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FACT, FANTASY, AND GERMAN HISTORY
Mary Fulbrook

I start with a conundrum: For most laypeople, history is concerned with telling the truth about the past: countering propaganda, myth, and legend with an honest, objective, unbiased attempt to tell it "as it really was" (or, to use the famous Rankean dictum, *wie es eigentlich gewesen*). For most lay visitors to historical museums and exhibitions, or lay viewers of television documentaries, or if there still are any lay readers of academic history books, there is an implicit assumption that what they are consuming is an accurate representation of some facet of the past as it actually happened. But even the briefest glance at the last ten or fifteen years of historical controversy and theoretical debate will suffice to show that this confidence in the objective representation of past reality is not shared by large numbers of academic historians. Quite the opposite, in fact: Reading some historians, particularly those engaged more with theory than practice, one might gain the impression that history is just another form of fiction; reading others, one might suppose that history is essentially a form of politics (even warfare) by other means.

Here I introduce some of the elements of skepticism that - although far from new - have in part been brought to a head by recent debates. I shall argue that an "appeal to the facts" is not an adequate solution to the postmodernist challenge: There is no way that allegedly "traditional" empiricist notions of history can be salvaged (even if one could find any real historians to stand in for the strawmen who are often lampooned by postmodernists). Nor do we need to take postmodernist refuge in "celebrating" history as fantasy or diversity of equally plausible fantasies between which we cannot make a rational choice. Instead of resting content with analyzing the polarization between those who reiterate that the past is out there, what really happened, and those who look at the gap between that past and our capacity to know it in the present, I suggest ways of bridging this gap. I
shall try to rescue some notion of historical truth or at least argue the case for spending our time trying to talk sense about the past, rather than nonsense about the impossibility of knowing the past.¹ I do this with particular reference to that most controversial of histories - the "past that will not pass away," characterized by more-or-less perpetual disagreement about the often disagreeable namely, German history.

The Problem: Facts and Geschichtsbilder

To the layperson, what distinguishes history from fiction is that while fiction can create figments of the imagination, history must be based on facts that are true. For some historians or historical theorists influenced by postmodernism, this distinction has collapsed.

Because postmodernism seems currently to be widely perceived as the major challenge to the practice of history as the pursuit of the truth about the past, we must clarify the nature of the beast.²

How should we define postmodernism? For some postmodernists, it simply is our contemporary condition, the nature of the age in which we live. As one particularly extreme exponent puts it, "postmodernity is not an 'ideology' or a position we can choose to subscribe to or not; postmodernity is precisely our condition: it is our fate."³ Whether one accepts this claim or not (and I do not), there clearly is an element of all-pervading zeitgeist: In the latter quarter of the twentieth century, in a wide range of endeavors, there was what might be characterized as an aura of uncertainty, but not necessarily pessimism; the rejection of old (Enlightenment) certainties about progress, understanding, and control, of single truths and definitive accounts, was often associated with a celebration of multiple perspectives, of the simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous, or a reveling in the free play of the imagination. As far as the discipline of history is concerned, however, there are some far more specific things that can be said.

Postmodernism essentially is a theoretical development (or perhaps better, fashion) of the last few decades that has restated an age-old skepticism about the possibility of historical knowledge.⁴ Postmodernist
challenges to what might be called empiricist, or traditional, views of history range from the less to the more skeptical, and are rooted in a variety of philosophical positions. I want here to focus particularly on two major lines of attack that have been mounted on what are assumed to be "traditional" or "empiricist" notions of history as a craft designed to uncover the truth about the past.

One line of attack, exemplified by F. R. Ankersmit, Keith Jenkins, and to a somewhat lesser extent Patrick Joyce, focuses on the impossibility of ever gaining real access to a real past. There is no unmediated "reality"; all we have are Derridean texts commenting on texts, discourse layered on discourse. Because there is no way that unmediated access to a real past can serve to assist in adjudication between competing accounts of the same historical phenomenon, different representations can only be judged on aesthetic or political grounds. In this view, history functions as a substitute for, rather than an attempt at faithful (if partial) representation of, the past. This version thus collapses history into art or politics (or both).

The other line of attack does not dispute the reality of the pastor at least the reality of surviving traces of a real past but rather focuses on the imaginative ways in which these surviving traces are actively selected, combined, and shaped by the historian to produce an essentially imagined account in the present. The classic exponent of this point of view is of course Hayden White, with his notion of "emplotment." White claims that stories are not simply "given" in the past, to be "discovered" by historians, but rather are imposed on selected tidbits the flotsam and jetsam, the floating debris of the past to construct a narrative that is more akin to the work of a novelist than a scientist. This version, then, collapses history into a form of creative literature.

Irritating though this sort of relativism, verging in some cases on nihilism, may be for practicing historians, there are as yet no fully adequate responses. Little light is shed on fundamental theoretical problems by didactic primers on "the historical method" (source criticism, etc.), such as that by John Tosh (who remains remarkably
unperturbed by the postmodernist challenge, classifying it merely as yet another "new approach"). A theoretically more sophisticated attempt to rescue some notion of "telling the truth" about the past by Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob ends up providing a somewhat Whiggish overview (and implicit celebration) of the development of a diversity of voices, failing to address questions of mutual incompatibility, a topic to which I return subsequently. An "appeal to the facts" is often used to argue the case for an empirically rooted history that is true. Richard Evans, for example, enters a plea against confusing the bigotry of Holocaust denial with real scholarship, irrespective of a formally comparable scholarly apparatus that serves to create the "reality effect." And in the somewhat different case of David Abraham's interpretation of the Weimar Republic, Evans points out that there appeared to be a broad consensus irrespective of theoretical or political persuasion concerning what is held to constitute "sloppy scholarship."

The facts of the matter clearly are important. Consider the case of "Binjamin Wilkomirski" (or Bruno Grosjean), whose claim to be a child survivor of Auschwitz has been challenged. The argument hinges on the question of whether his best-selling account, *Fragments*, is true or not; even those now convinced of its fraudulence concede that it is a moving read, a potential "classic" of Holocaust literature. It thus is not so much the reality effect which clearly is something of a success but rather the claim of authenticity that is at stake here. The identity of the author, in other words, matters and we read the book in a different way, depending on whether we think it is genuine autobiography (and hence authentic historical witness) or realistic novel (the accuracy of which can be tested against some model of what the experience of a child survivor would "really" have been like).

The general point is that we do appear to share very widely accepted conceptions of factual truth and falsity; but, important though this is, it is not an answer (or at least not a complete answer) to the postmodernist case. Most paid-up postmodernists would in any event agree that it is possible to make singular statements about the past that
are true (or not, as the case may be); strung together in chronological order, they make up what White has identified as annals and chronicles. He focuses rather on what is subsequently done to these discrete facts in order creatively to transform them into (an invented) historical narrative. And even those postmodernists who wish to suggest there is an impenetrable veil over the "real" past and that all "evidence" can in principle be interpreted in a multiplicity of equally valid ways actually operate in their own academic communications as though historical "texts" are open to a single, accurate interpretation.¹⁵

We can, therefore, say with some certainty when a particular historical account appears to be wrong; we can make negative points about distortion, inaccuracy, and falsehood with a considerable degree of certainty. But, for a variety of reasons, there are serious difficulties beyond this level of the falsifiability of individual statements of fact. And the most dramatic and heated historical disagreements are often not about what actually happened on which there is general agreement but how it should be characterized, explained, and inserted into a wider interpretive framework or "historical picture."¹⁶

Take, for example, the forever controversial questions surrounding the Third Reich. With the exception of those Holocaust denial revisionists who are beyond the historical pale (and the scope of this essay), we do not on the whole dispute the known dates and facts. The chronicle (give or take some quibbles about selection for inclusion or exclusion, and some agreement over crucial gaps in the evidence) is more or less uncontested. We do, however, have an extraordinary variety of conflicting contextualizations and interpretations, with radically divergent political and moral implications in each case.¹⁷ Consider just a few:

Is Hitler's rise to power best explained in terms of factors intrinsic to German history, as, in different ways, both the Sonderweg thesis and a variety of cultural approaches would suggest? From medieval "failure" to unify, through Prussian absolutism and militarism, to "belated unification" and rapid industrialization; from Lutheran quietism
through the German *Aufklärung to deutsche Innerlichkeit* combined with *Gründlichkeit*; in this sort of approach, premised on the need to identify long-term malignancies, there is always something to complain about in this most "difficult history."

Alternatively, should we frame Nazism not as something specifically German but rather as a consequence of "modernity," inaugurated by the French Revolution with its collapse of traditional authority and the unleashing of the masses, comparable to (even in partial response to) communism? Or, by contrast, as something to do with capitalism, captured by the generic notion of fascism rather than totalitarianism? Or should we perhaps reject such larger patterns altogether and present the rise of Hitler as a purely contingent event, explicable only in terms of a detailed narrative of individual actions and historical accidents; or as the charismatic takeover of an unwitting population by a uniquely potent individual, akin to a magician, thus leaving Germans innocent of anything other than falling prey to his powerful spell? Each of these *Geschichtsbilder* presents quite a different interpretive framework for understanding the same chronology, the same set of "facts"; and each carries with it quite different political implications and morals.

The same is true of controversies focusing more specifically on the Holocaust. Is it best explained by primary emphasis on Hitler and a small gang of evil henchmen, as many historians from Ritter and Meinecke to recent "intentionalist" accounts would have us believe and as many politicians, from Konrad Adenauer onward, continue to suggest, thus effectively exonerating the vast majority of the German people? Or should a wider circle of social groups be brought into the frame, and if so, who? Indicting bureaucrats and technocrats renders modernity problematic, whereas involving the Wehrmacht affects the sensibilities of those who want to be able to cling to some notion of honorable service to the Fatherland. Or should we accept the invitation to indulge again in collective self-flagellation or national character assassination by reference to an allegedly distinctive German "mentality" characterized by a peculiarly rabid anti-Semitism persisting over centuries?
As the heated controversies over, for example, the Wehrmacht exhibition and Daniel Goldhagen’s *Hitler’s Willing Executioners* reveal, the reception of any explanatory framework is affected as much by its broader attribution of guilt and innocence as by what one might call "purely academic" criteria although it is notable that in both these cases historians have scurried away to check the accuracy of the facts and to critique points of detail. What was interesting about the notorious *Historikerstreit* of 19867 was that the political implications of different interpretations appeared to take total primacy over any notion of empirical adequacy. This was amply demonstrated both by Nolte’s "method" of posing rhetorical questions and by Hillgruber's awkward confusion between personal sympathy for a particular group and historical empathy as a tool for understanding different mentalities. 19

All these sorts of accounts at least seem to have actors at whom the finger can be pointed, and in part the heat of the debates is explained by the shock waves unleashed each time a new culprit is framed. But behind them all lie larger historical pictures of the ways in which regimes should be classified, how they function, and what role individuals are or are not able to play in them (the notion of *Handlungsspielraum*). One of the reasons why Goldhagen appeared to score easy victories over Hans Mommsen during his media tour of Germany, for example, was that Mommsen’s more complex structural or functionalist account appeared to shift too much causal weight into the passive voice, with its emphasis on the "increasingly chaotic functioning of the regime" as the prime culprit. Goldhagen gave us both a collective culprit and a happy, if illogical, solution (the allegedly enduring mentality of centuries was transformed overnight by the introduction of democratic structures after 1945).

These diverse underlying *Geschichtsbilder* are not questions of purely academic importance. Much historical work is very closely related to practical consequences for the protagonists. 20 Historical interpretations were germane to the practical tasks of denazification and reconstruction immediately after the war in dramatically different ways in East and West Germany and in subsequent Nazi war crimes trials. More recently,
historians have been called upon to give evidence to the Enquetekommissionen of the parliament in the newly unified Germany about structures of power, complicity, and opposition in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Analyses of the "second German dictatorship" have had major implications for those East Germans who have lost their jobs or been "restructured" out of their careers because of assumptions about complicity and guilt in another Unrechtsstaat. They have also had unsettling implications for large numbers of East Germans who cannot recognize their own mundane biographies, their "perfectly ordinary lives," in the black-and-white histories written after the fall of the Berlin Wall, or who resent the notion of an authoritarian East German social psychology that allegedly is the product of collectivized potty training.

So: The facts alone are not enough. We can agree, against the more extreme postmodernists, that the facts are important and can exercise a form of veto power. But there is or has to be more to the defense of history than an appeal to the facts can deliver. There has, in short, to be some means of combining fact and fantasy, that which can be said to be true or false as an individual statement, and the larger pictures that do not appear to be firmly anchored in the facts. We need now to take a closer and more direct look at the nature of history as a discipline.

**Bridging the Gap: The Parameters of Historical Inquiry**

There are in fact two sorts of gap that I seek to bridge: first, the gap between "knowledge of the past in the present" (historical consciousness, the products of history as a discipline), and "the past as it actually was" (history as that which has gone forever); and second, the gap between "the facts we are more or less agreed on as true" (fact) and "that which is contributed by the play of human creativity or imagination" (fantasy). I seek to bridge these gaps not by looking for some (allegedly typically British) fudge or compromise, the "middle way" or now even "Third Way" but rather by focusing on the character of the constructions we devise, whether consciously or not, to make transitions from one side to the other. I also seek, in the process, to
break through the current impasse between those historians who want to adopt the attitude of "business as usual, just get on with the job, we can do it even if we don't know how," and those who adopt the opposite attitude that runs, "when you come to look at it in detail you can't provide firm foundations for what you are doing and therefore your interpretation is no better than anyone else's." 

My broader argument is that historical knowledge is made up of a combination of fact and fantasy, using the latter term in a wide sense to embrace a range of aspects of the human imagination and capacity for intersubjective communication (in other words, understanding fantasy in the Germanic sense of *Phantasie*, rather than what one might call the rather specific English literary notion, with its veiled connotations of untruthfulness). A fuller account would need to look in detail at such questions as empathy, interpretation, and representation, which cannot be explored further here. The point, however, is to look at the ways in which the play of the imagination is not as free, as arbitrary, as postmodernists appear to think; to look at why, or indeed how, "fantasy" can be constrained by "facts," as captured through the activities of the creative, inquiring mind; in other words, to look at the interplay between fact and fantasy, seeking to explore different positions on a spectrum in which the one is anchored, to a greater or lesser extent, by the other; and, in the process of this exploration, to achieve greater clarity about the kinds of choices we unavoidably have to make. We cannot necessarily devise shared criteria for deciding which approach is "better" or -"worse" than another; but we can at least hope to clarify our grounds for agreeing to disagree. It is worth noting at the outset that there are patterns to the way we imagine the past. We are not talking about individual, private fantasies here, but about collective sets of conceptions and approaches. I therefore focus, in this context, on some aspects of these collective ventures, considering specifically the questions of the interrelations between paradigms, concepts, and politics.

*Paradigms* 

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Any cursory glance at substantive historical writing and historiography will reveal a startling array of alternative approaches, or what, to borrow a term from Thomas S. Kuhn's now classic analysis of the natural sciences, we may wish to call paradigms. Actually, if we were truly Kuhnian, we would call these "paradigm candidates" because none has as yet attained true hegemony. The point here, however, is that in the field of historical inquiry, for reasons that we need to explore, none of them are ever likely to achieve hegemonic status across the field as a whole, although they often dominate particular institutional or intellectual corners at different times. I would contend that, irrespective of some spurious sense of a need to be faithful to Kuhn's stimulating original definition, it would be extremely fruitful to explore the nature of these candidates for paradigmatic primacy in history. It is in this spirit that I elect to adopt the term paradigm, as follows.

Paradigms, for my purposes here, are defined not by the essentially external criterion of success, that is, unchallenged hegemony over an intellectual field as a whole, but rather in purely internal terms, that is, in the ways in which they shape general approaches to a topic of inquiry. Paradigms in the sense in which I use the term here are made up of certain general components: basic presuppositions about what to look at (and what to look for); a framework of given questions and "puzzles"; a specific set of analytical concepts through which to capture and reproduce the "evidence"; and a notion of the types of explanation that will in some way satisfy curiosity or answer a particular question. It seems to me that analyses of "approaches" in history have not as yet distinguished sufficiently between different kinds of historical paradigm, and I would like to present a more differentiated framework for thinking about different approaches here.

Historiographical works often trace the development from "traditional" approaches (political and diplomatic history, history of "great men") to a multiplicity of perspectives - social history, labor history, economic history, women's history, "new" cultural history - allowing a diversity of previously repressed voices to be heard. The view often appears to be
that the more spotlights are cast on different parts of the past, the more the cumulative illumination there will be.\textsuperscript{27} However, it seems to me that some "new approaches" in history are actually not so much new approaches to old questions as old approaches to new questions. These are what I call "perspectival paradigms": paradigms looking at topics or "segments of reality" that had hitherto been partially ignored or completely neglected. Such perspectival paradigms are often simply subject specialisms that may serve to complement previously dominant histories (irrespective of the curious prevalence of personal animosities across these subfields).\textsuperscript{28}

But perspectival paradigms are cross-cut by other kinds of more fundamental, underlying paradigm. These are what I call "paradigms proper," mutually conflicting approaches based on prior assumptions that cannot necessarily be reconciled with one another. Recent examples include the difference between "women's history" (a perspectival paradigm saying we have not yet looked enough at the history of a particular group, defined biologically, namely, women); and "feminist history," a paradigm proper that treats gender as socially constructed and embodies a whole set of principled stands on a range of moral and political issues that can just as well be applied, for example, to the behavior and beliefs of men. One might want to elaborate a similar distinction between "social history" ("with the politics left out") and "societal history" (at the root of politics).

Classic examples of paradigms proper obviously include approaches deriving from Marxist or psychoanalytic roots (the nonfalsifiable "belief systems" identified by Karl Popper); or the strong forms of structuralism (Claude Lévi-Strauss rather than Émile Durkheim and A. R. Radcliffe-Brown) and poststructuralism (Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, Michel Foucault). These paradigms proper are rooted in irreconcilable metatheoretical assumptions: They are premised on different philosophical anthropologies (views on the construction of the subject, the relationships between society and the individual), on different assumptions about the nature of historical causes and about what it is that the historian is trying to do. At their most explicitwhen
they become a major "-ism" - they develop into comprehensive thought systems capable of repeated exegesis and elaboration, and often quite different patterns of institutionalization. They pose the biggest headache as far as any attempt to develop any notion of a single, objective "historical method" is concerned. Germans have had to think particularly hard about fundamentally conflicting paradigms with the legacy of East German Marxist historiography, premised as it was on quite different assumptions about the nature of the past and the purposes of historical inquiry.

Sometimes these major paradigms proper spawn what I call "pidgin paradigms" or "magpie theories." These are created when a historian appropriates particularly fruitful individual concepts or insights but does not necessarily wish to buy into the full theoretical gamut. We have many examples of such magpie theorizing being put to illuminating effect: Witness, for example, the widespread adoption of Weberian concepts beautifully exemplified by Ian Kershaw's use of "charismatic authority" to explore the interplay of individual and structure in Hitler's power (in the process helping to resolve some of the issues between intentionalists and functionalists already mentioned); or Richard Evans's occasionally rather eclectic selections from Foucault and others in his *Rituals of Retribution*; or the very widespread, often unwitting absorption of certain Marxist assumptions. (Who nowadays really thinks a focus on social and economic structures is not at least a better place to start than the Hegelian notion of "world spirit realizing itself"?) Similarly, Freudian notions of repression, or the subconscious, have widely entered into our subconscious vocabularies.

The importance of magpie theorizing is that it underlines the possibility of dislocating specific concepts from their original theoretical - and political - contexts. Deployed badly, it has to be said, magpie theories just masquerade second-rate or even shoddy work in the opaque guise of supposed cleverness (or obscurity). Deployed well, they seem to permit a degree of openness, of "interparadigm communication," while explicitly recognizing the need for a vocabulary of analytical concepts at
one degree of abstraction from the empirical material itself. I shall return to this later.

Many historians prefer to ignore theory and claim it is infinitely more profitable to "just get on with the job of doing history." But no historian is entirely innocent of theory and ignorance is no defense. All historians (even Geoffrey Elton) operate, whether they are aware of it or not, in the context of what I call "implicit paradigms." These are, yet again, made up of the basic components of all paradigms: different presuppositions about what to look for, the concepts through which to capture and reproduce the past, and the types of explanation to be constructed. It should be emphasized that even - perhaps especially - what is construed as a "common sense" approach entails what are usually culturally variable and quite specific assumptions about "essential human nature," patterns of motivation, and so on.

Consider, for example, the conflicting implicit paradigms of those who focus on individual motives and actions versus those who prefer to look at structures and conditions. To return to the example of Weimar: Even among supposedly "atheoretical" historians, there are those who tend to emphasize structural problems - such as long-term sociopolitical legacies, the consequences of war, the incomplete revolution and ambiguous compromises of 191819, the constitutional flaws, the ambivalent and divided political culture, and the inherent economic weaknesses; there are those who would focus on the alleged charisma and organizational brilliance of Hitler and the NSDAP; and there are those who would rather emphasize the decisions and mistakes of key individuals in the closing years and even weeks and days of Weimar democracy, or even the chain of chance events and accidents. These differences in implicit paradigms lead to radically divergent interpretations among historians who can in no way be accused of sloppy scholarship; the debates over Weimar are far more deeply problematic than a concentration on the Abraham affair alone would have us think. Implicit paradigms, not facts, are what are at issue here.

**What is the evidence? The problem of concepts**
Cross-cutting all these forms of paradigm is the problem that there is no generally shared set of concepts, or "theory-neutral data language," with which to capture the evidence of the past and to use in assessing the relative merits of different interpretations in the present. Historical concepts do not neatly correspond to (or at least seem to account for) elements and attributes of the "real world out there," as they appear to do in the natural sciences. Even though concepts in the natural sciences are imposed by the observer (such as quarks or neutrons), they do seem to correspond, in measurably better or worse ways, to an objective outside reality in a way that historical concepts do not.\textsuperscript{30}

Max Weber, who devoted considerable attention to this problem, came up with a typically ambiguous double answer. Unfortunately for us, he got it wrong on both counts. First, we cannot agree with Weber that historical concepts are broadly shared across "the culture of an age" for several reasons. They may be what I call "theory-drenched" concepts: deeply rooted within different paradigms, meaning quite different things within different frameworks. The classic examples here of course are concepts such as class or power, which may be defined quite differently depending on whether one is a Marxist, a Weberian, or a follower of Foucault. And, unless we are prepared to develop and speak in an inaccessible, even arcane vocabulary (easily dismissed as "jargon"), historical concepts also are very often the situated and loaded concepts of everyday life, further cross-cutting differences in theoretical definition. Consider, for instance, concepts of gender or race, construed variously as either essentially biological or socially constructed; or consider the different lived understandings of "nation" in Germany and America, or, at a theoretical level, between an Anthony Smith and a Benedict Anderson.\textsuperscript{31} It is in the nature of the subject matter that some will be "essentially contested," deeply controversial, carrying considerable emotional freight and significance. Furthermore, far from being universally shared, there may be very little correspondence between the concepts of the observer and those observed (see "anachronistic concepts"), or even among members of either of these communities (as in debates over the class designation of oneself and others).
The other (and at first sight very promising) part of Weber's proposed solution was the quite explicit construction of clearly defined concepts for purely heuristic purposes, which he called *ideal types*. Despite his view that all historical inquiry was but a product of its age, doomed to be superseded as new questions emerged, Weber's endless elaboration of ideal types in *Economy and Society* suggests that, nevertheless, he thought he could come pretty close to defining a kind of provisional Periodic Table of the Elements for history and society; and he certainly used certain concepts as the basis for his systematic comparative historical studies of, for example, the world religions (contrasting this-worldly and other-worldly, mystic and ascetic, and so on). The problem is whether - and on what basis - anyone else would share this (or any other) constructed, conceptual vocabulary. Even the most apparently innocent ideal type selectively highlights certain aspects, makes certain connections, and places a unique historical phenomenon in one or another different theoretical and contextual nexus. The notion of a self-consciously constructed, explicitly defined ideal type is certainly an advance over treating concepts as though they were essential realities; but it does not completely resolve our questions concerning conflicting paradigms.

**More noise: politics**

Why do historians opt for one paradigm or another? First, an observation: There is an unsettling correlation between certain theoretical approaches and corresponding patterns of political or moral identification. In some cases - Marxism, "identity" history - this correlation is both obvious and intentional. But even among those historians who claim that they alone do "objective" history there is a remarkable correspondence between theoretical preferences and political leanings.

If we survey the pre-1990 West German historical landscape, for example, we notice that the more conservative spirits tended to opt for "traditional" historical approaches (high politics, great men, narrative mode); left-liberals tend toward societal or social-structural history (the
"Bielefeld school" exemplified by Jürgen Kocka and Hans-Ulrich Wehler) with or without the new culturalist overtones; and those slightly further to the left could not quite, in the context of the divided Germany in the Cold War period, risk allegations of GDR sympathies by adopting one or another variant of the arcane neo-Marxist debates prevalent at the time in Britain and the United States, but tended rather toward underdog history (Alltagsgeschichte, historical anthropology). There is, of course, no complete overlap between paradigm choices and political sympathies, but tendencies are notable nonetheless. The same is true of Anglo-American historians of Germany, although without the German obsession with (or at least built-in institutional bias toward) political nominations to established chairs and directorships - nor the need to make such hard decisions about firing former exponents of a discredited historical paradigm in a semi-colonial takeover.

This raises rather pointedly the question of whether there is a rational way of adjudicating among competing approaches. Some paradigms, it is clear, are more open than others; the different types of paradigm I have already outlined also cross-cut each other to some extent. Perspectival paradigms, for example, seem to me more akin to language communities within which one has been socialized, feels comfortable, and wants to participate in an ongoing and usually relatively open conversation characterized by a substantive concern with certain questions and issues. Pidgin paradigms may be found in all these approaches as the conversations about the topics develop in what are often heralded as "new directions" implicit paradigms are not incapable of revision on the basis of argument - at least, when this is appropriately presented as "new evidence," without drawing too much attention to the conceptual net in which the evidence is captured. However, in all these somewhat more open paradigms there still is a degree of what might be called "background noise" or "contamination" by political and moral views that surrounds some implicit paradigms (as illustrated previously), and some historians simply do not want to listen to certain arguments that would shift the ground entirely. The position is most problematic in what I have called paradigms proper, where serious metatheoretical choices about fundamental philosophical and
anthropological questions have to be made, often entailing acts of faith or personal commitment to following a guru.\textsuperscript{32}

So, to revert to Kuhn, we appear to find ourselves in a distinctly "pre-scientific stage," a very uncomfortable position indeed for someone who believes that historical enterprise should seek to uncover the truth about the past and who believes that the validity or otherwise of the historical account produced at the end of the long, hard slog of research should be judged on something other than political or aesthetic criteria. This also may ultimately seem to be an untenable position with respect to educational establishments and funding bodies, which may expect a little more for their investment.

The easy answer to this is claiming that, in a democratic system, there is a free market for ideas. I am not sure that this view - which verges on intellectual Darwinism - is entirely satisfactory. Clearly, a degree of pluralism is an essential precondition for genuine intellectual debate; but the equivalent of a majority vote, or a dominant position in the popularity stakes for ideas, is not necessarily an appropriate measure or sufficient proof of greater intellectual adequacy.\textsuperscript{33}

\textbf{Politics, Truth, and History: Reinterpreting Modern Germany}

It might by now appear as if, by exploring some of the parameters of the gap, I have merely dug a deeper hole than that uncovered by postmodernists. But I believe, in fact, that explicit analysis of the parameters helps us rather to construct ever better ladders down into that hole, or to drop sounding devices at the right points, and to design buckets and nets of the right size and shape to bring up useful evidence.

This section is based on two premises: It is always easier to criticize than to do, and it is always exceedingly tempting, when returning to a historical question of considerable interest, to relapse into a business-as-usual mode, ignoring not only postmodernist cautions against the possibility of doing it at all but even one's own theoretical tenets. Let us return to consider some illustrations from very recent German history and take the contested territory of GDR history as our final example.
The beauty of this as an example is that, although some older intellectual fronts have simply moved forward to colonize this new historical terrain, the contours of controversy are still more fluid, more inchoate, than are the well-trodden stomping grounds of Weimar and Third Reich history. I focus here on the interplay of politics and paradigms, and take two particular issues, that of grand conceptualization of the whole and that of specific narratives of unique developments, as my examples.

The problem with East German history is certainly not one of a dearth of facts. A paranoid regime amassed literally miles of files and mountains of reports on every aspect of what was going on: from acts of sabotage and Republikflucht at one end of the spectrum to problems of toilet paper provisioning in hospitals or outbreaks of rabies among pet golden hamsters at the other. However, the very richness of archival and oral history sources only serves to underline the point that, in history, we cannot try to "let the facts speak for themselves." Exposure to the East German archives may even tempt the daunted student to take refuge in White's cautions about the impossibility of discovering, rather than imposing, a historical narrative. But in fact the need for criteria for interpretations we feel we can trust is thrust upon us; for many people, East German history is above all about at last finding out the truth behind the ideological and repressive facade of an often deeply manipulative, cynical, and secretive regime. It thus is all the more important to be quite clear about the relations between politics and paradigms.

In the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Wall, major public attention was focused on the extent and scope of Stasi surveillance, with almost daily revelations about individual Stasi informers or Informelle Mitarbeiter (IM). A morally and politically engaged historiography grew exponentially: Whereas environmentalists, Christians, and human rights activists were aghast at what the files held, and engaged in a public reckoning with the past, former communist Bonzen Erich Honecker, Günter Schabowski, Egon Krenz, Kurt Hager, and others - were not slow to capitalize on public interest in the collapse of the
dictatorship. Even the tone of many academic analyses of topics such as the role of the Protestant churches, or of general histories of the GDR, was highly charged with political and moral intent. Whether by East Germans such as Armin Mitter and Stefan Wolle, or West Germans such as Gerhard Besier, there was a message, often not so much implicit as stridently and explicitly expressed in historical analyses. And there were angry public exchanges over who should even be "allowed" or given institutional and financial support to do GDR history, as the debates over the Potsdam Center for Contemporary History Research (Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung or ZZF) in its earlier incarnation (as the Forschungsschwerpunkt Zeithistorische Studien, or FSP) illustrate all too clearly.

This phase of acute politicization - or at least of frequent public anger - appears to have subsided to some degree. Conferences are on the whole somewhat more temperate gatherings than they were a few years ago. But there are still massively different general paradigms of interpretation. In particular, the notion of "system-immanent" analyses, widely prevalent in the 1970s and 1980s, in the 1990s came under vicious attack from certain rather stridently triumphalist conservative quarters. There has, in their place, been a dramatic and securely institutionalized resurrection of totalitarianism as a concept designed not only to characterize but also to explain and to denounce the GDR. This has been explicitly countered by those who argue that one should rather look with a more open mind at the social history of the GDR, proposing instead the notion of a durchherrschte Gesellschaft as a means of exploring the variety of ways in which state and society interacted in the GDR. Not surprisingly, these theoretical battle lines roughly (although not entirely) correspond to the well-trodden political fronts of yesteryear.

The lazy way to locate oneself within this clash of paradigms would of course be to gravitate toward that approach that seems, on the face of it, the language community or the political/moral nexus in which we feel most at home. But let us see if the points developed so far can be of any help in adopting a potentially more fruitful approach.
Let us first consider different approaches to general characterization of the GDR. The concept of totalitarianism holds a template premised on contrasts with Western conceptions of democracy; it then plots, or highlights, those aspects in which the GDR is found wanting. This is not, then, a politically innocent ideal type. Were it used solely as a heuristic device, to be rejected once it has served its purpose of highlighting contrasts, further concepts would be required to explore other aspects of East German history not captured by this selective focus on contrasts. But proponents of totalitarian theory implicitly leap from the heuristic notion of an ideal type to the more essentialist notion that the concept of totalitarianism actually captures, reveals, the underlying reality of the GDR. Because this was different from the West, the distinction must, for political reasons, be sustained at all costs. And because the state in modern Western democracies also affects what is therefore also a durchherrschte society, one of the key exponents of the totalitarian approach, Klaus Schroeder, argues that in the case of the GDR we must speak rather of a durchmachtete Gesellschaft a society saturated with power rather than authority.41

Now all this (actually somewhat muddled) thinking is rather promising for our purposes, for we need not rest content with pointing out the not-so-hidden political agenda behind this approach. We can pick up on the empirical assertions being made, and examine them against "the facts" on which, if we are using a similar conceptual vocabulary, we ought in principle to be able to agree. Schroeder has fortunately chosen to use the very clearly defined concepts of power and authority in Weber's conceptual armory; so let us play him on this terrain. On my reading of the files, a picture posing stark contrasts between state and society, and placing primary emphasis on power and force on the one hand and the experience of repression and fear on the other, does not do justice to some of the ambiguities of more complex realities. We also have in some way to account for the ways in which many East Germans felt they were able to lead "perfectly ordinary lives."42

For example, at least some of those who held power did so not (or not only) for power's sake but because they genuinely wanted to achieve
what they thought was a better, more equal and just society; and they
sometimes sought this in areas where we, as Western democrats, can
agree with their goals. A closer look at the East German health service
during the Honecker period will reveal, for example, that the long-
serving minister for health, Ludwig Mecklinger, genuinely sought, in
adverse circumstances, to find means of tackling deteriorating
conditions in health and safety at work, and (unsuccessfully) tried to
argue the case against ministerial colleagues for shifting investment
away from dangerous and polluting heavy industry. Similarly, there is
much evidence of concern to improve rates of perinatal and infant
mortality, and standards of care for the elderly and dying. Another
area that has received much more extensive attention in Western
academia is that of policies to enhance equality of opportunity for
women.

Remember, too, that even dictators would prefer at least some of the
apparent support for the regime to be real rather than artificially
orchestrated or the product of repressive indoctrination. Thus, in some
propaganda campaigns the East German public were not only informed
and influenced but also to a certain degree consulted (such as in the
run-up to the Abortion Law of 1972). The constant monitoring of public
opinion was designed not just for the well-known purpose of instant
suppression of signs of dissidence and opposition, but also out of a
concern to identify and respond adequately to real problems. And if we
examine, for example, the evidence of citizens' petitions (Eingaben der
Bevölkerung) and related inquiries by committees of the Volkskammer,
we find real concern with meeting the needs of people in such mundane
areas as housing, child care, food provision, the introduction of shift
work, transport from residential areas to the workplace, and so on.
Discussions of these issues seem to have been remarkably open and
wide-ranging; there is in any event little sign that people felt inhibited
from voicing their complaints and desires quite openly in these areas.
There is, in short, much that anyone with any experience of local
government in Britain would find depressingly familiar.
There was of course the use of power and repression in the East German dictatorship; no-one would dispute this. But there also was a high degree of participation (for whatever variety of reasons) in the mass organizations and activities of this extraordinarily collectivized society; and, among millions of people who were neither committed communists in the service of the cause on the one hand, nor beleaguered Christians, political dissidents, or human rights activists on the other, there was over time an increasing degree of "taken-for-grantedness" about it all. All of this is not well captured by the vocabulary of power, oppression, and indoctrination beloved of totalitarian theory.  

Nor, incidentally, is it well caught by the similarly dichotomous state/society model underlying the durchherrschte Gesellschaft approach. Ironically, this shares with totalitarian opponents a common Geschichtsbild of the GDR as a pyramid of power. While one focuses from the top downward, the other starts from the bottom up. Even the latter's focus on "contested" areas or notions of "self-discipline" (Selbstbeherrschung) are perfectly compatible with the totalitarian emphasis on "limits" and the possibility of "failure to penetrate," "resistances," and so on.

It seems to me, however - as to many others currently grappling with these questions - that we need a somewhat more ambiguous concept for characterizing the GDR. A better concept might be the notion of a participatory dictatorship, or a police welfare state. I have also toyed with the idea of "modern party absolutism," which has nicely anachronistic overtones. At least these concepts allow us to escape from the inherited overtones and derogatory baggage - of being lumped with the Third Reich in the cataclysmic debates of the Cold War era that is part of the package of totalitarianism. They also have the advantage of embodying within them certain self-contradictory dynamics, helping to point us toward elements of instability and change (for example, heightened expectations during the early Honecker era, with its proclaimed "unity of social and economic policy," and the Helsinki agreement on human rights, which dashed hopes in the 1980s). I think
we also need to develop some notion that allows for the possibility of acceptance, as well as rejection, of the GDR as it actually was, without implying that those who accepted it, or who took it for granted, were in some way either fellow travelers or dupes of indoctrination and ideology, implicitly to be condemned as duplicitous, self-serving, mendacious, or just plain dumb. We have to remember - against simplistic comparisons of "the two dictatorships" - Third Reich and GDR - that the latter lasted more than three times as long as the former and that, in the process, new generations grew up seeing the world in quite different ways.

The point here, however, is a more general one. Such debates over broad concepts may, if we do not become too committed to a particular, essentialist view of the world, be a fruitful intellectual exercise, helping us - as active, inquiring minds exploring, classifying, and shaping the historical material - to highlight points of importance, elements of similarity and difference across a carefully selected range of historical cases. At first blush, this might appear to be a vindication of Weber's ideal-type method, applied with appropriate finesse, clarity, and differentiation (rather than as a blunt weapon of political denunciation, as in the a priori assumptions embedded in totalitarian theory). However, we must remain aware that there is no way of getting at the reality, the essence of a particular case: All accounts are phrased in terms of particular concepts, rooted in particular frameworks of assumptions (or paradigms, to revert to the previous discussion). Concepts at a more general or abstract level are deployed to gather and account for material at a more substantive, particular level. We then return to the difficulties already introduced relating to the choice of paradigms and concepts through which to investigate the past. My debate with Schroeder was made easier by my willingness to adopt the Weberian definitions of power and authority employed by Schroeder; had I rejected these concepts (and insisted instead, for example, on a Foucauldian definition of power), it would have been difficult, even impossible, to engage in the same type of empirically rooted argument.
The problem, in other words, still remains that of finding ways of agreeing on compatible routes for accessing "reality," which in the ideal-type methodology is still (rather unclearly) posited as in principle separable from, and capable of exerting constraints on or influence over, willfully constructed ideal types. And yet, as the example of my own attempts (and those of innumerable others working in this area) demonstrates, we happily do this all the time - out of sheer interest in the subject matter.

