organized a vocal movement against the more liberal elements of the 1927 prostitution reform. While Catholic politicians and associations often spearheaded initiatives to impose tougher controls on prostitutes, Protestants supported such efforts as well. In April 1930, the Reichstag committee on population policy passed a resolution that called for the strict suppression of street soliciting and of lodging houses (*Absteigequartiere*) used by prostitutes to meet their clients. The author of the motion was Reinhard Mumm, the Lutheran pastor and leader of the conservative Christian-Social People's Service (Christlich-Sozialer Volksdienst).¹¹ The resolution reflected demands communicated to Mumm by leading representatives of Lutheran churches and morality associations.¹²

Key to this backlash against liberal prostitution reforms was the political mobilization of prostitutes. The decriminalization of prostitution

energized streetwalkers to resist attacks on their civil and economic rights. Thus, Leipzig prostitutes founded an association that employed legal counsel to defend its members against the police. In March 1931, the Saxon Ministry of Labor and Welfare (Sächsisches Arbeits- und Wohlfahrtsministerium) reported that “[a] large number of Leipzig prostitutes have submitted a petition to the city magistrate and the chief of police, in which they protest against unduly repressive measures on the side of the police. They argue that they have the right to pursue their business like any other tradesperson since they pay taxes and would become dependent on social welfare if the severe controls continued.”¹³ In the city-state of Bremen, prostitutes challenged what they considered illegal forms of police repression. According to the Bremen health office, streetwalkers there had founded “a kind of protective association which represents the supposed rights of its members . . . through a certain lawyer.”¹⁴ After July 1932, the Bremen police arrested streetwalkers on the basis of the Law for the Temporary Arrest and Detention of Persons (Gesetz betreffend das einstweilige Vorführen und Festhalten von Personen), which allowed the police to detain individuals for a period of up to twenty-four hours if this appeared necessary to protect the person’s own or the public’s safety. Prostitutes opposed this practice as incompatible with the decriminalization of prostitution and sued the police for false imprisonment and grievous bodily harm.¹⁵ Bremen police officials were exasperated by the conflict, especially since negotiations with the court had cast doubt on the legality of the police measure.¹⁶

Major centers of the conservative backlash against the 1927 reform were Catholic-dominated cities in the Prussian Rhine Province. Cologne, a Center Party stronghold where Konrad Adenauer was mayor (*Oberbürgermeister*), was at the forefront of efforts to reintroduce harsher penalties for street soliciting. During the early 1930s, the Catholic morality association, the Volkswartbund, coordinated the local campaign against the anti-VD law.¹⁷ The Bund organized public protests and petitions and pressured Cologne’s chief of police to implement more punitive measures against prostitutes. In April 1932, the Working Group of Cologne Catholics (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kölner Katholiken) alerted Reich Chancellor Heinrich Brüning to the dramatic proliferation of commercial sex.¹⁸ “Growing poverty and the resulting moral degeneration of whole strata of the population have produced such an increase in prostitutes that prostitution has become a veritable plague (*Volksplage*) . . . Responsibility for this terrible situation largely lies with the Law for Combating Venereal Diseases.” The petition called for an emergency decree authorizing the police to suppress any form of street solicitation. Similar conservative grassroots movements against the 1927 reform emerged in Essen, Krefeld, and Dortmund.¹⁹ Catholic politicians increasingly pushed for a general

criminalization of prostitution. In June 1932, the National Women's Caucus of the Center Party (Reichsfrauenbeirat der Deutschen Zentrums-partei) appealed to the Reich Minister of the Interior to outlaw street soliciting.²⁰ On July 9, 1932, the Prussian State Council, the representation of the Prussian provinces, supported a motion to criminalize public prostitution that had been submitted by Konrad Adenauer and the other members of the Center Party delegation.²¹

Less than two weeks later, conservative critics of Weimar prostitution reforms could be hopeful that a policy shift toward more repressive measures was imminent. The Papen Putsch against Prussia's Social Democratic government brought to power prominent opponents of the 1927 reform. Historians have pointed out that Papen justified the coup with charges "that the Prussian government was unable to maintain law and order."²² They focus especially on Papen's criticism that Social Democrats were "soft on Communism." Unfortunately, most existing scholarship tends to neglect the significance of the backlash against the liberalization of sexual mores for understanding the political origins of the *Preußenschlag*. For religious conservatives, however, the Prussian regime's perceived failure to combat "immorality" effectively was a major reason to support Papen's coup. Franz Bracht, a Center Party politician and Federal Commissioner for Prussia after 20 July 1932, swiftly implemented several decrees aimed at restoring public morality. On August 8, Bracht outlawed nude bathing; on August 19, he forbade nudity and other "indecent performances" in theaters.²³ As former mayor of Essen, Bracht brought with him to the capital his chief of police, Kurt Melcher.²⁴ Melcher, who became Berlin's new police president, was one of the most prominent critics of the 1927 anti-VD law.²⁵

For religious conservatives, Bracht's appointment was an important victory. An article in *Volkswart*, the organ of Cologne's Volkswartbund, stressed that the path now was clear for a more rigorous repression of prostitution in Prussia.²⁶ Bracht did not disappoint such expectations. The Federal Commissioner installed a new chief of police in Cologne, Walter Lingens, who in December 1932 outlawed street soliciting.²⁷ During subsequent weeks, the police presidents of Neuss, Münster, and Dortmund followed Lingens' example. But the religious Right was somewhat divided about the question of how best to combat prostitution. Protestants supported demands for a revision of clause 361/6 of the penal code to increase the police's authority to intervene against streetwalkers. Unlike many Catholics, though, representatives of Lutheran churches and women's associations opposed the total criminalization of prostitution for fear that this would pave the way for the return of regulated brothels.²⁸ In October 1932, Paula Müller-Otfried, a Reichstag delegate for the conservative German National People's Party and president of the German

Lutheran Women's Federation (Deutsch-Evangelischer Frauenbund, or DEF), commended Bracht on his measures "against the degenerative developments in public life."²⁹ Müller-Otfried admitted that the anti-VD law offered no adequate legal means to curb street soliciting, but warned that the complete criminalization of prostitution would revive *Reglementierung*. "A return to the old system of regulationism . . . would cause great concern among women and the wider public." Bracht's own draft of a revision of clause 361/6 strove to mediate between the diverging Catholic and Lutheran positions. While the Federal Commissioner's proposal made all forms of public solicitation "suited to harass individuals or the public" punishable, it stopped short of outright criminalization of prostitution.³⁰ The Papen Putsch fulfilled key conservative demands for a tougher stance on "immorality" and a reversal of the more liberal aspects of Weimar prostitution reforms. This greatly strengthened the moral Right's support for the semi-authoritarian presidential regime of the early 1930s, which was based on rule by emergency decree and tended to minimize meaningful participation by parliament.

Conclusion

The connections between the movement against Weimar prostitution reforms and religious conservatives' support of the *Preußenschlag* underline the central role of issues of gender and sexuality in the decline of Weimar democracy. They show that radical Weimar gender reforms like the decriminalization of prostitution provoked a powerful anti-democratic backlash that united state officials, religious conservatives, and right-wing populists. The Nazis certainly were aware of the political value of the "moral" agenda for the advancement of their own cause when they attacked the decriminalization of prostitution as a quintessential sign of Weimar democracy's alleged "corruption" and promised to eradicate "vice" in the future National Socialist state. Analyses of Weimar's fall focused exclusively on pre-1918 authoritarian political traditions miss the importance and novelty of 1920s conflicts over gender that played such a fateful role in undermining popular support for the Weimar Republic.

Notes

¹ I find Joan Scott's definition of gender helpful. According to Scott, "gender is a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes, and gender is a primary way of signifying relationships of power." As Scott points out, relationships of power signified by gender often serve as a model and legitimation for other, non-sexual relationships of power in society: "Gender . . . provides a way to decode meaning and to understand the complex connections among various forms of human interaction. When historians look for the ways in which the concept of gender legitimizes and constructs social relationships, they develop insight into the reciprocal nature of gender and society and into

the particular and contextually specific ways in which politics constructs gender and gender constructs politics." See Joan Wallach Scott, "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis," in: idem, *Gender and the Politics of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 42, 45–46; see also Joan Kelly, "The Social Relations of the Sexes: Methodological Implications for Women's History," in: idem, *Women, History, and Theory: The Essays of Joan Kelly* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 1–18.

² On Weimar-era discourses about "immorality," see Richard Bessel, *Germany After the First World War* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 220–53; and Cornelia Osborne, *The Politics of the Body in Weimar Germany: Women's Reproductive Rights and Duties* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992), 69–101.

³ I explore this issue in more detail in my article "Backlash against Prostitutes' Rights: Origins and Dynamics of Nazi Prostitution Policies," *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 11 (2002): 67–94.

⁴ See the various essays on Weimar in Renate Bridenthal, Atina Grossmann, and Marion Kaplan, eds., *When Biology Became Destiny: Women in Weimar and Nazi Germany* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1984); see also Grossmann, "The New Woman and the Rationalization of Sexuality in Weimar Germany," in *Powers of Desire: The Politics of Sexuality*, ed. Ann Snitow, Christine Stansell, and Sharon Thompson, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983), 153–71; and idem, *Reforming Sex: The German Movement for Birth Control and Abortion Reform, 1920–1950* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

⁵ For similar arguments about the limitations of woman's emancipation in the Weimar Republic, see Karen Hagemann, *Frauenalltag und Männerpolitik: Alltagsleben und gesellschaftliches Handeln von Arbeiterfrauen in der Weimarer Republik* (Bonn: J. H. W. Dietz Nachf., 1990); and Susanne Rouette, *Sozialpolitik als Geschlechterpolitik: Die Regulierung der Frauenarbeit nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg* (Frankfurt am Main and New York: Campus, 1993).

⁶ See *Reichsgesetzblatt*, part I, 22 February 1927, 61–63. On the history of the anti-VD law, see Osborne, 109–12; see also Paul Weindling, *Health, Race and German Politics Between National Unification and Nazism, 1870–1945* (Cambridge, England, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), esp. 357–59.

⁷ See Richard J. Evans, "Prostitution, State and Society in Imperial Germany," *Past & Present* no. 70 (February 1976): 106–29; Regina Schulte, *Sperrbezirke: Tugendhaftigkeit und Prostitution in der bürgerlichen Welt* (Hamburg: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1994), esp. chapter 4; and Lynn Abrams, "Prostitutes in Imperial Germany, 1870–1918: Working Girls or Social Outcasts?," in *The German Underworld: Deviants and Outcasts in German History*, ed. Richard J. Evans, (London and New York: Routledge, 1988), 189–209.

⁸ See the detailed discussion of the legal aspects of regulated prostitution in Jill Harsin, *Policing Prostitution in Nineteenth-Century Paris* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985), chapter 2. See also Abraham Flexner, *Prostitution in Europe* (Montclair, New Jersey: Patterson Smith, 1969 [originally 1914]), esp. 136–37.

⁹ See *Die Bekämpfung der Geschlechtskrankheiten in deutschen Städten*, Schriftenreihe des Deutschen Städtetages, vol. 8, eds. Otto Schweers and Franz Memelsdorff, (Berlin: Selbstverlag des Deutschen Städtetages, 1930).

¹⁰ See *ibid.*, 103.

¹¹ On Mumm, see Kurt Nowak, *Evangelische Kirche und Weimarer Republik: Zum politischen Weg des deutschen Protestantismus zwischen 1918 und 1932* (Weimar: Hermann Böhlhaus Nachfolger, 1988), 36–37; 142–45; see also Peter Fritzsche, *Rehearsals for Fascism: Populism and Political Mobilization in Weimar Germany* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), esp. 50–51.

¹² See BArch 90 Mn (N 2203 [estate of Reinhard Mumm]), no. 531, esp. 33–37.

¹³ See the report to the Reich Ministry of the Interior of 17 March 1931 in GStA-PK I. HA Rep. 84a/869, 163.

- ¹⁴ See the health office's report of January 1932 in Staatsarchiv Bremen (StAB) 4,130/1-R.I.1.-17.
- ¹⁵ See the legal brief of 29 September 1932 in StAB 4,130/1-R.I.1.-24.
- ¹⁶ See the report of a meeting at the Bremen health office on 28 August 1928 in StAB 4,130/1-R.I.1.-24.
- ¹⁷ See "Sitzung des Volkswartbundes in Köln am 25. Januar 1933," in Archiv des Deutschen Caritasverbandes (ADCV), Sozialdienst katholischer Frauen (SKF), 319.4 D01/05e, Fasz.1.
- ¹⁸ See the petition of April 19, 1932 in BArch R 1501/26315, 16-18. See also "Gegen die öffentliche Unsittlichkeit," *Kölnische Volkszeitung*, 19 April 1932.
- ¹⁹ See the petition to Brüning by the Altstädtischer Verein Essen of 22 November 1931 in BArch R 1501/27217/8, 55; on the movement against the 1927 reform in Dortmund, see "Wann folgt Dortmund?," *Tremonia*, 29 December 1932; on Krefeld, see the minutes of a meeting of the Krefelder Hilfsbündnis für geistige Wohlfahrtspflege (Krefeld Alliance for the Protection of Spiritual Welfare) on 25 October 1932 in Archiv des Katholischen Deutschen Frauenbundes (AKDF), Morality Commission 1-27-6.
- ²⁰ See "Bekämpfung der Geschlechtskrankheiten," *Mitteilungen des Reichsfrauenbeirats der Deutschen Zentrumspartei* 7 (1932): 194-95; see also "Der Widerstand gegen das Gesetz zur Bekämpfung der Geschlechtskrankheiten," *Der Abolitionist* 31 (1932): 67-69.
- ²¹ For the debate in the Prussian state council, see GStA-PK I. HA Rep. 169 DIX E/6, 155-59; see also Dorothea Karsten, "Zur Frage der Bekämpfung der Prostitution," *Soziale Praxis* 41 (1932): 1277-86.
- ²² See Dietrich Orlow, *Weimar Prussia, 1925-1933: The Illusion of Strength* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), 228; see also Gotthard Jasper, *Die gescheiterte Zähmung: Wege zur Machtergreifung Hitlers, 1930-1934* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986), 93-104.
- ²³ See "Die neuen preußischen Verordnungen gegen sittliche Entartung," *Volkswart: Monatsschrift zur Bekämpfung der öffentlichen Unsittlichkeit* no. 1 (1932), esp. 149.
- ²⁴ See Hsi-Huey Liang, *The Berlin Police Force in the Weimar Republic* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970), esp. 153-54.
- ²⁵ See Kurt Melcher, "Grundsätzliches zur Behandlung der Prostitution im Geschlechtskrankengesetz," *Die Polizei* 29 (1932): 381-83.
- ²⁶ See "Die neuen preußischen Verordnungen gegen sittliche Entartung," *Volkswart*, no. 1 (1932), esp. 150-51.
- ²⁷ See the minutes of a meeting of the Volkswartbund in ADCV, SKF 319.4 D 01/05 e, Fasz. 1; see also "Köln in Front: Zur Wahrung der öffentlichen Sittlichkeit," *Tremonia*, 29 December 1932. On Lingens, see Adolf Klein, *Köln im Dritten Reich: Stadtgeschichte der Jahre 1933-1945* (Cologne, 1983), 49.
- ²⁸ See Hermine Bäcker, "Änderung des Reichsgesetzes zur Bekämpfung der Geschlechtskrankheiten durch Notverordnung?," *Die Rundschau: Mitteilungsblatt der Inneren Mission* 27 (1932): 272-74; see also "Eingaben der Vereinigung Evangelischer Frauenverbände Deutschlands zum RGBG," *Aufgaben und Ziele: Monatsblatt der Vereinigung Evangelischer Frauenverbände Deutschlands* 12 (1932): 70-71.
- ²⁹ See Müller-Otfried's letter to Federal Commissioner Franz Bracht of 8 October 1932 in Archiv des Diakonischen Werks (ADW), Central-Ausschuß der Inneren Mission (CA), Gf/St no. 291.
- ³⁰ See Bracht's proposals for a revision of clause 361/6 of 29 September 1932 in GStA-PK I. HA Rep. 84A/869, 247a-b.

TELLING THE STORY: SURVIVOR TESTIMONY AND THE NARRATION OF THE FRANKFURT AUSCHWITZ TRIAL

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In my examination of the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, I divided my time between the State Attorney's Office in Frankfurt am Main, where I read over the pre-trial files, and the State Archive in Wiesbaden, where I listened to the tapes of the trial. The trial lasted over one hundred and eighty days, involved approximately four hundred witnesses, and produced thirty thousand pages of files, not including the trial record itself, which is now being transcribed from audiotape. The transcriptions that appear in this paper (in translation) are my own. In listening to the audiotapes, I selected a cross section of witnesses and I will bring together here a picture of the courtroom from this research. The lack of a written transcription created a few disadvantages: I was unable to turn quickly to anyone's testimony, and it was nearly impossible to get through five hundred hours of audiotape. In addition, the prosecution, lawyers, and judges spoke out of turn and did not identify themselves. This made their voices often difficult to distinguish from one another (especially in the case of the twenty-one defense attorneys). However, there were advantages as well. I could get a strong sense of the atmosphere in the courtroom, the tensions that filled the room or evaporated depending on the witness, the judge's sensitive treatment of different survivors, and his reactions to outbursts in the courtroom by the audience or the defendants. Most importantly, I could conclude from these tapes that survivor testimony—trial testimony—is an essential historical source that has shaped the narrative of the Holocaust and provided historians with much of the basis of our knowledge of the events of the "Final Solution."

Early scholarship on the Holocaust had a tendency to negate the value of survivors' narration of their experiences. Documents and textual evidence took precedence over the recollections and the sometimes questionable memories of victims of the Nazis. There is still debate today about the usefulness of such testimony, particularly as organizations like the Shoah Foundation and the Fortunoff archives gather video testimony from thousands of survivors. Peter Novick, in his book *The Holocaust in American Life*, states that "it is held that survivors' memories are an indispensable historical source that must be preserved, and elaborate proj-

ects are underway to collect them. In fact, those memories are not a very useful historical source . . . (which) is not to say that they haven't been, or won't continue to be, important in evoking the Holocaust experience."¹ Novick calls upon the writings of Primo Levi, foremost Holocaust philosopher, to solidify his argument that survivor's memories are broken and blurred at best. Testimony is seen as a valuable emotional experience, evoking the startling pain and cruelty of Nazi persecution, but lacking in substantive historical information and often obscuring accurate evidence rather than illuminating it.

I, however, argue that the historical information we have about the Holocaust today is much more a product of survivor testimony than historians often realize. This is most obvious in the abundance of historical information, especially about the concentration and death camps, that has come from survivor testimony, specifically from meticulously recounted, painstakingly detailed pre-trial and trial interrogations of survivors. While the Nuremberg trials relied heavily on documentary evidence, West German postwar trials hinged almost exclusively on witness testimony. By examining the historical information provided by survivors at the Auschwitz trial, I will show that Peter Novick and others, like Raul Hilberg,² are wrong. Survivor testimony has value that far exceeds merely evoking a visceral reaction. It creates the basis for our understanding of life in Auschwitz.

The Auschwitz trial took place in Frankfurt-am-Main, West Germany, between December 1963 and August 1965. The trial of twenty Auschwitz perpetrators by the Public Prosecutor's Office of the state of Hesse represented a cross section of criminals who had participated in the atrocities at the camp between 1940 and 1945. The Auschwitz trial was by far the largest, most public, and most important trial ever to take place in West Germany using West German law. There was enormous national and international press coverage; in West Germany, each day in court was covered by all major newspapers. Most of what appeared in the papers was based on the testimony of the survivors on the stand. So although the files and tapes for these trials could not be accessed by the public for thirty years after the trial (due to a legal stipulation), the descriptions of everyday life in Auschwitz became part of the public consciousness about the camp and provided invaluable factual information for historical reconstruction of the crimes of the Holocaust.

Survivor witnesses made an essential contribution to the prosecution at the Auschwitz trial by recounting the horrors of Auschwitz and reconstructing the actions of the accused in the camp with painstaking accuracy some twenty years after the fact. Necessarily, the state gathered the evidence of survivors who had played important roles in the camp and worked closely under the rule of the SS. The survivors could provide the

court with extraordinary details of the activities of the camp guards. Most of the survivors who testified were Polish or Ukrainian political prisoners or German criminal prisoners, as Jews were rarely given jobs of any relative importance. They were generally either immediately sent to the gas chambers or assigned to hard labor, a fate which few survived. As a consequence, the Jewish voice was submerged at the trial. However, some Jews did have relatively safe jobs, and could tell their stories on the stand. They are central figures in our present-day understanding of the history of the Holocaust.

On day 19 of the trial, a soft-spoken Jewish doctor from Austria named Otto Wolken was the first witness to take the stand in the trial. Wolken had arrived in Auschwitz on July 9, 1943 and became a prisoner doctor. He avoided death in the gas chambers because of his profession and his acquaintance with a fellow prisoner who had connections to the Political Department and persuaded the administrators that Wolken could be useful in the hospital. Wolken worked in various sections of Birkenau, including the emergency block in the men's quarantine section, until the liberation of Auschwitz in January 1945.³ In the emergency block, he gathered enormous amounts of specific information about the various doctors who worked there. For example, he witnessed defendant Stefan Baretzki performing his favorite act of torture, a "rabbit hunt," in which prisoners at the roll call were ordered to take their hats off, and those who reacted too slowly were beaten and murdered on the electrical fence. Wolken's testimony on such matters was particularly valuable to the court because he had begun to write a chronicle while still in Auschwitz after its liberation in February 1945. What makes Wolken's chronicle so unusual was his decision to write it expressly for possible investigations of Nazi criminals after the war. His chronicle was first used in Krakow in June of 1945 by the investigative judge for the "Commission for Investigating German Crimes in Poland" for the Krakow courts. Wolken later sent this report to the International Auschwitz Committee (IAC) in Vienna, an organization of camp survivors under the leadership of Hermann Langbein, a survivor who was largely responsible for setting the wheels of the Auschwitz trial in motion (and whose important testimony I will come back to in this paper). Langbein passed it on to the public prosecutors in Frankfurt. Wolken's written chronicle of his experiences at Auschwitz and his spoken testimony at the trial constituted one of the first comprehensive descriptive accounts of daily life at Auschwitz, and the courts gave him almost two uninterrupted hours to testify.

Wolken not only had evidence of individual crimes, but his recollections were to form the basis of much of our current knowledge of the atrocities perpetrated in Birkenau. Wolken could refer to his chronicle and testify with certainty that, for example, prisoners on a transport from

Lvov were slaughtered by SS men Baretski, Weiss, Kurpanik, and Dargelis on April 10, 1943.⁴ Wolken could turn to his written reports and state with accuracy what he had seen. The courts gave him ample leeway to describe events, circumstances, and impressions that went far beyond the testimony required to convict specific defendants of specific crimes. The courts allowed the most important witnesses to speak at length about the structure of the SS hierarchy within Auschwitz, the daily activities, and their impressions in general. This helped to create a more complete picture of the surroundings in the camp.⁵

Another witness who made a vital contribution to the case in Frankfurt and to our historical information about the Auschwitz concentration camp was Hermann Langbein. Langbein, an Austrian political prisoner, was sent to Auschwitz from Dachau on August 17, 1942. There he became the secretary of Dr. Eduard Wirths, the main camp doctor at the time. Wirths was described by many witnesses, including Langbein himself, as much less brutal than his predecessor, Dr. Kurt Uhlenbrook. He ended some of the experimentation and decreased the number of fatal injections of phenol (carried out in large part by defendant Josef Klehr) that were performed daily. Langbein was in a position to witness almost everything that happened in the hospital or *Häftlingskrankenbau* (HKB) of the camp. He also wrote the reports and sometimes secret memos that Wirths sent out to various SS administrators, including Dr. Enno Lolling, the chief medical administrator of the concentration camps.

On the stand, Langbein was also given the opportunity to speak freely about what he experienced at Auschwitz. For example, Langbein talked about the system of prisoner identification, and the badges that each type of prisoner wore. He made the important contribution of describing the terrifying conditions in the HKB. Sick prisoners would avoid being sent there at all costs, for they were generally pronounced unfit for work and then either gassed or sent to block 20 for an "injection."⁶

Langbein's office overlooked the entrance room to one of the crematoria. From this vantage point, he could see prisoners being brought into the gas chambers alive and carried out dead by the *Sonderkommando*. On one night he saw that hundreds of sick prisoners were killed in the gas chambers as part of a "measles action" designed to curb a terrible outbreak of the disease. According to Langbein, it was dealt with by "gassing the lice along with the people."⁷ Langbein's job included the registering of deaths, and the next day he added a huge list to the death-books. According to his testimony, Dr. Wirths was forever battling the measles epidemic at the camp, and had signs posted everywhere announcing: "One louse, your death." Still, prisoners were too frightened to go to the HKB as they knew it meant certain death. Dr. Wirths promised that only the deathly ill would be killed by injection, but Langbein and the rest of

the inmates knew this was false. According to Langbein, Wirths really believed this and did not know that Dr. Friedrich Entress, who was in charge of the injections, was carrying them out behind his back along with Klehr. Langbein therefore went to the block-leader of the HKB, prisoner Richard Wörl, and the two started to document injections of healthy prisoners. When they came upon a German prisoner who had been murdered, and whose medical records were complete because of his nationality, they told Wirths about this. Wirths was convinced and reprimanded Entress. He had the injections slowed down and eventually stopped in the spring of 1943.

Langbein provided insight into the ability of an individual to change the atmosphere and the fate of many people within the camp. One such change came in November 1943, when Commander Höss was replaced with Artur Liebehenschel. Liebehenschel made many improvements: He had the standing cells ripped up, he had prisoner Wörl brought in as block-leader of the entire Auschwitz I camp, he stopped the selections within the camp (those at the entrance ramp continued), and a calmer atmosphere prevailed. Langbein said that "in general one could establish that even those SS members who were very bloodthirsty before became a bit more reserved because they realized that their fanaticism would not necessarily be tolerated anymore."⁸ It was important for Langbein, and for the prosecutors, to demonstrate that despite orders from Berlin that made certain executions inevitable, individual guards could make a difference and save lives if they were so inclined. This meant, of course, that they could also commit murder on their own initiative (as Langbein described), which was exactly what the prosecutors were trying to prove.

