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GHI PUBLICATIONS
The GHI was delighted and honored to invite Professor Hans Küng to Washington this spring to deliver the second Gerd Bucerius Lecture. Küng, co-president of the World Conference on Religion and Peace and president of the Global Ethics Foundation, was a natural choice for the Bucerius lectureship. The GHI functions as a bridge between the scholarly communities of North America and Europe, and Küng has devoted his career to building bridges between peoples, faiths, and cultures. In the process, he earned a reputation for speaking his mind on the issues of the day - for precisely the sort of stimulating, even provocative commentary that the Bucerius Lecture series was created to encourage. The text of Küng’s lecture, “A New Paradigm in International Relations? Reflections on September 11, 2001,” appears in this issue of the Bulletin. The GHI would like to thank Professor Küng for accepting the invitation to deliver this year’s Bucerius Lecture and the ZEIT Foundation Ebelin and Gerd Bucerius for making this lecture series possible.

Another highlight of the spring was the second of the lectures sponsored by the Friends of the GHI. This year’s speaker was a true friend indeed, Professor Gerald Feldman of the University of California, Berkeley. Professor Feldman, a leading student of the economic history of twentieth-century Germany, has been an active participant in the Friends since the group’s creation. The lecture he delivered at the GHI in February presented his research on the role of Allianz, Germany’s largest insurance company, during the Third Reich, a fascinating case study of the business community’s dealings with the Nazi government. His work on Allianz was carried out amid the recent controversies about the financial assets of Holocaust victims and compensation for former forced laborers. His lecture, published in this issue of the Bulletin, provides not only a sober consideration of the question of corporate culpability in the crimes of the Nazi era but also a first-hand account of the research challenges the topic presents.

With the help of organizations like the Friends, the GHI maintains several programs to support the work of younger scholars. Frank Schumacher, a candidate for Habilitation at the University of Erfurt, has used a GHI fellowship to work at the National Archives and Library of Congress. He provides an overview of his research project in this issue of the Bulletin in the essay “The American Way of Empire: National Tradition and Transatlantic Adaptation in America’s Search for Imperial Identity, 1898–1910.”

Two other junior scholars are at work far from home as the Bulletin goes to press thanks to new fellowships created in memory of the late Jürgen Heideking. Known for his broad interest in U.S. and German-American history, Heideking was particularly fascinated by the Ameri-
can Revolution and the early national period. It is therefore appropriate that the first Heideking-Kade Fellowship for a German student working in American history was awarded to Markus Hünenörder of the Ludwig-Maximilian-University in Munich to support his research on the Society of the Cincinnati and conspiracy theory in the early republic. A precis of his research project appears in this issue of the Bulletin. Early this summer, Dr. Frank Biess of the University of California began a twelve-month stay at the University of Cologne as the first Heideking-Thyssen Fellow. Biess is using his time in Germany to revise his doctoral dissertation on the experiences of former German POWs after their return home. The dissertation was one of the first honored with the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize awarded by the Friends of the GHI; an overview of his project was published in the Spring 2001 issue of the Bulletin. The GHI would like to thank the Annette Kade Charitable Trust and the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung for their help in supporting the work of younger scholars and paying tribute to the memory of a committed Transatlantiker.

The GHI is also grateful to the many institutions and individuals who helped make possible the conferences, symposia, and seminars described in this issue of the Bulletin. The German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Allianz AG, Munich, generously supported the second Young Scholars Forum. The Bundeskanzler Willy Brandt Stiftung was instrumental in helping organize our highly successful conference on German Ostpolitik and U.S. détente policy. With the Brandt Stiftung’s assistance, we were able to bring historians together with several key participants in the foreign policy debates of the Brandt and Nixon years. The postwar period was also the focus of the Eighth Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar (TDS). Jointly sponsored by the GHI and Georgetown University’s BMW Center for German and European Studies, this year’s TDS was graciously hosted by the Zentrum für Zeitgeschichte Forschung in Potsdam. Special thanks are due to GHI Friends Roger Chickering and Konrad Jarausch for their efforts on behalf of the TDS. Another loyal Friend, Marion Deshmukh, helped bring this spring’s session of the Mid-Atlantic German History Seminar to the GHI.

The GHI is pleased to make its facilities available for events like the Mid-Atlantic German History Seminar, and it is therefore glad to have a bit more room to extend a welcome to visitors. In March, the GHI expanded into the fourth floor of its home at 1607 New Hampshire Avenue. The space had previously housed the Washington branch of the Goethe Institut and, more recently, the German-American Center for Visiting Scholars. Anyone with an interest in history will find a welcome at the GHI - our doors are open to all.

Christof Mauch,
Director
FEATURES

A NEW PARADIGM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS?
REFLECTIONS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

Second Gerd Bucerius Lecture, April 17, 2002

Hans Künig
University of Tübingen

Before I started my first American lecture tour in 1963, a Jewish colleague from America visited me in Tübingen and asked me: “What is the topic of your lectures?” My answer was: “The Church and Freedom.” “Very interesting,” he said, with a charming smile. “I know that there’s a Church, and I know that there’s freedom, but I didn’t know that you could have the Church and freedom together!”

Now, nearly 40 years later, as I was preparing my lectures for the United States this time, I was also asked about my topic and said: “America and the New Paradigm of International Relations.” And the answer in Europe was: “I know that there is America, and I know that there is a new paradigm, but I didn’t know that you could have America and the new paradigm of international relations together!” And people asked me: “Why do you want to enter the lion’s den?”

In 1963 I was able to convince a few people that the church and freedom can go together. And I hope that in 2002 I shall also convince my public that America and the new paradigm can go together. But let me now start in a very un-American way: from history.

I. Paradigm Change in International Relations

Let me begin with three symbolic dates that signal the new paradigm in international relations that has been slowly and laboriously establishing itself: its announcement (1918), its realization (1945), and finally its breakthrough (1989).

The first opportunity: In 1918 the First World War ended with a net result of around 10 million dead, the collapse of the German Empire, the Habsburg Empire, the Tsarist Empire, and the Ottoman Empire. The Chinese Empire had collapsed earlier. American troops were on European soil for the first time and, on the other side, the Soviet Empire was
Hans Küng delivering the Bucerius lecture
in the making. This marked the beginning of the end of the eurocentric-imperialistic paradigm of modernity and the dawning of a new paradigm. That new paradigm had not yet been defined, but had been foreseen by far-sighted and enlightened thinkers, and was first set forth in the arena of international relations by the United States of America. With his “Fourteen Points,” President Woodrow Wilson wanted to achieve a “just peace” and the “self-determination of nations,” without the annexations and demands for reparations that some in Congress wanted. President Wilson has been ignored too much in the United States and even denigrated by Henry Kissinger who often polemicized against “Wilsonianism”.

The Versailles Treaty of Georges Clémenceau and Lloyd George prevented the immediate realization of the new paradigm. That was “Realpolitik.” The word was first used by Bismarck, but the ideology was developed by Machiavelli and first put into political practice by Cardinal Richelieu. Instead of a just peace, the First World War ended with a dictated peace in which the defeated nations took no part. The consequences of this approach are well known to you: fascism and Nazism (backed up in the Far East by Japanese militarism) were the catastrophic reactionary errors which two decades later led to the Second World War, which was far worse than any previous war in world history.

The second opportunity: 1945 saw the end of the Second World War with a net result of around 50 million dead and many more millions exiled. Fascism and Nazism had been defeated, but Soviet Communism appeared stronger and more formidable than ever to the international community, even though internally it was already experiencing a political, economic, and social crisis because of Stalin’s policies. Again, the initiative for a new paradigm came from the USA. In 1945, the United Nations were founded in San Francisco and the Bretton Woods Agreement on the reordering of the global economy was signed (foundation of the International Monetary Fond and the World Bank). In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights followed, along with American economic aid (the Marshall Plan) for the rebuilding of Europe and its incorporation into a free trade system. But Stalinism blocked this paradigm in its sphere of influence and led to the division of the world into East and West.

The third opportunity: 1989 saw the successful peaceful revolution in Eastern Europe and the collapse of Soviet Communism. After the Gulf War, it was again an American president who announced a new paradigm, a “new world order,” and found enthusiastic acceptance all over the world with this slogan. But in contrast to his predecessor, Woodrow Wilson, President George Bush felt embarrassed when he had to explain what this “vision thing” for the international order should look like. No
change in Iraq, no democracy in Kuwait, no solution for the Israel-Palestine conflict, no democratic change in other Arab states. And, at the present moment, doubts are also increasing in the United States whether the so-called “war against terrorism” can be our vision for the future. So today the question arises: Over the last decade, have we again forfeited the opportunity for a “new world order,” a new paradigm?

I do not share this opinion. After all, despite the wars, massacres, and streams of refugees in the twentieth century, despite the Gulag archipelago, the Holocaust, and the atomic bomb, we must not overlook some major changes for the better. Since 1945, not only has humanity seen numerous great scientific and technological achievements. But many of the ideas set forth in 1918 that had been pressing for a new, post-modern and global constellation were also able to better establish themselves. The peace movement, the women’s rights movement, the environmental movement, and the ecumenical movement all began to make considerable progress. New attitudes emerged toward war and disarmament, toward the partnership of men and women, toward the relationship between the economy and ecology, between the Christian churches and the other world religions. After 1989, following the end of the enforced division of the world into West and East and the definitive demystification of both the evolutionary and now also of the revolutionary ideology of progress, concrete possibilities for a pacified and co-operative world have begun to take shape. In contrast to European modernity, these possibilities are no longer eurocentric but polycentric. Despite all the monstrous defects and conflicts still plaguing the international community, this new paradigm is post-imperialistic and post-colonial, with the ideals of an eco-social market economy and truly united nations at their core.

Despite the terrors of the twentieth century, there is still perhaps something like a hesitant historical progress. Over the last century, the formerly dominant political orientations have been banished for good. For one, imperialism has no scope in global politics after decolonization. Moreover, since the end of the South African apartheid regime, racism, a consistent policy of racial privilege and racial discrimination, is no longer the explicit political strategy in any state. Likewise, in the countries of Western Europe, where it originated, nationalism has become a non-word and for many people is being replaced by “European integration.”

The current movement is heading toward a novel political model of regional cooperation and integration, and is attempting to peacefully overcome centuries of confrontation. The result has been half a century of democratic peace, not only between Germany and France, not only in the European Union (EU), but in the whole area of the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, founded in 1948 and developed in 1960), which includes all of the Western industrialized coun-
tries (the European countries, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and above all the USA). That truly is a successful paradigm change! There are wars in Asia, Africa, and in the Islamic world, but nobody could imagine a war between Germany and France or the United States and Japan anymore.

After this all too brief historical tour, I would like to move on to the fundamental definition of the new paradigm of international relations. I have received much stimulation and support in discussions among the small international “group of eminent persons” that was convened by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan for the UN year of “Dialogue of the Civilizations” 2001, an endeavor that produced a report for the UN General Assembly, published under the title “Crossing the Divide: Dialogue Among Civilizations” (Seton Hall University, 2001).

II. The New Paradigm for International Relations and its Ethical Presuppositions

On the basis of the experiences in the EU and the OECD, the new overall political constellation can be sketched briefly as follows. Here, ethical categories cannot be avoided. In principle, the new paradigm means policies of regional reconciliation, understanding, and cooperation instead of the modern national politics of self-interest, power, and prestige. Specifically, the exercise of political action now calls for reciprocal cooperation, compromise, and integration instead of the former confrontation, aggression, and revenge. This new overall political constellation manifestly presupposes a change of mentality, which goes far beyond the politics of the present day. For this new overall political constellation to hold, new approaches to international politics are needed.

For one, new international organizations are not enough here; what is needed is a new mind-set. National, ethnic, and religious differences must no longer be understood, in principle, as a threat but rather as possible sources of enrichment. Whereas the old paradigm always presupposed an enemy, indeed a traditional enemy, the new paradigm no longer envisions or needs such an enemy. Rather, it seeks partners, rivals, and economic opponents for competition instead of military confrontation.

This is so because it has been proven that in the long run national prosperity is not furthered by war but only by peace, not in opposition or confrontation but in cooperation. And because the different interests that exist are satisfied in collaboration, a policy is possible which is no longer a zero-sum game where one wins at the expense of the other, but a positive-sum game in which all win.
Of course, this does not mean that politics has become easier in the new paradigm. It remains the “art of the possible,” though it has now become nonviolent. If it is going to be able to function, it cannot be based on a random “postmodernist” pluralism, where anything goes and anything is allowed. Rather, it presupposes a social consensus about particular basic values, basic rights, and basic responsibilities. All social groups and all nations must contribute to this basic social consensus, including religious believers and non-believers and members of the different philosophies or ideologies. In other words, this social consensus, which cannot be imposed by a democratic system but has to be presupposed, does not mean a specific ethical system, but a common basis of values and criteria, rights and responsibilities: a common ethic, an ethic of humankind. This global ethic is not a new ideology or “superstructure,” but gathers together the common religious and philosophical resources of humankind, for instance the Golden Rule (“What you do not wish done to yourself, do not do to others”) and a few very basic directives you find everywhere in humanity: not to murder, not to steal, not to lie, not to abuse sexuality.

A global ethic should not be imposed by law but be brought to public awareness. A global ethic is simultaneously oriented toward persons, institutions and results. Therefore a global ethic does not focus exclusively on collective responsibility so as to relieve the individual of responsibility (as if only the “conditions,” “history,” or the “system” were to blame for specific abuses and crimes). Instead, it focuses on the responsibility of each individual in his or her place in society and especially on the individual responsibility of political leaders. Free commitment to a common ethic does not, of course, exclude the support of law but rather includes it, and can in some circumstances make an appeal to the law. Such circumstances include cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression contrary to international law, as recently in the former Yugoslavia. Meanwhile, following ratification by more than 60 nations, the International Criminal Court (ICC) can now be established, to which such violations can be submitted, specifically when a treaty state is unable or unwilling to impose legal penalties for atrocities committed on its territory.

As you know, the United States, which had always been in favor of the International Criminal Court, has recently tried to sabotage it, together with Israel, China, and Russia. And thus I arrive at the third—and for your ears probably most delicate—part of my speech. I could easily and comfortably have ended my lecture here or spent its third part on evasive generalities. I know, of course, that I am a foreigner, but I am not a stranger. I also know that it is not for me to give you advice on foreign policy but that you do expect me to express my personal concerns, which
are certainly shared by more and more American men and women and also by more and more columnists in the New York Times and the Washington Post. So I hope you will forgive my frankness!

III. Opportunities after September 11

It is notorious that the United States opposes not only the International Criminal Court but also other important international agreements like the Kyoto Treaty on Climate Change. This is a sad fact for all admirers of American democracy. To many people not only in the Islamic world, but also in the Asian and African worlds and in Europe, the present administration of the only remaining superpower seems to be disrupting the establishment of the new paradigm of international relations. I therefore cannot avoid comparing the new paradigm with the political reality after September 11, 2001, given that the fight against terrorism had to be started without doubt and the monstrous crime in New York and in Washington could not remain unatoned for. I had initially intended to entitle this part “Critical Questions after September 11,” but I decided to reverse the perspective with the more hopeful title “Opportunities after September 11.”

I shall dwell only briefly on the question whether after September 11 there was a possible alternative to the Afghanistan scenario that we experienced. It would not make much sense to philosophize after the event on whether another strategy would have been possible. What if, for example, President Bush had immediately taken command in the White House, as Winston Churchill certainly would have done, in order to announce the highest level of alert, but also to prevent any hysteria? What if he had not, for example, closed down the airports to the detriment of the economy? What if he had not called for “war,” with fleets of ships and squadrons of airplanes, but for “combating” the terrorist network through other means: a great alliance with the Islamic states and an operation by the police and secret service with the support of the Northern Alliance and a build-up of a Pashtun Southern Alliance? What if he had cut off military supplies from Pakistan and financial support from Saudi Arabia? All this without the bombing of a whole country, without the human sacrifice and destruction that may already have outnumbered the victims of Ground Zero. Let me make this clear: I was never and I shall never be an absolute pacifist, but Christian fundamentalists, too, should know that in the Christian tradition war can only be the last resort, the *ultima ratio*, and never the first resort, or *proxima ratio*.

But now that we have this very questionable war, we must not allow anyone to prevent us from asking some questions. We have:

—a war that after more than six months has still not attained its primary objectives (“Osama bin Laden dead or alive”): Bin Laden es-
caped, and Afghanistan risks a descent into chaos: new tribal conflicts, the rule of the warlords, and banditry as in the period before Taliban rule; no, there is no peace in Afghanistan, and hundreds of Afghans are coming from all over the country to the American embassy to ask for war compensation for the loss of their families and their homes.

—a war in which European soldiers, too, are becoming increasingly entangled in actions on the basis of “unlimited solidarity” and are possibly condemned to years of maintaining a presence and getting involved in clashes in the Hindu Kush with responsibility for the capital, Kabul;

—a war which makes some by no means pacifist contemporaries ask what German soldiers are doing not only in Afghanistan but also in Kuwait and Yemen, what German frigates have achieved in Djibouti and the Horn of Africa, and whether German soldiers should also join in wars against Somalia and Syria, Iraq and even Iran, without any restrictions. The defenders of this new military foreign policy think that Germany could be “marginalized.” But no, Germany is too great and too powerful to be “marginalized.”

After the most recent experiences, the decisive question is more than ever: What international commitment should we make? And should we simply continue the fight against terrorism in this style? My concern is not the alternatives of the past but the alternatives of the future. Have we any alternatives at all, as long as foreign policy is above all military policy and billions of dollars are being spent on sinfully expensive new weapons systems and transport planes instead of on kindergartens and schools at home and on fighting poverty, hunger and misery in the world? Are there still any opportunities at all for the new paradigm outside the OECD world as well? I think that there are, and I want to indicate them cautiously: not with apparently certain predictions, but in the mode of “It could be that . . .” I shall do this in full awareness of all the real uncertainties of the future, which today often bring about fundamental changes more quickly than before, changes which are, however, not always for the worst. I shall adopt, so to speak, the realistic anti-Murphy principle: “What can go wrong need not always go wrong . . .” And here I shall limit my remarks to Afghanistan and the Middle East.

The War in Afghanistan

My position on the war in Afghanistan is this: I am known as a friend of the United States; I have often been a visiting professor here and I am an admirer of the great American tradition of democracy and the demand for human rights. And precisely for that reason I would plead for peace—even in the face of the campaign against terrorism:

It could be that the present American administration, too, will realize that those who think that they can win the fight against evil all over the
world are self-righteously condemning themselves to eternal war, and that even a superpower can carry out a successful policy only if it does not act unilaterally in a high-handed way but has real partners and friends, not satellites.

It could be that the United States, more shrewdly than former empires, will not overextend its power and come to grief through megalomania, but will preserve its position of predominance by taking into account not only its own interest but also the interests of its partners.

It could be that the American President, whose budget surplus has decreased in the past year by four trillion dollars and who must reckon with deficits again in the future, will once again reorient his budgetary policy and instead of being primarily concerned with military policy will be concerned with a more successful economic policy, which has in view further Enron-style bankruptcies, Arthur Anderson crimes, stock market disasters, and a recession that is still possible.

It could be that the present American administration, because it does not want to alienate the whole Islamic world, will take more interest in the causes of Arab and Muslim resentment towards the West and the United States in particular; that instead of being concerned only with the symptoms, it will be more concerned with therapy for the social, economic, and political roots of terror; that instead of spending yet more billions for military and policing purposes, it will devote more resources to improving the social situation of the masses in its own country and those who lose out all over the world as a result of globalization.

It could be that the superpower USA would also act out of self-interest to prevent the worldwide trust in certain standards of international law from being shaken, as it is when the only superpower sets different standards from those which apply generally in international law, because this only helps those powers which do not want to observe the standards of international law and precisely in this way encourages terrorism.

The Middle East

This is my position on the tragedy in the Middle East: I have been a friend of the state of Israel from the beginning; I made the “Declaration on the Jews” my special concern at the Second Vatican Council and, after the Council, I worked for the recognition of the state of Israel by the Vatican; and I am very proud to have earned an honorary degree from the Hebrew Union College of Cincinnati. Precisely for that reason I would plead for peace—even in the face of a situation from which there seems to be no way out. And I ask the Jewish members of this audience to understand my critical remarks as an expression of my concern for peace and security for the state of Israel.
It could be that in the face of the ever rising spirals of violence and death since September 2000 (when Ariel Sharon, heavily armed and protected, climbed the Temple Mount as a pure provocation and thus sparked the second Intifada), more and more Israelis will realize that they cannot win this war. The dream of a Greater Israel and Sharon’s purely military strategy of “peace by repression” has failed and is disowned by a recent resolution of the Security Council that was introduced by the United States. This resolution conjures up “the vision of a region in which two states—Israel and Palestine—live side by side within secure and recognized boundaries.” In the present conflict, it is absolutely necessary to distinguish between cause and effect. Many years ago, I had a long conversation with one of the greatest Israelis: Yeshayahu Leibowitz, professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, a scientist and scholar of Judaism. He told me: “We lost the Six Days War on the seventh day. Because we refused to make peace, we became an occupation power.”

It could be that an increasing number of Israelis will realize that Ariel Sharon, who was already responsible for the disastrous Lebanon war in 1982 and the war crimes in the refugee camps there, and was therefore compelled to resign as minister of defense, led them astray a second time by his mindless demagogy when he promised them peace through the policy of a strong hand. No one should be deceived: Even if Sharon defeats Arafat and his administration, he will still not be able to defeat the Palestinian people because the capacity of the oppressed to suffer is greater and more sustained than that of the oppressors. This is the lesson which many strong armies were forced to learn from guerilla wars.

It could therefore be that the army and the population will give increasing support to those more than 500 brave Israeli officers and soldiers who refuse to do military service in an immoral war, giving as their reason: “We will no longer fight beyond the ‘Green Line’ to occupy, to deport, to destroy, to block, to murder, to starve and to humiliate a whole people there.”

It could also be that the Jews in America and Europe, already long challenged by the scandalous oppression of a whole people, will not only complain about the suicide bombers but will help to support the peace movement in Israel, which has reawakened again, and secure victory for those who are ready for peace in Israel, so that in this chaotic stalemate either this government adopts a new policy as quickly as possible, or another government is elected which really wants peace. To further this process, the U.S. government has the decisive role to play.

It could then be that under American pressure an Israeli government will withdraw troops, as it did in Lebanon in 2000 after two decades of occupation (Israel’s “Vietnam”), and take up the peace proposal put forward by the Saudi-Arabian Crown Prince Abdullah, which has been
supported by the U.S., the EU, the UN and Russia: withdrawal from all occupied territories and recognition of the state of Israel by all Arab states, with normal political and economic relations. This would make possible an autonomous and viable (not dismembered) state of Palestine, preferably in an economic union with Israel and Jordan, which could be a blessing for the whole region and especially for Israel.

Indeed, it could be that then even the radical Palestinians, who have applied the same logic of violence, will stop their bloody terrorist activities, and that the Palestinians will realistically restrict their “right to return” to symbolic return for some particularly hard cases—in exchange for new settlements and financial compensation. In the long run only the recognition by Israel will lead to a less authoritarian and more democratic administration in Palestine.

Indeed, it could be that even the Jerusalem question could find a solution, like the “Roman question,” which likewise dragged on for many years when the Vatican and the Italian state fought over sovereignty over the holy city of Rome. A relatively simple solution was finally found in the Lateran Treaties: a single city with one city administration but two sovereignties, Italy on the left bank of the Tiber, and the City and State of the Vatican on the right. For Jerusalem, this would mean two flags and two sovereignties but a single administration in the one Old City (only this counts here)—if possible with a mayor and prime minister of the stature of Teddy Kollek.

Here particular demands would be made on the religions, not to support the official politics of their respective governments uncritically, but to show their prophetic role:

— “Recompense no one evil with evil” (Romans 12.17). This New Testament saying is today addressed to those Christian crusaders in America and elsewhere who look for evil only in the other, thinking that a crusade hallows any military means and justifies all humanitarian “collateral damage.”

— “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth” (Exodus 21.24): this saying from the Hebrew Bible on the limitation of damage is addressed to those Israeli fanatics who prefer to take two eyes from their opponent instead of just one and would like to knock out several teeth, forgetting that the perpetuation of “an eye for an eye makes the world go blind” (Gandhi).

— “And if they incline to peace, do thou incline to it” (Surah 8.61): this saying from the Qur’an is addressed to those Palestinian warriors of God who today would still like most of all to blot out the state of Israel from the map.

Peace among the religions is a precondition for peace among the nations. That is the reason why I work so hard for a Global Ethic, which
in the age of globalization is more urgent than ever. In the age of the globalization of the economy, technology and communication, there is also a need for the globalization of ethics in coping with global problems. The two fundamental demands of the 1993 Chicago Declaration, taken up in the Manifesto “Crossing the Divide” for the Dialogue of Civilizations, are the most elementary ones that can be made in this regard, yet this is by no means a matter of course.

The first is the demand for true humanity: “Now as before, women and men are treated inhumanely all over the world. They are robbed of their opportunities and their freedom; their human rights are trampled underfoot; their dignity is disregarded. But might does not make right! In the face of all inhumanity our religious and ethical convictions demand that every human being must be treated humanely. This means that every human being without distinction of age, sex, race, skin color, physical or mental ability, language, religion, political view or national or social origin possesses an inalienable and untouchable dignity.”

The second fundamental demand is the Golden Rule: “There is a principle which is found and has persisted in many religious and ethical traditions of humankind for thousands of years: What you do not wish done to yourself, do not do to others. Or in positive terms: What you wish done to yourself, do to others! This should be the irrevocable, unconditional norm for all areas of life, for families and communities, for races, nations, and religions”.

But let me conclude now: I started with the lack of vision after 1989. I hope it became clear what his vision really could be. And I may summarize it in the following four propositions:

There will be no peace among the nations without peace among the religions.

There will be no peace among the religions without dialogue among the religions.

There will be no dialogue among the religions without global ethical standards.

There will therefore be no survival of this globe without a global ethic.

For further reading:


Notes

1 Dr. A. Kamal Aboulmagd, Egypt; Dr. Lourdes Arizpe, Mexico; Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, Palestine; Dr. Ruth Cardoso, Brazil; The Honorable Jacques Delors, France; Dr. Leslie Gelb, United States of America; Nadine Gordimer, South Africa; His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan bin Talal, Jordan; Prof. Sergey Kapitza, Russia; Prof. Hayao Kawai, Japan; Prof. Tommy Koh, Singapore; Prof. Hans Küng, Switzerland; Graça Machel, Mozambique; Prof. Amartya Sen, India; Dr. Song Jian, China; Dick Spring, T.D., Ireland; Prof. Tu Weiming, China; The Honorable Richard von Weizsäcker, Germany; Dr. Javad Zarif, Iran; Giandomenico Picco, Italy (Personal Representative of Secretary-General Kofi Annan for the United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations).

2 See Leibowitz: “The Six Days War was a historical catastrophe for the state of Israel . . . In fact we are the ones who are not ready to negotiate and share. Israel did not want peace in the past, nor does it want peace today. It is interested only in maintaining its rule over the occupied territories.” Quoted from Hans Küng, Judaism: Between Yesterday And Tomorrow (New York: Crossroad, 1992), 531f.
THE GERMAN INSURANCE BUSINESS IN NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMANY

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The purpose of this lecture is to discuss the German insurance business in Nazi Germany from the perspective of my recently published Allianz and the German Insurance Business, 1933–1945. I do so with two purposes in mind. On the one hand, I would like to talk about what is in the book and what my findings and conclusions are. On the other hand, I want to treat the book as an example of the general problems of writing the business history of the National Socialist period. The two tasks are interconnected. There are a variety of ways to write business histories, and the most logical and normal one is to write such histories under the assumption that the business of business is to survive and profit, thereby serving its shareholders and stakeholders. If one were to write the business history of Allianz in the Weimar period, for example, one would talk about its efforts to rejuvenate its business after a lost war and inflation, talk about new insurance products and the rationale behind its expansion into Germany’s largest insurance organization. Certainly politics would play a role in such a history and one would concentrate on such issues as the struggle with the publicly-chartered insurance companies, governmental regulation, and Allianz’s domination and use of insurance trade associations and employer organizations. Nevertheless, the major concern of the historian would be to examine these questions in terms of company strategy and decision making, internal organization, premium rates, expectations, market conditions and, most importantly, profitability.

Similarly, a history of Allianz during the past decade would also explore the latter issues, although far more attention would be paid to globalization and diversification into various financial markets for obvious reasons. Even the most tenacious proponent of an “internalist” approach to business history, however, would not advocate leaving politics out. It is impossible to separate the corporate strategy of Allianz and other large German corporations from their advocacy of recent changes in German tax laws, for example. Certainly the role of Allianz with respect to the questions arising from the law suits directed against it charging alleged non-payment of insurance policies and the more general charges of the role which it and other German companies played in the “Third
Reich” would form a significant unanticipated consequence of the end of
the Cold War and Allianz’s globalization strategy and a challenge to its
public relations efforts. Allianz had prospered since 1950 without any-
one saying much about the fact that its General Director from 1921 to
1933, Kurt Schmitt, was Hitler’s second Reich Economics Minister in
1933–1934, that he regularly sported an honorary SS uniform, and that he
was a member of the Himmler Circle of Friends, that is, businessmen who
had been recruited to back the SS and who were ultimately subjected to
a periodic diet of SS esoterica. Nor was anything made of the fact that
Schmitt’s right-hand man, Director Eduard Hilgard, was head of the
Reich Group Insurance between 1933 and 1945 and thus the industry’s
leading representative in all dealings with the government. It was thus
unpleasant suddenly to be reminded of these facts in legal briefs and even
more unpleasant for new facts to be discovered such as, for example, the
1997 revelation in Der Spiegel that Allianz had insured SS factories in most
of the major concentration camps.