Many historians, wearying of what often appears to be a sterile and acutely overpoliticized search for the concept, the approach, retreat instead into what they see as specific narratives of unique chains of events. Let us set aside debates on grand conceptualization for a moment and turn to our second substantive example. Let us consider, with respect to a rather different type of historical account, the ways in which not even would-be theoretical narrative historians can evade fundamental theoretical issues.

A useful illustration could be spun out, for example, with respect to explanations of the collapse of the GDR and the fall of the Wall almost exactly a decade ago - which some have sought to represent as a vindication of "events history" (Ereignisgeschichte) over structural or societal history. The moment we begin to look at the exponentially growing literature in this field, we notice that implicit paradigms immediately come into play, with different prior assumptions determining the focus, shape, and components of different narratives. Some appeal to the constant need for suppression by force, from at least 1953 onward, while others perceive a "golden age" variously located in the later 1960s and/or early 1970s. Some argue that the economic decline was an inevitable result of communist central planning, whereas others see it as a contingent consequence of Honecker's blinkered economic policies in a changing context of world recession. And although one historian would emphasize the role of Mikhail Gorbachev, another would stress the emergence of dissident movements as an indigenous product of the GDR. These differences in general explanatory
perspective are at least in part based in different prior political and anthropological assumptions.

Anyone who has seen Hans-Hermann Hertle's analysis of the actual unfolding of events during November 9-10, 1989, might even come to the conclusion that this must be a prime example of chaos theory applied to history: Looking at counter-factuals, it seems that had Krenz not handed Schabowski a draft of the proposed new travel regulations, which he did not even take the time to read through, let alone digest; or had the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) not been in permanent closed session, totally out of contact with what was happening at the Wall throughout the evening (or had Krenz and Erich Mielke been equipped with mobile phones!); or had world news coverage not run somewhat ahead of events, reporting more than was actually the case at the time; or had any one of the confused and beleaguered border guards lost their nerve and started firing on the growing crowds of East Germans thronging the border crossings; then events would have run quite differently, and there might still have been a GDR today. Or it might have collapsed in a quite different, probably more bloody and protracted manner.

Everyone who is actively involved in debates on GDR history will very likely have their own views on these specific questions; I certainly know where I stand on some; I still have an open mind on, and am intrigued by, others; and this of course is the very reason why we continue to engage in active research and debate. But let us return from these particular illustrations to the more general theoretical issues.

Does this rich choice of competing perspectives and explanatory frameworks necessarily imply that all are equally valid or, put differently, equally invalid, equally a product of our imagination, our imposition of narrative, and so on - as a postmodernist might wish us to believe? Or is there any way that some form of "appeal to the evidence" however mediated through specific paradigms and associated conceptual frameworks - can help us choose between one or another?
In my own view, some frameworks of inquiry - paradigms proper - will remain mutually irreconcilable, at least as far as fundamental philosophical, political, and moral assumptions about the relations between individuals and society are concerned. Other apparently conflicting interpretations are more a matter of emphasis and synthesis. It is perfectly possible to combine, for example, analysis of the "history of events," the often unintended consequences of the actions and intentions of individuals and their at times almost haphazard combinations under unique circumstances, with a focus on long-term factors - on institutional configurations, social and economic trends, key elements of structural and cultural history - within which and against which individuals live their lives. It is possible to write history with an acute awareness of the complex ways in which human beings are both in part formed and constituted by the circumstances in which they live - contributing to the remarkable patterning of social behavior - but are at the same time extraordinarily capable of injecting new elements of creativity and change. Let us return, then, to the wider questions about the "nature of history."

(A Somewhat Inconclusive) Conclusion: The Nature of History

What, if any, preliminary conclusions can we draw from these ruminations? I would make absolutely no claim, in this brief essay, to have resolved debates that have exercised many fine minds - including the formidable Max Weber - over decades, indeed centuries. I hope merely to have suggested some ways of thinking about these issues, which will hopefully be helpful in moving the debates out of certain sterile circles and at least somewhat forward, in some respects.

I should perhaps emphasize quite explicitly that this essay is more concerned with addressing certain perennial theoretical issues that confront all historians (whether they are aware of them or not) than engaging in particular substantive arguments within the terms of recent debates about postmodernism (such as the focus on allegedly new "sociocultural approaches," which seems to me to be largely just another example of a perspectival paradigm). Hence my attempt to develop
new, and somewhat more abstract, ways of talking about some of the problems relating to the gap between past realities and present representations.

We will not be able to restore the notion of one hegemonic "grand narrative" (if such a thing ever really enjoyed uncontested status - which seems exceedingly dubious); but at least we can be somewhat clearer about the interactions among different viewpoints in the present and different substantive stories about the past.47 We can also move from the substantive level of talking about specific, substantive types of story (or "metanarratives") to a more abstract level of analyzing the nature of competing theoretical approaches (or "paradigm candidates"). And we can be aware of the fundamental metatheoretical reasons why, in history, we have a multiplicity of competing paradigm candidates rooted in different conceptions of "human nature," different assumptions about the relationships between the individual and society, and so on. At least we can attain a degree of clarity about the bases for disagreements, and the grounds for choosing one or another approach. Nor, I think, will we be able to salvage the concept of "value neutrality" in the way that Weber defined it, simply because there is not and cannot be a shared set of common, unchanging analytic concepts to capture the constructed and changing realities of the social world. We cannot therefore - metaphorically - just leave our values at the door of the inquiry, to be picked up again when evaluating the results, as Weber thought. But we can at the same time be aware that this is not a matter of individual values (with the implied prescription: declare at the outset that you are a white, middle-aged male American conservative capitalist, or a young black lesbian, or whatever, and all biases are signaled and neutralized, or seen as "enriching") but rather a patterned set of (sub-)cultural values. Let me emphasize this: The problem is precisely not the old-hat question of personal prejudices at an individual level, to be declared and taken into account (as in the old adage to students: know the historian before you read the history); rather, the problem is a theoretical one rooted in the multiplicity of competing paradigm candidates and associated conceptual frameworks previously described.48 One could say that, to a remarkable degree,
individual biases are not in fact an issue: The issue rather is the ways in which they are institutionalized and filtered through the channels of specific theoretical language communities. We thus cannot simply seek to declare individual prejudices at a personal level and then hope to appeal to (unspecified) common-craft procedures at some universal level. The problem is precisely that there are no shared sets of theoretical approaches and concepts across the profession as a whole.

But this does not mean that we need to take flight into relativism nor resort to a notion of all history as ideology, nor even stick our heads in the sands of blind empiricism because we will have a greater awareness of the character, extent, and limits - the parameters - of what we are doing. We will at least be able to understand better the nature of competing communities of scholars - without positing some vague notion of a universal guild that allegedly shares certain unexamined craft practices - and be aware of what is involved in opting for one or another theoretical approach or paradigm candidate. Under the appropriate conditions (with certain shared metatheoretical values and assumptions, and institutionally sustained freedom of debate), we will be able to proceed with intelligence and goodwill in a community of scholars more committed to engaging in honest debates about the past than scoring political and personal points in the present. We can make informed choices about the theoretical languages we want to speak, in communicating with each other and - however much it is a matter of "looking through a glass darkly" trying to maintain lines of broken communication between past and present.

How, finally, should we summarize the discipline of history? There is a large and to my mind rather unprofitable industry in elaborating two polarized comparisons: history and science on the one hand, and history and fiction on the other. But it seems to me that there are far more fruitful lines of comparison we can explore if we really want to make some grand statement about the nature of history.

All sorts of other human endeavors could be brought to bear as points of comparison. History is a form of interpretive anthropology, seeking
to recover the lost languages and codes of intersubjective communication of the past. It is a form of art, seeking to depict - in words but also sometimes with visual imagery - worlds we have lost. It is a form of geography, seeking to present reasonably reliable maps of these lost worlds, with conventions for symbols and signs to mark the salient points and features, showing how to find our way around. (And we should never forget that some maps - however artificial the conventions they deploy - are far more useful than others.) History is a form of detective work, seeking to follow hunches, uncover clues, and identify possible culprits. A historian sometimes must also act as a lawyer, constructing a plausible case and deploying all the arts of rhetoric to persuade judge and jury, on the balance of the available evidence or even beyond reasonable doubt (although the court of historical appeal is never closed to new evidence). History is, in short, often partial (in both senses of the word), creative, argumentative, rhetorical - but not necessarily also, or only, invented or untrue. If we accept certain vocabularies and conventions of enquiry, it is even (within the constraints of these language communities) falsifiable.

Most of all, perhaps, history is fascinating. Let us not forget, in the end, that we do history because history matters. At its most basic, we do history because we are curious about other lives, other societies, other worlds. We want to know how different types of state and society were constructed and transformed; we want to know what people believed, why certain tragedies happened, what effects human actions and aspirations have had on the lives of others. We want to understand ourselves and where we have come from. No amount of pointing out that we cannot do these things perfectly, that nothing we say will be uncontroversial, that much relies on shared conventions and assumptions, should prevent us from continuing to explore the past with as much honesty and intelligence as we can bring to bear on this universal human endeavor.
NOTES

1 A fuller version of the arguments will be found in my forthcoming book, Historical Theory: Or, Talking Sense About History (London, 2000).

2 I should emphasize that my purpose here is not to explore in any detail the varieties of postmodernist critique, nor to plot the twists and turns in the development of sometimes arcane debates in this area, but rather simply to note the more important challenges that have recently been mounted to notions of history as the pursuit of truth about a real past. This is, in short, not a brief excursion into intellectual history but rather a raising to consciousness of the key issues with which I am concerned in this essay.


5 For a sustained engagement with a range of theoretical positions, see particularly Robert Berkhofer, Beyond the Great Story: History as Text and Discourse (Cambridge, Mass., 1995).

6 I am here, of course, glossing over the wide range of positions within the posited "traditional" camp, not all of which are as naive as some postmodernists would have us believe. Both labels postmodernist and traditional actually cover a wide range of approaches; the adequacy of the labeling is for present purposes less important than the questions addressed.


8 See particularly Hayden White, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore, 1987).


10 See John Tosh, The Pursuit of History, 2d ed. (London, 1991). Konrad H. Jarausch’s notion of "post-postmodernism" also appears to state that one can combine a (renewed rather than sustained?) commitment to a relatively traditional version of "the historian’s craft" and "accepted historical methods" with a heightened awareness of language or discourse as an element of the social construction of reality, achieved through exposure to postmodernism. This would then be less a new theoretical approach than a traditional approach to a (relatively) new area.

11 Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob, Telling the Truth About History (New York, 1994). I discuss this more fully in my forthcoming book (see note 1 to this essay); essentially, the problem is that these authors end up with a situation in which competing approaches are either deemed to be mutually compatible (see my discussion of "perspectival paradigms"), or their adequacy can only be adjudicated on the basis of extratheoretical, political, and moral criteria.

12 Richard Evans, In Defence of History (London, 1997). Given Evans’s acute sensitivity to any almost attempt to characterize his position expressed in, to date, around 24,000 words on a Web site of responses to his critics should hasten to add that he does not restrict his argument to this point.

13 I do not intend here to enter into the arcane debates stimulated by E. H. Carr’s confused disquisition on what turns "something which happened in the past" into a full-blown "historical fact"; see E. H. Carr, What Is History? (New York, 1961), chap. 1. Nor do I follow Hayden White’s somewhat idiosyncratic distinction between "fact" and "event"; I use the word "fact" in the generally accepted sense of a singular "true" statement about some aspect of the past (which need not be what we conventionally understand as an "event"). See also Chris Lorenz, Konstruktion der Vergangenheit (Cologne, 1997).

14 In the view of journalist Anne Karpf herself the daughter of a Holocaust survivor the only real question remaining now is whether Wilkomirski/Grosjean is "mad" or "bad": whether this is someone who, out of some deep-seated psychological insecurity, has genuinely convinced himself of a different identity or whether this is a person who is knowingly engaging in a long-term game of massive public deceit, for whatever reasons. Karpf, interviewed on "Child of the Death Camps: Truth and Lies," BBC documentary, Nov. 3, 1999.

15 Ironically, this is not least the case with Keith Jenkins himself, who certainly makes a convincing pretense of seeking to expound the arguments of Carr, Elton, Rorty, and
White, as though he really believes he is giving us an empirically faithful rendering of their texts.

16 This of course relates to Robert Berkhofer's notion of "Great Story," or Jean François Lyotard's notion of "metanarrative," both of which highlight the insertion of particular facts into broader, substantive narratives not given by the individual facts (such as the "rise of liberty," "progress," "human emancipation," and so on or even a great story of "ruptures," "absences," and "discontinuities," although postmodernists might not like to agree that their disjointed view also is in essence a metanarrative based on little more than presupposition). However, given the wider theoretical connotations of a concept such as metanarrative, I decided to stick with a less specific, less loaded term to intimate the rather multifaceted problem of Geschichtsbilder and "noise" around the edges of any historical account.

17 These are rooted to some extent in different substantive pictures rather than differences in theoretical approach (discussed further in the next section), although the two often overlap.

18 This interpretation had the double benefit of both proving anti-Nazi credentialsthrough the outright condemnation of the evil regime and the criminal acts committed in the name of the German peoplewhile at the same time providing an effective historical alibi for the vast majority of Germans. For further details, see Mary Fulbrook, German National Identity After the Holocaust (Cambridge, 1999).

19 This is obviously not an appropriate place to give full references on all these controversies. For the points made in this paragraph, see Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New York, 1996); and Historikerstreit (Munich, 1987). On some of the older historiography discussed in previous paragraphs, see, e.g., Friedrich Meinecke, Die deutsche Katastrophe: Betrachtungen und Erinnerungen (Wiesbaden, 1946); Gerhard Ritter, Europa und die deutsche Frage (Munich, 1948), eg. 1934; and further discussion in Fulbrook, German National Identity.

20 It might be noted in passing that even the postmodernist appeal to notions of "rupture" and "lack of order" have political implicationsbut in the case of postmodernist refusal to impose intellectual order or pattern on what appear to be chaotic and disordered events, the practical implication is one of willful abdication from any notion of political or moral responsibility or rational exercise of active citizenship.

21 This is, of course, reminiscent of the story that a bumblebee, if taught the laws of aerodynamics, would discover that it is technically unable to fly. A similar problem is faced by unpracticed bicyclists in their first attempts to balance on two wheels.

22 These issues are discussed more fully in my forthcoming book on these questions (again, see note 1 to this essay). It may be worth reminding ourselves, for the time being, that we, as human beings, communicate with each other on a daily basis -
sometimes with greater clarity and mutual comprehension, sometimes with obfuscation and misunderstanding - and that there is no reason, in principle, why we cannot develop appropriate, if different, forms of communication with other humans elsewhere and at other times. These modes of communication will of course be somewhat different from those involved in face-to-face encounters.

23 I should perhaps emphasize at the outset that I refer here to something rather more general and more abstract than the specific substantive accounts implied by notions of the "Great Story" or the "metanarrative." Whereas paradigm may not be a term welcomed by all, it serves my purposes very well here. 24 See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, 1962; 2d ed., 1970).

25 It might be added that with the development of quantum theory, the same currently appears to be true even of natural science pace Kuhn.

26 Maybe, because deviance from the master seems to be frowned on in some quarters, to give this version an aura of theoretical respectability I should call it "post-Kuhnian."

27 See, e.g., Appleby, Hunt, and Jacobs, Telling the Truth About History, which presents an essentially Whig view of the history of history.

28 See G. M. Trevelyan, English Social History (London, 1944; reprint, 1948), vii: "Social history might be defined negatively as the history of a people with the politics left out. . . . [But] without social history, economic history is barren and political history is unintelligible."

29 See, e.g., the essays in Ian Kershaw, ed., Weimar: Why Did Democracy Fail? (London, 1990), where very different weights are given, e.g., to structural weaknesses or individual decisions, as in the perceived degree of "leeway for manoeuvre" (Handlungsspielraum) in Heinrich Brüning's deflationary economic policy that had ultimately disastrous social and political consequences.

30 Although there are serious debates in the philosophy of science, on which I am not qualified to comment, a simple example will illustrate the basic point: Two atoms of hydrogen and one atom of oxygen will, when combined, produce water - whether one drinks it as a Chinese Marxist or an American capitalist. Remember the old rhyme: "Peter was a little boy; Peter is no more; for what he thought was H₂O; was H₂SO₄." Cf. also Tom Lehrer's song about the Periodic Table, which ends, "These are the only ones of which the news has come to Harvard; And there may be many others but they haven't been discovered."

31 On different definitions of "nation," see Fulbrook, German National Identity.

32 Let me give some examples of the acts of faith that may be required: I either believe in "deep structures determining surface appearances" or I do not. (For the record, I do not.) I either believe in the "decentered subject" or I do not. (For the record, I do not;
and actually, I must confess to a singular distaste for the kind of pretentious and antihumanistic theorizing that tends to go on in such quarters on occasion.) I either believe that analysis of individual motives and actions constitutes a complete and satisfying explanation of a course of events through a rich historical narrative, or I do not. (For the record, I do not - or at least, I do not consider this to be in any way sufficient as an explanation.) And so on.

33 Again, this is a massive question that cannot be pursued further in this context.


36 Some of the contributions to this debate are reprinted in Rainer Eckert, Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, and Isolde Stark, eds., Hure oder Muse? Klio in der DDR: Dokumente und Materialien des Unabhängigen Historiker-Verbandes (Berlin, 1994).


38 See, e.g., Klaus-Dietmar Henke and the work carried out under the auspices of the Hannah-Arendt-Institut für Totalitarismusforschung, Dresden (note the name).

39 See particularly Hartmut Kaebler, Jürgen Kocka, and Hartmut Zwahr, Sozialgeschichte der DDR (Stuttgart, 1994) and related volumes; and Richard Bessel and Ralph Jessen, eds., Die Grenzen der Diktatur: Staat und Gesellschaft in der DDR (Göttingen, 1996).

40 See my overview of the longer historiography in Mary Fulbrook, Interpretations of the Two Germanies (Basingstoke, U.K., 2000). A new twist to old West German battle lines has in fact been given by the East German dimension, in which those who were victims of the SED regime or who at least wanted to represent themselves in this light to some degree also adopted the condemnatory mode, often eclectically intermixed with overtones of social history and the history of everyday life. The work of Stefan Wolle is a case in point: See particularly Die heile Welt der Diktatur: Alltag und

41 Schroeder, SED-Staat, 632 ff.

42 I elaborate on these ideas in a book I am currently working on, titled Perfectly Ordinary Lives? A Social History of the GDR (forthcoming).

43 It should perhaps be remembered that principles of rationing operate in all healthcare systems: It matters little, for those who are excluded or disadvantaged, whether it is because of the primacy of political privilege under communism (members of the SED always had access to the best health care, the best-equipped hospitals and sanatoria in the GDR) or for economic reasons under capitalism (private health insurance schemes, private health care in a country with an overstretched national healthcare system, etc.). From the perspective of the disadvantaged under either system, it would be quite reasonable to quote Shakespeare: "A plague on both your houses."

44 While I was ruminating on these ideas, a young East German colleague told me that she would never be able to present such an interpretation because the predictable response would be along the lines of "well, you would say that, wouldn't you" in other words, such an analysis could be written off as yet another symptom of Ostalgie. It is also potentially open to denunciation as a tainted attempt to rescue "something good" from the GDR. It seems to me that we should take an emphatic stand against such politicized modes of evaluation, which are not relevant criteria for determining the intellectual adequacy of these approaches.

45 At the time of writing, Konrad H. Jarausch's recent edited volume, Dictatorship as Experience: Towards a Socio-Cultural History of the GDR (New York, 1999), was not available to me.

46 Logically, if competing explanations of the same events are mutually incompatible, we must either develop shared criteria for making a choice between them or we must take refuge in pretending to celebrate "a diversity of voices" for which read a rejection of Western traditions of rationality. It may be, of course, that the latter is precisely what some postmodernists - with their explicit rejection of what they term the "modernist" or "Enlightenment project" - want us to do. But, oddly, they simultaneously engage in what on the face (usually) appears to be rational debate grounded in the evidence of what others have said on the same issues and questions.

47 There seems little point, e.g., in seeking to resolve the theoretical issue of grand narratives by proposing the imposition of what amounts to a new substantive grand narrative of disorder, incoherence, and incomprehension as being supposedly more apposite to (or accounting better for) the realities (or evidence) of twentieth-century history.

48 Contrary to the impression given in some quarters, it did not take the impulses of
postmodernism to raise questions of “self-reflexivity” and personal bias to explicit attention: Even Geoffrey Elton had some comparatively wise words to utter on this topic more than thirty years ago (see, e.g., The Practice of History, 131ff). And it was of course Elton’s chief intellectual protagonist, E. H. Carr, who said: “Before you study the history, study the historian” - rapidly followed by the arguably much more crucial injunction: “Before you study the historian, study his historical and social environment” (What Is History? 54). Similarly, before postmodernists lay too much claim to coining the notion of history as a “dialogic enterprise,” we should remember that it was of course E. H. Carr who defined history as “a continuing process of interaction between the historian and his facts, an unending dialog between the present and the past” (What Is History? 35), a view with which - despite the vast gulf that separated them - Elton to some extent implied agreement.

49 Metaphors I rather like in the context of widespread discussions of history are “transparent window on,” “reflection of,” or “picture substituting for” the past. At least one can discuss degrees of shading and distortion in different types of glass through which one can still discern the shapes of something real, however darkly.

50 I have, in passing, made comments in respect to both of these areas, but I do not intend to explore them any more systematically in this context.
Regime ruptures as well as ideological struggles have shattered conceptions of the German past to a greater degree than the national histories of other European states. At the end of the twentieth century, the conjuncture of the collapse of communism and the linguistic turn has once again thrown accepted modes of narrating and interpreting Central European history into turmoil. How are we to explain the frequent system changes from Empire to Republic to Third Reich to German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)? What are the procedures for finding out the truth in a field marred by urban legends, Holocaust denials, and Ostalgie? In order to cope with such uncertainties, the informed but not partisan effort to restore order by eminent scholars like Mary Fulbrook, long-time editor of the journal German History, writer of leading textbooks and monographs on the GDR, is especially welcome. Although I agree with many of her observations, in the following comments I would like to emphasize some of my reservations in order to tease out the implications of her statements and then present some alternative proposals of my own.

The Fulbrook Perspective

The debate about postmodernism has been curiously delayed among German historians, many of whom have remained committed to a neorealist position due to the overwhelming presence of the Holocaust. When Michael Geyer and I attempted to initiate a more systematic discussion of the theoretical ferment in French or American
historiography in 1989, Kenneth Barkin, the editor of the leading journal in the field, censored us for abandoning the Enlightenment, although we simply presented a different understanding of its legacy. Despite these efforts, Ute Daniel, Christoph Conrad, and other younger scholars have triggered an intensive discussion about the possibilities and limits of a new cultural history in Germany as well. Some of the excitement of their discoveries has even penetrated into the pages of the social history mouthpiece Geschichte und Gesellschaft and exercised the subscribers of the electronic forum H-Soz-u-Kult. Curiously enough, this intellectual confrontation seems only just to have arrived among German specialists in Britain, as the recent volume by Richard Evans and the forthcoming book by Mary Fulbrook attest.

This delay would not matter if it did not have strange consequences for the shape of the argument. To an outside reader, especially of the footnotes, the British version of the debate seems largely self-referential, centering on Keith Jenkins or Patrick Joyce, while largely ignoring the earlier American and German statements. This surprising parochialism leads to a distorted representation of the advocates of the linguistic turn, focusing only on the radical postmodernist (Fred Ankersmit) and narrativist (Hayden White) positions. Unfortunately, it slights the broad middle ground that has emerged after a decade of heated discussions among feminists, former Marxists, and post-colonialists that welcomes postmodernism as an exciting opening but rejects some of its extreme epistemological consequences. Recent essays by Geoff Eley, as well as the survey by Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob (which Fulbrook dismisses too quickly), not to mention the arguments put forth by Michael Geyer and myself, are representative of this view.

This is not an attempt to cavil about priorities but a question of pointing to the existence of a more discriminating reaction that seeks to benefit from the methodological impulses of deconstruction, discourse analysis, or narratology without necessarily succumbing to their ethical relativism.
Because the Dutch theorist Chris Lorenz has laid the issue of referentiality to rest, the key problem does, indeed, revolve around the larger interpretative constructions that assign meaning to the past, be they frameworks or Geschichtsbilder. As the central explanatory concept Professor Fulbrook offers the Kuhnian notion of "paradigm," spinning it out by introducing "perspectival paradigms" as different from "paradigms proper" and subdividing these even further into "pidgin paradigms" and "implicit paradigms." At first blush this taxonomy appears suggestive, but on closer look the distinction between these various paradigms is not always clear, and feminist historians or partisans of Gesellschaftsgeschichte might be unhappy to be consigned to one subcategory or another. The notion of metahistorical constructs that precede scholarly investigation and are therefore resistant to empirical falsification is certainly helpful in pointing to the underlying theoretical assumptions of Marxists, Weberians, Foucauldians, and the like. But perhaps because I have myself been criticized for its misuse, I am more skeptical about applying the natural-science concept of "paradigm" to historiographical developments because the latter do not show a clear succession of ruling explanations but rather a contested contemporaneity of incompatible claims.

Concerning the elective affinities between certain implicit frameworks and "patterns of political or moral identification," Professor Fulbrook is more likely to be right. Beyond the Eurocentrist limitation of Weber's cultural concepts, I am not quite sure what provoked her strictures against the ideal-type method. However, I can only underline her conclusion of a general correspondence between conservative politics and traditional methodology on the one hand and more critical views and various methodological innovations, such as the "social history of politics" or everyday history, on the other hand. Within the German context, there does seem to be a good deal of generational and
ideological identity politics involved in the respective choice of such political commitments and interpretative stances,\textsuperscript{11} but I am skeptical of finding a set of criteria that will allow one to evaluate such competing approaches in general and rather trust in the competition of different empirical investigations and interpretative explanations of the past in an open market of ideas.

The intense debate surrounding the meaning of East German history is, indeed, a major proving ground for the various approaches because it revolves around the incorporation of an alien element into the Western-dominated collective memory of the united Germany. Professor Fulbrook's comments on the evolution of the debate from sensationalist accusations to more scholarly efforts are well taken.\textsuperscript{12} Moreover, her sharp criticism of the revival of totalitarianism (such as Klaus Schroeder's ugly neologism durchmachtete Gesellschaft) is an important contribution to arguments for more differentiated approaches to the contradictions of the GDR's past.\textsuperscript{13} And I can only agree with her emphasis on "the ambiguities of more complex realities" that she sees in the various social provisions of the communist regime, which resemble the British welfare state. But her objections to Kocka's notion of durchherrschte Gesellschaft fail to appreciate the stress on contestation between the regime and the population in some of the most recent work of the Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung (ZZF) in Potsdam.\textsuperscript{14} Moreover, her own conceptual contributions seem still somewhat unsettled, varying from "participatory dictatorship" or "police welfare state" to "modern party absolutism" and do not take into account the latest coinages, such as Konsensdiktatur.

As a result of these problems, Professor Fulbrook's final ruminations on "the nature of history" remain oddly inconclusive. One can only agree with her insistence on the ideal of "a community of scholars more committed to engaging in honest debates about the past than scoring political and personal points in the present." Moreover, the metaphor of
"looking through a glass darkly" is as poetic as it is fetching. Also, her description of history's resemblance to interpretative anthropology, an art form, a kind of geography, a version of detective work, and a legal brief is illuminating. But what are the standards by which an admittedly "partial . . . creative, argumentative, or rhetorical" writing about the past can be judged so as to be sure that it will be neither "invented [n]or untrue"? There she leaves her audience without an answer but this is precisely the crucial point! Although she clearly sets herself off from such neorealists as Geoffrey Elton, I hope not to do her too much injustice by supposing that when all is said and done, Professor Fulbrook would counsel us to use our "common sense." But is that really enough?

Conceptual Alternatives

In order to sound a more constructive note let me share with you some potential alternative solutions to the conundrums elaborated so well by Fulbrook. The following remarks draw on my collaboration with Michael Geyer, with whom I have for several years been engaged in a concerted effort to rethink the basic pattern of German history in the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{15} I also briefly refer to some of the heated discussions taking place in and around the ZZF in Potsdam, on how to deal with the history of the GDR and incorporate it into a joint postwar history of the Germans.\textsuperscript{16} These ruminations therefore try to bring American perspectives as well as German points of view more strongly into play in order to supplement the British vantage point. Instead of presenting post-modernism as the problem, I try to see whether its impulses might not also be part of the solution.

When attempting to describe the fundamental metahistorical orientations in German historiography, I find the concept of the master
narrative more useful than the dated notion of a paradigm. Taken from Jean François Lyotard, this term refers to a set of central stories told about a country that legitimize its identity through a certain representation of its history. Master narratives determine the content of such tales, the theoretical grounding of their presentations, the semantic methods of their retelling, and finally their basic discursive structure that creates a past reality. For instance, the story of the foundation of the American republic by freedom-loving colonists seeking to overthrow British repression is one such foundational narrative. One of the many advantages of this notion is the assertion of a systematic connection among historical interpretation, methodological approach, and political orientation that Professor Fulbrook has posited so eloquently.

In the postwar period three such master narratives have competed with each other for dominance within the German successor states. First, traditionalists such as Gerhard Ritter continued with a chastened version of the national master narrative, created by the Borussian school to justify Prussian-led unification, in order to prepare the restoration of a national state in the future. Second, East German historians such Ernst Engelberg elaborated a Marxist counternarrative to this bourgeois conception, based on social class, that focused on the progress of the labor movement and intended to legitimize the GDR. And finally, progressive social historians such as Hans-Ulrich Wehler and Jürgen Kocka, sometimes called the Bielefeld school, elaborated in West Germany a narrative of modernization that emphasized the Sonderweg, the German deviance from the West. At the turn of this century, all of these master narratives have become discredited due to the excesses of nationalism, the collapse of communism, and the postmodern shift. The current confusion about how to present German history is a result of the eclipse of these master narratives, which creates an unprecedented degree of freedom for maneuvering. If one concedes the postmodern claim that historians reconstruct the past rather than produce scientific truth, the task of historical writing becomes both more complicated and
easier at the same time. Although Hayden White is right in stressing the literary aspects of imagination and stylistic presentation, most practitioners agree that the writing of history is constrained by what actually happened in the past, which is accessible through memory or evidence. A historian also is limited by preceding debates about the interpretation of events because he approaches his subject with the baggage of previous arguments. Finally, historiography as a scholarly endeavor insists on certain "rules of the craft," regarding the handling of evidence and the presentation of material that are shared in the guild, regardless of ideology. But postmodern critics are correct in suggesting that writing about the past is a dialogic enterprise, approaching what happened before from a shifting present that establishes questions and often influences interpretations. The previous sketch of a moderate constructivism will hardly satisfy philosophers of history, but it represents the current practice of a post-postmodernist consensus. Whereas this approach cannot produce "truth" in the abstract, it can offer a degree of intersubjectivity that goes beyond "common sense."  

What would a history of the GDR look like, if it were written from the point of view of such a new sociocultural history? Taking my recent volume on Dictatorship as Experience, which summarizes the work of the ZZF in English, as an example, it would, much like Mary Fulbrook, reject totalitarianism theory and stress the many tensions and contradictions of East German society. But it would also go a step further in exploring the paradox between the dictatorial character of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) system on the one hand and the relative normalcy of many individual lives on the other hand. In order to explain both the long existence of the second German state and its rapid collapse, a differentiated approach would seek to investigate the countless interactions between the rulers and the ruled as well as probe the degree to which the population actually controlled itself through language, discourse, and symbolism. As theoretical formulations to describe this contradiction I have therefore suggested the concept of a Fürsorgediktatur, which highlights both the compulsive and caring
aspects of the regime, and the notion of a Gegengesellschaft, which stresses the communist attempt to replace bourgeois society. A critical appropriation of some postmodern impulses would have to stress the imperative of self-reflexivity as the precondition for critical scholarship. Because it tends to be neither common to all nor to make sense to everyone, an appeal to "sensualistic" cannot provide theoretical bootstraps for pulling oneself out of the methodological swamp. Instead, it is necessary to turn a critical gaze on oneself as historian, asking for an open admission of personal prejudices, motives, and agendas - all those present impulses that govern the reconstruction of a past not just among others. The differences in background, ideology, current preoccupations, and the like that scholars bring with them to their interrogation of earlier times cannot be effaced - instead they provide the potential for enriching understanding through their very diversity. But such a plurality will only produce positive results if they follow the shared procedures of the craft, admit their own stakes in the debate, and subject their work to the criticism of their peers. Because there is no easy way back to a state of Rankean innocence and objective truth, historians and their publics had better learn to live with the current sense of uncertainty.

When looking back at the entire twentieth century it seems that a limited openness to post-postmodern opportunities might provide clearer insights into its twisted course than a more traditional, unilinear narrative. The unparalleled catastrophes of the world wars and the Holocaust have shattered Whiggish notions of human progress and dramatized modernity's potential for barbarism instead. Yet the painful learning processes of the second half of the century have also produced the more positive outcomes of replacing dictatorship with democracy, creating security and prosperity through a social market economy, and overcoming nationalism with European integration, which appear to support greater optimism. How well can such extreme fluctuations and stark contradictions be represented by conventional event narratives and analyses that stress structural
continuities? Or does all this personal suffering and collective upheaval not need a historical approach that takes seriously collective experiences of rupture and incoherence? Before they start putting the pieces back together again, German historians ought first to face up to the incredible disorder of their past!
NOTES

1 Michael Geyer and Konrad H. Jarausch, A Shattered Past: (Re-)Constructing German Histories (forthcoming).


6 For critics of this post-postmodern consensus, see Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn, eds., Reconstructing History: The Emergence of a New Historical Society (New York, 1999).


14 See Thomas Lindenberger, ed., Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn in der Diktatur: Studien zur Gesellschaftsgeschichte der DDR (Cologne, 1998), as well as the companion volumes edited by Michael Lemke, Peter Hübner, and Martin Sabrow.


19 Chris Lorenz, Konstruktion der Vergangenheit: Eine Einführung in die Geschichtstheorie (Cologne, 1997).


A SEARCH FOR GENIUS IN WEIMAR GERMANY: THE
ABRAHAM LINCOLN STIFTUNG AND AMERICAN
PHILANTHROPY
Malcolm Richardson

Buried in the annual report of the Rockefeller Foundation for 1930 lies a
cryptic reference to a German educational bursary with an unlikely
name: the Abraham Lincoln Stiftung (ALS). The organization’s odd
name - combining the German word for foundation with the name of an
American president - was intended to symbolize the possibility that a
democratic educational system might provide both social mobility and
humane leadership. The creation of this German foundation with
American money remains one of the best-kept secrets in the history of
Rockefeller philanthropy. The Lincoln Stiftung began its short,
tumultuous life in 1927 in the afterglow of Locarno and died a violent
death seven years later, another victim in the wreckage created by
Hitler’s seizure of power.

During its short existence the ALS recruited many of the Weimar
Republic’s ablest intellectuals to help it identify exceptionally gifted
younger scholars, artists, and writers. Among those who took part as
"talent scouts" were Marianne Weber, the widow of Max Weber; Paul
Tillich; Herman Hesse; Walter Gropius; Käthe Kollwitz; visionary
educators Kurt Hahn and Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy; publishers
Heinrich Simon and Eugen Diederichs; Prussian educational reformer
Carl Heinrich Becker; and such statesmen as Willy Hellpach, Anton
Erkelenz, and Wilhelm Sollmann - the latter three were prominent
figures in the politics of the Weimar coalition and firm supporters of the
Republic.
The Lincoln Stiftung had great ambitions but few resources. Although only a handful of the names of its sixty or so grant recipients would be recognized today, a longer list of 133 candidates whom the directors of the ALS apparently intended to recommend or consider for aid suggests that, had it continued its activities for a few years longer, the Lincoln Stiftung would have become internationally famous. Just before 1933 the directors of the Lincoln Stiftung listed Hannah Arendt, Waldemar Gurian, Klaus Mehnert, and even Albert Schweitzer as possible fellowship recipients. However, within a few months the ALS's directors and many of its advisers and fellows were fleeing Germany.