Langbein's account of camp life was in some ways less helpful to the prosecution than to the general understanding of life in Auschwitz. He had very few specific details about any of the defendants except for Josef Klehr. He was better at giving his impressions of the defendants' characters, but often these worked against him. For example, in describing defendants Neubert and Hantl, Langbein characterized them both as reluctant to kill and more "decent" in their relationships with prisoners. He qualified these remarks, though, interjecting: "However, please remember that this was relative."⁹ The degrees of complicity and the overall circumstances of which Langbein was trying to remind the court—that these were volunteer SS officers at a concentration camp—were irrelevant to the law. It mattered only whether Hantl or Neubert had been brutal or sadistic in their actions.

Still, Langbein's testimony was invaluable for the image of Auschwitz that was being reconstructed before the eyes of the public in 1964 West Germany. History was being made, as a real sense of it did not yet exist at that time. The court's unusual onsite visit to Auschwitz reaf-

firmed much of what Langbein had described geographically. His depiction of the location of his room, the hospital blocks, the crematoria, and the view he had, were all confirmed by the court when it went there, and his testimony gained even more credibility. These details were taken very seriously by the court in the attempt to establish proof and evidence about the actions of the defendants. They should therefore not be discounted as the basis for a great deal of the evidence we have today about Auschwitz.

The testimony of Josef Kral provides a glimpse of everyday life for a tortured prisoner in Auschwitz. Kral's testimony was by far the most gruesome and devastating of all the witnesses on the stand. He had been a prisoner of the Political Department and therefore knew defendants Boger and Stark very well. He spent six weeks in a standing cell, during which time he was fed only three meals and was "interrogated" every day for three to four hours, sometimes by Boger on the infamous "swing" (a torture device created by the defendant). He was forced to lick the moisture from the walls of the standing cell. He watched his friend next to him die after eating his own shoes. He was hung by his arms (which were strapped behind his back) until they broke. His testimony prompted the judge to change the charge against defendant Hans Stark from aiding and abetting murder to murder, after Kral reported that he stood four meters from Stark and watched him kill two of his friends from Kattowitz with a shovel. Despite the defense's protests that this was new evidence and could not be admitted in court, Stark was put into investigative detention on the same day.¹⁰

One of the best ways for the court to determine how much of this testimony was accurate, and how much was impaired by the loss of memory or by political and national divisions amongst the prisoners within the camp, was through corroboration. The judges and the prosecution established the validity of testimony by asking multiple witnesses for exact information on seemingly irrelevant details. For example, many witnesses were asked to describe how the blocks were built, how big the foundations were, how much groundwater existed, how big the cells were, how many people were in them, and other similar questions. If they could provide these details, which could be verified by other witnesses and by the onsite visit to the camp, their testimony could be accepted despite some inevitable lapses of memory. Kral's testimony was corroborated by many witnesses. Among them was Kazimierz Smolen, a survivor of Auschwitz and the director of the Auschwitz museum at the time of the trial. According to Smolen, when he was organizing the exhibitions and archives for the museum in 1959, there was still no proper description of the "Boger-swing." He turned to Hermann Langbein, who directed him to Kral. His careful depiction of the "swing" (in drawing form)

was the first real representation of this torture device. This image also appeared in the pre-trial files of the Auschwitz case.¹¹

Finally, there was a most unusual group of survivors discovered by the state through the International Auschwitz Committee. This was a group of secretaries, transcribers, and translators who came to shed the most light on the activities of the Political Department of the Auschwitz I camp, where the brutal interrogation and torture of “political prisoners” took place. They are extraordinary because they were almost all Jewish, female, and privy to large amounts of information about the camp and its genocidal activities. Astoundingly, the large majority of them survived; of sixty-seven women, only six died in the camp. Nine of the survivors testified at the Auschwitz trial.¹²

One of these women, Dounia Wasserstrom, told the court of a most devastating experience:

There is one incident I can never forget: It must have been around November 1944. A truck, carrying Jewish children, drove into the camp. The truck stopped by the barracks of the Political Department. A boy—he must have been about 4 or 5 years old—jumped down. He was playing with an apple that he was holding in his hand. Boger came with Draser to the door. Boger took the child by his feet and smashed his head against the wall. Draser ordered me to wash the wall after that. Later I was called in to do some translation for Boger. He was sitting in his office eating the boy’s apple.¹³

Wasserstrom was a survivor residing in Paris who was interviewed through the West German embassy there by the Ministry of Justice of Baden-Württemberg in March 1959. In Auschwitz, Wasserstrom had been an interpreter in the Political Department, working chiefly for SS Private Draser, but also for the defendants Wilhelm Boger (one of the most sadistic and brutal guards, widely known in Auschwitz as the “Devil of Birkenau”), and Pery Broad. In her pre-trial testimony, Wasserstrom was generally quite vague and did not include specific accounts of the activities of the defendants. Nevertheless, Wasserstrom was called as a witness at the trial itself due to the nature of her position at Auschwitz. The decision to put her on the stand was a wise one, for her recollections proved to be some of the most important and sensational in the entire trial. In her cross-examination by some of the defense attorneys, Wasserstrom suddenly related the story of the little boy with the apple. The defense attorneys naturally pounced upon this new piece of testimony, questioning Wasserstrom as to why she did not relate something so important in her pre-trial testimony or in any of the numerous pamphlets she wrote after the war. Her response was simple: “That is a very private

matter. Since that moment I no longer wanted to have children."¹⁴ (The press, by the way, picked up this story because of its sensational impact. The distasteful headline from the *Frankfurter Rundschau* the next day read "Witness: Boger Splattered a Child on the Wall."¹⁵) The testimony had to be verified by virtually every other woman in the Political Department who had contact with Wasserstrom after the war, in an attempt to determine when exactly Wasserstrom had first mentioned it to the others. If it had been a subject of conversation only directly prior to the trial, it would have to be discounted. But witness Raja Kagan corroborated Wasserstrom's story with her testimony that Wasserstrom had recounted it to her already in 1947. Such discrepancies between pre-trial and trial interrogations demonstrate the dilemma faced by the court in its attempt to get the "whole picture" of the activities of the defendants at Auschwitz and Birkenau. They also show the meticulous demand for exact details before they were allowed as evidence. Last, but not least, the story of the little boy has become part of a greater body of legendary tales of devastation and makes up a crucial part of our historical imagination of the world of Auschwitz.

In the courtroom, truth is established through the testimony of witnesses about what they have seen. The accumulation of evidence leads to a verdict in which it is decided whether something did or did not happen. The law of every democratic nation puts its trust in witness testimony as the ultimate source of fact, truth, and the history of what has happened. There are, of course, flaws in this system, as it relies on human memory. However, through methods of rigorous interrogation, cross-examination, and legal inquiry, a clear picture of past events can be established. The same holds true for survivor testimony on the events of the Holocaust. At the Auschwitz trial, the history of the camp was reconstructed for the first time before a massive public audience. Survivors provided the specific details needed to convict the defendants, and the general ones needed to create a clear image of the camp. This testimony laid the foundations for much of what historians know about Auschwitz-Birkenau. Its historical value should not be overlooked.

Notes

¹ Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999), 275.

² Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews*, revised edition, (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985).

³ Otto Wolken, *Chronik des Lagers Auschwitz II (B II s)*, 1945, in *Pre-trial files of the First Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial*, The Public Prosecutor's Office at the District Court of Frankfurt-am-Main 4Js 444/59 (hereafter StAFM), 33: 5648a-59.

⁴ Prosecutor's Interrogation of Otto Wolken, in *ibid.*, November 14, 1960, 40: 6948.

⁵ A more detailed account of Otto Wolken's testimony has appeared in my article "The Wheels of Justice Turn Slowly: The Pretrial Investigations of the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, 1963–65," *Central European History* 35, no. 3 (2002), 367–8.

⁶ Hermann Langbein in *Strafsache gegen Mulka und andere*, 4Ks 2/63. First Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, Dec. 20, 1963—August 8, 1965, Jury trial at the District Court, Frankfurt-am-Main (hereafter APO), March 5, 1964, tape #3A. The camp jargon for the injections was "abspritzen," which literally meant injected to death.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Josef Kral in APO, May 15, 1964, tape #11A.

¹¹ Kazimierz Smolen in APO, May 25, 1964, tapes # 14B–15A.

¹² Lore Shelley, *Secretaries of Death: Accounts by Former Prisoners who Worked in the Gestapo of Auschwitz* (New York: Shengold Publishers, Inc., 1986), VII–IX.

¹³ Dounia Wasserstrom, testimony from the Auschwitz trial, April 23, 1964, in Hermann Langbein, *Der Auschwitz-Prozess, Eine Dokumentation*, 2 volumes (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Neue Kritik, 1995), 421. Unfortunately, Wasserstrom's testimony was not recorded and her statements at the trial itself are therefore only available through secondary sources.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Gerd Czechatz, "Zeugin: Boger zerschmetterte ein Kind an der Wand," *Frankfurter Rundschau*, April 24, 1964.

GHI RESEARCH

SUFFERING, TOLERANCE AND THE NATION: ASYLUM AND CITIZENSHIP POLICY IN WEIMAR GERMANY

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Several events occurred between 1917 and 1919 that radically altered the literal and symbolic geography of Germany.¹ 1) *Territorial transfer*. After the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Germans began making plans for the annexation of wide swaths of territory in Eastern Europe. A mere few months later, after its defeat in the West, Germany was forced to cede territory to France, Poland, and Denmark, as well as give up its expected gains in the former Czarist territories. 2) *The Russian Revolution*. Prior to the revolution, it was possible to look at Europe as constituted by various nationally determined entities as well as increasingly anachronistic multinational empires. With the Russian Revolution and the arrival of an explicitly international (and modern) state, this paradigm was unsettled. And, the result of these two developments was: 3) *Refugee crisis*. The end of the war was accompanied by massive movements of population, an event that has been termed the “first modern refugee crisis.”² In this paper, I briefly explore one specific case: asylum and citizenship policy during the early Weimar period.³

Hannah Arendt called the interwar refugees the “most symptomatic group in current politics.”⁴ The existence of these migrants, she argued, had important consequences for the order of the postwar world. For one, the willingness of states to forcibly deport anyone of a different ideology or nationality was a harbinger of increasing totalitarianism.⁵ Secondly, the failure of states to deal adequately with the refugees who streamed into their countries, either through repatriation or naturalization, led to a diminished toleration of the right of asylum and indeed the rights of foreigners more generally.⁶ Ultimately, however, what Arendt saw as the most harmful effect of statelessness during the interwar period was the way that these stateless people were entirely governed by the police because they did not stand to benefit from the protection of any state.⁷ For the stateless, the host country was, quite literally, a “police state” in which they were under police control, unmediated by any laws guaran-

teeing their rights. Arendt's argument extends beyond the plight of the refugee, as she also claims that the existence of the stateless had an extremely important effect on the states themselves. She contends, "the higher the ratio of potentially stateless and stateless to the population at large . . . the greater the danger of a gradual transformation into a police state."⁸

Arendt makes a serious charge here, one that is exceedingly difficult to prove—what exactly is the "danger of a gradual transformation into a police state" and how would one measure this danger?—but suggestive nonetheless. In early 1920s Germany, the police were indeed charged with controlling stateless persons, to whom the state was reluctant to grant citizenship or protection. But there were also serious debates about asylum, citizenship, and the role of the state within all levels of the German government that belied any simple claim about the "transformation" of Germany into a police state during this period. The refusal to grant most stateless persons citizenship combined with a willingness to grant some of them government assistance and a more widely-held tolerance of their right to be in the country were all important aspects of Germany's relationship to the stateless persons living in Germany in the first years of the Weimar Republic.

In the following remarks, I will look more closely at the way in which Germany dealt with the refugee crisis, paying attention to both those aspects that seem to confirm Arendt's argument and those that seem to diverge from it. I identify a nascent discourse of asylum used by German defenders of the refugees and discuss its consequences. This asylum discourse relied on a language of victimization. This language had a powerful claim during this period but also easily led to resentments in a state and society where belonging was still defined along quite different criteria. The disjuncture between the logic of citizenship and the logic of asylum spoke to a wider conflict in German society during the Weimar Republic.

There were two issues at stake within the postwar period. The first concerned the territory of Germany, with some Germans arguing that German territory was only for those persons defined as part of the German nation. As a result of the increased attention paid to foreign Germans during World War I, proponents of this position defined the German nation in substantially broader terms than had been the case for any but the most committed Pan-Germans prior to the war. Others argued that German territory should also be a haven for those suffering in other parts of the world—such as Jews from Eastern Europe. The holders of the second position emphasized the suffering and victimhood of these refugees, which was in contrast to otherwise prevailing norms of German policy towards foreigners, which privileged their utility as a justification

for allowing them to stay in Germany. This conceptualization of Germany as a land of asylum was a precursor to post-World War II German asylum policy. At the same time, the discursive framework set up by this debate was one in which Germans only accepted a responsibility for or interest in immigrants so long as they were seen as victims. Within this framework, there was no way of positively conceiving of immigrants as potential members of the German national community or worthy participants in German society.

The second debate in Weimar Germany at this time concerned the nature of the German community itself. Some argued for a German nation defined along racial lines, while others maintained that the German nation should be defined more by a shared culture. In my dissertation, I show that *pace* Brubaker, culture, and not necessarily biological race, was an important feature of German citizenship policy and practice.⁹ Moreover, arguments about citizenship during this period served a highly symbolic function. As I will discuss later, when Germans argued about citizenship during this period, they were also debating about who should be part of the German community in an ideal situation. Citizenship served to recognize those people who had already become “appropriately” German. Importantly, citizenship policy was also a regulatory ideal; it was, quite literally, about defining an *imagined* community—one that bore little resemblance to the heterogeneous population living within the territorial borders of the state.¹⁰

It is exceedingly difficult for modern historians to ascertain the number of refugees who came to Germany during and after World War I. John Hope Simpson claimed that there were nearly ten million refugees on the European continent as late as the mid-1920s.¹¹ Approximately 1 million refugees came to Germany, half of whom were of non-German descent.¹² This figure, while dwarfed by the migrations that occurred after the Second World War, was well beyond anything that had previously been experienced in the West. The massive and unprecedented size of this migration taxed the moral and financial capacity of both Germany individually, and the world community at large. These new refugees were also qualitatively different from their nineteenth-century precursors. Passports and visas came into widespread use for the first time after World War I, and so citizenship and statelessness had a different and more tangible quality than prior to the war.

Looking back on the immediate postwar years, the German Minister of the Interior, Rudolf Oeser, spoke of a “flooding of the territory of the Reich with foreigners.” Oeser saw this flood as part of a “massive migration of foreign elements from the East,” which had begun during the war but achieved “vigorous” (*rege*) proportions during 1919.¹³ In 1920, the German Society for Population Policy (Deutsche Gesellschaft für

Bevölkerungspolitik) wrote to the Reich interior ministry about the deleterious effects this migration would have on the German population. "Since the end of the war, a great migration (*Abwanderung*) from Russia and the former Russian section of Poland to Germany has begun. From month to month, this migration is becoming culturally and economically more dangerous for the German people."¹⁴

Despite the fact that the number of Jews immigrating to Germany (70,000)¹⁵ was a small percentage of the total number of refugees immigrating from the East (at least 500,000), it was an accepted, although obviously untrue, fact that the majority of the immigrants that came to Germany after the end of the war were Jews.¹⁶ The words *Ostjuden* and *Ostausländer* were often used as synonyms, and the Eastern Jew served as the model for the entire migration from the East. Usually this was done unthinkingly by bureaucrats, who acted as if the entire migration from the East was made up of Eastern European Jews. Descriptions of the migration from the East and the difficulty of border controls often shaded quickly into diatribes against the horrors of Eastern European Jewry that used stereotypes about Jews that long predated the current refugee crisis. Many Germans were convinced that migrants from the East were to blame for the German people's many hardships—a worsening of the housing shortage, an increase in the pressure on the food supply, economic difficulties created by unscrupulous merchants, and the importation of Bolshevik ideas.¹⁷ German efforts to limit the size of the foreign population concentrated on trying to enact an effective border control, but as the flurry of laws and regulations makes clear, because of both the lack of personnel and the size of the refugee population, the ability to actually enforce such control remained a mirage. Faced with what they believed was only the beginning of a massive invasion of Bolsheviks and Jews, some officials argued that the border needed to be completely closed. A Prussian *Erläss* from January 27, 1919, immediately after the cessation of hostilities, attempted to seal the border in both directions for all those who could not prove their German identity beyond doubt.¹⁸ But this proved impossible, as a report of a meeting at the *Auswärtiges Amt* made clear: "Experience shows that despite the closing of the border, foreigners crossed in droves."¹⁹

Despite attempts to end corruption at the border and increase the number of soldiers assigned to border patrol, officials were aware that "it was impossible to seal the border without any holes." Thus they turned to other strategies, arguing that it was necessary to place the Eastern border under strict surveillance.²⁰ Of course, such supervision proved to be no more possible than sealing the border, and the files of the Prussian and national interior ministries and border police are filled with accounts of frustrated officials who could not even manage to count the people

they saw streaming across the border. As one border guard wrote, “. . . the stream [of people] from the East continues without hindrance.”²¹

The German and Prussian governments attempted to steer a middle course in responding to this immigration. While they wanted to stop immigrants from getting in, they rarely did anything to those who made it past the border. Their hesitation to take truly drastic steps against immigrants (such as expulsion or internment—both of which were discussed and implemented in limited ways) was due to three reasons. First, and probably most importantly, finding and expelling or interning illegal immigrants would have cost resources that were well beyond the capacity of either the Prussian or national state in this period. Second, German officials were afraid of the effect that such radical measures would have on the international image of a weakened Germany. During a meeting about the possible expulsion of the Jews, one official noted that they had decided not to expel them because “American sympathies for Germany have recently grown, and it is important in this regard to keep the support of the Jews there who have an undeniable influence on American politics.”²² Similarly, another official noted that the Prussian government could not support the internment of Jews because of the “dangerous influence such a measure would have on public opinion [in other European countries].”²³

It is also important to note that many members of the German government shared the concerns of the world community for the fate of the Jews. After all, these Jews had been subject to horrible persecution in Russia and Poland, and it appeared to some unconscionable to send Jews back to face more of the same. An *Erlass* from Prussian Interior Minister Carl Severing in November 1919 looked at the problem of Jewish immigration. On the one hand, Severing noted that many immigrants, if perhaps not all, were prompted by legitimate reasons; “they didn’t just leave, but were driven out under the pressure of the political situation that in Poland led to pogroms and comprehensive military recruitment.”²⁴ At the same time, Severing explained that Germany was by no means in a position to easily accept these refugees, suffering as it was from unemployment and food shortages. Severing then concluded that the suffering of the Jews in a sense trumped that of the Germans. “Despite the suffering of the German population, for human rights reasons, it is impossible to forcibly deport the *Ostjuden* currently living in Germany, even when they have snuck across the border and do not possess legitimation papers. This is because the situation in their homelands presents a danger to their lives.”²⁵ Severing went on to state that these immigrants possessed a lower level of culture, that their immigration should not be encouraged, and they should be kept separate from Germans whenever possible; nonetheless, except in cases where they committed crimes, these Jews had

to be tolerated.²⁶ A *Vorwärts* article from October 22, 1921 also counseled patience with regards to the Eastern Jews in Germany. The author pointed out that many of these Jews had come to Germany as a result of German attempts to recruit workers for its munitions industry during the war.²⁷ Secondly, it remarked, many of them were refugees from pogroms and other repressive measures. In both cases, the author argued, Jews could not be forced to return to the lands from which they had fled.

There are several interesting things to note about both the Prussian *Erläss* and the *Vorwärts* article that constructed arguments in support of the Jews as legitimate asylum seekers. On the one hand, they do so only by conceding large parts of their opponents' arguments. They do not try to say that the Eastern Jews were the equals of Germans, nor do they answer accusations about the unsuitability of the Jews for life in Germany or the danger they supposedly posed to hard-working but destitute Germans. Just as other officials tried to blame the German toleration of Eastern Jewish immigrants on the grounds of international pressure, even those who were clearly sympathetic to the *Ostjuden* accepted that they were a burden on Germany at a time when the beleaguered German nation could ill afford any additional strain. Yet, while they concede these parts of the argument to their conservative opponents, they make their case on the basis of an appeal to the suffering that these Jews have faced. Rather than arguing from the perspective of the public utility of the Jews, an argument that would appear plausible considering the fact that utility was the main criteria for the toleration of immigrants prior to 1914, as I'll discuss shortly, both of these texts appealed instead to their vulnerability. By phrasing their arguments in this way, the *Vorwärts* author and the Prussian government were appealing to the undeniable hold that metaphors of suffering and victimization had for the German public at this time.

Indeed, Weimar German culture can be read in many ways as a culture of victimization and martyrdom. One of the most resonant founding myths of the German Republic, the stab-in-the-back story told by German conservatives to justify their defeat in the war, was a story of betrayal, suffering, and victimization.²⁸ As I discuss in my dissertation, Freikorps soldiers easily expanded this story to explain the failure of their campaign in the Baltics and they also told stories about how much they had suffered and identified themselves as martyrs. Robert Whalen, Richard Bessel, and Deborah Cohen, looking at returning soldiers, show how eager they were to believe that they had suffered, despite the fact that they had actually met a respectful, if not necessarily rapturous, reception in most towns, and most of them had found jobs quickly upon their return.²⁹ Karin Hausen has shown how war widows also successfully used a rhetoric of victimization and sacrifice to articulate their claims.³⁰

The potency of claims to victim status has been shown in diverse arenas. Greg Eghigian has recently attempted to “resuscitate the now somewhat unfashionable notion of ‘resentment’” as a category for understanding the Weimar years.³¹ He further argues that different groups (including the Central Association of German Invalids and Widows and the International League of Victims of War and Work) expressed

their values in a mythic narrative of injury and unredeemed suffering that bred a resentment for which something must be done. In all the versions of this myth, *Opfertum*—simultaneously connoting injury, victimhood, and sacrifice—was the linchpin . . . The rich, polyvalent trope of sacrifice provided a compelling heuristic by which perceived injuries and pains were able to be translated into a set of moral terms and claims.³²

Altogether, in the competition for limited resources during the Weimar Republic, representations of suffering and victimization held a powerful sway. Something about these stories of vulnerability and sacrifice spoke to Germans suffering from economic dislocation and a vague sense of humiliation stemming from the defeat and its consequences.³³

This emphasis on the suffering of the *Ostjuden* was quite different from the priorities that had previously driven German policy towards foreigners. Looking primarily at the Wilhelmine period, Jack Wertheimer contends that “the German approach to aliens was exploitative, not only did Germans not conceive of their homeland as a haven for the persecuted and needy, they evaluated foreigners solely on the basis of their utility.”³⁴ This utility argument is also used by other scholars such as Ulrich Herbert and Saskia Sassen.³⁵ Clearly, Wertheimer’s thesis is not borne out by the German response to the refugee crisis in the early Weimar Republic.³⁶ Those who supported the tolerance of foreigners in Germany did so not on the basis of utility, but on the grounds that they faced life-threatening danger. Those who opposed such tolerance also did not refer to the Jews and other refugees of non-German descent as not useful, rather they emphasized far more issues of deception and/or scarcity.

Yet, this emphasis on the suffering of Jews had its own problems. While Jews and other refugees might be tolerated so long as this sort of danger existed, they could not use this tolerance as a stepping-stone to actual participation in the German community, as the citizenship policies that I will discuss later make clear. In order for (most) German officials to tolerate these refugees, they needed to see them as weak. Indeed, the more an official defended *Ostjuden* and other immigrants, the more he was likely to emphasize their weakness. There was no room within German discourse on foreigners at this time to see immigrants as positive contributors to Germany. This emphasis on the weakness of the refugees,

especially the Jews, had complicated effects at a time when Germans were hyper-aware of their own weakness. It is difficult to find hard evidence to support this point, but one can imagine the complex of sympathy and resentment, identification and disavowal taking place as Germans looked at the refugees.

The logic of citizenship policy worked along quite different lines. Citizenship policy in all of the *Länder* oscillated between an emphasis on German descent and German cultural belonging. In my dissertation, I also make the argument that for Prussia, the state with by far the highest percentage of foreigners, cultural concerns tended to be accorded more weight than purely racial considerations. Regardless of which criterion was deemed more important, however, citizenship policy during this period was highly symbolic, one might even argue utopian, in nature. Citizenship, I argue, was about who, in an *ideal* world, *should* be included and *should* be public. Those who held to a notion of citizenship solely defined by descent and those who articulated a notion that was about a potentially acquired connection to the German nation were arguing about this ideal vision of who should constitute the German national community and what their connection to one another should be. In this debate about symbolism and ideals, questions of sacrifice and suffering, so important to the discussion of asylum, did not play a role.

The 1923 case of Aron Genkin, a Jewish Ukrainian doctor who intended to marry a German war widow, provides an example of this. Genkin wanted to become a German citizen in order to become licensed to practice medicine in Germany and thus better support his fiancée and her three children. The application was initially made in Thuringia and the Thuringian government was quickly advised by the Bavarians that they did not intend to support the application because Genkin belonged to a “racially and culturally foreign nation (*fremdstämmige und kulturfremde Nation*).”³⁷ Genkin’s fiancée, Maria Berenz, hearing of the possible rejection of his application, appealed directly to Ebert to intervene:

I have struggled most terribly for eight years [since the death of her husband in 1914 on the front] and I am both spiritually and physically at the end of my strength. Herr Dr. Genkin, a noble man who is respected by all who know him and a selfless friend to my children, has come and wants to help us, four victims of the war. . . . Shouldn’t the German state give this man citizenship so that he can fulfill the responsibilities that he has already taken upon himself with the engagement, and that he finds sacred? Here the state can also fulfill its sacred duty towards four war victims who would otherwise be doomed . . .³⁸

Despite Berenz's passionate appeal, there is no evidence that Ebert actually intervened. Instead, at the first vote in the Reichsrat, his citizenship application was denied by a vote of 5–4, with Prussia voting with the Bavarians against granting him citizenship. According to the Bavarian representative to the Reichsrat, the reason that the application was denied was that Genkin's stated intent of helping his wife and her family was noteworthy, but that these sorts of private interests had to be considered secondary to national concerns.³⁹ For the Bavarians at least, the link between the suffering of the Berenz family and the duties of the state that Berenz had tried to establish was unconvincing. Genkin's desire to help a German war widow, and the suffering of the Berenzes was secondary to the need to establish a German community solely comprised of those people who possessed the appropriate degree of German cultural capital.