From a moral perspective, of course, these issues were a challenge to
the sociopolitical and ethical commitments of Allianz’s leadership, which
to be sure, were either not born or in their childhood during the Nazi
period, and while I think they met this challenge in an admirable as well
as wise manner, one should not fool oneself about the visibility of virtue
in balance sheets. A less open and proactive policy with respect to ex-
ploring Allianz’s role in the Third Reich was a real alternative. One did
not have to commission a history or send a group of historians to scour
the archives of Europe to find materials which were unlikely to be edi-
fying. Many other companies have chosen and continue to choose to “go
easy” with respect to their histories, and while the policy of Allianz
carried and carries certain risks, there is no reason to presume that the
basic business history of Allianz in the long run, measured in terms of
profit and loss and the trajectory of its corporate development, would
have been significantly affected if it had not chosen the set of risks re-
lected in its asking me to write its history rather than simply leaving the
problems to the auditors and lawyers it had to employ anyway. I think it
important to note here that my condition for undertaking this task was
total independence in my research and writing. I agreed to submit my
work to a group of historians of my choosing for critical discussion, but
the final decision as to what to say and publish was mine, as was the
choice of publishers. While I have consulted persons at Allianz about
technical questions, I have never requested permission to say what I
wanted to say or approval of the book’s contents. There will, of course, be
no way to satisfy everyone that this is the way to deal with these issues.
There are those who confuse the task of the historian with that of the state
prosecutor and believe that efforts at contextualization do nothing but
serve the public relations efforts of the companies involved and that differentiation constitutes an ill-conceived politeness that veils or covers up fundamental issues of guilt. The essence of the historical enterprise, however, is contextualization and differentiation, and while every historian will write his or her history somewhat differently, all historical work must be be documented and the sources used should be open to checking by other interested parties. Manifestly moral issues are involved in historical judgement, as the case of David Irving has reminded us so well, but the historical perspective is inevitably different from that of investigators, state prosecutors, and judges back in 1946.4

These considerations are highly relevant to the kind of book I have written as well as to the problems of writing the business history of the National Socialist period in general. Quite aside from the fact that I do not think it is morally possible to write a pure business history of the Third Reich in which the guiding principle is the exploration of economic logic, I do not think it possible to write even a sensible business history in this fashion. Indeed, it is not possible to write a sensible history of the sciences or professions along such lines, which is not to say that the 1933–1945 period was devoid of solid and even some brilliant scientific work that, like various advances in industrial technology and business practice, cannot be analyzed on their own terms. Whether pure “internalist” histories are sufficient or satisfactory for any period of history is a question worth discussing, but it certainly should be clear that National Socialism overwhelms such efforts because the mass of exogenous novelty it imposed on every form of human activity quite simply transformed the quality of those activities. That is, after all, what made it totalitarian.

But let me turn to the book and begin with a few words about sources. Everyone knows that you cannot write a history without sources, unless, of course, you make them up, as apparently has been the case from time to time. For a long time, it was the practice of some German companies to claim that their materials had been destroyed in wartime air raids, sometimes truthfully, sometimes not. Unfortunately, it was true in the case of Allianz, and the most serious research problem I had was created by the Allied air force, which bombed the Allianz headquarters in Berlin and destroyed a substantial portion of Allianz’s central files, above all the correspondence with the board of management, between the board of management and middle management, and between the central headquarters and its various branches as well between the company and its sales agents. This obviously was and is very frustrating, and it made it impossible to present as intimate, detailed, or nuanced a picture of the concern in its day-to-day operations and decision making processes as would have been desirable. This is not to say that there is nothing left of Allianz’s documents. We still have some important documents from the
supervisory board and board of management, a very full collection of company circulars and publications, and some volumes of correspondence dealing with important topics. These materials are of great value. These documents, however, were saved fortuitously, either because they were not at Allianz when it was bombed or because some directors or other employees of Allianz had materials in their personal possession. In short, there is an important residual concern archive.

Now, a wonderful way to block historical work is to have archival materials but no archive, and it is worth noting that Allianz had already set up an archive and began actively gathering materials in 1996 on the instructions of the Board of Management, so that work was being done on organizing these materials, locating other materials from various parts of the concern, and finding what is left in Stuttgart, Frankfurt, and other important branches of the company. It is always possible that new documentation will turn up from private persons or in cellars and attics of buildings. We ourselves had some good strokes of fortune in this respect. In 1999 I located the personal papers of Kurt Schmitt, and his family was willing to give this invaluable collection to the Allianz archive, and we have smaller collections of Director Eduard Hilgard, who played a key role during the war, and Hans Hess, who was Schmitt’s successor as General Director. We were able to tap into the papers of other private companies, the most important of which was the Munich Reinsurance Company (hereafter: Munich Re), of which Schmitt became General Director after leaving the government in 1935. Munich Re is very important because it had a “friendship pact” with Allianz and worked very closely with it. These documents made up, to some extent, for the lack of managerial papers and correspondence in the Allianz files. So, too, did the papers of the General Association of German Insurers, which hold the protocols and circulars of the Reich Group Insurance. The book is called Allianz and the German Insurance Business for a reason—Allianz was the most important insurance concern in Germany and, indeed, in Europe, and it dominated the Reich Group, which was itself headed by one of the Allianz directors, Eduard Hilgard. Since the insurance industry was highly regulated by the Reich Supervisory Office for Insurance, which was under the Reich Economics Ministry, most of the negotiations between the insurance industry and the government were conducted through the leadership of the Reich Group and inevitably reflected the powerful position of Allianz in the insurance business. Most powerful, of course, was the Party and the government, and this made the materials in government archives essential to my book. While the materials in the German Federal Archives in Lichterfelde and Koblenz were important for a host of questions, especially with respect to the Reich Supervisory Board for Insurance and the Nazi Party’s involvement in insurance mat-

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ters, the records of the Section on Banking and Insurance of the Reich Economics Ministry in the so-called Special Archive in Moscow really justified the weeks spent there by the team and myself. Lastly, important sections of the book are based on the interrogations of leaders of Allianz to be found in the U.S. National Archives in Washington as well as the denazification and restitution and compensation records in various archives of the German Federal Republic. I and the team of bright young graduate students working with me gathered these materials and made them part of the Allianz archive. In short, Allianz not only gave me access to its materials but also gave me the resources to compensate as far as possible for what was missing.

So much for the sources. What is the history I present in the book, and what are my conclusions? The first portions of the study describe and analyze the relationship between the concern’s leaders and the Nazi regime between 1933 and 1938. That relationship turned out to be surprisingly close in the early years. Schmitt and Hilgard had regular contacts with Göring between 1930 and 1933, that is, before Hitler came to power. Göring was viewed as a “moderate” Nazi who was friendly to business and a valuable contact. While there is no evidence that Allianz gave money to the Party, there is evidence that, at Schmitt’s instructions, Allianz did give cash gifts to Göring to help him out of his financial difficulties. Soon all the leading corporations were to be giving gifts to Göring, but here Allianz seems to have pioneered. Schmitt was enthused about the National Socialists, if not necessarily about all their policies and tactics, and he believed one could defeat the radicals in the Party by pursuing a proactive policy. That was why he joined the Party and accepted the position of Reich Economics Minister. It was also why he urged the Allianz concern to take a positive attitude toward the regime after the March 1933 elections. These decisions had a powerful impact both nationally and internationally because Schmitt was a prominent and highly respected businessman. It is often overlooked that the business world of the Weimar Republic was scandal-ridden, and that the various business collapses that had taken place had done much to undermine faith in the capitalist system and respect for capitalists. In the insurance field, however, Schmitt had distinguished himself as an extremely solid concern builder and had done a splendid job of maintaining the good name of the insurance business by coming to the rescue and taking over the Frankfurt General Insurance Company (Favag) in 1930 and assuming its liabilities to its policyholders if not to its stockholders. The Favag, to be sure, had been Allianz’s chief competitor, but the rescue operation and the solidarity it demonstrated was in sharp contrast to the way the bankers behaved in 1931 and did much to boost Schmitt’s stature. Allianz directors and officials, but also executives and company officials through-
out the country took Schmitt’s decisions in 1933 as a signal that the regime could be trusted. Similarly, foreign businessmen took Schmitt’s decisions as a positive sign about the regime despite its bad reputation. Schmitt was not forced to make these decisions, anymore than he was forced to wear his SS uniform as an honorary Brigadeführer. His successor as General Director of Allianz and close friend, Hans Hess, never joined the Party and attended as few Nazi events as possible, and he urged Schmitt not to become Reich Economics Minister. Schmitt later regretted the decision himself, used his health problems to leave office in 1935 and became General Director of Munich Re but remained heavily involved in Allianz’s affairs. His experiences left him quite ambivalent about the regime. He constantly oscillated between a willingness to work with the regime, especially when it came to promoting the interests of the enterprises with which he was associated, and scepticism and even outrage over its misdeeds.

Later, both he and Hilgard, who became head of the Reich Group at Schmitt’s request, claimed that they engaged with the regime to “prevent the worst.” The “worst” they were trying to prevent was the possible takeover of the insurance business by the Nazi economic radicals and proponents of the publicly-chartered insurance companies under the leadership of the vicious Gauleiter of Pommerania, Franz Schwede-Coburg and Joseph Goebbels’s brother, Hans, who was the head of the publicly chartered Rhenish Fire Insurance companies. This battle with Schwede-Coburg and Goebbels and their supporters, of course, had nothing whatever to do with moral opposition to the regime itself, and Schmitt and Hilgard’s efforts to defend the private insurance business drove them into becoming more and more implicated with the Nazis in order to demonstrate their loyalty and basic agreement with the Nazi regime and its goals. Not only did they accept the Gleichschaltung or coordination of the Allianz concern but they also made pro-regime speeches, and Hilgard regularly spoke favorably of the need for a guided economy even though he personally, like Schmitt and nearly all their colleagues, believed in liberal economic policies. This raises the question of how great a danger National Socialism posed to capitalism and the capitalist system. There is no simple answer to this question, however, because the National Socialist approach to the economy was purely opportunistic and instrumental. Nevertheless, important elements in the Party, Martin Bormann in particular, and ideologues in the SS, including Himmler, hated both the banks and the private insurance companies, and were constantly trying to find ways of infiltrating and attacking them. By 1939, Hilgard and Schmitt appeared to have won out in their war with Schwede-Coburg by using their close contacts with Göring and by persuading him that the private insurance industry, which constituted 80
percent of the industry, was a better instrument for meeting the demands of the Four Year Plan than the publicly chartered companies. Göring was not going to disrupt an important sector of the economy in the mobilization for war and in wartime to please the Party radicals, and he was certainly aware that the private insurance industry was contributing heavily through the purchase, usually by command of the Reich Supervisory Office for Insurance and Reich Economics Ministry, of huge amounts of Reich bonds. Indeed, the fate of Allianz became by and large financially mortgaged to the fate of the regime.

All this did not mean, however, that the radicals stopped trying to promote a future nationalization of the industry despite a Hitler order that the discussion be put off until at least the end of the war. In practical terms, the real immediate danger was the “Partification” of the insurance business, a danger Schmitt and Hilgard managed to ward off more successfully than some other enterprises. It is important to recognize, however, that the radicals in the Party and SS were never fooled by Hilgard’s speeches or Schmitt’s appearances in SS Uniform or membership in Himmler’s Circle of Friends. SS-Oberführer Fritz Kranefuss, who headed the Circle, no more thought Schmitt a true National Socialist than he did many other business leaders who tried to cultivate the Party leadership: “When one as a National Socialist and an SS-man discusses economic and political questions, then one has the feeling that one is living on two separate planets. In human terms, such conversations are always very nice and polite but in the last analysis they are completely unsatisfying with respect to world view. He (Schmitt) has often demonstrated how he thinks and feels . . . . He will probably never understand why we have such a basic difference of opinion from him, and one actually cannot hold it against him that he does not understand us.”

If Schmitt was granted a certain fool’s license (Narrenfreiheit) by the regime and allowed to plead for the release of Pastor Martin Niemöller, to protect some Jews and to escape the plots of Schwede-Coburg, it was in large part because he had supported the regime early on and above all because his son Günther had fallen on the Polish front in 1939 as a member of the SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler. This brought him protection, but not the promotion to a higher SS rank he sought even as his personal distaste for the regime grew.

Schmitt, Hilgard, and those running Allianz and Munich Re knew that cultivating the regime was good for business. Allianz profited from Schmitt’s early support for the Nazi-regime and his contacts with Göring and Hitler in very substantial ways, among other things by getting important group insurance contracts from Nazi organizations, for example, the National Socialist Women’s Organization, the National Socialist Teacher’s Organization, and the National Socialist Lawyer’s League. The close connection with the Reich Master of the Hunt, Hermann Göring,
helped Schmitt, a passionate hunter himself, to take the leadership in
the obligatory hunting insurance, while the contact with Himmler was useful
in Allianz’s successful effort not only to maintain its group insurance
policy with the Fraternal League of German Police Officials but eventually
to increase the number of police insured by Allianz.

Collaborating with and doing business with the Nazis also inevitably
influenced concern policies toward their Jewish employees and their en-
gagement in “Aryanization,” that is the expulsion of Jews from employ-
ment and the professions and the transfer of Jewish property into non-
Jewish hands. Initially, Allianz sought to retain and protect their Jewish
employees, especially those in high positions, but they gradually gave
way to demands that they let their Jewish employees go. In some cases
they found positions for them abroad and sought to protect their pen-
sions or come to a fair settlement. Step-by-step, however, they increas-
ingly yielded to the pressures of the regime. By 1937–1938, they were
much more ruthless in firing Jews and in some cases paid or pensioned
off Jewish sales agents and gained control of valuable portfolios at well
below their worth. A similar development took place with regard to the
“Aryanization” of Jewish-owned properties. This is not to say that Al-
lianz intended to cheat its Jewish sales agents but rather that the pres-
sures emanating from the regime worked in such a way as to produce this
effect in any case. Take, for example, the case of Martin Lachmann, a
sub-director for Allianz in Berlin, who wrote to his daughter on October
20, 1938: “My future is now completely unclear. I do not, to be sure, think
that Allianz will leave me in the lurch; that would certainly be the abso-
lute worst. After 31 years of strenuous work in building up a portfolio,
the likes of which almost no one else has, being dropped would be a
catastrophe for me. I have regarded my portfolio as a security for my old
age and, to be sure, with full justification, for the contract with guaran-
teed portfolio was made with me for life, so that a breach of faith to me
in this respect will be almost like suicide. But I cannot and will not believe
it, since only a short time ago I have received assurances on their word of
honor from my highest superiors.”

Nevertheless, General Director Hess
had to let him go, but promised to try to find a position in Switzerland.
Hess, apparently, continued to try in 1939, as Lachmann acknowledged in
personal letters, but Hess was unable to secure Lachmann a position or
give him full value for his portfolio because it contained “Aryan” policies.
As he despairingly wrote, “I could not get my pension from this portfolio
because, from a portfolio whose largest portion has to be termed Aryan,
a non-Aryan cannot derive income. This is completely mysterious to me
since this business was made at a time when such laws did not exist and,
as my contract expressly states, constitutes a specific portion of my hon-
orably earned commission.”

Apparently, his prospects in Switzerland
did not work out, and his efforts to get out of Germany were not successful either. Allianz gave him a pension of 12,000 RM a year as well as 4,800 RM a year for his wife in return for his portfolio. He remained in Germany until November 1941, when was deported and murdered in Minsk shortly afterwards.

As in the case of its treatment of its Jewish employees, so in the so-called “Aryanization” of Jewish properties, the behavior of Allianz managers became harsher with the passage of time. Insurance companies frequently invest in real estate, which is one of the important forms of capital coverage for their policies, and Allianz acquired a considerable number of such properties in the 1930s as Jews sold off their assets. In the early years, it appears to have paid a relatively fair price for some of the properties it picked up. Later, as the regime became watchful to make sure that a fair price was not paid, it sometimes justified prices it paid by arguing that it needed the properties and that the Jews would end up paying almost everything in taxes anyway. What is clear, however, is that Allianz was extremely well aware of the situation of the Jews from whom it was acquiring property and that there were very identifiable and documentable cases where it took advantage of the situation to acquire such assets at well below value.

A pair of central chapters of my book deal in great detail with two of the major issues involving the insurance companies and the Jews: the Pogrom of November 9–11, 1938 and the confiscation of Jewish insurance assets. Allianz directors, especially Hilgard, as head of the Reich Group, and Hans Goudefroy, his legal adviser and a postwar General Director of Allianz, played a particularly unhappy role in the Pogrom, which I found quite surprising since both men disapproved of the Pogrom personally and were not at all Nazi-style anti-Semites. What the documents do show, however, is that they were quite prepared to use anti-Semitic argumentation and collude with the regime in an effort to spare the insurance companies any expense in connection with the Pogrom. In reality, the insurance companies had no or little liability because of the abolition of policies providing coverage in cases of civil disturbance. The Third Reich, after all was allegedly an “orderly state” and the supervisory board had insisted on the elimination of such clauses. Hilgard and his colleagues, however, were anxious to avoid court cases involving foreign companies, and they obviously could not take the regime to court. Göring did not understand much about insurance, but he came to the conclusion that the insurance companies had at least some liability and thought he might pick up another 20 million Reichsmark for the Pogrom. The money, of course, would only fictitiously be paid to the Jews, who had to pay the costs of the Pogrom and a huge fine in addition, and would actually be paid to the Finance Ministry. The achievement of Hilgard, if it can be so
termed, was to whittle the sum down to 1.3 million RM, not only by using his very good contacts in the Reich Economics and Justice Ministries, but also by arguing that it was improper, for the Aryan “risk community,” to pay the costs of damages brought on as a result of the justified rage of the people against the Jewish conspiracy to which the Pogrom was an allegedly legitimate reaction. The Pogrom was legitimized in the language of Goebbels in one document after another in the successful effort to limit insurance company payments: “Through the decrees of November 12, 1938, the entire Jewry, therefore also the German and the stateless Jewry has been pronounced guilty of the Paris murder and thereby of a provocation against the German people. When the provocateur brings about the event provoked, then he must accept being treated like the perpetrator himself. It will not do to treat the politically condemned Jews as being legally guiltless with respect to insurance. As a consequence, it is justifiable to raise the objection that the German and stateless Jews were responsible for being intentionally, or at the very least being grossly negligent in bringing about the insurance case. Thereby, however, all insurance claims are rendered inapplicable.”

Insofar as the question of the confiscation of Jewish insurance assets is concerned, here the behavior of Allianz is much less to be criticized, although their liability for any unpaid policies is obvious. Initially, I thought this was a very major issue, and it certainly is the issue that interests lawyers acting on behalf of Jewish claimants the most. Actually, most Jewish insurance assets were confiscated indirectly through the monetization of Jewish insurance assets under duress. It is important to note here that insurance policies themselves are not negotiable, in contrast for example to securities. They only have worth if the owner collects on them. The problem for Jews in Nazi Germany during the 1930s was that they found it harder and harder to hold on to their insurance investments because of loss of income, the costs of emigrating, and the various taxes and impositions they confronted. The problem became extreme after the November 1938 Pogrom against the Jews, when huge tax burdens were placed upon them and the combination of increased disabilities and terror made them seek to leave Germany as soon as they could. As a result, there was a huge effort to monetize their insurance assets. Insurance companies had no choice but to pay out, which was precisely what the regime wanted them to do so that the authorities could expropriate the money by one means or another. What this meant, in effect, was that the insurance companies had discharged their obligation to their Jewish customers. What was subsequently done with the money was of no account to the insurers. In short, under this scheme, the confiscation of insurance assets, insofar as it occurred, was indirect. The insured person received his money, and the state then robbed him of his money from this
and any other source it could. The record shows that most Jewish insurance assets were lost in this manner, especially between 1937 and 1939.

In addition to the indirect confiscation of insurance assets just described, there was also a direct confiscation under the Reich Citizenship Laws, which permitted the government to declare citizens enemies of the Reich, denaturalize them and hold their assets forfeit to the Reich. Under such circumstances, the Gestapo or financial authorities could confiscate bank accounts or require insurance companies, assuming they knew of the existence of such policies, to pay the repurchase value of the policies to the Reich. Under the 11th decree of the Reich Citizenship Law of November 25, 1941, all German citizens living abroad—Auschwitz was included in “living abroad”—automatically lost their German citizenship and their assets were forfeit to the Reich. Unlike as in the past, however, where the government published the names of persons who had been denaturalized, now the Gestapo and Finance Ministry required the insurance companies to search out the Jewish policies in their portfolios and report them to the Gestapo. This regulation presented a number of difficulties. First, and ironically this remains the problem to this day, insurance policies provided no information as to religion, let alone “race” so that Jewish policies could not be identified unless the name was blatantly Jewish, and this was not as common in Germany as it was in Eastern Europe or the United States, or if they contained telltale correspondence, in which case they had probably been repurchased already. As the Nazi ideologist Alfred Rosenberg and Gauleiter Gustav Simon demonstrate, these names are not necessarily Jewish! Under wartime conditions, assuming the will was there, the manpower was not, and the insurance companies were constantly asking for extensions on the deadlines set for turning in the policies. The problem was particularly difficult with respect to premium-free policies since they were basically inactive and buried in the files. Finally, companies were concerned that they not be held liable in foreign courts for turning over policies of persons who had acquired foreign citizenship and were thus no longer German or stateless citizens residing abroad. My research in this area suggests that the insurance companies certainly turned over policies under the 11th decree but that the initiative more frequently came from the Gestapo, itself understaffed.

In the last analysis, however, I think the more serious matters connected with Allianz and other German enterprises are those dealt with in chapters 7 and 8 of the book, especially the latter, which deals with the Second World War. A substantial portion of these chapters deals with the expansion of Allianz and Munich Re as Germany expanded, first into Austria and Czechoslovakia and then into the rest of Europe. They were willing and active participants in Germany’s imperialist drive, as is dem-
onstrated by the manner in which Schmitt, Hilgard, and the other leaders of the industry sought to achieve German domination over the European insurance industry. One of their most important goals was to drive out the British. Schmitt, for example, concocted a scheme to create an Association for the Coverage of Large Risks led by Germany that would bring together the large European insurers and reinsurers to handle large risks once insured by Lloyd’s of London. In western, central, and southeastern Europe the German insurers strove to take over the British portfolios and to acquire a controlling interest in key companies. It is important to note here, however, that French and Belgian companies were quite willing to collaborate with the Germans, at least in the taking over of British portfolios, and that the Swiss insurers cooperated very closely with their German counterparts in a host of ways. The Swiss Reinsurance Corporation, for example, was a leading participant in the Association for the Coverage of Large Risks. There was nothing unique about German businessmen, and while the policy of collaboration with the National Socialist regime may have started with them, it did not end with them. It was easier, of course, to advance through Europe as it was being occupied than to retreat, and one can clearly detect from the available documents an effort to save what could be saved and come to terms with reality in western Europe as one began to recognize that the war was lost.

It was during this wartime period, however, that Allianz became involved in various activities that brought it into proximity with the Holocaust and with the criminality of the German war effort: insuring the production and productive facilities of the Ghetto of Lodz, insuring the facilities of SS factories in a host of concentration camps, insuring the shipment of confiscated Jewish goods to Berlin, acquiring securities stolen from Jews in the Netherlands in the course of their efforts to gain control of a Dutch insurance company. Some of these activities were due to the initiative of Nazis in the company, like the subdirector Max Beier of the Allianz branch in Berlin, who organized the consortium of insurance companies for the SS concentration camp factories. There is no evidence that the other activities described were organized by ideologically committed persons. The insuring of the facilities of the Ghetto of Lodz, for example, was a major piece of business for which Allianz was prepared to make concessions and which it hoped to keep. Insurers normally had the right to inspect the facilities they insured to make sure they met its standards, and Allianz requested permission to do so in Lodz. When this was denied by the authorities governing Lodz, however, Allianz maintained the contract and was sorely disappointed when the contract was lost to a publicly chartered company for ideological reasons. Indeed, as in Germany, so in the occupied territories, the war between the private insurers and the publicly chartered companies continued on for every
type of business. Life was made easier for Allianz and the consortium it led that insured the SS concentration camp factories since the SS was much less shy about letting insurance inspectors examine the facilities and duly report on what they found. These reports obviously did not detail the situation of the prisoners in these plants other than to note that security was not a problem, but it does mean that the insurance inspectors were able to observe the situation first-hand. Needless to say, there is no reason to think that it would have made a whit of difference if insurance inspectors had been allowed to enter the Lodz Ghetto. Difficult as it is to imagine, a consortium headed by the Aggripina Insurance Company actually competed with the Allianz for the SS factory contracts in the spring of 1945! The economic rationale, let alone the rationality, of competing for this business in the spring of 1945 is hard to discover, but it illustrates the problem of treating the business history of the “Third Reich” as normal business history. The distinction between normal and abnormal business had evaporated along with elementary business ethics and the capacity to deal with political risk effectively.

Certainly neither the Allies nor the victims were prepared to consider all that had gone on normal business behavior. The last chapter of the book deals with the problems of postwar denazification and restitution and compensation, a field that needs a great deal more scholarly work and investigation. In it I describe how the leaders in the field considered themselves to be victims of National Socialism and praised themselves for having saved the private insurance industry from Schwede Coburg and other “real” Nazis as well as how they were forced to do all kinds of things of which they really disapproved. In the end, most of them were classified as followers (Mitläufer)—Schmitt and Hilgard included—and continued their careers or retired. Were there any “heroes?” Only two emerge: Hans Hess, who never needed to be denazified in the first place, and Wilhelm Arends, the General Director of the Allianz-owned Bayerische Versicherungsbank, a Catholic conservative who actively engaged in the Resistance movement as a military officer in the army.

The notion that Allianz was a “victim” of National Socialism also influenced its attitude toward restitution questions, and its record in handling some of the “aryanization” cases discussed earlier in the book is, to say the least, a mixed one. There was a persistent claim, for example, that a fair price had been paid for Jewish properties, a claim that was happily rejected by the authorities for purchases made after 1935. I conclude with a description of the compensation procedures employed in connection with confiscated insurance assets, a procedure which the insurance industry played some role in devising and from whose costs it was well protected because it was technically bankrupt thanks to its investments in German government bonds (Reichsanleihe). It was the
German Federal Republic that provided the compensation under the restitution and compensation laws of 1956–1957, and these payments were very small indeed because the value of all Reichsmark assets was reduced by 90% under the currency reform of 1948. Jews continued to pay for Hitler’s war in more ways than one.

What are my conclusions? On the surface of it, Allianz would not appear to be an especially outstanding example of the problems of doing business in the Third Reich. Insurance companies do not employ forced labor, in any numbers at least, and the insurance business itself is somewhat intransparent to most people, very technical in character, and matter-of-fact. As it turns out, however, Allianz is a good illustration of practically all the problems faced by historians in considering the implication of business in the regime. Quite aside from the special fact that Schmitt was one of the few big businessmen to have been directly engaged with the Nazis even before 1933 and was especially proactive afterward, there is the fact that nearly everything in modern industrial societies is insured. I do argue and would argue that the degree of engagement with the regime was at least to some extent a matter of choice, and the choices made by some members of Allianz’s leadership were most unfortunate. Ironically, they were probably least culpable in the area in which they have been subject to the most criticism, namely, the expropriation of Jewish insurance assets. This was not because of any special virtue, but rather because of the manner in which the Nazis confiscated those assets and the nature of the life insurance business. All the evidence suggests, however, that they accepted and sought after the business offered by the regime and that it has taken a long time for them and the rest of the German and indeed European and even portions of the American business community to confront what happened. I do think it is to Allianz’s credit that they have done so, and the spirit in which they have done so is also to their credit.

Notes


6 Kranefuss to Brandt, March 18, 1943, Bundesarchiv Berlin, formerly BDC, SL 62.

7 Letter of October 20, 1938, ibid., and information generously provided by Martin Lachmann’s grandson, Peter Haas.

8 Letter of October 26, 1938, ibid.


After victory in the Spanish-American War of 1898, the United States acquired substantial colonial possessions in the Caribbean and the Pacific Ocean. This turn from anticolonial to imperial republic has puzzled students of American history ever since. Coming to terms with empire has been a difficult and sometimes tedious process.

Two main issues still need further clarification: first, the connection between American continental expansion and overseas colonialism and, second, the relationship between American and European approaches to empire and colonialism. So far, historians have provided ambivalent answers to the first and paid little attention to the second issue. Recent studies arguing for continuities between continental and overseas expansion have explicitly emphasized the exceptional character of the American empire; whereas studies placing the American approach to empire within an international discourse on colonialism have tended to minimize the national experience of continental expansion.

This essay explores possible thematic links between the experience of continental expansion and insights derived from the analysis of other colonial powers and suggests that both dimensions were equally important to colonial state building in the American Philippines. Rather than viewing the acquisition of overseas territories as a new departure, Americans projected the experiences gathered in the conquest of the American West and the subsequent defeat of native Americans onto the islands in so many ways that the Indian analogy became a constant reference point for military leaders, administrators, and educators, as well as opponents of empire. This mental reference point attests to the continuities contemporaries themselves attached to the construction of continental and overseas empires.

At the same time, colonial state building did not take place in a purely national context. From the late nineteenth century on, Americans began to analyze and borrow freely from the colonial approaches of other imperial powers. Despite the multitude of interimperial discourses, the British Empire, in particular British rule in Egypt and India, became an
admired, reassuring, and trusted reference point for proponents of empire and served as inspiration for America’s colonial project. In this discourse, Americans did not perceive their imperial venture as unique or exceptional but emphasized interimperial connections. For opponents of empire, this transnational discourse was equally important, as it used the British practice of colonialism as a rallying point for opposition and fostered the connection of the North American critique to European anti-imperialism.