This essay attempts to provide a factual summary of the Lincoln Stiftung's origins and development and as full a listing of its advisers and fellows as the surviving documentary record permits. Because many of the organization's records apparently have been lost, a number of interesting questions about the ALS's operations and its choices of fellowship recipients must remain unanswered. At the same time, the Lincoln Stiftung's ambitious goals also invite speculation about the extent to which external philanthropists and liberal internationalists could have worked to strengthen the ill-fated Weimar Republic and whether the kinds of educational reform envisaged by its directors could have effected fundamental changes at German universities. Finally, the ALS's insistence on finding unrecognized genius or unfulfilled talent, and the involvement of many of its founders with the opposition to Hitler, demands an effort to examine the subsequent careers of its fellows. Although I can only begin to sketch a collective portrait of its fellows and leadership in the 1930s, even a preliminary assessment must at least consider some important issues about the younger generation's relationship to the events of 1933. Although I cannot fully answer the questions I intend to raise, I believe the case of the Lincoln Stiftung offers an opportunity for further research into the relationships among the youth movement, the educational system, and the fall of the Weimar Republic.
Background

From the outset the Lincoln Stiftung was an unusual example of German-American collaboration. When the ALS was formed in 1927 by a group of liberal German educators, both its German and American sponsors thought the enterprise was better left unpublicized, and accordingly made no public announcement. In the following year, when the trustees of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial voted to give money to the new German organization, they took care to keep their gift a well-guarded secret. The minutes of the memorial, a foundation created by John D. Rockefeller to commemorate his wife, record this decision: "The funds will be submitted to the Lincoln Stiftung through . . . [an] intermediary in order that the donor shall remain anonymous."¹ Shrouded in secrecy at birth, the Lincoln Stiftung has remained virtually unknown until today.²

That a gift from an American foundation, and especially one destined for the support of scholars and teachers in the humanities, could potentially be so controversial, and thus require such caution, seems difficult to believe in retrospect. To understand this discretion it is necessary to recall the fevered political climate of Weimar Germany. Although the Republic had weathered serious crises, and the Locarno pact and a brief prosperity created the illusion of stability, bitterness toward the Allied nations remained while political hatreds, religious differences, and class distinctions poisoned Weimar politics. The universities, rooted in Imperial Germany, remained conservative and suspicious of, if not hostile to, the Republic. As an experiment with American methods of philanthropy, the Lincoln Stiftung was implicitly critical of the German universities and educational bureaucracy.
The idea of a private foundation pursuing its own ends independent of government direction was not a familiar one to most Europeans in the 1920s, but Germany boasted thousands of charitable institutions and trusts devoted to the welfare of orphans, students, and the sick. Moreover, Germany’s Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft (Kaiser Wilhelm Society) had pioneered the use of private funds to create advanced scientific institutes whose research work was conducted independently of the state-supported universities. Germany’s network of private foundations and research institutes suffered a severe blow in the early 1920s with the onset of runaway inflation. Suddenly, institutions with millions of marks in assets watched as the purchasing power of their endowments disappeared. In response, German scientists and scholars created new institutions such as the Notgemeinschaft für deutschen Wissenschaft, or Emergency Committee for German Science, or the Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes (Student Foundation of the German People) and sought help from both government budgets and private donations. Although prominent industrialists provided some support, the uneven economic recovery made private funding difficult, and these new institutions - like the universities they served - relied heavily on state support. It should hardly come as a surprise, then, that the creation of the Lincoln Stiftung was the result not so much of German as American initiative. Even more precisely, the Lincoln Stiftung experiment originated in a three-sided collaboration among the American donors, three German educators, and a remarkable English man of letters, Geoffrey Winthrop Young, whose life was to become intertwined with that of the ALS. In the interval between its creation in a period of optimism and its destruction in one of depression and despair, the Lincoln Stiftung managed to suggest ways in which a democratic educational system could be constructed from the aristocratic and conservative one bequeathed to the Weimar Republic by the old empire.

Critical of their country’s class distinctions and limited access to higher education, the German organizers of the Lincoln Stiftung - principally
Carl Heinrich Becker, Hans Simons, and Reinhold Schairer - sought to promote the careers of a more democratic corps of teachers. As a consequence of this stance, the advisory board of the Lincoln Stiftung included a disproportionately large number of youth movement leaders, pacifists, feminists, adult education specialists, and educational experimenters.

The Lincoln Stiftung developed a national network of consultants, or nominators, who sought to find outstanding if unconventional minds and gifted individuals of both sexes who were not well served by the German academic system. Also included in this search were youths whose service during wartime or whose background at ordinary popular schools precluded admission to the German universities. More than a few of the Lincoln Stiftung’s fellows held leadership roles in various youth groups - trade union or socialist in the northern industrial cities, Catholic in the Rhineland and southern Germany - and a number participated actively in various movements for international reconciliation. Perhaps not surprisingly, several of the Lincoln Stiftung’s directors and advisers later distinguished themselves in the resistance to Hitler, while many more, including the directors Hans Simons and Reinhold Schairer, fled Germany after 1933. Of the 101 intellectual leaders listed as advisers or consultants in the ALS’s first report to the memorial, over a quarter emigrated and several others - most notably Theodor Haubach and Adolf Reichwein, who were executed for their part in plots against Hitler - participated actively in the German resistance. The Lincoln Stiftung’s advisers and fellows were, by and large, educators; Becker and his associates sought to create a generation of teachers committed not to any one party or political creed but to democratic values generally. That such an aim should require outside funds was an admission that the German backers might find politically embarrassing, and they readily agreed to the oddest part of the Lincoln Stiftung plan: its anonymity. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that Becker and the other German directors saw in the ALS a way to
circumvent the conservative educational bureaucracy and the no less conservative universities.

The Rockefeller Philanthropies and Postwar Internationalism

On the American side the creation of the Lincoln Stiftung can be traced to a desire on the part of the Rockefeller philanthropists to aid the cause of international reconciliation. In the years immediately following World War I each Rockefeller philanthropy - and there were several until most were merged into the Rockefeller Foundation in 1928 - searched for ways to promote international understanding.³ The Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, a fund devoted primarily to the social sciences, proved especially active in fostering international exchanges and fellowships in its own field of reference.⁴ In the mid-1920s the memorial, in its attempt to improve international understanding, sought to examine the process by which educational systems reproduced prejudices and nationalist sentiment. To this end it commissioned a series of studies. Directed by the political scientist Charles Merriam of the University of Chicago, these studies of civic education in France, Germany, Italy, and Russia suggested that national education systems continued to foster dangerous animosities among the former belligerents of World War I.⁵

By promoting international exchanges and by funding European educators who were active on behalf of internationalist causes, the memorial's president, Arthur Woods, and its executive director, Beardsley Ruml, hoped to use the social sciences to counteract parochialism and narrow-minded patriotism. This American faith in the efficacy of the social sciences ran into some practical difficulties, however. Merriam's survey of civic education had noted that European school curricula reflected a very traditional kind of education with only
limited attention to the newer social sciences. At the sametime the humanities disciplines, especially history and languages, formed the crucial components in the elementary and secondary curricula and in shaping a view of the outside world. The series of studies undertaken by Merriam and his associates coincided with the Rockefeller office’s interest in taking a wider look at the humanities in Europe, and after some deliberation, the memorial’s leaders decided to seek a European consultant who could advise them on the best ways to strengthen European humanists working to improve international relations. The memorial wanted a consultant who was both in sympathy with their aims for educational reform and one who knew European institutions.

A letter from Woods to Ruml in the summer of 1925 gives perhaps the most explicit account of what the memorial hoped to achieve in its early exploration of Europe:

The plan that has gradually formed itself is for a survey of the field in Europe, to find out in general what is the state of the Humane Studies, and in particular who are the very great men in these subjects, under what conditions they are working, what, if anything, need be done to help them produce their best work, whether of aid of some kind at home, or the possibility of international intercourse. Then to find out about the students: are the best men going into these studies; if not, why; where are the most brilliant, are they studying with the masters they should, do they need to go to other countries for work.  

Woods himself had carried on a one-man inquiry: At Oxford, at Cambridge, and in London, he spoke with the leading British intellectuals of the day who were active in the League of Nations and other international causesGilbert Murray, Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, Ernest Barker, George Macaulay Trevelyan, and the Fabians
Graham Wallas and Beatrice Webb. "They have all been keen about it, some extremely enthusiastic," Woods reported with satisfaction. It was in the course of these conversations that Woods hit upon the memorial’s consultant for the intended survey of the humanities in Europe: the British poet and educator Geoffrey Winthrop Young. "No one had anything except good to say of him," Woods wrote Ruml, and after talking with Young, Woods too became convinced that the poet was the right man for the job. Young himself echoed the enthusiasm of Woods, Trevelyan, and the others in his letter of acceptance. Of Woods’s proposed survey Young replied that "its idealism appealed to every moral fibre."

In many respects, Young was an ideal choice. He was well versed in several European languages. His career as a teacher had culminated in an appointment as one of His Majesty’s Inspectors of Schools, a prestigious appointment that took him throughout England and gave him a wealth of experience with different educational practices. A renowned mountain climber, Young remained an active figure even after the loss of a leg in World War I and amazed his contemporaries by continuing to climb with only one leg. "His successful ascent of the Matterhorn a few years ago, in the face of what might seem an insuperable disability, ranks as one of the greatest feats of mountaineering." The Times of London noted. Young, in fact, climbed peak after difficult peak for eighteen years after the amputation. At his death one mountaineering journal proclaimed him the best amateur climber of his day, and his companion on one numbing eighteen-hour climb described Young’s endurance that day as "the greatest physical feat he had ever witnessed."
Too old for active duty, Young had volunteered for dangerous assignments throughout the war - first as a correspondent, then as the field director of British ambulance units in Belgium and in Italy where an Austrian shell forced surgeons to sever his leg. His gallantry and personality could not fail to appeal to Woods and the American philanthropists; in addition to his undeniable courage, and quite apart from his linguistic qualifications, Young’s idealism and his faith in voluntarism struck a resonant chord in the offices of an American foundation that had given millions for Belgian relief. Finally, Young appealed to the Americans for another reason: Although he never abandoned his belief that the Germans bore the major share of the responsibility for the war, four years of bloodshed and his own personal trauma had burned away the nationalist ardor of 1914 and transformed Young into a pacifist. "We have chosen war and must follow it to its undiscriminating end," he wrote during the war in one passage reminiscent of Woodrow Wilson. "Let us see to it that it is for the last time."  

Although Young’s initial assignment included all of Europe, he soon narrowed his focus to Germany. "For reasons too many to set down, Germany must always remain, intellectually, of principal importance to Europe," Young began a lengthy report to the memorial. He suggested that it make an intensive study of German needs and then use the experience gained there before expanding its grant-making in the humanities to other countries. In the meantime, Young plunged into his work with relish. Following his own advice, he traveled throughout Germany, visiting the country’s principal intellectual centers and universities.

The Young Report, 1926
Young emerged from his travels through Germany with a remarkable, even prophetic report on the cultural and intellectual life of Weimar Germany and its educational system. Beneath the day-to-day surface of events, Young detected deeper illiberal currents running through the youth movement, in the universities themselves, and especially among the student groups. In his portrayal of the intolerance of many German intellectuals and the growing alliance of extremist student and youth groups, Young painted a damning but sometimes penetrating sketch of German education.

He had set out merely to survey the country's humanities faculties, but in the course of his investigations on behalf of the American foundation Young discovered an emerging reaction to the Republic's educational reforms and a growing sense of intense political partisanship. In particular, Young was alarmed by the failure of the German universities to foster a sense of political tolerance that he knew must underlie any democratic society. Yet, far from being a source of support for the new Republic, Young found to his dismay that the German universities were instead "the breeding grounds of active wrong-headedness, of dogmatic intolerance." 

Young also was appalled by the extent to which politics played a role in university appointments and in student life. In the view of this former inspector of English schools, "party views are not only encouraged to trespass where they do not belong, but they may - to our thinking - be improperly reinforced by the whole weight which an authoritative reputation or an official position can lend." Young reported that he had been given reliable information about cases in which students received scholarships and other prizes as a result of pressures placed on the educational administration by political figures. Even worse, Young cited cases where the students had tried to influence faculty appointments. He also intimated that academic freedom was not entirely guarded by the ranks of the professors either, citing the case of
a professor at Jena whose polemics against President Paul von Hindenburg had led the nationalists to demand he be fired. To Young it was apparent in reading the German press and the academic journals that the "tradition of the professorial war-letter is not, spiritually, dead" and that Weimar professors were just as prone to resort to ad hominem attacks on opponents as their nineteenth-century predecessors had been. "Forbearance with a dependent, a pupil, even a weaker opponent, does not count for wisdom or as a virtue," Young ruefully noted.16

Young's indictment of the German professors repeated the three-hundred-year-old conflict between British empiricism and German idealism. But it also reflected a considered view of teaching and a familiarity with German methods at their best and their worst. Some twenty years before his mission to Germany on behalf of Rockefeller philanthropy Young had studied educational theory at the University of Jena, and the defects of the German penchant for abstraction had been painfully etched in his memory by one German theorist. In an unpublished chapter intended for his memoirs, Young recalled how at Jena he had gone eagerly to listen to the lectures of a "great pedagogic theorist." The renowned expert proceeded to "give a course of lectures on how to teach art without illustration from a single sample drawing or even a blackboard sketch," a performance Young termed a "masterpiece of sincere verbiage."17

In addition to the dogmatism to which this abstract theorizing easily lent itself, Young came to see in the course of his inquiry for the memorial a second, and no less serious, flaw in the organization of the universities. Access to the German university was severely restricted by a series of competitive examinations and by the fact that secondary education was not free. Because both students and professors were thus likely to come almost exclusively from the privileged and wealthy classes, the dangers of an education that did not encourage researchers to seek practical experience were increased. Nothing in their university
education was likely to challenge the prejudices of the students, and accordingly German students in the Weimar period developed an increasingly militant dislike of the Weimar establishment led by moderate trade unionists and middle-class democrats. If Young deplored a surprising hostility to new ideas and a dogmatic tendency among the professors, he denounced the baleful influence of the student fraternities, the duel ing corps, and the even more overtly political associations. "Their selected representatives," he explained to Woods and Ruml, "not only take part in many forms of university government, but advise on such matters as the choices for state scholarships, etc."18

Far from siding with the underprivileged, the students were, in the majority, even more reactionary than their professors. Although Young tended to dismiss student rhetoric as only an "immature distortion" of the nationalist and conservative views of their elders, he was forced to report at the same time that the students, taken as a group, were even more dangerously intolerant than the nationalist professors. The more politically active among the students, Young noted, were partisan extremists who did not hesitate to use intimidation and even violence on occasion against political opponents. "But, it is of more serious moment for us that there should be evidence that the corporate students [that is, members of the dueling corps and other elite fraternities] in their turn, and with naturally greater crudity [than the professors of the same ideological bent], seek to establish little short of a 'terrorism' over their contemporaries of a different political persuasion."19

In late 1926 the prejudice among the student corps was anti-republican, and ironically, in a country noted for its respect for the established authorities, "we have the curious position that an outspoken Republican, that is, a state supporter, may be blackballed . . . for any Games Club patronised by the substantial middle class."20 Despite a discernible revolt against the older generation, the student radicals had come to inherit the worst features of the older authoritarianism,
exaggerating it until it acquired a menacing new form. Throughout the student associations, the dueling fraternities, and the social clubs, too, Young detected an illiberal inheritance that boded ill for the health of a democratic political life. In German schools, Young concluded, "the spirit of toleration, of compromise, and of the personal respect owed to those who may think differently from us on honest grounds, is not a popular or inborn instinct." In his talks with various German intellectuals and educational leaders, Young was particularly struck by the number who had participated in the youth movement. "At the present day practically all the men who count, as forces or what we may call 'live wires,' in the country have in their time belonged to the movement in its earlier phase." At some point in the course of his tramps through Germany, Young met the remarkable Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, an unorthodox and visionary educator fired with the conviction that formal schooling all too often left the spiritual dimension of the personality undeveloped. In his search for alternatives to what he regarded as the stifling conformity and one-dimensional education of the day, Rosenstock-Huessy developed close ties with the student movement in Silesia. At the time Silesia, a disputed territory whose southern districts were divided between Germany and Poland after a postwar plebiscite, attracted attention from the student movement as a jumping off point for rambles through Central Europe to German-speaking communities across the border - popular destinations for nationalist German groups unhappy with the boundaries imposed by the Versailles treaty - and as a site for camps and treks in the German countryside.

It was undoubtedly through Rosenstock-Huessy that Young first made connection with the most dynamic of the German youth leaders, Hans Dehmel, and came to see the potential of the reconstructed youth movement. In Silesia, Dehmel and Rosenstock-Huessy created a hostel and center for adult education, the Boberhaus, that became a model for similar educational ventures throughout Germany and Central Europe.
Young himself spent time at the Boberhaus and described it in a log of his travels:

The experience of the life and conversations here proved most enlightening. It is an experiment to convert Lower Silesia into a cultural unit for eastern Germany. Trade union workmen, peasants, and students are associated for three weeks in common activities and resultant discussions. One of the many objects is to set University education in a more sympathetic light and to secure its better appreciation. Another is to keep the population on the soil and to cultivate them while they cultivate it. It is conducted by Prof. Rosenstock of Breslau, a practical economist, and one of our Lincoln helpers, and by Hans Dehmel, perhaps the most important of the leaders of young Germany, whom the Lincoln Stiftung is enabling this year to complete his education and so secure a firmer footing for his wide activities.23

When Dehmel received one of the first Lincoln Stiftung fellowships he had been working uninterruptedly for eight years to reunify the German youth movement. Along with Ernst Buske he had re-created the Deutsche Freischar, the largest and most successful of the Free German or independent youth movement organizations in the Weimar years. From his Silesian base Dehmel sought to involve students, farmers, and workers in experimental "working camps" that provided useful day labor coupled with evening classes and social activities. Not only did these camps provide an outlet for the unemployed or the restless, but Dehmel and his youth movement colleagues sought to overcome the barriers of class, religion, and ideology that were increasingly dividing German youth into warring camps in the 1920s. This nonpartisan and democratic tone brought Dehmel and Rosenstock-Huessy to the attention of political and educational leaders in Berlin. For his part, Young saw in the Silesian work camps and the youth movement an ideal marriage of theory and practice, of idealism and
action. "The new movement adopts a far more practical and praiseworthy principle [than the prewar youth movement, the Wandervögel]," Young wrote. "It seeks to teach a judicial attitude of mind towards even political questions, and a habit of handling them detachedly and impersonally upon their own merits. . . . It preaches respect for an opponent . . . presumably, likewise inspired by honorable and patriotic motives." Although far from perfect, this wing of the youth movement seemed to Young much more likely to create a spirit of democratic citizenship than the universities or the public schools. That assessment in itself might be taken as one of the most damning, if unspoken, parts of Young's indictment of the German educational system.

The ALS and Weimar Educational Theory

Given his criticism of Germany's restrictive school system and his own career in Britain, it is not surprising to find that Young was intensely interested in Weimar Germany's educational reformers. German pedagogical debates were especially intense in 1920s, a product of the ideological and political upheaval of the time and the work of Weimar Republic leaders such as Becker to broaden access to education. In fact, many of the now unfamiliar names on the list of ALS advisers turn out to be German educators, no small number of whom, like Rosenstock-Huessy, might be called part of Weimar Germany's "counter-culture." These educators were radically at odds with German educational hierarchies and the university's seemingly single-minded pursuit of specialization and rationality.

As one of its first fellows the Abraham Lincoln Stiftung chose a Catholic priest, Ludwig Baum, who sought to imitate the English public boarding schools. Baum, like many of the ALS fellows, had served at
the front during World War I and had been active in the youth movement. Following three years of active duty Baum studied for the priesthood in Bonn and threw himself into social work in the Catholic workers’ movement. When the ALS discovered him in 1927, he had just opened his boarding school at Hellerau, near Dresden. There, according to the ALS’s biographical file, Baum attempted “to put into practice a synthesis of fundamental Christian doctrine and tradition with the finest ideals of the German youth movement.” In his own words, Baum aimed to “free the education of our Catholic youth from its limitations” and instill a “deeper understanding and sympathy for other nations.” Young himself added a note on the biographical sketch forwarded to New York, declaring Baum “a remarkable man” who possessed the “personal simplicity and gaiety of St. Francis.”

Unique though his personality may have been, Baum’s selection as one of its earliest fellows illustrated the Lincoln Stiftung’s commitment to educational innovation and the connection between educational reform and the youth movement. Another educator and school founder, Fritz Klatt, served first as a consultant or “talent scout” before the ALS’s directors decided that his own impecunious work merited financial subsidy. Klatt, a prominent figure in the youth movement and an educational theorist, burned with an almost mystical faith in the necessity for individual self-development or Bildung. Before the war Klatt had tramped with the Wandervögel and studied art history. He fought at the front line and was severely wounded; always introspective, his war experiences intensified his search for personal meaning. After the war his loyalty to the youth movement’s ideals and his dissatisfaction with the existing educational system took a practical turn.

By that time Klatt had formed very definite ideas about education. Highly individualistic himself - one suspects he fit badly into the prewar Prussian schools with their insistence on a rigidly structured
curriculum and severe discipline - Klatt reasoned that because every person was unique, his or her training should vary accordingly. In 1921 Klatt founded his own adult education school and hostel in a sleepy Pomeranian town near the Baltic to put his ideas into practice. Klatt himself gave lectures on art, poetry, and philosophy to "young men of very varied professions and from all classes of society."  

Klatt’s experiment brought him some attention and notoriety. "The ALS took up his case on grounds that they saw in him a rare type of educational leader,” the ALS's file on Klatt confides, "one whose reactions from present social conditions have not merely resulted in negative criticism, but have led him to concrete and constructive action, contributing to new forms of corporate living." Some idea of his success came from the Nazis themselves: In 1933 they closed the school.

Perhaps the most remarkable, and undoubtedly the most influential, of the German educators whom Young came to know was Kurt Hahn, whose path in life would soon come to parallel Young’s. Before turning to education Hahn had pursued a successful political and administrative career. Hahn rose to the top of the German civil service in the years before the war, and during wartime he served in the German Foreign Office as an interpreter of British public opinion. As Germany neared the end of the disastrous war Hahn threw in his lot with Prince Max of Baden, who became the head of the provisional government. As an aide to Prince Max in this transitional regime, Hahn played an important role behind the scenes, meeting secretly with Allied diplomats to negotiate an end to the war.

The crisis of 1918-19 seems to have slaked Hahn’s thirst for public office. Following the disastrous interregnum in which the Allied powers largely rebuffed overtures from Prince Max’s weak government, Hahn
withdrew from the public realm. The failures of Imperial Germany and the painful transition to the Weimar Republic convinced Hahn that postwar Germany required leadership of a new sort, and beginning his second career as an educator he set out self-consciously to train both intellect and character. In the salmon and ochre colored buildings of the former monastery of Salem am Bodensee, Hahn launched his educational experiment with Prince Max’s children as his first charges. Although he would later be celebrated for his contributions to German democracy, in 1919 Hahn struck many observers as distinctly aristocratic in his approach to educational problems. Arnold Brecht, who had worked closely with Hahn during the war years and who knew him well during this period, later recalled that Hahn’s educational ideas were elitist. According to Brecht, the courtly Hahn sought to educate leaders first and foremost. 30 Although Hahn supported the Weimar Republic, he clearly viewed it as an imperfect regime but one preferable to the alternatives. Hahn therefore was the embodiment of the Vernunftrepublikaner, the less than whole-hearted democrats who supported the new regime with their heads but not their hearts.

Hahn’s ideas, however, found a perfect resonance with Young. He had been struggling for years to put into words and practice his own dissatisfaction with the English boarding school and its emphasis on the playing field. Young, to be sure, did not object to athleticism as such: Although a thoughtful educator and a reflective man of letters, he freely admitted his love for rough games and outdoor activities. But what Young found missing in his own experience and in the German schools he visited as well was an educational practice that balanced intellectual rigor with vigorous physical activity - which personal experience had taught Young that boys needed - in a setting that provided an educational purpose to all the events outside the classroom. Hahn did not see the excursions he organized for his charges as a momentary diversion from schooling but as part of a carefully constructed curriculum of experiences destined to shape character and emphasize
creativity and leadership. For Young, Hahn achieved a near-perfect harmonization of two very different educational goals, high German academic standards with the English public school's emphasis on character development.

Young's embrace of Hahn's methods and their common understanding that the virtues of aristocratic ideals of self development must not be lost in a democratic age helped shape the Englishman's vision of what the Lincoln Stiftung should, and might, achieve. Disdainful of vocational and mass education, Young shared Hahn's conviction that a handful of educational reformers and idealists could create exactly the sort of leaders modern Germany needed - and that traditional channels seemed designed to exclude or stunt. In the composition of its advisory board and its selection of its first fellows, the ALS sided with the experimentalists and the visionaries.

Organization of the Lincoln Stiftung

In retrospect it is Young's perceptive criticism of the defects of German educational organization and his commentary on the distemper of the times that first seize attention, but for Young the business at hand was the more positive task of finding a way in which American philanthropy might aid these forward-looking German educators. And the latter were not yet in retreat: In particular, Young had been heartened by the liberal outlook of the Prussian minister of education, Carl Heinrich Becker, and by the experimental attitude of Reinhold Schairer, the director of Germany's student aid society, the Studienstiftung. Exactly how the idea of creating an entirely new, private German foundation emerged from Young's conversations with these leaders is not clear, but when Young submitted his report to Woods and Rumil in late October 1926, the heart of his study was a
recommendation that the memorial support an imaginative scheme designed to introduce a measure of voluntaryism into a system that was still authoritarian and inherently rigid.

In contrast to the centralized state ministries and their formal procedures, Young proposed to use the American funds for an experiment with a more dispersed or decentralized search for talented individuals conducted by a purely private foundation. He challenged the German administrators to contrast their system with "a scheme which based its search for personalities upon personal and individual information." The new organization would depend on the type of individual voluntary service characteristic of many British and American charities and would rely on the "free collaboration" of unpaid consultants, individuals who "could be trusted on their own merits to understand its objects . . . and enter into its spirit." The ALS would operate outside state institutions and guard its independence from university or educational bureaucracies.

Some evidence of Young's success in launching the ALS is provided by the list of prominent Germans who agreed to serve either as nominators or as members of the board of trustees. This latter group, which Young persisted in calling the "presidential committee," was chaired by Education Minister Becker. A distinguished Orientalist, Becker directed the largest educational system in Weimar Germany with a firm hand - and, a rarity among Weimar professors, with a genuinely liberal outlook. A colleague in one of these beleaguered coalition governments said of him that "even if everything Becker did had been wrong . . . still Prussia had not had a better minister of culture for over a century." Becker merited this praise for the way in which he ran the Prussian state educational system with a determination to expand educational opportunities at all levels. His democratic inclinations led him to revise the admissions procedures of the Prussian universities, prying them open to candidates who did not have the classical education previously
required. Becker also used his power of appointment to promote professors more sympathetic to the Weimar Republic than the majority who, as Young had put it in his report to the memorial, were "reactionary, both in their politics and their views of contemporary life."34

In addition to Becker, the remaining members of the board included a carefully balanced list of political and cultural figures. The treasurer, Albert Dufour-Feronce, was a German diplomat who had only recently been elected by the League of Nations to serve as one of its permanent undersecretaries. The remaining members were unlikely bedfellows: Heinrich Simon, a liberal publisher who directed the influential Frankfurter Zeitung; a much more conservative publisher, Eugen Diederichs of Jena; the philanthropist and industrialist Robert Bosch of Stuttgart (who would later play a key role in the German resistance, providing funds to Carl Goerdeler); another industrialist, Carl Duisberg of I.G. Farben; and Georg Kerschensteiner of Munich, one of Germany’s leading educational philosophers.

Young and the German organizers - principally Becker, Simons, and Schairer - never intended to hand any real duties to this board, except perhaps those of fund-raising. Its primary function seems to have been entirely symbolic as a guarantee of the plan's representative quality and its broadly nonpartisan character. A second purpose, to judge by the assurances Young relayed to Woods and the Rockefeller trustees in New York, may have been to defend the Lincoln Stiftung from possible charges of undue American influence in German cultural affairs. Schairer credited Young with insisting "that the first condition was the formation of a purely German presidential committee who should administer the scheme not as the trustees of a foreign enterprise, but as the guardians of a national undertaking."35 Young himself wrote, in a supplementary report on the Lincoln Stiftung's first year of operation, that this group of prominent Germans had been created less to function
as a board of trustees with real executive powers than as "a protective screen . . . whose names should secure the fund from press criticism or political pressure." The committee, Young reported with satisfaction in 1930, had met only twice and gave every sign that it would "remain protectively and usefully inactive, except when questions of finance or fundamental problems of extension and the like arise." Finally, to guarantee that the committee should not play too active a role, the organization's bylaws stipulated that no member of the presidential committee could take part in the deliberations of the fellowship committee or make recommendations on the Lincoln Stiftung's decisions to support individual candidates.

No less remarkable than the notables who served as honorary trustees were the Vertrauensleute or consultants whom Becker, Schairer, and Simons convinced to serve (without pay) as advisers or "talent scouts" for the new organization. In his report to the memorial, Young had spoken of the need to recruit the "live wires" among Weimar intellectuals, and his claim that the Lincoln Stiftung had done so clearly was no idle boast. A document accompanying Young's memorandum to the memorial describing the formation of the ALS in 1927 listed the names of 101 prominent Germans, of whom the majority were active defenders of the Weimar Republic and leading figures in the country's intellectual life (see Appendix 1). Nearly a quarter of these advisers were civil service administrators, many of them serving as Becker's colleagues in the educational and cultural ministries of Prussia, Saxony, and other German states.

In addition to this group of more-or-less "official" representatives of the German educational establishment, there were no less than ten members of the Reichstag and the chief judge of the supreme court, Walter Simons, whose son Hans was, as noted, one of the ALS's directors. Among the political figures were Willy Hellpach, the presidential candidate of the Democrats in 1925; and Anton Erkelenz,
Carl Severing, and Wilhelm Sollmann, the latter two prominent members of the Social Democratic Party. Among the political figures serving as advisers the Lincoln Stiftung included the feminists Gertrud Bäumer, Alice Salomon, and Helene Weber. Whereas the Lincoln Stiftung’s list of advisers was weighted left of center, it also displayed a conscious effort to include the full spectrum of political opinion in Weimar Germany. Thus, in addition to the prominent leftist and pacifist intellectuals, the ALS’s network of advisers included numerous members of the Catholic Center Party (Zentrum). The ALS also succeeded in recruiting leading figures from the Right, including such prominent conservative spokesmen as the legal scholar Carl Schmitt and Nationalist Party spokesman Otto Hoetzsch.

The largest single group - composed of some forty-five or more names - were academics, generally of a much more liberal disposition than the professoriate at large. Beyond the ranks of the parliamentarians, civil servants, and other representatives of "official" Germany, Young recruited an array of artists and literary figures who he hoped would counterbalance the ALS’s inherent bias toward academic figures. Foremost among these independent intellectual figures was Thomas Mann, although it must be added that there is no evidence that the great novelist ever played an active role in the selection of candidates or even that he nominated one. The Lincoln Stiftung’s artists included Käthe Kollwitz and sculptor Georg Kolbe, the dramatist Kurt Tucholsky, film director Paul Wegener, and, from the Weimar theater, Leopold Jessner. There also were a number of writers and editors on the board, including Karl Vossler, Ludwig von Ficker, travel writer Leo Matthias, and, from the Stefan George circle, Ludwig Klages. A writer more staunchly to the left, Walter Hammer, later played an active role in the resistance.

The ALS also boasted a small but distinguished number of scientists. The Nobel Prize winner Fritz Haber agreed to serve as a consultant, as did naturalist Friedrich Dessauer. Two liberal Protestant theologians,
Paul Tillich and Richard Kroner, took an interest in the ALS's nominations, and the list of nominators also included the church historian Georg Schreiber, a prominent Catholic lay leader who served as the Zentrum party's spokesman on educational questions affecting the universities.

By no means were all of these advisory board members active participants, and it is clear that Young and the German directors sought to keep the more politically involved members at arm's length from the selection process. Some time after the initial report of the ALS's formation was sent to the Rockefeller Foundation in 1927, the directors found it necessary to add new nominators. Unfortunately, there is no list comparable to the one compiled in 1927, so that the only indication of the newly expanded circle of nominators for the Lincoln Stiftung's later phase comes from a list of candidates compiled in 1930. This document names some 133 Kandidaten or nominees who were under serious consideration and also indicates which advisers made the nominations. This imperfect list, containing the names of so many new advisers not on the earlier lists, suggests that any complete roster of Vertrauensleute in 1930 would bear only a slight resemblance to the original list of 1927. The list of 1930 reveals some surprising additions to the ranks of the "talent scouts," including such luminaries as Hermann Hesse, Marianne Weber, and Albert Einstein.

Thus, although there is no record that Thomas Mann ever took an active interest in the ALS's search for new talent, Hermann Hesse sent in the names of actress and writer Emmy Ball-Hennings and her daughter Annemarie Ball. Max Weber's widow, Marianne Weber, was an even more active participant, and she proved to have an excellent eye for talent. Whereas it is probable that she suggested even more names, the list of candidates included four of her nominees, and of these two received financial aid. The philosopher Raymond Klibansky, one of her choices, later emigrated to Great Britain, where he was associated with
the Warburg Institute. Another fellow active in her Heidelberg circle, Eduard Baumgarten, translated Dewey's works into German and survived the Hitler years to play an active role in the reconstruction of the German universities.

The First Class of Fellows of the Lincoln Stiftung

The first fellows selected by the newly created German foundation came from a number of fields, but, perhaps not surprisingly given Young’s canvas of German educational leaders and the spirit of the Locarno years, the majority of the fellows were distinguished by their involvement in international reconciliation, educational reform, or the German youth movement (see Appendix 2). The educators Klatt and Baum, youth movement leader Dehmel, and scholars Baumgarten and Klibansky have already been mentioned. Others in this first class of selectees included Elisabeth Rotten, who had worked with English prisoners of war during World War I; Maria Sevenich, a leader of Catholic women's groups in the Rhineland and a future member of the Bundestag; international law specialist Heinrich Rogge; psychologists Karl Duncker and August Vetter; philosophers Heinrich Hellmund and Albert Dietrich; an art historian, Herman Goern; the marine geologist Albert Schwarz, who tragically would die young; the naturalist and veterinary medicine specialist Bernhard Grzimek, who would go on to play a leading role in international wildlife preservation efforts; political scientist Theodor Eschenburg; social scientist Alfred Sohn-Rethel; the writer Hans Queling; and youth movement leaders Fritz Skurnia, Hermann Lange, August Rathmann, and Rudolf Schubert.

When the Lincoln Stiftung issued its first report in 1930 it summarized the careers and work of this group of individuals. Consequently, this first cohort of twenty-two is the best-documented set of Lincoln Stiftung
fellows. Of these twenty-two selections, it is striking to note that at least twelve had participated in the youth movement, usually in some leadership role. Of the men, at least nine had served on the front lines during the war, and one, Klatt, had been seriously wounded. A number - Klatt, Baum, Vetter, Rathmann, and Skurnia - were especially concerned with problems of education for workers and other adults who fell outside the formal educational system. Despite the range of interests covered by this first class of fellows, the ALS directors heard complaints from their consultants that these selections did not range far enough and that, for such an experimental operation, there were too many academics destined for university careers. Young added a personal note suggesting that the Lincoln Stiftung also needed a permanent secretary, the beginnings of an administrative office, to keep in touch with the network of consultants and the expanding group of fellows whose careers the ALS should track. Just as it was developing its own administrative machinery, however, the Lincoln Stiftung’s distant patron was completely transforming its own.

Reorganization of the Rockefeller Philanthropies

In 1928 the various Rockefeller philanthropies were reorganized, and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial's programs in the social sciences and the humanities were incorporated into those of the Rockefeller Foundation - a change that would seriously affect the Lincoln Stiftung. The newly consolidated foundation emphasized advanced scholarly research along disciplinary lines ranging from the physical sciences to the humanities. The difficulties in fitting the older programs of the memorial into the revised programs of the foundation were especially evident in the case of the Lincoln Stiftung.37
Having inherited Young and the Lincoln Stiftung from the memorial, the officials of the Rockefeller Foundation hardly knew what to make of their bequest. Edward Capps, an American classicist who was charged with developing a program in the humanities, saw no place for the ALS in the foundation's future work. When Young set out the memorial's previous interests in the humanities in the form of a seven-page memorandum, Capps responded coolly. "The guiding principle of the Foundation as at present organized is the advancement of knowledge through research," he told Young. "This statement of purpose, therefore, would automatically exclude such an activity as you have established in the Lincoln Stiftung, in which your objective was the 'discovery of the original or humane mind' in Germany."

To further the administrative confusion the foundation's president, George E. Vincent, retired in 1929 and was replaced by a scientist-mathematician, Max Mason, who showed much less sympathy for the humanities and the rather freewheeling ways of his European consultant. Whereas Vincent had delighted in trips to the foundation's office in Paris and in long conversations with Young, Mason had little patience for the seemingly endless discussions that the humanities entailed. Foundation officials in Paris recommended that the Lincoln Stiftung be turned over entirely to its German directors with a notice that they would have to find alternative sources of funds, perhaps after a final Rockefeller grant.

But just as the Rockefeller Foundation was preparing to withdraw its support, the Lincoln Stiftung was began to attract wider attention from German officials. In December 1929 Young had journeyed to Berlin to meet Becker and other members of the ALS's board of directors in the education minister's offices. There, on the evening of December 14, the directors summoned several of their star pupils for a conference with Becker and other Prussian officials. Young made an opening statement on the origins of the educational foundation, and then several of the
ALS fellows spoke on the effects of the Weimar Republic's various educational reforms.

In his diary Young noted that this conference had also interested the German Ministry of the Interior as well as the educational hierarchy. Young recorded the participation of Carl Severing, the Reich minister of the interior and the chief minister of Prussia, as follows: "A dramatic incident was the entry of Minister Severing three hours late at the end of a cabinet meeting which had lasted two days, during which time he had saved parliamentary government in Germany, and incidentally avoided being appointed himself dictator by Hindenburg. He was naturally fatigued, but took part in our discussions for the remainder of a long evening."39 Severing had indeed been involved in protracted cabinet meetings concerning the ruling coalition's increasingly weak hold on the country, and the presence of one of the principal political figures of the day at a time when political infighting was intense was an indication of success.

In a second and fuller account sent to the Rockefeller Foundation, Young wrote that Severing's brief remarks included a promise to contribute 20,000 marks to the ALS's budget for 1930. In explaining the interest of so pressed and busy a politician in the Lincoln Stiftung, Young was perhaps not unrealistic: "It seems clear that he saw in the ALS a new opportunity for discovering and influencing opinion in many social sectors not usually reached, a kind of vertical register . . . composed of very able men drawn from many classes, which could be consulted with profit as one might read the markings on a thermometer outside the window."40

The decision of the German government to back the Lincoln Stiftung represented a major accomplishment for Young, Schairer, and Simons.
No doubt it was in large measure due to some unseen prompting from Becker, whose collaboration with Severing and the embattled moderates in the Prussian cabinet was close during these months. And, to be sure, Severing had cause for worry about German youth; with the depression deepening and unemployment mounting, extremist groups were gaining ground daily. In the end, the Lincoln Stiftung’s success, like Severing’s in the cabinet, was short-lived; the moment of their success coincided with the beginnings of the Weimar Republic’s death throes.