Shortly afterwards, the Thuringian representative, with the support of Prussia, brought the case back to the Reichsrat. Berenz again wrote a letter, this time to the Thuringian representative to the Reichsrat in support of her fiancé's application. In this letter, Berenz changed her tactic. Instead of emphasizing the suffering of her family, she talked about how great a provider he had been, ending by noting "it is not Herr Dr. Genkin's fault that he is of Jewish descent. He has a very noble-minded disposition and is a true friend of Germany."⁴⁰ In this later vote, the decision was made that the fact that Genkin intended to support his wife and his family and had been deemed sufficiently worthy to be admitted to the exam to get a German medical license did actually make him worthy of being granted citizenship.⁴¹

What is noteworthy about this case is how Berenz's appeal based on the suffering of her family was unsuccessful. Rather, what appeared to have changed the mind of the Prussian representative was a decision on the part of other German authorities that Genkin was acceptable on his own terms. There was a disjuncture between what was convincing from the perspective of tolerance and asylum, namely the appeal to recognize the worthiness of an immigrant based on how much he or she had suffered, and what was convincing from the perspective of citizenship, namely that someone themselves possessed a "German character." Here, even the suffering of a German war widow and her three children was less important to the decision of whether to grant Genkin citizenship than a determination of his appropriate German character. In such a situation, there arose a disjuncture between the language of asylum and the language of belonging that left refugees in a Catch-22. Refugees were tolerated in Germany because of what they had suffered, but it was precisely this perception of weakness that meant that they would not be accepted as productive members of the German community and thus eligible for citizenship. Moreover, the rhetoric of Jewish weakness set up a danger-

ous competition between Jewish and German suffering in a climate of ever shriller rhetoric about Jewish predation.

Arendt's contention that Germany was gradually transformed into a police state because of its high percentage of stateless persons does not hold for the early Weimar Republic. There is little that can be recognized as totalitarian in the refugee and asylum policies of the early Weimar period. Refugees had not been entirely abandoned to the police, and a plethora of different voices articulated and enacted different policies for handling these refugees. National, regional, and local authorities operated within a complex and multi-tiered system in which many immigrants were tolerated, some were considered eligible for benefits and only a small fraction were deemed worthy of actual citizenship. German officials attempted to apply both a logic of national-cultural belonging, and a logic of asylum or safe haven to regulate their relationship with foreigners, and neither of these allowed them either a consistent policy or a stable sense of themselves. The combination of wide-open possibility and threat that characterizes this period in so many different arenas ended with a sense of frustration.

In some sense, then, I'd like to suggest that Arendt may have been right. The refugee crisis in the Weimar Republic was tied to the rise of fascism in that country. Not because of Germany's "gradual transformation into a police state" as Arendt supposes, but because of the frustration engendered by the Weimar failure to assimilate foreigners except as victims in need of protection. What needs to be remembered about Nazism was that it was explicitly an ideology about foreigners—Jews—who were burdening, infecting, and ultimately destroying the German *Volk*. Thus, in some sense, the history of foreigners in Germany is central to understanding the appeal of the Nazis. I believe it is significant that so many of the issues that disturbed Germans were successfully connected by the Nazis to images of foreign invasion and infestation. Nazi ideas about biological race offered clearer boundaries and easier criteria for determining who belonged and who did not than the complex conglomeration of race and culture used by Weimar officials. The divide between tolerance and belonging that was so central, and also so problematic, for the Weimar national and Prussian state was done away with after 1933. Moreover, the victim status of foreigners led to resentments in the later Weimar Republic as the German people found themselves suffering even more due to economic hardship, resentments upon which the fascists were ready and eager to capitalize.

Notes

¹ This paper is taken from a talk given at the German Historical Institute as part of the Fritz Stern Symposium on November 15, 2002.

² Michael Marrus, *The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 9.

³ To place this in a wider context, my dissertation is an attempt to understand the territorial crisis and the highly ambivalent relationship to national borders in Germany precipitated by these three events. To do so, I also look at *Ansiedlung Ost*, a group of German socialists who planned to settle in Southern Russia, the *Freikorps* paramilitary campaign and settlement plans in the Baltics, and the German response to Russian POW camps and the émigrés living in the so-called “Russian colony” in Berlin. Ari Sammartino, “Utopia and Exile: Migration and Territorial Crisis in Weimar Germany” (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 2003, forthcoming).

⁴ Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1973), p. 277.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 276.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 280 & 286. As I will discuss in a moment, the story is more complicated than Arendt suggests, and at times her analysis of the phenomenon seems driven more by her, not unjustified, pessimism than some of the facts would warrant. For one, many of the refugees, especially political emigrés, such as the Russians, did not want to either repatriate or naturalize. Moreover, the right of asylum in the nineteenth century was never a legal right but more a question of custom. While the twentieth century did lead (or at least at times has led) to a restriction of asylum, it also marked the first time that asylum became a recognized legal right and the first time that there was international cooperation in terms of the regulation of that right. Nonetheless, Arendt’s basic point, namely that governments in the twentieth century were more cautious about asylees, and indeed of foreigners in general, than those in the previous century, does hold up.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 287.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 287–288.

⁹ Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992). For another argument critical of Brubaker along these lines, see Dieter Gosewinkel, *Einbürgern und Ausschließen: Die Nationalisierung der Staatsangehörigkeit vom Deutschen Bund bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001).

¹⁰ This discourse of belonging was quite different from contemporary discourses on citizenship, which sees citizenship within the context of integration. See, for example, the recent German debate about the citizenship law of 2000.

¹¹ Of these, Michael Marrus claims there were 2 million Poles, 2 million Russians and Ukrainians, and 1 million Germans. The rest of the 9.5 million figure was made up of Armenians and Hungarians and smaller numbers of other national groups. Marrus, *The Unwanted*, 51–52.

¹² Marrus, *The Unwanted*, p. 67. Generally the estimates of the size of the Russian community in Germany settle on a figure of 500,000. It is unclear if this number includes Russians of German or Jewish descent. Bettina Dodenhoeft, “*Laßt mich nach Rußland heim*”: *Russische Emigranten in Deutschland von 1918 bis 1945* (Frankfurt am Main, Berlin: Peter Lang, 1993), (Ph.D. diss., Hamburg, Univ. der Bundeswehr, 1992), p. 9.

¹³ Bundesarchiv—Berlin [henceforth: BArch] R 43 I/594, p. 76. Letter from the RMI to the Reichskanzlei, January 21, 1923.

¹⁴ BArch R 1501/114049, p. 135. Letter from the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Bevölkerungspolitik to the Reichsministerium des Innern, April 9, 1920.

¹⁵ Trude Maurer, *Ostjuden in Deutschland, 1918–1933* (Hamburg: Hans Christian Verlag, 1986), p. 65. About half of Maurer’s figure is made up of Jews who came to Germany because they were recruited as labor during World War I.

¹⁶ See, for example, BArch R 43 I/594, p. 3. Denkschrift from the Reichskommissar für Zivilgefangene und Flüchtlinge, October 30, 1920. BArch R 1501/114049, p. 19. A letter from

the Reichswanderungsamt to the Reichsministerium des Innern from February 8, 1920 provides the completely exaggerated number of one million *Ostjuden* that had immigrated to Germany.

¹⁷ BArch R 1501/114049, p. 13. This letter from the Zentral-Polizeistelle Osten, Frankfurt Oder to the Landesgrenzpolizei on February 5, 1920 provides one representative list.

¹⁸ BArch R 1501/118392, p. 15. Mention of this *Erlass* is made in a report of a meeting on May 17, 1919 at the Reichsministerium des Innerns about the recall of German troops from Kurland and Lithuania and the expected migration of the population there to the German Eastern border. References continued to be made to this *Erlass* and the need to close the border once and for all. See, for example, a letter from Carl Severing, the Prussian minister of the interior, to the presidents of local governments including the president of police in Berlin. In this letter, Severing makes clear that he wants both a better surveillance of the border and the railways and a more tightly enforced registration regulation. *Gemeines Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz* [henceforth: GStA], 1 HA, Rep. 77, Tit. 1814, Nr. 3, p. 207–208.

¹⁹ BArch R 1501/114061, p. 47. Minutes of a meeting at the Auswärtiges Amt on April 10, 1919.

²⁰ BArch R 1501/114049, p. 42. Letter from the PMI to the Zentralpolizeistelle Osten February 13, 1920.

²¹ BArch R 43 I/594, p. 19. Summary of the entry visas granted to Russian citizens during 1922.

²² BArch R 1501/114061, p. 47. Minutes of a meeting at the Auswärtiges Amt on April 10, 1919 regarding the expulsion of Jews.

²³ BArch R 1501/114049, p. 129. Explanation of the Prussian government regarding the deportation or internment of Eastern immigrants, February 26, 1920.

²⁴ GStA 1 HA, Rep. 77, Tit. 1814, Nr. 3, p. 190. Prussian *Erlass*, November 1, 1919.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.* At a meeting on the issue on December 10, 1920, this provision was harshly criticized. Letter from the Reichsminister des Innern to the Reichskanzler from February 7, 1920. BArch 1501/114048, Bl. 181. As a result, restrictions were sharpened with another Prussian *Erlass* from November 17, 1920 BArch 3901, Nr. 761. Nonetheless, even in this later document, it was stated that a “right to asylum” could not be denied in principle.

²⁷ Approximately 35,000 of the Polish forced laborers forced to work for Germany during the war were Jews. Maurer, p. 86.

²⁸ For more on the Stab-in-the-back myth, see Bernd Buchner, *Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie und der Kampf um die polit. Symbole in der Weimarer Republik*, (Bonn: Dietz, 2001), pp. 196–201; Joachim Petzold, *Die Dolchstoßlegende. Eine Geschichtsfälschung im Dienst des deutschen Imperialismus und Militarismus*, (Berlin (Ost): Akademie-Verlag, 1963); Friedrich Freiherr Hiller von Gaertringen: “Dolchstoß’-Diskussion und ‘Dolchstoßlegende’ im Wandel vor vier Jahrzehnten” in *Geschichte und Gegenwartsbewusstsein. Historische Betrachtungen und Untersuchungen. Festschrift fuer Hans Rothfels zum 70.Geburtstag*, Waldemar Besson et al., eds., (Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1963), pp. 122–160.

²⁹ Robert Whalen, *Bitter Wounds: German Victims of the Great War, 1919–1939* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Richard Bessel, *Germany after the First World War* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993); Deborah Cohen, *The War Come Home: Disabled Veterans in Britain and Germany, 1914–1939* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

³⁰ Karin Hausen, “The German Nation’s Obligations to the Heroes’ Widows of World War I,” in *Behind the Lines: Gender and the Two World Wars*, eds. Margaret Higonet, Jane Jenson, Sonya Michel and Margaret Weitz (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), pp. 126–140.

³¹ Greg Eghigian, “Injury, Fate, Resentment and Sacrifice in German Political Culture, 1914–1939,” in *Sacrifice and National Belonging in Twentieth-Century Germany*, eds. Greg Eghigian

and Matthew Paul Berg (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), p. 92. Eghigian takes his notion of resentment from Max Scheler, whom he quotes: "Revenge tends to be transformed into resentment the more it is directed against lasting situations which are felt to be 'injurious' but beyond one's control—in other words, the more the injury is experienced as destiny." Scheler, "The Meaning of Suffering," quoted in *Ibid.* For more on this theme, see Eghigian, *Making Security Social: Disability, Insurance and the Birth of the Social Entitlement State in Germany* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), chapters 5–7, especially chapter 6.

³² Eghigian, "Injury, Fate, Resentment and Sacrifice," p. 105.

³³ The view that the defeat, occupation and economic crises led to resentments that were instrumental in the rise of the Nazi party is represented by Thomas Childres, *The Nazi Voter: The Social Foundations of Fascism in Germany, 1919–1933* (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1983); Richard J. Evans and Dick Geary, eds., *The German Unemployed: Experiences and Consequences of Mass Unemployment from the Weimar Republic to the Third Reich* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987); Gerald D. Feldman, *The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics and Society in the German Inflation, 1914–1924* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). I do not myself maintain that these resentments were the only legacy of Weimar; indeed, as I have tried to show throughout this dissertation, I believe that these existed in a constant and complex relationship with potentialities (progressive, conservative, and radical) also unleashed by these events.

³⁴ Jack Wertheimer, *Unwelcome Strangers: East European Jews in Imperial Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 178.

³⁵ Ulrich Herbert, *Geschichte der Ausländerbeschäftigung in Deutschland 1880 bis 1980: Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter* (Berlin, Bonn: Dietz, 1986), p. 74; Saskia Sassen, *Migranten, Siedler, Flüchtlinge. Von der Massenauswanderung zur Festung Europa* (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, Taschenbuch Verlag, 1996), p. 110–113. Implicit in this argument is the idea that if Germans could conceive of their homeland in these terms, then they would be better people and have a better relationship with foreigners.

³⁶ One thing to note here: the early Weimar Republic featured a decrease in the use of immigrant labor. Actually, there were fewer foreigners in Germany during this period, but there were more without a definable function. This demographic change partially explains the shift from a discourse of utility to one of asylum.

³⁷ Bayerische Hauptstaatsarchiv [henceforth: BayHStA] MA 100317. Letter from the Bavarian Interior Minister to the Thuringen Interior Minister, February 7, 1923. Emphasis in original. In the German system of the time, an applicant for citizenship was really applying to be a citizen in one federal state. Nonetheless, other federal states could raise objections to those applicants they felt undeserving of citizenship. If the two states could not resolve their differences, the case fell before the *Reichsrat* where each federal state had a vote and the majority decision determined the fate of the application.

³⁸ BayHStA, MA 100317. Letter from Maria Berenz to Ebert, March 9, 1923.

³⁹ BayHStA, MA 100317. Letter from the Bavarian Representative to the Reichsrat to the Bavarian Justice Minister, May 12, 1923.

⁴⁰ BayHStA, MA 100317. Letter from Maria Berenz to the Thuringian Representative to the Reichsrat, May 3, 1923.

⁴¹ BayHStA, MA 100317. Letter from the Bavarian Representative to the Reichsrat to the Bavarian Justice Minister, May 17, 1923.

CONSUMING LANDSCAPES: THE VIEW FROM THE ROAD IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES, 1910–1995

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This research project deals with cars, drivers, roads, and landscapes in the twentieth century. Out of these four, especially the category of landscape merits some discussion. Landscape, for decades something of a dirty word in the German academy, has recently received more scholarly attention. When a geographer surveyed the field of landscape studies in Germany in the early 1970s, he found that the number of books whose titles include “Landschaft” had been decreasing sharply after 1945.¹ Since the 1990s, however, the situation looks quite different. A once classic anthology edited by the writer Rudolf Borchardt has been reissued, and historians are among the scholars rediscovering landscape as a field of study. Unlike an earlier generation of scholarship that sought to identify attention to landscape and the environment as “romantic,” and, worse yet, a step on the slippery slope towards Nazism, today’s studies seek to understand landscapes as historically produced and contested spaces without a necessary goal.² At the same time, geography in the English-speaking world has redefined landscape and learned to embrace its methodological multitudes.³

For historians, the renewed interest in landscape has contributed to the relative rise of environmental history. This subdiscipline, which by now is firmly established in U.S. universities, is still a fledgling enterprise with little institutional backing in Germany. Given the country’s occasional elevation of environmental consciousness into the realm of the normative and the voting successes of the Green Party, this state of affairs appears somewhat odd. Recent developments such as the establishment of a European Society for Environmental History in 2001, however, are encouraging.⁴

In this respect, environmental history has the potential to reach a wider audience both inside and outside of the academy. Landscape history can contribute to this growth. It combines the study of physical changes in the land with the analysis of different historical ideas about landscape, thus making it attractive for a wide range of historical subdisciplines, ranging from economic to cultural history. On a different level, an important insight has been formulated by David Nye, who insists that incorporating the history of technology into landscape studies

is indeed indispensable: "Technology is not alien to nature, but integral to it." Landscapes, in other words, are meeting places for technology and nature, "changing sites where new meanings are constantly emerging."⁵ Landscape's complexity can thus be understood as a rewarding challenge for the historian.

What do these musings have to do with cars and roads? Landscape change in the last century was to a large degree connected with the advent of car transportation as the dominant form of mobility. Without the massive building of roads, highways, parking garages, and all the other spatial paraphernalia of car travel, the automobile's rise to prevalence would have been impossible. In post-1945 suburban America, massive malls, commercial strips, and uniform chain stores often confine the landscapes of mobility.⁶ In the interwar period, however, a coterie of landscape planners, civil engineers, and local boosters sought technological designs, cultural valorizations, and public support ensuring that roads would form a harmonic unity with the surrounding landscape. The promoters and practitioners of this ideal and idealistic road sought to cushion the nascent and, in their view, favorable system of car-road-transportation in the organic entity of landscape. Many roads in European countries as well as the United States were constructed according to these ideas. *Consuming Landscapes* aims at identifying, analyzing, and understanding the technological and environmental preconditions, decisions, and consequences of phenomena such as the constructed landscapes of the North American parkways and German pleasure roads. The scope of the project is comparative, looking at the reverberations of a set of techniques promoting landscape consumption in both the United States and Germany from 1910 to 1995. At the heart of this project is a comparison of the driving experiences on the Blue Ridge Parkway and the Deutsche Alpenstraße, two major tourist roads whose construction began in the 1930s.

These commodified, readily available and accessible landscapes signified the first major environmental change wrought by widespread use of the automobile; their politics and meanings are also quite specific to negotiations of modernity in the first half of the twentieth century. These landscapes groomed for transportation were not the result of an autonomous technology intruding upon unspoiled nature, but rather the outcome of human decisions based on desires, values, and professional status. These values were inscribed into the technology of the road and thus onto the landscape, leaving a cultural imprint on them. Far from offering a refuge from civilization, these sculpted landscapes reflected their cultures of origin quite vividly. At the heart of the analysis is the cultural meaning of these technologies, their rootedness in and effects on culture.

The consumption of landscapes was also crucial for the appeal of tourism, the identity of tourist regions, and the growth of the nascent tourist industries. The landscapes that could be experienced through the windshield were an integral part of the self-representation of tourist regions. Prospective tourists learned to recognize characteristic mountain peaks, distinguish one landscape from another, and anticipate the allure of the sea by exploring the scenery in guidebooks and brochures before they would set out and experience the landscapes themselves by driving through them. In a sense, tourism regions had to be invented, not least through the promise of consumable and accessible, car-ready landscapes.⁷

The project is based on the assumption that a given technology's design and usage reflects cultural and social practices and has the potential to reinforce or alter them. As the car encountered the landscape in the first half of the twentieth century, the meaning of roads changed decisively. Instead of serving several constituencies of pedestrians, equestrians, and bicyclists, some users thought that roadways should be reserved for the exclusive use of automobiles. This idea of controlled access was very popular with car drivers and their elite associations in Germany in the first decades of the century. While the *Herrenreiter*—the upper-middle class male automotive pioneers—also benefited from an economic discourse pointing to the comparative advantages of road transportation, the testimonies of their Sunday or summer outings bespoke their fascination for the hardy nature of their cranky automobiles and for the aesthetic gain of experiencing nature by driving a car through it. They were able to overcome the confines of the railway's panorama as seen from the compartment window.⁸ With the car under their control, the landscape was now open to their explorations in the absence of train schedules and railway lines. They celebrated this new quality of appropriating nature through recent means of technology. The consumption of landscapes was seen as an aesthetic experience of deliberate slowness, gainful deceleration, and culturally advanced exploration. These practitioners of travel set their own agenda of leisurely exploration. A set of viewing opportunities, in this respect, opened up nature and defined it anew. Through explorations, adventurous car trips, and the dissemination of these accounts of conquest, this set of techniques became increasingly popular. The analysis of this change in attitude will be based on contemporary journals, books, and exhibitions in both countries.

Concomitant with this change was the establishment of specific roads called parkways in the United States. Ever since the landscape architect Frederick Law Olmsted had called a path through Prospect Park in Brooklyn, New York, a "parkway" in 1868, these green roads grew both in size and cultural importance in the United States. According to the

urban historian Clay McShane, these parkways were originally either roads to or through a park; in his eyes, the prohibition of common carrier traffic on the parkways assured class segregation as well as the appropriate natural feel. Social and environmental decisions were intertwined from the outset in the history of the parkway. McShane has calculated that, by 1916, 223 miles of parkways and 432 miles of park drives existed in the 15 largest US cities.⁹

Increasingly, the design features of urban parkways were also utilized for rural roads. Whether or not the National Parks should be made accessible for car drivers was a major bone of contention in the early twentieth century. The National Park Service at first banned cars in major parks such as Yosemite, but lifted the ban in 1913. Some conservationists were on the side of park administrators and embraced the car as the representative of a middle landscape, where technology was reconciled with nature. The vision that park officials created was, in the words of parkway historian David Louter, a “windshield wilderness.” On the other hand, this accommodation of the car spurred a major wave of opposition resulting in new organizations, which one author sees as the precursor of more recent environmental movements.¹⁰

The large rights-of-way of the park roads and parkways were used to physically separate and visually screen the roadway from surrounding areas. The road itself was adapted to land form through a curvilinear alignment that preserved scenic features, such as streams and hills. Also, parkways introduced the idea of limited points of access, separate alignment for lanes running in opposite directions, and amenities such as roadside parking lots, rest areas, and scenic overlooks.

A widely used design vocabulary for parkways was formulated in the Northeastern United States, especially in New York’s Westchester County, which spent over \$80 million to complete a system of parks and parkways in the interwar years. Robert Moses’ work as the chairman of the Long Island State Park Commission and subsequently as commissioner of parks for the city of New York is both famous and notorious.¹¹ For the purposes of this paper, it suffices to note that Moses popularized and massively sponsored this idea of exclusive access to nature. The federal government sponsored the construction of the Mount Vernon Memorial Highway, leading from the capital to George Washington’s birthplace and built to commemorate the 200th birthday of America’s first president in 1932. The Bureau of Public Roads employed the same landscape architects who had worked in Westchester County. Thomas McDonald, head of the Bureau, proudly exclaimed: “Our intention is not to make a formal parkway of the boulevard at any point. It is to be as close an approach to nature as can be managed, with planting directed toward the end of maximum beauty.”¹² The Mount Vernon road, despite its

rather limited size, became quite influential because of numerous publications celebrating its design and cultural significance. Another road combining modern technology and beauty was the Merritt Parkway, opened to traffic in 1940 and 38 miles long. It became an object of preservation itself in the 1980s, and the view from the road has changed little since the 1940s.¹³

The most extensive project of the time was the Blue Ridge Parkway, spanning 469 miles in the southeastern Appalachians of Virginia and North Carolina, which introduced drivers to breathtaking views and pastoral ideals. This project was overseen by the National Park Service, which was headed by a landscape architect and became the largest employer of landscape architects at the time.¹⁴ The Blue Ridge Parkway, whose construction began in 1935 and was not completed until 1987, is still one of the most heavily traveled tourist roads in the United States. It receives about 20 million tourists annually. Guidebooks extoll its natural beauty and pastoral qualities. From ridgetop overlooks, tourists enjoy the scenery as much as when traveling at maximum speeds of 45 miles per hour. No commercial traffic is allowed on this elongated parkway and would have a hard time navigating the hairpin curves and narrow roadbeds anyway.

In other words, the landscaping of the parkway has made every effort to hide its efforts. Unless they immerse themselves in the literature, travelers today will know little about the landscaping that created the parkway. Even a local newspaper recently found it newsworthy to inform its readers that even though the road looks “as if it simply happened,” it was the deliberate creation of landscape architects.¹⁵

While older publications have celebrated the landscaping and the road itself as a boon to the economy and a masterful piece of engineering, the Blue Ridge Parkway has recently been analyzed as a politically contested tool to promote tourism which did not always benefit local communities. The Park Service sought to acquire wide swaths of land as right-of-way in order to control the scenery adjacent to the road. This led to the displacement of locals and a skewed portrayal of mountain life.¹⁶

The landscape of the Blue Ridge Parkway was aligned to express these particular notions of an agricultural life in the mountains in harmony with nature, even if it included screening what the planners thought were inappropriate views of “unkept” homesteads. Parkway designers sought and achieved total control of the roadside. Under the tutelage of the Park Service, grazing cows displaced residents and abandoned homesteads were displaced with native succession species. Even today, commercial activity is almost nowhere to be seen from the roadway. In this respect, the Parkway is a “prototypical environment of instruction”; it was meant to educate both the local inhabitants and the car

drivers and passengers about the virtues of the bucolic life.¹⁷ Yet, the tension between the pre-industrial landscape exhibits of the Blue Ridge Parkway and the vehicles which allowed them to be seen—the cars and the road—was so eminent that it was difficult to explain away even for the promoters of the parkway. The question, then, is how contemporary travelers perceived of this nature, which experience it provided for them, and whether this experience contributed to a conceptual reshaping of the road. This complex will be at the core of further research.

Additionally, this project aims at a comparative history of the driving experience on inter-war roads in both Germany and the United States. Before and during the period of parkway building in the U.S., the European Alps saw many efforts at tourist appropriation, of which the building of mountain roads for car tourism is but one. A few historical studies have examined the politics of landscape production in this respect. In the case of the Sustenpaß, a mountain pass road in Switzerland built from 1938 to 1946, the cultural values and interests of tourism promoters, conservationists, and advocates of individual car ownership coalesced in advocating this road. Similar studies have been written about a weekend-getaway road in the vicinity of Vienna and a picturesque roadway to the Großglockner peak. Both roads were built to incorporate the highest degree possible of “Austrian” values as reflected in the cultural modernity of the road and its vernacular landscape.¹⁸

In the Swiss and Austrian cases, landscape, car driving, and road building were to be conjoined in a decidedly national mode. Rates of car ownership and the beauty of the natural landscape were both seen as specific national achievements, thus imbuing car-driven mobility with a sense of modernity resting on state-sponsored road building. The fact that civil engineers extolled these roads as landscape-friendly and opening up the features of the landscape only reinforced the idea of a conciliatory triad of roads, cars, and landscapes.