As with all forms of cultural and ideational transfers, the process of mining the nation’s past for precedents and adapting transnational concepts was carried out in a highly selective manner. Some arguments and ideas were appropriated, while others were rejected. Americans borrowed from both the national and international contexts, reconfigured the information and adapted the findings to a new context. The result was neither a carbon copy of the original nor old wine in new bottles, but an amalgam, a hybrid of national tradition and transatlantic adaptation that shaped the American way of empire.

Coming to Terms with Empire: Research Trends

For decades the history of America’s overseas expansion has been one of the most contested areas of historical inquiry. Generations of historians have not only disagreed on the purpose, intent, direction, and driving forces of overseas expansion, but also on the question of whether the United States in the early twentieth century even constituted an empire in the European tradition of imperialism. Dissatisfaction with the state of the field was widespread and as late as 1988, Lloyd Gardner criticized the lingering ambivalence and defensiveness of historians to come to terms with the true nature of the American empire which he described as “the empire that dare not speak its name.”

Fourteen years later, the historiography of American imperialism constitutes a vibrant field of research whose development has profited greatly from new analytical categories and methodological approaches derived from the wider fields of imperial and colonial history and U.S. diplomatic history. Innovative research has introduced historians to the work of literary scholars, anthropologists, and sociologists and broadened a scholarly discourse that for decades had been deeply entrenched in debating the “same old questions”. The “cultural turn” has produced a growing body of literature that examines the cultural foundations and expressions of American expansionism. In this context, scholars have analyzed the role of gender in the colonial enterprise, and studied the colonial functions of museums and tourism, world expositions and colonial literature in the creation of an imperial society.
Despite the introduction of new analytical categories and the opening of new subfields of research, two fundamental interpretative issues for understanding the nature of the American empire remain largely unresolved. The first issue concerns possible connections between continental and overseas expansion. According to older interpretations, which rejected structural continuities of expansion, the acquisition of overseas territories resembled a temporary aberration of U.S. foreign policy. More recent interpretations, however, indicate that an obsession with empire and expansion characterized nineteenth-century American foreign policy. Thus the authors of a recent survey of the historiography of American foreign relations up to 1941 identify empire as a *Leitmotiv* for U.S. diplomacy since the early republic and reject the notion that a more traditional form of colonialism occurred only at the end of the nineteenth century. Despite this emerging consensus, continental empire is still absent in most surveys of American imperialism.

To support the continuity thesis that interprets overseas expansion as a “logical sequel” to the conquest of the American West some historians have established connections between the fate of native Americans and the fate of indigenous peoples on the periphery of the overseas empire. They have argued that American Indian policy established a pattern of colonialism that served as reference point for dealing with the Philippine Islands. Other have suggested that Americans approached the colonial question in the Philippines as an exercise in self-duplication with the goal of making the islands “more American than America itself.”

Ironically though, this imaginative approach to connecting continental and overseas expansion remains securely locked in a web of exceptionalist logic, as most of its proponents insist that the search for a “usable past” indicated a clear rejection of European modes of colonial control. The application of America’s national experience of conquest to the new colonies, so the argument, resulted from the desire to consciously draw the line between Old and New World approaches to empire.

Thus, while research has demonstrated various continuities in the process of expansion, the underestimation of the international context, the interimperial contacts, and the importance of a transnational web of exchanges in the age of empire has left the national and international dimensions largely unconnected. Instead, this research emphasis has implicitly or explicitly fostered the old *Sonderweg* (exceptionalist) argument that American and European imperialism had little or no resemblance, and that the American empire was in fact unique.

Struggling with exceptionalism, some historians of expansion have long called for internationalizing the American experience, which is the second issue that remains unresolved. To chart the course of the American empire in its relationship with the international context, they have
suggested placing American colonial state building in comparative perspective. As valuable as this methodological approach promises to be, it has so far produced little insights for historians of late nineteenth and early twentieth-century American history. By contrast, the multiple attempts to trace the transnational context of American history have produced tantalizing results. A number of studies have explored the transatlantic ideational exchanges in the Progressive Era. Although specific discussions of empire are absent in the work of Daniel Rogers or James Kloppenberg, their emphasis on the international forces that shaped American history have inspired a new generation of expansion scholars to chart the transnational context of American overseas expansion.

These studies recognize the power of a horizontal set of circuits in which colonial officials drew from frameworks offered by colonial neighbors and imperial competitors: “Through these circuits moved generations of families, tools of analysis, social policy, military doctrine, and architectural plans. Whole bodies of administrative strategy, ethnographic classification, and scientific knowledge were shared and compared in a consolidating imperial world.” As Daniel Rodgers has observed: “From Delhi to London, Leopoldville to Brussels, the imperial world was crisscrossed with appropriations, rivalries, and imitations—sometimes independent of the debates over domestic social politics but often interlaced with these [. . .] This was a system of exchanges in which the Americans were deeply involved.”

Historical research tracing the involvement of the United States in this transnational context has been most fruitful with regards to American colonial state building in the Philippines. Historians, sociologists, and anthropologists are currently beginning to analyze the multiple layers of the transnational frame of reference in the age of imperialism. In a forthcoming and path-breaking volume entitled *Global Perspectives on the U.S. Colonial State in the Philippines*, authors examine the multiple interimperial connections within which American colonialism in the Philippines took place.

These research trends have demonstrated the transnational roots of the American empire and contributed to an undermining of the exceptionalism paradigm. At the same time, the preoccupation with destroying the myth of uniqueness has delegated the impact of national contexts and traditions of expansion to the sidelines. Indeed, “creating an empire is more complicated than borrowing a garden hose from a neighbor.” More importantly, the tendency to leave national experiences and traditions out of the picture obscures the need to explain why certain elements were adapted, others rejected, and even others ignored.
In sum, current research on the history of American expansion is producing tantalizing results but the two main interpretative issues, are largely being tackled at the expense of each other with little discernable effort to reconfigure their insights into an interpretative matrix of the American approach to empire.

Transatlantic Adaptations and National Experiences

As Americans were confronted with the task of governing newly acquired territories, they simultaneously studied the British example and searched for a usable national past. The result was an administrative style and approach that combined central elements of British imperial rule with ideological core convictions of territorial expansion and administration.

By the end of the nineteenth century, many Americans still held ambivalent views of Britain’s world-power status. By the same time, however, a strong sense of admiration and support for the British idea and concept of empire steadily gained ground in the United States. In a surge of Anglo-American rapprochement and Anglo-Saxonism, Americans praised the advantages of British rule, the efficiency of its colonial administration, and its enlightened approach to colonial state building.

At the beginning of the early twentieth century, Great Britain was firmly established in the American worldview as the most enlightened imperial power. This process had been fostered by a conceptual differentiation between “negative” and “positive” forms of imperial control. “Negative” imperialism was characterized by conquest, the mere desire for profit, and the resulting exploitation of the indigenous population. “Positive” imperialism aimed at creating order out of chaos and placed great emphasis on fostering the development and civilizing “uplift” of the colonized. This distinction and the accompanying re-interpretation of British rule in India enabled Americans to openly praise the accomplishments of the British empire.

Considering the close affinity between the United States and Britain and the tightly knit exchange network of goods, people, and information crossing the Atlantic, it should not be surprising that Americans faced with the task of colonial state building mined the British empire for insights on effective approaches to colonial administration and other matters of colonial rule.

Soon after the peace treaty with Spain had been signed in December of 1898, leading members of the McKinley administration, such as Secretary of State John Hay and Secretary of War Elihu Root, emphasized the need for information from other colonial powers and recommended a decision-making process based on intensive inter-imperial discourse.
government initiated a fact-finding commission, launched research programs, collaborated with the academic community and enabled its administrators to frequently visit the colonies of other powers in South and Southeast Asia.

In December of 1899, Root, the chief architect of America’s colonial policy in the Philippines, wrote to a friend: “The first thing I did after my appointment was to make out a list of a great number of books which cover in detail both the practice and the principles of many forms of colonial government under the English law, and I am giving them all the time I can take from my active duties.”32 The secretary collected a library of reference in his office, mostly with British texts on colonial law and administration. He considered the systematic evaluation of the activities of other colonial powers an essential guide to American decision-making. He supported an international approach to the American colonial project, but also emphasized the importance of balancing outside input with national traditions. According to Root it was necessary: “To take the lesson we could get from the colonial policy of other countries, especially Great Britain, and to apply it to the peculiar situation arising from the fundamental principles of our own government, which lead to certain necessary conclusions which don’t exist in Great Britain or Holland, notwithstanding the spirit of liberty and freedom in both those countries.”33 This flexible approach resembles what theorists of cultural transfer have described as appropriation and rejection. Information is borrowed freely from the experience of others, reconfigured, and applied to the national context.

Secretary Root shared the predisposition of learning from the experiences of other colonial powers with other members of the administration and even president himself. In 1899 William McKinley had instructed the First Philippine Commission, a fact-finding commission under the direction of Jacob Gould Schurman, president of Cornell University, to gather and organize information on the Philippines in preparation for colonial government. Instructed by McKinley, Hay, and Root, the members also compiled substantial information on other colonial powers and commissioned research reports such as “Administration of British Colonies in the Orient” by Montague Kirkwood, a British lawyer who served as an advisor in colonial matters for the Japanese administration of Taiwan. Such reports provided information on the administrative, judicial, social, and military conditions of British rule in India, Burma, Ceylon, the Federated Malay States, and the Straits Settlements. Much of this data was included in the four-volume Report of the Philippine Commission to the President officially presented on January 21, 1900.34

The government also initiated a massive research program through the Library of Congress and a number of government departments.35 The
results were impressive. For example, the Department of the Treasury reported on *The Colonial Systems of the World*. Under the directorship of O.P. Austin, the Department’s Bureau of Statistics amassed information on the world’s 125 colonies, protectorates, and dependencies. The widely distributed report (more than 10,000 copies were printed) delivered a comprehensive interpretative framework for the analysis of the “present governmental conditions in the colonies of the world” and enabled Americans to situate their own colonial project within the international context.\(^{36}\) In conclusion, the report emphasized the significance of the British model: “The most acceptable and therefore most successful of the colonial systems are those in which the largest liberty of self-government is given to the people. The British colonial system, which has by far outgrown that of any other nation, gives, wherever practicable, a large degree of self-government to the colonies”.\(^{37}\)

During this period of intense search for colonial models, universities, professional organizations, and scholarly journals placed themselves at the service of empire and helped to chart the nation’s course through analysis of other colonial approaches, most notably through British concepts of colonialism.\(^{38}\) The nation’s universities established courses in comparative colonial administration and economy relying heavily on British expertise\(^{39}\). But Americans also launched their own research programs. One of the most prolific proponents of field research in tropical colonies was Alleyne Ireland, the University of Chicago’s Colonial Commissioner. Ireland was a frequent speaker at national and international conferences on colonialism, a prolific writer, and advisor to the government. He was an ardent proponent of transplanting British colonial methods to America’s new overseas territories.\(^{40}\)

Finally, the American search for colonial expertise was not limited to reports and research projects. It involved frequent visits and inspection tours to the possessions of other colonial powers in Asia. As Paul Kramer has observed: “Soon enough, American colonial officials took their place in a network of imperial policy tours and exchanges with colonial officials from the American Philippines, Dutch Java and the East Indies, and the British Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States.”\(^{41}\)

Visits were not only limited to neighboring colonies but sometimes involved travel halfway around the world. Many of the high-ranking administrators and military governors discussed their questions with famous British proconsuls such as Lord Cromer, who had represented the empire in Egypt for 28 years, Alfred Milner who played an important role in Egypt and was later High Commissioner for South Africa, and Sir Harry Johnson who had administered the Uganda Protectorates.\(^{42}\)

Although Americans were attracted to British conceptions of empire and colonial rule and spent a great deal of time and effort studying its
applicability, they did not simply copy what they found. The British
experience of empire provided an intellectual framework within which
Americans could discuss their own ideas about colonial rule. The ins-
sights from interimperial exchanges were pitted against the nation’s core
values and earlier experiences of continental expansion.

From the very beginning, those charged with developing an admin-
istrative approach made it clear that they would consider an adaptation
only within certain parameters. Elihu Root’s statement was instructive as
he emphasized that it was important “to take the lessons we could get
from the colonial policy of other countries, especially Great Britain” but
also argued that the application of insights derived from this procedure
would need to be adapted “to the peculiar situation arising from arising
from the fundamental principles of our own government.”

In search of guidance, Americans mined the nation’s past for a du-
rable basis for a colonial policy in accordance with established precedents
and tradition. The inherent assumption that American colonial state
building in the Philippines did not symbolize an aberration but a logical
progression was pervaded by a sense of continuity between continental
and overseas expansion. Many agreed that the problem of governing
territory was as old as the Union itself.

Commentators emphasized the evolutionary nature of the American
system of progression from territory to statehood as exemplified by the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and the administration of the Louisiana
Territory. Territories would pass through a state of preparation in
which the inhabitants would be trained for self-government. It was this
sense of progression that inspired the tendency to differentiate between
American and British approaches to colonial administration. While Lon-
don focussed on the development of colonial infrastructures, Americans
would focus on the preparation of the colonized for self-government and
 eventual independence.

This “graduation” doctrine did not suggest a loosening of control
over the Philippines, for example; on the contrary, it required, in the
tradition of the approach to the Louisiana Territory, a stern hand at the
helm to spread the benefits of social uplift and civilization. To achieve
this degree of control over the Philippine Islands the United States fought
one of the bloodiest and most costly colonial wars ever. Between Febru-
ary 1899 and July 1902, more than 130,000 American soldiers fought
against a Filipino independence movement. The fighting killed at least
4,200 and wounded more then 3,500 U.S. soldiers, one of the highest
loss-rates in American military history. On the Filipino side, at least
20,000 soldiers (one fourth of Aguinaldo’s troops) died, and anywhere
between 250,000 and 750,000 civilians were killed. Large portions of the
islands were devastated in a war that continued well up to World War
One even after President Roosevelt had officially declared an end to the fighting on July 4th, 1902.

The American approach to the war in the distant islands and the heated home-front debate on the legitimacy of Washington’s campaign were shaped by Indian analogies and frequent reference to the British experience with colonial warfare in general, and in the South African War in particular. The Indian analogies were often invoked by officers and troops who had a remarkably high exposure to Indian warfare in the American west. The military leadership and administration officials in Washington evoked Indian analogies in their characterization of the enemy, their justification for the total warfare conducted in the islands, and their discussions of policy measures designed to pacify the islands.

The anti-imperialists employed the Indian analogies as well and used concern about the treatment of the indigenous population as a rallying point for opposition to America’s engagement in the islands. Frequently reported massacres and the continuous escalation of the war, particularly in Samar, Batangas, and later Mindanao, served as a focal point for fundamental opposition to America’s course of empire.

In addition to the extensive use of Indian analogies, Americans also looked to the British empire for insights into effective colonial military policy. The Pax Britannica not only inspired naval planners such as Alfred Thayer Mahan, but also captured the imagination of those in the army who were in charge of militarily securing the American empire. Their discussions filled the pages of the professional journals and fostered the adaptation of many pragmatic insights gained from the British experience of policing the empire: from military health policies to the introduction of native support troops.

Finally, the simultaneous blunders of British troops in South Africa and the U.S. Army in the service of empire resulted in an intensive Anglo-American discourse on improving the professionalism of the armed forces. During this close collaboration on military reform, American military officers were sent to Britain and to South Africa, to analyze through firsthand observation, and British military theorists such as Spencer Wilkinson’s *The Brain of the Army* (1890) were widely read in the United States. On a more popular level, this discourse and the common war experience produced a widely held sense of common destiny which left a deep imprint even in popular culture. Not surprisingly, Elbridge Brooks, the famous author of juvenile literature, concluded his popular *With Lawton and Robert* (1900), in which an American youth volunteers in the Philippine War and then fights for Britain in the Boer War, with the theme of imperial ‘brotherhood’: “the Stars and Stripes in the Philippines, and the Union Jack in South Africa, are advancing the interests of humanity and civilization.”
Conclusions

In addition to thematic clusters such as administration and war, the dual influences of national experience and insights derived from interimperial dialogue shaped many other issues such as urban planning, colonial education, and other forms of colonial representation. In each case, Americans argumentatively connected the process of continental expansion to the challenges of colonial state building in the overseas possessions. Simultaneously, the international context of colonialism, specifically the example of the British empire, offered numerous useful reference points for America’s colonial planners. Neither one, however, exclusively determined the contours of Washington’s approach to colonial rule. It was the mix of transatlantic adaptation and national experience that shaped the American way of empire.

Notes

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5 For research trends in this field see Diplomatic History and for the panorama of methodological innovation still: Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, eds., Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
For an important overview of the state of research see: Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease, eds., *Cultures of United States Imperialism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993).


For a most recent example, see the otherwise excellent: Frank Ninkovich, *The United States and Imperialism* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2001).


For example: The Nation and Beyond. Transnational Perspectives on United States History, a special issue of the Journal of American History 86, no 3 (December 1999).


30 This observation was made by: John M. Coski, “The Triple Mandate. The Concept of Trusteeship and American Imperialism, 1898–1934” (Ph.D. dissertation, College of William and Mary, 1987), 60–62.

31 Many Americans now argued that Britain’s brutal suppression of the Sepoy Mutiny in India, 1857/58, was a watershed in London’s administration of the subcontinent, after which enlightened, selfless, and impartial civil servants were trusted with the administration and the East India Company abolished; for the impact of British actions in India on American anti-imperialists: Alan Raucher, “American Anti-Imperialists and the Pro-India Movement, 1900–1932," Pacific Historical Review 43 (1974): 83–110.

32 Letter Root to Samuel L. Parish, December 1, 1899, Elihu Root Papers, LC Manuscript Division.


35 The Library of Congress became an initial clearing house for information on other colonial systems and information on America’s colonial possessions. On request by Henry Cabot Lodge, chairman of the Senate Committee on the Philippines, it compiled extensive bibli-


37 Ibid., 1407.


42 We have, for example, detailed descriptions of at least five meetings between W. Cameron Forbes, Governor General of the Philippines and Lord Cromer in London. Descriptions are to be found in Forbes’ excellent diaries: i.e. Journals of W. Cameron Forbes, First Series, Vol. III, January 1909 [there is only one long entry for the month] LC Manuscript Division; First Series, Vol. V, June 1, 1912; First Series Vol. V, November 17, 1913; Second Series, Vol. I, April 17, 1915.

48 GHI Bulletin No. 31 (Fall 2002)


45 The search for a “usable” past is described in: Treadway, “Terra Incognita,” 14–46.


49 Twenty-six of thirty generals in command during the Philippine-American War and all four military commanders in the islands between 1898 and 1904 (Merritt, Otis, MacArthur, Chaffee) had been socialized in the Indian wars; Williams, “United States Indian Policy and the Debate over Philippine Annexation”, 828; Russell Roth argued: “from 1899 through 1917, many of the officers and men of America’s post-Civil War Indian-fighting Army were involved in yet another armed conflict. This time, however, rather than Kiowas, Comanches, Sioux, or Apaches, they were battling Tagalogs, Ilocanos, Visayans, Moros, and Mandayans”, Muddy Glory: America’s ‘Indian Wars’ in the Philippines 1899–1935 (West Hanover, MA: The Christopher Publishing House, 1981), 15.


52 On health policies, see: Mary C. Gillett, The Army Medical Department, 1865–1917 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1995), particularly chapters 8 and 11; on native troops: U.S. Department of War, Adjutant General’s Office, Military Information Division,


DEALING WITH THE PAST ABROAD: GERMAN IMMIGRANTS’ VERGANGENHEITSBEWALTIGUNG AND THEIR RELATIONS WITH JEWS IN NORTH AMERICA SINCE 1945

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In the last two decades, Germans’ manifold ways of Vergangenheitsbewältigung—‘of effectively ‘working through’, ‘coming to terms’ with—or eliding—[their] immediate past, of collectively and individually assimilating and commemorating (or alternatively deflecting, neutralizing or repressing) it”²—have been well researched. Recent research on the subject has included comparative studies of East and West Germans, of members of three generations, and of people with different political sympathies and educational levels.³ But the attempts of one group of Germans to deal with their past have not been the subject of academic investigation so far: Germans who lived abroad, specifically those who left for North America after 1945. In the second half of the last century, mainly during the 1950s and 1960s, over 800,000 Germans migrated to the United States; another 400,000 to Canada. Moreover, especially since the mid-1980s, hundreds of thousands have lived in North America for longer periods of time as students, workers, and artists.

How have these Germans in North America dealt with their own, their families’, and their nation’s past? Has their Vergangenheitsbewältigung been similar to or different from that of Germans in Germany? How has the process of migration, intercultural exchange and, increasingly, transnational life shaped their negotiations of memory, history, and identity? How have different private and public interpretations of the past and present, and German migrants’ understanding of them, shaped their social and personal relations? Was emigration a way to remove oneself physically from the country of guilt and shame in order to look away from the scene of the unbearable crime, to escape the ghost that has haunted the reconstruction of post-war and post-unification German identity? Or was emigration, as Renata Lefcourt, who left Germany in the
1950s at the age of 18, argued, a way to face the past in a constructive manner? Did German emigrants “tear the silence,” as Ursula Hegi, who was born in 1946 and came to the United States in 1964, has suggested in her collection of interview excerpts with German immigrants, because “[w]hen you leave your country of origin, you eventually have to look at it much closer”? Emigration might well have begun as an attempt to escape, but later have provided an impetus to take a second look at Germany. Sabine Reichel, born in Hamburg in 1946, wrote: “I left Germany without sadness when I moved to New York in 1975. Was I glad to have escaped! But being away from Germany had an unexpected effect on me. Slowly the past caught up with me.”

These three German women—immigrants to North America and conscious members of the Second Generation—have strained to work through their national and personal past. Their efforts are nearly all we know of how migration and intercultural exchange are linked to Vergangenheitsbewältigung. Hence, the first objective of this study is to investigate how Germans abroad thought and talked about their personal and national past and dealt with their knowledge of World War Two and the Holocaust in the context of being outside of Germany and of being inside (albeit partially as outsiders) U.S./Canadian society. The study focuses on non-Jewish Germans of different ages, generations, social, regional, and religious backgrounds who migrated to urban centers and suburban regions in the United States and Canada between the late 1940s and 1990s.

In one way or another, the encounter with Jews in North America figured prominently in the three women’s negotiations of the past and present. Lefcourt converted to Judaism and was active in her local Jewish community. Hegi wrote about the importance of early meetings with Jewish employers and later encounters with Jewish readers of her best-seller novels. The first man Reichel fell in love with in New York was a Jewish artist. Encounters with Jews have also been conceived to be of major significance in young Germans’ education about their past, and in attempts at reconciliation. The second objective of this study then, is to explore the relations between Germans and Jews outside of Germany, specifically between three generations of Germans in North America and North American Jews, including German Jewish refugees and Holocaust survivors and their children and grandchildren.

Scope of the Study

This study evolved from interviews I conducted for earlier projects with German men and women who migrated to North America in the late 1940s and 1950s. In their life stories there emerged three major differences...
between—as one of my interviewees put it—"being a German in Germany and being a German in North America." The first is an issue of insider-outsider and hinges on the power relations between Germans and the "Other." The second is based on the differences between German and U.S./Canadian culture and society. The third is the fundamental difference between German-Jewish relations in Germany and in North America. Interviews specifically conducted for this study with non-Jewish German immigrants and Jewish Americans in New York City have confirmed the significance of these three differences in cultural interaction.

The first difference between Germans’ Vergangenheitsbewältigung in Germany and in North America is an issue of power relations. In Germany, Germans were insiders; they belonged to the nation and defined themselves in opposition to the Other, the “foreigners.” In North America, however, they were (at least at first) outsiders and themselves defined as the Other. The relations of power were reversed and this included the power to speak about the past. In Germany, Germans could feel strong or at least safe, because as insiders it was they who could choose to talk about the Holocaust or—as they did in public in the 1950s and 1960s and in families up to the present—to remain to a large extent silent. As people who had suffered displacement and personal as well as material losses during and after the war, members of the First Generation could and did easily present themselves as victims of the war and as a people betrayed by Hitler.

Evasion was not as easy in North America. From the very beginning, Germans were confronted with public discourses about Nazism and World War Two and later about the Holocaust, and it was rather difficult—although not impossible—to demand to be seen as a victim or to ignore the discourse. Culturally shaped confrontations ranged from the blatant to the subtle and even the unintended. Some Germans were called “Nazi,” others, like Renate Freeman, who came to the USA as a “war bride” in the late 1950s, felt “exposed” in other ways: “If there was something about Jews on TV, the next day it would start: ‘Renate, did you watch TV last night?’ ‘No.’ ‘You ought to have seen it, shows what the Germans did to the Jews’, that continued till 1985. One of my colleagues in particular, Natalie, shouted through the whole office.” For some Germans, culturally shaped confrontations with the past became a process of learning. The first time Renate Freeman talked about the Holocaust with a family member was when her mother visited her in the United States in the early 1990s. Ursula Hegi remembered: “During my first year of living here [in the U.S.], I found out more about German history than in the eighteen years of growing up in Germany.” Some of Hegi’s and my interviewees related the same experience.
Such learning processes point to the diametrically opposed power relations in Germany and North America: Hegi’s statement, while subjectively true, is misleading, because she implies that it was the silence in Germany that prevented her from learning about the past. While the silence in families and schools was pervasive, Germans could not claim that they could not find out about the Holocaust in Germany. While too young to be confronted with discourses about Nazi crimes in the early postwar years, in the years before her emigration in 1964, the desecration of synagogues and Jewish cemeteries in West Germany, war crimes trials against Nazis (such as the Auschwitz trials in Frankfurt in 1960 or the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem in 1961) and other incidents were widely publicized and sent shock waves through German society. If Hegi thus pleaded ignorance in 1964, she could not claim this to be based solely on the silence about the Holocaust in German families and schools. Had she wanted to find out, she would have been able to do so in West Germany. The reason she did not find out about German history was because West German society made it easy—but not impossible—to remain ignorant.

Nevertheless, German immigrants could not evade confrontations with their national past. For some, this applied to their personal or family’s past as well. For nearly two decades, one German-American community that I visited in Michigan has been overshadowed by the story of one of its members, who after his immigration in the 1950s was tracked down in the early 1980s as a war criminal and has lived in hiding ever since. Sabine Reichel, after her migration in 1975, returned to Germany to ask her father: “What did you do in the war, daddy?” Johanna Hegen- scheidt, a young dancer born in Bremen in 1970 and living in New York since the late 1990s, is deeply troubled by the mysterious stories about her paternal grandfather’s role in the Wehrmacht and his suicide at the end of the war and by her father’s unwillingness to be critical of his mother’s glorifying tales about his father. She finds this uncertainty about her family’s past to be even more distressing in the relations with her Jewish friends.

One of this study’s goals, therefore, is to reconstruct how in every day life German immigrants negotiated—in private and public, with their Jewish and non-Jewish, white, immigrant, or African-American lovers, children, employers, and colleagues—the power of speaking, listening, and remaining silent about the past, of showing, seeing, and looking away from it, of remembering the Holocaust and the war, of defining and naming victims, perpetrators, followers, and bystanders.

The picture of reversed power relations is in a way oversimplified. The social situations in which Germans in the United States and Canada were confronted with the past varied, depending on the time, the environment (small town or big city), their profession and circle of acquaintan-
stances and friends, and on many other factors. By interviewing men and women of different backgrounds and ages, my study illuminates not only how German immigrants’ Vergangenheitsbewältigung has been different from and similar to that of Germans in Germany, but also the diversity of German migrants’ negotiations of confrontations with the past. Stereotyping, for example, was encountered by all three generations of German immigrants, but each generation reacted differently. Within each generation, there were different reactions, too, depending on their view of German history. While all German immigrants rejected negative stereotyping, such as being called “Nazi”, their reactions to positive stereotypes, which were more prevalent, varied greatly. Also, definitions of “good” and “bad” stereotypes changed over time and differed between generations.

In postwar North America, a view of Germans as easily assimilable white North Europeans and good, hard workers was much more common than the equation of all Germans with Nazis. While materially and socially beneficial, this made some Germans uncomfortable. As one of Hegi’s interviewees explained: “When people attach ‘German’ to ‘clean and orderly,’ those traits come across as negative to me, and I feel a little strange.” Some older German immigrants, by comparison, believed in such positive stereotypes and embraced them. German immigrants of the Third Generation rejected such stereotyping, but felt more relaxed about them than the generation of their parents.

U.S. and Canadian cultures, however, offered Germans ways to deal with such confrontations that were different from those offered by German culture and society. In Germany, Germans could only remain Germans, whereas in North America they could become Americans or Canadians (at least in the form of citizenship). The study explores how German immigrants used this option: as a way to rid themselves of links with their German heritage and thus evade their past or as a means to feel freer to “tear the silence” that had numbed them in Germany? What other options did acculturation or assimilation offer German immigrants? While in West Germany, for instance, anti-Semitism (at least, if openly displayed) was a taboo, in the United States certain forms of anti-Semitism offered German immigrants a way of dealing with their past.

Another part of the cultural issue is what Lutz Niethammer has noticed in the relationship between collective memory and individual remembering: what individuals remembered was partly informed and structured by what the collective commemorated. Thus, in East Germany, it was mainly the Soviets and more generally the Slavs that were remembered as victims of Nazi Germany, while in West Germany it was mainly the Jews. Whom, then, did Americans commemorate and whom did German immigrants remember? How have German immigrants negoti-
ated U.S. and Canadian commemorations of D-Day, V-E Day, the Battle of the Bulge, Veterans Day, etc.? How has that changed with the increasing awareness of the Holocaust in North American society and culture?