However, to the Rockefeller Foundation officials at the time, the ability of the ALS to enlist new sources of support in the midst of a severe depression constituted a strong argument for giving it additional support. By the summer of 1930 Mason was persuaded that the Lincoln Stiftung should not be cast adrift just as it showed signs of becoming self-supporting. When Mason and Thomas B. Appleget, the foundation’s vice president, visited the Paris office that same summer they met with Young and Selskar M. "Mike" Gunn, the head of the foundation’s European operations, and quickly came to an agreement to extend Rockefeller contributions for an additional three years. Foundation officials abandoned the memorial’s insistence on anonymity and approved a plan to have Young serve the remainder of his consultancy as full-time liaison between the Lincoln Stiftung and the Rockefeller Foundation. Mason, Young, and Appleget agreed that "if the experiment is successful, more and more contributions will come from German sources."  

Following the foundation’s decision in June, Gunn and Appleget traveled to Berlin in the following month to meet with the Lincoln Stiftung’s leadership. Encouraged by the renewed interest, Becker and Schairer raised the possibility of increasing the stakes in this gamble. Suggesting that the Americans commit their organization to a pledge of $50,000, they optimistically estimated that they could raise half that
amount from German sources. At the end of a further trial period, with these expanded revenues, the ALS would undoubtedly be in a position to demonstrate its worth.42

As it turned out, however, the Lincoln Stiftung’s optimism proved premature. By the time the two Americans returned to Berlin, the Weimar coalition had lost its tenuous hold on power and they found that Severing’s replacement at the ministry did not share the Social Democrat’s interest in educational experiments. “The Minister,” Appleget’s diary explains, "announces for the first time that the subventions previously granted by the German government must now be discontinued and enlarges upon the difficult German economic situation." Gunn, who no doubt had been involved in similar negotiations before, responded that the Rockefeller Foundation "could never be the sole source of support of any enterprise" and expressed the foundation’s desire to see "other contributions . . . forthcoming."43

Despite these setbacks the Rockefeller Foundation was now determined to support the ALS and to offer it one final chance to prove itself to its German backers. Gunn and Appleget agreed that, if nothing else, the Lincoln Stiftung represented an interesting experiment and might serve as a "control group" in comparison with the foundation’s fellowship program. Thus, even in the absence of an agreement by the German government to live up to Severing’s pledge, the two Rockefeller officials agreed to push for a renewal of the foundation’s support. Interestingly, they agreed to recommend $60,000, an even larger sum than the Germans had requested. But to reinforce the point that the foundation hoped to see the Lincoln Stiftung become entirely supported by German funds, they proposed to have the foundation’s grant taper off over a four-year period, each annual installment becoming progressively smaller.44
Shortly after Gunn and Appleget decided to continue with the Lincoln Stiftung project, word arrived from Germany that the government had relented. Although the subvention from Berlin was trimmed in half - to 10,000 marks - it was nonetheless a victory for the ALS and, perhaps, for Gunn, too. Schairer, who directed a national student service organization, wrote Gunn to explain that his own organization’s budget had been trimmed by over 600,000 marks: "In this situation you will understand that the contribution to the Abraham Lincoln Stiftung is also shortened."\(^{45}\)

Appleget returned to New York in the autumn of 1930 convinced of the need to give the Lincoln Stiftung a decisive boost. At a meeting with Mason and the principal officers of the foundation he argued that the earlier role played by the Rockefeller office and the prominence of the Germans who had by then become involved with the ALS dictated further support. Although Appleget conceded that the entire project was far removed from the Rockefeller Foundation’s new orientation toward basic research, he thought the work of the ALS too valuable to be abandoned lightly. The support promised by the German government constituted another important argument. From a variety of sources it seemed evident that the Lincoln Stiftung had succeeded in its initial efforts and that it was conducting activities that had received enthusiastic backing from Becker and other German educators. On balance, Appleget thought that the previous grants had been too small to accomplish Young’s original scheme, and the minutes of the meeting record his judgment that these previous grants of $10,000 per year were "ridiculously small for the size of the machinery and the number of good applications reported." In sum, Appleget now recommended a large appropriation of $85,000 to be spread over six years in diminishing payments. Such a plan would bestow a “decent gift” on the Rockefeller offspring and also would give the German backers ample time to weather the depression and raise funds locally.\(^{46}\)
The extended discussion over continuing support to the ALS was finally brought to an end by the trustees in December 1930. Although the trustees allowed themselves to be persuaded that a grant was in order to achieve a "definite but still courteous withdrawal," there were apparently many reservations about, and perhaps even opposition to, the plan Appleget had formulated. In the end, the foundation's trustees decided to cut the proposal virtually in half and award the ALS an additional $45,000 spread over four years in the following manner: 1931: $15,000; 1932: $15,000; 1933: $10,000; 1934: $5,000. By cutting the total and by scheduling the payments in this fashion, the foundation clearly intended to put the Germans on notice that they would have to find additional sources of funding by the end of 1932.

Writing to Gunn in Paris, Appleget summarized the sentiment at the meeting: "I think that the final action may be considered as a compromise between our feeling that the project should have further trial on a more adequate basis . . . and the feeling of the trustees that, in view of the impossibility of weighing the imponderable considerations presented, the Foundation should, as soon as it could in all justice to our German friends, leave the project." Although this decision fell far short of Young's and Schairer's hopes, given both the doubts of the trustees and the initial hostility of the president, it was undoubtedly the best outcome they could have obtained.

The Crisis of 1933

The issue of additional Rockefeller support for the ALS became critical in 1933. In February, less than a month after Hitler's designation as chancellor, Hans Simons met with one of the foundation's representatives in Paris, John Van Sickle, to emphasize the importance of the German agency's work. Although the Rockefeller Foundation's
grant would not expire until the end of 1934, the ALS's directors could already feel the pinch of the decision made in 1930 to taper payments. The German directors were convinced, however, that they had a case to make for further support. Simons, according to Van Sickle's notes, "cited one case after another of men of exceptional promise who, through help at a critical point, have been saved from disaster or a futile existence and brought to secure positions in which they will make real contributions."\(^{49}\) Ironically, Simons himself had just been fired by the new regime and Van Sickle reported his pessimistic estimate that "a number of years will elapse before he can return to public life."\(^{50}\) Although he had just been a victim of political pressure, Simons nonetheless argued that the Lincoln Stiftung would be able, as it had in the past, to place its candidates.

This latter argument was repeated even after the Nazi purge of the civil service and the dismissals of Jewish professors in April 1933. Throughout 1933 the directors of the ALS, and especially Simons, who made no less than three visits to the Rockefeller Foundation's office to plead his case, attempted to persuade the foundation to reverse its decision. Despite Van Sickle's unambiguous declaration in February that "further support was not to be expected,"\(^{51}\) Simons and Young continued to hope that some additional aid could be coaxed out of the foundation. Given the inability of the Lincoln Stiftung to replace its governmental subsidies or to raise any private German funds, a decision by the Rockefeller Foundation not to renew its support would be tantamount to killing the organization.

Simons remained convinced that the ALS still had a role to play in saving careers of "exceptional promise." To Tracy B. Kittredge, another officer of the foundation who worked in Paris, he made known his distress over the earlier rejection and argued with evident conviction that the Lincoln Stiftung was the last remaining hope for saving independent intellectual life in Germany. Kittredge reported that "Dr.
Simons . . . is convinced that under present circumstances the Stiftung might be able to play a role of exceptional importance if it could continue its work for a further period.” Kittredge added that Simons "pointed out that the hope of intellectual life in Germany now rests definitely on men of the younger generation.”

Precisely for that reason it was all the more imperative for the Rockefeller Foundation to reconsider its stance and to give the independent German foundation additional funds to carry on its work. Simons offered an intriguing forecast of the months to come:

[T]he present regime is so solidly established that it is bound to endure for a relatively long period. He feels that the men of the older generation who have been definitely labelled as social democrats or as liberal intellectuals will play very little role in the future of German intellectual development. Many of them will go into exile, and of those who remain in Germany few will be able to exercise much influence. He feels that those who have rallied to the regime will, on the whole, have less influence than those who have held aloof.

On the other hand, Dr. S[imons] feels that the experience of the last six months shows quite definitely that there will be a very important modification in the movement itself through the influence of the stronger intellectuals among the youth who make up the party. About half of the former beneficiaries of the ALS have become party members. In so doing, Dr. S[imons] feels that they have not abandoned in the least their own intellectual independence or the possibility of contributing to the future of German culture.
Simons feels that in the future the forms and methods of intellectual expression will be different than in the past, but he has no reason to believe that in the long run the German intellectual tradition will not be maintained. For this reason he is convinced that if in addition to supporting for a further period of one or two years certain men now receiving grants, the Stiftung could also make a number of new grants, that it might make a very significant contribution to the future of German thought.  

Although Kittredge warned Simons that the Rockefeller Foundation would be curtailing its programs in Germany and that he could not give the ALS official any encouragement, the wording of his reply may have in fact done so. Kittredge told Simons that there was only a "very small prospect" of further support, but given the categorical reply from Van Sickle in February this answer sounded much less final.

Consequently, Simons and Young made yet another concerted effort in November to reopen the ALS question. The various diary entries and memoranda suggest that they had a sympathetic audience in the Paris-based officers of the foundation. Both Kittredge and Van Sickle were well informed about the dismissals and Nazi persecution of intellectuals and political opponents, and the possibility of funding an organization seemingly free from state control must have appealed strongly to the foundation's representatives. Despite the repeated and often categorically negative responses, the persistence of these conversations and the sympathetic tone of Paris office memoranda suggest that the Rockefeller Foundation did, in fact, give these last-minute appeals serious consideration.

From London Young wrote that although it had been possible to place half of the ALS fellows in once secure jobs, "because of the political
changes in Germany, even the results already obtained are now endangered. . . . Positions offered to the A. L. St. for its members have been occupied by members of the governing German party. But in the same breath Young and Simons argued with some ingenuity that the Lincoln Stiftung offered the last remaining hope to transform the new regime in Germany. "Both Young and Simons feel that it is of the greatest importance to help men of character they are interested in to remain in Germany," Van Sickle summarized one discussion held in November 1933. "Such men will not occupy leading places," Simons and Young conceded to Van Sickle, "but they will be an important element in liberalizing the Regime once the first excesses of the revolution are over."

Nothing better reveals this hopeful estimate of the possible "liberalizing" effects of the Lincoln Stiftung experiment than a curious report forwarded by Young to the Rockefeller Foundation. Two of the ALS fellows had rendered signal services to the Reich Labor Ministry by organizing adult education programs in the state-run labor camps. Of one of these fellowship recipients, an expert in adult education who had received ALS funds to travel abroad and study in the years prior to the Nazi takeover, it was claimed that without this stipend he would never have come to the attention of the new government bureau. That this might be an ambiguous blessing in 1933 did not deter the officials of the Lincoln Stiftung from pointing to this particular case as an outstanding example of their success in placing promising younger men into positions of leadership. "We provided a salary and put him at the disposal of the Social Ministry of the Reich [Reichsarbeitsdienst]," the officials of the ALS wrote (in Young's translation): "Owing to his efficient guidance, the working camps are now no longer confined to manual labor and training, but are becoming more and more centres of valuable adult education." That this Fabian strategy was pursued actively - and not in one or two cases only - is attested to by other documents. Young's report cited a second fellow, Hans Raupach, as an example of the successful penetration of the party’s counsels by men of
a more liberal disposition. Described as the "official adviser of a provincial headquarters" of the National Socialist party, Simons and Schairer still believed Raupach to be at heart on the side of the angels. An important youth movement leader, and Dehmel's successor as director of the Boberhaus, the Lincoln Stiftung's leaders credited this expert on agrarian problems with "supporting German youth in its struggle against the more military forms of its present organization." A third fellow had "studied the methods of conducting intelligence tests developed in the USA" but "was unable to find any work after his return." With the backing of the ALS he had helped the Saxon provincial government develop tests, based on the latest American social science methodology, for assessing likely university applicants. Because the new government proposed to restrict admissions, the work of this fellow had an immediate relevance and his tests were welcomed by the authorities in Dresden. Thanks to these techniques, the directors reported, the Saxon government "should reduce the numbers of university students by half."  

Simons seems to have devised a tactic that succeeded in placing those Lincoln Stiftung fellows who were so inclined into government bureaucracies. The memorandum summarizing his conversation with Van Sickle in November 1933 explains the technique:

Simons particularly stresses . . . that many men can be assured of secure positions of great usefulness in Germany, in public service, if - for a period of six months to a year - the salaries attached to their offices can be defrayed from non-governmental sources. As long as it is known that the displacing of such a man will not open the way for a Nazi in better standing, there will be no pressure to put him out. After he has been there for a short time it will be comparatively easy to provide for him from government funds: his position will be taken for granted. If the Nazi higher up is in favor of the man, he will be able to work him into the system.
Or, put more simply, ALS grants bought temporary places for several fellows, including the two youth leaders who volunteered for work with the Reich Labor Service. Although hindsight makes it easier to see that the question of who was using whom was far from answered, in 1933 Simons seems to have persuaded Van Sickle that he and the Stiftung had found a way around the politicization of the civil service and one that might ultimately help liberalize the government's policies.

Young and Simons recognized that such a course of action posed some risks, and indeed they seem to have been worried about the careers of several of the fellows whose "high intellectual and moral standards" were already bringing them into conflict with the new regime. "We wish to support existing members of the A.L.St. who cannot continue their research or their practical work without joining the 'Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei' against their convictions, and thereby giving up the essential value of their individual contribution to the human cause."61 Ironically, for an organization that had attempted to be nonpartisan and that had constructed elaborate safeguards against political interference from Weimar political parties, the Lincoln Stiftung now found its officers, fellows, and advisers enmeshed in political considerations.

On the American side the decision on the fate of the ALS formed part of a larger policy debate within the Rockefeller Foundation about whether it should continue to have a role in Germany and, if so, what the best course of action should be. By the spring of 1933 the foundation's office in Europe was painfully aware of the extent of Nazi anti-intellectualism and xenophobia. Following the first anti-Semitic decrees by the Hitler government ousting hundreds of Jewish professors and scientists from their posts, the foundation's office in Paris found itself inundated with appeals for aid. Foundation officials also heard contradictory advice
about how best to help and widely divergent assessments of the long-
term impact of the new regime. The foundation's German fellowship
advisers, fearing a complete withdrawal of American funds, took an
optimistic stance and predicted that the disruptions caused by the
dismissals of 1933 would not last long. Van Sickle and Kittredge, the
program officers in Paris responsible for the social sciences, hoped that
the foundation might be able to resume its normal operations. They and
their counterparts in the science programs of the Foundation heard
similar assessments from German educational authorities who stressed
the need for continued assistance during the emergency. Consequently,
they were sympathetic to arguments from the ALS that its grants made
independent intellectual life possible. The private nature of the ALS
strengthened its appeals to foundation officials because in 1933 it
appeared to be one of the few viable organizations in Germany capable
of continued operation.

This natural sympathy on the part of the Paris-based officers of the
Rockefeller Foundation for the German intellectuals with whom they
worked was offset, however, by the growing skepticism of the
foundation's trustees and senior officials in New York that the
philanthropy could continue to do business as usual in Germany. The
foundation very quickly moved to create effective programs for refugee
professors, and the trustees ordered the continuation of all existing
German grants to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. As it became
apparent that Nazi rule would not be temporary, and that its dismissal
policy was not an aberration but part of the new regime's fundamental
outlook, the foundation altered its operations in Germany. Beginning
with its cautious case-by-case approach in the spring of 1933, the
foundation's trustees reluctantly concluded that intellectual repression
precluded any further activity and in 1935 they ordered a halt to the
Foundation's grant-making in Germany.62
The decision on the Lincoln Stiftung, however, was made well before this crucial turning point, and indeed the Foundation’s senior leadership studied the evolution of this small experiment with keen interest as a clue to the changes in the intellectual climate in Germany and as a test of the real possibility for any independent organizational life under the Nazi regime. Appleget, the foundation’s vice president and the chief backer of the ALS in 1930, had become convinced that the foundation could not do business as usual in Nazi Germany. Although he might have been sympathetic to Young’s and Simons’s efforts to support anti-Nazi fellows, Appleget did not believe that the strategy outlined by the Lincoln Stiftung would work. “The argument advanced, namely, that the L.S. will provide a stimulation and training to the best of the young men in the Nazi movement, is not particularly appealing,” he recorded in his diary.63

Appleget’s judgment spelled the end of the ALS and its remarkable experiment in carving out a greater role for private institutions in the German educational system, an experiment that was unique in Rockefeller and general American philanthropy at the time. Although Simons and Young continued to appeal for support, the Rockefeller Foundation declined to provide any emergency support or to make any supplemental award. With this decision, the ALS came to an end in 1934. The following year, when Simons came to New York to join the New School’s University in Exile as a refugee professor, even he was forced to concede that the foundation’s decision had been correct: Simons told John Marshall, the assistant director for the humanities program, that there remained no possibility for independent intellectual life in Germany.64

Toward an Assessment of the Lincoln Stiftung
Sixty-five years later, how are we to evaluate the Abraham Lincoln Stiftung? Appleget's conclusion that the ALS could not survive and the jarring estimate in Kittredge's memorandum that half its fellows had joined the National Socialists suggest a very negative assessment by the Rockefeller Foundation's officers. Whether half the Lincoln Stiftung either sympathized with or joined the Nazis cannot be determined until the full roster of fellowship recipients can be identified, but given the high number of émigrés among both the fellows and the advisers, it seems doubtful that the majority of the ALS fellows actively sympathized with National Socialism.

Nonetheless, it is clear that some - most notably, the jurist Heinrich Rogge, the philosopher Albert Dietrich, and the journalist Giselher Wirsing - actively endorsed the new regime's nationalism. However, the majority of the Lincoln Stiftung fellows whose careers I have been able to trace clearly did not join either the National Socialists or participate in the party's organs. If we set aside (for a moment) the question of political allegiance, a close reading of the judgments expressed by foundation officials in 1930 and again in 1933-4 suggests that they did not regard the experiment as a complete failure. It would be more accurate to conclude that the Rockefeller Foundation did not know how to evaluate this unique entity and that as the American foundation ended its German operations it began to view the issue - which, despite the ALS's small size and limited scope, once engaged its presidents and professional staff on both sides of the Atlantic in a lively debate - as irrelevant to its newly defined programs.

Perhaps appropriately, the final word in this debate over the Lincoln Stiftung's merit as a fellowship scheme came in 1937, when Reinhold Schairer published an evaluation in the British Education Yearbook. Unlike the ALS's critics in the foundation, Schairer judged the experiment to be a resounding success. He praised Young's genius in seeing the need for such a private entity in Weimar Germany and his
remarkable personal skills in the successful creation of the German foundation. On what basis did Schairer judge it a success? First, Schairer implicitly agreed with Young's analysis of the need for more private initiative in the German educational system, and consequently he praised, almost in passing, Young and the ALS for successfully implementing a flexible new scheme for awarding fellowships and other forms of support. In a sense, Schairer seems to have been arguing that the "principle of personal guidance and individual discretion" was missing in German scholarship programs - including, perhaps, the one he ran in Dresden - and, as a sign of success, he cites (as Young had) the ALS's insistence on pairing its candidates and fellows with individual mentors, an echo of the British tutorial system.65

Schairer also asserted that the ALS had succeeded in altering lives and careers for the better, and just as he and Simons had done in their first report to the Rockefeller Foundation in 1930, Schairer counted not only the relatively small number of stipend recipients but also the much larger list of candidates who received only advice or referrals. Most of the preliminary list of possible fellows, Schairer added, needed no funds from the Lincoln Stiftung but only assistance from existing sources. Nonetheless, by steering such talent into the right channels, the new foundation provided a service not offered by any existing agency. More verifiable evidence, of course, came from the careers launched by, or saved by, the ALS's actual grants.

Schairer found a third value in the ALS's "social potential," that is, in its insistence that intellectual distinction be married to public service and leadership activities. Although the roster of Lincoln Stiftung fellows certainly demonstrates that a number of its fellows went on to pursue distinguished academic careers, Schairer's third standard of judgment was a much harder one to establish, and his article in the Education Yearbook did not attempt to elaborate on this point. Instead, Schairer pointed to Young's prescient earlier reports and noted that, had the ALS
had more time to work with the Silesian labor camps and the adult education schools, it might have offered German youth a much more powerful alternative than the nihilism of the Nazi movement. Despite Schairer’s enthusiasm for Young’s model, the Lincoln Stiftung found no imitators and soon faded from view. The Rockefeller Foundation and other philanthropies had no intention of launching such experiments in the midst of a global depression and in a Europe where nationalist sentiments were reaching the boiling point.

Schairer’s study does suggest at least one approach for the historian: to look at the subsequent careers of the Lincoln Stiftung fellows, and possibly those of the larger group of candidates who, had more funds been available, might have been awarded stipends. Unfortunately, the documentary evidence presents some serious obstacles for historians with a statistical bent: The ALS did not publish a final report (save for Schairer’s article), and the Rockefeller Foundation files contain confusing documents; of those emanating from Germany, none seem to go beyond 1933. How the ALS spent its few remaining funds in 1934 is unknown.

Even identifying the fellows of the ALS is difficult. Schairer’s 1937 article, for example, speaks of "about seventy" fellows (or "members" as he and Young referred to the stipend recipients). A retrospective assessment by Kittredge in 1935 notes that "of approximately 70 cases . . . practically all had turned out successfully." A note appended to a summary of the ALS’s work at the beginning of the Rockefeller files refers to "82 beneficiaries" between 1928 and 1933, but the source of this number seems to be a memorandum from Young and Simons dated November 29, 1933.
This latter document was itself an elaboration on an earlier memorandum, containing the ALS's plea for one last grant to supplement the meager sums available from the 1930 appropriation. Writing from London in early November 1933, Young estimated that the ALS had benefited approximately fifty young Germans, but when he asked Schairer and Simons to bolster his case with a more detailed assessment they produced a report, with valuable (but incomplete) biographical details, that put the number of stipend recipients at sixty-three. At the end of 1933, Schairer and Simons reported, "Of these 63 members, 10 are still in need of the help and guidance of the A.L.ST. With 5 exceptions, all the rest have been definitely placed." 

Although it is possible that the ALS used its remaining $5,000 in 1934 to aid new recipients, it seems more likely that the German administrators spent the remaining balance from the Rockefeller Foundation's appropriation to address the needs of the ten to fifteen fellows who still required assistance. This record of placement is perhaps the standard by which Kittredge and Van Sickle judged the ALS: During the depression years from 1929 to 1933 they were painfully aware of the poor prospects for many of the Rockefeller Foundation's own fellowship recipients in the social and natural sciences. Using employment as the measure of success, the Fabian strategy of the ALS may indeed have surpassed the foundation's prestigious fellowship program.

Given the absence (in the Rockefeller archives, at least) of any final reports or records from the ALS for 1933 and 1934, the only way to compile a list of the fellows is to sort through these partial reports from 1930 and 1933 and try to reconcile the varying numbers and lists. Fortunately, the ALS forwarded detailed financial accounting for its Rockefeller funds, and these ledgers show expenditures from 1928 through the end of 1932. Almost in answer to a historian's prayers, the outgoing ledger shows payments to individual scholars, although
vexingly these accountant’s documents fail to give first names for the individuals listed as recipients! Thanks to these ledger sheets and other documents, it is possible to compile a list of all known recipients from 1928 to 1933 - and the number totals sixty-three. Unless further documents surface in Germany, I am prepared to conclude that the figure mentioned by Schairer and Simons in November 1933 is the actual total of Germans receiving financial assistance from the five-year experiment.

Of these sixty-three individuals, it is possible to identify more than half (see Appendix 2). Young and ALS directors wrote biographical sketches of the first twenty-two grant recipients. Later reports, especially the documents from 1933 on the ALS’s successes, provide additional biographical details about a few more of these talented personalities. The Rockefeller archives also hold a curious list of Kandidaten, dating from 1930, that provides tantalizing glimpses into the ALS’s operation midway into its life (see Appendix 3, Part 1). This list of 133 names provides first names for some, but not all, of those fellowship recipients who came to be listed on the 1931 and 1932 financial ledgers. Finally, although not part of the Rockefeller archives, some documents held by Geoffrey Winthrop Young’s son, including unpublished letters and essays presented to the elder Young, either confirm identifications suggested by biographical dictionaries and other standard reference works or provide the names of many of the fellows who are listed only by their last name in the financial ledgers at the Rockefeller archives. Even with this documentation, seven of the sixty-three fellows remain unidentified and to date I have been unable to find any biographical details on seventeen and only cursory information on three or four others. Thus, roughly one-third of the sixty-three stipend recipients must remain shadowy figures for the moment, and the absence of biographical information makes it impossible to paint a definitive historical portrait of the ALS fellows as yet.
Another consideration is whether the sixty-three fellows who received stipends should be viewed as a separate, and more select class, than those whose names are included in the list of candidates. Because the Lincoln Stiftung had so few funds, Young and the German directors stressed the services that the ALS played by simply offering advice or referrals to other sources of funds, such as the Studienstiftung. Given the eminence of many of the names on the list of candidates, it is possible that the Lincoln Stiftung viewed these men and women as gifted individuals who were equal to its stipendiaries but in less need. Seen in this light, it is arguable that the list of candidates in 1930 represents Weimar Germany’s "best and brightest" the fruit of a two-year search for genius and leading personalities in all fields of human endeavor. Certainly, Young and his German collaborators never suggested that this narrow pool of applicants was anything but distinguished; other ALS documents suggest that these individuals were all likely candidates for financial aid had sufficient funds been available. Indeed, the Rockefeller Foundation’s archival copy mistranslates the list as "Fellows of the Abraham Lincoln Stiftung."

Because this document, the only surviving list of candidates, dates from 1930, it also raises the possibility that other documents, listing later nominations, almost certainly must have been compiled and perhaps may still exist in German archives. Any final judgment about the Lincoln Stiftung’s record would have to consider the complete circle of possible choices before deciding how well the administrators fared in recognizing the leaders of the future. To give only one example, the list of candidates in 1930 contains Hannah Arendt, nominated by Lotte Israel. Candidates were ranked, apparently, by the urgency or priority of their cases, and Arendt was assigned eighty-fourth place out of these 133 individuals considered for aid. Given her subsequent international recognition, and her stature as a philosopher, one wonders on what basis her case was deferred (see Appendix 3, Part 2). Did ALS directors not see her promise as a philosopher, or did they deem her too narrowly intellectual an able German scholar but one without the "force of character" or leadership that would render her work influential beyond the university? Or, as seems likely, did they simply deem her case a lower priority because other fellowship agencies were willing
and ready to assist her? And, in a minor key, when did Lotte Israel join the ranks of ALS advisers? Did her nomination carry less weight than those of the original nominators? The answers to such questions cannot be found in the ALS documents; there is no file or dossier on Arendt, or correspondence from Israel to Schairer or Simons, although surely such letters must have existed at one time.\(^{71}\)

How much can be read into the small number of fellows and candidates two distinct, if overlapping, sets of individuals? And, what importance should be attached to the original list of nominators (advisers), with its blue ribbon composition? At first glance, it would appear that such a small sampling could hardly have any statistical significance. Yet, the Lincoln Stiftung experiment clearly intrigued the Rockefeller Foundation’s program officers in the social sciences because it provided a possible "control group" against which the foundation’s own fellowship selections in Germany might be measured. In retrospect, however, the significance of the Lincoln Stiftung experiment derives from its glimpse into the response of talented younger Germans to the crisis of the 1930s. Because the Lincoln Stiftung clearly succeeded in recruiting its advisers and trustees from a wide cross-section of Weimar Germany’s intellectual elite, drawn from all points of the political and ideological spectrum, it is not unfair to conclude that the list of candidates and fellows represents the German elite’s selection of the most promising younger scholars, political leaders, and educators. The Lincoln Stiftung claimed to represent more than, say, the social science fellowship program of the Rockefeller Foundation; the latter claimed to offer postgraduate fellowships only to the best younger economists, sociologists, and political scientists. It sought highly specialized experts who were the best in their fields; it judged success by academic standards, and did not seek wider leadership or demand exceptional moral character. By contrast, Young's definition of the ALS's role called for a search for "intellectual distinction . . . reinforced by a humane temperament and a force of character which could make such mental quality an effective influence."\(^{72}\)
Given this broad and difficult standard, it is no wonder that Rockefeller Foundation officials threw up their hands in despair. Appleget actually ventured to Berlin in 1930 and met with four of the ALS fellows: Eduard Baumgarten, Richard Gothe, Hans Queling, and Heinrich Rogge. Appleget wrote to Woods, who in retirement continued to take an interest in the ALS, and offered this mixed assessment:

We have heard a great deal for and against the Stiftung. All of us are, I think, uncertain about it. Allied to that is a certain amount of uncertainty regarding Geoffrey Young. Personally, I like him and have had some interesting times with him. I cannot fail to admire his courage and a great many of his qualities. All of us, however, would be nonplussed if you asked us for a percentage grade either on the Stiftung or Young. Incidentally, you may be interested to know that of the group of fellows mentioned, I personally met and talked with four, Baumgarten, Rogge, Gothe, and Queling, and was equally puzzled about them. Human nature is a hard thing to work with.\(^73\)

Appleget’s discomfiture is perhaps understandable. Of the small group of fellows he met, two - Baumgarten and Gothe - had spent considerable time in the United States and undoubtedly spoke English well. Baumgarten had taught for five years at various American universities as an exchange professor and had already finished a translation of John Dewey’s works into German; Gothe at one point in his career had lived in New York, where he had organized and directed a German youth group. Both were liberal in outlook and quite sympathetic to America.
By contrast, Rogge and Queling must have presented much harder cases. Even by the eccentric standards of the Lincoln Stiftung, Queling was in a class by himself. Chosen at the insistence of an adviser who thought the experiment was leaning too heavily toward academic figures, Queling was the epitome of the outsider who did not fit into the German educational system: He had left school and Germany in the mid-1920s to travel to India overland, working his way there with several comrades by playing music as a street performer. While in India he sought out Mahatma Gandhi and Rabindranath Tagore, living briefly with the former. Queling described his adventures in a series of travel books. Queling hardly fit the Rockefeller Foundation's model of intellectual success or distinction, and Appleget must have had difficulty in evaluating a young travel writer with such an unusual curriculum vitae.  

The fourth fellow, Rogge, was, in fact, one of the least appealing of the Lincoln Stiftung fellows. He was well into middle age when the ALS chose to assist him - he was forty-four years old in 1930, when the organization forwarded its biographical sketch to the Rockefeller Foundation. He had studied law in prewar Berlin and had entered the civil service with the intention of pursuing further legal studies once he had gained practical experience. Rogge became so ill during World War I that he lost his position, and, according to the ALS's files, "continued his studies privately, but under the greatest financial difficulties." During the hard postwar years Rogge received support from the Notgemeinschaft and served as a consultant to the German Foreign Office. By the time the Lincoln Stiftung took note of him, Rogge had made his reputation with his writings on the war debt and international law.

Rogge appealed to the Lincoln Stiftung directors not only because of his late-developing talents and personal hardships but also because he wrote in a pacifist idiom about international law. "Peace by means of
law is the political programme of the world peace movement," Rogge noted in one statement cited by the ALS, "and, it is the axiom of the international law policy which seeks to extend international law and to give more importance to the League of Nations as the guarantee of peace. Rogge proposed to put pacifism and international law on a more scientific, or scholarly, basis, and the Lincoln Stiftung agreed to aid his research - in essence, giving him a sabbatical from his occasional work for the foreign affairs ministry. The prospectus for Rogge's planned book, The Science of Peace, did not in fact differ greatly from the no less metaphysical speculations of many English or American advocates of international law.

Given this research topic, it is not difficult to see why the Lincoln Stiftung would choose to support Rogge's work. Yet what was not apparent from Rogge's abstract discussion of the role of international law were the nationalist sentiments that motivated his work with the foreign ministry and the ill will that remained from his own experiences. It appears that the legal scholar had also become a very embittered man over the course of the years from 1914 to 1930. Already noticeable in Rogge's work on the international settlement of 1919 and subsequent agreements on reparations was a lingering resentment toward the Allied powers. For example, he referred to the Versailles peace treaty like any other German nationalist as a Diktat, and when the Nazis took power in 1933 his writings became much more openly nationalistic and propagandistic. In the years between the Nazi seizure of power and the onset of war in 1939 Rogge wrote not only a theoretical treatise on international law but also several polemical defenses of German foreign policy with such revealing titles as Hitler's Peace Policy and International Law and Hitler's Search for Peace with England. Rogge's brand of peace, then, was rooted in a singular interpretation of international law that pivoted on his continued belief that the postwar peace settlements had been illegitimate. Not surprisingly, when Hitler disavowed the provisions of the Versailles settlement, Rogge was only too happy to lend his pen and his legal
training to the Foreign Office to justify Germany's violations. Judging by a posthumously published volume on East Prussia - a territory lost to the Poles after 1945 - Rogge never reconciled himself to the territorial settlements of either 1919 or 1945.77

Rogge's willing service to the Nazi regime brings us to the crux of the matter: Any evaluation of an experimental foundation designed to produce, as Schairer maintained, humane leadership and positive social outcomes cannot be satisfied by simply noting those grant recipients who later published academic treatises and secured positions - that is, by the normal standards with which the Rockefeller Foundation judged its research grants. Although many of the ALS fellows went on to distinguished academic careers - including Baumgarten, Eschenburg, Raupach, Vetter, among others - even its organizers would have agreed that this aspect of its work was not enough to distinguish it from conventional fellowship-granting organizations.

The Lincoln Stiftung's inner circle - Young, Schairer, and Simons - were proudest of their work with youth movement leaders and adult education schools. The conference in Berlin in 1929 in which Severing took part, pointed to the kinds of practical outcomes that Young and his German colleagues thought would be the greatest contribution of their organization. At the heart of this work were Dehmel and Gothe, two of the most dynamic figures of their generation. Dehmel, as we have seen, spent four years on the western front and following the war had devoted himself to rebuilding the youth movement. For his part, Gothe was no less active in organizing labor camps and youth organizations. Following Buske's death, Gothe seems to have assumed an increasingly larger role in the work of the Silesian and eastern German youth movements. Like Dehmel, Gothe saw military service, but he only entered the German army in its last, disintegrating days. Gothe played an active role in the soldiers' councils of 1918-19 and sided with the Independent Socialists. The Rockefeller archives contain a brief account
of this period in his own words: "Because I had on several occasions stood up against military oppression, my fellow soldiers chose me in 1918 as a member of the soldiers' council. Thus, at the age of 18 I was given a responsibility far too heavy for my shoulders." Following the German revolution and the disarming of the soviets, Gothe left Germany for Brazil and, after three years, the United States, where he organized a student association. Gothe, in fact, was a born organizer: He pursued his studies at night while working day jobs. When he finally returned to Germany his working class background - and the fact that he had never attended either a Gymnasium or Realschule seemed destined to exclude him from the university degree he sought. "The door to the university is very narrow," he wrote, "But for the ALS I should not have been able to hold out until it opened for me; without its help, I should not now have been already able to study for a year, with good results and profound inner satisfaction." Young appended a note on Gothe's biography when the ALS filed its first report with the Rockefeller Foundation in 1930: "When I first suggested the creation of the A.L.S., the words were used to me by one of the Foundation Trustees 'If one man is found of the real 'leader' type, in five years, who would not otherwise have been found or furthered, the organization will have justified itself.' Since I have gotten to know him, Gothe has often recurred to mind as this single justification, if others had been lacking." In addition to Gothe and Dehmel, several other ALS fellows were active in the Boberhaus movement. Hans Raupach, Vetter, and others drew upon their own earlier involvement with the youth movement in an attempt to expand educational opportunities. It is important to note that official interest in these activities began during the period when the Weimar coalition - a group of centrist and leftist political parties - governed Germany and sought to deal, albeit unsuccessfully, with the depression and mounting unemployment.

For Dehmel, Gothe, and the other youth camp leaders the coming to power of the Nazis in 1933 proved to be the great test. As the leader of the Deutsche Freischar, Dehmel felt increased pressure to merge his
organization with Nazi Party youth organizations. Raupach and others took positions with provincial governments and party organizations that, it appears, quickly realized the political value of the labor camps and the adult education programs launched by various ALS fellows. After weeks of pressure Dehmel announced his decision to join the National Socialists. In a letter published by the party organ Der Angriff, Dehmel offered a public explanation for his decision. Citing his previous work with German youth movement groups, Dehmel argued, curiously, that his group had always marched alongside more nationalist groups in the eastern border zones and had attempted to show solidarity with pan-German communities in the alienated territories and foreign cities of eastern Europe. Whatever their differences in political activity or organization, the aims of the centrist groups he led had been the same as those of the nationalists, Dehmel averred.81

It was not long, however, before Dehmel was clashing with Nazi Gauleiter and other party officials. Dehmel's defenders credited him with public opposition to Nazi policies affecting the Silesian youth groups, but although letters published decades later do suggest that Dehmel disagreed with the tenor and policies of the Nazi youth movement, it would be wrong to place Dehmel and many of the Silesian youth leaders in the small camp of the opposition to Hitler. Dehmel's attempt to compromise with the new regime does not seem to have prevented his steady eclipse as the Nazi youth movement absorbed the last vestiges of the independent youth groups. When war came, Dehmel, along with a number of other fellows (Raupach, for example), took refuge from these political struggles and joined the German army.

For his part, Gothe, who had been Young's favorite example of a Lincoln Stiftung discovery, found he no longer could work freely with German youth and educational institutions. Although he, like Dehmel,
at first tried to continue his labor camp work with the new Reich Labor Ministry, Gothe objected to the introduction of compulsory service and the increasingly tighter Nazi control. When Gothe, who seems to have thrown himself into opposition to the Nazis with characteristic energy, came to understand that the Nazis were quickly eliminating all independent centers of power, he chose to leave Germany with his family. In 1938 he joined the emigration to the New World. Once in New York, Appleget remembered their earlier encounter in Berlin and warmly welcomed him - in fact, the Rockefeller files suggest that the foundation vice president even helped make temporary living arrangements for Gothe and his family.