Informed by the ideas of these mountain roads and by a reception of the American parkway, the National Socialist dictatorship chose the autobahn as one of their preferred icons of technological modernity and imbued it with design features of the aforementioned roads while presenting it as a token model of an essentialist, German technology. However, the rhetorical support given to landscape architects who became part of the autobahn project did not translate into a coherent parkway design. Rather, civil engineers and landscape architects were given competing roles in a project whose basic premise was speed of construction, not homogeneity of style. Landscape became the focus of altercation: In the final analysis, civil engineers were inclined to use it as the ultimate symbol of a technologically mitigated aesthetic climax, while landscape architects tapped landscape as a rhetorical resource in trying to overcome

their insecure status. The results of these ideological and political conflicts were mixed. While some stretches of the autobahn offered scenic qualities and enabled the consumption of landscapes, most early roads lacked the qualities so vividly described by Nazi propaganda. In a sense, the Nazi autobahn incorporated both the model of a leisurely drive in a commodified landscape and the idea of a road network as a route to spatial domination and as a means of securing territoriality.¹⁹

Besides the autobahn, engineers and landscape architects also began work on tourist roads. The Deutsche Alpenstraße, a road extending 450 kilometers on the northern mountain crest of the Alps, had been envisioned as a tourism road since the 1920s and received a major boost in the mid-1930s. Contemporaneous publications praised the road as a boon for the economic development of the region and as a new way for urbanites to enjoy the scenery.²⁰ Like the Blue Ridge Parkway, the extensive plans for the Alpenstraße were not fully realized; building continued after the war. In 1960, a motorist complained about occasional bumpy driving and having to drive in second gear on stretches of the Alpenstraße.²¹ Again, my research will concentrate on the experience of the Alpenstraße both before and after the war, as it was expressed by drivers and passengers.

Lastly, *Consuming Landscapes* examines the withering of the politics of panoramic production in both postwar West Germany and the United States. Both countries chose to build vast networks of utilitarian interstate highways that presented a departure from both the ideology and the architectural style of the parkway's mode of landscape consumption. The United States witnessed the first full-fledged version of the utilitarian transportation machine, the Pennsylvania Turnpike, in 1940. These "superhighways" incorporated another ideology, one of the uninhibited flow of commodities as a vital part of a market economy; circulation thus was seen as the precondition to production and economic growth. Instead of consuming landscapes themselves, the drivers on these new networks became part of a sphere of rapid flow for freight and humans. American civil engineers, while impressed with the speed of construction and the dictatorial right-of-way exhibited by the autobahn, generally cited its lack of proper planning and its aesthetic efforts as undemocratic and unsuitable for a massive infrastructure effort.²² Both the U.S. Interstate System and the postwar German autobahn came to signify this approach to roads as concrete embodiments of market ideologies. At the same time, the old parkway idea did not simply die. Parkway specifications were and are still chosen in the United States for specific tourist roads or as public urban monuments, for example, the Jimmy Carter Parkway built in Atlanta in 1994. For European mountain roads, the politics of landscape production are still valid guidelines. However, the sheer number of driv-

ers and cars has made access to these panoramas a scarce resource during the tourist season.

In conclusion, the research project is concerned with three major objectives. Firstly, far from being a transient moment in the history of motorization, the technology of landscape appropriation from the roadway offers a unique insight into one of the ways in which Western societies have tried to solve the conundrum of nature and technology. By consuming landscape, major elites in the first half of the twentieth century aimed at bringing nature back to the technologically advanced societies of the West. In retrospect, this might seem like the opening of a Pandora's box of nature destruction. However, the claim of the designers that they had found the means to embellish nature must be taken seriously and analyzed historically. With such a study, it is possible to place these roads in the respective cultures of which they were a part. Rather than trying to fit these historical phenomena into procrustean models of modernity and anti-modernity, I understand them as variegated answers to modernity.

Secondly, the comparative outlook of this project should yield conclusions on the management of the environment in these two major countries with quite different political systems. The parkway ideal was one of total management of the land in the hand of a powerful public agency. While the National Park Service's agenda for the Blue Ridge Parkway was more discreet than Nazi Germany's blunt nationalism, in both instances the power of the state was meant to be visible, albeit to differing degrees. Interestingly, the statism of the parkway approach of consuming landscapes corresponded to a static understanding of nature: The landscapes designed were ideologically charged moments frozen in time, which required even more careful management in order to avoid natural dynamics. While *Consuming Landscapes* can be read as a tale of reversible Americanization and Germanization, as efforts to imbue technologies with specific national valorizations, it also makes landscape a central part of the narrative. Exactly because of its ambiguity, this concept became the central tenet of the parkway ideology. The fruition of the field of landscape studies in the United States calls for studies of specific landscapes embedded in social processes of ideological conflict and professional collaboration; the meaning of landscape for work and play is a historical product.

Lastly, by understanding landscapes as consumable items, this project aims at enriching our understanding of the history of consumer societies in the twentieth century. By analyzing publicly created landscapes as loci of consumption, this study seeks to extend the scope of the history of consumption which is increasingly becoming an important field of research.²³ In a way, the landscapes that car drivers and their passengers

experienced were as mass-produced and calibrated as the cars that helped them to see these landscapes. At the same time, this kind of consuming activity was circumscribed by the powerful hand of the nation-state, whether in totalitarian or Cold War contexts.

Notes

¹ Gerhard Hard, *Die "Landschaft" der Sprache und die "Landschaft" der Geographen: Semantische und forschungslogische Studien zu einigen zentralen Denkfiguren in der deutschen geographischen Literatur* (Bonn, 1970), 22–3. Whether or not this decline is a direct reaction to the perception of the National Socialist dictatorship as an era of "Blood and Soil," remains to be seen.

² Rudolf Borchardt, *Der Deutsche in der Landschaft* (Frankfurt, 1925, 1989); Klaus Bergmann, *Agrarromantik und Großstadtfeindschaft* (Meisenheim, 1970); Nobert Fischer, "Der neue Blick auf die Landschaft," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 36 (1996): 434–442; Gerhard Lenz, *Verlusterfahrung Landschaft: Über die Herstellung von Raum und Umwelt im mitteldeutschen Industriegebiet seit der Mitte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts* (Frankfurt/New York, 1999); David Gugerli, ed., *Vermessene Landschaften: Kulturgeschichte und technische Praxis im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Zurich, 1999).

³ Daniel E. Cosgrove, *Social Formation and Symbolic Landscape* (Madison, Wisc., 2nd ed. 1997); Richard Muir, *Approaches to Landscape* (Lanham, Md., 1999); W.J.T. Mitchell, *Landscape and Power* (Chicago, 1994).

⁴ The homepage of the European Society for Environmental History can be found at www.eseh.org

⁵ For an example of this confluence of environmental history and the history of technology, see Richard White, *The Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia River* (New York, 1996).

⁶ John Jakle, "Landscapes Redesigned for the Automobile," in *The Making of the American Landscape*: Michael Conzen, ed. (Boston, 1990), 293–310; Jakle, *The Visual Elements of Landscape* (Amherst, Mass., 1987); John Brinckerhoff Jackson, "Roads Belong in the Landscape," in idem., *A Sense of Place, A Sense of Time* (New Haven/London, 1994), 187–205; Dirk van Laak, "Infra-Strukturgeschichte," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 27 (2001): 367–393.

⁷ John Urry, *The Tourist Gaze: Leisure and Travel in Contemporary Societies* (London, 1990); John Jakle, *The Tourist: Travel in Twentieth-Century America* (Lincoln, 1985); Marguerite S. Shaffer, *See America First: Tourism and National Identity, 1880-1940* (Washington, D.C., 2001).

⁸ Rudy Koshar, *German Travel Cultures* (Oxford/New York, 2000); Koshar, "Germans at the Wheel: Cars and Leisure Travel in Interwar Germany," in *Histories of Leisure*, idem, ed. (Oxford/New York, 2002), 215–230; Martin Scharfe, "Ungebundene Circulation der Individuen. Aspekte des Automobilfahrens in der Frühzeit," *Zeitschrift für Volkskunde* 86 (1990): 216–243; Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the 19th Century* (Berkeley, 1986); Christoph Maria Merki, *Der holprige Siegeszug des Automobils, 1895–1930: Zur Motorisierung des Straßenverkehrs in Frankreich, Deutschland und der Schweiz* (Vienna, 2002).

⁹ Clay McShane, *Down the Asphalt Path: The Automobile and the American City* (New York, 1994), 31–40.

¹⁰ David Louter, "Glaciers and Gasoline: The Making of a Windshield Wilderness, 1900–1915," in *Seeing and Being Seen: Tourism in the American West*, David Wrobel, ed. (Lawrence, Kan., 2001), 240–270; Paul Sutter, *Driven Wild: How the Fight Against Automobiles Launched the Modern Wilderness Movement* (Seattle/London, 2002).

¹¹ Gilmore D. Clarke, "The Parkway Idea," in *The Highway and the Landscape*, W. Brewster Snow, ed. (New Brunswick, 1959), 33–39; Robert A. Caro, *The Power Broker: Robert Moses and*

the Fall of New York (New York, 1975), 318; Langdon A. Winner, "Do Artifacts Have Politics," *Daedalus* 109 (1980): 121–136; Steve Woolgar/Geoff Cooper, "Do Artifacts Have Ambivalence? Moses' Bridges, Winner's Bridges and other Urban Legends in S&TS," *Social Studies of Science* 29 (1999): 433–449; Bernward Joerges, "Do Politics Have Artefacts?," *Social Studies of Science* 29 (1999): 411–431.

¹² Timothy F. Davis, "Mount Vernon Memorial Highway: Changing Conceptions of an American Commemorative Landscape," in *Places of Commemoration: Search for Identity and Landscape Design*, Joachim Wolschke-Bulmahn, ed. (Washington, D.C., 2001), 123–177.

¹³ Bruce Radde, *The Merritt Parkway* (New Haven, 1993).

¹⁴ Environmental historians have not yet paid sufficient attention to the transformationist visions of landscape architects. For first intrusions, see Linda Flint McClelland, *Presenting Nature: The Historic Landscape Design of the National Park Service, 1916 to 1942* (Washington, D.C., 1993).

¹⁵ *The Citizen Times* (Asheville, NC), October 10, 2002.

¹⁶ Harley E. Jolley, *The Blue Ridge Parkway* (Knoxville, 1969); Anne Virginia Mitchell, *Parkway Politics: Class, Culture, and Tourism in the Blue Ridge* (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1997).

¹⁷ Alexander Wilson, *The Culture of Nature: North American Landscape from Disney to the Exxon Valdez* (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), 35.

¹⁸ Walter Zschokke, *Die Strasse in der vergessenen Landschaft: Der Sustenpass* (Zürich, 1997); Georg Rigele, *Die Wiener Höhenstraße: Autos, Landschaft und Politik in den dreißiger Jahren* (Vienna, 1993); idem., *Die Grossglockner-Hochalpenstraße: Zur Geschichte eines österreichischen Monuments* (Vienna, 1998).

¹⁹ For an extended discussion, see Thomas Zeller, *Straße, Bahn, Panorama. Verkehrswege und Landschaftsveränderung in Deutschland von 1930 bis 1990* (Frankfurt/New York, 2002), 41–209.

²⁰ Hans Schmithals, *Die Deutsche Alpenstraße* (Berlin, 1936); Wolf Strache, *Die Queralpenstraße* (Stuttgart, 5th ed., 1963).

²¹ H. Bachmann, "Deutsche Alpenstraße. Vom Bodensee zum Watzmann," *ADAC-Motorwelt* 6 (1960): 398–9.

²² Bruce Seely, "Der amerikanische Blick auf die deutschen Autobahnen. Deutsche und amerikanische Autobahnbauer 1930–1965," *WerkstattGeschichte* vol. 7, no. 21 (1998): 11–28.

²³ Susan Strasser/Charles McGovern/Matthias Judt, eds., *Getting and Spending: European and American Consumer Societies in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1998). For a recent overview of the expanding literature, see Susan Strasser, "Making Consumption Conspicuous. Transgressive Topics Go Mainstream," *Technology and Culture* 43 (2002): 755–770.

CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA, SEMINARS

AMERICA IN GERMANY—GERMANY IN AMERICA

Panel at the German Historikertag in Halle a.d. Saale, September 12, 2002. Convener: Christof Mauch. Participants: Heike Bungert (University of Cologne), Kathleen Conzen (University of Chicago), Andreas Daum (Harvard University), Philipp Gassert (University of Heidelberg), Wilfried Mausbach (Free University, Berlin), Axel Schildt (Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte and University of Hamburg).

The 44th biennial Historikertag, the largest meeting of professional historians in Germany, was dedicated to the topic "Traditionen—Visionen." The German Historical Institute organized and sponsored a panel that focused on the German presence in America and the American presence in Germany. In his introduction, Christof Mauch pointed out that the papers in this section reflected a change of influence from the nineteenth to the twentieth century in the German-American relationship. The first three papers focused on nineteenth-century German immigrants and travellers to the United States; the other two were dedicated to America's influence in Germany in the twentieth century. America played only a secondary role in political, economic, cultural, and scientific discourses of the nineteenth century, and German cultural critics often regarded the United States as a country without memory or history or, for that matter, as the "land of the future" (Hegel). The situation changed in the course of the twentieth century, when the American influence in Germany and Western Europe became strong in almost every field: American troops and movies, computer software and fashion, and more recently, the introduction of the Bachelor of Arts degree are highly visible and much-discussed symptoms of America's presence in and the Americanization of today's Germany. In contrast, the German influence in today's American culture is hardly visible, even though, according to the 2000 census, German-Americans are the strongest ethnic group in the U.S.

In a methodologically reflexive and highly stimulating paper, Andreas Daum (who unfortunately could not attend the meeting himself, but whose paper was read by Kathleen Conzen), argued that the German scientist Alexander von Humboldt enjoyed a great public reputation in nineteenth-century America. According to Daum, Humboldt was "invented" as a "hero" primarily *after* his death. He became a public figure

between 1859 and 1880 because worshipping him served multiple purposes on different (popular) levels of American culture. Daum discussed images of Humboldt as well as discursive strategies and symbolic acts pertaining to the American veneration of this German hero, whose popularity seems to have hinged on multiple (Daum identified ten) different "symbolic meanings" that could be found in American Humboldt celebrations. Depending on the ideals that specific social or ethnic groups projected onto their hero, Humboldt could be represented as a cosmopolitan figure or a nationalist German, a freethinker or a believer in God, a scientist or a politician, a second Columbus or a new Benjamin Franklin. Furthermore, Daum argued that Humboldt's success as a public figure coincided with the last peak of parade culture in the second half of the nineteenth century, which also saw the unveiling of Humboldt monuments in three major American cities: Philadelphia, St. Louis, and Chicago. According to Daum, the invention of "Humboldt-as hero" happened "because diverse groups within the United States realized that, in a period of social, ethnic, and cultural unrest, Humboldt's biography, his outstanding scientific accomplishments, and his political opinions allowed them to project their different cultural self-definitions onto one individual."

Like Andreas Daum, Heike Bungert discussed social values and cultural phenomena as essential elements within America's immigrant society. Bungert argued that German ethnic festivals played an immensely important role for nineteenth-century German-Americans. Because of the absence of common religious, social, and (until 1871) national roots, festivities offered "the only opportunity" to German-Americans for the "construction of a collective identity or ethnicity." Bungert explained that *Sängerfeste* and *Turnfeste*, as well as the anniversary celebrations of German personalities, were designed to gain recognition by fellow Americans and to invoke the German past and images of *Heimat*; to build German-American identities and to allow a temporary retreat from everyday routine. According to Bungert, the creation of the German Reich strengthened the identification of German-Americans with their homeland. At the same time, regional origins and differences were emphasized in a new type of *Volksfest* culture that began to arise in the late nineteenth century. Contrary to other scholars, Bungert argued that German-American festive culture did not disappear after World War I, but that sites of German-American memory were now located in America, rather than Germany.

In the third paper of this panel, Kathleen Conzen focused on a much overlooked section of America's immigrant population: German-speaking Catholics. By the end of the nineteenth century, this group had formed well over 2000 parishes scattered across the northern United

States. German Catholicism had endured as a distinctive subculture in American society because so many aspects of American life were confessionalised in nineteenth-century America and, more specifically, because Catholics had been successful since the 1820s in establishing a wide array of institutions, ranging from schools to mutual benefit societies, from orphanages to German-language Catholic newspapers. According to Conzen, the underlying organizational energy was as much an aggressive diasporic reflection of Catholic Germany as it was a defensive reaction to American nativism, German immigrant anticlericalism, or American Catholicism. The influence of nineteenth-century confessionalism, for which German Catholic immigrants may provide an instructive example, was not only stronger than is generally assumed, but according to Kathleen Conzen, it can also help us understand the American concern with religion which is "too often dismissed by American historians as either irrational nativism or irrelevant distraction from more central issues of race."

In a fourth paper (an expanded version of which is published in this issue of the Bulletin), Philipp Gassert focused on the field of American Studies in Germany, as well as on its main protagonists and institutions. Gassert emphasized the fact that the founding of the German Society of American Studies (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Amerikastudien, DGfA) in 1953 was supported by the High Commissioner of the United States and clearly showed an "American face." The Americans saw the revitalization of American Studies after World War II as part of their more general efforts in the field of reeducation and democratization. At the same time, however, a number of continuities lived on after 1945. The first board of the DGfA combined members who had emigrated from Nazi Germany, and others who had remained active as academics during the Third Reich. The ambiguous character of this new beginning was accompanied by the attempt to establish American Studies as a "cooperative project" of different disciplines rather than a subject of its own, which it had been during the Weimar period and the Third Reich.

In the last paper, Wilfried Mausbach discussed and analyzed German discourses about the war in Vietnam. Mausbach argued that terms such as the Occident (or *Abendland*), the West, the Atlantic Community, and the Free World provided emotionally charged patterns of political, ideological, and spacial identification for postwar Germans in an increasingly globalized and bipolar world. Vietnam had a fixed place in this virtual space. The issues connected with Vietnam were seen as a free-world problem rather than a regional matter. McGeorge Bundy declared at one point that "the defense of Berlin, right now, is in Vietnam." Thus, the Berlin-Saigon analogy provided a central symbol within this discourse of an imagined global geography. Interestingly, at the same time, Vietnam

also served as a very different symbol for leading members of the radical socialist student movement who identified the American genocide in Vietnam with the Holocaust and Vietnam with Auschwitz. In this respect, German discourses about Vietnam remind us that the 1960s saw “not only,” as Wilfried Mausbach put it, “an American war in Vietnam but also a German war for Vietnam.”

In his comments, Axel Schildt emphasized that all of the presenters had focused more on cultural issues than on diplomatic history. All of them had analyzed images of Germany or America, and they had thereby revealed the prejudices, visions, and desires of the creators of those images. Schildt made numerous constructive comments about each paper, but in his criticism he repeatedly returned to the larger question of what social factors and conditions might have contributed to the erosion or the disappearance of specific images, values, and preferences. The papers, as well as Axel Schildt’s comment, triggered an extensive discussion with a large and very interested audience.

Christof Mauch

GERMAN-AMERICAN ENCOUNTERS AFTER WORLD WAR II AND THE HOLOCAUST

Conference at the GHI, September 26–28, 2002. Conveners: Alexander Freund (GHI/AICGS/University of Winnipeg), Atina Grossmann (Cooper Union), Raimund Lammersdorf (GHI), Annette Puckhaber (GHI). Participants: Keith Allen (Corcoran College of Art and Design), Tobias Brinkmann (Simon-Dubnow-Institut für Jüdische Geschichte und Kultur, Leipzig), Gerhard Fürmetz (Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Munich), Laura J. Hilton (Muskingum College, New Concord, OH), Robert Gerald Livingston (GHI), Jeffrey M. Peck (AICGS/Canadian Centre for German and European Studies, Toronto), Johannes Platz (University of Trier), Steven Paul Remy (Brooklyn College—CUNY), Nils H. Roemer (University of Southampton), Timothy L. Schroer (George Mason University), Michael Schüring (Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften e.V., Berlin). Additional Participants: Kai Behrens (GHI), Caroline Galm (GHI), Janel B. Galvanek (GHI), Anna Held (GHI), Jeffrey Herf (University of Maryland), Dirk Schumann (GHI), Christoph Strupp (GHI), Birgit Zischke (World Bank, Washington, DC).

After 1945, Germans and Americans, both Jewish and gentile, encountered each other and had to deal with the past of the Second World War and the Holocaust in a variety of sites and situations in Germany and the United States. Most often, the encounters were located in and shaped by the transatlantic experiences of emigration, exile, occupation, return, exchange, and immigration. Gender and generation shaped these encounters as much as time and place, and they occurred as often in situations of everyday life as in more formal and institutionalized settings. Sixteen scholars from Germany, the United States, and Canada focused on such personal encounters in public and private and at different levels of society, and on the effects of these encounters on individuals and societies at large. The majority of papers examined encounters between Germans, Jews, and Americans in postwar West Germany and focused their attention on contemporary debates about Germans' ability to overcome Nazism. Other papers looked at more recent times or settings in the United States, exploring everyday encounters and constructions of memory, traditions, and sites of encounter.

In the opening panel, Alexander Freund examined how gentile Germans who had immigrated to the United States between the late 1940s and 1990s dealt with the Nazi past in an intercultural setting. For many post-1945 German immigrants, who Freund had interviewed in the past ten years, it was often the everyday encounters with Jewish Americans

and Jewish immigrants from Europe (both prewar refugees and postwar Displaced Persons) that forced them to negotiate the personal and national past in ways that Germans in Germany did not experience. As exemplified in a number of case studies, however, there were substantial differences in the experiences of three generations of Germans who came to live in the United States since the late 1940s. These differences were parallel to, but, because of the significantly different position of Germans in each society, not identical to the different experiences of the same three generations in Germany. In the discussion that followed, Atina Grossmann and Jeff Peck pointed to the importance of gender and generation in the analysis, while Tobias Brinkmann pointed out that the avoidance of encounters with Jews, especially in the first generation of postwar German immigrants, was also a form of encounter. Gerhard Fürmetz and Annette Puckhaber encouraged more research into the role of the German government and German-American clubs in the immigrants' reactions.

In his study of American-Jewish organizations' encounters with postwar West Germany, Karl-Heinz Füssl placed the theme in a more specified time frame and institutionalized situation. Examining three such encounters between 1945 and 1960, Füssl revisited the debate over Germans' ability to overcome antidemocratic, anti-Semitic and antihumanitarian attitudes. A study of American-Jewish organizations' research on anti-Semitism and democratic values in West Germany between 1945 and 1960 showed that Germans' attitudes toward Nazi values changed only very slowly. Because of their research findings, the American Jewish Congress and B'nai B'rith continued to be skeptical of German society, in part because they struggled to find German partners for institutional programs. Yet, they continued their engagement in activities to make German society more democratic and rid it of its anti-Semitism. Strategies to fight anti-Semitism differed between Germans and Americans. German campaigns (including those by Jewish-German organizations and communities) were directed specifically at anti-Semitism, whereas Jewish-American organizations proposed a broader fight for the protection of universal human rights.

In the second panel, Laura J. Hilton and Atina Grossmann juxtaposed everyday experiences with "official" or institutional responses. Examining the attitudes of the U.S. military and government toward Jewish Displaced Persons (DP's), Hilton concluded that they deteriorated dramatically as soon as the U.S. ground troops who had liberated the concentration camps were replaced by inexperienced troops, who saw Germans in a more favorable light and did not understand the background of Jewish DP camp life. With the emergence of the Cold War, moreover, the U.S. government shifted its focus from a fight against anti-Semitism to viewing West Germany as the new bulwark against Communism.

What had been understood as an “honorably burden” came to be seen as “just a burden.” This changing attitude led to an increase in German anti-Semitism in the immediate postwar years. It was especially young Germans who, receiving cues from the occupation forces, acted out their anti-Semitism.

How this and other changes in postwar Germany played out in everyday encounters between “defeated Germans and surviving Jews” was analyzed by Grossmann. The baby boom in DP camps led to innumerable relations between young Jewish mothers and German physicians, nurses, housekeepers, and nannies. Other sites of encounter were soccer matches, cafes, bars, dance-halls, weddings, administrative offices, and the camps themselves, which Germans entered both legally and illegally. Jews in postwar Germany established their visibility in German streets and their relations with Germans at least in part as a political act. Jews understood their showing Germans the rebirth of Jewish (political and personal) life as outright or symbolic revenge or justice. They achieved this in part by taking over former Nazi sites and redesignating them as Jewish spaces. In her gender analysis, Grossmann pointed out that the Jewish baby boom and Jewish-German sexual relations—phenomena that have hitherto been explained (away) as personal reactions—can be understood as such acts of resignification. The discussion that followed concentrated on the multitude of experiences of Displaced Persons in postwar Germany and reactions to them by the German population, the U.S. occupation forces, and the U.S. government.

The third panel took up the theme of everyday encounters and explored more specific case studies. Timothy Schroer examined relations between African-American men and German women in postwar West Germany. In the social context and the underlying dynamics of such relationships, race operated to “level the playing field” in the power relations between occupiers and occupied. The case of a German who prostituted his wife to an African-American GI in exchange for material goods illuminated how the power of whiteness could be used to counterbalance the power that the soldier had gained through his access to economic resources, his political power as a member of the occupying forces, and his masculine power. Yet, such interracial relationships did not undermine the racial divide, but strengthened it. Germans’ anxieties over U.S. troops were expressed not only in morality debates about German women’s relations with African-American GIs. As Maria Höhn argued in her study of the Rhineland-Palatinate, they were also expressed in moralized national discussions about Jewish bar owners who were alleged to facilitate such relationships. Bars in garrison towns continued to be segregated even after the U.S. military forces in Europe had been integrated in the early 1950s. Most bars catered to white GIs. Many of

these bars were owned by Germans, who leased them to Jewish bar operators. Yet, German discourse focused on the bars catering to African-American GIs, the German “prostitutes” who had relationships with black GIs, and the Jewish bar owners. Germans felt they were not breaking the philo-Semitic code when attacking Jewish bar-owners, because they were not German Jews, but rather East European. In fact, some even argued that Jewish bar owners were in part to blame for continued anti-Semitism. In his film “Schwarzer Kies” (1960), Helmut Käutner attempted to criticize this anti-Semitism in a scene that depicted a German making anti-Semitic remarks about the Jewish bar owner. But the public outcry that followed forced Käutner to cut the controversial scene.