The third major difference lies in the fundamentally different German-Jewish relations in North America and Germany that are based on the presence and absence of Jews respectively. The German-Jewish relationship up to this day has been based on the virtual absence of Jews in Germany. The great majority of non-Jewish Germans have never met Jews in Germany, let alone worked or lived with Jews on a daily basis.

This experience was strikingly different for German immigrants in North America. The great majority of them met Jews and quite a number of them had more than fleeting personal contacts with Jews. Depending on when they were born, when they came to North America, and what their experiences had been before their migration, such encounters and relations varied very much. Without being asked or otherwise prodded, more than half (44 of 79) of the German immigrants I interviewed for earlier research on migration experiences talked about meeting a Jew within their first few weeks, months, or years in Canada or the United States. Twelve (particularly female domestic servants) were employed by Jews, a few shared personal friendships, and one Protestant pastor was engaged in theological dialogue with rabbis. Almost all of the interviewees talked about such encounters as a positive or at least not negative experience. Most did not explore it any further in their narratives, however, and few would have agreed with Ursula Hegi’s interviewee Gisela, who talked about her friendship with Jews as a “healing gift.”

Among the Germans in New York that I interviewed specifically about their relations with Jews, I encountered reactions from explicit anti-Semitism to sincere and successful attempts at reconciliation. Whatever the reactions, however, unlike Germans’ reactions to Jews in Germany, German immigrants’ reactions were based on actual, daily encounters with Jews, be it as lovers and spouses, employers, neighbors, or colleagues. Those with good friendships with American Jews have found this encounter to be the most significant part of their identity as Germans. This included giving specific meanings to such friendships and positive encounters, particularly with Jewish refugees from Europe and survivors. Thus, some German immigrants have interpreted the welcome of their Jewish friends as “absolution” from collective guilt. The study explores the different reactions and interpretations of German-Jewish relations, their role in dealing with the past, and their attendant problems, shortcomings, and promises.

The complex issues deriving from the three key differences in the socio-cultural relations within which German immigrants had to grapple with identity—meeting Jews, confronting the past, breaking the silence,
reconfiguring memory, knowledge, and identity—are vividly captured in Sara Varsintzky’s reflections on her experiences as a German immigrant. Born into a Protestant working-class family in 1931 and growing up in Lower Silesia, she fled from the Red Army in 1945 to the U.S. Zone in western Germany. In 1953, she migrated to Canada, where her first job was as a maid in a household to pay off her loan for her overseas passage to the Canadian government:

And I didn’t know it at first, but I moved in with a Jewish family. And they were so nice to me. And I remember thinking: ‘How come they’re nice to me? How can they be nice to me?’ And I had to sort of struggle with this. I don’t struggle with it anymore today, but at that age. And I remember going to a movie, it was the first American movie I saw where there were Nazis, and I was so upset that they portrayed our soldiers so badly that I ran out half way through, crying. So that was the first time I sort of came face to face with that there was another side, you know. And this was difficult, because as children all during the war we were sheltered, we weren’t told anything that was going on, you know. So I had to, finally, I heard more and more and adjusted more about this problem and I could sort of try to come to grips with it, and I’d tell myself: ‘Oh, I haven’t done anybody any harm, my dad wasn’t in the party,’ but then they all said: ‘Oh yeah, nobody is ever in the party,’ that’s how the Canadians would talk, you know.  

For German immigrants, then, struggles over the past and their identity could be triggered by small incidents such as watching a movie and by big incidents such as living with and working for a Jewish family. Such incidents could occur both in private and in public. Some incidents, for example encounters with employers, colleagues, neighbors, friends, or lovers, confronted German immigrants as individuals and triggered an individual identity crisis and response. Other incidents, such as public(ized) discourses on Nazism, World War Two, and the Holocaust would affect German immigrants as a collective, and although individual responses might differ, there could be a collective response.

There have been many such incidents in North America in the last five decades that confronted German-Americans and German-Canadians with their personal and national past. Some were the same as in Germany, but were experienced in a different socio-cultural context. These events included Germany’s reparation politics in the 1950s, the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem (1961), Chancellor Willy Brandt’s kneeling at the Warsaw Ghetto memorial (1970), the U.S. television mini-series

Other incidents were specific to the North American context, above all the presence of Jews, but also the different public representation and collective memory of the German past. In the first three postwar decades, the American media portrayed Germans stereotypically as brutal soldiers and perverted SS officers—both from dramatic and comedic angles. Thus, Germans in North America watched Hogan’s Heroes on television; but they did not watch the movies emphasizing German suffering viewed by the (West) German audience. While West Germans annually commemorated the protest of East Germans in Berlin on June 17, 1953 as the “Day of German Unity” and on November 9 were reminded of the pogroms of 1938, did German immigrants take part in U.S. and Canadian Memorial Days? How did Germans in North America experience the reunification of Germany in 1989/90, the celebrations of V-E Day in 1995, and before?

Such transatlantic exchanges were also part of transnational life—both for Germans abroad and for Germans at home. “Transnational life includes those practices and relationships linking immigrants and their descendants abroad with the home country, where such practices have significant meaning, are regularly carried out, and embody important aspects of identity and social structure that help form the life world of immigrants or their descendants.” Memory (or rather discourses about the past) is one such social practice that so far has not been examined from a transnational perspective. Considering the increasing research on (especially Holocaust) memory in history, this is somewhat surprising, even more so in the German-American context. The transnationalizing of German-American war and Holocaust memory began, after all, not with the Finkelstein and Goldhagen debates, nor with Bitburg or the airing of Holocaust. It began with the emigration of political refugees from Nazi Germany in the 1930s and the liberation of the concentration camps by American troops in 1945. For Germans abroad, this memory was a major link to their home country, which shaped Germans’ lives in North America.

Sources and Methods

Publications by and for non-Jewish Germans in North America, such as the New Yorker Staats-Zeitung and Kanada Kurier, can tell us how certain groups of German immigrants dealt with their past collectively and in public. Publications by Jewish communities in North America, such as Aufbau and Jewish Week, as well as mainstream media throw light on how German migrants’ attempts at dealing with the past were perceived by
others. Personal papers of German immigrants working in specific positions or functions in the institutions of the German community (churches, consulates, clubs, media, etc.) help to further illuminate the Vergangenheitsbewältigung in the public sphere. Hence, from the files of Kurt von Cardinal, an officer of the German embassy in Ottawa during the 1950s and 1960s, we learn that some German immigrants perceived the 1960s television comedy series *Hogan’s Heroes* as “hate propaganda.”

Publicized discourses are limited, however, in an investigation of German immigrants’ dealing with the past and German-Jewish relations in North America. After a steady decline in the early twentieth century, the post-World War Two German-American and German-Canadian press has been much less diversified than it had been in the decades and centuries before. The majority of German immigrants have blended into white mainstream society, which is reflected, for example, in their rate of taking out U.S. and Canadian citizenship and in the rate of moving into suburbs. Those organized in German-American and German-Canadian institutions have tended to be immigrants of the 1950s and 1960s and North American-born children and grandchildren of German immigrants with a predominantly conservative worldview. Focusing on the organized German-North Americans, therefore, would severely bias the study. Oral history interviews are used as the major way of avoiding such bias.

Hence, life-story interviews with non-Jewish Germans who came to North America in the second half of the twentieth century as well as with Jewish Americans, including Jewish German refugees, Holocaust survivors, and their descendents, are the main source of this study. The range of the interviewees’ life narratives is large enough to show the diversity of individual experiences, but also of collective paths. In addition to gender and class balance, this includes interviews with people of different ages and generations and with immigrants arriving in different decades. The study draws on interviews conducted for earlier research with nearly 80 German immigrants throughout North America and on interviews with 20 German immigrants on the U.S. East Coast conducted specifically for this study. Future interviews will be conducted in Winnipeg’s diverse German and Jewish communities.

Oral history here serves not merely as a substitute for non-existing written sources. One theoretical focus of this study is on orality, including oral narrative, because it is through speaking rather than writing that most people make sense of their experiences. They craft stories around what they experience, what they remember, what they learn from social relations and from encounters with interpretations of history (in books, museums etc.). Through telling and re-telling their stories, they make memory and knowledge of the past into their identity.
addresses the imbalance of much historiographical work on German *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* that focuses on the written products of the political, social, cultural, and even economic elites.

Furthermore, people usually negotiate meanings in oral form, in dialogue, conversation, debate, and silence. Such negotiations become particularly visible in interviews with couples, in this case especially with German-Jewish couples. Moreover, many narrators had never before been asked to talk about their understanding of the past and their role in history. Many of them therefore struggled to give meaning to their experiences and memories, to make sense of their own past as much as of their national past, to construct new stories around their concepts of self in relation to National Socialism and the Holocaust. But it is not only the narrators who have to struggle. One of the advantages and challenges of oral history is that the historian participates in the dialogue, and he or she is just as much called upon to make sense of private experiences (such as encounters with Holocaust survivors) and public discourses (such as former Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s phrase “mercy of late birth” or a visit to the Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, DC). Such experiences in turn inform the research and interpretation.27

It is no wonder then that some of the interviews deconstructed some of my preconceived notions and categories, and increased the complexity of the analysis of the phenomena under study. This is particularly true for narratives about personal and intimate relations between Germans and Jews. In telling stories about homosexual relations with an American Jew who came out of the closet in Frankfurt/M., about the work and pain invested in making a heterosexual relationship with the child of Holocaust survivors succeed, about marriages with American Jews and children of German-Jewish refugees, the German interviewees as much as their Jewish partners constructed identities and social lives as Germans, Jews, and Americans, as lovers, friends, and partners, as parents, siblings, and children, as students, workers, and artists that I had not anticipated at the outset of this project.

It is in people’s stories that we can uncover who in the mental, familial, social, and cultural context has the power to speak or remain silent, to listen or make oneself heard. Where in their biographies did the German immigrants situate their past, the Holocaust, their encounter with Jews, and how did they do it? Who else—their parents, their children, perpetrators, victims—spoke through their life stories? It is here, in and through their stories, that I explore how German immigrants dealt with their past in the last five decades.

If one strives to understand how societies make sense of the past, how German and North American societies negotiate the past and the present, reviewing only the written reflections and cultural products of academ-
ics, artists, journalists, and politicians would lead to too narrow a picture. But their discursive practices, in the form of books, articles, and speeches, museums and memorials, films, plays, and paintings, cannot be ignored. One needs to ask, instead, how people who do not deal with the past on a professional level absorb, learn from, argue about, and reject such publicized discourses that confront them on a regular if not daily basis.

Such an investigation must therefore be based not only on an analysis of the contents but also of the forms of people’s narrative. What patterns of interpretation, strategies of remembering, constructing the past, and telling the story have German immigrants used in grappling with their heritage? Are there recurrent themes, symbols, story lines, or interpretations in their life stories, their stories about coming to terms with the past, their stories about their first encounters with Jews, about being a German in North America? Did they construct myths as a way to confront or to silence the past or to break through and counter socially dominant myths? Were these narrative strategies the same, similar to or different from those developed in Germany?

Notes

1 For financial, logistical, and intellectual support of this study, I would like to thank the German Historical Institute, Washington, D.C., the Johns Hopkins University’s American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, the Rockefeller Foundation, and Columbia University’s Oral History Research Office.

2 Steven E. Aschheim, Culture and Catastrophe. German and Jewish Confrontations with National Socialism and Other Crises (Houndmills, 1996), 17. On the concept of Vergangenheitsbewältigung as private and public discourses on National Socialism and its consequences, motivated by the underlying question of (collective) guilt, see Michael Kohlstruck, Zwischen Erinnerung und Geschichte. Der Nationalsozialismus und die jungen Deutschen (Berlin, 1997), 13–38. Distinct from this descriptive-analytic use of the concept, Vergangenheitsbewältigung has also been conceived as a normative prescription of how one should deal with the past, e.g. Michael Wolffsohn, Keine Angst vor Deutschland (Erlangen, 1990), 96: “Zur Vergangenheitsbewältigung gehören Wissen, Werten, Weinen, Wollen, als vier Ws. Wissen, was geschah. Das Werten der Taten als Untaten. Das zumindest symbolische Weinen über die Opfer. Das Wollen eines anderen, als besser und moralischer empfundenen Allgemeinw... Das Wollen wäre die Voraussetzung zum Handeln.” Quoted in: Ulrich Brochhagen, Nach Nürnberg. Vergangenheitsbewältigung und Westintegration in der Ära Adenauer (Hamburg, 1994), 11.


5 While Germans’ confrontation with their past and/or encounters with Jews during visits abroad are occasionally mentioned, there is hardly ever a follow-up, see Kohlstruck, *Zwischen Erinnerung und Geschichte*, 103–126. On the other pole of transnational life are attempts by American-born children of German immigrants to deal with the past, see Frederick Kempe, *Father/Land. A Personal Search for the New Germany* (New York, 1999).


7 The concept of “foreigner” has been historically fluctuating. After 1945, up to one quarter of the West German population consisted of German refugees who were considered “foreigners” and non-Germans by the majority of the “native” West German population. While socio-economic integration was swift, tension and animosities have remained, but have been covered up by, consecutively, animosities toward labor migrants from South and South East Europe, so-called ethnic German refugees from the Soviet Union, asylum-seekers from Africa, refugees from the former Yugoslavia, and by tensions between West and East Germans after reunification.


9 Renate Freeman (pseudonym), interview by Alexander Freund, Silver Spring, MD, USA, 18 May 1998.


11 Reichel, *What Did You Do In the War, Daddy?*


From 1945 to 1991, the number of Jews in West Germany was 30,000. Wolfgang Benz, *Zwischen Hitler und Adenauer. Studien zur deutschen Nachkriegsgesellschaft* (Frankfurt/Main, 1991), 64; the number rose to 70,000 in 1998 because of the migration of Russian and other Eastern European Jews: Torsten Schneider-Haase, “Der ewige Antisemit,” *Die Woche* Nr. 52-01/1999, 8.


Sara Varsintzky (pseudonym), interview by Alexander Freund, Ottawa, ON, Canada, 26 March 1998.

Cf. Moeller, “War Stories”.

The June 17 “Day of German Unity” has been replaced by the “Day of German Unity” celebrating the 1990 reunification on October 3.

For the politics of public memory see Bartov, “Defining Enemies”; specifically for West Germany, see Moeller, “War Stories”; for the USA, see Shandler, *While America Watches*.


National Archives of Canada, Manuscript Group 31 H39, Cardinal, Kurt v., vol. 3: Trans-Canada Alliance of German Canadians (TCA), file: “Hate Propaganda”.


Conspiracy theories abound in the United States of America and worldwide, taking a multitude of forms and covering a wide variety of topics. One contemporary example is the hate-filled anti-Semitic accusation that the US federal government is in reality a “Zionist Occupational Government” bent on disarming, subjugating, and eventually exterminating white Americans. These charges can be found in the infamous Turner Diaries, which inspired Timothy McVeigh to bomb the Oklahoma City federal building in 1995. Less violent, but even more prevalent, are the various theories surrounding the assassination of John F. Kennedy in 1963. Rejecting the “lone gunman” explanation of the Warren Commission report, thousands of Americans have turned conspiracy theories about JFK into a veritable cottage industry. According to various “assassination buffs,” Kennedy became the victim of Cuban exiles, a CIA faction, the Mafia, the oil industry, the military-industrial complex or a combination of any of these groups. Oliver Stone’s movie *JFK* brought one variant to millions of Americans through the medium of the Hollywood movie. Indeed, the popular culture of the 1990s is full of conspiracy theory material, the most prominent example being the FOX network’s TV show *The X-Files*, featuring the exploits of an eccentric FBI agent trying to prove that the government is covering up the existence and nefarious plans of extraterrestrials on Earth. The show ran for nine years, demonstrating the attraction and staying power of conspiracy theories in contemporary American culture.

Historically, too, the United States has provided fertile ground for conspiracy theories in many shapes and forms. Franklin Roosevelt was accused of deliberately opening Pearl Harbor to a Japanese attack in order to drag the United States into World War II against the will of the people. During the 1950s, anticommunist witch hunters saw the U.S. on the brink of a “Red” takeover from within, repeating a pattern that had already been present in the aftermath of World War I. In the nineteenth century, nativists and protestant alarmists saw a life-threatening danger in the allegedly subversive activities and unholy rituals of the Catholic Church, the Mormons or the Freemasons. In the 1790s, the Congregationalist clergy of New England warned their parishes of the diabolical intentions.
of the Illuminati, whom they blamed for drenching the French Revolution in blood and planning to do the same in America. Even the very creation of the United States was connected to conspiracy theory, as many Founding Fathers interpreted the various tax crises of the 1760s and 1770s not as bona fide political disagreements between England and her colonies, but as a ministerial conspiracy to enslave the American colonists, and eventually all free Englishmen. Leading English politicians, including George III in turn believed that a cabal of American radicals had planned to steer the colonies towards independence all along.¹

Historians, philosophers as well as cultural and literary theorists have tried to explain and analyze the phenomenon of conspiracy theories, and have arrived at a variety of conclusions. Curiously enough, hardly any of these theorists provides a working definition of conspiracy theory, in part because of wide-ranging disagreements as to their nature. Let me therefore offer a rough definition. I define conspiracy theories as all forms of political or cultural discourse that describe a group of people or an institution as secretly plotting to assume or exercise power over a larger group of people, using covert methods and pursuing goals that are presented as detrimental to the victim group. Typically, but not necessarily, the alleged conspirators operate behind a cover of legitimacy or benevolence, they target a nation, a state, a culture, a religion or even the entire world as their victims; their goals range from personal gain to shaping and controlling history, and their methods might include everything from the dismantling of individual liberties to the assassination of dissenters, and from the assumption of political or economic power all the way to mind-control and genocide. Note that this definition says nothing about the actual or potential veracity of a conspiracy theory, the motives, social status, and state of mind of those who promote it, or the effects of the conspiracy theory on society and politics in general. Nor does it say anything about whether the United States is exceptionally fertile or infertile ground for conspiracy theory—all these questions are hotly debated in various interpretations of conspiracy theories.

**Interpretations of Conspiracy Theories**

That being said, one can identify different schools of interpretation on the topic of conspiracy theories. The first of these, which might be called the “paranoid style” school, emerged from the concern of liberals in the aftermath of the 1950s anticommunist hysteria and was established by Richard Hofstadter’s article “The Paranoid Style in American History.” This school looks at conspiracy theory as a form of political pathology, typically found on the fringes of political culture. In their view, conspiracy theories are by definition radical, deluded, and often dangerous;
A second tradition, in contrast, views conspiracy theories primarily as a model of historical and causal interpretation. In the opinion of authors such as the historian Gordon Wood and the antitotalitarian philosopher Karl Popper, conspiracy theories serve primarily as a simplification of complex social, political, and cultural developments. Instead of looking at the structural causes of change, which are complicated and do not provide hard and fast answers, conspiracy theorists blame detrimental contemporary and historical events on the intentions of an individual or group. In many ways, conspiracy theory works very much like religion, replacing the will of God with the will of conspirators, but adhering to the same model of causality. While Popper condemns conspiracy theories as delusions and obstacles to proper social science, Wood acknowledges the role of conspiracy theories in the context of Enlightenment thought as a stepping stone from a religious to a truly scientific mode of interpretation. Cultural theorist Peter Knight puts a postmodern twist on this interpretation. For him, too, conspiracy theories serve as a model of interpretation, but not necessarily one that is by definition inferior to a structural analysis of history. In his opinion, conspiracy theories are an understandable response to the simultaneous dearth of knowledge generated by government secrecy and the overflow of information in the media, as well as the breakdown of “grand narratives.” This school has in common, however, its view of conspiracy theories as responses to hermeneutical crises. For Wood it is the crisis of modernity and for Knight the
crisis of postmodernity, but conspiracy theories have apparently arisen in answer to both.³

The third school focuses on the cultural specificity of conspiracy theories rather than their function or pathology and is especially interested in the role of conspiracy theories in an American context. From this point of view, while conspiracy theories may well arise from the need to explain complex events in simple terms, and may well pose a threat to liberal politics, what is significant about them is the way they arise from and are embedded in specific cultural, political, and social traditions. This “cultural specificity” school was established by the historian David Brion Davis, who was the first author to look at conspiracy theories not only as a universal, but also a specifically American phenomenon. He found that the anti-Catholicism, anti-Mormonism, and anti-Masonry of the early nineteenth century were a reaction to the rapid social and economic changes of the Jacksonian era. The celebration of individualism and emerging capitalism of the time promised national expansion and prosperity, but they also proved deeply unsettling to many people, usually protestant and native-born, who yearned for reassurance and unity. The antisubversive movements and conspiracy theories allowed their adherents to unite against an enemy that, in their imaginations at least, stood against the equality and liberty they celebrated and feared at the same time. Subsequently, other authors have found conspiracy theories at the fault lines of American exceptionalism, for example in the tension between a millennial and a secular vision of America, the race question, or the conflict between local autonomy and national power in American politics. Consequently, while conspiracy theories are by no means exclusively American, they often are very specifically American.⁴

The newest tradition sees conspiracy theories not as a form of political pathology, but as an expression of a utopian impulse. Very recently, the cultural theorist Mark Fenster and the literary theorist Timothy Melley both published monographs highlighting the idealist background that underlies many conspiracy theories. Fenster sees conspiracy theories as one form of populist dissenting discourse, addressing very real problems about the unequal distribution of power, albeit in an ideologically distorted manner. Melley, based on a close reading of the plentiful conspiracy-theory-laden fiction of recent decades, concludes that the constant fear of conspiratorial manipulation expressed in the works of Thomas Pynchon, Don DeLillo and others, actually embraces the importance of individual autonomy. Nevertheless, this “utopian” school is not necessarily celebrating conspiracy theories. Neither of the authors sees conspiracy theories as an effective means of actually achieving the ideals that lie behind them, nor do they fail to recognize the potential for violence and hatred in conspiracy theories. Nevertheless, the “utopian”
school is important in pointing out that conspiracy theories do not necessarily arise from the basest of human instincts.  

All these approaches are useful, but a multi-tiered analytical framework combining a variety of aspects promises the best results in making sense of any specific conspiracy theory. First of all, it is necessary to trace the specific historical genesis of the conspiracy theory, including its contents, its dissemination, and its propagators. On this crucial descriptive level, it can sometimes be worthwhile to look into the conspiracy theory’s veracity, for while most conspiracy theories are too exaggerated to be taken seriously, it can still be interesting to see whether real-life intrigue played a role in generating them. Secondly, a careful look at the political and cultural context is needed. What specific traditions and conditions helped generate the conspiracy theory and allowed it to spread and become a factor in political and cultural life? This question is especially important in determining whether there is anything specifically American about the conspiracy theory. Thirdly, we need to know the functions the conspiracy theory fulfilled for its believers, including its efficacy as a form of dissent, possible expression of utopian ideals, and its explanatory power as a model of interpreting historical and contemporary developments. The final step of analysis concerns the effect of the conspiracy theory on society and politics: Did the conspiracy theory become a pathology, threatening the stability of the political system? Did it have a lasting impact on the political culture? And, in the case of a historical conspiracy theory, it would be interesting to know whether it is still around.

I have chosen as my case study of conspiracy theories in the United States a controversy that is mentioned in passing in many histories of the early Republican period, but fully explored in none: the conspiracy theory targeting the Society of the Cincinnati, which accused this organization of Revolutionary War officers of trying to establish a hereditary aristocracy in the United States. This controversy came into being in the fall of 1783 and remained a factor in American political life throughout the 1780s, the period between the end of the Revolutionary War and the establishment of the new constitutional order, thus almost perfectly coinciding with what John Fiske has called the critical period of American history. From the point of view of the history of conspiracy theories, this is an intriguing period because it immediately precedes the French Revolution and thus the conspiracy theory about the Illuminati, which is much better documented but essentially an import that grew out of a European, not an American tradition. If there ever was a time for a specifically American conspiracy theory, it was during this formative period of the American Republic, and before the influence of the Illuminati theories hit U.S. shores. The Society of the Cincinnati conspiracy theory was indeed
a considerable factor in the politics of the critical period as well as in shaping the political culture of the United States.

The Society of the Cincinnati Conspiracy Theory, 1783–1784

In the spring of 1783, with news of a peace treaty with England expected any day, two leading officers of the Continental Army, Henry Knox and Friedrich von Steuben, organized a fraternal society of their fellow officers, and succeeded in recruiting George Washington as its first signer and ceremonial president-general. Such an organization seemed useful, even necessary at the time; most officers wanted to preserve the bonds of affection that had grown during seven years of war, friendships, and a sense of achievement that transcended state lines in this first American army. Moreover, the organization could serve as a source of support for those members of the officer corps that had been rendered invalid or indigent by the war, or for their widows and orphans. Finally, the officers had important interests in common: Congress had long promised them a pension of half-pay for life, a promise that was changed to a lump sum of five year’s pay in early 1783 under a policy known as commutation. Many officers feared the economic uncertainties of returning to civilian life; they had already sacrificed much wealth to the cause of independence, and greatly hoped for a commutation payment as a just reward for services rendered. However, payment of commutation was uncertain. Throughout the war, Congress had proven extremely unreliable in even providing current pay, let alone pensions. Given the massive war debt and congressional lack of independent income, commutation seemed far from secure. Even though George Washington denied it in the years to come, the Society of the Cincinnati was certainly planned as one of the earliest examples of an interest group in U.S. politics.

Knox, Steuben, and the other organizers drew the name for the society from Cincinnatus, a Roman general, who—at least in the idealized story known to the classically educated American elite—left his farm at the behest of the Senate, assumed leadership of the army, defeated Rome’s enemies, and subsequently rejected all offers of political power to return to his plow. The name was also a clear reference to George Washington’s reputation as a selfless patriot who intended to give up command of the Continental Army as soon as the war was over, a reputation that most officers felt that they, on a less exalted level, deserved as well. The “institution” that Knox and the others drew up included several key features that suited the founders’ plans for a fraternal society, but left the organization wide open to criticism that soon coalesced into a conspiracy theory. The most critical of these features was hereditary succession, with membership passing from father to eldest son, or lacking direct
male offspring, to the collateral line. The institution also included a gold
eagle badge suspended from a blue and white ribbon to be worn by the
members, the possibility of bestowing non-hereditary honorary members-
ships on worthy citizens, and an organization that included a General
Society as well as state societies and a French branch, all of which were
to meet regularly and communicate through circular letters. Finally, the
society was to establish a charitable fund, financed by each member
contributing one month’s pay. In the summer and fall of 1783, state so-
cieties were founded in all 13 states and in France, and the first meeting
of the general society was planned for April 1784.11

Soon the trouble started. During the summer of 1783, commutation
became a highly unpopular and controversial issue in New England.
Military pensions reminded the critics too much of the British system of
a standing army and privileged bureaucrats; since the pensions were
limited to the officers they were also perceived as an upper-class boon
financed by middle-class taxes. Already, there were voices who cautioned
that Congress was amassing too much power and that some people
wanted to establish a central government detrimental to the hard-fought
and newly won liberties of the American Revolution.12 As the news of the
formation of the Cincinnati became known, the critics started seeing a
connection. In early September 1783, the town meeting of Killingworth,
Connecticut, took note of the Cincinnati as an argument against commu-
tation: If the officers could afford to establish a charitable fund, why
would they need pensions anyway? The town meeting mockingly rec-
ommended that the Cincinnati loan their funds to the government in its
time of need.13

Enter Judge Aedanus Burke of South Carolina. Burke, an Irish immi-
grant, had for some time been a somewhat eccentric figure in South
Carolina politics. In 1783 he held a seat on the high court of the state and
was known for his efforts to protect loyalists from confiscation and dis-
enfranchisement.14 Upon learning of the Cincinnati, Burke, under the
pseudonym “Cassius,” wrote the pamphlet “Considerations on the Soci-
ety or Order of Cincinnati,” which transformed public perception of the
organization and effectively turned a vague discomfort into a full-fledged
conspiracy theory.15 Burke accused the Cincinnati of establishing for
themselves and their descendants a hereditary aristocracy, decorated
with a badge, supported by a perpetual fund, and capable of raising as
many as 30,000 armed men to ensure their will be done. And while Burke
felt that the actual generation of revolutionary officers was not devoid of
honor, it was just a matter of a few generations until their descendants
would refuse to intermarry with commoners; eventually these noble pa-
tricians of the erstwhile American republic would even claim divine de-
scent. In short, the Cincinnati were nothing less than “a deep laid con-
trivance to beget, and perpetuate family grandeur in an aristocratic Nobility, to terminate at last in monarchical tyranny.”16 Burke lambasted the American people for turning a blind eye to the subversion of their liberties, and called on the state legislatures to outlaw the Cincinnati before it was too late. “Considerations” saw several printings and was distributed throughout the United States.