In addition to Gothe, several ALS fellows showed outright hostility toward the new regime. Rotten, who had cared for English prisoners of war during World War I, fled to England; Karl Dunker, a distinguished psychologist, became a refugee professor (but committed suicide in 1940); the lyricist and poet Paula Ludwig, one of the later appointments, also fled Germany, as did the writers Hans Henny Jahnn, Albert Daudistel, and Stefan Andres. Maria Sevenich, one of the handful of women grantees, spent time in a German concentration camp for her work with a Catholic organization.

On the whole, however, the majority of the Lincoln Stiftung’s fellows seem neither to have resisted, emigrated, or actively collaborated with the National Socialists. Like most Germans, they continued to hold jobs and to work inconspicuously; Klatt, for example, moved to Vienna and worked on studies of the poet Rainer Maria Rilke. (Klatt’s war record - he had been severely wounded in World War I - may have spared him further harassment.) Those with academic positions - Vetter, Goern, Baumgarten, and others - continued to teach. Many of the fellows who had created educational institutions found, like Gothe, that their independence would not be tolerated.
The experience of the ALS fellows offers an interesting window into the generation that came of age during World War I and that grew to maturity during the interwar years. Many historians have sought to meld the shared generational history of wartime trauma and postwar misery into an explanation for the phenomenon of fascism between the wars. As Robert Wohl wrote, "Fascism was the great temptation of the generation of 1914." Moreover, in addition to fueling political extremism, the experiences of the war widened the usual generation gap, especially in Germany, where the prewar youth movement had already launched a mild revolution against the established order.

At first glance the experience of the Lincoln Stiftung would seem to confirm this generational difference. As noted, the advisory board or the talent scouts for the Lincoln Stiftung included over a hundred of the nation's most prominent cultural and intellectual figures. Although the roster of consultants or nominators was not the randomly selected group associated with social scientific polls, it was nonetheless a highly diverse and not unrepresentative sampling of German intellectual leaders, albeit one tilted toward the internationalist and pacifist side of the political spectrum. Among this group, an astonishingly high number chose to emigrate. By contrast, for those fellows whose careers I have been able to trace beyond 1933, no more than a dozen chose to leave Germany. How can this disparity be explained? For the moment, answers to these questions must remain tentative and provisional, although it may be that Simons's argument, that the younger and unknown fellows of the ALS would find it easier to retain academic and other positions and remain in Germany, is the simple answer to a complex question.

But if, as Kittredge's notes suggest, a high number of the ALS's fellows obtained positions because they chose to join the Nazi Party, then the
gap between the advisers, scholars, and cultural figures of an older generation and the fellows, who by and large were members of the "generation of 1914," would be all the more striking. In either case, further research into the careers of those selected by the ALS promises to throw a powerful light onto the motives and experiences of this distinguished group of younger intellectuals.

Despite the seemingly unremarkable record of most of its fellows, the Lincoln Stiftung nonetheless played a supporting role in the German resistance to Hitler. The advisory board, in particular, contained a number of political activists, and there is evidence that a few of these individuals continued to meet with Young after the termination of the Rockefeller grant and the formal end of the fellowship program. The ALS’s network of over a hundred advisers covered the entire length and breadth of Germany, and this diverse group included men and women of all political persuasions. Given this range of opinion, it is striking that over forty of the initial one hundred advisers either played a role in the opposition to Hitler or left Germany as émigrés. No less important, Young maintained close ties with Simons and Schairer, who were both dismissed from their positions by the Nazis, and with members of the ALS’s "presidential" or steering committee, a group that included Robert Bosch.

Among all the ALS’s German advisers, or nominators, Young developed the closest relationship with Kurt Hahn, the founder of a private school in Baden-Württemberg. Hahn immediately came into conflict with the new regime when he denounced the violent murder of a young German Communist by six Nazi storm troopers. Hahn sent a message to all of his Salem school graduates demanding that they either "break with Hitler or break with Salem," and shortly afterward his school was closed and Hahn was arrested. 83
Fearful for his friend’s life, Young returned to Germany with the archbishop of Canterbury to demand Hahn’s release. Young, in fact, was to make many such pilgrimages to Berlin, and he later recalled one of these visits: “I had returned again now to Berlin, with Sir William Deedes, in the first days of Adolf Hitler’s Chancellorship. There was still hope that an appeal to reason or compassion might be listened to; and we were the bearers of a letter of remonstrance about the internment camps and the Jewish persecution, organized by Archbishop Temple and signed by well-known names from every department of English life.”

Young and his associates, appealing to Franz von Papen, succeeded in securing Hahn’s release, and soon Hahn emigrated to England where he and Young established a new boarding school, Gordonstoun, modeled after Salem. The success of Hahn’s educational venture spawned an international movement, and in England the new school became the training ground for Young’s own son and many others who, after the war, would form a network of distinguished schools based on Hahn’s method.

Among Hahn’s circle, and a member of the Lincoln Stiftung’s steering committee, was Bosch, who introduced Young and Hahn to Karl Goerdeler, the mayor of Leipzig and the focal point of one of the major resistance groups. Although the ALS played only a minor part in Bosch’s life, and none at all in Goerdeler’s, it did throw Hahn into close association with Young, whose staunch advocacy perhaps saved Hahn’s life, and whose continued interest in Germany proved of invaluable assistance to the circle around Goerdeler. Young, in fact, helped to organize many appeals on behalf of political prisoners in Germany, and he took justifiable pride in his efforts to save not only Hahn but the playwright Walter Hasenclever and others. The British organizations formed in the 1930s by Young and others to protest the Nazis’ infringement of civil rights and academic freedom may rightly be seen as precursors to Amnesty International and other postwar human rights organizations.
Conclusion

Years later, in an unpublished chapter intended for his autobiography, Young reflected on the aims of the Abraham Lincoln Stiftung and the experiences of its fellows. In a passage that might serve not only as his own verdict on the ALS but also as the epitaph for all the educational efforts launched by liberal German educators, Young wrote, "We were beginning to yoke high individual intelligence with common sense, and with worldly intelligence, and we were in hopes of being able to check the rising tide of despair and of revolution in the country. But time proved too short for us, and the scope of our work was too restricted." 86

The Lincoln Stiftung did not work entirely in vain, however. Of its hundred or more distinguished advisers, nearly thirty escaped Nazi Germany as exiles, and a dozen or more who remained in Germany actively opposed the new regime, with several taking part in the resistance to Hitler. Among these resisters, advisers Adolf Reichwein and Theodor Haubach, paid for their actions with their lives.

Among those who left Germany or who labored quietly in "inner exile," several lived to play an active role in the restoration of the German universities and German intellectual life in the postwar period: Theodor Eschenburg, August Rathmann, and others like them were the final legacy of the ALS. They lived to rebuild the German educational system on a sounder footing after 1945, and in so doing may be said to be the final return on the Rockefeller "investment," a legacy that no one among the American foundation’s officials ever expected and one that until today few have suspected.
NOTES

1 Minutes of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, Mar. 15, 1928. The surviving records of the memorial are housed at the Rockefeller Archive Center in North Tarrytown, New York (hereafter RAC). At some point someone took the records of the ALS and arranged them chronologically, pasting them in sequence into two bound volumes. With the exception of the appendices, including the only published report on the ALS (in German), the documents are paginated. Consequently, it is possible to cite documents by page number, by date, or by archival folder number. The archive's records are customarily cited by the series, box, and folder numbers; the Abraham Lincoln Stiftung files are found in series 717R. However, because almost all of the ALS documents are filed in two boxes, nos. 17 and 18, I will dispense with the archival numbers when citing these papers and use dates only.

2 With the exception of a brief listing in the 1930 Annual Report of the Rockefeller Foundation (New York, 1931), for over sixty years the only other account in English of this remarkable organization was a retrospective look by Reinhold Scharrer, "The Abraham Lincoln Foundation," Educational Yearbook, 1936 (London, 1937), 15570. In Geoffrey Winthrop Young; Poet, Mountaineer, Educator (London, 1996), Alan Hankinson treats Young's work with the Rockefeller Foundation but does not discuss the ALS in detail.


4 For a description of the memorial and its operating philosophy, see Martin Bulmer and Joan Bulmer, "Philanthropy and Social Science in the 1920s: Beardsley Ruml and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, 19221929," Minerva 19, no. 3 (autumn 1981): 347407.

5 On Merriam's work on civic education, see Barry D. Karl, Charles E. Merriam and the Study of Politics (Chicago, 1974), 16985.

6 Arthur Woods to Beardsley Ruml, Aug. 2, 1925, RAC.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Young's response is quoted in Woods's letter to Ruml. I have not been able to find the original.

10 The Times, Mar. 20, 1932.

11 See Arnold Lunn, "Geoffrey Winthrop Young." Mountain World 81 (1960): 3, for an assessment of Young's status as a mountaineer and for a portrait of his family.

12 From the Trenches: Louvain to the Aisne, the First Record of an Eye Witness (London, 1914), 301.

13 "A Summary of Impressions Received During an Inquiry Made on Behalf of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, with a Recommendation," Oct. 1926, 9, RAC (hereafter "Summary of Impressions").

14 Ibid., 38.

15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.

17 Papers of Geoffrey Winthrop Young, Schule Schloss Salem, Salem am Bodensee. I am grateful to Young's son, Jocelin Young, for giving me access to his father's papers and for sharing a copy of this document with me.


19 "Summary of Impressions," 40.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., 38.

22 Ibid., 13.

23 Geoffrey Winthrop Young, log, Dec. 1929, RAC.


25 Reinhold Schairer and Hans Simons, "Abraham Lincoln Stiftung: First Year's Report," July 21, 1930. Young translated this report from the German original and added a cover memorandum and comments on the ALS fellows he knew. Young's summary report may by found in volume 2 of the ALS's records, RAC.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.


32 Ibid.

33 Quoted in Brecht, Political Education, 272-3. Brecht is paraphrasing a eulogy by Willy Hellpach, another ALS advisory board member.

34 "Summary of Impressions," 37.


38 Ibid.

39 Geoffrey Winthrop Young, diary, Dec. 14, 1929, RAC.


41 Selskar M. Gunn, diary, June 2, 1930, RAC.

42 Thomas B. Appleget, diary, July 12, 1930, RAC.

43 Ibid.

44 This plan is summarized in Appleget's diary, July 14, 1930, RAC.

45 Schairer to Gunn, Sept. 8, 1930, RAC.

46 Minutes of Staff Conference, Nov. 19, 1930, RAC: 904, vol. III.

47 The phrase occurs in Appleget's description of the trustees' meeting in a letter to Gunn, Jan. 31, 1931, RAC.

48 Ibid.

49 John Van Sickle, "Memorandum on conversation with Dr. Hans Simons in Berlin," Feb. 17, 1933, RAC.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.


53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.

55 For example, Van Sickle attempted to interest David H. Stevens, the newly appointed director for the foundation's program in the humanities, in the ALS. See his letters to Stevens in RAC.

56 Geoffrey Winthrop Young, memorandum, "Abraham Lincoln Stiftung," Nov. 9, 1933, RAC.


58 Geoffrey Winthrop Young and Hans Simons, "Abraham Lincoln Stiftung," Nov. 29, 1933. This report was prepared to bolster Young's request for support in his memorandum from Nov. 9 cited in note 56. Its description of the work of specific fellows is especially valuable.

59 Ibid.

60 Van Sickle, "Abraham Lincoln Stiftung," RAC.
61 Ibid.


63 Appleget, diary, Dec. 7, 1933.

64 John Marshall, diary, Feb. 14, 1935: "It appeared that S. made this inquiry on behalf of friends still in Germany. S. was candid in saying that he, personally could not urge further support for the Stiftung at this time."

65 See Schairer, "Abraham Lincoln Foundation," 1602, on Young's insistence on the need for "personal guidance" along the lines of the English tutorial system.

66 Ibid., 165.

67 Tracy Kittredge, "Memorandum of interview with Dr. Hans Simons," Jan. 8, 1935, RAC.

68 The reference to eighty-two beneficiaries is found in a docket item summary at the beginning of the Lincoln Stiftung files: Young and Simons, "Abraham Lincoln Stiftung," Nov. 29, 1933, RAC.

69 Ibid.

70 The ledger sheets are found in the first section of the ALS records, following a section titled "Financial Statement" (beginning on page 22 of the file created by the Rockefeller office). The decision of the Rockefeller Foundation office in the 1930s to place these unpaginated sheets at this point in the bound volumes means that these German records are out of chronological sequence; the organizing device for the rest of the records in this series. In reading through these files, I completely missed the significance of these ledgers until, upon rereading the files many years later, I realized that I had found the key to reconstructing the roster of ALS fellows.

71 Hannah Arendt's correspondence with Karl Jaspers documents her relations with the Lincoln Stiftung. A letter from 1929 asks Jaspers for a letter of reference and mentions an interview with Hans Simons. See Lotte Kohler and Hans Saner, eds., Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers: Correspondence, 1926-1969 (New York, 1992), 78. Other letters show that Arendt also sought aid from a Jewish fund and from the Notgemeinschaft and in 1930 the latter offered her assistance - perhaps explaining why the Lincoln Stiftung directors did not.


73 Appleget to Woods, Nov. 21, 1933, RAC.

74 In addition to Hans Queling's biographical note in the Lincoln Stiftung files, see his published travel works, such as Sechs Jungen tippeln nach Indien (Berlin, 1931) and Sechs Jungen tippeln zum Himalaja (Berlin, 1933).

75 Quoted from Rogge's biographical sketch in "Abraham Lincoln Stiftung: First Year's Report."

76 Heinrich Rogge, Nationale Friedenspolitik: Handbuch des Friedensproblems und seiner Wissenschaft (Berlin, 1934). Franz von Papen contributed an introduction to this volume, which appears to be the volume outlined in the Lincoln Stiftung files. Following this work, Rogge published Hitlers Friedenspolitik und das Völkerrecht (Berlin, 1935) and Hitlers Versuche zur Verständigung mit England (Berlin, 1940).

78 Quoted from Gothe's biographical sketch in "Abraham Lincoln Stiftung: First Year's Report."

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid.

81 Der Angriff, Mar. 1933, quoted in Aufbruch einer jungen Generation, 43. New York Public Library pamphlet collection.


84 Young papers, Schule Schloss Salem.


86 Young papers, Schule Schloss Salem.
A COMMENT ON MALCOLM RICHARDSON
Eckhardt Fuchs

Malcolm Richardson has had the good fortune to find what every historian is looking for: A bundle of documents buried deep inside an archive, hidden away for many years. Soon after a historian discovers such a treasure, however, frustration quickly overtakes excitement. The main question the historian now faces is how to shape the material into a cohesive historical narrative. Furthermore, the historian must resist the temptation necessarily to place this newfound material at the center of the larger story.

Richardson has presented a well-written, informative, empirically rich account of the Abraham Lincoln Stiftung's (ALS) brief history. His essay offers insight into a hitherto forgotten part of the activities of the Rockefeller Foundation and into a chapter of German-American cultural relations during the Weimar Republic. But his account, as is the case with any microscopic analysis of a single historical event, runs the danger of having its conclusions and judgments relativized when observed from a broader historical perspective. With this comment, I would like to offer a few suggestions on how to situate the history of the ALS within a broader contextual framework and, therefore, to decenter the main subject of Richardson's investigation. In the following, I first raise five possible leitmotifs for such a contextualization, then I explore two of them in greater detail.

A first leitmotif might be the history of the Rockefeller Foundation itself. In this, the ALS could be seen as a part of its overall activities not just in Germany, not just in the area of scholarship, and not just in the field of education. It could include the international dimension of the foundation and its institutional politics. It is, for example, quite
interesting to ask what role the European headquarters in Paris played in the decisions regarding the ALS, considering French-German hostility at the time. If one embeds the history of the ALS within the whole range of activities of the Rockefeller Foundation, its scope and impact would become reduced. Besides the ALS, the foundation sponsored many other activities for German scholars and scientific institutions, including the International Educational Board, founded by Rockefeller in 1923, which supported individuals, such as Albert Einstein, and institutions, such as the library of the University of Munich, the Institute of Physics at the University of Göttingen, the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft, and the Notgemeinschaft der deutschen Wissenschaft.

Another leitmotif might be the general history of philanthropy in the United States, referred to in Richardson's title but rarely discussed in his text. This includes the political, cultural, economic, and academic origins and purposes of American philanthropical organizations. The history of the Rockefeller Foundation and its programs might be compared to other foundations, such as the Carnegie Foundation or the Cecil Rhodes Foundation. One could show what political influence these institutions gained in different parts of society, what impact they had on American culture, and how they actually contributed to U.S. foreign cultural policy since the 1920s.

A third leitmotif might focus on the role of American foundations and endowments as agencies for promoting international understanding and peace. In general, it can be said that a primary goal of the Rockefeller Foundation, as well as other similar foundations, was to cultivate international cooperation based on harmony and peaceful coexistence. From this point of view, the ALS could be seen as a single tile within a larger mosaic that can be called the international peace movement.
The fourth leitmotif locates an analysis of the ALS within the context of the German-American intellectual relationship since the late nineteenth century. In placing the ALS within the broader realm of German-American intellectual cooperation, it becomes clear that something that sounded novel and exceptional in the 1920s was in fact not new. Two examples underscore this point: First, the notion that Germans were unfamiliar with private foundations is inaccurate; second, it is misleading to suggest that foreign sponsorship of the such organization had to be shrouded in secrecy. In 1905 the American Speyer Foundation and the German Koppel Stiftung sponsored an exchange of professors between Germany and the United States that was inaugurated by Harvard University and the University of Berlin. In addition, the Koppel Stiftung later became one of the sponsors of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft of Physical Chemistry. The Germanistic Society, founded in New York in 1904, organized and sponsored lecture series for German scholars in the United States. The still famous German-American brewer Adolphus Busch from St. Louis and the businessman Hugo Reisinger from New York financed the creation of the Germanic Museum at Harvard in 1910. A year later, an exchange program between the University of Wisconsin and Germany was established with the backing of the Carl Schurz Memorial Association. In 1913 the German-American Jacob Schiff sponsored an exchange professorship at Cornell. The most important post-World War I example of a German foundation is the Stifterverband der deutschen Wissenschaft, founded in 1920. German industry also helped to establish societies in order to promote education and research. For instance, there were the Justus-Liebig-Gesellschaft zur Förderung des Unterrichts and the Emil-Fischer-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der chemischen Forschung, both founded in 1920 and sponsored by the chemical industry. In the same year the Helmholtz-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der physikalisch-technischen Forschung was established with the support of the electrotechnical industry.
It is worthwhile to investigate the close personal entanglements between cultural and economic institutions and the fact that the majority of sponsors were German or German-American Jews. It remains to be studied how this collaboration between the cultural and economic elites influenced German foreign policy. The Jewish background of these private foundations was one reason why officials did not want to make the sponsorship public. This was especially true in the case of the Amerika Institut, founded in 1910 with financing from Speyer and Schiff. Many of the ALS fellows and sponsors of German-American cultural projects after the war also were Jewish. In this light, it may not be so surprising to learn that many ALS fellows later opposed the Nazi regime.

Another similarity between pre- and post-World War I cooperation is the mixture of official and private initiatives. Although the ALS's representatives tried to avoid any governmental participation, they soon found out that because of Germany's centralized political and academic structures, success was impossible without some state support.

Looking at this broader picture, we can assert that academic cooperation and exchange in the early twentieth century was continuous, even if interrupted by the war and Germany's international isolation afterward. The United States belonged to the few countries that tried very hard to reintegrate the Germans into international cooperation immediately after the end of the war. The Americans - and not only the Rockefeller Foundation - organized emergency aid programs and were eager to re-establish close relations with Germany. In 1922-3 the Carl Schurz professorship was revived, and in 1927 Harvard inaugurated the Kuno Francke Professorship of German Art and Culture through the generosity of such German-American Jews as Felix and Paul Warburg.
But in comparing cooperation in the decades before and after the war, we should not neglect substantive differences. In Germany after 1918, the Reich government no longer was the main initiator of this cooperation, and people chosen by the ALS as fellows did not belong to the academy’s inner circles. For example, whereas after 1890 mainstream teachers went to the United States with the Prussian-American Exchange of Teachers program, in the 1920s the ALS chose teachers and intellectuals with alternative concepts. Furthermore, the importance of German-Americans within American culture had declined. After World War I it was not the Germans who were trying to influence American culture and science through their foreign cultural policy but the Americans who now used their economic and intellectual potential to introduce their political values and educational ideas into German society.

From an international perspective, we also have to take into account the transformation of international science after 1918. This transformation spread beyond the relationship between Germany and America, but it deeply affected the mutual cooperation of both countries. Moreover, it is characterized by the rise of American science and the rise of the United States to the status of leading scientific power. This shift, which had already begun before the war, was the result of new economic and cultural developments in the international arena. Due to the war and the postwar crises, German science and research were internationally isolated and lacked a sufficient financial basis for research. In Germany the foundation funds were destroyed by inflation, and financial support from the government was rare. German science would never recover, and the exodus of most prominent German scientists after 1933 symbolized its final decline. Although this line of argument cannot be further pursued here, by 1945 the United States had taken the leading international position in scientific research. To summarize: I see the program of the ALS as a part of the ongoing history of German-
American cooperation, rather than as something new and different; however, this history has its share of major shifts and breaks. What was innovative about the ALS program was its direct political purpose: It aimed to create a cohort of educators and intellectuals in Germany who supported democracy and an open society. After a more-or-less successful transfer of aspects of German culture to North America through the end of the nineteenth century, the cultural transfer flowed in the opposite direction after World War I.

This leads me to my fifth and final leitmotif, which is the connection between education and public policy. Richardson emphasizes the important role that ideas about education had in the establishment of the ALS. The program aimed to support young, alternative intellectuals and teachers in order to give them a chance to proceed with their projects. The long-term goal was to reorient the German aristocratic and conservative system of secondary and higher education toward democratic and republican ideals. But was the idea to promote democracy, international understanding, and peace unique to the postwar period? And, perhaps more important, was it realistic?

In 1896 Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia University and one of the foremost American educators who later became not only a key figure in the Carnegie Foundation but also one of the main representatives of the international peace movement, published an article titled "Democracy and Education." In it he linked democracy with the concept of education. In his view, the educational ideal in a democracy must be the development of an "intelligent citizenship," that is, the teaching of individual responsibility for social and political progress, on the one hand, and of democratic moral issues and values, on the other. Here, Butler addresses a topic that was one of the most widely discussed issues in international cultural relations in the first decades of the century. "Education" was the buzzword for international exhibitions, world's fairs, exchange programs, congresses, international
institutions, and so forth. The belief in the universal merits of international education also led to the foundation of many international institutions, a process that was in many ways carried out under American leadership. For example, the National Educational Association had proposed in 1884 and again in 1910 the foundation of an International Council of Education; the proposal was finally realized in 1923 when World Federation of Educational Associations was established. In 1912 the U.S. Congress passed a resolution for the creation of an International Board of Education. With Butler as director, the Division of Intercourse and Education of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace discussed several plans for international educational cooperation, leading in 1919 to the establishment of the Institute of International Education. I already have mentioned the Rockefeller Foundation’s International Educational Board. All of these institutions served to promote international cooperation in all areas of education. They established exchange programs, organized conferences, and sponsored scholarships.

Within the broader scope of international cooperation in education, the ALS was no exception. Growing international exchange since the turn of the century had led to the steady increase in national discourses on alternatives in the educational systems in different countries. When we try to locate Germany in this process, we find a few more reasons for the failure of the ALS, namely, the differing structure of the educational systems in the two countries, the mutual misperceptions, and the possible alternatives for reform. Let me conclude with a few comments on these points.

Before World War I the German educational system became an international model. Germans academics and politicians were well aware of this fact. Nationalistic pride nevertheless led to ignorance or rejection of developments in educational facilities, research, and innovations abroad. Although Germans paid attention to the
transformation in the American educational system after the 1890s, their overall criticism, especially of the system of higher learning, prevented an open reception of American educational ideas and theories. As Peter Drewek has shown, the "official" view in Germany led to a selectively constructed "image" of the other country's system according to the parameters of its own logic, a misperception that continued after the war.

Conversely, the ALS's promoters neglected the structure and traditions of Germany's educational system, which could not be changed from the outside. In contrast, German education reformers such as Becker aimed to effect a structural reform of the universities from the inside. The idea of exporting the concept of democracy without considering particular needs of the importing country was destined to fail. Thus, the goal of the ALS was unrealistic from the beginning. The type of reform promoted by the ALS should have created a consciousness among scholars and students that was not based on militarism and chauvinism. But such ideas were not linked to democratic ideals as much as they were to nationalism. The Americans could not yet offer an alternative educational structure that could overcome Germany's tarnished image of American educational institutions. It was illusory to believe that the creation of a small idealistic elite could change either the German educational system or the German image of America.

These five leitmotifs suggest ways in which the history of the ALS could be placed within a broader historical context. Depending on the angle from which one approaches the subject, different narratives are created. But the precondition of synthesis is empirical research. Richardson's study presents an insightful account of an institution we knew nothing about. Institutions can be interpreted as parts of the social structure and as cognitive entities of society. Within and without institutions, social
actors develop the framework in which they can pursue their goals. At the same time, their actions are influenced and limited by the institutions they have created. I believe the history of the ALS offers an excellent example of this dialectical relationship.
At its meeting in Chicago in early January 2000 the American Historical Association (AHA) announced its decision to bestow upon German historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler an honorary foreign membership. The AHA is the oldest and largest professional organization for historians in the United States; its first honorary foreign member was Leopold von Ranke in 1885. Altogether there are now eight Germans who have received this honor, including Theodor Mommsen (1900), Friedrich Meinecke (1947), Franz Schnabel (1952), Gerhard Ritter (1959), Fritz Fischer (1984), and Karl Bosl (1990). The AHA confers this special membership on scholars who are distinguished in their fields and have notably aided the work of American historians.

Hans-Ulrich Wehler was born in 1931 and studied history, sociology, and economics at the universities of Cologne and Bonn, and at Ohio University in Athens, Ohio. He received his Ph.D. in 1960 and completed his Habilitation in 1968, both at the University of Cologne. Wehler taught German history in Cologne and American history at the John F. Kennedy Institute of the Free University of Berlin before assuming a chair of history at the University of Bielefeld in 1971. Since then he also has held several visiting professorships at American universities, such as Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, and Yale.

At the center of Hans-Ulrich Wehler's work stand problems of modern German history with a particular focus on the rise of industrial society and imperialism, the formation of authoritarian political structures, and the social, economic, and political problems inherent in the processes of modernization. Wehler has published numerous books, including his
Wehler’s work has culminated in his broad societal history of modern Germany, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, published by Beck Verlag in Munich since 1987, with three volumes covering the eighteenth to early twentieth centuries. Wehler is currently working on the fourth volume, which will deal with the era between World War I and German unification. Wehler also is the co-editor of Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft, a monograph series, and the journal Geschichte und Gesellschaft. The founding of both reflected the agenda of what Wehler, Jürgen Kocka, and other German historians in the early 1970s called Historische Sozialwissenschaft or historical social science. Historical social science was designed as a new and critical approach to modern history that was based on the use of analytical social sciences, demanded theoretical sophistication, and focused on long-term structural processes and the changing role of social classes and groups.

GHI: Professor Wehler, how do you feel as a successor of Leopold von Ranke as an honorary foreign member of the American Historical Association?
WEHLER: I accepted with great pleasure the honorary membership of the American Historical Association because for nearly fifty years I have felt closely connected to the professional American historical community. I generally turn down memberships in academic commissions and academies because they absorb a great deal of time. And by the way, I don't feel myself to be Leopold von Ranke's or Friedrich Meinecke's successor, both of whom received the same honor from the AHA, because I have repeatedly stressed that scholars of modern history can learn much more from Max Weber and Karl Marx.

Could you tell us something about your first encounters with America?

My first contact with American culture and political life occurred while I attended Gymnasium in a small city in the barren eastern part of the Prussian Rhineland. There, we were introduced to modern American literature very early on, and for my generation there was immediacy to the study of contemporary American politics.

In the 1950s you spent a year as a student in Athens, Ohio. What was that experience like?

I was fortunate that right after my Abitur I received a scholarship from the Fulbright Commission and was able to go to America during my second semester. At that time America was for us the "promised land" in many respects - political, cultural, economic, and, last but not least, athletic. Therefore, I considered it to be a great privilege to be allowed to study in America. Naturally, we all wanted to attend one of the famous East Coast universities. But in fact I learned much more about America in the Midwest. After the academic year had ended, I worked for six months as a welder and a truck driver in Los Angeles.
You have frequently returned to the United States to do research or to teach as a visiting professor. How have your perceptions of American academic life changed over time?

After finishing my dissertation in 1960 I chose for the subject of my Habilitation project American imperialism between 1865 and 1900. With support from the American Council of Learned Societies, I was able to stay in the United States in 1962-3 with my family and to spend one and a half years in archives and special libraries. Thereafter, I have often been invited to be a visiting professor, for example, in Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, and Yale. These visits yielded the acquaintance, even the friendship of several American colleagues, and above all close contact with undergraduate and graduate students. At the same time I could observe the latest trends in American historical scholarship.

Since my experiences as a student in Ohio I have always advocated the adoption of the American academic model in Germany: We also should allow four years for basic studies, concluding with exams, after which the majority of students would leave university. And we should introduce a graduate program for M.A. and doctoral students. It has always been illusory to treat every German student as a potential scholar in the sense of Wilhelm von Humboldt. I am of course also a supporter of the idea that each university should be able to select its own students, assess its own fees, and enter a lively competition for the best minds. This opinion has repeatedly been strengthened during each of my trips to America. I don't see any better alternative to the rational restructuring of the mass university from within.

Against the backdrop of your personal experiences, how would you characterize the American contribution to your intellectual life?
The nearly six years altogether that I spent in the United States have influenced me mostly in the direction of a kind of political liberalism, which in the 1950s and 1960s was seen as "leftist" in the old Federal Republic. I also have been influenced by the more flexible American style of discussion. In contrast, the epistemological positivism in the U.S. has horrified me from the beginning - and still does to this day.

How did your acquaintance or friendship with German émigré scholars living in the United States influence the development of your historical thinking?

Without question, I have been deeply influenced by personal friendships with German historians who were forced by the Nazi regime to leave the country. This is true above all in the case of my long-term relationship with Hans Rosenberg, but also is true for scholars such as Dietrich Gerhard, Hajo Holborn, Alfred Vagts, as well as the children of émigrés such as Fritz Stern, Klaus Epstein, and others. When we were searching for forerunners for a new social history, reference to the works of these historians played an important role, especially the fact that all of them could be considered political liberals.

How would you describe the connections between the American theoretical debates of the last twenty years - for example, feminist theory, the linguistic turn, the New Cultural History - and the development of your major project, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte?

Work on my "history of society" (Gesellschaftsgeschichte) has been conducted independent of the fashionable trends in the United States. I
myself experienced the short-lived rise of psychohistory, cliometrics, and culturalism. These fashionable trends spread like brush fires through American history departments and disappeared just as quickly as they started. The so-called linguistic turn is epistemologically the return of a neo-Kantian epistemology. I don't see anything new, especially with regard to relative constructivism, which has greatly informed the New Cultural History. The rise of gender history, however, closes a long existing gap, but my own work certainly doesn’t satisfy the expectations of its proponents.

In your view, what is the current state of the transatlantic historiographical dialog?

The transatlantic dialog between American and German historians since the late 1940s is based on the fundamental experiences of the political generations that lived through the Nazi dictatorship, World War II, the postwar years, and the founding of the Federal Republic. These common experiences led to close contacts; I am someone who has profited immensely from them. The generations of Carl Schorske, Leonard Krieger, Hajo Holborn, Arno Mayer, Jim Sheehan, Henry Turner, Gerald Feldman, Charles Maier, and others, have influenced in a lasting way the political generation in Germany to which I belong. Perhaps they also took up this or that stimulus from our side. Nonetheless, there remain surprising gaps. As an approach cliometrics has almost been completely ignored in the Federal Republic. Our type of political social history has not been adopted by American new social historians with their faith in quantification. Our argument in regard to a German Sonderweg - an interpretation that is of course specific to the "civilization break" in 1933 - has not persuaded all of our American friends. But what remains is an exceptionally intensive discussion that has been sustained over the course of several decades. I hope very much that this discussion among the younger generations in Germany and in America doesn't come to an end.
Why do you think the approach of Alltagsgeschichte plays a more prominent role among American students of German history than among German historians?

It has been clear for some time that the "history of everyday life" (Alltagsgeschichte) has been a failure, theoretically speaking. All of the smart people have moved on to the New Cultural History. This development also will take its course in America, where currently students of those historians who once declared themselves enthusiastically for the history of everyday life are fighting a rearguard battle.

How would you evaluate the American reading of your work and the American perception of "historical social science" - an approach that you and others have promulgated since the late 1960s?

What we had in mind as an "historical social science" (Historische Sozialwissenschaft) and then pragmatically translated into actual studies, especially social historical ones, as well as into syntheses of the history of society, has been received by our American colleagues with a friendly curiosity. Like their German counterparts, a younger generation of American historians, which is interested in women's history, ethnic studies, and the New Cultural History, has been less interested in our project. It remains to be seen what the outcome of this duel will be in the short or long term. I am still confident that historical social science, with its foci on social, economic, and political history and its theoretical sophistication, will hold its own in this debate. Above all, historical social science can absorb important trends emerging from the New Cultural History rather than the other way around.
How would you compare your Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte to other histories of Germany in the nineteenth century written in English?

I certainly will not engage in a detailed comparison of my own attempt to synthesize the history of society with the attempts of others. The synthetic works of American and British historians with which I am familiar basically are still framed in the language of conventional political history. I don't see anywhere in the general histories, not to mention in "textbooks" (with the one exception of Volker Berghahn's), an indication that they have much in common with our ideas on the history of society. To that extent, the Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte perhaps represents a welcome addition.

What do you see as the relative strengths and weaknesses of the historical professions in Germany and the United States?

As far as a cost-benefit analysis regarding American and German historical scholarship is concerned, German provincialism has without doubt remained rather frightening. There are very few faculties where the history of southern or western Europe is taught, let alone the history of Latin America, Africa, or Asia. You can easily count the number of practitioners in these fields on one hand. At every major university in the United States the situation is fundamentally different; this reflects the much broader range of historical interests in America. However, I think the training of our doctoral students is much better. The best of our future scholars have studied two subjects, for example, history and sociology. They also are more theoretically minded. Within a few years of the dissertation they write a second study (Habilitationsschrift) on a different problem, in a different time period, and on a different country than they did for the dissertation. This system allows them to have
broader interests and to be less narrow. I know only a few American Ph.D. dissertations that can compare with the excellent doctoral works, let alone the Habilitationsschriften, of our best young scholars.

The institutionalization of professional historical scholarship in both countries is similar. We have fewer professional organizations than in America. However, the influence of German historical scholarship on the German public is comparatively much greater than that of the American guild on its respective public. At any time we can intervene on television, on the radio, and in the cultural pages of the major newspapers. Many of us do this on a regular basis. In America that is rarely the case; you must be an adviser of the president in order to attract media attention. Looking back, it is clearly apparent that the West German invention of contemporary history, which had not really existed beforehand, and the enormously important role of modern history in general for West German political consciousness have had an enlightening effect in the positive sense.

Where do you situate National Socialism in the history of the twentieth century?

The experiences of the Nazi dictatorship, its war of extermination, and its mass murder particularly of the Jews and Slavs remains an integral part of German history in the twentieth century. I believe this history will continue to be treated in a privileged way by the international community of scholars. Even for comparative history the experience of the German dictatorship continues to be a horrifying example. One can try to understand this history from various points of view, but certainly not in the sense of the "trashbook" by Daniel Goldhagen.
What impact will the passage of time have on Germany's political self-definition with respect to the Nazi past?

Of course, the temporal distance grows, and a new political generation's experiences are referenced to fifty peaceful years of the Federal Republic. However, I believe that the break with civilization in the 1930s and 1940s will continue to be an indispensable point of orientation for German political consciousness. One cannot steal away from this context, as we have seen in the debate over compensating forced laborers. In the near future we will finally turn to the problem of the Aryanization of Jewish businesses during the Nazi period.

Will recent research on the history of the GDR change views of the history of West Germany?

I don't believe for a minute that research on the history of the GDR will essentially change the perspective on West German history. There is no way to get around the fact that the second German dictatorship failed in every respect. It is one of the bitterest experiences of eastern Germans that they cannot contribute anything lasting to the unification process, neither political, nor economic, nor social. One can criticize this statement as a judgment from the era of the Cold War, but I believe that the West clearly won the Cold War and that this victory will continue to have an effect on interpretations of German postwar history, and should continue to have normative effects.

What do you see as the major challenges for the writing of German history in the future?
German historical scholarship will face a number of challenges in the future. In many respects it already finds itself in the middle of a lively debate. The relations between social and cultural history have to be clarified. In particular, the epistemological bases, which are deplorably undeveloped in many cultural historical projects, will have to be clarified. Moreover, support of economic and political history should not be neglected. In the era of globalization and the new international constellation since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the decline of economic and political history in Germany is practically a disaster. Women’s history needs to be expanded into gender history because the real world is made up of two genders after all, much like an ellipse with its two foci. Above all, however, academic history has to stay conscious of the unavoidable political implications of its work. There is no room for a retreat to an apolitical position, which can be clearly discerned in the work of some cultural historians.

To conclude with two general questions, what would you say are the three or four most important influences on the writing of German history in the twentieth century?