In the discussion that followed, Peck and Höhn pointed out that black men were eroticized in Western and German culture. Höhn also specified black GIs’ access to economic resources, pointing out that they often worked in the kitchen, giving them greater access to food. Karl-Heinz Füssl criticized the lack of historical contextualization, pointing to the Swing Youth and the *Edelweißpiraten* in Weimar and Nazi Germany. While the forum could not decide whether these groups were the same generation as those establishing relationships with GIs, Schroer pointed out that it was often former *Edelweißpiraten* who beat up U.S. soldiers having relationships with German women. Fürmetz added that the public outrage over German women’s relationships with GIs might have been caused in part by the violence that shaped many of these relationships. As several participants argued, race became a major issue in public debate, because racism and segregation were seen as detrimental in the context of the Cold War. At the same time, many black soldiers experienced Germany as a place of freedom where they faced less racism. As Herf emphasized, however, the great majority of German-American encounters were between white, conservative, small town people.

In the fourth panel, Gerhard Fürmetz examined the case of the Jewish-German Holocaust survivor Philipp Auerbach (1906–1952), whose rich correspondence, stored at the Bavarian State Archives in Munich, Fürmetz is currently organizing and describing for archival access. As the highest Bavarian official in charge of compensation and redress, Auerbach was deeply involved in the discussions and political practice of *Wiedergutmachung* (redress) between 1946 and 1951. His positions in both the government and Jewish organizations placed him at the “crossroads of encounter” between Germans, Jews, and Americans. In order to achieve his many political aims, including relief for Nazi victims and punishment of war criminals, he built up a network of personal contacts that he manipulated with great skill. This strategy and the increasing divergence between his and his political allies’ goals eventually isolated him. In judicial proceedings charged with anti-Semitism, he was arrested

in early 1951 and charged with embezzlement and other felonies. Two days after being sentenced to prison he committed suicide.

Johannes Platz examined another institution in postwar West Germany—the military. More specifically, he analyzed the role and eventual failure of remigrated social scientists and former OMGUS officers in introducing new forms of personnel testing in the Bundeswehr’s formative years, 1950-57. Psychologists and social scientists, many of whom had returned from the United States, proposed to use an adapted form of a U.S. test to weed out recruits with an “authoritarian personality” or antidemocratic attitudes. Military officers, all of them former *Wehrmacht* officers, successfully rejected this method and reintroduced antiquated methods, although newer methods of testing were adopted in other respects. This opened the door to accepting more “modern” methods in the 1960s. In the discussion that followed, Grossmann emphasized the importance of Jewish *rémigrés* in postwar Germany and their changed positions in West German society after 1949. This was when they lost the protection of the U.S. government and international Jewish organizations, which ceased to condone Jews staying in Germany once the option of leaving was available. Remy pointed out that one has to differentiate among *rémigrés*, especially among those who had been pro-Nazi before their emigration and those who had not. Herf pointed out that by 1954 there was no further effort to bar war criminals from the Bundeswehr, and Platz emphasized that by 1956, the West German military was no longer open to negotiating.

In the fifth panel, Steven Remy pursued the discussion of remigrants in postwar West Germany, focusing on German-Jewish emigrés and academic culture in the U.S. zone of occupation. Suggesting that this case was not unique, Remy analyzed the personal confrontation between Daniel Penham, who returned to Germany as a member of the U.S. Army’s Counter Intelligence Corps, and Karl Heinrich Bauer, president of Heidelberg University. In 1945/46, when denazification in the U.S. zone was reaching its climax and critics on the German and American sides were gaining ground, Penham described the university’s faculty and student body as “Nazified to the core” and in need of thorough denazification. In his conclusion that universities in the U.S. zone were filled with Nazis, Penham was backed by some of his colleagues and part of the U.S. press. But his call for a temporary closing of the university and a removal of Bauer, whom he saw as compromised by Nazism, was rejected not only by Bauer (backed by Karl Jaspers) and the University Senate, but also by his American superiors. Although Penham achieved the dismissal of 17 instructors, Penham’s and many of his colleagues’ efforts to denazify universities in the American zone failed.

Continuing the focus on academic culture, but bringing the site of German-American encounters back to the United States and thus connecting it to Freund's paper, Peck examined the complex network of migration and the transfer of academic culture in the discipline of *Germanistik*. The generation of German *Germanisten* born in the war years who received their doctorates at German universities and critically examined the Nazi past migrated to the United States in the 1960s and 1970s. There they were mentored by an earlier generation of German emigres, who had fled persecution in the 1930s and continued their education and careers in the United States. This encounter forced many to revisit the German past and the history of exile and loss of culture. In the 1970s and 1980s, this second generation became mentors to a third generation, that of American graduate students, many of whom were Jewish and who in turn were faced with questions of identity. Moving into professional positions in the 1980s and 1990s, this third generation of American-Jewish *Germanisten* has shaped the shift from the focus of *Germanistik* on literature to the "Americanized" interdisciplinary field of German Studies. As new generations of German students come to the United States to pursue graduate degrees and careers, this web of knowledge, culture, and personal relations is further complicated. In the discussion that followed, Remy and Herf recounted negative encounters with archivists in Germany. Peck argued that such stories showed the continuing experience of many scholars visiting Germany, where their Jewishness plays a greater part than in their daily lives in the United States. Schüring emphasized the importance of differentiating among generations, which led to a more general discussion about German professors' willingness or unwillingness to come to terms with the universities' Nazi involvement. In a critique of the archaic hierarchical university system in Germany, several discussants pointed out that those pointing to the Nazi past of universities and their professors continue to be marginalized.

Panel six continued the focus on education as a site of German-American encounters. Michael Schüring examined the role of the Max Planck Society (MPS) in reestablishing contacts with emigré scientists in the United States. The myth of an untainted past of the MPS's predecessor, the Kaiser Wilhelm Society (KWS), has only recently been debunked. Indeed, the KWS's strategy of protecting only its most distinguished Jewish members from the Nazis was continued by the MPS, when it contacted only the most prominent emigré scientists after 1945 and ignored former KWS members' claims for compensation, referring them to German state authorities. Hence, in establishing its reputation as an important research institution, the MPS had to rely on emigré scientists who were reminders of the institute's complicity with Nazism. The emigré

scientists who were asked to rejoin the MPS found themselves in a dilemma as well. On the one hand, membership in an elite scientific institution was integral to their identity as accomplished scientists. On the other hand, they had to accept the MPS's rejecting responsibility for any injustice done under the Nazis. In the discussion that followed, Schüring explained the personal dilemma emigré scientists faced by pointing out the impoverished lives most of them lived in exile, which may explain why many showed more loyalty to the scientific community than resentment over their discrimination by the KWS. Herf framed this in the notion of self-respect versus career interest and mentioned strategic self-censorship. Discussants pointed to the concept of the transnationalization of Holocaust memory as a context of the MPS study and also to the fact that an increasing number of scientific institutions as well as corporations have begun to investigate their Nazi past, in part because, as Schüring said about the MPS project, "they could not afford not to study it."

Annette Puckhaber examined the early German student exchange programs, particularly the exchange of high school students organized by the National Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC) after 1948. These were organized in the general effort of reeducation and reorientation, which the United States saw as important in turning German society into a democracy. Understanding religion as a common bond between former enemies, the NCWC praised the high school exchange program as most effective. While the NCWC was convinced of the general success of the program and the positive impact German students had in the United States and in Germany upon their return, evaluations of returning students did not demonstrate any basic democratization. Instead, it seemed that students living the "American way of life" were more attracted by the material riches of the American economy than by democratic values. Many experienced the return to Germany as a greater "culture shock" than life in America. In the discussion that followed, Puckhaber, in response to Höhn, explained that parents were not concerned about the "American way of life," in part because the students could support their families in Germany. Füssl and Fürmetz emphasized the impact of the material wealth, but Puckhaber pointed out the link between an attraction to wealth and to democratic ideas. Responding to Höhn and Remy, Puckhaber explained that interviews with students in early exchanges showed that the Nazi past was less a topic of debate than communism, and that there were concerns about students' "misperceptions" of the United States if they lived in the segregated American south.

Panel seven brought the discussion of German-American encounters into the more recent past by looking at public, touristic places in Germany as sites of encounters. The Berlin Scheunenviertel is such a site of encounters between Jewish-American and German gentile and German-

Jewish visitors. But, as Tobias Brinkmann showed in his paper, it is a complicated and complex site that is less real than it seems. Revived since the early 1980s by a non-Jewish public interested in the Holocaust's victims and promoted more recently as the "Jewish Berlin" by the Berlin tourism agency, it is part of a larger phenomenon of "virtual Jewish culture." While this neighborhood possesses a number of Jewish community institutions, few Jews actually live there. Moreover, even at the height of its Jewish population in the Weimar Republic, the Scheunenviertel never had the cultural significance of Jewish neighborhoods such as New York City's Lower East Side. Yet, in the 1990s the Scheunenviertel was recreated for mostly non-Jewish visitors, based in part on traditions invented and nostalgia invoked by non-Jewish Berliners. The artist Shimon Attie and others, however, have focused attention on the Scheunenviertel as a Holocaust memorial, pointing to the loss of culture rather than to any existing or previously existing culture. Other neighborhoods, especially Berlin's Bayerisches Viertel, have employed more subtle means and memorials to point visitors to the neighborhoods' Jewish history.

Nils Roemer pointed to Worms as a tourism site that features the presence of the absence of a Jewish cultural heritage. Non-Jews' reconstruction of Worms as a Jewish space in spite of Jews' absence from this space began in the late 1940s as a result of personal encounters with Jewish-American visitors. By 1950, as Hannah Arendt noted, Worms had become "a shrine of Jewish pilgrimage." Surrounded by much controversy, the Worms synagogue was rebuilt in 1961. While Worms was emphatically embraced by Germans as a new beginning and pushed by the German National Tourist Office since the early 1990s as a "must" for Jewish tourists, Jews around the world have remained skeptical. Although Worms draws thousands of Jewish visitors each year, others have stayed away. Still others have given it new meaning, constructing it as a point for Jews to connect with pre-Holocaust Jewish history. Nevertheless, most Jewish visitors experience Worms in ambivalent ways, as a place that connects them to the past before the Holocaust and to the Holocaust itself. They see the synagogue, but also its emptiness. In the discussion that followed, Peck stated that it is interesting to see the rising interest in and awareness of Jewish culture and studies in Germany, but that it is also suspicious. Schüring pointed out that many Jewish-American visitors to the Scheunenviertel notice the strong police presence first. Roemer noted that while Worms may not be typical, it does represent a major part of German society and history and has been an important place to visit for European and American travellers.

In the last panel, Robert Gerald Livingston and Raimund Lammersdorf revisited Ronald Reagan and Helmut Kohl's infamous 1985 Bitburg visit. While Livingston recounted the fascinating details of the politics

and politicking in the highest echelons on both sides of the Atlantic, Lammersdorf looked at the politics of memory. Livingston contended that official German-American political relations were influenced by American-Jewish organizations exactly twice: In the early 1950s, on the question of NATO membership and reparations to Israel, and in 1985, on the question of the President's and German Chancellor's visit to the cemetery that contained graves of members of the Waffen-SS. But Bitburg did not change the Cold War relations between West Germany and United States. Kohl, much like his successor Gerhard Schröder, attempted to reinvigorate German pride. Lammersdorf discussed the politics of memory surrounding the incident, which both insulted the values U.S. troops had fought and died for and validated the sacrifices of German troops. This pointed to different conceptions of victimhood on both sides of the Atlantic, which are ultimately irreconcilable. The case study of Bitburg supports the thesis Lammersdorf proposes in a larger comparative study, namely that the differences between the political cultures in the United States and Germany are greater than they are usually perceived. While not pursuing a strategy of nationalization, Kohl represented a larger national feeling. Like many Germans, he conflated all victims of World War II as the same victims. While controversial, such an interpretation has recently become more accepted.

The conference's concluding discussion attempted to synthesize the many topics and approaches and to outline areas and methods of further research. Discussants proposed a number of themes that would help focus various research strategies and topics. Peck outlined four such themes: the author's position in research (the idea of "being implicated"), the concepts of exchange and movement (travelling, working abroad, etc.), the notion of ambivalence about the reestablishment of a Jewish community in Germany and its meanings, and the role of the Holocaust in German-American-Jewish relations and the question of "normalization" in such relations. Grossmann noted the response to the conference's call for papers, which attracted mainly papers on German-Jewish relations and on cultural and social relations, but few papers by women and on gender. Some of Peck's and Grossmann's points were taken up by Freund, who argued for the concept of transnationalism to analyze processes such as normalcy and migration and for methods of "bottom up history." Grossmann further emphasized the role Jews have played as interpreters of German society and politics for Americans. She also suggested using Frank Stern's concept of the "historic triangle" of German-American-Jewish relations to investigate how these relations worked at different times and places. Roemer advocated expanding and thus complicating the historical triangle to include Israel and Great Britain. Peck supported this idea, noting the importance of Israeli-German relations.

Livingston, however, wondered whether the Jewish focus in work on German-American encounters was disproportionate. This was echoed by Platz and Schüring. Other topics of further research that were suggested included the enigmas of German victimhood and West German society's successful democratization (Grossmann). Livingston pointed to the role of economics to explain the latter. Schroer emphasized the significance of generation in the actual research process and the perceived marginalization of younger historians at the conference and in the transatlantic research community at large. The discussion ended with a plea to continue the cooperative working relationships and the proposal that the focus of research should shift to the third generation of postwar Germans. Grossmann also encouraged the formation of transatlantic study teams to research large projects such as the history of displaced persons and referred to the role of the United States as an accommodating site for Germans to reflect on their history. Overall, the conference succeeded in spite and because of the great diversity of topics, and because of its interdisciplinarity and intergenerational form.

Alexander Freund

THE DIFFICULT PATH TO UNITY: EAST GERMAN MENTALITIES AND THEIR TRANSFORMATION AFTER 1990

Symposium at the GHI, October 3, 2002. Convener: Bernd Schäfer (GHI).
Speakers: Joachim Gauck (Berlin), James D. Bindenagel (Washington,
D.C.).

One might think that October 3 as the “Day of German Unity” is an uncontroversial day in contemporary German history. Remembering the joyous 1990 unification and subsequent merger of the two German states established under post-1945 Cold War divisions, the celebration of such a day might by now have become rather routine. Germans being Germans, however, memory was soon clouded by the increasing economic, social, and psychological burdens of unification in both former parts of the country. Therefore, in Germany itself, October 3 has turned into a highly compartmentalized day of celebration on which the Federal Republic’s political elite solemnly gathers in one of the state capitals to search their souls about the still unsatisfactory “inner unification.” Servicing people in the Washington area interested in such issues, the German Historical Institute strives to commemorate this day with reflections by prominent speakers on Germany’s “state of the nation.”

In 2002 Joachim Gauck, the former “Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security of the former GDR” and one of the few people in Germany after whom an agency—the so-called “Gauck-Behörde”—has been named (albeit unofficially), lectured to a large audience about “The Difficult Path to Unity” and East German mentalities. He spoke and sometimes preached to highly attentive, almost spellbound listeners, given his eminent oratorical skills developed in decades of Protestant ministry in the former GDR.

Before discussing German unification, the speaker talked about the preceding loss of freedom on the side of the East Germans. How they regained that freedom by taking their grievances and frustrations to the streets of the GDR in fall 1989 was narrated by Joachim Gauck in an impressive manner. He wondered whether anybody in the western world could imagine what it meant to motivate people who were captives of fear throughout their lives to become politically active and take the risk involved in confronting the authorities of a menacing state apparatus. Gauck repeated a line from one of his public speeches to 8,000 people in his Rostock church in October 1989 and related how he agonized over pronouncing these words: “We say good-bye to our fear” (Wir sagen

unserer Angst "Auf Wiedersehen"). For himself and many friends in the GDR, he confessed to have learned from Vaclav Havel "the power of the powerful derives from the weakness of the powerless." The speaker stressed the importance of fully grasping this truth and defining the real situation in a dictatorship. With the increasing flight of younger people to the West in summer of 1989, the repressed population in the GDR had finally realized this dictatorial pattern and began to overcome their weakness. In fall 1989, people said farewell to fear, went into the streets, and shouted "We are the people," according to Gauck, in fact saying "We have entered into a new role that we haven't practiced thus far."

People in the GDR had been incapacitated, denied any real participation or emancipation in the political realm. Therefore, the fall of 1989 was a period of empowerment for the people. They regained self-consciousness: "I am something, I am a citizen, we are the people." Utilizing their new power, an overwhelming majority of people in East Germany longed for rapid reunification with West Germany, where everything seemed to be superior to the GDR and nearly picture-perfect. They didn't want to wait a lifetime for another experiment of social reform or revolution, but opted for what they perceived as the almost infallible model of success from the prosperous Western part of the country. Unification, however, soon brought about another period of tutelage. The Eastern victors of history in 1989/90, who had become masters of their fate when overthrowing the communist rulers, suddenly had to realize their demotion to "apprentices under Helmut Kohl." The feeling of having to learn a completely new and different system of society, economy, and culture furthered a second consecutive alienation from "the system." "Liberation does not mean liberty": Many people in the former GDR, according to Gauck, have no desire to become citizens of a civil society, but reproduce and nourish a feeling of powerlessness. The speaker considered such fatalism dangerous in the long run, and he estimated the timeline of mental transformation from dictatorship to democracy at four to five decades. Intellectual knowledge might not be a substitute for deficiencies in mentality.

Gauck argued that Germany had a weak tradition of liberation movements compared to extensive periods of voluntary obedience and political subservience. The East German revolution of 1989 had the potential of establishing pride among East Germans, just as the post-1945 success story of democracy did for the West Germans. An emancipated German nation could draw from this pride to establish self-reliance and avoid neurosis. Maybe Germans could then respond to foreign immigration more calmly, acknowledge and accept different opinions, and enter debate in an engaged and civilized style. Joachim Gauck wanted to give Germany all these wishes on October 3, 2002.¹

In his comments, Ambassador James D. Bindenagel, an “old German hand” of the State Department who served in the U.S. embassies of Bonn and East Berlin in the eighties and nineties and recently acted as U.S. Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues, recalled the November 1989 events from his personal memory when he was stationed in the GDR. He continued by outlining the emergence of the new Germany as a “Berlin Republic” over the last decade, characterized by such landmark decisions as German participation in international military missions and agreeing to compensation for forced laborers from the Nazi era. Without hiding his irritation with some of the political rhetoric in the 2002 German electoral campaign, Bindenagel wondered about future irrationalities of a “special German way.” He ended, though, on an optimistic note that Germans would live up to their international responsibilities.

Bernd Schäfer

Note

¹ The full German text of Joachim Gauck’s lecture from October 3, 2002 can be accessed on the GHI website at www.ghi-dc.org.

THE FIGHT FOR THE FILES: CAPTURED GERMAN RECORDS AFTER WORLD WAR II

Panel at the German Studies Association, San Diego, California, October 3–6, 2002. Co-sponsored by the German Historical Institute, Washington, D.C., and the German Historical Institute, Paris. Moderator: Christof Mauch, GHI, Washington. Panelists: Stefan Martens (GHI, Paris), Astrid M. Eckert (Free University Berlin/GHI, Washington), Annette Weinke, (University of Potsdam). Commentator: Gerhard L. Weinberg (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill).

At this year's GSA conference in San Diego, the GHI Washington and the GHI Paris co-sponsored a panel for the first time, which will hopefully be the beginning of a fruitful cooperation between these two Institutes. The panel explored three different aspects of the postwar history of captured German records by turning the records from sources of information for the writing of history—as historians usually think about them—into objects of study with a history in their own right. The focus on the “biographies” of the records and archives revealed them as highly contested commodities in the struggle for political, military, and technical intelligence, and for precedents in the writing of history.

When Allied troops advanced into Germany, they captured a large number of German records. The historical records of the German Foreign Office dating back to 1867 were seized by American and British troops in April 1945. American GIs also captured approximately ten million Nazi Party membership cards that would later become part of the Berlin Document Center. The British seized the papers of the German Navy; the Americans shipped countless German military records to the United States. Whereas the Americans and British were as prepared for the capture of essential records as circumstances during the advance permitted, the French lacked the necessary information to secure a major acquisition. Meanwhile, the extent and character of records and archives captured by Soviet troops remained unknown to the Western Allies during the early occupational period. On all sides, the documents were put to immediate use. They were a priceless source of operational intelligence while the war lasted and provided crucial evidence for the trial of major war criminals and the subsequent proceedings in Nuremberg. At the same time, the Allies were fully aware of the unique historical value of the papers. In 1946, this awareness led to the decision to publish the most important papers from the German Foreign Office (*Auswärtiges Amt*) and the Reich Chancery in the Anglo-American edition *Documents on German Foreign Policy* (the French joined the project in spring 1947). Unforeseen, however,

was the role Nazi records would play in the ideological conflict (*Systemkonflikt*) between the two Germanies. The destabilizing potential of these records for the political elite of the Federal Republic was aptly exploited by the GDR government in pointed propaganda campaigns.

Stefan Martens, deputy director of the GHI Paris, filled a gap in our knowledge on the postwar fate of German records in France after the withdrawal of occupational authorities and Wehrmacht troops. His paper "Akten als Element der Vergangenheitsbewältigung. Das Schicksal deutscher Akten nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg in Frankreich," was based on the recent joint effort by the German Historical Institute in Paris, the Federal Archives (*Bundesarchiv*), and the Archives Nationales to give an overview on German sources in French archives and material on the occupation of France and Belgium in German archives.¹ According to Martens, the origins of French interests in German archives are to be found in the nascent planning for postwar war crime trials which, in the French case, meant primarily the trial of native collaborators. To that end, the records of the German occupational authorities, especially the *Militärbefehlshaber Frankreich* (MBF), were indispensable. Yet whereas the British and Americans entered the Reich well prepared for the document hunt—Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) had assigned special Target Forces—the French could not keep up the pace. Thus, the most prominent military and political records, including parts of MBF, found their way into document centers under Anglo-American jurisdiction.

Counting on their recently acquired status as an occupying power, the French government attempted to gain access to the Ministerial Collecting Center in Fürstentagen near Kassel and, later, to the Ministerial Document Branch in Berlin-Tempelhof. British and American diplomats, however, were anxious to defer French use of the archives. It was not until October 1945 that a French delegation was allowed to set foot into the document centers—only to be overwhelmed by the tremendous quantity of largely disorganized paper. The hunt for the records of *Militärbefehlshaber Frankreich* led to a partial success when, in April 1946, the Americans sent several boxes of records to Paris. However, as the French quickly realized, the Americans had held these records for several months without informing them, and they made no attempt to deliver any further material relating to the German occupation of France. This and similar incidents nurtured the French suspicion of being deliberately excluded from the document hunt. In his commentary, Gerhard L. Weinberg pointed out, however, that what might have looked like a conspiracy to the "very touchy and suspicious French government" could just as well have been due to the chaotic circumstances during the immediate postwar period. Regardless of the actual source of political sensitivity, the

perception of being excluded had consequences at a later date: In 1952, when the Federal Government demanded the return of the captured records, the French High Commissioner, André François-Poncet, blocked the request for the duration by declaring the records to be war booty. The French government thus attempted to finally have a say in the document business.

Astrid M. Eckert shifted the focus from the French to the British. The paper—derived from a recently submitted dissertation²—examined the negotiations for the return of the captured German records from the British perspective. Whereas we are partly informed on how the various branches of the U. S. Government dealt with the captured records,³ the policies pursued in London have only been examined in connection with the most prominent case, the so-called Windsor File.⁴ Based on wartime agreements, however, the British were an equal partner in determining the whereabouts of the seized archives and records. The paper focused on the fate of the German diplomatic files that were being edited in England for the projected multivolume publication *Documents on German Foreign Policy*.

The seized records and archives became a bone of contention once a West German government was formed and could reassert itself again. In one of its very first resolutions, in October 1949, the *Deutsche Bundestag* demanded the return of all captured records and archives. The West German press, in sometimes nationalistic tones, joined in and held that the Allies had captured and “carried away” German national history. The demand from Bonn caught the Foreign Office in the process of redefining its policy towards the former foe. The British diplomats soon wanted to accommodate the Federal Government and advocated a return of the diplomatic records in order to remove a possible irritant in the changing Anglo-German relations. This was met by strong resistance from some British historians who feared the Germans would tamper with the returning files to alter the historical record for political purposes. The protest was vigorous enough to successfully preclude an early solution. The British diplomats thus found themselves in a position where—in order to satisfy the historians—they offended their American partners who favored a return, as well as the Germans whose cooperation was being sought on larger political issues. It was Churchill’s personal interest in the return issue, Eckert argued, that weakened the Foreign Office’s stand and gave the historians the leverage to block the negotiations for at least two years. As Gerhard Weinberg added, the British historians were thus taking a position on the return issue that was exactly opposite to that of American scholars. Whereas the British urged delay, the Americans pushed for rapid action. Absent from Eckert’s presentation was a discussion of the British sensitivity about the German naval archives, especially

records on submarine warfare. Gerhard Weinberg pointed to the centrality of these documents to *any* British return policies.