As a result, during the fall of 1783 and spring of 1784, accusations against the Cincinnati mounted. Among their critics were some of the most prominent figures of the American Revolution: Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, Samuel Adams, John Jay, Elbridge Gerry, and Benjamin Franklin all publicly or privately (in their correspondence) described the Cincinnati as a nascent nobility that would damage and subvert the republican character of the United States.17 Moreover, Burke’s dramatic appeal to the state legislatures did not go unheeded. In February 1784, governor Benjamin Guerard of South Carolina addressed the state legislature, denouncing the Cincinnati.18 While the South Carolinians did not take action against the society, the Massachusetts legislature appointed a committee which concluded that the “Society, called the Cincinnati, is unjustifiable, and if not properly discountenanced, may be dangerous to the peace, liberty, and safety of the United States in general, and this Commonwealth in particular.”19 The Massachusetts delegates were especially alarmed by the organization of the Cincinnati, which mirrored that of the United States itself, and thus gave the impression of creating a state within the state. A recurrent, but incorrect rumor that Rhode Island had disenfranchised the Cincinnati, was widely circulated.20 Congress itself did not take up the issue, but in Jefferson’s original version of the Northwest Ordinance, the western territories would remain closed to anyone who carried a hereditary title, a provision clearly aimed at the Cincinnati.21 By early 1784, membership in the Cincinnati had become such a political liability that General William Heath of Massachusetts actually circulated a false rumor that he had left the Society in order to bolster his chances at the polls.22

George Washington, ever mindful of his reputation, and convinced by his correspondence and conversation with Jefferson and others that he was on thin ice, pressured the General Society at its first meeting in April 1784 to drop heredity and honorary membership and to place the charitable fund under the authority of the state legislatures. He would have preferred to dissolve the Cincinnati altogether, but the enthusiastic reception of the Society in France effectively precluded that option—dissolution would be a slap in the face of America’s ally.23 Even so, the delegates to the General Society only grudgingly accepted the revised institution, and only because Washington effectively threatened to leave if they did not comply. The revisions, along with a circular letter by
Washington explaining the innocent character of the society, of which the
revisions were a clear sign, were widely published in newspapers. What escaped
the notice of the public was that a majority of the state societies never ratified the changes and thus prevented their implementation. By 1790, the General Society acknowledged that the original institution, complete with heredity, was still in effect.

The Conspiracy Theory After 1784

After 1784, as a result of the revised institution, the clamor surrounding the Cincinnati died down somewhat. Indeed, some contemporaries and later historians concluded that the controversy ceased to play a role in political life. However, the conspiracy theory about the Cincinnati remained in currency, and if anything became even more distorted and suspicious than before. Some of the prominent critics, most notably Elbridge Gerry and Thomas Jefferson, never ceased to believe in the baneful influence of the Society. In everyday politics, too, suspicions of the Society persisted, as can be seen from an episode in the Connecticut legislature of 1787. At issue was the incorporation of a state medical society, on which the American Mercury reported: “Col. Burrall observed ... that he was against all Societies, whose constitutions and designs we did not know; such as the Cincinnati, Free Masons, and this Medical Society: that they were composed of cunning men, and we know not what mischief they may be upon.” The conspiracy theory was also reinforced by a version of Burke’s pamphlet that had been translated into French and considerably edited by the Comte de Mirabeau; this version was retranslated into English and subsequently published in London and Philadelphia.

When Shays’ Rebellion shook Massachusetts in late 1786 and early 1787, Mercy Otis Warren was quick to suspect those who, in her opinion, would inevitably profit from the call for a strong hand in putting down the insurrection: “The Cincinnati, who have been waiting a favorable tide to waft them on to the strong fortress of nobility, are manifestly elated by the present prospect.”

Fear of the Cincinnati also played a role in the most consequential debate of the early American republic, that about revising the Articles of Confederation. In 1785, the Massachusetts delegates to the Continental Congress wrote to governor James Bowdoin, warning against calling a convention to reform the Articles, for fear that the Cincinnati would dominate any such effort. When the Federal Convention was called in 1787, the specter of the Cincinnati still loomed. Washington, reluctant to be connected too closely with the Cincinnati and claiming fatigue, made public his decision not to attend the Cincinnati general meeting in Philadelphia. However, he was elected a delegate to the Federal Convention
(also meeting in Philadelphia at roughly the same time) shortly thereafter, and had to choose whether to offend his fellow officers by attending the Federal Convention and not the Cincinnati meeting, or to abandon what many felt was the last, best effort to secure a stronger federal government for the United States. Washington tried to procrastinate his arrival in Philadelphia so as to miss the Cincinnati meeting but be present for most of the Federal Convention, but since both meetings were delayed, he eventually attended both. Contrary to his earlier intentions, Washington remained the society’s president-general until his death, but he never attended another meeting and had nothing to do with the society’s everyday affairs.

During the Federal Convention itself, Elbridge Gerry brought up his concerns about the Cincinnati. He rejected the notion of a popular election of the president, arguing that if the election were left to the easily swayed multitude, a well-organized group like the Cincinnati would effectively “elect the chief Magistrate in every instance.”

Given the fact that twenty-two delegates, including Washington, were at the time members of the Cincinnati, Gerry felt it necessary to proclaim his respect for individual members, but insisted on his reservations against the institution nonetheless. The conspiracy theory also affected the question of constitutional ratification. Washington himself stated that some people thought “the proposed general government was the wicked and traitorous fabrication of the Cincinnati.” Effectively, the conspiracy theory was one aspect of the Anti-Federalist argument against the constitution. Allegations against the society surfaced in newspapers and elsewhere throughout the late 1780 and into the 1790s. It was only in the course of the 1790s and 1800s that the Cincinnati faded from the public mind, and in the case of some state societies, out of existence. One of the reasons the revised “institution” (the Society’s charter) that abolished heredity was never ratified was that after 1787 the triennial meeting of the General Society was unable to attain a quorum of seven state societies attending. In fact, the society came close to vanishing, until it was revived in the second half of the nineteenth century. Today, it is alive and well, with over 2,000 members and a magnificent headquarters of the General Society on Massachusetts Avenue in Washington, D.C.

The conspiracy theory against the Cincinnati was almost completely unfounded. While the officers certainly had important interests in common, there is no indication that they saw themselves as a nobility—existing, nascent or otherwise. In fact, the leading members of the society reacted to Burke’s allegations with humor, as is evident from a letter of Steuben to Knox in early 1784: “the young marquis Henry Knox is already promised in marriage to a Princess of Hyder Ali, and . . . the young Comtesse of Huntington is to marry the hereditary Prince of Sweden.
... the King of Spain wishes to accept the place of Treasurer of the Order. During the political frustrations of the early 1780s, radical members might well have wished for a monarchy, possibly with Washington as king, to impose political order. However, the society never pursued any such policies, especially as Washington himself was adamantly opposed to anything that might threaten civilian, republican government. While most Cincinnati strongly supported the new Constitution, there were also members among Anti-Federalist leaders, most notably governor George Clinton of New York. Similarly, during the first party system, most Cincinnati tended towards the Federalists, but there were also many among the Jeffersonian Republicans. If the society furnished the largest part of the new national army’s officer corps, this was only to be expected and had little political effect. Even when Congress debated the fate of commutation certificates in 1790, the society did not make a strong lobbying effort on behalf its members. In short, the Cincinnati did not form a conspiracy, or even a political party.

Relevant Sources and Analytical Approach

The bulk of the allegations against the Cincinnati can be found in pamphlets, newspapers, as well as the correspondence of critics and supporters of the society. The holdings of the Society of the Cincinnati in Washington, D.C. include various editions of the anti-Cincinnati pamphlets by Burke and Mirabeau, as well as many manuscripts and little-known documentary collections such as Edgar Hume’s General Washington’s Correspondence Concerning the Society of the Cincinnati. Another important source for letters is the manuscript division of the Library of Congress. Furthermore, the papers of many of the most prominent Americans of the early republic are available in well-edited collections. Newspapers, with the exception of some well-known publications, such as the Connecticut Courant or Independent Chronicle, remain a largely unmined source. The Library of Congress holds practically all newspapers of the period. While the controversy of 1783–84 is relatively easy to follow due to the relatively widespread public debate, references to the Cincinnati from 1784–1786 are scarcer, but can nevertheless be found in letters as well as scattered newspaper articles. The period from 1787 to 1790 is especially interesting because the framing and ratification of the Constitution produced the most profound and lasting debates in the American political tradition. The Ratification of the Constitution Project at the University of Wisconsin at Madison holds practically all relevant sources for this period for their Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution.

Returning to the multi-tiered analytical framework described above, several aspects of the conspiracy theory are striking. Given the promi-
nence of some of the Cincinnati’s critics, the conspiracy theory was clearly not a product of the political fringe, nor was it directed against a typical “scapegoat” minority. Instead, some of the leading politicians of the early American republic, as well as some more eccentric but well-established characters such as Aedanus Burke, accused an association of the United States’ most prominent military leaders of threatening the republic with aristocracy, nobility, military rule, and even monarchy. Not all of the critics accused the Cincinnati of actually planning to bring such a disaster about, but quite a few did. The role of George Washington is especially interesting due to its ambivalence. On the one hand, practically nobody dared accuse the “American Cincinnatus” himself of plotting against the republic, although that would have been the logical conclusion of the conspiracy theory. On the other hand, George Washington obviously feared the impact of the Cincinnati on his reputation and acted accordingly. The conspiracy theory clearly was a phenomenon at the center of the American polity.

Therefore the accusations against the Cincinnati must be interpreted in the context of specifically American traditions and conditions. A strong case can be made that this conspiracy theory could only have arisen in America. In the monarchies of Europe, the establishment of a knightly order or a hereditary aristocracy hardly seemed a problem; they were realities of everyday life. It was only in the context of the American debate about republicanism and equality that the Cincinnati could be perceived as a threat. A long-standing skepticism of standing armies and military establishment fostered the distrust directed against the officers of the Continental Army, as did contemporary interpretations of the Cromwell regime and the decline of the Roman Republic. Finally, the 1780s were generally a time of political and economic turmoil in the aftermath of the American Revolution. There was an economic depression as well as a controversy over who should pay the bill for the revolutionary war. The same economic and political fears that prompted Shays’ Rebellion and demands for paper money also put Americans on the lookout for those who might wish to profit from the troubles or who might even be behind them.

The conspiracy theory also appears to have functioned as a mode of causal interpretation. There was a common notion among American intellectuals, based largely on their interpretation of the classics, that constitutional decay from republicanism to despotism was a constant danger to any republic, and indeed the fate of practically all historical examples. Texts like Burke’s “Considerations” identified the Cincinnati as the personification of constitutional decay. This process was encouraged by the fact that publicly accusing a specific individual of evil intentions was during this time considered bad manners at best and grounds for dueling
at worst. Directing their attacks against an institution rather than individuals allowed the conspiracy theorists to express their criticism more forcefully than would otherwise have been acceptable. At least during the controversies of 1783–1784, the accusations against the Cincinnati also played a role in the organization of political dissent. For example, the extralegal anticommutation Middletown convention in Connecticut (itself accused by its opponents of being an illegal plot against proper government) deliberately presented itself as a sort of anti-Cincinnati, to the point of trying to time its sessions with those of the state society.\textsuperscript{37} While the anti-Cincinnati movement did not coalesce into a political organization, there was a rhetoric of common cause, for example in Burke’s calls for resolutions against the Cincinnati not only in South Carolina but in state legislatures throughout America.

The conspiracy theory directed against the Cincinnati played an important role in the shaping of a “dissenting tradition” in American political culture,\textsuperscript{38} a tradition that continued in aspects of Anti-Federalism, the Jeffersonian Republicans, and Jacksonian Democracy. It still exists in the various anticentralist, anti-elitist arguments and movements of the present day. This discourse of distrust against central authority and the insistence on the rights of “the people” against the machinations of the few runs like a red thread through much of American history, from the American Revolution to the twenty-first century. It is an expression of a utopian desire for equality that has taken the form of regular political debate as well as the form of conspiracy theories at various junctures in the history of the United States. While conspiracy theories remain a highly problematic aspect of American political culture, the role of episodes such as the Society of the Cincinnati conspiracy theory is not to be underestimated.

Notes

1 For a list of conspiracy theories present at one time or another in the United States, see for example Richard Hofstadter, \textit{The Paranoid Style in American Politics} (New York, 1965), or Robert Anton Wilson, \textit{Everything Is under Control: Conspiracies, Cults, and Cover-Ups} (New York, 1998). The latter is a product of popular culture, but nevertheless useful. The \textit{Encyclopedia of American Conspiracy Theories}, edited by Peter Knight of the University of Manchester, will be published by ABC-Clio in 2004.


Conspiracy Culture—American Paranoia from the Kennedy Assassination to the X-Files (London, 2000).


5 Mark Fenster, Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy and Power in American Culture (Minneapolis, 1999); Timothy Melley, Empire of Conspiracy: The Culture of Paranoia in Postwar America (Ithaca, N.Y., 2000).


8 For the impact of the Illuminati conspiracy theory, see Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics; the essential texts that established the conspiracy theory and were instrumental in exporting it to the U.S. were Abbé Barruel, Memoirs, Illustrating the History of Jacobinism (London, 1798) and John Robison, Proofs of a Conspiracy against All the Religions and Governments of Europe, Carried on in the Secret Meetings of Free Masons, Illuminati, and Reading Societies (Philadelphia, 1798).

9 Most histories of the Society of the Cincinnati were written by its members, the descendants of the historical actors of the 1780s. Early examples include Winslow Warren, The Society of the Cincinnati (Boston, 1929) and Edgar Erskine Hume, George Washington and the Society of the Cincinnati (Washington, D.C., 1933); the most recent and comprehensive one is Minor Myers, Liberty without Anarchy: A History of the Society of the Cincinnati (Charlottesville, 1983). The only major “outside” treatise is Richard Frank jr. Saunders, “The Origin and Early History of the Society of the Cincinnati” (PhD dissertation, University of Georgia, 1969), which to the best of my knowledge was never published.

10 The term “institution” in this context refers to the actual document describing the rules and bylaws of the Cincinnati.

11 A copy of the institution is reprinted in Myers, Liberty without Anarchy: A History of the Society of the Cincinnati.

12 See Connecticut Courant, 24 June 1783, for one of many examples of anticommutation sentiment. Main, The Antifederalists: Critics of the Constitution, 1781–1788 analyzes the anticommutation, anti-impost sentiment of 1783–85 as one of the origins of anti-federalism.

13 Connecticut Courant, 2 September 1783.

14 Burke’s personal papers were burned upon his death, in accordance with his last will and testament, so no biography of his private life exists. However, John C. Meleney, The Public Life of Aedanus Burke: Revolutionary Republican in Post-Revolutionary South Carolina (Columbia, SC, 1989) provides an excellent account of his political activities, both in South Carolina and as a member of the first Congress.

15 Aedanus Burke, Considerations on the Society or Order of Cincinnati (Charleston, 1783; reprint, Robert Bell, Philadelphia)

16 Ibid. 14

17 Thomas Jefferson to George Washington, 16 April 1784, Edgar Erskine Hume, General Washington’s Correspondence Concerning the Society of the Cincinnati (Baltimore, 1941), 135–39;


19 Independent Chronicle, 25 March 1784.


21 The clause was eventually struck out.


23 Myers, Liberty without Anarchy: A History of the Society of the Cincinnati, 61–62

24 See for example Connecticut Journal, 2 June 1784.

25 It is quite curious that hardly anybody noticed that heredity was still in effect. Upon the death of Nathanael Greene, several newspapers reported that his son, George Washington Greene, would be admitted to the society once he came of age. See for example Connecticut Journal, 19 July 1786. In fact, John Quincy Adams did notice and wrote his father about it: John Quincy Adams to John Adams, 30 June 1787, Saunders, “The Origin and Early History of the Society of the Cincinnati”, 32–33. However, as far as I have found, this realization was not widespread.

26 American Mercury, 4 June 1787.

27 Gabriel-Honoré de Riquetti Mirabeau, Considerations on the Order of Cincinnatus. To Which Are Added Several Original Papers Relative to That Institution. Translated from the French of the Count De Mirabeau (Philadelphia, 1786). Benjamin Franklin, one of the milder critics of the Cincinnati, had given a copy of Burke’s “Considerations” to the Comte, whose translation was aimed at French politics rather than America. Interestingly, Mirabeau’s younger brother was a member of the French society.


29 The Massachusetts Delegates (Elbridge Gerry, Samuel Osgood and Rufus King) to the Governor of Massachusetts (James Bowdoin), 3 September 1785, Edmund C. Burnett, ed., Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, 8 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1921–1938) 8: 208.

30 Washington’s circular letter was, for example, reprinted in the Boston Gazette, 14 May 1787.


35 During the Ancien Regime, there were some suspicions against the Cincinnati because they were connected to republicanism. It was only during the radicalisation of the French revo-
olution that the French Cincinnati were accused of aristocratical leanings; during the terreur many members became victims of the guillotine.


37 *Connecticut Journal*, 7 April 1784.

38 This term is taken from Saul Cornell, *The Other Founders: Anti-Federalism & the Dissenting Tradition in America, 1788–1828* (Chapel Hill, 1999), a brilliant analysis of Anti-Federalist thought in the early republic and its influences even on the present day.
In March 2002 the German Historical Institute, Washington, D.C., held its second Young Scholars Forum for American doctoral students and recent Ph.D. recipients in modern German and European history. The Young Scholars Forum has the character of a workshop and concentrates on a different topic each year. In 2002 it featured projects dealing with questions of “War and Society.” It brought together fourteen participants from across the U.S.A. and one graduate student from France for a weekend of scholarly discussion and exchange. They had the opportunity to present their research and to benefit from the comments and insights of their colleagues and distinguished senior scholars from both sides of the Atlantic. This year four professors – Deborah Cohen, Ute Frevert, Gerhard Hirschfeld, and Gerhard Weinberg – acted as mentors and – together with Roger Chickering, Christof Mauch, Richard Wetzell, and the convener of the Forum, Christoph Strupp – chaired the eight panels of the conference. The papers had been predistributed in the form of a conference reader. The sessions were therefore devoted to questions and discussions. Each of the panels featured two papers introduced not by the authors themselves but by two of their fellow students acting as commentators. Different viewpoints and critical questions stimulated discussion right from the beginning of every panel. This year’s Young Scholars Forum was made possible through generous grants from the Allianz AG, Munich, and the German Marshall Fund of the United States. The organizers are particularly grateful for their support.

The topic of this year’s Young Scholars Forum, War and Society, is far from being only of historical interest. Military violence with all its con-
sequences for nations and societies remains a powerful political factor. The papers presented at the Young Scholars Forum addressed many subjects that have recently been discussed in the evening news and the morning papers, including guerilla warfare, war coverage by the media, defining and dealing with prisoners of war, the influence of war on intellectual debates in Europe and the USA, problems of transition from war to peace, and commemorative cultures.

The positive response to the call for papers showed the broad interest in the subject among American scholars. Most of the proposals, and thus most of the papers presented at the conference, focused on the first half of the twentieth century and the period of the world wars. The papers demonstrated a broad range of methodological and thematic approaches to military history and the history of warfare. And even though it was not the goal of the Forum to establish conceptual frameworks, methodological guidelines or master narratives for the “new” military history or the history of violence, the papers proved once again that over the past two decades military history has clearly emancipated itself from its beginnings as an auxiliary science for generals and high commands. Historians today deal with the relationship between war and society from the perspectives of political, social, economic, cultural, and gender history, and they take advantage of the broadest possible range of sources.

The opening panel featured two papers dealing with militarism and youth. Bryan Ganaway presented his research on military toys in Germany. In the course of the nineteenth century these evolved from utilitarian objects of a small elite into mass market articles designed to affirm and teach the nation. Technical improvements and pedagogical views that stressed the possibility of transmitting adult values to children both contributed to this change. Through military toys and miniatures, it became possible to participate at least symbolically in the wars of the nineteenth century, and not necessarily on the German side alone. With World War I, military toys became less broadly European and more aggressively and characteristically German in character. Ganaway also addressed the question whether children actually perceived the symbolic meaning of their toys – memoir literature indicates that boys liked to be medieval heroes or cowboys and Indians just as much as nationalist citizen soldiers.

In the second paper Andrew Donson discussed the military training of sixteen and seventeen-year-old males in World War I. Noting that participation was voluntary, he argued that the continuously high rates of participation in these training programs, even among working class youth, are indicators of strong support for the war. Even though the recreational and social dimensions clearly played a role in the popularity of the programs, Donson regarded them primarily as an opportunity for
young people to express their patriotism and to be part of a nationalist spectacle. He closed with the suggestion that the military youth companies offered an easy transition into right-wing paramilitary violence after 1918. In the discussion, other possible reasons for participation in military training were offered, such as getting away from daily routines or the hope for a better preparation for service at the front. The discussion of both papers revolved around the question of whether children were in fact indoctrinated by nationalist ideology and adult martial values. Historians face great difficulties in proving the motives for playing with military toys or joining military training companies and assessing their psychological effects.

The second panel dealt with several aspects of war and language. In his paper on German colonial wars and the mass media, Bradley D. Naranch dealt with the “dirty little wars of Imperial German history” and the way the middle-class public in Germany experienced their realities. Because of the geographical distance, these wars were perceived as “virtual conflicts.” On the other hand, war correspondents, with the help of the newly invented telegraph, were for the first time able to have their reports printed just days after the events happened and thus limited the effectiveness of state censorship. Their eye-witness reports influenced the German colonial debate and were used by supporters and opponents of the Imperial colonial policy alike. The language of war and military violence they developed stressed the cultural and racial dimensions of the colonial conflicts and left no room for sympathy with their indigenous victims.

Aaron Cohen sketched the totalitarian “language of war” in Germany and Russia during World War I and II. He came to the conclusion that on a purely linguistic level there were remarkable similarities in the form and content of official propaganda during the Second World War, which was shaped by the experiences of both countries in the First World War. Simplistic differentiations between friends and enemies, the degradation of the enemies as beasts, social outcasts, or ancient barbarians, and the justification of the war as a defense of the cultural values of one’s own society can be found on both sides in both wars. The goal of the war language was, of course, the mobilization of the public in the interest of the war. During World War II, language was subject to far greater institutional control than during preceding periods. While Nazi language distinguished in an emotional way between the “Volk” and its enemies (Jews, Communists, and others), Russian war language focused on the working class (-party) and the (future) Soviet reality. Participants discussed the importance of new technologies for the transmission of propaganda, its reception by different audiences, and the difficult relationship of reality and language in general.
The third panel consisted of two papers that were more loosely related. First, Daniel Krebs presented his research on German prisoners of war in the American war of independence. About 6000 German mercenaries were captured during that conflict. Based on letters and diaries, Krebs described the process of capture and the transition from being soldiers to being prisoners of war through certain rituals of surrender. These rituals stood in for international laws on warfare and prisoners of war, which were at that time sketchy at best. While Congress set some general rules in May 1776, the administration of the prisoners had to be left to local authorities. Generally the prisoners were treated well, kept in regions with a high percentage of German settlers, and could even work for money. Because of a serious labor shortage, the prisoners of war were quickly regarded as potential immigrants. In the discussion, Krebs stressed the differences between the treatment of captured German and British soldiers, and the absence of ideological factors, which played an important role in the treatment of prisoners of war in the twentieth century.

In his paper on the problems of guerilla and interethnic war in the Austrian-Hungarian Militärgeneralgouvernement of Serbia in 1917, Jonathan Gumz took the participants back to the early twentieth century. The Habsburg’s occupation of Serbia can be seen as the persistence of an older absolutist form of rule that did little to win over the population of that territory even though the Militärgeneralgouvernement, concerned with its image, avoided large-scale violence in its counter-guerilla actions. The situation was complicated by the mix of ethnic groups and religions in the region, with the Austrian government supporting Muslims and Albanians in the south in their struggle against Bulgarians and Serbs. Gumz focused on aspects of World War I that, in the face of the industrialized mass warfare of the western front, have been largely overlooked. He stressed the borderland character of the occupied territories and made clear that, contrary to the western and eastern front, this occupation was never meant to lead to annexation.

The fourth panel focused on two papers dealing with World War I and its aftermath from local and comparative perspectives. In his research on the cities of Béziers (France) and Northampton (England), Pierre Purseauigle shed light on the importance of local elites for the social mobilization for war. They acted as local transmitters of the national propaganda efforts by adjusting the messages to local cultural codes. Mourning and remembrance served as prime examples of how local identities and national events interacted. Purseauigle also discussed advantages and limits of the comparative approach he has chosen.

Adam R. Seipp compared the demobilization process in Munich and Manchester in 1918–19. Power structures were put to the test during the
tumultous first months of the Räterepublik in Munich and the strike-ridden winter of 1919 in England. Both cities will serve as case-studies in a project that focuses on the new role of state and citizenship, the changed understanding of politics, and the way authorities coped with the general demand for "order" in the post World War I period. Both papers successfully attempted to "make the picture more complex" by challenging established narratives on the national level, but were confronted with problems of contextualizing their findings and justifying the selection of their examples.

Because one of the originally selected participants had to cancel, the fifth panel consisted solely of a paper presented by David J. Bielanski on Weimar paramilitary violence and the cult of the dead that arose in Germany after World War I. Bielanski explored the masculine features of the "new man" that were based on the experiences of the front soldiers and revolved around concepts of duty and service to the nation. They were prominently visible in paramilitary organizations like the socialist Reichsbanner and the nationalist Stahlhelm. Violence was a key element in the identity of their members; fights in the streets replaced the fight in the trenches. Those killed in these battles were easily incorporated into the cult of the dead.

The papers of the sixth panel dealt with the relationship between intellectuals, science and war. James A. Good showed how the American reception of German idealism – most notably the philosophy of G. W. F. Hegel – was influenced by war. The American Civil War and the German wars of unification stimulated American interest in German culture and the liberal values of its system of education: Lehrfreiheit and Lernfreiheit. John Dewey embraced Hegelianism as a student in the 1880s and later, as a professor at the Universities of Michigan and Chicago. After the turn of the century Hegelianism gradually lost its influence, and during World War I Hegel’s political philosophy was held responsible for the German militarism. Dewey criticized German idealism – Kant and Hegel – in his book German Philosophy and Politics (1915). Good argued that while Dewey was certainly unable to convincingly prove a correlation between abstract philosophical ideas and the policies of the German government, his changed perception of German culture has to be seen mainly as a disillusionment with the German intellectual tradition in the light of German propaganda rhetoric.

Steven P. Remy discussed his research on the University of Heidelberg in the Third Reich and disproved the "Heidelberg myth" of the universities as victims of the regime. Focusing on the activities of departments and prominent professors during World War II, he showed that the regime could count on the support of its universities and research institutions through war-related publications, courses, and lectures as
well as technological innovations, weapons research, Raumforschung, and medical services. Resistance among professors or students was rare in Heidelberg. Beside ideological commonalities, the large-scale financial support of scientific research by various government and military institutions was of crucial importance. The discussion of both papers raised very broad questions about the relationship between intellectuals and society. It became clear that intellectuals or university professors do not work in a vacuum. They respond easily to massive social disturbances like wars, and outside factors deeply influence the production of knowledge.

The seventh panel brought together papers by Wendy Maxon and Monica A. Black. Wendy Maxon explored the topics of mechanization and bestialization in German culture after World War I and demonstrated the value of art works for historical research. She focused on the works of artists such as Oskar Schlemmer, Rudolf Schlichter, Heinrich Davringhausen, and George Grosz. They were occupied with the effects that the industrialized slaughter had on the soldier’s body, especially on the western front. They represented different views on general debates over the human body that played an important role in German culture of the 1920s. Their disturbing images of robots and human flesh contrasted with a new awareness of sports, conditioned bodies, nutrition, and health in general.

Monica A. Black presented her research project on perceptions of death among German soldiers during World War II. Based on a reading of letters from the front, which were dominated by elements of the Christian narrative of suffering, death, judgement, and resurrection and victimization, she argued that religious convictions largely survived under the Nazi regime. The totalitarian ideology had not superseded Christianity, but on the eastern front the two coincided as the enemy was described as godless, anti-Christian, and bestial. German soldiers viewed themselves as defenders of Christian culture. The discussion concentrated on soldier’s letters as a source that is difficult to use because of the masses of material and the randomness of preservation in the archives, but that nevertheless remains one of the most fruitful sources for the history of wartime mentalities.

The last panel dealt with German history after 1945. Andrew Oppenheimer discussed West German pacifism. The fate of the German Peace Society (GPS), founded in 1892 and relicensed in November 1945, illustrates the obstacles to a simple continuity in pacifist thought and activism. During the Cold War, the society’s educational work could not be based on the Weimar-era ideals of anti-militarism. In the anti-communist climate of the late 1940s and early 1950s, the GPS had difficulties dealing with the communist wing of its organization. It adapted to general
Finally, Kristin Rebien presented her research on the *Gruppe 47*, the influential network of writers around the author Hans-Werner Richter. All the members of the group fought in World War II and dealt with the war and its consequences in their writings. The myth of the *Stunde Null* that influenced the social and political development of the Federal Republic, was also decisive for the *Gruppe 47*. Their self-image and their success was based on the notion of a “new beginning” and their self-proclaimed status as a cultural elite. Even though publishers refrained from publishing new authors for a number of reasons in the immediate post-war years, the *Gruppe 47*, through its affiliation with critics and publishers, managed to achieve a unique position in the literary market. The discussion of both papers centered on various questions of political and cultural continuity and discontinuity after 1945.

The final discussion of the Young Scholars Forum raised a number of important general questions with regard to the history of war. The broad spectrum of topics and methodological approaches presented at the conference was clearly seen as an asset. The participants interpreted war as a “social situation” rather than as a historical event, and this paved the way for valuable discussions of the problems of pre- and post-war societies and called into question the notion of wars as historical watersheds. Almost all the papers were also marked by an interest in the representation and perception of history rather than history itself. Some of the papers on German history in the first half of the twentieth century were influenced by a revived notion of a German *Sonderweg*, which proved once again the necessity and the value of comparative research and interdisciplinary approaches. The Young Scholars Forum certainly helped to lay the ground for this. Quite unintentionally, the selection of papers also worked in favor of a separation of the history of war in early modern history from the developments in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which likewise called for more comparative or collaborative research. The quality of the papers and the readiness of all participants and the invited scholars from Germany and the United States to engage in discussions in a dedicated and friendly manner was very impressive. It made the weekend at the GHI in Washington a success.