When it comes to the greatest influences, I would have to say again that Max Weber and Karl Marx have offered the most stimulating ideas. The most important German historian of the first half of the twentieth century was Otto Hintze. After that, I would mention Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy (the only genius I ever met) and Ernst Troeltsch

If the last page of the last volume of Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte was written and you had time to write a small book, what would you write about?
When I finally throw off the burden of this enormous project, that is, when the fourth volume (which covers the period from 1914 to 1990) is published, I would in fact like to turn to the writing of a small book. I would probably attempt to write a fusion of social, political, and cultural history, for example, an outline of the history of modern nationalism.
The international system of the post-World War II era was characterized by two major developments: the Cold War and decolonization. Whereas the history of decolonization has been studied mainly from the perspective of the colonizers and the colonized, historical research on the Cold War has concentrated on East-West relations and on alliance politics. The aim of this workshop was to assess American policies toward decolonization and the emerging Third World, thereby emphasizing the important role the United States played with regard to the political, economic, and cultural transformation of large parts of the globe. Implicit in this analysis is the understanding that decolonization was a long-term process that did not end with the official transfers of power. The workshop also marked the start of a research project on decolonization at the University of Cologne, which is supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. The papers and discussions centered on the ways U.S. decision makers perceived, accompanied, and shaped these processes as well as on the methodological and theoretical problems involved in studying international relations.

In his introductory presentation Jürgen Heideking outlined the basic ideas of American Cold War politics and argued that decolonization posed a great challenge to the bipolar worldview and its accompanying policies. He identified six areas where research seems necessary: the question of American global and regional strategies and their connection to decolonization; the role of the United Nations and other multilateral organizations in U.S. policy; perceptions of decolonization as well as Third World economic nationalism and neutralism; the influence of American reconstruction policies in Europe on decolonization; the problem of traditional modes of exploitation versus new forms of dependence; academic and public discourses on the political and economic development of newly independent nations in the United States. Heideking strongly argued in favor of multidimensional approaches that combine corporatist analyses, world-system theory, and theories on culture and international relations.
Wilfried Mausbach took up the theme by reviewing the existing schools of Cold War historiography. He stated that U.S. policy viewed developments in the Third World largely within the context of the Cold War, and that policy makers tried to limit the role and importance of newly independent countries. This resulted in numerous conflicts because Third World countries regarded the Cold War as being of secondary importance. Gustav Schmidt continued this thought by analyzing the postwar international arena: the global contest between the United States and the Soviet Union was fundamentally different from bilateral antagonisms of the past; the international political economy, developed long before the onset of the Cold War, was shaped by America's "option" for the rise of West Germany and Japan as subcenters of their respective regions; Britain's and France's quest for world-power status impacted on the structures of the Western system; the singular position of the United States in global and regional terms molded a new international system. Schmidt also contrasted American efforts at global integration with Third World countries' desire for local autonomy.

David S. Painter reviewed various approaches toward the study of third actors in decolonization and emphasized the role of Europe in shaping U.S. policy toward the Third World. He identified American interests in a capitalist world order, strategic considerations, and racist notions as the driving forces of U.S. foreign policy toward newly independent nations. Painter urged the participants to broaden their research by the inclusion of Third World perspectives, and he concluded by arguing that development policies and nonstate actors may have had a greater impact than political or military issues. Henry W. Brands argued that the term Third World is highly problematic because there was neither an effort on the part of the newly independent countries to arrive at common positions vis-à-vis the West and the East nor a single and coherent U.S. policy toward the Third World. Specific cases have to be evaluated on their own terms, and in connection with decolonization the United States preferred to work through allies, particularly Great Britain. In Brands's view, geopolitics played a larger role in the conduct of foreign policy than ideology. Ronald W. Pruessen, while not neglecting the importance of geopolitics, called for an analysis of individual and collective mindsets and belief systems. He used the example of John Foster Dulles to illustrate the ambivalence that characterized the American discourse on decolonization. Although very much concerned about decolonization, Dulles's "great power mentality" and his feeling of "superiority" vis-à-vis the rest of the world put limits on the U.S. policy of gradual and cooperative approaches to decolonization. In the end, Dulles sided with the European allies and not with the newly independent countries. However, he was well aware of the problems with this approach.

Wibke Becker presented the case of Ghana to outline basic concepts of American policy toward decolonization in Africa. Washington's policy was largely shaped by the perceived danger of communist subversion of African societies. However, the Kennedy administration acted more flexibly and tried to cooperate with Ghana, particularly in the Volta River dam project. Philipp Jansson pointed out that the
struggle for civil rights in the United States during the 1960s deeply influenced policies toward Africa. Studying the decolonization process should therefore include research on domestic forces that shaped foreign policies. Marc Frey argued that U.S. policies toward the transfer of power in Southeast Asia were modeled on the "Philippine example," which stressed gradual development, the continued cooperation between the colonial powers and the newly independent nations, and regional integration. However, American notions of modernization and nation building did not constitute a viable pattern for both the colonial powers and the newly independent countries. Frey argued that Southeast Asian nations developed a kind of regional framework more in opposition to than in accordance with U.S. initiatives.

Heide-Irene Schmidt analyzed the post-World War II international economic system. She outlined basic American approaches toward modernization and argued that the bulk of U.S. economic assistance to Third World countries was transferred through bilateral channels, rather than regional or multilateral institutions. Bilateral channels, however, quite often contradicted regional needs. In the 1960s the concept of "trade not aid" assumed greater importance, and in the "Kennedy Round" of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the U.S. demand for liberal access to markets clashed with Third World options that favored economic nationalism.

The workshop allowed for extensive discussion. Concepts such as modernization and Third World were questioned. The participants agreed that world-systems theory provides a promising but not all-encompassing framework for studying and understanding the triangular relations between Europe, the Third World, and the United States. Another aspect on which consensus could be established was the observation that American relations with the Third World were deeply influenced by its experiences with Latin America. Overall, the informal atmosphere and extensive discussions proved to be enjoyable and rewarding, and further workshops on the topic are envisioned.

Marc Frey

Global Human Experience, Capitalism, and Nature: The Construction of New Grand Narratives in History

Panel at the Annual Meeting of the German Studies Association in Atlanta, Georgia, October 710, 1999. Convener: Eckhardt Fuchs (GHI). Presenters: Jerry Bentley (University of Hawaii at Honolulu), Franz-Josef Brüggemeier (University of Freiburg), and Steffen Sammler (University of Leipzig). Chair: Raimund Lammersdorf (GHI).
Nature: The Construction of New Grand Narratives in History." Organized by Eckhardt Fuchs, its aim was to take up recent debates on one of the most important pillars of modern historical scholarship, the idea of a comprehensive historical synthesis, or to use another term, of the grand narrative. On the one hand, the postmodern critique has not only made historians aware of the role of texts, representation, referentiality, and interpretation, but it also indicates an epistemological crisis of academic history because for these critics the meaning of the past itself has become obsolete. If there is not a single past, then there cannot be a single history or, in other words, the grand narrative. Alltagsgeschichte and cultural history have challenged the epistemological and methodological basis of grand narratives written from a social-history perspective and embedded in the Weberian tradition. On the other hand, postcolonialism has questioned the Eurocentric interpretation of history that is still dominant in German and international historical scholarship. Its rejection of European domination in writing and constructing history includes a critique of the theoretical foundation of modern historical science.

However, context and narrative are two aspects of the historiographical undertaking of a majority of professional historians. Modern historiography only makes sense if one assumes that there is a past that can - at least partly - be comprehended as a unified flow of events organized by historians in narratives. It is the search for unity in the diversity of the past that characterizes the work of modern historians. However, there are different ideas about the narrative, and historians use them in two ways to transform the past into history. First there is the assumption that there is a "total" past, the "Great Past" that can be understood as history. The historiographical consequence of this idea is a "great narrative" that claims the past can be completely told. The epistemological assumption that there is a general history that can be conceived of as a single story, which has always been central to the historical profession, has recently come under attack from different angles. Whereas in postmodern thinking such a Great Past does not exist and therefore nor do great nor grand narratives, modern historians agree the Great Past exists, but they reject the idea that it can be told in a single "great narrative." The acceptance of the possibility of a grand narrative is, therefore, the second assumption. Grand narratives are historical syntheses aimed at revealing parts of the Great Past using theoretical assumptions as their basis. However, historians who accept grand narratives differ on the question of which parts of the Great Past can be transformed in historical narratives and how to do it. The multiplicity of subject matters challenges old grand narratives but seems to make new grand narratives impossible.

The three papers presented at the session were situated within this larger context of recent debates. The speakers introduced new or suggested to rethink traditional theoretical concepts and showed how they can be used in different grand narratives of history. In his talk on "World History and Grand Narrative" Jerry Bentley offered a persuasive, non-ethnocentric concept of grand narrative based on three facts of global human experience - the rising human population, expanding
technological capacity, and increasing cross-cultural interaction - as an alternative
to the teleological Enlightenment narrative of human progress and postmodern
critique. Steffen Sammler asked "Is the Theory of Capitalism Still Useful to
Conceptualize World History? The Case of the German Historical School of
National Economy," and called for a revival of traditions in German economic
history focusing on the Historical School of National Economy. Franz-Josef
Brüggemeier introduced in his paper on "History and Environment: Global
Thinking of Empirical Research?" the most recent debates on environmental
history.

Looking at the key terms of the three talks, world, economy, and nature, it is
striking that all three concepts have long historiographical traditions. During the
Enlightenment world history gained new momentum in the eighteenth century, and
the writing of world history became an integral part of the arsenal of
historiography. Whereas in the course of the nineteenth century national histories
dominated the profession, in the twentieth century a more professional world
historiography developed. Early writers, such as Oswald Spengler and Arnold
Toynbee, established concepts of large and complex civilizations before world
history became an influential subdiscipline in the 1980s. The same is true for
environmental history. Even if the term is a more recent invention, the relationship
between nature and history has been a part of historical writing - although
marginalized - since the eighteenth century. Montesquieu and Buckle are prominent
examples. And, as Sammler demonstrated, economic history arose at the end of the
nineteenth century and became very influential in Germany, as well as in England
and France. The analysis and early critique of capitalism based on a close
connection between history and social sciences helped to illuminate the mechanism
of modern society.

Why, then, do we celebrate a revival of these approaches? What are the conceptual
and theoretical differences and innovations? Does, one might polemically ask,
historiography go in or through circles regarding topics and concepts? Do we
repeat classical dichotomies, such as economy versus politics, explanation versus
narration, idiographic versus nomothetic, man versus nature, local versus global, to
mention just a few, time and again without ever solving them? As the papers and
the discussion showed, the answer to these questions might not only be found
within historical epistemology and methodology itself. Historians have always
demanded the authority over the past in the way that they determine which voices
are to be heard. But as the three examples showed, it was the new voices that forced
historians to listen to them: the voice of the decolonized, the revenge of nature, and
the rise of the global market. The ideal of historical impartiality becomes obsolete
when the knowledge and engagement of historians are needed to provide solutions
to social and cultural problems. The myth of the objective ideal of historical
research that has led to an impartiality and to an alienation between the historian
and society is a dead end. One key word is eurocentrism, a worldview that goes
back to the late eighteenth century. In the nineteenth century, European history was
elevated to the level of a world history in which certain peoples and societies came
to be excluded from world history. This concept has to be challenged for the last two decades. Postcolonialism is the political background for world history. The responsibility of the historian is to transform the curriculum. The historian has not only to illuminate the ideological basis of Western civilization courses and to overcome their limited scope but to bring world history and global history into contemporary consciousness.

The same holds true for nature. Mankind has become more and more aware of the fragility of the environment. In order to come to terms with the mutual relationship between man and nature on equal terms we need to change our attitude toward nature. Whereas until the early nineteenth century nature was perceived as a model for society, with industrialization and modernization nature became more and more the vehicle of progress that could be exploited in the interest of the human species. A history of how humans and nature interacted, with merits and shortcomings, can contribute to a wider awareness of the fact that humans are part of nature and not separate from it. As Brüggemeier made clear, environmental history has developed in connection with the general debate about nature and environment in contemporary societies. Society became the agent and regulator for environmental history. For Brüggemeier it is the moral authority of society and not the one of the historian's grand narrative that is demanded. So he claims that what we need are new debates rather than new narratives. It is the dialectical relationship between history and politics that can initiate debates and find solutions.

As Sammler tried to show, a comparative historical analysis of different forms of industrial activity can reveal alternatives for economic politics. Just how much older concepts, such as Werner Sombart's, can be revitalized is a question that can be answered only on a case-by-case basis. For example, radical world historians such as Gunder Frank neglect entirely the notion of capitalism in favor of world economics. But what is important here is Sammler's argument that economic developments demand an analysis that can only be done by the combined efforts of different disciplines. Sombart's psycho-genetic analysis of capitalism, for example, not only combined theory and history but seemed to anticipate the relationship between history and anthropology of our day.

Fuchs noted in his comment that there are two main consequences of new grand narratives: The demystification of assumptions that were previously given in historical scholarship and the dehierarchization of the discipline. In the most pessimistic view, the epistemological consequences of a radical new history can be devastating, as the example of Eurocentrism demonstrates. If Eurocentrism is inextricably linked to modernity, then the rejection of Eurocentrism must also entail surrendering concepts of modern provenance. Ultimately, this means giving up the concept of history as a science. But if modernity is historicized and thus no longer interpreted as a universal valid project, it opens the door to competing narratives of history. However, this raises epistemological questions. As the speakers showed, neither world history, nor environmental history, nor economic history are based on a single theoretical concept. How, then, can we construct new
grand theories? Can the plurality of grand narratives be reconciled with the singularity of the Great Past presumed in theory? Are different versions of the same subject equally valid? What criteria do historians have to judge the merits and values of a grand narrative?

Some of these questions were picked up in the discussion, and the session itself seemed to offer an answer to some of them. Because all three papers were completely related to each other, the much regretted fragmentation of the discipline seemed to be overcome at the session. Concepts of world history are based on economic models, such as world-system theory or the concept of diffusion that is based on trade and economic integration of large regions. However, not only large-scale economic history but large-scale environmental and ecological history are central parts of world history. All three papers emphasize interdisciplinary cooperation, which is not only grounded in personal cooperation with scholars from other disciplines. This interdisciplinarity also means opening up toward other concepts, methods, and findings. Incorporating anthropological and ethnological approaches or getting inspiration from other issues, such as gender or power, benefits historiography because it also breaks down the hierarchy of the discipline. Not interdisciplinary competition over the ultimate competence of interpretation, that, as Sammler showed, led to a break in German historiography after 1945, but rather cooperation seems to be the most challenging task in the future, namely, the knowledge and acceptance of different conceptions of history and historiography without hegemonic claims in a nonhierarchical academic environment. This might result in structural changes of the institutions of historical production.

The session made evident that historians need new grand narratives and that they might affect the profession - epistemologically, institutionally, and morally. It is the historical synthesis that helps to overcome the alienation between the historian and the public and the fragmentation of the discipline. Only when historians bridge this gap can they act responsibly - world history, environmental history, and economic history are ways to do so. All participants shared the conviction that the "great narrative" as the only valid "great story" is a myth. But the story the historian tells must be a grand narrative in order to provide orientation in a complex world. So the message of the session can be phrased as follows: The revival of grand narrative is the revival of synthesis. The "great narrative" is dead. Long live grand narratives.

Eckhardt Fuchs

Coming to Terms with the Female Sonderfall: Women's Work and Gender Politics in East and West Germany

This panel was the result of the GHI's Collaborative Research Program on "Continuity, Change, and Globalization in Postwar Germany and the United States" (see Bulletin no. 24, Spring 1999). It featured the research of three German scholars of women in the two Germanies in the 1950s and 1960s. Karin Zachmann presented a paper titled "Technikpolitik als Geschlechterpolitik: Der tayloristische Ansatz der Frauenförderung im ersten Fünfjahrplan als Achillesferse des staatspolitischen Gleichberechtigungsprojekts." Zachmann addressed a major question about the initial phase of economic reconstruction in the German Democratic Republic (GDR): How and why were women integrated into the burgeoning industrial labor force of the early 1950s? Female integration, especially into skilled technical positions in factories, proceeded more slowly and at lower skill-levels, Zachmann argued, than economic planners, much less ideologues of the Socialist Unity Party (SED), initially intended. Rather than being trained in courses that qualified them for skilled positions, women by and large became semi-skilled workers while on the job. Zachmann attributed this trend to the microeconomic industrial organization Taylorism that accompanied the first five-year plan's macroeconomic goals - rapid development of a heavy industrial base in mining and metals production. By directing managers to divide industrial tasks into their component "efficient" parts, Taylorism both allowed inexperienced women to move into positions in "male" industries while freeing men for skilled labor in priority industries and, ironically, allayed the need to train them to do skilled work. In consequence, Taylorism, the paper convincingly showed, undermined the socialist project of accomplishing women's emancipation through equal participation in the labor force.

In her paper "Normalarbeitstag und Hausarbeitstag: Zur Politik der Doppelbelastung in der DDR" Carola Sachse picked up the story of East German female workers on the job - or rather followed them as they took advantage of their monthly paid housework day. Sachse discussed the origins and evolution of the Hausarbeitstag from the 1940s through the 1970s. The housework day became, she argued, viewed as an entitlement by East German women, the vast majority of whom worked for wages. Although the GDR, the SED, and the trade union federation wanted to dismantle this concession almost as soon as they introduced it, they did not dare eliminate it and, indeed, eventually had to extend it to include all workers who had an independent household. Until the late 1970s, however, the state was able to define the Hausarbeitstag along lines that discriminated against women according to their marital status: It was available to all married women but only to those single women with dependents under sixteen years of age. Sachse discussed the quite militant discourse of the many challenges, both individual and collective, by women workers to this version of the housework day. She concluded that by the 1960s women used if not feminist, then "womanist" arguments that maintained that, because of the demands made on them at home, women deserved to deviate from the "normal workday."
Christine von Oertzen maintained the panel's focus on women in wage labor but turned the spotlight toward women's work in the Federal Republic. In "Sonderrechte für den weiblichen 'Sonderfall': Die Einführung von Teilzeitarbeit in Westdeutschland 1955-1969" she considered the economic, political, and cultural background to the rise of married mothers' part-time work. The extremely tight labor market since the mid-1950s constituted the economic context of the increasing reliance on women's part-time labor, von Oertzen argued. In the face of the extraordinary demand for labor, public discourse about married women's waged labor became noticeably more tolerant than in the early 1950s. Simultaneously, married mothers were eager to enter the labor market, both to escape the confines of the home and to allow their families to participate fully in the new consumer society. Part-time work was a solution that met employers' demands for labor and married mothers' demands for jobs and income while not challenging the gendered division of domestic or waged labor, nor husbands' understanding of themselves as the primary breadwinner. In her paper von Oertzen also discussed the legal integration of part-time work into the West German benefits and tax system. The legal anchoring of part-time work, she argued, grew out of a complex process of negotiation among state agencies, trade unions, and workers - both male and female. On the one hand, part-time workers, like women workers in the GDR, gained legally secured status as employees despite their divergence from the hours of the "normal workday." On the other hand, husbands refused to relinquish their tax status as "main provider" and preferred to pay higher taxes than accept a tax bracket that accorded separate-but-equal status to each spouse in a working couple.

Taken together, the papers stimulated listeners to think about similarities and differences in the rates and kinds of female labor in antithetical political and economic systems that impinged on an originally shared culture of gender. Comparison was made all the easier because each panelist approached her theme from a similar methodological angle: the interaction between labor market, state law, and popular behavior in the shaping of postwar gender relations. The papers suggested that the extraordinary demand for labor in both East and West Germany not only changed married women's rate of participation in the workforce but also affected the social understanding of this phenomenon. The panelists agreed, however, that politics and ideology also made a difference. Both the social-market state and the state-socialist regime adopted a gendered labor policy, but the GDR remained consistently favorable to the full-time workforce participation of wives, whereas the Federal Republic of Germany evolved from a deeply hostile stance to an ambivalent, even friendly, attitude toward wives' part-time work. Each paper demonstrated, finally, that neither a booming labor market nor state policy transformed ingrained cultural notions about what women should work, what jobs and hours they should work, and how their paid labor fit within the family budget.

Donna Harsch
The Culture of Hypnosis: Pseudosciences, Sexuality, and Art in Fin-de-Siècle Europe

Panel held at the annual meeting of the German Studies Association in Atlanta, Georgia, October 9, 1999. Chair: Andreas Daum (GHI). Participants: David Ehrenpreis (James Madison University), Michelle Facos (Indiana University), and Corinna Treitel (Harvard University). Commentator: Paul Lerner (University of Southern California).

In recent years historians of the modern era have taken a fresh look at cultural phenomena that have long been dismissed as obscure or marginal. In particular, increasing attention has been paid to those topics that are difficult to place in a narrative that tells a success story about how "modernity" has risen from "premodern" times and how a scientific, rational view of the world has pushed alternative ideologies aside. Today our pictures of modernity are becoming more nuanced and ambivalent. For example, historians are tracing the persistence of religious attitudes well into the twentieth century. In addition, they now take many of those ideological currents seriously that contributed to a new enchantment of the rationalized world and tried to counterbalance the rigidity of scientific analysis at the fin-de-siècle.

A session at last year's annual meeting of the German Studies Association devoted itself to deepening this revisionist view of the modern era by focusing on the "culture of hypnosis." Not limiting themselves to viewing hypnotism as a minor cultural phenomenon, the panelists rather used it as a starting-point to opening different windows onto turn-of-the-century society, to shedding new light on gender roles, the development of bourgeois psychology, and the meaning of subjectivity in Europe before World War I. This panel took hypnosis as a cultural practice that, in itself and in its attraction for a wide range of societal groups, needs further explanation. The presenters attempted to carefully observe these practices and their representations - in art, for example - and to look at what role hypnosis played in different contexts and what meanings it assumed in these contexts.

This approach marks a new step in the historiographical discussion of hypnotic practices, a topic that for obvious reasons has always been difficult to tackle. First, "hypnosis" and "hypnotism" are diffuse terms in themselves. The Encyclopedia Britannica captures the common ground by describing hypnosis as a "special psychological state with certain physiological attributes." According to this definition hypnosis marks a "functioning of the individual at a level of awareness other than the ordinary conscious state." This state is characterized "by a degree of increased receptiveness and responsiveness in which inner experiential perceptions are given as much significance as is generally given only to external reality. The hypnotized individual appears to heed only the communications of the hypnotist."

The latter aspect, mentioning the hypnotist, already indicates that hypnotic practices take place in certain social settings that deserve precise analysis. This
second aspect also has contributed to the difficulty of clearly assigning hypnotism to specific cultural genres or intellectual disciplines; its location often shifts between science and popular culture, medicine and superstition, psychology and the esoteric. Many historians have solved this problem by putting the history of hypnosis into a vast Pandora's box of things difficult to identify: The so-called pseudosciences. Here, hypnosis and mesmerism (with which it is often equated), astrology and spiritism, phrenology and natural magic come together.

In treating pseudosciences such as these historiography has paid considerable attention to what might be called the mechanics of inclusion and exclusion, and the often subversive role pseudosciences are said to have played: Was animal magnetism, for example, the vehicle for popular radicalism or rather an endeavor of elitists? What happened to magnetism when modern medicine and science, "hard" science, began to dominate institutions and discourses treating body and soul? The panelists tried to go beyond perspectives such as these. They addressed the third fundamental problem in studying hypnotism, that is, the crucial question of how to deal with hypnotic practices as an integral part of, rather than a deviation from, what characterized modern culture around 1900: Does the study of hypnosis mean to focus on what many have called antimodernism or a counterculture? Or do the practices and societal uses of hypnosis rather have a place in the center of modernity itself, not as its negation but as its companion?

The first speaker, Corinna Treitel, who had organized the panel, based her paper on recent findings documented in her dissertation on "Avatars of the Soul: Cultures of Science, Medicine, and the Occult in Modern Germany (18841937)." Her paper dealt with "The Creative Unconscious: Occultism, Hypnotism, and Art in Imperial Germany." Treitel focused on the Psychologische Gesellschaft, founded in 1886 as a research group in Munich. She traced the changing understanding of the creative powers of the unconscious among leading members of this group. In the 1880s and 1890s the Psychologische Gesellschaft first turned to the intensive study of hypnotized female mediums, whose ability to express their innermost emotions in facial and bodily form provided vast material for intellectual curiosity as well as new artistic topics. Treitel concentrated on Carl du Prel, Albert von Schrenck-Notzing, and Wilhelm Hübbe-Schleiden, who each represented different ways of utilizing hypnotic practices for pragmatic interests in fields as diverse as philosophy, parapsychology, medical therapy, and theosophy. Also, artists such as Albert von Keller joined the group to use mediums as artistic tools. By the turn of the century, however, the expressive abilities of the mediums were emerging not only as topics appropriate for the group's artists but also as a highly effective method of producing modern art itself. Treitel demonstrated this shift in the case of Keller, who by 1900 helped to stage appearances of a female "dream dancer." He now allowed artistic models to turn themselves into active expressers of their own creative urges. Rather than simply using hypnotized women as models, the men of the Psychologische Gesellschaft began to present and represent the mediums as artists - albeit still unconscious ones - in their own right.
Michelle Facos, an art historian, followed the traces of hypnosis in art in her paper, "Hypnosis, the Occult, and the Symbolist Movement." She took as a starting point French physician Jean Martin Charcot (1825-1893), who worked at a renowned psychiatric clinic outside Paris. Charcot provided hypnosis with some of its much needed scientific legitimacy. Through numerous sessions and observations Charcot developed a three-stages model of hypnotic states encompassing lethargy, catalepsy, and somnambulism. The first hypnotic stage, lethargy, became the topic of French artist André Brouillet in his painting "Charcot's Lecture," which was exhibited in the Paris salon in 1887. According to Facos, the high degree of realism in Brouillet's painting conferred a false aura of scientific objectivity to the scene, which contains a clear subtext about masculine control and feminine feebleness. Facos followed this theme along examples by various European artists, ranging from Swedish painter Richard Bergh and Paul Gauguin to Swiss symbolist Ferdinand Hodler, Max Klinger, Odilon Redon, and Belgian artist Ferdinand Khnopff, and finally to Gustave Adolph Mossa. With the dawning of the Symbolist movement in literature in the mid-1880s, the aspects of hypnosis that attracted artists shifted from an ostensibly objective attitude to an unmistakably subjective one. It was not merely the outward, physical manifestations of hypnosis that fascinated artists, but also the inner, subconscious ones. For many painters working in the late 1880s and 1890s hypnotism provided scientific proof of the truth and vitality of the human imagination. It substantiated their assertions that a real, if unseen world existed beyond the limited boundaries of the senses and that access to this world was granted only by the suspension of rational intellectual processes. Hypnotism inspired the Decadents, who sought escape from the oppression of modern industrial society through solipsistic withdrawal. And it influenced the Symbolists, whose efforts were directed more optimistically toward educating society about the syncretistic character of human thought and the universality of human experience.

David Ehrenpreis pursued a similar avenue but focused more on the ambiguities inherent in representations of hypnosis. He began by looking at the work of Charcot, who, during the 1880s in Paris, helped to familiarize the broad public with hypnotic practices but could never escape from critics who stigmatized his efforts as pseudoscience and quackery. Critics also pointed to the sexual appeal that evolved from Charcot's treatment of hypnotic women. Charcot constructed a kind of circular medical discourse in his systematic investigation of hypnosis. Patients - exclusively women - learned to act out their symptoms and were then rewarded with attention and privileges for their theatrical and highly sexualized performances. Hysterical attacks therefore represented a rare cultural moment in which female sexuality could be made completely manifest. Those representations of women in anomalous, sexualized states were easily popularized, for example, in artistic images and in Charcot's photographs documenting the different hypnotic stages of his patients.

In a subtle twist, however, Ehrenpreis demonstrated that the image of the inequitable relationship between the masterful man of science and his passive
female patient, who acted as a tool to evoke sexual desires, could also undergo ironic changes. As an example he used a cartoon from the Munich satirical weekly *Simplicissimus*. This cartoon depicted a doctor who hypnotized his female assistant only to seduce and rape her. Later overcome with remorse, this formerly powerful man of science acts like a helpless child and becomes a hapless domestic figure who must care for the baby that resulted from the encounter with his assistant - his desk now serves as the baby's changing table. Here, the power relationship at work in hypnosis served as a vehicle to represent contemporary fears of the loss of masculinity and male power.

In his comment Paul Lerner rightly praised the complementary nature of all the papers, which were remarkable examples of interdisciplinary work. The papers demonstrated that hypnosis and the occult permeated the intellectual climate and popular culture at the turn of the century; the authors emphasized that both movements inherently belonged to modern culture rather than revolted against it. This becomes particularly clear when looking at the ways in which contemporary researchers used the tools of science and reason in their attempts to decipher and give coherence to the irrational, as Treitel emphasized in her paper. At the same time the popularity of hypnosis always raised questions about how and where to negotiate the boundaries of "legitimate" science. Quite obviously, issues of gender and gendered power relationships were conspicuously present in all three papers, among which those of Treitel and Ehrenpreis went beyond the by now conventional characterization of the dichotomy constructed in hypnotic practices by male control and female passiveness.

Lerner also addressed various questions that would enable historians to go even further. Undoubtedly, we need to know more about why the paranormal became so acceptable and attractive to heterogeneous strands of society and how this increasing interest can be linked to what historiography has described as the birth of modern subjectivity and the fin-de-siècle's lust for immersing in and exploring the subjective, invisible, and irrational. Proceeding from here, the relationship between hypnotism and the occult needs to be clarified, as does the problem of the role of women in both fields. Finally, our definitions of "culture" will require further sophistication to be more precise in delineating the resonance of both hypnotism and the occult in socially diverse societal segments and in highbrow as well as lowbrow areas of sociability, education, and entertainment.

The close focus on interrelated problems and the broad range of problems addressed in this session attracted a large audience at the GSA conference and stimulated a very lively discussion. Both can be seen as an encouragement to proceed in the attempts to address key questions of modernity through the prism of what is too easily dismissed as anti-modern. This session demonstrated that the culture of hypnosis may serve surprisingly well as a platform to continue this discussion.

*Andreas Daum*
Gender History in Transatlantic Perspective: Women, Motherhood, and Social Change in Twentieth-Century Europe and the United States

Conference held at the GHI, Washington, D.C., December 34, 1999. Convener: Christine von Oertzen (GHI). Presenters: Eileen Boris (Howard University), Elizabeth M. Cox (Washington D.C.), Donna Harsch (Carnegie Mellon University), Lora Knight (University of Utah, Salt Lake City), Wiebke Kolbe (University of Bielefeld), Maria Mesner (University of Vienna), Sonya Michel (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign), Christine von Oertzen, Irene Stoehr (Berlin), Emilie Stoltzfus (Washington, D.C.), Anja Schüler (Free University of Berlin), Angelika von Wahl (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), Maren Wichmann-Siegfried (University of Kiel). Moderators: Rebecca Boehling (University of Maryland at Baltimore County), Eileen Boris, Daniel Letwin (Pennsylvania State University), Christof Mauch (GHI), Christine von Oertzen.

This conference resulted from the GHI's Cooperative Research Program on "Continuity, Change, and Globalization in Postwar Germany and the United States" (see Bulletin no. 24, Spring 1999). The conference aimed to explain how societies produced hierarchies of gender, ethnicity, and race during periods of rapid social and economic change; its objective was to present the results of new comparative research to a transatlantic audience.

The exchange of ideas proved to be highly stimulating. We began with a comparison of women's experiences in both the United States and German-speaking Europe in the early twentieth century. Anja Schüler shared her insights concerning a famous German-American friendship in early twentieth century. A close examination of the lives of two women, Alice Salomon and Jane Adams, allowed Schüler to illustrate the transfer of ideas among female social workers on both sides of the Atlantic. Whereas American progressives such as Adams debated the value of German social reform programs such as medical and old-age insurance or protective labor laws, the political activism of American women inspired German counterparts such as Salomon. In her presentation Lora Knight brought to our attention the ethnic and racial components of the transatlantic discourse about women and discussed how German and American eugenicists during the 1920s and 1930s described women and assigned them roles in maintaining and improving the race. Eugenicists in both countries, she showed, used a new ethic based on biological science to underscore a traditional image of women's only "natural" avocation as mother in the home and to limit women's paid labor and academic activities. Comparative analysis in this work clearly shows that class, not only race, played an instrumental role in German eugenic thinking.

Comparative history of women brings to the fore new understandings of traditional social historical themes such as class and race. Our collective exploration of gender history in a comparative perspective also shed new light on the relative importance of the nuclear family. In Maria Mesner's essay, for example, the participants
discovered that - in sharp contrast to Germany - ideas about the family did not primarily occupy the thoughts of Austrian social planners until the end of World War II; after 1945, however, an ideology of domesticity found fuller expression in the Alpine nation than in either Germany or the United States. Both Eileen Boris's and Sonya Michel's work demonstrated that the history of gender in the United States casts new light not only on questions of welfare but also on race, citizenship, and labor. Sonya Michel drew our attention to the importance of the American state in the formation of America's postwar "social citizenship." After 1945, Michel showed, the growth of welfare offered by employers (as opposed to welfare offered by the state) reduced pressure for the public provision of child care and pensions. Denied access to good jobs, white women and women and men of color were excluded from the American system of welfare.

From our examination of gendered welfare and social citizenship in the capitalist society par excellence we turned our attention to arguably the most successful socialist state of the twentieth century, the German Democratic Republic. Whereas Western policy makers insisted on seeing women first and foremost as mothers, East German authorities viewed women as both mothers and laborers. Yet "social citizenship" was not extended to men and women alike. As Donna Harsch showed, the Socialist Unity Party (SED) defined men as subjects of history only, whereas the party defined women as creatures of nature and history. As a result, the (potential) motherhood of women workers was always a determinant of policy toward them, whereas the parental status of male workers never was.

The Third Way, the model of the Scandinavian welfare state, was the focus of Maren Wichmann-Siegfried's examination of single motherhood in Denmark and West Germany. In her view, during the 1950s the achievements of the Danes were modest yet important: Although a conservative social climate in both countries meant that single motherhood was, in the most limited sense of the word, "tolerated," in Denmark the legal code offered single women with children the same rights as their married counterparts.

Socialist and social democratic societies on the whole have offered women more formal protection as workers and mothers in the second half of the twentieth century. But in her examination of child care in the most American of states, California, Emilie Stoltzfus showed that even in postwar America welfare rights advocates enjoyed real, if limited, successes. Because California women linked their need for child care to their wage work in the public economy, parents there could justify the need for the public finance of child care. Although efforts to provide state-sponsored child care in the United States were ultimately unsuccessful, American society in the postwar era was not without its own share of innovation. As Christine von Oertzen showed, this observation is particularly true in the realm of women's employment. Introduced during World War II as a measure to bring mothers into the work force, after 1945 part-time labor became an important means by which women of the middle classes gained access to the world of peacetime wage work. Laggards in other fields of welfare, here the Americans
showed Germans the way: Beginning in the late 1950s West Germans, too, revised ideas about women's employment outside the home. They came to approve women's part-time employment, a form of occupation that became a source of positive self-affirmation to women, particularly married women, hitherto excluded from the world of wages.

How did women as political leaders react to the postwar world? In her essay titled "Citizens in High Heels: Female Citizenship and Feminist Anticommunism in West Germany During the 1950s," Irene Stoehr reminded the audience of the importance of the imperial period to a full understanding of how West German women's organizations talked about women's politics. Because East German women appropriated the discourse of motherhood/mothers - as staunch advocates of an international peace - West German women turned to a new concept of women's role as citizens. In Stoehr's view, West German women forged close bonds with men in the struggle against communism and thus abandoned assertions of gender difference during the Cold War.

Detente, as Wiebke Kolbe and Angelika von Wahl demonstrated, brought dramatic changes in policy toward the family and women's rights as workers in western Europe and the United States. Kolbe's analysis of parental leave in Sweden and West Germany (enacted in 1973 and in 1986, respectively) established the social context in which the new policy emerged. In both countries, the state took the lead in the formation of new welfare initiatives. Still, as von Wahl argued, welfare, perhaps especially for women, is well and truly in the eye of the beholder. For all its patent negligence, the American state has pioneered initiatives aimed to promote women's equality as workers, namely, the concept of affirmative action. As von Wahl illustrated, the corporatist structure of German society - and here she drew attention to big business, the public sector, the political parties, and the trade unions - means that no institution exists to champion the right of an individual to full access to the labor market.

The construct of gender enables researchers to explore a remarkably broad range of social and cultural change. This meeting established another, perhaps less well-known fact: The study of gender (a central tenet in historical discussions of topics as diverse as citizenship, race, and labor) facilitates comparative analysis. The discussion of gender in the transatlantic perspective led us to conclude that if one wishes to gain a full appreciation of the nature of social change in the twentieth century, one must study the network of dense relationships not only within but also among Western societies during this period of social transformation.

Christine von Oertzen

Aesthetics and Politics: From Cologne Cathedral to the Holocaust Memorial

Situated at the interface of history, art history, philosophy, and sociology, the focus of the session was an analysis of the construction of meaning through historical representation, and on the limits and failures of this process. Looking at modern Western society, the papers examined the role of the visual arts in the creation of those narratives that seek to imbue the past with sense and significance, especially its dramatic or traumatic episodes such as industrialization, social and political transformation, war, and revolution. The session traced nineteenth-century strategies of constructing a meaningful relationship to the past and their evolution, recreation, and final annihilation in the twentieth century. In so doing, the session aimed to contribute to a new typology of modes of historical representation in visual culture from the French Revolution to the recent debates about the remembrance of the Holocaust.

Interdisciplinary in its approach, the session was grounded in the assumption that images have played an important role in the understanding of history and consequently have been intimately related to it since the dawn of modernity. The increasing importance of a visualization of history becomes evident in Leopold von Ranke's remark that "History is distinguished from all other sciences in that it is also an art. History is a science in collecting, finding, penetrating; it is an art because it recreates and portrays that which it has found and recognized." As Ranke's dual agenda indicates, the nineteenth century not only witnessed the rise of historical-mindedness as "a substratum to almost every type of cultural activity," it also was marked by the rise of the visual as a dominant cultural factor in a society that had become inescapably visual, a world of spectacle and entertainment. Visual culture began to play a decisive role in shaping the discourse on history, and in creating those symbols, signs, and markers that formed this discourse. Even to the present day, we moderns comprehend the world, both the present and the past, to a large degree aesthetically.