Finally, the paper “Of Confrontation and Cooperation: The German-German Conflict over the Use of East-bloc Nazi Files as Documentary Evidence in the Criminal Investigations against the Nazi Perpetrators” by Annette Weinke gave a fascinating account of the closely interrelated judicial *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, the systemic competition between the two German states, and their respective foreign policy. She put to work the paradigm devised by Christoph Klessmann that views the history of the two Germanies as a “parallel history of two separate German states, asymmetrically interwoven with each other” (*asymmetrisch miteinander verflochtene Teilungsgeschichte*).⁵

With the Hallstein Doctrine well entrenched, the SED regime attempted to undermine the Federal Republic’s stubborn insistence that it represented the only legitimate German state. For that purpose, it conducted various “anti-fascist” propaganda campaigns, targeting the West German elite as a bunch of Nazi revanchists. The logistical basis for this propaganda offensive lay in the East bloc’s large store of German documents from the Nazi era. Much of the Third Reich’s meticulous paperwork had survived and was warehoused at the East German party and state archives, or in the archives of the East bloc allies, especially Poland and Czechoslovakia. After the Allied War Crimes trials, the files had been ignored for many years. One of the most effective East German propaganda campaigns began in 1957 and was known as the attack on “Hitler’s Blood Judges.” By chance or design, East Germany’s “anti-fascist” agitation was well-timed. It happened to begin just when West German attitudes with regard to the Nazi past were changing. One result of this change in West German attitudes was that the Federal Republic’s political and law enforcement authorities began, at the end of the 1950s, to show—or at least pretended to show—greater interest in obtaining the archival evidence of Nazi crimes available in the East bloc in order to enable the state attorneys to bring charges against former Nazi judges and prosecutors.

Weinke convincingly argued that, in the long run, the East German “anti-fascist” campaigns—unsettling as they at first proved to be for the West—backfired and became at least as unsettling for the GDR as they were for FRG: The increased interest in Nazi crimes was drawing attention to alleged Nazi perpetrators who were still living unmolested in East Germany. Even worse for the SED was the fact that West German authorities, foremost the Zentralstelle in Ludwigsburg, established informal contacts with the Polish government that blossomed into a formal working relationship. As Weinberg added in his commentary, this relationship threatened to lead to the discovery of “embarrassing documents about

individuals in the GDR" by West German authorities—a situation to be avoided at all costs. By the middle of the 1960s, then, the constellation between the two German states on the field of *Vergangenheitspolitik* had dramatically changed. In the late 1950s, the GDR had forced the Nazi documents on West Germany. Now, a few years later, the GDR was actively trying to prevent West German prosecutors from gaining access to the Nazi files in Polish archives.

In his concluding remarks, Gerhard Weinberg drew attention to the fact that the fight for the files at the time as well as current negotiations about the return and restitution of records from the war period contained a remarkable element of short-sightedness. Like other countries at war, German agencies generally used the poorest paper possible; all nations preferred to use their resources for the urgent requirements of the moment. This means in practice that the paper is deteriorating, and those who hold it will before long have little but crumbling and illegible scraps. It is for this reason essential, Weinberg urged, that the records be micro-filmed, wherever they are. Over time, physical possession of the paper records of the first half of the twentieth century will become less and less significant. There is a window of opportunity now, Weinberg said, for a general exchange of films, but that window will close as the originals fall apart.

Astrid M. Eckert

Notes

¹ Stefan Martens, "Frankreich und Belgien unter deutscher Besatzung und das Schicksal der deutschen Akten nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg," in *Frankreich und Belgien unter deutscher Besatzung 1940–1944. Die Bestände des Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv Freiburg*, Stefan Martens with the aid of Sebastian Remus, ed. (Stuttgart: Thorbecke, 2002). See also: *La France et la Belgique sous l'occupation allemande 1940–1944. Les fonds allemands conservés aux Centre historique des Archives nationales. Inventaire de la sous-série AJ40*. Inventory revised by Guy Beaujouan, Anne-Marie Bourgoin, Pierre Cézard, Marie-Thérèse Chabard, Élisabeth Dunan, Jean-Daniel Pariset, Christian Wilsdorf, review by Christine Douyère-Demeulenaere with the collaboration of Michèle Conchon. Introduction by Stefan Martens and Andreas Nielsen. (Paris: Archives nationales, forthcoming winter 2002). Wolfgang Hans Stein, *Inventar von Quellen zur deutschen Geschichte in Pariser Archiven und Bibliotheken*. Instrumenta 5. (Stuttgart: Thorbecke, 2002).

² Astrid M. Eckert, "Der Kampf um die Akten. Die Rückgabeverhandlungen um beschlagnahmtes deutsches Archivgut, 1944–1958" (Phil. Diss. FU Berlin, September 2002).

³ Robert Wolfe, ed., *Captured German and Related Records. A National Archives Conference* (Athens, OH: Ohio UP, 1974).

⁴ Paul R. Sweet, "Der Versuch amtlicher Einflußnahme auf die Edition der 'Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1933–1941,' in *Vierteljahrshäfte für Zeitgeschichte* 39 (1991): 265–303; Sweet, "The Windsor File," in *Historian* 59:2 (1997): 263–279.

⁵ See Weinke's recently published book: *Die Verfolgung von NS-Tätern im geteilten Deutschland. Vergangenheitsbewältigung 1949–1968 oder: Eine deutsch-deutsche Beziehungsgeschichte im Kalten Krieg* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2002).

EXCEPTIONALISM IN EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY

Symposium at the GHI, October 10, 2002. Convener: Christof Mauch (GHI). Participants: Joachim Radkau (University of Bielefeld), John McNeill (Georgetown University).

Over the last few years, the German Historical Institute has sought to enhance the dialogue between environmental historians on both sides of the Atlantic.

In 1999, the GHI organized a lecture series on "Nature in German History," and in 2000, a conference was held in Tallahassee, Florida, on the topic of "Environmentalism in Global Perspective." The symposium in October 2002 brought together two outstanding scholars from Germany and America in the field of global environmental history, Joachim Radkau and John McNeill. The event also served as the opening event for an international conference on "Landscapes and Roads in Europe and America," which started the following day.

In his paper, Radkau argued that Western and Central Europe could be considered as an environmental unit since medieval times in several important respects. He noted, however, that religion would be at the center of a distinctive European path, and he pleaded for an institutional approach to environmental history. According to Radkau, one would be most likely to identify a characteristic European path of environmental history not in the sphere of ideas and individual actions, but on the level of institutions and collective behavior. He argued that European polycentrism had produced diverse approaches, which proved to be an advantage for effective environmental management. Nevertheless, environmental history was not a "European miracle" (Eric L. Jones). Instead, western civilizations should learn lessons from Chinese environmental history, where, for a long time, a high degree of sustainability existed, which partly explained Chinese cultural continuity over the millennia.

In his reply, John McNeill agreed with the general argument that Radkau had presented, but challenged many individual points. After a discussion with the audience, McNeill praised the boldness of Radkau's undertaking and suggested that the German Historical Institute would do well to bring Radkau's work to the widest possible audience. The next issue of the *Bulletin* will feature Joachim Radkau's paper and John McNeill's response.

Christof Mauch

LANDSCAPES AND ROADS IN NORTH AMERICA
AND EUROPE:
CULTURAL HISTORY IN TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE

Conference at the GHI, October 11–13, 2002. Conveners: Christof Mauch (GHI) and Thomas Zeller (GHI). Participants: Rudy Koshar (University of Wisconsin at Madison), Tim Davis (U.S. National Park Service, Washington, D.C.), Robert Buerglener (University of Chicago), Carl Zimring (Carnegie Mellon University), Massimo Moraglio (Politecnico di Torino), Peter Merriman (University of Reading), Michel Conan (Dumbarton Oaks), Thomas Zeller (GHI), Joachim Wolschke-Bulmahn (University of Hannover), Axel Doßmann (University of Jena), William Rollins (University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand), Matthew Roth (University of Southern California), Suzanne Julin (Public Historian, Missoula, MT), Diane Krahe (Washington State University), Nancy Volkman (Texas A&M University), Jeremy Korr (California State University, Fullerton), Louise Nelson Dyble (University of California, Berkeley).

This international conference brought together scholars working on the aesthetics and politics of landscape. By looking at various examples of road design in the twentieth century, the conference participants tried to assess the meaning of landscape for different countries and under different political regimes. Roads are a particularly useful field of study in this respect, since they are situated at and often represent the borderline between nature and technology, one of the most powerful dichotomies in Western thought. Rather than reinforcing this divide, the conference aimed at historicizing the question of what is natural and what is man-made. Many of the papers were informed by recent methodological approaches in environmental history that seek to shed light on the areas of exchange and transition between nature and technology.

Another goal of the conference was to make possible comparisons between individual countries and their respective ideas and practices of building roads (such as the *autobahn*, *autostrada*, *autoroute*, or motorway) and, thereby, landscapes. During the twentieth century, road designers often claimed that a particular road would express essentially German, French, or American ideas about landscape. In analyzing the rhetorical and technological means that helped to construct these notions, conference participants were able to overcome these ideas of particularity, which had often influenced the historiography as well.

The conference's opening panel, entitled "Inventing Drivers—Creating Roads," introduced the topic of landscaped roads with two broadly

conceived papers. In his contribution, "Driving Cultures and the Meaning of Roads: Some Transnational Examples," Rudy Koshar argued that roads derive their cultural meanings and social resonance not from the actions of engineers or political authorities, but from car drivers. His effort to bring the driver back into the picture was based on a larger understanding of citizenship in twentieth-century societies that included driving cars as a civic activity, not just as a technical skill. Koshar proposed a sequence of three distinct driving practices: pioneering, democratic, and oppositional; each one associated with different historical periods. In his similarly extensive paper, Tim Davis analyzed "The Rise and Decline of the American Parkway." Both technologically and culturally, he asserted, parkways could serve simultaneously as icons of modernity and repositories of traditional values. Federally funded projects such as the Blue Ridge Parkway in North Carolina and Virginia or the Mount Vernon Memorial Highway in suburban Washington, D.C., presented a highly selective version of American history and destiny, according to Davis. Still, they were emulated in other parts of the Western world as well.

One way to make sense of the landscape is by reading signs and markers, which were the subject of the second panel, "Inscribing the Landscape—Constructing the Road." In his paper "The Inscribed Landscape: Early Twentieth-Century Automobile Tourists, Signage, and Route Markings in the U.S.," Robert Buerglener described a process of ordering and classifying landscape through increasingly uniform signs. Organizations such as highway associations and motor clubs physically changed the driving environment through the use of signs and markings, enabling people to drive at higher speeds and with greater predictability. In the 1960s, billboards alongside American roads became the subject of a fierce battle over "highway beautification," as Carl Zimring pointed out. His paper "Neon, Junk, and Ruined Landscape: Competing Visions of America's Roadsides and the Battle Over the Highway Beautification Act of 1965" examined the evolving interests of the scrap metal industry and the outdoor advertising industry. Their commercial motives pitted them against environmentalists and parts of the federal government, in particular Lady Bird Johnson, President Johnson's wife. Zimring asserted that, in the end, economic instead of environmental usages of space prevailed after a long battle.

The next panel, "Designing European Roads," shed light on European constructions of landscape. In a sweeping paper entitled "Landscape and Highways in Italy: Progress and Tradition from the 1920s to the 1970s," Massimo Moraglio described this nation's massive push for road-building in the 1920s and the subsequent growth of the autostrada network. In sharp contrast to the United States and other European coun-

tries, the managers of the Italian highway system deemed it unnecessary to hire landscape architects for beautifying the roads and instead relied on models of increased communication, circulation, and modernization in the most efficient form possible. Until the 1960s, roads could still be portrayed as harbingers of progress. In Peter Merriman's presentation "'Beautified' is a Vile Phrase: The Politics and Aesthetics of Landscaping Roads in Early Postwar Britain," highway design in Great Britain appeared as the outcome of contestations between civil engineers favoring "orderly" roads and the proposals of landscape architects based on horticultural ideas and the long British history of sculpted landscapes. Only in the late 1950s did landscape consultants enter the design process. In his contribution "The Living Landscape of Lassus' Motorways," Michel Conan analyzed the landscaping of French toll roads by Bernard Lassus, a Parisian professor. In this process, Conan argued, rural citizens participated in decisions on design, making landscape a living process rather than a fixed state of nature.

The construction of the Nazi autobahn has been the subject of much scholarship and debate. One of the conference panels took a fresh look at various aspects of road and landscape design in 1930s Germany and beyond. In his paper on "Building and Rebuilding the Landscape of the Autobahn," Thomas Zeller discussed two major issues pertaining to roads as cultural and technological artifacts. First, he argued that speed and speeding on the autobahn were central to its purpose. He emphasized that autobahns were specifically portrayed as tokens of national German pride during the Nazi period. Second, he looked at the civil engineers and landscape architects and the way in which they organized the construction and design of the roads. In particular, Zeller argued that the technological knowledge of engineers gained increasing currency vis-à-vis the ideas and ideals of landscape planners. During the Nazi period, the importance of design decreased over time, partly because of economic constraints. Similarly, in the postwar period concerns of rationality and safety took prominence over landscape architecture. The upsurge of road casualties was blamed on roads, rather than drivers; and the cutting down of trees along the roads was regarded as a necessary tribute to modernization.

In his paper on "Landscape Planning and Reichsautobahnen during the Nazi Period," Joachim Wolschke-Bulmahn emphasized Nazi interest in the highway project as a propaganda tool for demonstrating the progressiveness and modernity of National Socialism. He argued that the blood-and-soil ideology of the Nazis, which implied a rejection of everything foreign and had fatal consequences for millions of people, also impacted the planning of German roads and landscapes. Thus, German landscape architects characterized the straight roads of the Italians and

Americans as inappropriate for Germany. Moreover, they advanced a design doctrine for German highways that was both nationalistic and racist as it promoted the exclusive use of native plants. Wolschke-Bulmahn criticized those planners in the Federal Republic who continued to promote native-plant-ideologies after 1945; he suggested that considerations of ecology and plant sociology, rather than nativity, should be stressed in landscape design.

Issues of continuity and change were also addressed in the paper by Axel Doßmann, titled "'Volkseigene Autobahnen': Landscape, Bridges and National Self-Image in the GDR, 1949-1989." Doßmann pointed out that GDR politicians and landscape architects were hoping to establish a clear aesthetic alternative to National Socialism. In reality, however, by trying to distinguish themselves from the Western ideals of the Bauhaus and the International Style, they ended up promoting a type of classic design (for instance in bridge-building) that mirrored Nazi concepts and ideals. Both aesthetic and ecological considerations took a backseat in the planning of GDR highways; and from the 1960s, GDR civil engineers drew much of their technological knowledge and ideas from West German technical literature.

In his presentation "Rooting for Modernity: Native Roadscaping as Self-reflective Modernism," William Rollins characterized the debate about American and German highways in the 1930s and 1940s as essentially a debate about modernism. Specifically, he compared the ideas of the German landscape architect Alwin Seifert with those of the American Frank Waugh. While Seifert emphasized extreme racial ideas, there were also similarities between the German and American landscape concepts. Both seemed to promote a model of *Kulturlandschaft* that would unite utility and beauty; and both concepts included an emphasis on native plants. According to Rollins, Waugh's highways functioned "as a network of green across America." His concept reflected the "boldness of optimism" which seems to have been "typical of many of the landscapers of the 1930s."

Automobile tourism exerted a profound influence on the American landscape and the built environment. One of the conference panels focused on some of the major transformations of landscapes, a development that started early in the twentieth century. In his paper on the "Pacific Coast Highway and the Cultural Construction of Southern California, 1910-1930," Matthew W. Roth demonstrated that the now famous scenic and recreational qualities of the Pacific Coast Highway emerged only during its construction. State engineers used the beauty of the coastal scenery as justification for a project in a remote and isolated part of California. He illustrated his point by focusing on one individual rancher, May Rindge, who, through a number of legal battles, tried to

prevent the highway from cutting through her extensive landholdings. The decision went as far the U.S. Supreme Court, which decided against Rindge in 1923, partly on the grounds that driving through the beauty of a scenic landscape was to be seen as a public good. In her paper about "Automobile Tourism and Scenic Roads in South Dakota's Custer State Park, 1919-1932," Suzanne Julin discussed the construction and use of scenic roads as tourist attractions in the Black Hills. The private South Dakota tourist industry had encouraged road planners to produce a unique landscape that would prove to be stunning and filled with unexpected features and vistas. The highway seemed to reveal itself to the adventure-seeking automobile tourists, while in reality it had been carefully planned to create a dramatic drive.

One of the most overlooked factors in the construction of roads is ethnicity. In her paper on "The 'Roading' of Texas," Nancy Volkman analyzed Spanish and German traditions in road design. Her research was informed by multiple observations about the layout of towns, places, and streets, about planning authorities, street surfaces, methods of surveying, the location of roads in relation to waterways, etc. Among the many features that set the two ethnic traditions in road design apart was the fact that Germans did not plan roads based upon a scheme dictated by the government. In the Spanish tradition, through-roads radiated out only from the major towns, while German communities constructed their roads in more diverse ways and to serve specific commercial and social purposes. In her paper, titled "Keeping American Indian Lands 'Roadless' and 'Wild'," Diane Krahe discussed a New Deal scheme to keep tribally-owned lands roadless. Robert Marshall, perhaps the most outspoken voice for wilderness in the U.S. in the 1930s, believed in the now outdated notion that Native Americans did little to impact their local environments. According to Marshall, Native Americans did not want for more than what nature provided. As a federal administrator, Marshall projected onto Indian people his view of "roadless nature as the ultimate state of nature." In the 1950s, a pro-development attitude both on many reservations and in the Bureau of Indian Affairs contributed to the demise of the Indian roadless areas. The Wind River Roadless Area in Wyoming is the only one that survives to this day.

While the majority of papers in this conference was concerned with the design of roads and with roads as cultural artifacts, the presentations of the last panel focused primarily on political issues and the role of the public in the development of roads. In a paper titled "National, Environmental, and Planning Implications of the Capital Beltway In and Around Washington, D.C.," Jeremy Korr presented his research on the Capital Beltway, a major ring road around the nation's capital. Korr pointed out that the Beltway serves multiple constituencies within a framework of

federal, state, county, and municipal authorities and demands. Korr's case study showed that many of the public's concerns about safety, noise, and environment were not addressed appropriately by transportation officials. Even when public hearings were organized, residents who were invited to discuss the planning process felt excluded as their concerns were not adequately acknowledged. In contrast to Korr's study, Louise Nelson Dyble, in her paper on "Roads as a Political Weapon: Freeways and the Defeat of Suburbanization in Marin County, California," presented the case of a successful effort of conservationists and environmentalists who halted the development of bridges and roads. Even though Marin County was dominated by pro-growth lobbyists and real-estate developers in the late 1950s, the process of highway development turned out to be vulnerable to public protest. According to Dyble, the planned road provided the opportunity for a fledgling group of environmentalists to rally property owners to the cause of preservation. The new movement challenged the prevailing vision of Marin County's future. It led to the "1966 freeway revolt" and marked a turning point in attitudes and planning for growth and development. Altogether, the papers of this pioneering conference in the comparative history of roads created a new awareness of how our surroundings reflect important cultural and technological changes, and how the meaning of roads has changed over time.

Christof Mauch and Thomas Zeller

MEDIEVAL HISTORY SEMINAR 2002

Seminar at the Humboldt University, Berlin, October 24–27, 2002. Conveners: Michael Borgolte (Humboldt University, Berlin), Caroline W. Bynum (Columbia University/American Academy, Berlin), Johannes Fried (University of Frankfurt), Patrick J. Geary (University of California, Los Angeles), Christof Mauch (GHI), Christoph Strupp (GHI). Made possible through a grant from the German Program for Transatlantic Contacts of the Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie, Bereich ERP-Sondervermögen.

In 2002, the German Historical Institute successfully continued its new program for junior scholars in medieval history. For the second time, the Medieval History Seminar brought together sixteen German and American doctoral students and recent Ph.D. recipients to discuss their projects and benefit from the comments of their peers and senior faculty. Professors Michael Borgolte and Johannes Fried from Germany, and Caroline W. Bynum and Patrick J. Geary from America served as mentors and chairs of the panels. After last year's meeting in Washington, D.C., this year's seminar took place at the Humboldt University in the heart of Berlin, where it was graciously hosted by Professor Borgolte and his staff.

Once again, proposals from all areas of medieval studies were considered. The selected projects covered the broadest possible range of thematic perspectives, methodological approaches, and periods of medieval history. Since the participants' papers had been distributed beforehand, the eight panels could be fully devoted to discussion. Each panel featured two papers, introduced not by the authors themselves but by two of their fellow students acting as commentators. The papers provided fascinating insight into current research in medieval history in Germany and North America, and the discussions benefited greatly from the enthusiasm and expertise of everybody involved.

The opening panel featured two projects dealing with medieval diplomas and their value for historical research. Jennifer Davis presented the results of her research on the diplomas that Charlemagne granted to Italian recipients. They account for roughly one quarter of all the surviving diplomas of Charlemagne. They were issued to Italian monasteries, episcopal sees, and individuals. Even though there had already been a strong tradition of Lombard royal grants, Charlemagne developed his own pattern. Ms. Davis interpreted this as an indication of the deliberate integration of Italy into the Carolingian realm and of Charlemagne's persistent claim to rule in Italy. Participants discussed the meaning of integration in the Early Middle Ages, and Ms. Davis's elaborate statistical

analysis of her material led to an intense debate on the problems of quantification in medieval research arising from the random preservation of sources.

Jochen Johrendt's paper focused on the relationship between the papacy and church organizations in Germany, France, Italy, and Catalonia, as reflected in the papal diplomas of the ninth and tenth centuries. The requests for papal grants shed light on the general function of the papacy and the way the papacy was shaped by the expectations and wishes of the petitioners. Until 1046, the legal institution of "papal protection" was open to a variety of interpretations by the recipients. Based on the diplomas granting papal protection in Germany and France, Johrendt concluded that in Germany there was a close connection between the monasteries receiving those grants and the Ottonian royal dynasty. Papal protection almost always supplemented royal protection in Germany, while in a politically fragmented France the situation was more complex. In some parts of the country, it strengthened local authorities. Johrendt also pointed out that papal protection did not only establish a close legal bond between the Holy See and the monasteries, it also contributed to the salvation of their members.

The second and third panels continued the discussion of politics and culture in the eighth to tenth centuries. Dmitri Starostine dealt with the medieval measurement of time. Using sources such as the Salzburg calendar of 818 and the poems of Wandalbert of Prüm, he examined the failed attempts of Charlemagne to introduce a new calendar, which was based on the rhythm of agricultural activities and assigned cosmological significance to these activities. The new calendar was supposed to be more closely linked to the everyday life of the people than the traditional Roman calendar and to have a unifying effect on the empire. Once again, the discussion concentrated on the scarcity of sources for this difficult subject and the resulting problems of interpretation.

Harold Siegel focused on the often neglected court of Emperor Lothar I and his patronage of learning and culture in the Middle Kingdom from 840 to 855. Based on the exchange of letters between Lothar and two leading intellectual figures of the period, Hrabanus Maurus and Angelomus of Luxeuil, who provided Lothar with extensive biblical commentaries, Siegel demonstrated how Lothar used the resources of the time to create an intellectual court with a broader appeal. His network of intellectual contacts extended beyond the political boundaries of his empire. However, it is still open to question whether Lothar really stood out among his contemporaries or whether his court was a spiritual and cultural center like others at the time.

Kerstin Schulmeyer shed new light on one of the most important sources of Ottonian history of the ninth and early tenth centuries: the

chronicle of Thietmar of Merseburg. Historiography is always a construction, never a copy of the past. This is true for modern as well as for medieval historians. Medieval historiography had a strong teleological dimension, a point of reference that enabled its authors to sort out the important facts and make sense of the events of the past. Thietmar wrote his chronicle of the history of the Saxonian kings after 1013. With Henry II's ascent to power in 1002, the presentation changes noticeably from a historical tale to a chronicle of current events. It becomes contemporary history and faces the typical difficulties of judgement. The historiographical concept of an "Ottonian" epoch ending with the childless Henry II, which is taken for granted today, was in fact Thietmar's answer to the politically motivated call for a change of ruling dynasty. But the chronicle and the historiographical message it sends also reveal how important the influence of subconscious "images of the past" (*Vergangenheitsbilder*) was for its structure. Separating the intentional from the subconscious level is the major challenge of Ms. Schulmeyer's project.

Jenny Oesterle presented her dissertation project on the liturgical dimension of royal representation under the Ottonians and early Salians. Drawing on a historiographical tradition established by Gerd Althoff and Hagen Keller, she interpreted the ceremonial coronations on Easter and Christmas and the official court meetings (*Hoftage*) as a "chain of rituals." They enabled all present to participate in the representation of power. Historians have noted the sacralization of the royal government after the ninth century and its visual demonstration, but there has been little examination of the development of liturgy as a crucial element of transformation and shaping in this process. Ms. Oesterle stressed the multiple character of ceremonial coronations and coronation processions as an opportunity to display royal power in all its dimensions. Such events also reminded the viewers of the king's first coronation and his future as a heavenly co-ruler. The discussion revolved around problems of inclusion and exclusion inherent to all rituals, their constant adjustment to new situations, and the inevitable discrepancy between the descriptions of rituals historians work with today and the actual events of the past.

The papers of the fourth panel took a close look at the conditions of military action in the High Middle Ages. Holger Berwinkel analyzed Friedrich Barbarossa's campaign against Milan in 1158, and David Bachrach dealt with the military administration of King Henry III of England in the thirteenth century. Berwinkel concentrated on the logistical challenges of moving an army of tens of thousands through the country, supplying the troops, and organizing a siege. Bachrach focused on the building, transportation, and storage of siege engines, for which Henry III developed a complex administration, which generated an extensive parchment trail. Many documents have survived, providing his-

torians of England with a more extensive body of sources than is available to historians of Germany. Both authors attempted to write military history as social history by dealing with broader problems of cartography, royal finances, and—at least for Germany—a lack of sources resulting from the oral character of medieval society.

The fifth panel took the seminar to medieval Paris with two papers on the abbey of Saint-Victor. This reformist abbey, formally founded in 1113, gained great intellectual and political influence in twelfth-century France. Martina Schilling examined the connection between the architecture of the building and the canonical identity of its inhabitants from an art historian's perspective. By combining information on the internal structure of the Victorine order with an analysis of other contemporary reformist abbeys, she challenged the common assumption that there were no distinctive traditions for the architecture of regular canonical houses. Unfortunately, little is known about the original building of Saint-Victor: the oldest views date from the fifteenth century, and it did not survive the French Revolution.