*Christoph Strupp*

**Participants and Their Topics**

DAVID BIELANSKI, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, “Wartime Memories and Post-War Victims: Weimar Paramilitary Violence and the Cult of the Dead”
MONICA A. BLACK, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, “Gott mit uns: Perceptions of Death Among Wehrmacht Soldiers, 1939–1941”

AARON J. COHEN, California State University, “The Language Of War: Exhortation, Condemnation, And Symbolism In German And Russian Public Culture During The World Wars”

ANDREW DONSON, Marquette University, “What Was the Compulsion to be a Soldier? The Military Training of Male Youth in the First World War”

BRYAN GANAWAY, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, “The Military Miniature Scenario in the Long Nineteenth Century”

JAMES A. GOOD, Rice University, “War and the Reception of German Idealism”

JONATHAN GUMZ, University of Chicago, “The Militärgeneralgouvernement Serbien in 1917: In the Midst of Guerilla War and Interethnic War”

DANIEL KREBS, Emory University, “‘Aller Mut und Herzhaftigkeit, die sonst den Soldaten belebten, war uns entfallen’ – German Prisoners of War in the American War of Independence”

WENDY MAXON, University of California, San Diego, “Eisen und Fleisch: The First World War and Images of Mechanization and Animalization in German Culture”

BRADLEY D. NARANCH, Johns Hopkins University, “Telegraphing Race: German Colonial Wars and the Mass Media, 1890–1907”

ANDREW OPPENHEIMER, University of Chicago, “Perpetual Peace at the Crossroads: Pacifism and West German Political Culture, 1945–1951”

PIERRE PURSEIGLE, Université de Toulouse II, “Imperial Societies and Local Communities at War: The WWI Experience of England and France”

KRISTIN REBEN, Stanford University, “World War II and Stunde Null – Revisiting the Myth of the New Beginning”

STEVEN P. REMY, Ohio State University, “Fighting Science: German University Professors and War, 1939–1945”

ADAM R. SEIPP, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Between Peace and Order: Demobilization, International Politics, and Urban Protest in Munich and Manchester, 1918–1919”
LATIN AMERICA, NORTH AMERICA, AND EUROPE: INTERNATIONAL ENCOUNTERS AND RELATIONS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Conference held in conjunction with the Fiftieth Annual Meeting of the Rocky Mountain Council for Latin American Studies, Portland, Oregon, April 10–13, 2002. Conveners: Christof Mauch (GHI) and Friedrich Schuler (Portland State University). Participants: Walther Bernecker (University of Erlangen-Nürnberg), Ragnhild Fiebig von Hase (University of Cologne), Thomas Fischer (University of Erlangen-Nürnberg), Claudia Haake (University of Bielefeld), Friedrich Katz (University of Chicago), Alan Knight (St. Anthony’s College, Oxford), Uta Kresse Raina (Temple University), David Lazar (GHI), Uwe Lübken (University of Cologne), Ray Sadler (New Mexico State University) Thomas Schoonover (University of Southwestern Louisiana).

Over the years, the GHI has organized numerous conferences in the area of transatlantic history focusing on the manifold interactions between the United States and Europe. The annual meeting of the Rocky Mountain Council for Latin American Studies (RMCLAS) provided an opportunity to take a broader perspective. In collaboration with RMCLAS, the GHI invited several European scholars to share their thoughts on the three-way interactions between North America, Europe, and Latin America with experts on Latin America from the U.S. While most of the papers presented at the conference “Latin America, North America and Europe: International Encounters and Relations in Historical Perspective” focused on U.S.-European rivalry for influence in Latin America, much of the discussion centered on Latin American responses to that rivalry.

The first session of the conference was devoted to “German Interests in Latin America.” In her paper “Clio and the German Danger 1896–1914,” Ragnhild Fiebig von Hase suggested that historians’ discussions of the question whether Imperial Germany posed a challenge to the Monroe Doctrine or a threat to U.S. interests in Latin America in the years immediately preceding World War I have been skewed by preoccupation with other issues. German historians long tended to subordinate analysis of German policy toward Latin America to consideration of Germany’s dealings with the other great powers and the origins of the first world war. American scholars, meanwhile, have tended to link the question of the “German threat” to the question of the long-term influence of President Theodore Roosevelt’s Latin America policy.

Fiebig von Hase’s paper was followed by a case study of the differing goals two German governments pursued in their dealings with a Latin
American nation. Friedrich Katz opened his paper “A Comparison: German Policy Toward Mexico During Imperial Germany and the Third Reich” by noting that Mexico generally played a minor role in German policy in Latin America. In contrast to several other Latin American nations, pre-World War I Mexico had very limited economic dealings with Germany and comparatively few German settlers - the focal points of Imperial Germany’s interest in Latin America. German interest in Mexico suddenly increased, according to Katz, with the Mexican revolution - during which Germany proposed establishing a de facto German-British-U.S. protectorate in Mexico - and the outbreak of the World War I, when Germany sought to provoke conflict between the U.S. and Mexico to divert U.S. attention from Europe. During the 1930s, Katz went on to argue, there was initially little basis for expanding ties between Hitler’s right-wing government and the leftist Mexican government of Lázaro Cárdenas. A new impetus in German-Mexican relations came, however, in the wake of the Mexican government’s nationalization of the oil industry in 1938; faced with a boycott by foreign oil companies, the Mexican government was willing to barter oil for industrial products with Germany. Cárdenas nonetheless remained fundamentally anti-Nazi - his was the only government to protest the German-Austrian Anschluss - and Mexico was eventually to join with the United States in declaring war on Germany.

The second session of the conference explored “U.S., British, and German Imperialism in Latin America.” Alan Knight made the case for the utility of the notion of “informal imperialism” in his paper “British and U.S. Imperialism in Latin America: A Comparison.” Britain’s relations with Latin America after about 1850, Knight argued, illustrate the exercise of informal imperial control to advance the imperial power’s economic interests. Before roughly 1840, Britain had tried to use coercion to secure favorable terms for trade and investment in the region, but with little success. After 1850, Latin American elites, for reasons of their own self-interest, became increasingly receptive to British economic influence. Britain was thereafter able to obtain much of what it had earlier sought by way of economic advantage; although coercion did not figure in Britain’s dealings with the nations of Latin America, Knight stressed, there was a marked imbalance of power that worked in Britain’s favor. The United States’ relations with Latin America, he went on to argue, exemplify the defensive function of informal imperialism. Until the end of the Cold War, U.S. policy toward Latin America was shaped by a preoccupation with perceived external threats to U.S. interests in the region - fascism in the 1930s and 40s, for example, and communism in the following decades. The U.S. was more interested in trying to shape the social and political order in Latin America than Britain was, Knight noted, and U.S. policy had moralistic and missionary undercurrents missing from British policy.
Looking at the work of German scholars on Andean cultures, Uta Kresse Raina invoked another form of imperialism in her paper “Anthropology and Archaeology as Means for Intellectual Conquest in the Andes, 1850–1920.” Germany had only very limited political and economic ties to the Andean nations, but the region was a major focus of German “intellectual imperialism,” according to Kresse Raina. German self-identity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was built upon the notion of the Germans as a people with ancient roots, and that notion strongly influenced the work of German scholars who studied ancient cultures, be it the Greeks or the Incas. Drawing a sharp contrast between a “noble” Inca past and a less glorious, ethnically mixed present, German anthropologists and archaeologists appropriated the Andean past for the construction of a German identity.

The two papers presented during the third session of the conference, “Concepts and Cultural Space,” pointed to some of the difficulties - archival in one case, conceptual in the other - in studying the points of intersection between U.S., European, and Latin American history. In his paper “Finding Master Spy Abwehr Agent August Lüning in Havana, 1942 and 2002,” Thomas Schoonover outlined the challenges of trying to piece together an account of Lüning’s covert career and eventual arrest from the surviving records. Although Lüning’s superiors were apparently dissatisfied with the information he provided them, and although he was undone largely by his own bumbling and clumsiness, U.S. counterintelligence officials were quick to portray Lüning as a serious threat to the Allied war effort and his arrest as a major blow to Nazi espionage. In the second paper of the session, “Genocide: Different Approaches to the Application of a European Concept in Latin America and the United States,” Claudia Haake sketched the history of the term “genocide” and the ways it has been applied in studies of the indigenous peoples of North and South America. The term was coined by the Polish legal scholar Raphael Lemkin toward the end of World War II to describe the Nazi regime’s policy of mass murder directed at specific groups. A central issue in early discussions of the concept of genocide, Haake noted, was the question whether intent was a necessary defining element. Some of the scholars and activists who have applied the term to the experiences of Native American groups have argued against the necessity of demonstrating intent in applying the concept of genocide or have sidestepped the issue by focusing on numbers and avoiding precise definitions. Voicing dissatisfaction with the often emotional tone and frequent vagueness in discussions of possible instances of genocide in the Americas, Haake closed by suggesting that a firm definition of genocide is still needed before the question whether genocide did in fact occur in the Americas can be decided.

The two papers presented during the fourth session, “European and U.S. Competition in Latin America,” were conceived as twin case studies.
of great power economic rivalry. Walther Bernecker, sketching the competition between Great Britain and the United States in Mexico, called attention to the impact of the differences in Spanish, British, and U.S. colonial economic policy. Thomas Fischer placed U.S.-German competition for economic advantage in Colombia within the context of regional economic differentiation within Colombia itself.

The subject of the closing session of the conference was "Japan and Germany in Latin America in the Interwar Period and World War II." Uwe Lübken's paper "Playing the Cultural Game: Nelson Rockefeller and the German Threat to Latin America" set out the dilemma U.S. policy makers confronted as they sought ways to counter Nazi and Fascist influence in Latin America in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Too direct a response, Lübken explained, might prompt Latin American governments and publics to suspect the U.S. was reverting to either the policy of the "Big Stick" or dollar diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy, on the other hand, seemed to offer a method for achieving traditional diplomatic goals through indirect means. The Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA) was created in 1940 under the direction of Nelson Rockefeller to serve as a channel to provide private groups with governmental funding to showcase U.S. culture in Latin America. Even with the OCIAA, however, the U.S. did not have a long-term policy for achieving long-term goals through cultural diplomacy in Latin America. U.S. cultural policy in Latin America, according to Lübken, remained first and foremost a response to the perceived fascist threat.

The conference closed with Friedrich Schuler's paper on "Japan in Latin America, 1933–1939." Schuler began by explaining his interest in reconsidering the terms and categories that have been used in writing Latin American history. The case of the development of the Japanese government's trade policy toward Latin America during the 1930s suggests, in his view, that the unfolding of events and decisions was much more haphazard than historical accounts indicate. The start of Japan's war on China coincided with the collapse of diplomatic efforts to address the Depression in the early 1930s, but it was only later in the decade that the Japanese government tried to direct trade with Latin America to serve the needs of its war effort. Japanese policy developed, Schuler argued, in opportunistic response to developments such as the U.S.-British embargo of Peru or the threat of protectionist measures on the part of Japan's Latin American trading partners: the eventual subordination of trade policy to the war effort was not preordained.

The organizers are planning to publish a collection of essays based upon the conference.

David Lazar
On Saturday, April 20, 2002, members of the Mid-Atlantic German History Seminar met for a luncheon and discussion which centered on a paper submitted by Elizabeth Janik: “‘The Golden Hunger Years’: Music and Superpower Rivalry in Occupied Berlin.” Janik, currently a post-doctoral Teaching Fellow at George Mason University, will be joining the history faculty at James Madison University, Harrisonburg, Virginia, in the fall of 2002. She recently completed her Ph.D. under the supervision of Professor Roger Chickering, Georgetown University. Her paper was part of her larger study, now under revision for eventual publication.

In her paper, Janik described and analyzed American and Soviet arts policies, focusing on music, an area of culture often neglected in postwar and occupation historical accounts. She concentrated on Berlin and especially the role of American and Soviet military occupiers in fostering competing visions of culture. As Janik suggested: “In competition with each other and seeking the loyalties of their German charges, the Allies encouraged Berlin to become a lively—and heavily subsidized—city of the arts.” She concluded by noting that by the end of the occupation period, both east and west Berlin had symphony orchestras, radio stations, and universities, all of which would serve as institutional carriers of competing political, social, and cultural visions during the Cold War.

A lively discussion followed, which was made especially interesting and informative since a number of participants (including Robert Wolfe and Charles Herber) had been U.S. Army soldiers or OMGUS officers in Germany during these postwar years. Henry Friedlander also vividly described the post-World War II scene as he recalled it. These insightful observations about Berlin’s cultural climate were very illuminating.

In 1969, Vernon Lidtke (Johns Hopkins University) conceived of the idea of an informal historians’ group meeting occasionally to present work-in-progress. He along with William Fletcher (University of Delaware) and other Washington, DC-Baltimore area professors first met in the spring of 1971 at Johns Hopkins University. James Harris (University of Maryland) presented the first paper. Thus, the Mid-Atlantic German History Seminar was founded over thirty years ago to promote scholarship in German history. An informal association of academics, government employees with a background in German history, and museum officials, the group has been meeting regularly two times annually, in the...
fall and in the spring. Participants offer to present a work-in-progress, such as a book chapter or article, and these are submitted in advance of the luncheon meeting. Over seventy individuals are on the Mid-Atlantic German History Seminar’s mailing list. For many years, Professor Thomas Helde (Georgetown University) coordinated the effort, followed by James Harris (University of Maryland). Currently Marion Deshmukh (George Mason University) is the group’s coordinator.

With the spring 2002 meeting, a new relationship begins with the German Historical Institute. Dr. Christof Mauch, the GHI’s director, graciously offered to host the annual spring meeting of the Seminar. This will provide a central and convenient location. Normally, the various area universities of its participants host the Seminar meetings. In the past, the meetings were held at virtually all the Washington, DC universities (Catholic, George Washington, Georgetown, American, University of Maryland, George Mason University). But meetings have also been held at Prince Georges Community College, the Holocaust Museum, Towson University, University of Maryland, Baltimore County, Johns Hopkins University, and the University of Delaware. Seminar participants come from universities as far as Hofstra, Rutgers, Virginia Commonwealth, and the University of Richmond. Thus the new relationship between the Mid-Atlantic Seminar and the German Historical Institute will be a welcome partnership. For more information about the Seminar, please contact Marion Deshmukh (Department of History & Art History, George Mason University) at (703) 993-2149 or via e-mail at mdeshmuk@gmu.edu.

Marion Deshmukh
EXPERT CULTURES AND SOCIAL ENGINEERING
IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY:
SCIENTISTS, SCHOLARS, AND INSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
BETWEEN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES

Conference at the GHI, April 26-27, 2002. Conveners: Philipp Loeser (GHI/AICGS) and Christoph Strupp (GHI). Participants: David Cahan (University of Nebraska), Eckhardt Fuchs (University of Mannheim), Christie C. Hanzlik-Green (University of Wisconsin), Thomas A. Howard (Gordon College), Jochen Kirchhoff (German Museum Munich), Gabriele Lingelbach (University of Trier), Christof Mauch (GHI), Dorothy Ross (Johns Hopkins University), Jeffrey Sklansky (Oregon State University), Frank Trommler (University of Pennsylvania), Andreas Westerwinter (University of Leipzig/University of Paris IV).

The development of nineteenth-century scholarly research was characterized by expansion, specialization, and increasingly self-referential modes of operation. The rise of research universities, first in Europe and with some delay in the United States, had a tremendous impact. A new professional apparatus with a seminar system, laboratories, reference tools, and scientific journals shaped professional activities. Distinct sets of methodologies and legitimation strategies developed within each discipline. As a result, the overall focus shifted from the universal orientation of humanist education to specialized professional training. The ideals of Bildung and cosmopolitan scholarship were still held in high esteem, but they were at odds with the development of relatively autonomous expert cultures. Many of the new forms of knowledge were difficult to integrate into the general education of the individual. At the same time, the influence of academics on culture and society seemed to decline; they had increasing difficulty in making themselves heard outside their own fields of study. The success story of the research university can also be read as the story of the alienation of many of the individuals involved. Professional careers at universities drifted apart from those in politics, law, or the business world. Interests beyond the field of academics could no longer be articulated directly and with immediate results.

The conference at the GHI explored how individuals sought to participate in the engineering of culture and society and how they established themselves as authorities beyond their scholarly disciplines, even as the drift towards formal expertise counteracted this goal. Within this general perspective, the conference focused on two sets of questions. First and foremost, the participants from Germany and the United States
looked at the rise of expert cultures in the second half of the nineteenth
century and discussed this phenomenon from different angles. The expert
as a new social type enabled individuals to define their personalities
solely with respect to a self-referential, methodologically self-sustained
system of disciplinary thinking and experimentation. This development
challenged previous notions such as the participation in the public sphere
or the classical type of Bildung. Wherever the participants in this confer-
ence probed their material in this regard, a turbulent if inconclusive
struggle of different sets of values emerged—the old gentleman ideal, a
utilitarian focus on professional training, obligations with regard to the
functioning of public life, and the idealist, self-referential concepts of
German Wissenschaft or modern science. The second set of questions con-
cerned a transatlantic differential: The migration of German concepts and
educational frameworks to the U.S., studied through a comparative ap-
proach that everyone felt was necessary. In the second half of the nine-
teenth century, German professors appointed to American universities
and Americans trained in Germany found themselves in the middle of a
dynamics of changing institutions, curricula, and individual roles inside
and outside the university system. They had to redefine their work’s
relation to society and this process invariably impacted the latter. The
participants sought to address relevant processes of transfer and med ia-
tion as complex, contingent adaptations, appropriations, and interpreta-
tions involving a source culture and a target culture (the U.S.). The aspect
of social engineering, that is the preoccupation with questions of how a
society should function and how related goals could best be achieved
with the educational instruments at hand, played an important part in
many instances of cultural transfer.

New institutional developments in the educational system of the
United States between 1860 and 1900 were often related to German mod-
els. This is obviously true for the research university as the dominant
innovation of the time, but it also applies to smaller institutional changes
and elements of scientific professionalization in general. Gabriele Lingel-
bach discussed several unsuccessful attempts to establish “Schools of
Political Science” within the research university of the late nineteenth
century. The intention of historians such as Andrew D. White, Charles K.
Adams, and Herbert B. Adams at Cornell, Michigan, and Johns Hopkins
was to provide university-level training for future politicians, journalists,
and other key figures of public life. The projects revealed a desire for
social relevance, but never lasted long, presumably because of their con-
tested utilitarian outlook. The inherent processes of specialization mar-
ginalized the impact of the humanities on politics and ethics, and a new
discipline such as political science seemed to be an obvious place for
those interested in public service careers. But despite the American civil
service reform of the 1880s, politics was not yet considered a profession and thus not linked to a need for professional training. At least until after the turn of the century, the idea of professionally trained politicians was at odds with the self-image of the U.S. as a democratic, open, and meritocratic society.

Jochen Kirchhoff analyzed transfer processes with regard to the discipline of agricultural chemistry. He pointed out that national particularities that were contingent upon historical context shaped the formation of different expert cultures in Germany and the United States. Although the initiation to German *Wissenschaft* played an important role for individual American researchers studying abroad (mainly in Göttingen with F. Wöhler), the introduction of agricultural chemistry as a scientific discipline in the United States from the 1840s on had much more to do with practical reasoning. Quality control of fertilizing substances was a major issue, and it took more than twenty years before a system of state experimental stations was finally complemented by scientific research at universities. The early German and subsequently American agricultural chemists drew their prestige as experts not so much from abstract research but from their role in the examination procedures and the practical value of their knowledge. Christie C. Hanzlik-Green made a strong case for the indebtedness of the system of University Extension in Wisconsin between 1890 and 1920 to German concepts of the university. What started out as a progressive educational instrument, aimed at the workforce and heavily dependent on the skill of its few popular orators, entered into a crisis in the late 1890s and was revived only when Louis Reber, a German-trained engineer, took charge. He installed a centralized, bureaucratic structure, drawing heavily on German ideals of the state universities as central authorities in the production of knowledge. The concept proved to be viable and was adopted by numerous other American states. Andreas Westerwinter recounted the complex makings of American “New Psychology” between 1870 and 1910. A slow shift from German to French paradigms of research and educational institutionalization corresponded to generational differences among American psychologists and, notably, generational differences in interests and outlooks among American graduate students at Wilhelm Wundt’s famous laboratory in Leipzig. The faithful transfer and even the acceptance of German-style research could by no means be taken for granted. On the contrary, a selective and idiosyncratic reception enabled American universities to generate considerable creative potentials of their own.

Individuals often faced epistemological and ethical conundrums. Should a search for truth be displaced by a focus on the coherence and consistency of scientific research? Could the public duties of an American citizen be reconciled with the self-referentiality of modern science? Chris-
toph Strupp took a close look at the career of Andrew D. White, the founding president of Cornell University since 1868. A number of crucial problems of the time are epitomized in this case. The moral duties of the cultivated gentleman had to be aligned with a focus on the practical value of education and a tendency of expert cultures to withdraw into secluded niches of specialization. During an extended stay in Europe (1853–56), White had discovered his love for historical scholarship, but his lack of formal training and his energetic personality prevented him from becoming a specialist in a narrow sub-field of the discipline. Until his death in 1917, he was a wanderer between the worlds of scholarship, university administration, politics, business, and the American diplomatic service. His progressive and present-minded concept of history, his interest in educating future public leaders, and his anti-sectarian position with regard to higher education all heavily influenced the educational program of Cornell University. Even though not completely untouched by European influences, it became a university with a specifically American character that tried to respond to the problems of American higher education and the demands of a changing American society.

David Cahan investigated the eminent German physicist Hermann von Helmholtz and his influence on American graduate students and scholars studying and doing research with him at his prestigious physics institutes in Heidelberg (1863–71) and Berlin (1878–94). With inspirational force—and a remarkable command of English, which was superior to his American students’ command of German—Helmholtz managed to combine the expertise of the specialist and a drive towards intellectual unity. Helmholtz’s name gained fame beyond Germany early on, through translations of his popular public lectures and his membership in the American Academy of Science (1868). Even though his qualities as a teacher are disputed, his institutes were “networking arenas” of crucial importance for foreign students and scientists. Here they could pursue their research in total academic freedom. Cahan showed in detail how most of Helmholtz’s American students, among them Henry Rowland (later a physicist at Johns Hopkins University), Dewitt Bristol Brace (University of Nebraska), and Michael Pupin (Columbia University), pursued distinguished careers in the United States.

In his presentation on Henry Adams, Philipp Loeser argued that despite Adams’s key position in the formation of history as an academic discipline in the United States (Adams conducted the first graduate seminar in medieval history in the early 1870s and was a pioneer in archival studies), he was not the founding father of American history departments that some historical accounts have claimed him to be. Adams took modernist uncertainties very seriously and underwent a shift from scientific to aesthetically based thinking, most profoundly expressed in his well-
known autobiography *The Education of Henry Adams*. Adams admired and benefited from the German model of scholarship, but he could not fully appreciate the drive toward specialization and lack of general inspiration in the individual disciplines.

Jeffrey Sklansky examined G. Stanley Hall, the founder of child and educational psychology in the United States, and his recasting of pertinent problems of modernization in terms of educational reform. Hall reevaluated social conflicts, such as the diminishing of the eighteenth-century ideal of the masterful self, the deepening divide between mental and manual labor through processes of specialization, and the abstention of the researcher from political and moral problems, as the “growing pains of a nation coming of age.” He viewed this dualistically as a development from childhood to adulthood and from savagery to civilization. His studies in Berlin and Leipzig in the late 1860s and 1870s convinced him that German “scientific philosophy” and the educational system of the Bismarck state—with its research universities and compulsory primary schools—might prove valuable for the development of an American people still immature in its reaction towards modernity. He hoped for a reconciliation of intellect and willpower, empirical learning and spiritual growth with recourse to German moral responsibility and totalizing world views.

Significantly, most case studies dealt with Americans who had gained academic experience in Germany and then returned to the United States. This certainly reflects on the United States’ lack of appeal for educated Europeans. But nevertheless some German academics went to the U.S. Thomas A. Howard’s presentation on “German Theological Wissenschaft in America” argued persuasively that several cultural mediators of the nineteenth century brought a significant amount of German theology to the United States and successfully complemented the transfer of secularized German Wissenschaft with religious impulses, however controversial at the time. In Germany itself, theologians easily managed to integrate new scientific approaches and remained culturally influential throughout the entire nineteenth century. In America, next to Edward Robinson, who spent four years at German universities in the late 1820s, it was primarily the theologian Philip Schaff who acted as driving force and self-proclaimed “missionary of science.” Schaff had been born in Switzerland but was educated at German universities. In 1844 he took up a teaching position at the seminary of the German Reformed Church in Mercersburg, Pennsylvania, and moved to the Union Theological Seminary in New York in 1870. He saw himself as a mediator between German academic culture and the American tradition of political liberty and religious voluntarism. Although he was a leading exponent of modern scientific church and religious history at American universities, he re-
mained equally committed to orthodox protestantism and Christian values and attempted to harmonize science and belief.

Eckhardt Fuchs chose the 1904 Universal Exposition at St. Louis as the starting point for observations on contemporary theories of knowledge transfer and practices of intercultural exchange. A “Congress of Arts and Science” that included German professors from a variety of disciplines had been structurally outlined by the Harvard psychology professor Hugo Münsterberg. It turned out to suffer heavily from translation problems and inabilities to enter into a dialogue on both the German and the American side. Münsterberg’s notion of a “double entry” into both cultures at the same time did not pay off, nor did the fiction of the “impartial observer” prove productive in a communicative context that depended on stereotypical complexity reductions.

All the papers inspired lively discussions, further stimulated by insightful commentaries on the presentations of Sklansky, Howard, and Loeser by Dorothy Ross and Frank Trommler. The conference benefited greatly from the broad spectrum of disciplines from the humanities and the natural and social sciences that were discussed. Comparisons could be drawn and connections became visible that are otherwise easily overlooked. The final discussion revolved around questions of terminology, periodization, and the driving forces behind processes of cultural transfer and institutional change. The expert clearly is a social type that developed in the late nineteenth century, but he is difficult to distinguish from the specialist and the professional and needs further terminological clarification. Everybody also agreed that the beginning of the German influence in American culture and its intensity varies from discipline to discipline. Whether influential individuals managed to introduce new subjects and methodologies on their own or whether they acted as agents of larger cultural trends needs further in-depth research. The biographical approach of the conference helped to keep the papers focused, but it is certainly not the only possible approach. It is equally difficult to measure the results of processes of cultural transfer in terms of success or failure. Sidelines and dead ends must be taken into consideration. It was not the goal of the conference to come to conclusive results at this point, but rather to contribute through a fresh perspective to an on-going debate in one of the most interesting subfields of the history of science. This was certainly achieved and the conveners are looking forward to further exploration in follow-up projects.

Philipp Loeser
and Christoph Strupp
EIGHTH TRANSATLANTIC DOCTORAL SEMINAR:
GERMAN HISTORY, 1945–1990

Seminar hosted by the Zentrum für Zeitgeschichtliche Forschung (ZZF), Potsdam, May 1–4, 2002. Co-sponsored by the GHI and the BMW Center for German and European Studies, Georgetown University. Conveners: Roger Chickering (Georgetown University) and Richard F. Wetzel (GHI). Moderators: Andreas Daum (Harvard University), Manfred Görtemaker (Universität Potsdam), Elizabeth Heineman (University of Iowa), Ulrich Herbert (Universität Freiburg), Konrad Jarausch (ZZF), Christoph Kleßmann (ZZF).

For the eighth time, the Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar in German History brought together sixteen doctoral students from North America and from Germany to present and discuss their dissertation projects with one another and with faculty mentors from both sides of the Atlantic. Since this year’s seminar was dedicated to German history from 1945 to 1990, it also had the virtue of bringing together historians working on West Germany with those working on East Germany. It was graciously hosted by the Zentrum für Zeitgeschichtliche Forschung (ZZF) in Potsdam. The seminar began with an opening lecture from the co-director of the ZZF, Prof. Konrad Jarausch, on “A Double Burden: The Politics of the Past and German Identity,” in which he explored the connections between the debates about the East German and Nazi dictatorships and argued that Germany’s culture of historical self-criticism ought to be balanced with a historical sense of Germany’s positive accomplishments in order to allow a “democratic patriotism” to develop.

The first panel brought together two papers that examined the early postwar histories of East Germany and Poland in comparative perspective. Jan Behrend’s paper examined the history of propaganda in East Germany and Poland from 1944/45 to 1957, focusing on the question to what extent the propaganda strategies of the two regimes succeeded in creating Vertrauen (trust) in the regime among the population. Although the nature of the available sources makes it difficult to assess the reception and effectiveness of propaganda efforts, Behrends argued that sudden changes in propaganda strategy, which occurred in both countries, led to irritated reactions in the population. The lack of open communication, he concluded, meant that “Soviet-type” systems suffered from a very limited scope of Vertrauen. David Tompkins compared the early history of music festivals in the GDR and Poland, from 1948 to 1957. Music, he argued, was a key element in the communist parties’ “softer” forms of control. The communist parties in both countries sought to har-
nass music for ideological purposes by pushing for “socialist-realist” music, but encountered some resistance from composers interested in more avant-garde “formalist” works and from audiences who could simply leave concert halls empty if the musical program strayed too far from popular tastes. On balance, the SED was more successful in imposing its vision than the communist party in Poland, where composers gained considerable autonomy after 1953. The first panel’s discussion focused on the difficulties of determining popular attitudes in dictatorial regimes and of distinguishing between pragmatic adaptation and genuine consent; differences between Vertrauen and other forms of legitimacy; and the importance of negotiations over the meaning of terms like “socialist realism.”