Reversing Francis Haskell's interrogation of the historian's assessment of the visual image as a source of evidence, the papers addressed the intrinsic formative power of art in the process of shaping the modern historical imaginary. In so doing, they analyzed art's role in and influence on the creation of memory and commemoration. All three papers contested the pre-eminence of "the text" and worked instead with the assumption of an interrelated and fluctuating mutual sphere of influence. They emphasized the role of art objects as agents of historical "writing" rather than mere illustrations or historical documents. The papers thus inquired into the systems of communication and the cultural production of history specific to visual culture. The analysis of art's function within commemoration and historical thinking thereby was based on the recognition of the specific position of aesthetics in these
processes. In this sense, the aesthetic quality of artworks was interpreted as a significant part of their ability to transform history's contingency into (allegedly) meaningful time. This very capacity of art to transform contingency into purposeful necessity through sensual perception also was seen as the guarantor of its power of aesthetic redemption. That this production of meaning could also be illusory, or could be used by a society's dominant powers to cover up the evident meaninglessness of certain historical events became apparent in the discussion about the practices of commemorating World War II and the Holocaust.

Ever since 1945 this redemptive potential of visual culture - especially of commemorative art - has been contested. It also formed the core of the session's discussion. Although everyone agreed that the Holocaust "not only denies but even more destroys every sense of history instead of becoming integrated into it," as Jörn Rüsen expressed it, he strongly differed with Jay Winter in his assessment and valuation of the functions that art could and should fulfill in any commemoration of the Holocaust. Rüsen contended that the iconic quality of art enables modern artworks to integrate the essential senselessness of the event of the Holocaust into the sense of history without depriving it of its traumatic character. "Modern art," he stated, "has its meaning and significance in presenting the absence of sense in a sense-bearing way... Eisenman's monument... represents this sense-bearing absence of sense." In contrast to the belief in the ability of artworks - such as Anselm Kiefer's 1975 painting "Unternehmen Barbarossa" (see Figure 1, to be inserted) to depict the tension between the senselessness of the event it commemorates and its own beauty, Winter rejected the redemptive processes that underlies the attempt to give remembrance of the Holocaust an artistic expression. He regarded the emotional relief that aesthetic redemption can provide as unsustainable and inappropriate in the face of "the most violent of centuries."

Although the papers could not provide inexhaustible answers to the problems discussed, they clearly demonstrated the importance of those processes immanent in aesthetic systems for our understanding of historical culture and for our strategies of memory. They also showed that the question of what role "aesthetic sense generation" (Rüsen) could and should play in the remembrance of the Holocaust and World War II will indisputably remain a central issue in any debate about the possibility - or absurdity - of commemorating the atrocities of the twentieth century.

In her paper "Presenting the Past: The Rise of History and the Politics of Representation in the Nineteenth Century," Cordula A. Grewe examined the crucial changes that occurred in the construction of history through visual representation. Her paper called attention to two sets of issues: First, it asked how the relation to the past was redefined in the nineteenth century once the exemplary role of historical knowledge as a source of moral values, of history as a school of statesmen, or as "philosophy teaching by examples" (Viscount Bolingbroke) had been replaced by a historicist view. Second, it examined the ways in which nineteenth-century visual culture constructed history as representation, given the
shifting ground of historical thinking. In this context, Grewe's paper focused on the rise of two conflicting types of historical representation. On the one hand, artists thematized the unbridgeable gap between historical knowledge and the past itself. In order to fulfill this goal they reduced the narrative to fragmentary indications, a strategy that left narrative blanks to be filled in by the viewer's imagination. This new approach found a paradigmatic expression in historical genre painting - also known as genre historique or charakteristisches Lebensbild that advanced in the first decades of the nineteenth century. On the other hand, in competition to this open concept of historical interpretation, a form of history painting developed that sought to recreate history as congruent with reality and to present the depicted as an eyewitness report. As a prime example for this strategy, the paper analyzed academic history painting from the Wilhelmine era.

With respect to the first decades of the nineteenth century, Grewe identified two factors that were crucial to the development of new forms of historical representation. One was a fundamental shift in the understanding of the relations between past and present. Formerly unquestioned strategies of representing history became unconvincing once the topos of Historia Magistra Vitae had dissolved into the perspective of a modernized historical process, and once the assumption of a temporal quality peculiar to history itself had begun to replace the apprehension of human possibilities within a general historical continuum. The other factor was the collapse of the traditional notion of a unified audience owing to the disintegration of traditional patronage systems and the emergence of a free-market economy. The particularity and fragmentation of the audience at the salon, with its competitive atmosphere, exemplified the new art public. Until today, this fragmentation of the audience continues to be as Rüsen's and Winter's papers demonstrated a critical issue in debates about "national art" and "national memorials." The rapid dissolution of the exemplum virtutis as the most distinguished area of history painting corresponded with the formation of a modern sensibility oriented to and nourished by the private sphere and its values. The dramatic shift in what Friedrich Nietzsche called "the monumental relation to the past" forced artists and historians alike to establish new links between past and present that acknowledged the different temporal quality of the past while still using it for the present, that is, as an exemplary model or as a source of legitimization.

The key feature of historical genre painting was the combination of the grand narrative of history painting with a personalized mode of narration that allowed the artist to concentrate on the psychological aspects of the story rather than on the story itself. In contrast to positivistic approaches to history as essentially factual, historical truth was sought in the merging of concrete historical facts with a representation of characteristic yet imagined situations in which a fictive, hermeneutic interpretation of the protagonists' state of mind could convey authenticity. In reference to literary art, Heinrich Heine formulated this concept in 1828: "History . . . is not falsified by the poets. They faithfully convey its meaning even when they invent figures and incidents." True to the spirit of the historical genre, Düsseldorf artist Carl Friedrich Lessing, for example, did not depict the
main trial of the fifteenth-century heretic Jan Hus in his *Hus Before the Synod in Constance* from 1842 (see Figure 2, to be inserted), but rather a preliminary hearing. The painting also expressed the concept of an open interpretation of history in its emphasis on a personal, emotional identification with the depicted personage. In contrast to historicist antiquarianism, this empathetic approach marginalized questions of historical concreteness. Following Heine's argument, these imaginative options were left open for the viewer not only because the subject called for it but because it was in the nature of historical representation to preserve an open field for interpretation, once the intrusive moralism of eighteenth-century historiography had been conclusively dismissed. The renunciation of a dominant moral message stressed the discursive character of historical narration. The audience's active intervention not only supplied those elements of the narrative withheld by the images but also secured a personal identification with the depicted. Whereas art historians of the twentieth century - puzzled by the dichotomy of the contemporary interpretations - have mostly tried to identify the one and only "true" reading, this very ambiguity belonged to the specific qualities of historical genre painting in general. Only its ambiguity secured a general accessibility as well as the fascination of a wide public of varied origins and political leanings. It also underlined the artists' references to the present in the content of their works. The public recognized their own feelings, needs, and aspirations in these paintings, whether as individuals or as a class.

On a structural level, the legibility of the new genre was guaranteed by an effective appropriation of representational strategies developed in religious art, thus reflecting the role of history as a "new religion" on a semantic level. As Jay Winter elucidated in his analysis of memorial art after World War I, this incorporation of Christian iconography as well as the employment of patterns of receptivity inherent in devotional imagery remained a significant device in commemorative art until the end of World War II. In making "profane devotion" possible, art gave the past an individual shape and made it personally accessible to the spectator.

In contrast to these images, the hyperrealist history painting of the Wilhelmine era closed off any blanks in its narrative. Despite the appropriation of central features of historical genre painting, such as the concentration on the psychological state of the protagonists and the tendency toward sentimentalization, the character of the viewer's participation were dramatically redefined. More than ever the spectator is drawn into the picture as an immediate participant. Anton von Werner's adaptation of Lessing's design for his painting *Luther at the Reichstag in Worms 1521*, painted in 1870 (see Figure 3, to be inserted), demonstrates this process. A circular composition with numerous repoussoir figures has substituted Lessing's parallel organization of the pictorial plane. The spectator stands at the very bottom of the circle, himself part of the crowd. The image pretends to show history as reality, an illusion that is reinforced by the hyperrealist mode of representation, with its excessive emphasis on antiquarianism, historically accurate costume, and anecdotal detail. History is presented as an eyewitness report. Yet by becoming an eyewitness, an actor within the spectacle, the viewer paradoxically loses the power
of an independent, polyvalent interpretation. This nondiscursive, enclosed representation of history accompanied and supported an approach that searched for a total immersion in the past, that is, an unabashed historical mimetism. As Stephen Bann has suggested, nineteenth-century relations to history also included this border crossing between past and present, an attempt at "living the past" instead of "bringing the past to life." An example of this kind of merging past and present can be found in the tableau vivant, the living picture in which the performer completely assumes the role of a historical, literary, or mythological persona. As Grewe argued in her paper, this boundary crossing between staging and recreating the past - like any form of historical mimetism - necessarily produces an unstable ideological message. The theatricality of the performance - or, similarly, the imaginary character of the modern theme park - unwittingly creates ambivalence between a monumental and an antiquarian reading, between the focus on the symbolic meaning of history's reenactment and the simple enjoyment of its entertaining effects. Turning historical-mindedness into historicist mimetism, the relation to history lost its exemplary potential and became pure spectacle. It turned into escapism, an alternative to the present rather than a model for it.

This problematic of historical mimetism as a means to construct a meaningful relation to the past has not been restricted to nineteenth-century culture, however. As Grewe pointed out, the phenomenon has not lost any of its attraction and still plays a significant role in the perpetuation of historical knowledge, the modern theme park being just one of many examples. Grewe's critical assessment of this form of spectacle and of its alienation from the subject of the discourse in its overriding pursuit of intense, illusionary effects corresponded with Winter's rejection of those practices of commemoration that seek to relive the past through "enveloping" experiences, such as the blitz experience of the Imperial War Museum with its plaster displays and shaking floors. Winter extended his criticism to the practice of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C., which offers children a glimpse into the world of the camps. Even though the museum operates on a much more sensitive level than the Imperial War Museum in London, Winter emphasized, the project of reliving the past nevertheless risks turning Auschwitz into Alabama, that is, the American South during the civil rights struggle of the 1950s and 1960s.

Winter's critical stance on this concept of representing history reflected the key thesis of his paper, "The Risks of Aesthetic Redemption: Some Reflections on Twentieth-Century Commemorative Art," that is, that World War II represented an epistemic break in the commemorative culture of Western society. This break made it impossible for the politics of meaning after 1945 to replicate those after 1918. Winter explained this irreversible collapse of commemorative strategies with three major characteristics of World War II. First, more civilians died in this war than soldiers, and second, there were civilians among the killers as well as among the victims. Third, the war against civilians entailed crimes never before witnessed. In Winter's eyes, these factors destroyed the possibility of aesthetic redemption, that is to say, the symbolic exchange between the living and the dead.
Winter structured his analysis around four aspects of public remembrance that he regarded as its crucial elements: its embeddedness in political discourse, its character as business, its dependence on aesthetic conventions, and its connection to ritual. His analysis showed that two political forces come into conflict in the production of memory, the interests of the dominant political elements in a society and the multivocal accord of the regional, local, idiosyncratic portions of that society. The overlapping of these two different spheres, of national history and family history, is a decisive presupposition for the continuance of public commemoration. The merging of the two is what enables people born long after the wars and revolutions to commemorate them as an essential part of their own life. Public commemoration thrives only as long as people assign meaning to the rituals surrounding commemorative forms and keep them alive. But in the end, it is almost always the ultimate fate of these structures to fade away, leading to the transformation or disappearance of commemorative forms as active sites of memory. The depth of commemoration thus depends on the intersection of the macro- and microhistorical levels, of the private and the public. He criticized the character of the Berlin Holocaust Memorial project for transforming the fate of the victims into a prelude to contemporary politics.

Yet Winter's questioning of post-1945 strategies of commemoration was grounded not only in the political instrumentalization of memory but also in its character as a business. Where does pilgrimage to memorial sites stop and tourism take over? How to read the message of Kiefer's art (Figure 1, to be inserted), with its multitude of references to the German catastrophe, in the context of its circulation as a high-priced and highly prized commodity in the world of the great galleries? In his critical assessment of aesthetic redemption, Winter implied the corrupting potential of the monetary exchange that accompanies the narratives and symbols of remembrance.

The epistemic break in commemorative culture after 1945 also expressed itself in a dramatic shift in style. Whereas medievalism, neo-classicism and the human form dominated artistic production after World War I, art after 1945 tended to use abstract modes of representation - with certain exceptions, such as in Soviet art. Forms that suggested absence or nothingness replaced classical, religious, or romantic notions in commemorative art. This aesthetic shift had important social and political implications. "Great War commemorative art had sought out some meaning," Winter explicated, "in the enormous loss of life attending that conflict. 'Never again' was the ultimate meaning of the monuments." Because this implicit warning broke down less than twenty years later, its utopian message could not, once destroyed, be repeated after 1945. Moreover, the extreme character of World War II challenged the capacity of art - any art - to express a sense of loss when it is linked to genocidal murder or thermonuclear destruction.

By contrast, Rüsen insisted on the historical quality of art, that is to say, its ability to contribute to the construction of a significant and meaningful temporal relationship to facts, before and after. Prior to discussing the consequences that the
The notion of an intrinsic "historical sense of art" contains for actual debates about the representation of the Holocaust, Rüsen elaborated on a theoretical framework for "The Visibility of History: Bridging the Gap Between Historiography and the Fine Arts." The framework was based on the assumption that "facts become 'historical' when they are interpreted in the context of other facts. This happens by applying the mental procedure of narrating a story." Building on this definition, Rüsen then examined the possibilities of art to visualize the narrative creation of historical sense. In so doing, he first questioned the concept that objects of the past possess historical originality and authenticity in and of themselves. Instead, he contended their immanent historical senselessness. In their physical otherness, they can only indicate a prehistorical that becomes historical only through meta-aesthetical processes, such as explanatory texts. Rüsen then analyzed monuments to which he attested a semihistorical sense. He defined them as semihistorical because they generate the presupposition for historical meaning, that is, a temporal bridge. Yet this construction is not historical in the strict sense because "it is a temporal bridge in which from the past 'history' is made for the present, whereas in fact history can only be constructed backward in time - from the present into the past."

In the next step Rüsen turned toward the successful production of historical sense through art and in art itself. To him, art holds the power to generate historical sense when pictorial representation explicitly thematizes a meaningful historical relation between times. The specific contribution of art thereby is the aesthetic formulation of temporal difference, the visualization of the narrative bridge between times that enables a sensual experience of this bridge. Following Imdahl, Rüsen stressed the role of art's aesthetic quality for constructing historical meaning. The historical function of aesthetics derives from the analogy that exists between the inner logic of creating aesthetic sense in art and of making sense of history in the work of historical consciousness. Rüsen concluded his theoretical deliberations with the challenge to "consider art seriously as a source for and contribution to the sense and meaning, which we call historical. Only in such a connection between the aesthetic value of art and the historical sense criteria today can historical culture enforce its own aesthetic dimension. Aesthetics would not deteriorate to a mere means of presenting cognitive or political historical messages. Instead, art would gain its own historical sense. Historical experience would be aesthetically enriched and the memorial work of historical consciousness would gain a new perspective and cultural richness."

The notion of art's essential value in the production of historical meaning also informed Rüsen's approach toward the remembrance of the Holocaust. Whereas Winter objected to artistic forms of Holocaust commemoration because of the redemptive quality of art in general, Rüsen stressed the unique ability of art to speak about the unspeakable and to find ways to express the senselessness of the events. For Rüsen, art thus plays an important, indispensable role in the process of coming to terms with the atrocities of the twentieth century.
Reassessing the possibility of historical representation, the session clearly laid out what is at stake in the contemporary debates on commemorative art and traced the roots for the modern challenges back to the nineteenth century. The session thereby demonstrated that we are far from a solution to our struggle with the memory and heritage of World War II. How to relate to history, how to construct our own self-understanding on the basis of this past? Although the positions remained irreconciled, with Rüsen stressing that "history is not the past. It is a meaningful relation to the past. It is a narrative bridge between past and present" and Winter emphasizing that "this narrative is broken; by the Holocaust," this session fostered a dialog between the approaches that in itself is important. And it will, undoubtedly, continue.

Cordula A. Grewe

The Past and Future of Comparative History


Heinz-Gerhard Haupt's thoughtful defense of comparative history as a viable and extremely flexible instrument for the analysis of history engendered a lively response from the commentator, Deborah Cohen, and from the assembled group of fifty attendees. Haupt developed his arguments both with a view to the historiography of the Federal Republic of Germany, arising from an analysis of the specificity of National Socialism, and against the negative foil of Michel Espagne's assessment of comparative history as a "dubious" methodological approach.

It is precisely the focus on the "national" that Espagne attacks, along with comparative history's tendency to choose semantic rather than functional equivalents for comparison and its "narrow focus" on social groups. Haupt interpreted Espagne's writing not only as a criticism of methodology but as a "symbolic conflict about the legitimacy of approaches."

Having thus raised the stakes, Haupt then set out to demolish Espagne's argument by showing comparative history's central role in "enhancing mutual international understanding," in general and the idea of a common Europe in particular. He pointed to the fruitful interrelationship between history and the social sciences after World War II, when "comparisons played a prominent part" in the conceptualization of "historical social science." Above all, he asserted that comparative history allowed for a shift away from static, normative models - for example, England as a model for parliamentary democracy - toward greater understanding of national and regional peculiarities. Comparative history, according to Haupt, is capable of making highly differentiated value judgments because it remains aware of the historical relationship between intellectual
enterprise and political power. It is thus precisely in the historiography of suppressed cultures that comparative history's light shines.

Example by example, Haupt affirmed comparative history's heuristic, descriptive, analytical, and paradigmatic functions, citing the work of Marc Bloch (English enclosure), A. Rosenberg (French worker movement), and Frederick Cooper (comparison of capitals under feudal rein) to strengthen his thesis. His appreciation of comparative history as a flexible endeavor that can serve multiple approaches culminated in his praise of its Möglichkeitssinn, a term borrowed from Robert Musil. He concluded that the historical comparison is an adequate though difficult means of historical analysis that can - quoting Natalie Zemon Davis - "provide the highest satisfaction of our craft."

Cohen's thoughtful and witty response, rich in irony and peppered with metaphors, began with the self-incrimination of comparative historians as the "evangelicals of the profession." She focused immediately on the questions of comparability, advising that historians must begin from a point of relation and referred to comparative history's tendency to obscure distinctive histories of region.

From there she moved to the problem of causality and the discipline's tendency toward reductionism. Why, then, undertake comparative history? Cohen's answer was that it is capable of providing glimpses into the paths not taken and can shed light on phenomena that national historians take for granted. Comparative history has a future if it begins from a point of relation and if it remains realistic in its expectation of what it can achieve. She concluded that the discipline must be capable of moving away from the nation as the principle unit of comparison.

The audience was eager to comment on both speakers and fueled the discussion for or against the viability of the discipline with such enthusiasm that only the late hour could cut short its ebb and flow.

Malve S. Burns
The annual symposium of the Friends of the German Historical Institute has become an event eagerly anticipated by the Friends in both the academic and Washington communities, and by colleagues at the Institute itself. The eighth such symposium was held on November 19, 1999, at the GHI. This year's presenters were the joint Friends' Dissertation Prize winners, who were chosen in a nationwide competition to find the best doctoral dissertations in German history or German-American studies, and one of the research fellows at the Institute.

Professor Geoffrey J. Giles, as president of the Friends, began by thanking the dissertation prize committee for the hard work they put into their difficult task of selecting two joint winners from a short list of quite excellent doctoral dissertations from around the country. The 1999 committee was chaired by Professor William Hagen from the University of California at Davis, who was himself the supervisor of one of the previous year's winners, and was thus known to have a good eye for superlative work. He was joined by Professor Herbert Andrews from Towson State University and Professor Ron Smelser from the University of Utah team that truly spanned the country. The dissertations submitted to them ranged in focus all the way from the seventeenth century to the 1990s, but they had no difficulty in reaching unanimity over the two winners.

The first young scholar to present his work was Ian F. McNeely, who had conducted much of the research for his University of Michigan Ph.D. in Stuttgart. During the current academic year he is a member of the Society of Fellows at Harvard University. McNeely gave a lucid and fascinating account of the role of scribes (Schreiber) in Germany, especially in Württemberg in the decades around 1800. He gave his talk the title, "Writing, Citizenship, and the Making of Civil Society in Germany, 1780-1840."

The joint Friends' Dissertation Prize winner, and the second speaker, was Andrew Zimmerman, who completed his doctorate at the University of California at San Diego. He is spending this academic year in the Society of Fellows in the Humanities at Columbia University. His illuminating talk explored the position of anthropology in the Kaiserreich, focusing on both the practitioners and the museums in which they exhibited their often curious finds. His talk was titled, "Anthropology and the Place of Knowledge in Imperial Berlin."

After lunch, the audience settled back in to enjoy a presentation of some of the interesting research being carried out in the Institute itself. GHI Research Fellow Cordula A. Grewe illustrated with thought-provoking slides her work-in-progress on corporeal imagery in the service of nationalism. Grewe is working toward her Habilitation at the University of Freiburg. Her paper was headed, "The
As in previous years, a lively discussion followed each of the papers, and the day finished all too quickly. The Friends are already looking forward to their next symposium, scheduled for Friday, November 10, 2000.

Geoffrey J. Giles

What follows are synopses of the presentations given by the Friends' Dissertation Prize winners, McNeely and Zimmerman, and Grewe of the GHI.

Official Encounters: Writing and the Making of Civil Society in Germany, 1790s-1820s

The project explores how written texts mediated the encounters between state officials and local citizens in Germany. Set in the duchy (later kingdom) of Württemberg, it spans the fascinating but severely neglected decades from the French Revolution through the aftermath of Napoleon's invasions. It also takes place in local communities, a setting often overlooked by scholars focusing on events in high politics, such as wars, statemaking, and "reforms from above." At the same time, the book attempts to integrate these communities into the broader narratives of German history. Ultimately, it synthesizes micro- and macrohistory, melding political - and cultural - historical methods to argue that Germany's famously bureaucratic culture was also a profoundly civic culture.

The book begins with the observation that the telling of German history has long been dominated by the state. Often reified as a site of oppression or compulsion, sometimes viewed as an "organic" entity with a life and purpose of its own, the state has long been seen as the motor of German historical development. It has functioned as an instrument of totalitarianism, an agent of national unification, and an architect of warfare, religious reform, and social discipline. Starting in the early modern period, writing emerged among the principal means by which the state made its power felt. Writing - the handmaiden of bureaucracy - stands behind the modern state's most potent apparatus of influence. Germany is both famed and despised as perhaps the world's most notoriously administrative society: Every official encounter there is marked by a stamp, a seal, a certificate, or a form. The German state's prowess with writing has, moreover, sustained a belief that its citizens were passive creatures of a bureaucratic monolith.

Official Encounters questions this view. It attempts to situate the production and power of official texts amidst the strategies and assumptions governing the use of

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1 This text is not intended for attribution or quotation without the author's express consent.
writing in German society at large. I want people who read it to think differently about the exercise of power, through official writing, at the interface between state and society. Not only must "bureaucracy" be disaggregated into the individual texts and practices of writing bringing influence to specific officials. Writing must itself be viewed as a vehicle for citizen empowerment. Its very plasticity as a medium, even in its official, bureaucratic form, ensured that the powers the state conferred on writing eluded its grasp at the moment of encounter with local society. To follow the trails of paper circulating between officials and citizens is to re-imagine the German state as a community of political participation, not a site of domination, and thereby restore the German citizenry to the making of its own history during this time period. Citizenship is often viewed in terms of identity, as a passively acquired legal or cultural status defined by those other than citizens themselves. By contrast, I want to recuperate a sense of how citizens themselves actively practiced and participated in the exercise of power. This entails a new conception of citizenship, one whose attention to the uses in texts in local settings shows how power was negotiated within the state, and not between it and an externally constituted civil society.

"Civil society," the realm where citizens interact independently of the state, is the outcome, not the origin, of the historical transformation described in the book. In Germany, civil society was the product of countless decisions, deliberate and accidental, by officials and citizens alike, to demarcate a sphere of free association where ideas and information could be exchanged and society's interests formed without the state's interference. Changes in official writing promoted and at the same time reflected civil society's disengagement from the state. A long-existing set of textual practices and cultural beliefs about writing, once predicated on the interpenetration of state and society, gave way to one in which these realms were viewed as separate. These subterranean, tectonic shifts, rather than the classic philosophical distinctions and political reforms which later recognized and institutionalized them, constitute the "making" of civil society that is the main subject of Official Encounters.

II

At the center of this story stands an ambitious group of manipulative local scribes or Schreiber active in Württemberg. These scribes, a species of powerful half-private, half-official notaries public, stood in a hazy realm between government and the local community and experienced the disentanglement of state and civil society especially acutely. They straddled a fault line that widened into an open chasm after Napoleon's invasions in the early 1800s. Not only does their sudden decline provide a vivid illustration of civil society's coalescence, but their previous role as mediators and teachers for their clients in local communities compellingly illustrates the learning process leading up to it.

The study uses the scribes as a lens through which to view the uses of writing in flesh-and-blood settings. It is divided into four parts, encompassing the role of
writing in four interrelated spheres: daily life, political mobilizations, the state proper (bureaucracy and parliament), and civil society itself. Before the 1800s, the scribes presided over a civic culture that bound citizens to the state, and to each other, through elaborate textual formalities. Part I details how they managed property transactions; drew up mandatory estates inventories; drafted "alimentary contracts" between parents and children, exchanging heirlooms and property in exchange for care in old age; and influenced the conduct of "protocoled investigations," textual inquisitions into local corruption or malfeasance which brought the state into the world of the scribes and local citizens. Collectively, these texts colonized citizens' lives with bureaucratic formalities but in crucial ways allowed them to pursue and express their social interests through the written record, all with the mediation of the scribes.

As certain of these scribes became enamored of the French Revolution in the late 1790s, they parlayed this underlying civic involvement into a truly political activism, manipulating the machinery of administrative communication and stretching the interpretation of constitutional documents to their absolute limits. Part II begins with a chapter on the so-called Black Forest Cahier, telling how provincial scribes, through their role in drafting binding written mandates and instructions issued by local citizens to their parliamentary representatives, practiced "political ventriloquism" to project their own voices into the faraway debating chambers of the Stuttgart parliament or Landtag. It then shows how, despite the manipulative and paternalistic nature of such ventriloquism, scribes nonetheless educated their putative puppets in the arts of citizenship. In particular, the culture of petition and supplication allowed citizens to participate in dialog with the state and, when state investigators forced citizens to account for words put in their mouths by the scribes, called forth powerful expressions of civic courage and political conscience on their part.

The scribes fell from power when the Napoleonic invasions led to the creation of a larger and more cosmopolitan state in Württemberg, unleashing a parliamentary and governmental campaign to strip them of their provincial hegemony. The tremendous growth in bureaucracy during this period of statemaking generated massive complaints against what Friedrich List called Vielschreiberei, excessive red tape from which the scribes personally profited, with G.W.F. Hegel accusing them of keeping citizens in "textual serfdom," Schreibleibeigenschaft. Part III narrates the parliamentary and public sphere movement to strip the scribes from power and tells how, in a powerful expression of civil society's maturity, this campaign eventually compelled the state to enact emancipatory reforms. During this time, state reform commissioners pioneered new practices of writing, collecting personnel dossiers and income reports on the scribes and analyzing them statistically to get a picture of their lives in civil society. This not only allowed the state to co-opt the scribes and demarcate bureaucracy from civil society for the first time, but also signaled a new role for written texts as vehicles for legibility: official texts now promoted knowledge of the broader social world in a looser, more
pragmatic fashion than had been the case under the culture of formality the scribes had themselves dominated.

Robbed of their mediating role between state and citizenry, the scribes saw their tutelage replaced by a more informational, entrepreneurial culture of writing designed to enlighten rather than patronize a citizenry newly emancipated from their clutches. Part IV concentrates on two forms of print culture that put knowledge and information in the hands of citizens and enabled them to construct new networks and affiliations among themselves. The first of these, a series of local statistical-topographical almanacs, brought state officials into collaboration with hometown notables in the production of printed reference books, showing how a progressive, scientific, Enlightenment-inspired encyclopedias had come to Biedermeier hometowns long regarded by historians as provincial and backward. The second print medium, so-called intelligence gazettes, demonstrates this even more clearly. These classified ad newspapers embodied the Enlightenment's ambition to bring practical knowledge to the people, and their massive and spontaneous diffusion throughout the Württemberg kingdom in the 1820s testifies to a large and sophisticated market for information, goods, and services in local communities, one which evolved in an explicitly political direction in the 1848 revolution. With these changes came a recognizably modern traffic in texts, one forming an integral part of German civil society from the nineteenth century to the present.

III

Official Encounters fundamentally sheds new light on the landscape of civic interactions between the state and local communities in the decades surrounding Napoleon's invasions of Germany, from the 1790s to the 1820s. These interactions have been neglected by a historical literature that misses the vitality of the local amidst the continental sweep of wars and revolutions, that focuses its account of civil society's origin on a rarefied sphere of intellectuals and policymakers, and that fails, above all, to appreciate citizens' participation in a state that purportedly dominated them.

Civil society was the outcome of a long learning process between the 1790s and the 1820s. It took hold not in the minds of Enlightenment thinkers, in their writings and salons and reading societies, but in a much more everyday world where local citizens encountered state officials. What Official Encounters attempts to show is that at each moment during this entire process, what we normally call "the state" had to contend with the active participation of its citizens. In Germany, the state and its written instruments were indeed ubiquitous. But precisely because they were diffused throughout social life and only marked off from civil society over a long process of negotiation, such power remained as much the patrimony of its subjects as the monopoly of a bureaucratic elite. Even in a period of continental warfare and violence and reform and disruption, citizenship and civic participation mattered.
Anthropology and the Place of Knowledge in Imperial Berlin

Anthropology was practiced in locations significantly different from those of the conventional academic humanities in the Kaiserreich. Rather than the university and the library or archive, anthropology took place in voluntary associations, popular ethnographic spectacles, museums, and in the world outside Europe. In my dissertation I followed anthropological knowledge through these various locations, as it traveled from popular shows to scientific museums or from colony to metropole. Anthropology was in many ways defined by the enormous amount of distance it covered, and it was by means of a set of material cultures that anthropology could travel such enormous distances. Anthropologists depended on the material culture of the societies they studied, the artifacts that filled their museums. Furthermore, anthropological knowledge about these non-European material cultures itself depended upon a set of European material cultures. These included the technical apparatus of European imperialism as well as the technologies of display that anthropologists used in their museums. These two material cultures both sustained and contradicted the intellectual and ideological aspirations of anthropologists. These contradictions were not simply an impediment to anthropology but also a precondition for the discipline. By focusing in this essay on the collection, circulation, and display of anthropological objects, I hope to show how the development of anthropology as an ahistorical human science was part of a larger, global colonial encounter.2

Anthropologists studied societies that had been rejected by German historians from Leopold von Ranke to Eduard Meyer as lacking history and therefore as unworthy of scholarly attention.3 Anthropologists shared the view that the people they studied were not historical. Following historians, they regarded these societies as "natural peoples" (Naturvölker), rather than "cultural peoples" (Kulturvölker). Natural peoples were "natural" because they possessed neither writing, history, nor culture. Nature, in this scheme was radically ahistorical. Adolf Bastian, the leading German anthropological theorist and head of the Berlin Museum of Ethnology, asked about natural peoples: "What would be old here? What young? In the eternally old or

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2 The limited space here prevents me from citing the important secondary literature on anthropology, museums, and collecting. For a more complete bibliography, see Andrew Zimmerman, "Anthropology and the Place of Knowledge in Imperial Berlin," Ph.D. diss., University of California at San Diego, 1998.

eternally young of nature?"4 Anthropologists conceived of their methods as a natural scientific alternative to the interpretive, narrative methods of academic history. They pointed out that when historians studied the past they relied on historical documents, accounts that societies wrote about themselves, which, one suggested, contained self-congratulatory exaggerations and even lies.5 Instead of interpreting written sources, anthropologists looked at objects, at the possessions and body parts of the people they studied. They claimed that when they studied these objects they did not interpret them as historical traces but rather used natural scientific methods. Bastian proclaimed that the goal of anthropology was to attain a "total impression" (Total-Eindruck) of humanity in all its variations.6 A complete collection of anthropological objects displayed in a museum, it was hoped, would allow an individual to achieve the anthropological total impression. By rendering objects not as historical documents, to be interpreted as part of a narrative, but rather as specimens evidencing a timeless nature, anthropologists thought it would be possible to understand humanity independent of historicism.

The Royal Museum of Ethnology, which opened in Berlin in 1886, was thus supposed to catapult the human sciences outside the horizon of time. The basis of this achievement were the glass and iron display cases designed in part by one of the museum's curators, Albert Voss. Voss chose to replace conventional wooden case frames with iron because iron frames could support much larger pieces of glass.7 The combination of glass and iron, which had made it possible to bring the brilliance of sunlight into enclosed areas such as the crystal palace or the numerous commercial arcades in European cities, also allowed the brilliance of sunlight to fall on anthropological objects. The arrangement of the cases in parallel rows in large halls further induced the eye to compare and generalize from the artifacts of different natural peoples and thus encourage anthropological induction.8 The museum was to demonstrate that humans, or at least natural humans, could be subject to the same kind of classification as the rest of nature. Understanding humans was therefore, the museum offered, not the province of the humanist historian, who placed individuals into narratives, but rather the province of the natural scientist, who placed specimens into classifications.

The presentation of the objects of the colonized as artifacts of an ahistorical humanity was not, however, an accomplishment solely authored by

4 Adolf Bastian, Zur Kenntniss Hawaiis (Berlin, 1883), 125.
8 As the museum's architect explained, this design assisted in creating the kind of all-encompassing vision that anthropologists desired: "This kind of display . . . allows for a grouping of the objects that makes easier an overview (übersicht) according to individual ethnic groups, which is especially important in ethnological collections."
anthropologists. Rather, the objects in the museum were the product of exchanges between Europeans and colonial subjects. Anthropologists rarely traveled abroad to collect objects, and even when they did they were most successful when they acquired collections already brought together by local Europeans. More commonly, German soldiers, government officials, and merchants in the colonies would acquire objects, often in the ordinary course of colonial rule, and mail them to the Berlin museum. This denial of history was as much a part of the practical course of colonial rule as it was a part of anthropological discourse. Colonists themselves had an interest in making the people they ruled radically different and fundamentally inferior to Europeans. Putting the objects of the colonized in an anthropology museum was thus part of a larger attempt to deny historical agency and even full humanity to the subjects of colonial rule. Anthropologist and colonist were partners in a larger process of determining the relations between Europe and the rest of the world.

A good example of colonial collecting occurred in German New Guinea in May, 1898, when Lower Pay-Master Braun of the H.M.S. Seagull purchased objects for the Berlin Museum of Ethnology. Braun gave an indigenous leader a hatchet, a carpenter's plane, and four packets of tobacco in exchange for a wooden figure used to protect coconut trees from thieves. Even this exchange, which went quite smoothly, illustrates the work required to fix such encounters as culture collecting nature. One might at first be tempted either to applaud or to denounce this exchange as a form of modernization. The Papuan, one might claim, abandoned traditional economic practices based on the magical manipulation of the world, represented by the wooden figure, in favor of modern economic practices based on technological intervention in the world, represented by the hatchet and the carpenter's plane. One might also point to the integration of the Papuan into a system of commodity exchange and away from a gift economy. However, the moment of exchange, rather than "modernizing," actually destabilized the distinction between the "primitive" and the "modern." For collectors like Lower Pay-Master Braun, this sort of exchange was a step toward initiation into the Prussian Orders of the Eagle or the Crown, groups centered around totems that transferred royal aura to their members. One of the most important motivations for colonists to collect anthropological objects was the hope of being named to one of these orders, since donations of artifacts to a royal museum could be interpreted as service to the Prussian monarch. Royal orders conferred prestige upon their members and gave them the privilege of wearing ribbons and medals with formal attire. The objects of exchange thus had a number of ambiguous meanings in precisely the "subjective," historical sense that anthropologists hoped to eliminate from their study. Only when the objects were placed in the Berlin museum was the

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9 Karl von den Steinen remembered that Bastian did field research by seeking out "[European] authorities who had been familiar with the natives for years and who possessed the kind of thoroughly organized material in their manuscripts and collections that a hasty foreign visitor could never bring together."

10 Max Braun to Adolf Bastian, June 27, 1898, MfV, IB 48, Bd. 1, 927/98.
exchange stabilized as a contribution to science rather, for example, than an exchange of one kind of magic for another.

The Berlin museum was extraordinarily successful in amassing the objects that would allow for a total impression of the natural peoples. The concept of the total impression proved, however, to be self-contradictory, and Bastian privately complained that every advance the museum made toward its goal of completeness was a retreat from its goal of allowing for a totalizing, summarizing gaze.\footnote{Bastian to Rudolf Virchow, Jan. 18, 1876, NL Virchow, 117 (part I), Bl. 19-22.} By the turn of the century the collections had become such a jumble that "the cases are overfilled, so that every instructive arrangement of the collection remains impossible," Bastian lamented.\footnote{Bastian to the General Museum Administration, July 12, 1899, MfV, I/1, vol. 1, 712/99.} Bastian, who had conceived of the plan of offering a total impression in the museum, left the practical work of cataloging and setting up such massive displays to the junior curators. These curators seem to have resented Bastian for his unwillingness to participate in the cataloging he required of his subordinates.\footnote{Karl von den Steinen, "Adolf Bastian. Gedächtnisfeier am 11. März 1905," ZfE 37 (1905): 247; Bernhard Ankermann, "Die Entwicklung der Ethnologie seit Adolf Bastian," ZfE 58 (1926): 227.} One complained "that they were supposed, like handy-men, to take inventory of objects as they came in from every possible part of the earth."\footnote{Fritz Graebner, "Adolf Bastian's 100. Geburtstag," Ethnologica 3 (1927): ix-xii.} Even Luschan, a very senior curator, griped that his own work in the museum had become "mechanical," involving mostly registering objects.\footnote{See Fritz Graebner, "Kulturkreise und Kulturschichten in Ozeanien," ZfE 37 (1905): 28-53; Bernard Ankermann, "Kulturkreise und Kulturschichten in Afrika," ZfE 37 (1905): 54-84.} Anthropologists had become victims of their own challenge to history.