Todd Upton discussed perceptions of Jerusalem and the Holy Land in the sermons of Richard of Saint-Victor during the first crusades. Upton examined their liturgical topoi, compared the sermons to the explicit crusade homilies and letters of Saint Bernard of Clairvaux, and speculated on possible Victorine attitudes about the Levant in general. The sermons can be viewed as a serious contribution to crusade ideology in the High Middle Ages, but at the same time mention of "Jerusalem" or "Israel" was part of the strong allegorical tradition of the Victorines. Participants recognized this double dimension as the key challenge of Upton's project. It calls for a careful reading of the texts and the consideration of aspects such as the character of the genre of sermons in general, their function at the abbey, and the audience Richard was writing for.

The sixth panel continued the series of papers dealing with questions of intellectual history. Markus Schürer's paper concentrated on the genre of exemplum literature, as it was used by the orders of the Dominicans and Franciscans in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Exempla—short stories of a (sometimes fictional) historical deed with an argumentative or educational character—had a tradition going back to antiquity. For the Dominicans, they seemed to have been even more important than for the Franciscans. In the Late Middle Ages, they preserved and institutionalized the knowledge of the founding generation of the order and revealed much about its self-conception. Exempla ensured that daily life went according to the rules. They had a strong normative dimension, and they supported the general orientation of the order.

Pavel Blazek discussed the medieval reception of the views of Aristotle on marriage as presented in the "Nicomachean Ethics," the "Poli-

tics,” and the (Pseudo-Aristotelian) “Economics.” Leading scholars such as Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and other members of the Parisian art faculty used the texts of Aristotle to prove the natural character of marriage. They enhanced the Christian understanding of the special relationship between man and woman and the divine command for reproduction and thereby created a unique link between Christian theology and ancient philosophy. This makes marriage one of the most interesting examples of the medieval reception of Aristotle.

Benjamin Scheller presented his research on the housing complex that Jakob Fugger the Rich built for poor people in Augsburg in the early sixteenth century. Scheller discussed the concept of social welfare in the Late Middle Ages in general and the concept of the “worthy poor”—often whole families, who alone were eligible for help—as opposed to ordinary beggars. The still operating “Fuggerei” is a unique example of this concept because of its size and architectural structure, which, on the one hand, allowed the inhabitants a maximum of privacy and, on the other, had a strong disciplinary function. There were no uncontrolled common rooms or public places in the complex. Vices such as profanity, drinking, gambling, or unchastity could not be pursued. Since the “Fuggerei” was a foundation, inhabitants were supposed to maintain the “memoria” of Jakob through certain well-regulated actions.

John Eldevik’s paper on the Thuringian tithe dispute of the 1050s and 1060s concluded Saturday’s meeting. The ecclesiastical tithe, a ten-percent levy on all gross income and produce, was a key source of income for any church in the Middle Ages, and a significant link to the community it served. Eldevik’s research shed light on the tension between local traditions and a normative understanding of medieval institutions. Tithe conflicts were not only a matter of legal theory, but reveal important information on the character of episcopal lordship in general. While officially it was the prerogative of the bishops to collect tithes, from the ninth century prominent monasteries such as Hersfeld and Fulda had become the de facto recipients. The efforts of bishop Siegfried I to reestablish his rights in Thuringia met with fierce resistance and showed the limits of episcopal power in the High Middle Ages.

In the last panel, Robert Fajen, who specializes in medieval literary studies, and Amy Morris, an art historian, demonstrated the value of including medievalists beyond the scope of traditional historical studies in this program. Their presentations—on the 1396 “Livre du Chevalier Errant” (The Book of the Knight Errant), written by the Piemontesian count Thomas III of Saluzzo, and on Lucas Moser’s 1432 St. Magdalene Altarpiece of the parish church at Tiefenbronn near Pforzheim—led to a lively discussion on historical contextualization and the function of art in the Middle Ages. Fajen emphasized that literary texts should not be re-

duced to their political or social context, but rather viewed as a mediator between reality and imagination. The “Chevalier Errant,” a combination of knight’s tale, literary allegory, and encyclopedia, reveals the self-perception of its author, but at the same time differs from modern autobiographies in its complex relationship between real life and literary fictionalization. Fajen interpreted these fictional elements of the book not so much as an expression of a flight from reality, but rather as an elaborate reflection on the problems of noble identity in general.

Little is known about Lucas Moser, the painter of the St. Magdalene Altarpiece, a German counterpart to the famous Ghent Altarpiece by Jan van Eyck, and little work has been done so far on its historical context. Amy Morris’ dissertation combines an iconographical analysis of the five scenes from the life of Mary Magdalene depicted in the painting with a comparison to other Magdalene cycles both in Germany and Europe, and research on the medieval function of the cult of Mary Magdalene, patronage and pilgrimage practices. She also examines the history of the city of Tiefenbronn.

The final discussion of the German Historical Institute’s Medieval History Seminar 2002, moderated by Professor Borgolte, summed up the discussions and offered general observations. Most of the projects presented could be characterized as intellectual history with a touch of social history. They dealt with the mentality and culture of an elite—ecclesiastical or noble—rather than with problems of economies or material culture. Substantial differences between the German and American approaches were less noticeable than expected. Participants discussed the problems of inter- or transdisciplinary projects, which often require language skills, extensive background knowledge from other disciplines, and familiarity with methodologies beyond the scope of the individual historian. Everybody agreed on the value of collaborative and cooperative work to overcome tendencies of fragmentation and self-referentiality. Without a doubt, the Medieval History Seminar made a contribution in this direction by enabling its participants to establish fruitful international contacts at an early stage of their careers.

For the GHI, the value of its graduate conferences comes not so much from the fine-tuning of specialized research. Consequently, there will be no publication of the conference proceedings. Rather, it is the atmosphere of open discussion and the participants’ engagement with approaches and methodologies that are at first glance unrelated to their own projects that often proves to be the most important aspect of these conferences. Especially for younger scholars absorbed in the details of their dissertation research, it is very helpful to look beyond the scope of their topics. This year’s Medieval History Seminar—with its contributions ranging from Charlemagne to the dawn of the Reformation and covering political,

ecclesiastical, and cultural history as well as Medieval architecture, art, and literature—offered ample opportunity for this and encourages us to continue this unique program in medieval history.

The third Medieval History Seminar for German and American doctoral students and recent Ph.D. recipients will take place at the GHI in October 2003. If you are interested in participating, please see the “Announcements” section of this issue for further information and application requirements.

Christoph Strupp

Participants and Their Topics

DAVID S. BACHRACH (University of Notre Dame): *The Military Administration of King Henry III of England (1216–1272): The Royal Artillery*

HOLGER BERWINKEL (University of Marburg): *Friedrich Barbarossas Feldzug gegen Mailand 1158 und die strategischen Verhältnisse in der Lombardei*

PAVEL BLAZEK (Friedrich Schiller University, Jena): *Die Rezeption aristotelischer Gedanken über die Lebensgemeinschaft von Mann und Frau im dreizehnten und vierzehnten Jahrhundert*

JENNIFER R. DAVIS (Harvard University): *The Integration of the Regnum Italiae: Charlemagne's Diplomas for Italian Recipients*

JOHN T. ELDEVIK (Pontifical Institute for Medieval Studies, Toronto): *Episcopal Lordship and the Politics of Submitting Tithes in Medieval Germany*

ROBERT FAJEN (University of Würzburg): *Adelige Kultur im spätmittelalterlichen Piemont: Untersuchungen zum Chevalier errant Thomas' III. von Saluzzo und zum Freskenzyklus in der Burg von Manta*

JOCHEN JOHRENDT (Ludwig Maximilians University, Munich): *Papsttum und Landeskirchen im Spiegel der päpstlichen Urkunden (896–1046)*

AMY MORRIS (Wittenberg University, Ohio): *Lucas Moser's St. Magdalene Altarpiece: An Iconographical and Contextual Reevaluation*

JENNY RAHEL OESTERLE (Westfälische Wilhelms University, Münster): *Liturgie und Herrschaftsrepräsentation. Festkrönungen und Hoftage in ottonischer und frühsalischer Zeit*

BENJAMIN SCHELLER (Humboldt University, Berlin): *Die Armensiedlung als Disziplinarraum, oder “Das Prinzip Atopie.” Die Fuggerei Jakob Fuggers des Reichen*

MARTINA SCHILLING (University of Warwick): *The Regular Canons of Saint-Victor, Canonical Identity and Architecture*

KERSTIN SCHULMEYER (Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt): *Vom Umgang mit erzählenden Quellen des Mittelalters: Interpretationsstrategien zur Chronik Thietmar von Merseburgs*

MARKUS SCHÜRER (Technical University, Dresden): *Exempelliteratur, kollektives Gedächtnis und Institutionalität der Mendikantenorden (13.–14. Jh.)*

HAROLD SIEGEL (University of Notre Dame): *Cultural Patronage at the Court of Emperor Lothar I, 840–855*

DMITRI STAROSTINE (University of Michigan): *Calendar, Territory, and Power: Medieval Concepts of Time and Space and the Political Context of Their Origins*

TODD P. UPTON (University of Colorado): *Jerusalem and the Holy Sites in the Twelfth Century: Perceptions of the Holy Land in Sermons of Richard of St. Victor*

EMOTIONS IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE AND COLONIAL NORTH AMERICA

Conference at the GHI, November 7–10, 2002. Conveners: Vera Lind (GHI), Otto Ulbricht (University of Kiel). Participants: Marina Arnold (Herzog-August-Bibliothek, Wolfenbüttel), Barbara Benedict (Trinity College), Steven Bullock (Worcester Polytechnic Institute), Elena Carrera (Oxford Brookes University), Déborah Cohen (University of Paris I), Robert Dimit (New York University), Nicole Eustace (New York University), Aaron Fogleman (Northern Illinois University), Peter Goddard (University of Guelph), Katherine Goodland (College of Staten Island), Heikki Lempa (Moravian College), Kenneth Lockridge (University of Montana), Michael Monheit (University of South Alabama), Kate Narveson (Luther College), William Reddy (Duke University), David Sabeian (University of California Los Angeles), Peter Stearns (George Mason University), Michael Stolberg (Technische Universität München), Dorothée Sturkenboom (Vrije Universiteit), Fredrika Teute (Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture), David Turner (University of Glamorgan).

From November 7 to 10, 2002, the GHI hosted a conference on the history of emotions in the early modern period. Interest in this field has burgeoned in the last two decades in disciplines like anthropology, psychology, sociology, and philosophy, but it is still a new topic of investigation for historians, especially those working in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. Today, few doubt that emotions, though a bodily state, have many cultural dimensions that make them a fascinating topic of historical investigation. Besides researching the role of normative systems regulating the display of emotion and their change, historians are also interested in the role of gender, race, and class in the study of emotions, as well as social control, consequences of emotional code violations, and emotions during great events, like war and revolution. Scholars also focus their attention on particular emotions like desire, greed, envy, fear, sadness, love or happiness, or on emotions and religion, or emotions and the body. The goal of the conference was to bring together junior and senior scholars of the early modern era for the first time in order to evaluate this developing field. This evaluation was done comparatively, analyzing emotions in early modern Europe and early North America, also for the first time.

Papers were pre-circulated, so the conference participants had to have their contributions ready well in advance of the conference. The group of sixteen was selected from a field of over sixty applicants who

had responded to the call for papers. Also present were several invited scholars. The conference began with two keynote lectures by two historians who have been very influential in shaping the developing field of historical research on emotions, namely Peter Stearns and William Reddy. Peter Stearns, a pioneer in the study of emotions in American history, presented an overview of the historical study of emotions in the past twenty years. William Reddy presented a theoretical overview, focusing on approaches of special importance to early modernists. Reddy recently published a study on the history of emotions in France from 1700 to 1850 that not only examines current theories of emotions from disciplines like psychology and ethnography, but also provides a new theory of emotions that enables us to track changes in emotional experience.

Over the following three days, the conference participants discussed fifteen papers in seven thematically arranged sessions. Besides the keynote speakers, two additional distinguished historians joined the group and provided comments and a wider perspective on the history of emotions in early modern Europe and early America respectively, namely David Sabean and Kenneth Lockridge. The first session focused on emotions in the context of early modern medicine and philosophy. Michael Stolberg traced the history and impact of changing medical and lay notions of emotional physiology. He discussed the differences in the emotional make-up ascribed to the sexes, the debate on the location of emotional experiences within the body, emotions in regard to the relationship of body and soul, and concluded that changing understandings of body concepts not only left their mark on theoretical, learned approaches of emotions, but also changed the actual subjective experience of emotions. In the second paper of the session, Robert Dimit analyzed works on the theory of passions in Europe between 1540 and 1690, and argued that passions are different from emotions. Compared with emotions, passions were defined as passive, basically the same in everyone, and they were not viewed as intrinsically good. Also, the criteria for identifying passions were different: Instead of taking internal feelings as indicators, as is normally the case with emotions today, in the early modern era emotions were defined by a certain type of relationship between the soul and an object of passion.

The second session dealt with class and political issues in regard to emotions in a transatlantic perspective. First, Steven Bullock examined the significance of anger and standards of emotional control in North American colonists' changing views on power and self-representation, using the example of the violent outbursts of Maryland Governor Francis Nicholson and other prominent political figures around 1700. These were important issues in the struggle for authority between the American gentry and colonial governors, in which bullying and anger as opposed to

emotional control were debated as tools of governance. Déborah Cohen shifted the focus from emotions within the upper hierarchy of political systems to the expression of emotions by lower classes in the public sphere in late eighteenth-century France. She looked at the police records of carriage accidents in Paris and showed that although in most cases there is no evidence of direct linguistically expressed political feelings by the general public, it is possible to find traces of political emotions in popular modes of behavior. Cohen noted that historical analyses of emotions usually limit their scope to linguistic expressions instead of including all manifested emotions that sometimes cannot be pronounced in words.

The expression of grief was the topic of the third session on the first day of the conference. Marina Arnold concentrated on grief and consolation in seventeenth-century German funeral sermons and funeral poems. This literary genre documents a change in the perception and experience of grief over the course of the century from being set within a controlled public church ceremony to the attempt to achieve a more private, personal way of coping, in which stronger emotional attachments could be shown. This change also indicated a growing distance from the church and subsequently a change in devotion. Katherine Goodland then showed how female grief was perceived as madness and monstrosity in post-Reformation England through her analysis of sermons, medical treatises, and Shakespearian drama. She connected this perception with the loss of ritual justification for mourning as a result of the Reformation, which led to concern over the appropriate demonstration of grief. Goodland concluded in her paper that the extreme depiction of female grief was a reaction against Catholic images of the Virgin Mary in her role as the *Mater Dolorosa* and thus a sign of deep anxiety within Protestant English society over any connection between the world of the dead and the world of the living.

On the next day of the conference, session four featured three papers dealing with emotions and religion. Michael Monheit presented Calvin's doctrine of images in connection with the formation of his religious sensibility. He pointed out how in earlier years, before his conversion, Calvin, through his own experience, linked steady, restrained passions with virtue. But in general, Calvin associated strong emotions with unlawful desires, and his hostility towards religious images was related to his conviction that an image, in fact all material reality, evoked sudden and unpredictable passions in the human imagination. Kate Narveson then confronted the problem of emotional authenticity in early Stuart devotional writing. These devotional texts were supposed to help readers to find certain affections within themselves and nurture them, creating some tension between actively finding emotions and the passivity re-

quired to feel the work of the Spirit. Narveson argued that the authors of the texts were not concerned with the ambivalence of consciously producing religious affectivity, but that they were instead deeply concerned by spontaneous affections. It was possible to consider actively shaped emotions sincere, because emotions were understood as having both passive and active qualities, and because they needed to be cultivated in order to conform to their object. In the last paper of the session, Elena Carrera investigated the role of emotions in sixteenth-century Spanish spirituality. Interpreting the discourses in devotional treatises and treatises on confession, she concluded that these texts, which the printing press made more widely available to the general population, taught the method of prayer of recollecting and gathering the senses, which led from self-examination to a meditation on Christ's humanity, thus allowing the reader to experience a union with divinity. This did not require intellectual training, but the ability to recognize emotions. Carrera coined the term "affected hermeneutics" for this process, in order to show how early modern practices presented emotions as both self-confronting and self-transforming.

In session five, which dealt with gendered emotions, David Turner analyzed gender and emotions in early modern English narratives of adultery. He focused on men's emotions, especially the humiliation caused by their wives' sexual infidelity, as expressed in letters submitted to the periodical press that sought help in dealing with these issues. The letters showed the importance of the body and bodily metaphors in the formation of male honor, and for the conceptualization of the betrayal. Adultery was perceived as a bodily loss, something surrendered to another man. Nicole Eustace also dealt with masculinity and emotions in her paper on the encounter between Europeans and Native Americans during the Seven Years' War in North America. This encounter provoked questions about the traits of civilized versus savage emotions, and sensibility versus cruelty as a source of moral relations. She examined the religious roots and political uses of the ensuing debate, and analyzed the rhetorical use of emotions. Eustace argued that controlling the passions came to be seen as a source of strength and virtue for Anglo-Americans, and that a consensus formed on compassionate action as the foundation of humanity, which prevented masculinity from slipping into cruelty, and sensibility from degenerating into effeminate passivity.

In session six, which dealt with emotions and colonial encounters, Peter Goddard presented a paper on Jesuit analyses of Huron and Algonquian emotional states in the seventeenth-century mission to New France. The missionaries read emotional expressions as insights into the spiritual state of the newly converted Amerindians, and were confronted with what they regarded as a disregard of self-discipline and self-

regulation, as well as an impassiveness towards religious imagination. In response, the Jesuits treated these emotional states as child-like and established a paternalistic regime over the Huron and Algonquian converts. Goddard concluded that the emphasis the missionaries put on ideas of civility and self-control can be seen in the context of the emerging concept of an emotionally contained “modern” subject.

Language, knowledge, and honor in regard to emotions were the topics of the last session. Dorothee Sturkenboom analyzed the emotional vocabulary of Dutch moral authors in the eighteenth century. She pointed out that these authors were not using the modern Dutch word for “emotion,” but a word that translates into “passion” instead, and which included a wide range of phenomena. It was only in the late eighteenth century that the modern distinction between “passion” as a more vehement and violent emotion and “feeling” as a softer emotion developed. Shifting the focus to eighteenth-century Germany, Heikki Lempa then investigated the changing concept of honor with regard to contemporary pedagogical ideas. He examined Christian Thomasius’ efforts to make the practices of court society useful for society at large, and how a group of educators and ministers later took up these ideas and incorporated “honor” in their educational experiments at schools in Dessau and Schnepfenthal. In practice, however, the institutional arrangements at these schools transformed the sense of honor into the measurement of merit. The last paper of the conference was given by Barbara Benedict. She investigated curiosity as a touchstone of early modern ideas on how to understand and control human feelings. At that time people debated whether curiosity was more related to the body or mind, more vice or virtue. She showed how this debate was used to enforce distinctions of class and gender and how curiosity came to be defined as corporeal and uncontrollable when the question of social control was involved, but was viewed as an heroic intellectual power when the enterprises of learned men were concerned.

The conveners of the conference, supported by the GHI, plan to publish the revised conference papers in a volume of essays on the history of emotions in early modern Europe and early America. This publication should provide historians and other social scientists with an overview of the most recent research in this new field and time period.

Vera Lind

ELEVENTH ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM OF THE FRIENDS OF THE
GHI AND AWARD OF THE FRITZ STERN
DISSERTATION PRIZE

Symposium at the GHI, November 15, 2002. Convener: Konrad Jarausch (President, Friends of the GHI). Participants: Julia Roos (Princeton University), Rebecca Wittmann (Marquette University), and Ari Sammartino (GHI/ University of Michigan, Ann Arbor).

The Friends of the German Historical Institute convened in Washington on November 15, 2002, for their eleventh symposium, chaired by Konrad Jarausch, President of the Friends. The morning session featured the presentation of the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prizes, awarded every year for the two best dissertations in German history at a North American university. This year's prizes were awarded to Julia Roos, who earned her Ph.D. at Carnegie Mellon University, for her dissertation "Weimar's Crisis Through the Lens of Gender: The Case of Prostitution," and to Rebecca Wittmann, who earned her Ph.D. at the University of Toronto, for her dissertation "Holocaust on Trial? The Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial in Historical Perspective." This year's award was generously funded by the German Marshall Fund of the United States. The Stern Prize Selection Committee was composed of Prof. Donna Harsch (Carnegie Mellon University), Prof. Steve Hochstadt (Bates College), and Prof. Eric A. Johnson (Central Michigan University), who chaired the committee. The committee's prize citations commended Roos for "show[ing] how to use one issue, prostitution, to analyze the wider struggle over changes in the conception and politics of gender during the Weimar Republic" and Wittmann for "mak[ing] a major empirical and interpretive contribution to our understanding of both the [Auschwitz] trial itself and, more broadly, to the wrenching and contested process of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* in the Federal Republic." The presentations of their work that Roos and Wittmann gave following the awarding of the prizes are featured, in revised form, in the "Stern Prize" section of this *Bulletin*. In the afternoon session, GHI Research Associate Ari Sammartino gave a presentation of her dissertation research, titled "Migration, Utopia and Exile: Germany and Russia in the Early Weimar Republic," which is featured in the "GHI Research" section of this *Bulletin*.

Richard F. Wetzell

COMMISSIONING HISTORY IN THE UNITED STATES, GERMANY, AND AUSTRIA: HISTORICAL COMMISSIONS, VICTIMS, AND WORLD WAR II RESTITUTION

Conference at the National D-Day Museum, New Orleans, November 21–23, 2002. Co-organized by the GHI, the Center Austria of the University of New Orleans, the National D-Day Museum, and Claremont McKenna College. Conveners: Günter Bischof (University of New Orleans), Kenneth Hoffman (D-Day Museum), Jonathan Petropoulos (Claremont McKenna College), Bernd Schäfer (GHI), Richard F. Wetzell (GHI). Participants: Konstantin Akinsha (Washington, DC), Elazar Barkan (Claremont Graduate University), Peter Berger (University of New Orleans/Vienna University for Economics and Business Administration), James D. Bindenagel (U.S. Department of State), Martin Eichtinger (Federation of Austrian Industry, Vienna), Gerald Feldman (University of California, Berkeley), David Goldfield (University of North Carolina, Charlotte), Constantin Goschler (Humboldt University, Berlin), Peter Hayes (Northwestern University), Clemens Jabloner (High Court of Administration, Vienna), Helen Junz (London), Saul Kagan (Jewish Claims Conference), Kenneth Klothen (The Susquehanna Group, LLC), Martin Morgan (National D-Day Museum), Gordon Mueller (National D-Day Museum), Jonathan Petropoulos (Claremont McKenna College), Lawrence Powell (Tulane University), Oliver Rathkolb (University of Vienna), William Slany (Historians' Office, U.S. Department of State), Dieter Stiefel (University of Vienna), Ernst Sucharipa (Austrian Diplomatic Academy, Vienna), Henry Turner (Yale University), Jeffrey K. Wilson (University of New Orleans), Hans Winkler (Austrian Foreign Ministry, Vienna), Daqing Yang (George Washington University), Dieter Ziegler (Ruhr University, Bochum).

Since the mid-1990s, a series of high-profile class-action lawsuits has brought the issue of incomplete compensation and restitution for victims of the Nazi regime to the public's attention. As a result of such lawsuits, international pressure, and a new public awareness of these unresolved issues, new compensation and restitution settlements were reached in Germany, Austria, and other countries. Often these settlements took place in conjunction with the establishment of commissions of historical experts, whose reports have increased our knowledge of various aspects of the Nazi period. This conference brought together German, Austrian, and American historians—and a few officials who participated in the recent settlements and commissions—in order to discuss in a compara-

tive perspective: the postwar history of compensation and restitution for victims of Nazism; the most recent compensation and restitution settlements, particularly compensation for forced labor and restitution of stolen property, especially works of art; the methods and findings of official government commissions of historical experts, including the U.S. Presidential Commission on Holocaust Assets in the United States and the Austrian *Historikerkommission*; and the methods and findings of individual historians or teams of historians who have been commissioned to write the history of particular companies during the Nazi era.

The first panel examined the historical background and larger context of the most recent round of commissioned historical research and compensation settlements. The panel opened with a paper by Elazar Barkan, professor of history at the Claremont Graduate University, on "The Guilt of Nations: A Theory of Restitution in Modern International Affairs." Since the end of the Cold War there has been a sudden rush of restitution cases all over the world. The paper presented a brief overview of restitution and explored how victims and perpetrators have negotiated restitution and historical injustices, attempting to present a general "Calculus of Restitution." Barkan argued that the pattern formed by these recent cases of restitution has become a central component of a new international morality and testifies to a new globalism that pays greater attention to human rights. Critics of this trend often refer to the spread of a "victims culture." Barkan, by contrast, underscored the increasing way in which "our histories" shape "our identities." In this sense, he concluded, the new "we" of history comprises both winners and losers, and history changes who we were, not only who we are.

In his paper "*Wiedergutmachung*: Restitution in Germany after World War II," Constantin Goschler, *Privatdozent* in history at the Humboldt University in Berlin, provided a historical overview of German restitution and indemnification policies for Nazi victims after 1945. After summarizing the basic structure and the results of these efforts, he examined the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion with respect to different groups of Nazi victims. He also inquired into the political driving forces in the field of restitution and indemnification, distinguishing several historical phases. Finally, Goschler commented on the symbolic aspects of restitution policy, partially contesting Barkan's more optimistic assessment of these policies.

In his paper on the "Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany," Saul Kagan, a longtime official of the Claims Conference, presented an overview of the organization's efforts, over more than 50 years, to secure indemnification for injuries inflicted on individual victims of Nazi persecution and restitution for properties confiscated by the Nazis. He discussed the Luxembourg Agreements between the Claims

Conference and West Germany, which lead to the enactment of significant compensation and restitution legislation in the Federal Republic. He also examined the negotiations with the Austrian governments starting in 1953 for compensation and restitution on behalf of Jews in and from Austria.