The second panel dealt with West German history during the 1960s and 1970s. Peter Kramper’s paper examined the history of the trade-union-owned “Neue Heimat” and its transformation, over the course of the 1960s, from a developer of housing projects into a Städtebaukonzern, a company involved in urban development more generally. This transformation, Kramper argued, was both the last initiative that the Neue Heimat legitimated in terms of “meeting demand” (Bedarfsdeckung) and its first step toward assuming a particular role in the social market economy. Keith Alexander’s paper dealt with the increasing acceptance of parliamentary democracy in the West German left by examining how one of the “K-Groups,” the antiparliamentary, revolutionary KPD-Rote Fahne, came to join in the formation of a parliamentary party, Berlin’s Alternative Liste, which ran in the 1979 election and entered the West Berlin Abgeordnetenhaus the same year. The ensuing discussion raised several important issues: whether the papers demonstrated the increasing acceptance of parliamentary democracy (by the K-Groups) and the market economy (by the Neue Heimat); whether the transformation of the K-Groups should be attributed primarily to the appeal of parliamentary democracy or to the biographical path of K-Group members; the relative weight of ideology and biography in the history of the K-Groups; and whether the reasons for the urban-development ambitions of the Neue Heimat included political hostility to the architecture of the Kaiserreich and a process of Verwissenschaftlichung.

The third panel examined two different kinds of cross-border traffic. Simone Derix’s paper analyzed the role of images (Bilder) in official state visits in West Germany in the 1950s. The Federal Republic might have seemed short on symbols because it cultivated a “pathos of soberness” that was designed to project distance from the pomp of the Nazi regime. Nevertheless, in its arrangements for state visits, Derix argued, the Federal Republic sought to promote two images in particular: Germany’s successful rebuilding, visualized through visits to model factories, and
the division of Germany, visualized through visits to Berlin. In her paper, Edith Sheffer offered a “microhistory of German division” by examining the border relations between two neighboring Franconian towns (Sonnewerth and Neustadt) that became separated by the inter-German border. Exploding the myth that the border was fortified by the East against Western objections, Sheffer showed that the German population and the occupying forces on both sides contributed to making the border increasingly impermeable for a variety of reasons, including both economic self-interest and hostility toward refugees on the Western side. The discussion raised the questions of how one can combine cultural and political history, and to what extent both papers represented new approaches to writing the history of the Cold War.

The fourth panel dealt with two instances of “social engineering” in West and East Germany. Ruth Rosenberger’s paper studied the entry of industrial psychologists (Betriebspsychologen) and human resources specialists (Personalexperten) into West German companies during the period 1945–1975 as an instance of the scientization (Verwissenschaftlichung) of the social. The impact of these experts, Rosenberger argued, was Janus-faced. On the one hand, management used psychological expertise to rationalize production; on the other hand, the principle of dialogical communication that these experts promoted also had the potential to humanize the workplace. The second paper, by Gregory Witkowski, also dealt with the arrival of a new actor in an economic institution: in this case, the arrival of industrial workers on East German collective farms. Examining the East German campaign to recruit industrial workers to work on farms during the 1950s, Witkowski demonstrated how the various interests of the participants—workers and farmers—consistently frustrated the state’s planning goals. The GDR, he argued, is best understood as an “educational dictatorship,” whose power was limited by a measure of Eigen-Sinn—individual interests rather than outright resistance—of the population. In the discussion, it was argued that both papers dealt with processes of modernization that addressed specifically German deficits: hierarchical structures in industrial enterprises and an insufficiently modernized agricultural sector. It was also suggested that the interest of enterprises in human-resources specialists fluctuated with the labor market. Finally, the question was asked: Did these papers suggest that West German methods of social engineering were sophisticated (wrapping rationalization in the mantle of humanization), whereas East German methods were generally clumsy and therefore ineffective?

The fifth panel brought together two papers on history and memory in East Germany. David Marshall presented an overview of his dissertation on East Berlin’s Museum für deutsche Geschichte. In the 1950s and 1960s, Marshall argued, the museum focused primarily on German na-
tional history and engaged in harsh Cold War rhetoric against West Germany. After 1970, the museum shifted its focus toward international socialism, emphasized German-Soviet relations, and started to promote a “separate GDR historical identity.” In his paper, Jon Berndt Olsen examined three examples of early East German “memory work”: the reconstruction of the Gedenkstätte der Sozialisten in the Friedrichsfelde cemetery, designed to link the SED to the tradition of the German labor movement; the centennial commemoration of the 1848 Revolution, which stressed supposed analogies between 1848 and the current situation in Germany; and the 1948 traveling exhibit “The Other Germany,” which portrayed the SED’s current struggle as an extension of the fight against fascism. In sum, Olsen argued, the SED attempted to appropriate existing “memory rituals” and to “transfer the counter-memory of a select group of individuals onto the collective memory” of the East German population. The ensuing discussion called attention to: the fact that the politics of history and memory in both Germanies were always shaped by competition between the two German states; the need to analyze the interaction of public memory culture and the development of history as a discipline; and the benefits of moving beyond national histories when studying the politics of history.

The sixth panel addressed two important aspects of social and economic life in East Germany. According to Molly Wilkinson Johnson, the SED regarded organized sports as an important tool for building a “socialist culture” (defined by “productivity, health, and military preparedness”) and for “structuring the leisure time” of its citizens. Examining the campaign to mobilize the Leipzig population for “voluntary work actions” to build a sports stadium, she argued that the campaign’s success demonstrated the GDR’s “progress in fostering citizens’ identification with the state,” but also observed that the available sources make it difficult to determine people’s motivations for participating in such campaigns. Philipp Heldmann examined GDR consumer goods policy during the 1960s, using the example of clothing. His analysis stressed four “weaknesses” of the regime: the leadership’s policies were often contradictory; the bureaucracy often did not implement the leadership’s wishes; the planning bureaucracy had limited control over the economy; and, finally, the regime depended on a measure of cooperation from the population—and was keenly aware that the availability of certain consumer goods was crucial to secure such cooperation. Heldmann concluded that far from being dictated from above, consumer goods policy was characterized by a fair amount of “bargaining” and “negotiation” among different actors, including the population. The discussion suggested that the different goals of the regime’s sports policy—creating socialist personalities, structuring leisure time, and training a corps of athletes for the
Olympics—might have been in tension with one another and raised the question how changes in priority changed sports policy over time. The discussion also addressed the question whether the notion of “weaknesses” of the regime was useful for analyzing the GDR.

The seventh panel examined two aspects of Vergangenheitsbewältigung—coming to terms with the Nazi past—in West Germany. Jürgen Zieher’s paper examined how the legacy of the Holocaust was dealt with in Dortmund, Düsseldorf, and Cologne from 1945 to 1960. Public commemoration of the Holocaust, he showed, was mostly limited to the Jewish communities in these cities and a very small, but active non-Jewish section of the public. Most of the population and city officials were silent about the murder of the Jews. Local officials became more willing to participate in commemorations of the Holocaust in the second half of the 1950s, but they did this in order to make a superficial peace with the survivors and to absolve themselves, rather than to honestly confront their history. Daniel Morat’s paper provided an overview of his dissertation about Martin Heidegger, Ernst Jünger, and Friedrich Georg Jünger and how these intellectuals dealt with the Nazi past—and their own role in it—after 1945. Morat argued that after 1945 all three thinkers managed to distance themselves from National Socialism by reinterpreting their relationship to technological modernity, which they now interpreted as part of an “age of nihilism.” In the biographical crisis situation they faced after 1945, this intellectual strategy allowed them to relativize the importance of National Socialism, which became merely one instance of the more general phenomenon of nihilism, and to recast their own role as that of intellectuals who were working to overcome this nihilism by acting as “seismographs.” The discussion raised a number of issues: Did the papers assume a normative path of Vergangenheitsbewältigung? If so, it was suggested, one ought to examine the social function of Verdrängung (repression), which might have been necessary after 1945. There also was a debate about the terms “Conservative Revolution” and Abstandsdenken, which can be seen as tainted by their apologetic use and implications.

The last panel was devoted to two aspects of West German reactions to the constant threat of war—nuclear war in particular—during the Cold War. Nicholas Steneck’s paper examined the origins of West Germany’s first civil defense law, which was passed in 1957. Tracing the interaction of expert planners, parliamentary politics, and public opinion in the shaping of civil policy, Steneck argued that the civil defense law of 1957 was deeply flawed. Its mandates remained unfunded because the Adenauer government was unwilling to commit sufficient federal funds and sought to shift the costs to the private sector and to state and local governments; and the content of the civil defense plans (which contained no provisions for mass evacuations) showed that the civil defense planners were still
fighting the last war and failed to take the nuclear threat seriously. As a result, critics charged that the law simply provided an illusion of civil defense rather than any actual protection. Katrin Köhl presented an overview of her comparative study of the development of “conflict resolution studies” in the U.S. and Friedens- und Konfliktforschung in West Germany. Using the concept of Erfahrungsgeschichte, Köhl argued that once the immense stockpile of weapons of mass destruction in East and West were experienced as creating a situation of permanent danger, research on war and peace underwent a major shift, which took the form of two different Denkstile (styles of thought) in the U.S. and Germany. In the U.S., the desire to expand the room for manoeuver in international relations led political scientists to move beyond the conceptual dichotomy of “war” and “peace” by focusing on “conflict” and “conflict resolution,” and the question of how to create an international system of arms control. West German research, by contrast, was shaped by the perception that the nuclear threat had eliminated all room for manoeuver in politics, which led West German political scientists to stress the danger of a superpower “pax atomica” and to develop the notion of organisierte Friedlosigkeit—a state that was neither war nor peace—as a key concept in West German peace research. The discussion focused on: the pros and cons of Erfahrungsgeschichte; the relevance of the fact that West Germany and the U.S. did not experience a “hot” war after 1945; the role of Friedensforschung as a weapon in the Cold War; and the importance of the Korean War and the German Atomdebatte for both civil defense debates and peace research.

Like most of the seminar, the concluding discussion was characterized by lively debate. The suggestion that the papers on East Germany had mostly been narratives of failure and those on West Germany mostly narratives of success met with disagreement from most participants, who insisted that the papers on both German states told more complicated stories. Several authors of papers on the early period of the GDR observed that they were primarily interested in explaining the stability of the system for forty years rather than its failure. It also became clear that the division between German and American participants had turned out to be less important than the division between those working on the West Germany and those working on East Germany. Significantly, even though several papers presented comparative studies, no one presented comparisons between the two German states. Whether they were working on the FRG or the GDR, most participants reported that they knew little about research on the “other” German state and were glad that the TDS had brought those working on West and East Germany together. The differences between American and German dissertation topics noted at previous seminars had diminished. Whereas in previous years cultural history was mostly an American enterprise, cultural history was well
represented among this year’s German papers as well. One crucial difference between the two academic cultures was repeatedly noted, however: the existence of temporary Sonderforschungsbereiche at German universities. Several of the German dissertations presented were part of Sonderforschungsbereiche on particular topics and reflected these affiliations in their conceptual frameworks. Finally, it was observed that the papers and the discussions were remarkably unideological. The great debates in German historiography, which were often about causality and hence about ideology, were clearly a matter of the past for the new generation of German historians. The participants seemed primarily interested in writing studies that draw a complex picture of postwar German history. This made for interesting papers and a great experience of genuine intellectual exchange at the seminar.

Richard F. Wetzell

Participants and Their Topics

KEITH ALEXANDER (University of Maryland), The K-Groups and the Alternative Liste Berlin

JAN BEHRENDTS (Universität Bielefeld), Erfundene Freundschaft. Eine vergleichende Studie zur Propagandageschichte in der Volksrepublik Polen und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (1944–1957)

SIMONE DERIX (Universität Köln), Performative Politik. Die ‘Bilder’ der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in den Staatsbesuchen der 1950er Jahre

PHILIPP HELDMANN (Universität Köln), Herrschaft, Wirtschaft, Anoraks. Konsumpolitik in der DDR der Sechzigerjahre am Beispiel Bekleidung

MOLLY WILKINSON JOHNSON (University of Illinois, Urbana), Voluntary Campaigns, Sports, and Mass Participation in the ‘Building of Socialism’ in Leipzig in the 1950s

KATRIN KÖHL (Universität Tübingen), Kriegserfahrung und Friedensforschung. Die Entstehung der Friedens- und Konfliktforschung in den USA und Westdeutschland in der Situation des Kalten Krieges

PETER KRAMPER (Universität Freiburg), ‘Dienst am Fortschritt’: Die NEUE HEIMAT auf dem Weg zum Städtebau 1962–1969

DAVID MARSHALL (University of California, Riverside), Das Museum für Deutsche Geschichte: A Study of History and Identity in the German Democratic Republic, 1952–1970

DANIEL MORAT (Universität Göttingen), Seismographen der Technik? Martin Heidegger, die Brüder Jünger und der lange Abschied vom Nationalsozialismus

JON OLSEN (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill), Mobilizing Memory and Tailoring Truth in the SBZ
RUTH ROSENBERGER (Universität Trier), Psychologen und Personalpolitik in westdeutschen Unternehmen 1945–1975

EDITH SHEFFER (University of California, Berkeley), Checkpoint Burned Bridge: The Cold War over the Green Border, 1945–52

NICHOLAS STENECK (Ohio State University), Protecting the Population: West Germany and the 1. ZBG, 1950–1957

DAVID TOMPKINS (Columbia University), Mobilization, Control and Ideological Formation: Music Festivals in the GDR and Poland

GREGORY WITKOWSKI (University at Buffalo), Planned Perceptions: State Policy and Personal Interests in the Socialist Transformation of the East German Countryside

JÜRGEN ZIEHER (TU Berlin), Erinnern versus Verdrängen. Der Umgang mit dem Holocaust in Dortmund, Düsseldorf und Köln von 1945 bis 1960
JOHN F. KENNEDY AND BERLIN:
FROM THE WALL TO THE 1963 VISIT


The question, or more correctly, the permanent crisis surrounding the city of Berlin played a central role in John F. Kennedy’s short presidency, all the way from the 1961 building of the wall to his triumphant 1963 visit. Commemorating the latter in the lead-up to its upcoming fortieth anniversary, the Goethe Institute in Washington put on display the photo exhibit “JFK in Germany” from April 2 to May 31, 2002. In conjunction with the Goethe Institute, the GHI and the Chancellor Willy Brandt Foundation (Berlin) organized a public discussion with Egon Bahr on May 8.

During the cold war tensions in the decisive early 1960s, Egon Bahr, the later architect of West Germany’s Ostpolitik, was Press Secretary and a close confidant of West Berlin’s mayor Willy Brandt in the city hall of Berlin-Schöneberg. Welcomed by Werner Ott (Goethe Institute), Christof Mauch (GHI) and Gerhard Groß (Willy Brandt Foundation) and moderated by Bernd Schäfer (GHI), Egon Bahr related his experiences with Kennedy and U.S. foreign policy to a large and highly attentive audience in the Goethe Institut.

In a captivating narrative Bahr laid out the dramatic unfolding of events in Berlin between August 12–20, 1961 from the perspective of Willy Brandt and his advisers. Bahr focused on the German perception of American reactions to the encircling of West Berlin by a barbed wire fence, which was to be replaced three days later by the construction of a concrete wall. Describing the astonishment of the West Berliners, including their political leadership, about the seeming passivity and equanimity of President John F. Kennedy in the face of this East German answer to the refugee stream into West Berlin, Bahr prepared the ground for his explanation of how West Germans had to come to terms with the realpolitik of the superpowers.

In fact, this prevalent cold war pattern was a self-protecting mechanism to avert a “hot war,” which would inevitably have gone nuclear on a battlefield like Europe. The Germans in West and East, as well as informed politicians like Brandt and Bahr, were apparently not aware how dangerous the “Second Berlin Crisis,” instigated by the GDR and the Soviet Union in 1958, had become by mid-1961. The meaning of John F. Kennedy’s sigh of relief, “a wall is a hell of a lot better than a war,” entered West German minds with considerable delay, if at all.
From Willy Brandt’s fury after his return from the Western Allies’ Berlin headquarters (“they are all cowards”), to the West Berliners barely getting used to the permanence of a fortified border towards East Berlin and the GDR, to the visit of U.S. Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson handing over a letter from President Kennedy and asking where to buy Brandt’s slippers, Bahr depicted, in sometimes drastic terms, the story of how West German politicians learned a stern lesson: The major nuclear powers were not willing to risk a confrontation over German reunification. What is more, for an indefinite period, they regarded the division of Germany as an element of stability in Europe as long as ideological tensions and an arms race between the U.S.S.R and the U.S. persisted.

In order to overcome German division in the long run, West Germans had to take initiatives of their own to promote accommodation with Moscow and Eastern Europe and at the same time lay the foundations for gradual changes within the Eastern bloc to make borders more transparent. In his narrative, Egon Bahr subsequently portrayed the lessons from this week in August 1961 as the tentative beginning of what would two years later evolve into Ostpolitik inspired by his own “change through rapprochement” speech in Tutzing in 1963. During this process Kennedy and his administration, for both of whom Egon Bahr had high praise, supported prospective European leaders like Willy Brandt. In order to change the stalemate of the status quo in Europe and tackle the “German question,” the Germans themselves had to adapt to realpolitik. This meant nothing less than to accept the status quo for the time being and to strive peacefully to modify it in the distant future.

In his remarks, Egon Bahr anecdotically confirmed the contemporary notion of a striking connection between the personalities of the U.S. President and West Berlin’s mayor, culminating in Kennedy’s triumphant visit to West Berlin in June 1963. From his personal perspective, Bahr described the relationship with the Kennedy administration as the best that a West German government ever had with a Washington government led by Democrats. Usually Bonn governments got along better with Republicans, Bahr opined, citing his close and confidential exchanges with Henry Kissinger and his staff after 1969. Quite in contrast to the years 1961–1963, however, Brandt’s and Bahr’s appreciation for Washington was, to put it mildly, not met with reciprocity by President Richard Nixon.

Egon Bahr’s sometimes stunning and always lively presentation on the formative period of post-1961 American-German relations was received with great applause. A reception followed where many old friends from Washington were eager to meet the German politician, who had truly shaped German history and German-American relations over the course of his political career – and, besides, had just turned 80 in April 2002.

Bernd Schäfer
American Détenente and German Ostpolitik, 1969–1972

Conference at the GHI, May 9 and 10, 2002. Co-sponsored by the Bundeskanzler-Willy-Brandt-Stiftung, Berlin, the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), Washington D.C., and the Parallel History Project on NATO and Warsaw Pact (PHP), Washington D.C./Zurich/Vienna/Florence/Oslo. Conveners: Bernd Schäfer (GHI) and Carsten Tessmer (Bundeskanzler-Willy-Brandt-Stiftung). Participants: Egon Bahr (Bonn), David Binder (New York Times), Chen Jian (University of Virginia), Jonathan Dean (Union of Concerned Scientists), David C. Geyer (U.S. Department of State), Hope M. Harrison (George Washington University), Wjatscheslaw Keworkow (Bonn), Melvyn P. Leffler (University of Virginia), Vojtech Mastny (PHP, National Security Archive), Christof Mauch (GHI), Gottfried Niedhart (Universität Mannheim), Christian Ostermann (CWIHP, Woodrow Wilson International Center), Mary E. Sarotte (Cambridge University, UK), Douglas E. Selvage (U.S. Department of State), Kenneth N. Skoug (Alexandria, VA), Helmut Sonnenfeldt (The Brookings Institution), James S. Sutterlin (International Studies at Yale University).

On the night of the West German election in September 1969, U.S. President Richard Nixon called Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger in Bonn and prematurely congratulated him on his electoral victory. But since the CDU/CSU, which the White House regarded as their “friends” in Germany, failed to win an absolute majority of seats in parliament, a SPD/FDP coalition headed by Willy Brandt came to power, much to the consternation of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. This new government soon started foreign policy initiatives and negotiations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, leading to highly contentious domestic debates in West Germany and finally to the ratification of treaties with Moscow, Warsaw, and East Berlin in 1972/1973. The architect, promoter, and chief executor of this self-reliant and assertive new German Ostpolitik was Egon Bahr, Minister of State at the German Federal Chancellery throughout Willy Brandt’s chancellorship from 1969 to 1974. This Ostpolitik changed the dynamics of German-American relations. Reactions within the frequently baffled Nixon administration ranged from serious reservations in the White House to solid support in the State Department. Initially, the American government, which had pursued its own tactical “detente” with Moscow before Brandt came into power, had not been enthusiastic about similar activities by European allies. These were regarded as rival concepts coming into conflict with U.S. policy. This pat-
tern was modified, however, when the Nixon White House became so entangled in “linkages” and “reverse linkages” with Moscow and Beijing, that West Germany’s treaties with the East and a quadripartite agreement on Berlin became identical with U.S. interests in 1971/72.

Commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of the dramatic weeks of April and May 1972, when Willy Brandt barely survived a no-confidence motion and secured the parliamentary passage of the treaties with the East (Ostverträge) a few weeks later, the GHI and the Bundeskanzler-Willy-Brandt-Stiftung hosted a two-day conference with an international group of scholars and contemporary participants in the events. Co-sponsoring this event and furthering its outreach into the scholarly “cold war history community” were the Washington-based Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP) at the National Security Archive and the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) at the Woodrow Wilson International Center. The conference participants were welcomed by Christof Mauch (GHI) and Gerhard Groß (Bundeskanzler-Willy-Brandt-Stiftung) on behalf of the hosts, Vojtech Mastny (PHP) and Christian Ostermann (CWIHP) for the co-sponsors, and by Bernd Schäfer (GHI) for the conveners.

The first day of the conference was devoted to presentations by scholars, followed by discussions with the audience, in which many of the contemporary participants present shared their impressions with the historians. The morning session began with a paper by Hope M. Harrison on the significance of the 1961 construction of the Berlin Wall. She convincingly outlined the U.S. commitment to West, not East Berlin and the implied recognition of a Soviet sphere of influence. This led to long-lasting effects on certain West German political leaders and paved the way for Ostpolitik many years later. Vojtech Mastny placed the Brandt/Bahr negotiations between 1969 and 1972 into the wider context of superpower relations by presenting a critical assessment of U.S. realpolitik concerning relations with the Soviet Union during those years. Whereas the Nixon administration reassured the USSR that it would respect its sphere of influence in Europe, the Western European advocates of détente pursued a potentially destabilizing policy towards the East by emphasizing bilateral treaties and multilateral endeavours like the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Chen Jian gave a vivid description of the “Chinese factor” by analyzing Mao’s motives for the Chinese-American rapprochement of 1971/72 and pointing out the distracting effect this historic turnaround had on the Soviet Union. In fact, the Chinese “threat,” as it was perceived in Moscow, alleviated Soviet concerns about accommodation with West Germany and Western Europe and instigated a policy favorable towards “détente” in Europe. How all these international strategic implications came into play over Germany,
was demonstrated by David C. Geyer’s analysis of the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin. Drawing extensively on U.S. sources that were declassified over the last few years, he showed how the White House used backchannels not just to outmaneuver the State Department, but also to secretly negotiate with the Soviets and the West Germans on an unprecidented diplomatic level. This session was moderated and concluded by Melvyn P. Leffler, who presented an assessment of the U.S. policy of détente, which he considered just another form of “containment,” but now undertaken from an American position of extreme “weakness” due to the Vietnam involvement and domestic political factors.

The afternoon session, chaired by Gottfried Niedhart, focussed on the content and origins of the actual Ostverträge. Whereas Carsten Tessmer highlighted the first cornerstone of this complex, the 1970 Moscow Treaty with its mutual renunciation of force, Douglas E. Selvage discussed the trials and tribulations of Warsaw’s Władysław Gomułka in his relations with East Berlin and Moscow since the early 1960s on the basis of Polish sources. The discriminations that the Poles were experiencing from their Western and Eastern neighbours, who were nominally their allies, finally pushed them into economic rapprochement with West Germany and the 1970 Warsaw Treaty in order to preserve precarious stability at home. Mary E. Sarotte had to cancel her appearance but forwarded her paper on “International Politics and the Basic Treaty,“ which was read to the audience. Sarotte credited Western policymakers with helping to ease the Cold War division of Europe by obtaining East German signatures on the Basic Treaty, thus skillfully playing upon public relations and, most of all, the Sino-Soviet conflict. Bernd Schäfer shed light on the intense domestic debate over Ostpolitik by focussing on the relationship between the CDU/CDU opposition parties and the Nixon administration. Stressing the “traditional friendship” between American governments and the CDU/CSU, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger sought to stay neutral on Bonn’s partisan quarrels in public, even as they quietly hoped for a political alternative to Willy Brandt. In an ironic twist, however, in the end they needed Brandt’s foreign policy success in order to pursue their agenda of Nixon’s reelection. As a result, Bonn’s opposition leader, Rainer Barzel, who had extremely close ties with U.S. officials, learned painful lessons in Washington’s realpolitik.

On the second day, an attentive audience enjoyed the privilege of listening to often revealing statements by former political actors on the Ostpolitik stage from West Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States. David Binder, the Bonn Correspondent for the New York Times between 1967 and 1973, moderated the morning session and introduced Egon Bahr, Willy Brandt’s chief negotiator of the treaties with Moscow,
Warsaw, and East Berlin. Bahr gave a lively and personal overview of Ostpolitik from its beginnings in the 1960s all the way through German unification in 1989/90. Attending every session of the conference, he frequently enlightened participants with his insightful comments drawing on his wealth of experience in diplomatic negotiations. He was followed by Wjatscheslaw Keworkow, a retired general of the Committee for State Security (KGB) of the Soviet Union. In front of a U.S. audience for the first time, this Russian participant, who long stayed out of the public spotlight for obvious reasons, discussed his mission as KGB chief Yurij Andropov’s liaison to the Bonn government and Egon Bahr in the years after 1969. This secret channel between the Soviet and West German governments, which Moscow had established to bypass the parallel structures of official foreign office diplomacy, remained intact in different forms until 1990.

The German and Soviet perspectives were followed by four statements from former high-ranking officials in the competing Washington foreign-policy bureaucracies of the White House and the State Department. Opening the field was Helmut Sonnenfeldt, formerly Senior Staff Member at the National Security Council (NSC) and a close confidant of Henry Kissinger’s in German as well as European and Soviet affairs. Unfortunately Martin J. Hillenbrand, former Assistant Secretary of State and Ambassador to Germany, had to cancel his participation. The State Department perspective on Ostpolitik and the inner tensions of the administration were nonetheless vividly presented by James S. Sutterlin and Kenneth N. Skoug, who, respectively, served as Director and Deputy Director at the German desk of the Bureau of European Affairs in the State Department. The panel concluded with a presentation by Jonathan S. Dean, who had been an extremely well-informed officer at the U.S. Embassy in Bonn due to his excellent contacts with German politicians on all sides of the partisan divide.

These statements as well as parts of the discussion from the second conference day were taped with the consent of the participants, who rewarded the audience with insightful and, for the most part, frank assessments and narratives. Since bringing together historians and contemporary historical actors is always a risky experiment, the organizers were particularly happy that the conference was a success. The conference proceedings as well as excerpts of the transcripts will be published as a GHI in-house publication and will also be posted on the webpages of the PHP and CWIHP.

Bernd Schäfer
SUMMER SEMINAR IN GERMANY 2002

For the tenth time since 1990, the GHI, with the generous financial and administrative support of the German Department at the University of Wisconsin–Madison and the Nanovic Institute for European Studies at the University of Notre Dame, held its Summer Seminar in Germany for advanced graduate students. Between June 2 and June 15, thirteen participants from eight American universities and from five different disciplines attended events aimed at preparing them for their prospective dissertation research trips. The group visited research institutions in four different German cities and had conversations with German and American scholars about research methods and working in German archives and libraries.

As in the past three years, the program began its itinerary in Koblenz. The Landeshauptarchiv of the state of Rheinland-Pfalz served as our home base. Students spent five mornings working through historical documents written in old German script. The instructor for this intensive exercise was the inimitable Walter Rummel, who took the students through the paces of deciphering and decoding handwritten documents from the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries. During the first week, the participants also visited the Bundesarchiv, where Tilman Koops introduced the Reichskammergericht collection and Hans-Dieter Kreikamp gave us a tour of the impressive facilities on the Karthause.

Philipp Gassert of the University of Heidelberg joined us in the middle of the week to discuss his current research project, a biography of former West German chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger. Gassert’s presentation was meant to explore the methods and methodology of writing contemporary history, as well as answer students’ questions about working in archives and tracking down elusive sources.

The last item on the week’s agenda was a trip to Mannheim and the Deutsches Spracharchiv. Here, Peter Wagener introduced us to a database of recordings of German dialects and speech patterns, accessible in part through the Internet. Since the middle of the last century, linguists have collected bits and pieces of spoken German from throughout the country. It proved fascinating to listen to these “speech events” and to rediscover the variety of spoken German, something often lost sight of in the era of Denglish.

On Saturday the group relocated downriver to Cologne. That afternoon we met with Norbert Finzsch, a professor at the University of Cologne, and one of his graduate students, Eva Bischoff. The campus of the university was unusually quiet on account of an ongoing student strike.
that was protesting the proposed introduction of student fees at universities in the state of Nordrhein-Westfalen. A Ph.D. student, Bischoff presented her dissertation project, titled “Menschenfresser – Totmacher: Zur Genealogie von Alterität zwischen 1900 und 1933.” Bischoff is looking at the history and societal discourse surrounding a group of criminals in the Weimar Republic, who were accused of cannibalism (“white cannibals”). Following the presentation, the group engaged in a lively discussion of the topic and the methods and theory involved.

On Monday we spent the day at the Historisches Archiv der Stadt Köln where archivists Eberhard Illner and Joachim Deeters were our hosts. In our tour of this extensive and venerable archive, we learned about how a modern city archive goes about its business of not only conserving the official public record but also actively pursuing the acquisition of ephemera and personal papers of prominent individuals. Because Cologne has played such an important part in the cultural life of Germany, particularly in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the collections here are wonderfully rich and varied. Our visit to the Historisches Archiv prompted the students to reflect on various ways of tracking down materials related to their individual projects.