Junior curators eventually rebelled against the model of anthropology offered by the museum. Instead of striving to achieve an inductive "total impression" of all the artifacts of "natural peoples," these curators reconceptualized anthropology as type of cultural history. The junior curators Fritz Graebner and Bernhard Ankermann encouraged anthropologists to interpret selected artifacts that were particularly significant of cultural contacts and development.\footnote{See Fritz Graebner, "Kulturkreise und Kulturschichten in Ozeanien," ZfE 37 (1905): 28-53; Bernard Ankermann, "Kulturkreise und Kulturschichten in Afrika," ZfE 37 (1905): 54-84.} This so-called culture-historical method offered a solution to the practical problems of a museum conceived as a non-narrative, inductive overview of a complete collection of uninterpreted objects. This new direction in anthropology did not immediately revolutionize museum displays or subsume the discipline into history (something most historians would, in any case, have resisted). Nonetheless, culture-historical methods did undermine the original project of German anthropology and began a dialog about anthropology and museum techniques that would continue throughout the Weimar Republic and afterward.\footnote{The most notable descendent of these debates was the so-called Berlin museum war of the early 1920s, which involved the distinction between anthropological objects and art and the appropriate methods of displaying the objects of non-Europeans. Related to this question was the development in Germany of expressionist art that followed "primitive" art found in anthropology museums. On the "Berlin museum war," see Karl Scheffler, Berliner Museumskrieg (Berlin, 1921).} Culture-historical anthropologists at least tacitly acknowledged that the possessions of the colonized were embedded within a history of conflicting...
interpretations and that every anthropological object was the outcome of a colonial struggle. German anthropology, its challenges to historicism, and its reshaping of the German human sciences were constructed and contested in a global system of material cultures that Europeans could never fully master.

Andrew Zimmerman

The Nationalized Body: Conceptions of the Body and the Nationalist Imaginary in Nineteenth-Century Germany

Since the Renaissance, the body, especially the nude, has become not only central to the expression of artistic concepts but also a significant site to inscribe representations of gender, class, or the nation. In the context of the latter, depictions of the body played an important role in the construction of national identity. The creation of a "national body" in the nineteenth century - that is, of a visual metaphor for the modern nations that were constituted and shaped during the course of that epoch - build decisively on cultural discourses about race and ethnicity, gender and politics, and an allegedly cultural and national heritage. As George L. Mosse pointed out in his discussion of modern masculinity, beginning with the French Revolution symbolically loaded images of the body hardened into stereotypes that became normative, stripped from their original multitudes of personal or ideal definitions. "Stereotypes came into their own with the modern age as part of a general quest for symbols in order to make the abstract concrete within the bewildering changes of modernity. . . . At a time when political imagery like the national flag or the Jacobin's cocarde became potent symbols, the human body itself took on symbolic meaning."18

Here, I discuss different conceptions of the body in their relation to national imagery and the nationalistic imaginary in nineteenth-century Germany. Beginning with images of Germania, the main part of my discussion focuses on two opposing notions of the body in the period of the Wars of Liberation: I contrast what Mosse called the "modern masculine stereotype" with an androgynous model developed in Nazarene art. This interpretation aims at an attempt to shed new light on the phenomenon of androgyny in art that has been overlooked for a long time in the German context and seldom discussed in a broader historical framework. I also examine the relationship between the artistic program of the Nazarenes and their political world views, especially their relation to nationalism and national aspirations in the first decades of the nineteenth century. This approach coincides with the self-understanding of the Nazarenes who perceived their project of a renewal of German art and politics as a Gesamtkunstwerk and regarded the arts as the spiritual foundation of political developments.

Talking about Germany, or to be more precise, about the multitude of independent states that would become Germany in 1871, one connects the image of the national body immediately and inevitably with depictions of colossal Teutonic warriors and

Wagnerian women, exemplarily represented by Karl von Piloty's famous *Thusnelda in the Triumphal March of Germanicus*, begun 1865 and finished 1875, and by Lorenz Clasen's famous *Germania on Guard at the Rhine* from 1860. The formation of Germania as an aggressive Valkyrie, fit-to-fight the enemy west of the Rhine, was fostered by the so-called Rhine crisis of 1840. In that year, the French government had suffered a humiliating diplomatic defeat in the Ottoman Empire. In an attempt to divert the attention of its citizens from this foreign-policy debacle and to restore national pride, France declared its intention to recapture the left bank of the Rhine from the Germans and thus to reestablish the river as the country's "natural" eastern border. The threat of war charged nationalist sentiment throughout the German territories, a reaction that soon recalled the intense patriotic, anti-French fervor present during the Wars of Liberation. German nationalism radicalized as the fear of a French attack grew. The sense of a common fate, of belonging to a single German nation, spread. The intense reaction to the Rhine crisis was particularly evident in the press.

Yet the political discussion was not limited to journalistic articles. Starting in the fall of 1840, a flood of *Rheinlieder* written, published, and sung - attested to the strong anti-French and nationalist patriotism among the German population both during and after the Rhine conflict. One poem in particular is credited with launching the *Rheinlieder* craze in 1840: Nikolaus Becker's "Der deutsche Rhein." Becker appealed to his readers' sense of a national character with traditional, romantic images of the river: His poem claims that the Rhine should, and could, remain German as long as an oar strikes its waves or as long as bold lads court slender lasses, to mention just two of his images. Lorenz Clasen's Valkyrian Germania fitted well into Becker's nationalist imaginary, and it rose to the rank of one of the most successful visual manifestations of anti-French sentiment in Germany. As shown in the following, belligerent images such as Clasen's composition successfully entered the visual memory of what is German, and in so doing, erased the memory of and identification with other models of representing the nation and of other concepts of the body.

Already in the last few decades of the eighteenth century, a small circle of enlightened doctors, educators, and cameralist theorists known as the Philanthropists had begun a campaign to bring back what they referred to as the ancient art of physical training or *Gymnastik*. By the early nineteenth century the idea of gymnastic training for male youth gained broader popularity. Against the background of the Napoleonic wars, educators and patriots across the German territories set up a series of gymnastic fields and societies as part of a larger effort to bring about "national liberation" and "renewal." Leaders of the gymnastics movement envisioned the training field as a cradle of nationalist sentiment and promoted gymnastics as part of the education of future citizen-soldiers. In contrast

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19 The following paragraph is based on material from the dissertation of Teresa Stanislo, University of Michigan, and her talk on "The Dangers of Civilization: Protecting Manliness in the Age of Enlightenment and 'National Liberation,'" Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar, German Historical Institute, Washington, D.C., Apr. 21-4, 1999.
to their nineteenth-century followers, the gender concepts of the eighteenth-century Philanthropists were less strict in their binary division of female and male role models. Nevertheless, their notions of masculinity tied into the evolution of Mosse's idea of the modern masculine stereotype, which came to embody predominantly bourgeois "normative patterns of morality and behavior, that is to say, typical and acceptable ways of behaving and acting within the social setting of the past centuries."20 During the French occupation, the association of physical training, moral virtues, and national desires gained enormous significance and wide-spread acceptance.

In the years between the defeat of the Prussian army in 1806 and the uprising against Napoleon in 1813 figures such as Ernst Moritz Arndt aimed to direct individual aspirations toward the ideal of the Volk, while propagating a concept of beauty that represented a new national stereotype. The idea to foster citizenship and cultural programs together with health and physical-education activities, particularly gymnastics, was rigorously cultivated and then successfully implemented in Prussian culture through Friedrich Ludwig Jahn (1778 - 1852), the German "father of gymnastics." Jahn was a fervent patriot who believed that physical education was the cornerstone of national health and strength and important in strengthening character and national identity. In 1811, he founded the first Turnverein or gymnastics club in Berlin. Becoming soon popular as centers for the cultivation of health and vigor through gymnastic exercise, early Turnvereine also were intended to prepare German youth to defend their country against Napoleonic France, and gymnasts were encouraged to develop a spirit of patriotism and Deutschheit (Germanness). This national stereotype based on the Greek revival á la Winckelmann nurtured a cult of masculinity, "the male body hard and lithe, poised for battle"21 that revived the Philanthropists' idea of physical training as the foundation of a new German man, the citizen-warrior. The unity of body and spirit was vital for this conception, "as indeed it was for the Gymnasts whose bodily contours were made visible by the uniform Jahn designed for them."22

Despite the vivid discourse about masculinity and war and about masculinity and the creation of a united Germany, the modern masculine stereotype as the foundation of the "new man" did not remain unchallenged. In their attempt to overcome the decadence of the eighteenth century and to renew German culture, the German Nazarenes developed an alternative body concept of the nude male that was grounded in androgyny and found its expression primarily in drawing.

As a reaction to rationalism, the Enlightenment, and the intellectualization of faith, and in artistic terms, against eighteenth-century Neoclassicism, the Nazarene movement found its first institutional expression in the German Brotherhood of St.

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20 Mosse, Image of Man, 4.
21 George L. Mosse, Nationalism and Sexuality: Respectability and Abnormal Sexuality in Modern Europe (New York, 1985), 78.
22 Ibid., 79. See also Friedrich Jahn and Ludwig Eiselen, Die Deutsche Turnkunst (Berlin, 1816), 244.
Luke, the first effective anti-academic movement in European painting. The brotherhood was formed in 1809 and searched to revive and renew artistic practice through a return to the medieval spirit in art. The brotherhood's original members were six Vienna Academy students with Johann Friedrich Overbeck and Franz Pforr as its leading figures. The circle moved in 1810 to Rome, where it occupied the abandoned monastery of Saint Isidoro and where it soon constituted a central group within the community of German expatriate artists. In Rome, the young artists soon acquired the originally derisive nickname "Nazarenes" because of their affectation of biblical style of hair and dress.

Based on a holistic world view, the Nazarenes regarded all facets of human life - whether art, culture, economics, politics, and even war - as an unified whole, whose critical condition of decadence and atheism they set out to heal. The fundamental element of the Nazarene national project represented thereby their belief that only the rise of a new religiosity could lead to an artistic as well as political renewal of the German people after a century of decadence and moral decline. This yearning for a re-Christianization was not rare among the generation who was born in the decade of the French Revolution and grew up in a dramatically changing world. Confronting the collapse of traditions and traditional values, political instability and war, industrialization and the origin of the working class, and a new experience of time dominated by speed and rapid transformations, many of them searched for a new foundational ethical and moral system. For that reason the Nazarene movement turned to religion. In so doing, they were part of the religious revival movements that originated around 1800 and were to become a major sociopolitical force throughout the nineteenth century.

Instead of depictions of forceful, well-build men, the nude drawings of the Nazarenes represent pubescent boys whose bodies are only on the verge of becoming manly physiques. In opposition to the late-Baroque style taught at most academies throughout the German-speaking language area the Nazarenes predominantly rejected the masculine body of professional models and instead hired young boys that they had encountered in daily life. Searching for true expression, they treasured the uncorrupted innocent attitude of their nubile models who had not been involved in any academic or art business prior to their involvement with the Nazarene artists. Beside artistic reasons, this attitude also reflected the anticapitalist stance of the Nazarene movement. As a result of their rejection of traditional models, the first Nazarene generation, that circle that had gathered around Overbeck and Pforr in Rome developed an androgynous ideal of the male body. Thus, Nazarene depictions of the male body contradicted both the stereotype of modern masculinity and the call for the masculine citizen-warrior as advanced by the war party in Prussia.

As mentioned earlier, the heart of the Nazarene enterprise was formed around the belief that only the rise of a new religiosit could lead to an artistic as well as political renewal of the German people after a century of decadence and moral decline. Turning toward Christianity, the majority of Nazarenes rejected antiquity
as a symbol of heathenism and denounced French Neoclassicism as an expression of secularization and revolution, which they both despised. In contrast to the persistence of Winkelmannian enthusiasm for Greek art as the model of perfect beauty, exemplarily embodied in Goethe's *Weimarer Preisaufgaben*, the Nazarenes searched for a truly Christian style, exploring medieval and Renaissance art as sources for their artistic endeavor. The formulation of a new body ideal, however, proved to be difficult: On the one hand, the restricted, abstracted depictions of the nude in medieval art - that is, of Christ on the cross or scenes of saints' martyrdom - did not provide a model that the Nazarenes perceived as aesthetically satisfying. Renaissance art, on the other hand, represented a revival of a body image based on the reception of antiquity. Thus, to follow the conception of the nude in Renaissance art would have meant to assimilate in one way or the other the despised Greek revival of the eighteenth century, and had therefore to be avoided. The lack of Teutonic figurative art or monumental sculpture reinforced the problem of devising an alternative to Greek beauty.

Like Neoclassicism, the notion of androgyny, alas only in its male form, as the germ of social, political, and artistic renewal had a strong theoretical basis in German thought, again beginning with Winckelmann. His rediscovery of the classical world was critical for the development of the mystique of the androgyne. In this context, Aristophanes' narrative of the origin of human being in Plato's *Symposium* that promoted the idea of a primal being as a cosmic androgyne whose original unity disintegrates into a world of conflicting parts transformed into the notion of a middle voice embodying the utopian call for an aesthetic state that could restore such wholeness. The androgynous concept thus became the major utopian counter model to the fixation on binary models of logic and scientific discourse that characterized the eighteenth century. The Nazarene interest in this model was reinforced by the revival of the notion of God as an androgynous unity - an idea that was revived in the eighteenth century by mystics such as Jakob Böhme and Pietists such as Graf von Zinzendorf.

The questions remains, however, how the androgynous ideal of the Nazarenes related to German nationalism in the first and second decade of the nineteenth century. The most important link between the two was religion: The Nazarene reform program with its emphasis on personal faith and a renewed religiosity as the driving force of all aspects of human life corresponded with the religious overtones of anti-French resistance and the war rhetoric. The religious orientation of these movements clearly shows that the nineteenth century, despite an unfolding secularization, also witnessed a strong re-Christianization. Religion seemed for the Nazarenes as well as for many nationalist to be the true basis for a united Germany. It is thus not surprising that a Nazarene, Philipp Veit, fabricated the monumental image of Germania that embellished the first German parliament, the Paulskirche in Frankfurt. Thereby, the Nazarenes looked back to the perished Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, embraced the idea of the Reich, and opted for a pan-German solution. An example of this attitude is Philipp Veit's fresco of the *Introduction of the Visual Arts in Germany through Christianity*, executed in 1835 for the newly
founded Städelsches Kunstinstitut in Frankfurt am Main. In this fresco, we see Germania on the right dressed in the ornate of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. She holds a shield that is embellished with the double eagle. At her feet we see the crown of Charlemagne and the imperial insignia, and the pedestal, on which Germania's throne rests, is decorated with the coats of arms of the seven *Kurfürsten*, the seven imperial electors, that like the insignia refer to the vanished German empire.

In contrast to the aggressive Valkyrian Germania of the second half of the nineteenth century, the Nazarenes did not give priority to martial strength and the will to fight. Instead, they focused on virtues such as purity, self-restraint, and sexual abstinence which they regarded central to the new, regenerated German people. They saw these values manifested in the not-yet-fully developed bodies of the young pubescent boys they hired. They thereby favored values that gymnasts and fraternities also tried to integrate into their ideal of the new man, in their case a correlative, if not control mechanism to their emphasis on those manly virtues that were immediately related to combat. As Mosse put it: "Indeed, the Gymnasts while training for battle were supposed to avoid the so-called sins of youth, such as laziness, lustfulness, and uncontrolled sexual passion." This moral side of the modern masculine stereotype allowed its supporters such as the fraternities to embrace Nazarene art despite its rejection of pronounced masculinity. The Nazarenes' turn to the androgynous model expressed a deep desire to find an alternative to the Greek model, quite a unique undertaking in Western art at that time.

Beside the choice of young boys as models, the striving of the Nazarenes for purity found furthermore expression in their draftsmanship. In the attempt to reduce the sensual aura of the nude human body, they reduced the depiction of the body to outlining the model's contour. Two drawings by Franz Pforr showing the young Italian model Xaverio, who enjoyed immense popularity among the Nazarenes, demonstrate exemplarily this approach. Although the first drawing displays the boy from the front, leaning against a pedestal, in a rather realistic manner, the second depiction of Xaverio on the same sheet, a much smaller view from the back, is much more abstract in character. This abstract quality also distinguishes Pforr's second drawing, again a view of Xaverio from the back. In this drawing, Pforr reduced the model's body to a purified ornamentalized outline without articulation of the corporeal structure itself. In contrast to the reductionist depiction of the boy's body, Pforr represented the face - seen in lost profile - in delicate detail. It is noteworthy that Pforr's drawing represents a technique common among the Nazarenes. The dualism between the abstract representation of the body and a detailed characterization of the face thereby grew again out of the Nazarenes' denial of Greek beauty associating it with perfect bodies, but impersonal, non-individualistic faces. In contrast to Greek art, the Nazarenes believed that

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Christianity had found its highest artistic expression in the representation of the face. This divide - antiquity/body versus Christianity/face - reflected the Romantic theory of the spiritual origins of Christianity. For the Nazarenes, the emphasis on the face symbolized the spiritual character of Christian faith, because they believed that the face mirrored human spirit as well as emotions.

Another connection between the Nazarene concept of the male body and the ideal of modern masculinity as favored by German nationalists formed a decisively anti-French sentiment. The Nazarenes created their pure androgynous nude drawings in opposition to the sensuality of French art. This attitude reflected popular stereotypes and was part of a discourse among German-speaking thinkers on the character of the races. Of course, one could reasonably question the Nazarene definition of their own art as being non-sexual. In contrast to their rhetoric about purity and purified spirituality, their nude drawings possess often a very sensual, almost homoerotic quality that is not at all diminished by the abstract elements. In addition, a closer look at French art reveals another self-deception: The construction of a strict dichotomy between French and German spirit proves untenable as soon as one takes the Romantic classicists into account such as Pierre-Paul Prud'hon, whose art also featured androgyny. In addition, French and German academic art shared a similar approach to the technique of painting, and both Prud'hon and the Nazarenes preferred enamel-like surfaces, a porcelain coloring of the flesh, and a suspension of narrative and action that resulted in a certain frozen quality of the depicted scenes. If anything, the superior technique of the French artists remained a clear dividing line between German and French academic artists, and it did so way into the second half of the nineteenth century.

Interestingly enough, the Nazarenes did not aspire to rival the technical superiority of their French competitors. Instead, they defined this difference again as a sign of the moral supremacy of German art and character. In their opinion, the strong emphasis on skills and the technical execution of an art work represented just another aspect of French decadence, like the over-heated sensuality that German critics thought to detect in French art. In the eyes of the Nazarenes, a dominating orientation toward technique prevented the immediate and unpolluted expression of feeling, sentiment, and emotions that they strove for. Instead of mourning their lack of technical skills, the Nazarenes valued the allegedly direct expression of an artist's idea more important as technical perfection. Their slightly defective drawing technique thus became a signifier of honesty and truth, moral values that the German artists claimed to be at the inner core of the German national character.

As this essay has shown, androgyny in Nazarene nude drawings represented an artistic as well as political reform program that aimed at a renewal of German society on the basis of a religious reawakening. The Nazarene ideal of the androgynous male thus provided an alternative to the modern masculine stereotype with its grounding in ancient art, while it participated at the same time in the German discourse about nation, liberation, and the creation of a united fatherland. Of course, this reading of androgyny in Nazarene art in the context of re-
Christianization and nationalism is not an exhaustive interpretation of the material. Androgyny also bears other sets of meaning concerning gender, class, and homosocial bonding. That is, however, another story and will be told at another place.

*Cordula A. Grewe*
NEWS AND EVENTS

The Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize

The Friends of the German Historical Institute are pleased to announce the competition for the best doctoral dissertations in German history, German-American relations, or the history of Germans in North America. The two joint winners of the newly named Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize will be given the opportunity to present their research at the Annual Symposium of the Friends on November 10, 2000, at the GHI. They will each receive an award of $2,000 and reimbursement for their travel to Washington, D.C.

Application is through nomination by dissertation supervisor. Candidates must have completed their doctoral dissertation during the 1998/99 academic year. The prize committee, composed of Peter Fritzsche (University of Illinois), Mary Lindeman (Carnegie-Mellon University), and Dagmar Herzog (Michigan State University), will announce the prizewinners at the end of the summer.

The Institute cannot conceive of a more qualified and inspiring role model for younger scholars focusing on German-American issues than Professor Stern. Stern will personally award the prize whenever possible, and the public will be invited to attend the symposium. The GHI is grateful to the Friends for the initiation of the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize, which will strengthen German-American scholarship and reward younger scholars for excellence.

Efforts to endow the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize are under way. The Friends have received their very first individual pledge and have proposals pending. Anyone wishing to make a contribution may send a check payable to the Friends of the German Historical Institute and designated to go toward the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize.

Summer Seminar in Paleography and Archival Studies, June 4-18, 2000

The GHI is pleased to announce the names of the participants in the Summer Seminar in Paleography and Archival Studies, co-organized by the German Department of the University of Wisconsin at Madison. The participants will first attend classes in handwriting and archival studies and then visit a number of archives and libraries. This year the program will again begin in Koblenz, travel to Bonn, Cologne, and then conclude in Gotha. Daniel S. Mattern from the GHI will lead the program. A complete summary of the program will appear in the Fall 2000 issue of the Bulletin.

Laurie M. Bowman, University of Wisconsin at Madison. Dissertation topic: "The Linguistic Consequences of Contact Between Speakers of Middle Franconian and
Limburgic Dialects During the Late Medieval and Early Modern Periods.” Adviser: Robert B. Howell.


Gregory McDonald, West Virginia University. Dissertation topic: "Mining the Self: Regionalism and Worker Identities in German and American Coalfields." Advisers: Katherine B. Aaslestad and Ronald L. Lewis.


**Sixth Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar in German History**

The Sixth Annual Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar for Ph.D. candidates in German history will take place at the Humboldt University of Berlin from April 26 to 29, 2000. The topic is "Germany in the Imperial Age, 1850-1914." The following doctoral students have been invited to participate in the seminar (a detailed report will follow
in the Fall 2000 Bulletin):

David Ciarlo, University of Wisconsin at Madison

Michael Dorrmann, Humboldt University of Berlin

Elizabeth Drummond, Georgetown University

Ina vom Feld, Max-Planck-Institut für Rechtsgeschichte, Frankfurt am Main

Elun Gabriel, University of California at Davis

Uffa Jensen, Technical University of Berlin

Martin Kohlrausch, European University Institute, Florence

Angela Kurtz, University of Maryland at College Park

Martin Majewski, University of Munich

Sabine Marx, Carnegie Mellon University

Douglas McGetchin, University of California at San Diego

Maren Möhring, University of Munich

Helen Müller, European University Viadrina, Frankfurt an der Oder

Wendy Norris, University of Chicago

Lisa Swartout, University of California at Berkeley

Olaf Zachau, University of Bonn

Moderators at this year’s seminar will be:

Prof. Celia Applegate, University of Rochester

Prof. Rüdiger vom Bruch, Humboldt University of Berlin

Prof. Roger Chickering, Georgetown University

Dr. Andreas Daum, GHI
Prof. Wolfgang Hardtwig, Humboldt University of Berlin

Prof. Nancy Reagin, Pace University

Recipients of the GHI's Dissertation and Habilitation Scholarships, 2000


Marc Frey, "Die USA und die Auflösung der europäischen Kolonialreiche in Südostasien." Habilitation adviser: Jürgen Heideking, University of Cologne.


Patricia Heberer, "'Exitus' Today in Hadamar: The History of a National Socialist 'Euthanasia' Facility." Adviser: James F. Harris, University of Maryland at College Park.


Michael J. Marcsisin, "Robert Murphy and the Art of Diplomacy." Adviser: Gerald D. Feldman, University of California at Berkeley.
Kirsten Okun, "Ästhetik der Grenzüberschreitung als Subversion dualistischer Denkmuster - Die 'Amerikanisierung' der deutschen Literatur durch die Beat-Generation." Adviser: Albert Meier, University of Kiel.

Charles E. Robinson, topic: The political and cultural history of racial representation of Africans and African Americans in Germany, 1900-1933. Adviser: Rudolph Binion, Brandeis University.


Christoph Strupp, "Wissenschaft und Krieg: Die USA und das Deutsche Reich im Ersten Weltkrieg." Habilitation adviser: Volker Sellin, University of Heidelberg.

Library Report

We are very happy to inform our readers that in the past months we have expanded our already wide collection of periodicals. The following journal and yearbook titles are new to the library of the GHI:

Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte; holdings: 1998-

Environmental History; holdings: 1999-

Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung; holdings: 1 (1992)-

Mittelweg 36; holdings: 1992-

Westfälische Forschungen; holdings: 40 (1990)-

Thanks to the generous donations of several of our readers we have also been able to add collections of books that date back to the 1940s through the 1970s into the holdings of our library. They cover a wide range of topics, from World War II documents to the history of art. These titles as well as the complete collection of the library can, as always, be researched on our regularly updated Internet catalog at our Web site at www.ghi-dc.org.

Conference Papers on the Web

We have recently begun publishing on our Web site papers from conferences that
were hosted here at the Institute. The first "volume" is The American Impact on Western Europe: Americanization and Westernization in Transatlantic Perspective, a conference held at the German Historical Institute, Washington, D.C., March 25-27, 1999, available here.

Although we will continue to publish conference volumes with Cambridge University Press, we believe that Web publishing offers an additional and exciting new opportunity for scholarly exchange between authors and readers. Authors find a quicker way of sharing preliminary results of their research with a wider audience without forgoing the possibility of publishing a final product in journals or books. Readers get easier and faster access to the latest scholarly developments.

Unresolved copyright issues play a major role in hampering publication on the Web. However, after consulting with our authors, internet specialists, academic presses, and spokespeople from scholarly associations we believe that we have reached a workable solution:

This is an experiment and we would greatly appreciate it if readers could send us their comments on this project to the email address provided on the Web page.

Scholarship Guide and other Reference Guides

If you haven’t visited our Web site yet you may not realize that our most recent reference guides are accessible through the World Wide Web. In contrast to the printed versions, the web format allows searches and linking to other Web sites.

A fine example is our new updated issue of Research and Funding: A German-American Guide for Historian and Social Scientists. With one click you can go directly to the home page of the sponsors listed. By clicking on their address you can send them a message without having to copy or type their email accounts. Applying for scholarships doesn't get any easier than this! Go to www.ghi-dc.org/reference.html.

Publications of Note


The Institute is delighted to bring to readers’ attention the publication of an essay collection edited by Hartmut Lehmann et al. Lehmann is a former director of the GHI in Washington (1987-93). This book began as a conference organized by the GHI and

**Staff Changes**

Malve S. Burns, Research Fellow, joined the staff of the Institute in January. Burns earned an M.A. from Cornell University in 1967; a Ph.D. from Cornell in 1971. Specialty: early modern German literature and culture. Dissertation: Analysis of the sonnets of Catharina Regina von Greiffenberg. Taught at Cornell, University of California at Irvine, the University of Southern California, and Marymount University. Main research interest: The generation after World War II in Germany.

Johannes Dillinger is affiliated with the GHI and Georgetown University (CGES) as a visiting researcher (Emmy Noether-Programm), 2000-1. After studying history, Catholic theology, and educational theory at the universities of Tübingen and Norwich, he joined the dissertation fellowship "Westeuropa in vergleichender historischer Perspektive" at the University of Trier. Dillinger's Ph.D. thesis, "Böse Leute.' Hexenverfolgungen in Schwäbisch-Österreich und Kurtrier im Vergleich" was published in 1999. After teaching early modern history at the University of Trier, Dillinger took up work on a research project titled "Communities and Territorial States: Conditions and Aims of Local Representation in Early Modern Europe and New England," which he is still pursuing. His main areas of interest are comparative and anthropological historiography, state building in the early modern period, the history of criminal justice, and folk beliefs.

Eckhardt Fuchs, Research Fellow, left the Institute on December 31, 1999, to return to Berlin, Germany, where he took up a postdoctoral research fellowship at the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science. He will continue his research on scientific internationalism from 1850 to 1920.

Winfried Haubold, Deputy Administrative Director, retired from the Institute in February after eleven years of service. Before taking up his administrative duties at the GHI, Haubold worked as Head of Disbursement Section, German Military Representative, in Washington, D.C. His retirement will take him, along with his wife Irmgard, to Spain, where they intend to settle. After over fifty years of toil, Haubold plans to enjoy his retirement to the utmost.

Simone Herrmann, Intern, left the Institute in February 2000 to continue her studies at the University of Braunschweig.
Kathrin Klein, Copy Editor, Cold War History Project, born in Siegen, Germany. M.A. in Political Science, University of Munich, 1996; M.A. in International Relations, School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, 1999; Recipient of the ERP-scholarship of the Deutsche Studienstiftung. Klein's M.A. thesis dealt with the United States' approach toward global warming. Her main research interests are international environmental and energy-related issues.

Vera Lind, Research Fellow, was born in Frankfurt am Main in 1967. She studied history, politics, and art history at the universities of Bielefeld and Kiel. From 1989 to 1990 she was a graduate fellow at Queen’s University in Belfast. She received her Ph.D. in history from the University of Kiel in 1997, and wrote her dissertation on the history of suicide in early modern Germany. This study has been published as Selbstmord in der Frühen Neuzeit: Diskurs, Lebenswelt und kultureller Wandel am Beispiel der Herzogtümer Schleswig und Holstein (Göttingen, 1999). Lind received a research fellowship from the Max Planck Institute for History in Göttingen in 1997 and then took a position as a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Saarland, 1997-9. She is currently working on her second book, tentatively titled "Africans in Early Modern German Society: Identity - Difference - Aesthetics - Anthropology." Her research interests include all aspects of early modern cultural history, gender history, and the history of ideas.

Lusi K. McKinley, Editorial Assistant, left the Institute at the end of December 1999 to move to Philadelphia, Pa., with her family.

Lindsay McClellan, Intern, left the Institute in January 2000 to continue her studies at University of the South, Sewanee, Tenn.

Margit Moffit, Deputy Administrative Director, was born in Bönnigheim and grew up in Asperg, Baden-Württemberg. In Germany, Moffitt worked for the Fachhochschule für öffentliche Verwaltung and the Landesamt für Flurbereinigung. She moved to the United States in 1991 and has lived in the Washington, D.C., area since 1994. Before joining the Institute in January, she worked for DaimlerChrysler Aerospace.

Edmund Spevack, Research Fellow, left the Institute on December 31, 1999, to return to his home Münster, Germany. When he has recovered from his current illness, he will see his book, Allied Control and German Freedom: American Political Influences on the Framing of the West German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) through the press.

Recipients of the German-American Center for Visiting Scholars (GACVS) Research Grants 1999/2000

Ulbricht, Susan, M.A. "Income Mixes - Changes of the Structure of Income Sources."
University of Leipzig.

Beckert, Jens, Ph.D. "Negotiated Modernity: Inheritance in Germany, France, and the United States Since 1800." Free University of Berlin.

Helmke, Cornelia, M.A. "U.S.-American Retailers in Germany - A Study on the Internationalization of Retail Business." University of Lüneburg.


Braml, Josef M., M.A. "U.S. and German Think Tanks and Their Different Ways and Means of Coping with and Impacting Their Marketplaces." The Brookings Institution.

Stoltzfus, Nathan, Ph.D. "East(ern) Germany and the Tradition of German Protest." Florida State University.

Tate, John Jay, Ph.D., Two untitled projects, analysis of recent changes at the German Vocational Institute (BiBB) and assessment of the impact of BiBB and related German institutions on efforts to establish European-level vocational training standards and institutions. University of California at Berkeley.

Monod, David, Ph.D. Untitled study of postwar music-politics in Germany’s American Zone (exploration of cultural relations between Americans and Germans from 1945 to 1953). University of Toronto.

Deller, Kerstin, M.A. "The Role of Business Organizations in Climate Change Negotiations." Humboldt University of Berlin.

Lang, Markus, M.A. "The Political Theory of Karl Löwenstein." Technical University of Chemnitz.

Hitz, Torsten, M.A. "Jacques Derrida’s Political Philosophy." School of Design, Karlsruhe.

Nickel, Christiane, M.A. "The Consequences of the European Monetary Union for the Exchange Rate Policy in Central and Eastern Europe." Otto Beisheim Graduate School of Management.

Strohm, Natalie, M.A. "Ethics in Public Office." University of Bamberg.

Trumbull, Gunnar, Ph.D. "Product Market Regulation France/Germany/USA (in Particular FDA." Massachusetts Institute of Technology.


Oertzen, Christine von, Ph.D. "German-American Comparison on the History of Part-Time Work." Technical University of Berlin.


Events

Spring 2000 Lecture Series

History and Its Images

A Farewell to Detlef Junker, Director of the GHI, 1994-1999

On Thursday, September 16, 1999, the Institute said good-bye to its director, Detlef Junker. The event took place in the GHI's public rooms. The day was filled with meteorological drama as Hurricane Floyd made its way up the Eastern Seaboard of the United States, wreaking havoc on travel plans and preventing many from attending this farewell celebration.

The occasion began with a short speech by Christof Mauch, GHI deputy director, who also served as the evening’s host. The German ambassador to the United States, Jürgen Chroboch, was unable to speak personally. In his stead, Minister Volker Schlegel of the Germany Embassy conveyed the thoughts of official Germany and congratulated Professor Junker on his productive tenure as director. Christoph Eitner, the chair of the Institute’s Board of Trustees, flew in from Germany for the occasion and delivered a speech outlining Junker’s contributions to the Institute and to German-American academic relations. Klaus J. Hildebrand, the chair of the
Institute's Academic Advisory Council, followed with more accolades, thanking Professor Junker for fulfilling his tasks expertly and energetically. Marion Deshmukh of George Mason University spoke on behalf of the Friends of the German Historical Institute; she praised the work of the Institute and wished the GHI well in its search for a suitable successor. The president of the Friends, Geoffrey J. Giles of the University of Florida, was unable to attend due to the inclement weather. Professor Junker was then presented with an etching of Old Heidelberg that now hangs in the director's office as a memento of his directorship. Fritz Stern of Columbia University also was prevented from coming to Washington but sent along a letter that was read to those who could be present.

Professor Junker then took to the podium to deliver a short farewell address. In it he talked about the challenges and rewards of serving in this post for the past five years, discussed what he had learned, and thanked those who had aided him in fulfilling his obligations and responsibilities during his stay in Washington. He also related three sets of experiences that helped shape and inform his life as a professional historian and a keen observer of the United States. A buffet reception concluded the evening.

At the end of September 1999 Professor Junker returned to the University of Heidelberg where he assumed the Curt Engelhorn Chair in American History.

Honor for Timothy Mulligan

On December 10, 1999, Dr. Timothy Mulligan was honored during a festive occasion with the German-American Friendship Award.

Mulligan is well known among the friends of the German Historical Institute. For many years he has served as a specialist for German-language materials at the National Archives. Over the years he has aided the archival research of numerous scholars from Germany and the United States.

In addition, Dr. Mulligan has distinguished himself through his own scholarly studies. His doctoral dissertation on German occupation policy in the Eastern Europe in 1942-3 has become a standard work, owing to its broad source base and the central questions connecting political and military history. Last year, he published a book titled Neither Sharks nor Wolves: The Men of Nazi Germany’s U-Boat Arm, 1939-1945 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1999). In this study, Mulligan persuasively combined the methods of social history and the history of mentalities with those of classical military history - and yet at the same time transcended all of them.

In a speech that praised Mulligan's work and career Dr. Christof Mauch, Acting Director of the GHI, thanked Mulligan for his unceasing support of GHI scholarship
recipients over the last twelve years. Finally, on behalf of Jürgen Chrobog, the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany, Dr. Hans-Ulrich Seidt, head of the Cultural Affairs Department of the German Embassy, presented the award to Dr. Mulligan.

**U.S. Environmental History and Global Change**

On Monday, February 21, 2000, the GHI and the Science Division of the Germany Embassy organized a forum on the history of the environment. In a lecture titled "Back to Nature and Forward to the Machine," Christof Mauch (GHI) introduced his current research project on the environmental history of North America, and in particular the relationship of Americans to nature. The paper was presented to a delegation of the German Advisory Council on Global Change (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der Bundesregierung Globaler Umweltveränderungen), headed by delegation vice-chair Prof. Dr. Dr. Juliane Kokott. The members in attendance were leading German experts on global change, representing both the natural and social sciences (agronomy, biology, botany, economics, law, limnology, medicine, meteorology, physics, psychology, and sociology). A lively discussion followed on issues of environmentalism in global and historical perspectives.

**First Lecture of the Friends of the GHI**

The GHI is pleased to announce that Hans Mommsen, a professor of history at the University of Bochum and currently at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, will give the first lecture sponsored by the Friends of the GHI. The lecture will take place on Tuesday, April 4, 2000, in the Institute’s Lecture Hall. The title of Professor Mommsen’s lecture is "The Dissolution of the Third Reich: Crisis Management and Collapse, 1943-1945." Doris L. Bergen, a professor of history at the University of Notre Dame, will comment.

**Call for Papers**

Exhibiting the Other: Museums of Mankind and the Politics of Cultural Representation


Scholarships: GHI Dissertation and Habilitation Scholarships 2001

Upcoming Conferences and Workshops

"'Nature's Nation' Reconsidered: American Concepts of Nature from Wonder to Ecological Crisis." Conference at the European Association for American Studies (EAAS), Graz, Austria, April 14-17, 2000. Convener: EAAS.

"German-Jewish Identities in America: From the Civil War to the Present." Conference at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, October 26-29, 2000. Convener: Christof Mauch (GHI) and Joseph Salmons (University of Wisconsin at Madison).


"Coming to Terms with the Past in West Germany: The 1960s." Conference at the University of Nebraska - Lincoln, April 19-21, 2001. Conveners: Philipp Gassert (University of Heidelberg) and Alan E. Steinweis (University of Nebraska).