The second panel examined the issue of Nazi gold and the role of banks in the crimes of the Nazi regime. Dieter Ziegler, *Privatdozent* at the University of Bochum, who is part of a German research team that is writing a history of the Dresdner Bank during the Nazi regime, examined three key aspects of the Dresdner Bank's participation in the process of the economic persecution of German Jews: the exclusion of self-employed and wage-earning persons of Jewish origin from their occupations, which affected both the banks' employees and also the banks' debtors; the transfer of business property from private "Jewish" to private "Aryan" possession; and, finally, the confiscation of private property by state authorities. Ziegler's preliminary conclusion from his research was that the Dresdner Bank acted rationally – in an economic sense – in an irrational environment. Anti-Semitism as a motive was of minor importance. The Dresdner Bank was probably closer to the regime than the other great banks and seized the opportunities that this position provided. At times, the bank clearly violated the standards of moral behavior that are said to be common in the civilized world. This was true not only for the bank's involvement in the economic persecution of German Jews, but probably even more so for the bank's activities in the occupied areas during the war.

Hans Winkler, head of the Legal Office of Austria's Foreign Ministry, examined Austria's role in the Gold Settlement. Immediately after the *Anschluss* in March of 1938, Germany confiscated the roughly 79 metric tons of Austrian monetary gold and transferred it to Berlin. After the war, a total of 50 metric tons of fine gold were returned to Austria. In 1997, Austria's remaining share of gold in the Tripartite Gold Commission's (TGC) gold pool was 834 kg of fine gold. After the 1997 report on "U.S. and Allied Efforts to Recover and Restore Gold and Other Assets Stolen and Hidden by Germany During World War II" proposed making the value of the remaining gold (estimated at about US\$70 million) available to Holocaust survivors, Austria was, according to Winkler, the first country to support the creation of a "Nazi Persecutee Relief Fund" by renouncing its claim to its remaining share in the Tripartite Gold Commission's pool. Since then, the Austrian contribution to the Fund (valued at Euro 7.45 million) has funded some 180 projects through the Austrian National Fund for Victims of National Socialism.

In his paper on "The United States and Nazi Gold," William Slany, who directed the U.S. State Department's Historical Office until 2000,

argued that the 1997 and 1998 U.S. government reports on gold and other assets stolen or looted by Nazi Germany, which U.S. diplomatic negotiators used to spur a growing movement to compensate Holocaust victims, were carried forward quite accidentally and from an unlikely source. The initiative for the reports came from the State Department's own official historians rather than being commissioned by government leaders. The State Department, which had such a deplorable record of failing to recognize and resist the Holocaust and to rescue its victims, accepted the challenge of its own official historians to support full historical disclosure of its own record and those of other U.S. agencies. The turnabout at the State Department, several generations and half a century later, reflected the mounting importance of the concept of human rights to State Department officials since the Vietnam War and the American civil rights movement. U.S. diplomacy soon outdistanced the State Department's official historians, and the commissioning of history in the U.S. soon followed a pattern that had already emerged in various European governments.

The third panel focused on the role of insurance companies in the Nazi regime and in the recent restitution efforts. Gerald Feldman, professor of history at the University of California at Berkeley, who was commissioned by the Allianz insurance company to write the company's history during the Third Reich, spoke about "Historical Narration and Problems of Restitution: Allianz AG." Feldman discussed the circumstances of his taking on the Allianz project and then provided a summary of his findings regarding the problem of the confiscation of Jewish insurance assets, showing that most Jewish life insurance assets were subject to indirect confiscation, meaning that, under intense financial pressure, Jewish insured persons cashed in their policies and received their payout from the insurer and the German state then robbed them of it. In addition, a 1941 decree made possible the direct confiscation of life insurance assets of German citizens who had been deported to concentration camps abroad, which led to Gestapo and Finance Ministry demands for searching out Jewish policies in the insurance companies' files. After discussing post-1945 restitution policies regarding insurance, Feldman concluded with reflections on the relationship of issues of restitution and the historical narration of the type found in his Allianz book, noting that the main contribution of his book had more to do with the deterioration of business ethics and the increasing implication of Allianz in the crimes of the regime than with restitution issues.

Dieter Stiefel, professor of history at the University of Vienna, who was commissioned by the Austrian insurance industry to write a history of the insurance business during the Nazi period, spoke on "The Life Insurance Sector in 'Austria' During World War II and the Postwar Settlements." Stiefel discussed the circumstances of his taking on the commis-

sion, the source base for his study, and his main findings. Stiefel's findings paralleled Feldman's: most Jewish life insurance policies were cashed in at their repurchase value by the Jewish policy holders, so that the insurance companies discharged their obligations to their Jewish customers, even as the state then proceeded to rob Jews of the proceeds. Stiefel noted that there were two major waves of insurance policy repurchases—right after the Anschluss in March 1938 and after the November pogrom in late 1938.

Helen B. Junz, an independent consultant who worked on many of the commissions related to World War II restitution issues, spoke on "The United States and Holocaust Era Financial Assets." She explained that assets that belonged to victims of the Nazi regime came under U.S. government management in two different ways: outside the United States as U.S. military forces swept up a vast amount of Nazi loot, and within the United States as the authorities sought to prevent the Axis from using foreign-owned assets in the U.S. in aid of their war effort. Her presentation focused on the latter case. To guard against the Axis powers gaining access to the wealth that was migrating from Europe to the United States, the U.S. took measures that covered assets belonging both to friend and foe, including Nazi persecutees. Though some accommodation was made during the war to ease the effects of these control measures on Nazi victims, the postwar decontrol process gave little or no consideration to the needs of Nazi victims. Although regulations, in the end, were amended to provide necessary accommodation, such amendments tended to be made only after unintended deleterious effects had become apparent. The paper detailed some of the arduous efforts to turn the widespread support for a return of victims' assets to their heirs or to successor organizations into practical acceptance and implementation.

The fourth panel focused on the role of private businesses in the Nazi regime and the recent restitution efforts. Oliver Rathkolb, professor of history at the University of Vienna, presented the results of a research project that he directed on forced and slave labor in the Hermann Göring Werke in Linz (founded in 1938), which was based on more than 30,000 employment records. Through detailed studies and psychological interviews, this research project analyzed both the framework for the traumatization of individuals and the functioning of the Nazi system of force, suppression, and privilege. Regarding the origins of the recent Austrian compensation settlement, Rathkolb voiced disagreement with other Austrian participants by insisting that this settlement was not freely embarked on by the FPÖ-ÖVP government under Chancellor Schüssel, but had already been decided on by the last coalition government of Social Democratic Chancellor Klima and had simply been postponed until after the 1999 elections. Rathkolb also argued that, despite a more effective

execution and interpretation of the Austrian compensation settlement, there was no reason to present Austria today as a model case compared to Germany.

Peter Hayes, professor of history at Northwestern University, who has been commissioned to write a history of the Degussa AG during the Nazi years, presented an overview of the company's history from 1933 to 1945 and its implication in the crimes of the Nazi state, and then turned to a discussion of how he has handled the problems that inevitably arise in connection with preparing a "commissioned history." He outlined the terms on which he agreed to undertake the assignment, the company's supportive but non-interfering stance toward his work, the state of the surviving internal records, and the countervailing forces that a historian must contend with in interpreting what he finds—most notably, the "seductions of proximity" that may lure a writer into seeing problems only as the company involved does or did, and the human burden of doing justice to the ordeals of the former victims one comes to know.

Henry Turner, professor of history at Yale University, who headed the General Motors documentation project on GM's relations with Nazi Germany, spoke on "General Motors and Ford Subsidiaries in the Nazi War Economy." Turner reported that in 1998, in response to class-action suits on behalf of victims of forced and slave labor, both Ford and General Motors commissioned the assembly of documents relevant to the roles of their German subsidiaries during the Third Reich and have since made the resulting documentation available to scholars. Ford assigned both collection and analysis of the documents to commercial research firms, then issued an anonymous annotated report as a company publication in 2001. The GM documentation project did not provide for a published report, but an independent study is in preparation. Turner summarized the findings as follows: Ford and GM both became, in effect, hostages of the Nazis as a result of currency controls that made it impossible for them to withdraw their large investments in their German subsidiaries; under pressure from the regime, both subsidiaries became involved in war production after the war began in Europe; both American firms lost control over their subsidiaries before Hitler's declaration of war on the United States; although placed under German custodianship, neither subsidiary was ever confiscated, so that both remained the property of the American firms throughout the war; in neither case did the American firms have any voice in the wartime use of forced and slave labor by their subsidiaries; but after resuming control following the war, the American firms both laid claim to wartime dividends from their subsidiaries that had been generated by the manufacture of war materials for Germany with the use of forced and slave labor. Both firms have made sizeable contri-

butions to the fund recently established to provide compensation to victims of forced and slave labor.

The fifth panel dealt with the issue of compensation for forced and slave labor. Martin Eichtinger, former chief of staff of the Special Representative of the Austrian Government for the Settlement of Slave and Forced Labor-Related Issues, discussed the Austrian forced labor settlement. Eichtinger reported on the origins of the settlement in lawsuits against Austrian companies, the Austrian government's initial position that compensation for forced labor was the responsibility of Austrian companies, and its eventual decision to take government action on the forced labor issue by establishing the Austrian "Reconciliation Fund" with voluntary contributions from Austrian companies.

In his paper "The American View of Nazi Forced Labor," James D. Bindenagel, former U.S. Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues, discussed the twin goals of American foreign policy with regard to the forced labor issue: to seek a measure of justice for victims of the National Socialist regime and to help achieve "legal peace" for German companies in the United States. In the 1990s, the U.S. government seized on the opportunity to reach survivors of slave and forced labor through dignified payments and recognition, accompanied by apology, for the suffering they endured. The U.S. government, working with the German government, helped to create the German "Remembrance, Responsibility, Future" Foundation. The Foundation has distributed payments to more than a million survivors and is dedicated to continued research and education to foster reconciliation in memory of the victims. American lawsuits against German companies were dismissed through the foreign policy intervention of the U.S. government.

The sixth panel was dedicated to the topic of Aryanized property and looted art. Ernst Sucharipa, director of the Austrian Diplomatic Academy and Special Envoy for Restitution Issues of the Austrian Foreign Ministry, spoke on "Jewish Property and Austrian Restitution Efforts." Sucharipa argued that Austria's efforts to pay compensation for deprivation and loss of property due to the crimes of the Nazi era started right after World War II, but that these efforts were completely inadequate at first and drawn out over decades. For this situation to change, two things had to occur: first, a thorough rethinking of Austria's past, namely the recognition that the "victim theory" based on the Allies' Moscow Declaration of 1943 represented only half of the truth; second, U.S. insistence that Austria shoulder its responsibility in a more adequate fashion. While individual Austrian writers and historians had prepared the ground earlier, the rethinking on the official level started in 1988—fifty years after the *Anschluss*—and was expedited by important declarations first by Prime Minister Vranitzky and then by the Federal President in the course of

historic visits to Israel. This rethinking culminated in the Washington agreements concluded in January 2001 between the Austrian and the U.S. governments, class-action lawyers, and victim's associations. While full restitution in this and similar cases appears out of reach, it is important that measures provide both "a measure of justice" and essential elements of history.

Konstantin Akinsha, Senior Research Director of the Commission for Art Recovery in Washington, DC, and a former researcher for the Presidential Commission on Holocaust Assets in the United States, spoke on "Nazi Art Theft in Occupied Territories and Soviet Looting in Postwar Germany." Akinsha explained that the Russian government initially tried to make a list of cultural property stolen by the Germans, but had to abandon this effort because their records for the Baltic States, the Ukraine, and Belorussia—from which most art works were taken—were not good enough. Instead, the Russians drew up a list of artworks held by the Germans that they wanted to bring to Russia as compensation for the art that the Germans had stolen from Russia. After the Russians occupied Germany, they removed numerous works of art to the Soviet Union without any regard to provenance, that is, including artworks that the Germans had stolen from Jews or other owners in occupied countries. Therefore, today the issue of the restitution of cultural property removed to Russia at the end of the war is not just a matter between Russia and Germany, but involves other European countries as well as Jewish Holocaust survivors.

Jonathan Petropoulos, professor of history at Claremont McKenna College and former Research Director for Art and Cultural Property of the Presidential Commission on Holocaust Assets in the United States (PCHA), offered an assessment of the PCHA's work with regard to cultural property. He first noted areas where the commission made contributions. This included assessing millions of pages of documents in the National Archives, among other repositories; helping to accelerate the declassification of documents; inducing museums to conduct self-studies of their collections to identify unrestituted victims' assets; and encouraging U.S. government institutions and agencies, such as the Army and the Library of Congress, to examine their role in handling victims' assets. Petropoulos also identified limitations of the PCHA's work, including: the mandate of the commission, which restricted research efforts to Holocaust victims' property; the inability to induce the art trade to be more forthcoming; and the difficulties of including all the research findings in the final report. Petropoulos concluded by noting areas where the PCHA's work remained unfinished. Here, he focused on a database of artworks lost by victims but never recovered (now on the PCHA's website), and identified topics where the findings were too sketchy to permit

solid conclusions (for instance, the smuggling of looted artworks through Switzerland and Latin America). He noted that there is still a great deal to be done and that cooperation with other commissions and organizations will be crucial to future work.

The Evening Roundtable explored comparative dimensions of the conference topic. Clemens Jabloner, president of Austria's High Court of Administration and chairman of the Austrian Historical Commission, spoke about the background, framework, and methods of the commission's work. Since the final report was expected in a few weeks' time, he declined to report on the commission's findings, but mentioned that substantial parts of the commission's work have been published in several interim reports and are available on the commission's homepage www.historikerkommission.gv.at. Jabloner noted that as a consequence of the theory that saw Austria as a victim of Nazism, for the longest time Austria did not regard restitution as an important public matter, but "privatized" this field. Generally speaking, the legal system offered victims of Nazism opportunities to get their property back, but the system had gaps and took a long time to get results.

Daqing Yang, associate professor of history at George Washington University, spoke on the topic "Yen for the Past? Japan and World War II Reparations." If the Cold War was a blessing for Japan as far as the war settlements were concerned, the end of the Cold War brought about a flood of law suits against the Japanese government and companies for war crimes against Asians and Americans during World War II. Few of them have succeeded, however. Geopolitical realities in Pacific Asia, Yang argued, make it difficult to repeat European-style restitution. To finally heal the scars of war in East Asia, he concluded, political will on all sides as well as regional economic integration will be needed.

David Goldfield, professor of history at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte, gave a paper on the topic "Slave Reparations: An Idea Whose Time Has Come or Gone?" After a brief discussion of recent calls for slave reparations in the United States, Goldfield carefully reviewed and assessed the merits of six arguments that have been advanced against reparations: that no particular group can be held responsible today; that only a minority of whites were slaveowners; that America today is a multi-ethnic nation; that reparations claims turn African-Americans into victims; that reparations have already been paid in the form of welfare payments and affirmative action benefits; that slavery existed for thousands of years until abolitionism finally came about.

The public lecture concluding the conference was delivered by Ken Klothen, the former executive director of the U.S. Presidential Commission on Holocaust Assets in the United States (PCHA), who spoke on "The PCHA: Assets, History, Process, Results, Future Agenda." If one

wants to determine whether and how “politics” influence the work of historical commissions, Klothen suggested, one must first ask what definition of politics one is applying. In the case of the Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets, he argued, there was no experience of politics in the sense of partisan attempts to shade results or determine historical findings based on a result-oriented desire to protect the reputation of the United States government. There were, however, principled disagreements about historical conclusions voiced by political appointees based on their personal review of the evidence.

Richard F. Wetzell

ART AND SOCIETY IN EUROPE IN THE LONG
NINETEENTH CENTURY:
CONNECTIONS AND COMPARISONS

Conference at the GHI, December 6–8, 2002. Conveners: Christof Mauch (GHI), Deborah Cohen (Brown University), Peter Mandler (Cambridge University). Participants: Celia Applegate (University of Rochester), Leora Auslander (University of Chicago), Eva Giloi Bremner (Princeton University), Holger Hock (Cambridge University), Stefan Muthesius (University of East Anglia), Emma Winter (Cambridge University).

The subjects of art, architecture, and design constitute fields in their own right. Perhaps for that reason, none has garnered sufficient attention from social, cultural, political, and economic historians. Many historians have been understandably chary of trespassing upon the expertise of specialists whose knowledge far exceeds their own. Lacking an understanding of technique and genre, historians have tended to use pictorial sources simply as illustrations. That has, to some degree, changed in the past decade. Historians have grown more sophisticated in their approach to visual culture. They have also undertaken important studies in the historical sociology of art and design, investigating cultural institutions such as museums and phenomena such as collecting and consumption.

The conference at the GHI brought together historians who are working on topics in art, architecture, and design in Britain, France, and Germany. It was both comparative and cross-national in scope. We began with two broad questions. First, does culture have a national face? Second, and interrelated: Are nationally-focused studies the most revealing way to study culture? Of course, similar social, political, and economic phenomena have often been studied in national terms; there are, for instance, a number of studies of industrialization that examine national variation even as they recognize an end-point much the same across the West. But should the history of culture proceed along the same model?

The first session was devoted to a pair of papers that offered very different accounts of the role of the British state in promoting art. Peter Mandler's paper, "Art in a Cool Climate: the Cultural Policy of the British State in European Context, c. 1780—c. 1850," told the dismal story of the laissez-faire state's neglect of the arts. Unlike on the Continent, where a belief in art's civilizing effects and the national patrimony (among other reasons) led to state support, two peculiarities distinguished the British: first, Parliament's parsimony and distrust of the Crown, and second, deeper Protestant qualms about art more generally. The wars that engulfed the Continent from 1794 to 1814 caused, Mandler argued, a greater divergence between the British and the French and Germans, as those

states pursued an active arts policy intended to bind together the populace. Britain, by contrast, had little need to worry about national integration, and public opinion favored the sphere of commerce as the best way to promote art. And yet, as the market eventually proved inadequate in Britain to promote good design and bolster the country's export industries, the 1830s and 1840s witnessed some convergence with the Continent: The rebuilt Houses of Parliament, the South Kensington Museum, and local museums and art colleges were the result. Despite their promoters' fervent hopes, however, these initiatives ran aground by the 1850s. Local authorities proved uninterested in spending tax money on artistic initiatives, an aversion that Mandler attributed to the detachment in Britain between local cultural and governing elites.

By contrast, Holger Hoock's account of the arts in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Britain was rather more optimistic. There were important differences between academies in eighteenth-century Europe; however, these should not, he argued, blind us to the critical functional similarities. Setting the British Royal Academy within the context of other European art academies, Hoock pointed out, results in a far less gloomy portrait than is commonly painted. Not only did British governments between the 1790s and c. 1820 spend more money on cultural projects than they had ever before, but the Royal Academy gained for itself a privileged role vis-à-vis the state. It won important concessions on the taxation of art, helped to design new coinage, and gained a consultative role on monuments.

The second session of the workshop considered the subject of Anglo-German interactions. In her paper, "Art and Industry: Historicism in the Wilhelmine Empire," Eva Giloi Bremner explored the circles surrounding Friedrich Wilhelm and Crown Princess Victoria. Building upon archival work in the royal papers, she drew connections among the spheres of historicism in the arts and crafts and liberal economic and political thought. Historicism has been, Bremner argued, wrongly associated with backward-looking sentiment, and specifically with the famed feudalization thesis of the middle class. Instead of being a feudal remnant, historicism, for Bremner, is more properly associated with the liberalism imported by Crown Princess Victoria along with her attachment to the Italian Renaissance. The sins (or at least the preoccupations) of the parents were visited upon their son, and here Bremner's contribution was also rehabilitative. Bremner situates Wilhelm II's love of historical fancy dress within the context of his parents' costume balls, antique collecting, and art fancying—a context in which dressing up as Frederick the Great looks less like maniacal delusion and more like bourgeois pageantry.

Emma Winter offered an account of a cross-fertilization that proceeded in the other direction. Why, she asked, did a Select Committee in

1841 recommend that the walls of the new Houses of Parliament at Westminster be decorated with frescos—a Catholic art-form *par excellence*? And, no less puzzling, why was the role of Ludwig I of Bavaria lauded as an example? She traced the origins of the recommendation to Ludwig’s kingdom, and specifically, to his hope that culture might vault his small state onto the European stage. English admirers of Ludwig’s patronage enjoyed similarly high hopes for fresco painting in the Nazarene style, once transplanted onto British soil. The Select Committee imagined that fresco painting might serve as a unifying and elevating force for a politicized populace. But, as Winter demonstrates, they underestimated the confessional anxieties that their proposal would spark in a Britain roiled by the Oxford Movement. The Select Committee’s recommendation raised the question of the relationship between art and religion—an issue that led ultimately to the rejection of German artistic models.

The third panel paired a paper on France and one on Germany to discuss the significance of the arts to projects of national unification. Leora Auslander explored the role of aesthetics in the national pedagogy of France’s Third Republic. Her interest lay in the everyday practices that helped to instill Frenchness. Pitting the local against the national is not, Auslander argues, the most fruitful approach, because republican cultural policies must be considered as a whole in order to be understood. Her paper uncovered appeals to the heart and to the mind in a variety of sites, from paintings in museums to national symbols on coins, from monuments to domestic interiors. If fine art was thought to have transcendent appeal, the domestic sphere functioned as the site of national culture. The French state, Auslander concluded, succeeded in maintaining the aesthetics of the everyday “French”; neither imports nor modernist styles gained much of a foothold in French homes during the Third Republic.

In her paper “What Difference does a Nation Make?” Celia Applegate assessed how German unification affected art and its institutions. She began with critiques of the standard interpretations—to wit, arguments either that unification changed everything or that it changed nothing. Applegate’s question was different: She asked what a single German state made possible that wasn’t possible before. There were, as she noted, important developments in the spheres of copyright laws and language standardization, alongside the less easily quantifiable but obviously important fact of nationhood itself. At the same time, however, the significance of unification should not be overstated. Even after unification, individual states continued to sponsor their own artistic projects. Nor does unification seem to have affected the various private cultural organizations that existed before 1871 and continued thereafter to operate in a largely unchanged manner.

The final panel of the workshop examined the subjects of art and design. Stefan Muthesius' paper on the applied arts in late nineteenth-century Central Europe considered the relationship between universalism and nationalism. Not until the later 1860s, Muthesius argued, was the term "national" widely deployed in discussions about the decorative arts. In the multinational Austro-Hungarian Empire, beset with its own problems of political nationalism, nationality remained a concept to be used cautiously. For Imperial Germany, by contrast, it was not chiefly the term "national," but rather the style implied that raised controversy. Both Austrians and Germans manifested a love-hate relationship with the French, to whom they compared themselves anxiously. Into this decorative chaos rushed the Bavarians, who, Muthesius concluded, successfully developed a style that became synonymous with German *Gemütlichkeit*.

Deborah Cohen's paper explored the ways in which art in Britain had, by the 1870s, burst its banks, overflowing into the shops, the magazines, and most importantly, the homes of the middle classes. From the ubiquitous "art furniture" displayed in store windows to the "artistic effects" achieved by those who decorated, the British home had become the haven for art. Why did art proliferate in this way? Two sorts of answers, Cohen argued, are needed: One takes account of the role of figures such as Ruskin and Morris, as well as the South Kensington project. But if this answer is necessary, it is not sufficient: A deeper social and cultural explanation is required. Cohen's paper sketched a transformation in the ways that middle-class Britons conceived of their household goods; she traced a trajectory from possessions as sinful to possessions as they came to be seen at the end of the end of the nineteenth century—as an expression of individuality. Art provided a crucial waystation along that road, both as a means of vindicating abundance and later, as an expression of the consumer's discernment and individuality.

The parallels uncovered in the papers were perhaps more striking than the differences. We encountered similarities of models, of aspirations, of conceptions, of antagonists, even of players. We even saw, in the various papers, that actors in the various countries shared the same worries—they each ascribed superiority or uniqueness to other countries; the Germans wrung their hands about British superiority and, of course, vice versa. And if that weren't striking enough, we have ostensibly distinctive "national" styles that were revealed to be anything but. The broader outlines of bourgeois culture in the long nineteenth century were very much on our agenda, even as we tried to assess in which arenas national differences mattered.

Deborah Cohen

GHI FELLOWS SEMINARS FALL 2002

The GHI's Fellows Seminars are a forum in which recipients of fellowships and other visiting scholars present their research to the research fellows of the Institute and interested scholars from local academic institutions. The Fellows Seminars are organized by Deputy Director Dirk Schumann.

The GHI awards doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships for the duration of one to six months. These fellowships are designed for doctoral candidates and postdoctoral scholars whose research deals with a topic in one of the following fields: German history, the history of German-American relations, the role of Germany and the United States in international relations, and American history. For the application process, see the "Announcements" section of this *Bulletin*.

August 22, 2002

Michael Frey, University of Bochum

Transatlantischer Protesttransfer 1950–1970: Der interkulturelle Brückenschlag zwischen der amerikanischen und der deutschen Neuen Linken

Prof. Dr. Uta Gerhardt, University of Heidelberg

Die Macht der Stunde Null: Eine soziologische Studie zum Kulturtransfer nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg durch die Besatzungsmacht USA

Dr. Frank Schumacher, University of Erfurt

How Unique Was the American Empire? The United States and Great Britain in the Age of Imperialism, 1865–1918

September 19, 2002

Dr. Ulrike Kirchberger, University of Bayreuth

Die protestantische Mission unter den nordamerikanischen Irokesen im 18. Jahrhundert in ihrem transatlantischen Kontext

October 17, 2002

Rupinder Singh, Princeton University

Complex Ideal of Pure Form: German Architectural Theory, 1879–1910

December 12, 2002

Dr. Hanns C. Lühr, Free University of Berlin

Hitlers 'Sonderauftrag Linz'

Katrin Pieper, Free University of Berlin

Erinnerung und Präsentation der Vergangenheit: Der Holocaust zwischen Geschichte, Kultur und Politik, gezeigt an dem United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C. und dem Jüdischen Museum in Berlin