The next day we visited the Historisches Archiv des Erzbistums Köln. Our host, Joachim Oepen, briefly described the relation between church history and German history, using the example of the Cologne archbishopric. Oepen showed how church records have been reshuffled in response to administrative processes and political events. He also stressed the value of church records for different kinds of projects. In conclusion, Oepen gave the students a chance to practice their newly acquired skills at reading old German script, as well as demonstrated by example what finding aids can and cannot tell you about the holdings of a particular collection.

The last leg of our journey began with a five-hour train trip across central Germany, from west to east, to the small, former residential city of Gotha in the Free State of Thuringia. Again this year we were hosted by the Forschungsbibliothek Gotha, housed in the Schloss Friedenstein and part of the University of Erfurt. The first morning, Rupert Schaab, the library’s head, gave the participants a fascinating tour of the stacks, exposing everyone to this amazing collection of manuscripts and published books. The history of the library dates back to the seventeenth century, when Duke Ernst der Fromme began building the collection, parts of which came to Gotha as spoils of the Thirty Years’ War. The library contains over half a million printed books, of which nearly 350,000 were published before 1900. In addition, the library is home to nearly 10,000 volumes of manuscripts, including rare materials brought back from the
Orient. Noteworthy also are the collection of Protestant hymnals and the large collection of bound eulogies. In addition to exploring the For- schungsbibliothek’s holdings, the students also received brief introductions to the German library system, medieval manuscripts, early modern personal papers, and the first published books (incunables). Cornelia Hopf, one of the library’s helpful and knowledgeable staff members, assisted with these presentations.

On Wednesday afternoon the group traveled to Weimar. At the Goethe National Museum, Ulrike Müller-Harang led us on a tour of the permanent exhibit, emphasizing in particular the ideas behind the assemblage of various artifacts from Goethe’s life and cultural community. At the Goethe-Schiller-Archiv Weimar, Director Jochen Goltz showed us around the facility. In the evening the group traveled to Schnepfenthal in the Thuringian Forest where we were treated to the hospitality of Ursula Lehmkuhl, vice president of the University of Erfurt, and her husband Wolfgang Helbich, a retired professor from the University of Bochum. Everyone enjoyed a wonderful evening of conversation, debate, and delicious food and drink.

Continuing our speakers’ series, Cordula Grewe from the GHI and Warren Breckman from the University of Pennsylvania gave presentations on their respective work. Grewe is an art historian working on nineteenth-century German religious painting. Breckman is an intellectual historian who talked about his book on Marx and the young Hegelians. Both discussed method and methodology with the participants, touching on the pitfalls and promises of doing independent archival research. A lively question-and-answer session followed.

The final event of the Summer Seminar came in the form of a presentation by Juliane Bransch. She is currently working on the third volume of the diaries of Friedrich I, duke of Saxony-Gotha-Coburg. Two volumes have already appeared in print, containing transcriptions of the diaries. The third volume will contain commentary and explanatory notes. Bransch explained how she set about learning how to read Friedrich’s often difficult handwriting, then to decipher the diary entries, and finally to track down the various personalities and topics contained therein.

The GHI would like to thank its American collaborators and its numerous German partners for helping to make the tenth Summer Seminar in Germany a success. For information on the 2003 program, see the “Announcements” section of this issue.

Daniel Mattern
Lunch at “Zur Malzmühle” in Cologne, with Dr. Eberhard Illners of the Historisches Stadtarchiv
Participants and Their Projects

CHRISTOPHER C.W. BAUERMEISTER, History, Purdue University; dissertation topic: “Enlightenment and Administrative Reform in Electoral Hanover”

SHANNON E. HUNT, History, University of Virginia; dissertation topic: “The German Court, the Crisis of Aristocracy, and the Civilizing Process: A Study of Challenges to German Aristocratic Court Culture in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries”

HOI-EUN KIM, History, Harvard University; dissertation topic: “Physicians on the Move: German Physicians in Meiji-Japan and Japanese Medical Students in Imperial Germany”


ANTJE KRÜGER, German Literature, University of Wisconsin-Madison; dissertation topic: “Trivial Literature as Public Discourse in the Eighteenth Century”

KIMBERLY A. MILLER, German Linguistics, University of Wisconsin-Madison; dissertation topic: “Loss of Case in Low German”

JEANNE-MARIE MUSTO, Art History, Bryn Mawr College; dissertation topic: “Shaping a Discipline and a Nation: The Early Art History of Speyer Cathedral”

LARA OSTARIĆ, Philosophy, University of Notre Dame; dissertation topic: “The Concept of Genius in Kant’s Philosophy”


LAURA C. SMITH, German Linguistics, University of Wisconsin-Madison; dissertation topic: “Prosodic Change in Germanic: A Template Approach”

LAURA STOKES, History, University of Virginia; dissertation topic: “Patterns from Chaos: German and Swiss Witch Trials, 1430–1530”
ANNOUNCEMENTS: FELLOWSHIPS, SEMINARS, CALLS FOR PAPERS

TRANSATLANTIC DOCTORAL SEMINAR

GERMAN HISTORY IN THE EARLY MODERN ERA, 1490–1790
APRIL 9–12, 2003
CALL FOR PAPERS

The German Historical Institute in Washington, DC, and the BMW Center for German and European Studies at Georgetown University are pleased to announce the 9th Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar in German History. The 2003 seminar will take place in Washington, DC, on April 9–12, 2003.

The seminar brings together young scholars from Europe and North America who are nearing completion of their doctoral degrees. We plan to invite eight doctoral students from each side of the Atlantic to discuss their research projects. The organizers welcome proposals on any aspect of German history during the years 1490 to 1790. Doctoral students working in related disciplines—such as art history, legal history or the history of science—are also encouraged to apply, as are students working on comparative projects or on the history of Austria or German-speaking Switzerland. The discussions will be based on papers (in German or English) submitted in advance of the conference. The seminar will be conducted bilingually in German and English. The organizers will cover travel and lodging expenses.

We are now accepting applications from doctoral students whose dissertations are at an advanced stage but who will be granted their degrees after June 2003. Applications should include a short (2–3 pp.) project description, a curriculum vitae, and a letter of reference from the major advisor. Questions may be directed to Dr. Richard Wetzell by email at r.wetzell@ghi-dc.org.

Applications and letters of reference must be received by December 1, 2002. They should be sent to Ms. Baerbel Thomas at the German Historical Institute and may be submitted by email, fax or regular mail:

German Historical Institute
Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar
Attn: Ms. Baerbel Thomas
1607 New Hampshire Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20009-2562
Email: b.thomas@ghi-dc.org
Fax: +1 (202) 483-3430
YOUNG SCHOLARS FORUM

CULTURE IN AMERICAN HISTORY
MAY 29–JUNE 1, 2003
CALL FOR PAPERS

The German Historical Institute and the Friends of the German Historical Institute are pleased to announce the third Young Scholars Forum. The focus of the 2003 Forum is American history.

Designed to bring together European and American Ph.D. candidates for a weekend of scholarly exchange, the forum will take place from May 29 to June 1, 2003, in Washington, DC. The Forum offers promising young scholars the opportunity to present their work to their peers as well as to distinguished scholars from both sides of the Atlantic. Applicants should be working in a field of American history from the colonial period to the present.

The theme of the 2003 Forum is “Culture in American History.” We invite participants to define the role of culture in their particular approach to American history. Possible topics include: migration and regions; politics and foreign relations; race, ethnicity, and identity; sexuality and gender relations; religion, education, memory, experience, and historical imagery.

Participants must submit a paper of twenty typewritten pages by April 2003. In order to promote a lively exchange of ideas, papers will be distributed in advance. Instead of a conventional presentation of one’s own work, each participant will comment briefly on a colleague’s paper.

The German Historical Institute provides lodging and some meals. Travel assistance is available upon request.

European applicants must submit their materials by October 1, 2002. They will be notified by November 2002. Upon completion of the selection process for European candidates, a second call for papers will be directed to American universities in order to match the European candidates with U.S. scholars who are working in related fields.

A complete application will include the following materials: (1) a curriculum vitae; (2) a brief description of the paper (not to exceed two pages, double-spaced); (3) a formal letter of recommendation. Please send applications to:

Young Scholars Forum
German Historical Institute
1607 New Hampshire Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20009-2562
Tel: +1 (202) 387-3355
Fax: +1 (202) 483-3430
Email: Oertzen@ghi-dc.org
SUMMER SEMINAR IN GERMANY
JUNE 1–14, 2003

The Summer Seminar, co-organized by the GHI, the German Department of the University of Wisconsin at Madison, and the Nanovic Institute for European Studies at the University of Notre Dame, is a program for advanced graduate students in German historical studies. The program trains participants to read die alte deutsche Schrift, familiarizes them with German research facilities (archives and libraries), provides a forum for discussing research methods and practical tips, and helps prepare them for their prospective dissertation research trips to Germany. The program has practical and theoretical dimensions. We will spend the bulk of our time together thinking about research methods and discussing practical information on using archives and libraries. Students will learn how to contact archives, use finding aids, identify important reference tools, and become generally acquainted with German research facilities. In theoretical terms, participants will be exposed to various approaches that archivists, librarians, and scholars use to locate source material in an exceedingly complex repository landscape. We also will gain insight into how historical materials are acquired, stored, and made accessible to scholars. We will hear from scholars actively engaged in research, and we will have the chance to ask them questions on research methods, strategy, and planning.

Potential applicants should note that the program is exploratory in nature and should not be considered a predissertation research grant; participants will have limited opportunity to do their own work. Most institutions that we visit will not have materials specifically related to the participants’ topics. However, over the course of the seminar participants learn tips that are directly related to their projects as well as meet archivists and librarians who may be useful contacts in the future. We hope that participants will gain an appreciation for the various kinds of archives and special collections located in Germany, either for future reference or for their general edification as scholars of German culture, history, and society. Of course, students are welcome to extend their stay in Germany to do their own exploration and/or preliminary research.

Applications must be enrolled in a Ph.D. program at a North American institution of higher education. The program seeks qualified applicants interested in historical studies in a broad range of fields (art history, history, literature, musicology, etc.). The program is looking for advanced graduate students whose projects require that they consult source material in archives and research libraries as well as handwritten materials in the old German script. Preference will be given to those who have already
chosen a dissertation topic, have already written a dissertation proposal, but have not yet embarked on actual research. Successful candidates must have a very good knowledge of written and spoken German. All official parts of the program will be conducted in German. The organizers will evaluate applicants’ oral German proficiency through telephone interviews before participants are selected.

A complete application consists of: (1) a cover letter that outlines the need for participation; (2) a curriculum vitae; (3) a dissertation proposal (4–8 pages); and (4) a letter from the doctoral adviser.

The deadline for submission is December 31, 2002. All applicants will be notified by February 15, 2003. For more information, contact Dr. Daniel S. Mattern, The Nanovic Institute for European Studies, University of Notre Dame. Phone: 574-631-3545; e-mail: dmattern@nd.edu.

Send application materials to:
German Historical Institute
Summer Seminar
1607 New Hampshire Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20009-2562

**DOCTORAL AND POSTDOCTORAL FELLOWSHIPS**

The GHI awards short-term fellowships of one to six months to German and American doctoral students and postdoctoral scholars/Habilitanden in the fields of German history, the history of German-American relations, and the role of Germany and the United States in international relations. These fellowships are also available to German doctoral students and postdoctoral scholars/Habilitanden in the field of American history. For postdoctoral applications, the GHI will give priority to post-doc projects that are designed for the “second book.” The research projects must draw upon source materials located in the United States. The monthly stipend is €1,480 for doctoral students and €2,650 for postdoctoral scholars. In addition, fellows based in Germany will receive reimbursement for their round-trip airfare to the U.S. All fellows are required to present their research at the GHI in Washington during their grant period. Depending on the funds available, it may be possible to extend the scholarship by one or more months (up to a maximum duration of six months).

The deadline for applications is May 31, 2003. Applications should include cover letter, curriculum vitae, proof of academic degree, project description, research schedule for the fellowship period, and at least one letter of reference. All applicants will be notified by October 15. Please send applications to:
KADE-HEIDENKING FELLOWSHIP

Funded by the Annette Kade Charitable Trust, the Kade-Heideking Fellowship is awarded annually to a German doctoral student working in one of the three areas to which the late Jürgen Heideking made significant contributions: American history and German-American relations from the early modern period to the present; international history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, including the history of international relations and the comparative history of colonial systems and societies; and twentieth-century German history, with emphasis on America’s influence on German society between 1918 and 1949.

This is a residential fellowship of twelve months’ duration, and the recipient is expected to divide his or her time between the GHI and the University of Wisconsin in Madison. The stipend amount is $30,000. Applications should include a cover letter, curriculum vitae, proof of academic degree, project description (8–10 pages), research schedule for fellowship period, and two confidential letters of reference. The application deadline is November 15, 2002. Please send applications to:

German Historical Institute
Kade-Heideking Fellowship
1607 New Hampshire Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20009-2562

THYSSEN-HEIDENKING FELLOWSHIP

The German Historical Institute invites applications for a one-year postdoctoral fellowship in memory of the late Jürgen Heideking. The fellowship, supported by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation, is intended for American scholars working in one of the three areas to which Professor Heideking made important contributions: American history and German-American relations from the early modern period to the present; international history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, including the history of international relations and the comparative history of colonial systems and societies; and twentieth-century German history, with emphasis on America’s influence on German society between 1918 and 1949.

The Heideking Fellow will receive a stipend of €21,250 (plus a family allowance if applicable) for a fellowship period of six to twelve
months in residence at the University of Cologne to begin in 2003. The fellow will be expected to give one public lecture on his/her research. Applications should include a cover letter, curriculum vitae, proof of academic degree, project description (8–10 pages), research schedule for fellowship period, and two confidential letters of reference. The application deadline is November 15, 2002. Please send applications to:

German Historical Institute
Thyssen-Heideking Fellowship
1607 New Hampshire Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20009-2562
NEWS

LIBRARY REPORT

Among the recent acquisitions of the GHI library is the *Index deutschsprachiger Zeitschriften 1750–1815*. This index completes our microfiche collection of the *Diazo-Ausgabe der Volltextverfilmung der Deutschen Zeitschriften des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts*. The index is an essential tool for searching the contents of the journals and therefore tremendously simplifies research. Furthermore, we were able to add the nine-volume *Lexikon des Mittelalters* to our collection. Since the GHI organizes the annual Medieval History Seminar, we are happy to provide access to this fundamental reference work in our library. Like most of our reference works, the *Lexikon* is accessible in the Reading Room, whose holdings have been recently rearranged to make this ready-reference collection more user-friendly.

The library team recently made a complete inventory check of the collection. The library was closed for two weeks, and all the books on the shelves were checked against the entries in our online catalog. The inventory check turned up a number of books with incorrect callnumbers, which have now been corrected. Unfortunately, it also turned up some missing books; the library committee will soon review which titles need to be replaced. At any rate, the shelves and the catalog are now in good order again.

We would like to express our gratitude to the following people and institutions for donating books to the GHI library: David Binder, Christoph Bottin, Franz Eckhart, Felicitas Hentschke, Hans Küng, Mrs. Lau- man, Arnold Price, Thomas Sowell, Christoph Strupp, Gabriele Teichmann, and John Vaughan.

NEW PUBLICATIONS

The GHI is pleased to note the publication of two works by the late Jürgen Heideking, an early research fellow at the Institute and, at the time of his death, a member of its Academic Advisory Board. C.H. Beck (Munich) recently published a third edition of Heideking’s *Die Präsidenten der USA*. 
The new edition was prepared by GHI director Christof Mauch and includes an essay on President George W. Bush by GHI research fellow Bernd Schäfer. Together with former GHI visiting fellows Heike Bungert and Marc Frey, Mauch compiled and edited a collection of essays by Heideking, *Verfassung, Demokratie, Politische Kultur: Amerikanische Geschichte in transatlantischer Perspektive* (Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier). The volume *Republicanism and Liberalism in America and the German States, 1750–1850* edited by Heideking and James A. Henretta, with the assistance of Peter Becker, was published earlier this year by Cambridge University Press in the “Publications of the German Historical Institute” series.

**RECIPIENTS OF GHI FELLOWSHIPS**

**Postdoctoral/Habilitation Fellowships**

**HILDEGARD FRÜBIS**, Humboldt-University, Berlin, “Images of Jewish Modernity: Between the ‘Jewish Question,’ Gender Difference, and Art History”

**ISABEL HEINEMANN**, University of Freiburg, “Kultur- und Gesellschaftsgeschichte der USA in den 1950er und 1960er Jahren”


**STEFAN ZAHLMANN**, University of Münster, “Scheitern im Kontext. Soziale Beziehungen und die autobiographische Repräsentation persönlichen Versagens”

**Dissertation Fellowships**


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SILVIA DANIEL, “Die Vereinigten Staaten und der Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkriegs—Der Blick auf Europa.” Adviser: Prof. Klaus Hildebrand, University of Bonn


ANDREAS FLEITER, “Penal and Prison Reform in Germany and the USA—Prussia and Maryland, 1870–1935.” Adviser: Prof. Klaus Tenfelde, University of Bochum

VALERIE HÉBERT, “The High Command Case in View of the Myth of the Clean Hands of the Wehrmacht.” Adviser: Prof. Michael Marrus, University of Toronto


ALEXANDER MISSAL, “‘In Perfect Operation’: Social Vision and the Construction of the Panama Canal.” Adviser: Prof. Norbert Finzsch, University of Hamburg

STEFFAN MÖRCHEN, “‘Krebsschaden am Volkskörper’: Schwarzer Markt und Kriminalitätsdiskurs in der Nachkriegszeit am Beispiel Bremens.” Adviser: Prof. Inge Marszolek, University of Bremen

MARTHA M. NORTON, “Cosmopolitan Patriots: German Conservatism and the French Avantgarde.” Adviser: Prof. John Binion, Brandeis University


ALEXANDER PYRGES, “‘Kulturtransfer’ und ‘Assimilation’: Einwanderung aus dem Alten Reich nach Georgia, 1730–1825.” Adviser: Prof. Helga Schnabel-Schüle, University of Trier

RECIPIENTS OF GHI INTERNSHIPS

The GHI was again fortunate in having a number of hardworking and excellent interns. All of them contributed wonderfully to our efforts. They worked in archives and libraries, helped prepare and conduct our conferences, supported our editor and the library, and cheerfully did all the other things that interns are usually burdened with. We would like to extend a warm “thank you” to Holger Löttel (University Bonn), Wolfgang Reinicke (University Bamberg), Charlotte A. Lerg (St. Andrews College, Scotland), and Kai Behrens (Free University, Berlin).

STAFF CHANGES

CORDULA GREWE, Research Fellow since 1999, left the Institute at the end of August 2002 to accept a position as assistant professor of art history at Columbia University, New York.

SIMONE LÄSSIG, Research Fellow, joined the Institute in September 2002. She studied history and pedagogy in Dresden, Saxony, and received her Ph.D. there in 1990. From 1993 to 1998, she was an Assistant Professor at the University of Dresden. From 1999 to 2001, she held a fellowship of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft for her Habilitation and from 2001 to 2002 she had a fellowship from the Saxon Ministry of Science and Culture. Her first monograph, Wahlrechtskampf und Wahlreformen in Sachsen, 1895–1909, was published in 1996 and was awarded the Horst-Springer-Preis of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. A second book, Reichstagswahlen im Königreich Sachsen, 1871–1918, appeared in 1998. She also edited three essay collections and published a number of articles and essays in collections and journals, including the Historische Zeitschrift, Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, Parlaments, Estates and Representation, Blätter für deutsche Landesgeschichte, Jahrbuch für Liberalismusforschung, and Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht. She is currently in the process of publishing her Habilitationsschrift, Ursachen eines prekären Erfolges. Die Verbürgelung der Juden in Deutschland im Zeitalter der Emanzipation, 1780–1870. Her current and future research interests include: the social and cultural history of Germany and Europe from the late eighteenth to the mid-twentieth century; the history of philanthropy and patronage in comparative perspective; immigration to the U.S. and several other countries in the twentieth century, with a special focus on changes in the social and cultural status of former elites. She is preparing a five-generation biographical study on the formerly German, now American and Brazilian banking family Arnhold.
ARI SAMMARTINO joined the Institute in September 2002. Ms. Sammartino is currently a doctoral candidate at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. She received her M.A. from Michigan in 1999 and expects to receive her Ph.D. in 2003. Her dissertation, entitled “Utopia & Exile: Germany’s Symbolic Geography, 1918–1922,” examines migration during the early Weimar years between Russia and Germany. Looking at such diverse topics as the Freikorps campaign in the Baltics and the German response to post-revolutionary Russian émigrés, the dissertation explores the meaning of national identity and national borders in Weimar Germany after the upheavals of the Russian Revolution, the German Revolution and the end of World War I. Her research interests include the intellectual and cultural history of nineteenth and twentieth-century Europe; the history of migration, refugees and asylum seekers; theory and history of citizenship; post-colonial and state theory.

DIRK SCHUMANN, Deputy Director, joined the Institute in June 2002. He studied history and political science at the Universities of Munich, Freiburg i. Br., and Boulder, Colorado, received his M.A. from the University of Munich in 1985 and earned his Dr. phil. there in 1990. His first book, Bayerns Unternehmer in Gesellschaft und Staat, 1834—1914. Fallstudien zu Herkunft und Familie, politischer Partizipation und staatlichen Auszeichnungen, was published (with Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht in Göttingen) in 1992. From 1990 to 1996, he was an Assistant Professor at the University of Bielefeld, in 1997 he was awarded a fellowship of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft for his Habilitation, and in 1999, upon its completion, he became a Privatdozent at Bielefeld. From 1999 to 2002, he taught as a Visiting DAAD Professor at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia. His second book, Politische Gewalt in der Weimarer Republik. Kampf um die Straße und Furcht vor dem Bürgerkrieg, came out in 2001 (with the Klartext-Verlag, Essen). He has also published a number of articles and essays in journals such as Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften, Zeitschrift für Bayerische Landesgeschichte, and elsewhere. His research interests include modern German social, political, and cultural history, twentieth-century European social history, and the history of violence. Currently, he is working on two projects: “Zwischen ‚Volksgemeinschaft,’ Organisationsdisziplin und Radikalisierung: Arbeiterchaft und Arbeiterbewegungen im Ersten Weltkrieg” is a general account of the social and the political history of the German working classes during the First World War; “The Beaten Body: Corporal Punishment and Societal Order in Germany and the USA after 1945” is a research project that deals with the debate about and practice of corporal punishment in both German states and the U.S. from
the late 1940s to the early 1960s as crucial parts of the “search for order” in the emerging consumer society and its problems with unruly youth.

CHRISTINE VON OERTZEN, Research Fellow, joined the Institute in June 2002. She received her Ph.D. from the Free University of Berlin in 1998. Before joining the GHI, she taught at the Technical University of Berlin. In 1999, von Oertzen received a one-year postdoctoral fellowship from the GHI. Since 1996 she has been a managing editor of the journal WerkstattGeschichte. Her monograph, Teilzeitarbeit und die Lust am Zuverdienen. Geschlechterpolitik und gesellschaftlicher Wandel in Westdeutschland, 1948–1969, a history of gender relations and social change in West Germany, was published by Vandenhoek and Ruprecht in 1999. She is currently writing a comparative history of the German and the American university women’s associations, to be published as Education, Gender, and Society: A Comparative History of Academic Cultures in Germany and the United States. Her research interests include the social and cultural history of nineteenth and twentieth-century Europe; the history of women and gender in comparative perspective; and the history of education, the professions, and the international networks of influence that connect Western Europe and North America.

THOMAS ZELLER, Research Fellow, joined the Institute in September 2002 and also teaches in the Department of History at the University of Maryland in College Park. He studied at the University of Munich and Temple University in Philadelphia. After receiving his M.A. from Munich in 1995, he finished his Ph.D. there in 1999. His book Strasse, Bahn, Panorama. Verkehrswegwe und Landschaftsveränderung in Deutschland von 1930 bis 1990 was published in 2002 by the Campus Verlag in Frankfurt am Main. Zeller has also published papers in Technikgeschichte, WerkstattGeschichte, in the volume Landscape and Technology, edited by David Nye (University of Massachusetts Press, 1999) and (with Paul Josephson) in the forthcoming volume Science and Ideology, edited by Mark Walker (London: Routledge, 2002). His research interests encompass environmental history and the history of technology, especially the history of landscape and land-use change in modern Germany. Currently, he is working on a book-length study entitled “Consuming Landscapes,” which compares the driving experience on pleasure roads in twentieth-century Germany and the U.S. He also serves as co-editor of the forthcoming volumes Germany’s Nature and How Green Were the Nazis? Since 1999, Zeller has been working in the United States. He was a visiting assistant professor at the Georgia Institute of Technology and the University of Pennsylvania. Before joining the GHI, he was assistant professor of history at Oakland University in Rochester, Michigan.
UPCOMING EVENTS

FALL 2002 LECTURE SERIES

CONTESTED BELIEFS:
ISSUES IN GERMAN AND AMERICAN RELIGIOUS HISTORY

Michael Hochgeschwender
Universität Tübingen
“Beyond Sacredness: The Specifics of Religion in the U.S.”
Thursday, September 5, 5–7pm

Monika Wohlrab-Sahr
Universität Leipzig
“On Symbolic Emigrations and Symbolic Battle: A Type of Conversion to Islam in Western Countries”
Thursday, September 19, 5–7pm

Aaron Fogleman
Northern Illinois University
“Transatlantic Perspectives on Marriage, Sex, and Religious Deviance in British North America”
Thursday, October 17, 5–7pm

Philip H. Melling
University of Wales, Swansea
“Disobedience and the Divine Way: A Puritan Context for September 11th”
Thursday, October 31, 5–7pm

Anne Braude
Harvard University
“Religion and Feminism in American Society since the 1960s”
Thursday, November 21, 5–7pm

Sarah Barringer Gordon
University of Pennsylvania
“The Mormon Question: Polygamy and American History”
Thursday, December 12, 5–7pm
UPCOMING EVENTS SPONSORED BY THE GHI

For a regularly updated calendar of GHI events, please check our website at www.ghi-dc.org.

FALL 2002

September 10–13  “Deutschland in Amerika, Amerika in Deutschland.” Panel at the 44. Deutscher Historikertag in Halle. Convener: Christof Mauch (GHI)

September 26–29  “German-American Encounters after World War II and the Holocaust.” Conference at the GHI. Conveners: Alexander Freund (University of Winnipeg), Atina Grossmann (Cooper Union), Raimund Lammersdorf (GHI), Annette Puckhaber (GHI)

October 3  Symposium with Joachim Gauck and Ambassador Bindenagel, at the GHI

October 3–6  “Deutsche Beuteakten.” Panel at the German Studies Association Meeting in San Diego. Conveners: Astrid Eckert (FU Berlin) and Christof Mauch (GHI)

October 10  “A ‘Sonderweg’ in European Environmental History?” Symposium at the GHI. Conveners: Christof Mauch (GHI) and Joachim Radkau (University of Bielefeld)

October 11–13  “Landscapes and Roads in North America and Europe: Cultural History in Transatlantic Perspective.” Conference at the GHI. Conveners: Christof Mauch (GHI) and Thomas Zeller (GHI)

October 24–27  “Sexuality in Modern German History.” Conference at the GHI. Conveners: Edward Dickinson (University of Cincinnati) and Richard Wetzell (GHI)

October 24–27  Medieval History Seminar 2002, at the Humboldt University, Berlin. Conveners: Christof Mauch (GHI) and Christoph Strupp (GHI)

November 7–10  “Emotions in Early Modern Europe and Colonial North America.” Conference at the GHI. Conveners: Vera Lind (GHI) and Otto Ulbricht (University of Kiel)

November 14  “Was There a Nineteenth Century?” 16th Annual Lecture of the GHI. Speaker: Jürgen Osterhammel (University of Konstanz)

November 15  Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize Symposium, at the GHI. Convener: Friends of the GHI


December 6–7  “Art and Society in Nineteenth-Century Europe: Comparisons and Interactions.” Conference at the GHI. Conveners: Deborah Cohen (Brown University), Peter Mandler (Cambridge University), Christof Mauch (GHI)

2003

Spring 2003  “Historical Justice in International Perspective: How Societies are Trying to Right the Wrongs of the Past.” Conference at the GHI. Conveners: Manfred Berg (Free University Berlin) and Bernd Schäfer (GHI)


March  “Gendering Modern German History: A Critical Assessment of the Historiography.” Conference at the Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto. Conveners: Karen Hagemann (University of Toronto) and Christine von Oertzen (GHI)
April 9–12  “German History in the Early Modern Era, 1490–1790.” 9th Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar in Germany History, at the GHI and Georgetown University. Conveners: Roger Chickering (Georgetown University) and Richard Wetzell (GHI)

May 3  Mid-Atlantic Seminar in Germany History, at the GHI. Convener: Marion Deshmukh (George Mason University)

May 29–June 1  “Culture in American History.” Young Scholars Forum, at the GHI. Convener: Christine von Oertzen (GHI)

Summer  “The Presidency of John F. Kennedy.” Conference at the Free University Berlin. Conveners: Andreas Etges (Free University Berlin) and Bernd Schäfer (GHI)

August  “Nazi Crimes and the Law.” Conference at the University of Amsterdam. Conveners: Henry Friedlander (Brooklyn College), Nathan Stoltzfus (Florida State University), Richard Wetzell (GHI)

October  “Environmental History in Europe and America.” Conference at the GHI. Conveners: Christof Mauch (GHI) and Thomas Zeller (GHI)

Fall  “Death in Germany.” Conference at the GHI. Conveners: Paul Betts (University of Sussex), Alon Confino (University of Virginia), Dirk Schumann (GHI)