# PEOPLE
# ON THE
# MOVE

## Migration, Acculturation, and Ethnic
## Interaction in Europe and North America

*DIRK HOERDER*

*With Comments by*
*Donna Gabaccia*
*and*
*James Oliver Horton*

German Historical Institute
Washington, D.C.
Annual Lecture Series
No. 6

# PEOPLE ON THE MOVE:
## Migration, Acculturation,
## and Ethnic Interaction
## in Europe and North America

*Dirk Hoerder*

Comment

*Donna Gabaccia*

Migration toward a New World Order
A Comment

*James Oliver Horton*

**BERG**
*Providence / Oxford*

# Introduction

Topics related to the history of migration have been discussed in our Annual Lectures a number of times: In 1987, Bernard Bailyn examined the role of Protestant peasants and Jewish intellectuals in the peopling of America; in 1988, Carl Degler compared the thought of two major immigrant scholars on culture and race; in 1989, Kathleen Conzen analyzed the meaning of assimilation theory for our understanding of the experience of the German peasant pioneer.

In the year of the Columbian Quincentennial, it seemed appropriate to probe, once again, the theme of "people on the move." Looking at current events in Europe, it is quite clear that the consequences of migration, namely acculturation and ethnic interaction, are problems of European as well as American history.

Five hundred years ago, the peoples of the Old World first encountered the peoples of the world across the Atlantic-a world that was an old world in its own right but that soon received the label "New World" by the newcomers. In the fifteenth century, no one imagined that this encounter was just the beginning of a seemingly endless exchange and the start of one of the most fascinating relationships in terms of culture, economics, and politics.

We are very grateful to Professor Dirk Hoerder of the University of Bremen for explaining in this year's Annual Lecture some of the problems created by people moving about in the transatlantic world. Professor Hoerder is the author of *Crowd Action in Revolutionary Massachusetts, 1765–1780*, published in 1977, and *Labor Migration in the Atlantic Economic: The European and North American Working Classes during the Period of Industrialisation,* published in 1985. Recently, he has compiled, together with Christiane Harzig, a three-volume bibliography on *The Immigrant Labor Press in North America.*

We are equally grateful to Professor Donna Gabaccia of the University of North Carolina at Charlotte and Professor James O. Horton of George Washington University for having agreed to serve as commentators. Professor Gabaccia is a specialist in the field of Italian immigration to this country; she has also published important works on immigrant women. Professor Horton is well known for his research on communities of African Americans in the nineteenth

century. He currently directs the Afro-American Communities Project of the National Museum of American History at the Smithsonian Institute.

HARTMUT LEHMANN
*Washington, D.C., March 1993*

# People on the Move:
## Migration, Acculturation, and Ethnic Interaction in Europe and North America

*Dirk Hoerder*

In 1910, 1.04 million persons arrived in the United States; among its population of 92.4 million, 13.5 million, or 12.5 percent, were foreign-born. The same year, Germany, then and now the second-largest labor-importing country, experienced an in-migration of 0.7 million and an out-migration of similar volume. Foreigners numbered 1.3 million, constituting 1.9 percent of Germany's population of 64.9 million. Eighty years later, in 1990, the United States counted some 700,000 newly arrived immigrants, in addition to half a million legalizations of formerly illegal migrants. West Germany received a total of about 830,000 newcomers, of which 193,000 were refugees, 379,000 eastern European "ethnic Germans,"[1] and 240,000 East Germans. In- and out-migration of "guestworkers and their descendants" was balanced. However, 545,000 persons left Germany in the same year. Spatial mobility was and is high on both sides of the Atlantic.[2]

Attitudes toward newcomers differed. In the United States and Canada, they were considered immigrants, even though the vast majority came as temporary laborers who intended eventually to return to their countries of origin (34.6 percent did so in the decades before and after 1900).[3] In Germany, they were categorized as "for-

---

[1] "Ethnic Germans," according to German law, are n[th] generation descendants of the eighteenth-century Russian and Danubian Germans.

[2] These are gross figures. Statistics about return migration were collected in the United States since 1908. *Historical Stasistics of the United States*, 2 vols. (Washington, DC, 1976), series C; Klaus J. Bade, *Vom Auswanderungsland zum Einwanderungsland? Deutschland 1880–1980* (Berlin, 1983). Figures for 1990 are taken from press releases. *Frankfurter Rundschau*, Oct. 27, 1992, on out-migration from Germany.

[3] Ann Orlov, ed., *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups* (Cambridge, MA, 1980), 1036–1037.

eign workers," and most of them were forced to leave the country by the end of each year. In 1913, for example, the rate of departure for this rotating migrant labor force was 60.6 percent.[4] By contrast, France, with its low birth rate, had tacitly been an immigration country since the mid-nineteenth century, but it was never publicly considered as such.[5] In England, London received skilled workers from the German territories, and farming areas took in laborers from Ireland, while numerous Britishers still left for other parts of the world.[6] North Atlantic migration patterns around 1900 were complex, indeed.

However, preconceived notions about sedentary populations prevented an analysis of the phenomenon of migration in Europe. In the United States, the ideological focus on immigration kept observers from recognizing the existence of return migration. Today, politicians express concern about new population flows, and right-wing parties emerge. No exuberant paeans are sung about an attractive (new) world, opportunity, freedom, or a home for the "huddled masses"[7] of the earth. Instead, skinheads chant "*Ausländer 'raus*"

---

[4] Ulrich Herbert, *A History of Foreign Labor in Germany, 1880–1980: Seasonal Workers—Forced Laborers—Guest Workers* (Ann Arbor, MI, 1991); Lothar Eisner and Joachim Lehmann, *Ausländische Arbeiter unter dem deutschen Imperialismus 1900–1985* (Berlin, 1988). Foreign workers in mining and industry were permitted to stay due to pressure from employers who had invested in their training and who needed them in production processes that were continuous. Those engaged in agriculture had to leave, and big landowners thus saved on wages. Politically, the reason for the system of rotation was anti-Polish and anti-Catholic nationalism.

[5] Walter F. Willcox and Imre Ferencri, *International Migrations*, 2 vols. (New York, 1929, 1931), esp. vol. 2, 201–236. "About 1886 P. Leroy-Beaulieu wrote: 'France is quite as much an immigration country as Argentina or Australia. In good years or bad from 40,000 to 50,000 foreigners go there to settle and found a family.'" Ibid., 219.

[6] E. J. Collins, "Migrant Labour in British Agriculture in the Nineteenth Century," *Economic History Review*, ser. 2, vol. 29 (1976): 38–59; William J. Fishman, *East End Jewish Radicals, 1875–1914* (London, 1975); Lloyd P. Gartner, *The Jewish Immigrant in England 1870–1910* (1960; 2nd ed., London, 1973); Colin Holmes, ed., *Immigrants and Minorities in British Society* (London, 1978).

[7] Emma Lazarus, "The New Colossus" (1883), inscribed on the pedestal of the Statue of Liberty; repr. in Abraham Chapman, ed., *Jewish-American Literature. An Anthology* (New York, 1974), 308.

(Foreigners out!), an enraged citizenry supports their acts of brutality,[8] and law enforcement agencies and political institutions refuse to protect the newcomers.

In view of the lack of understanding of migration processes in Europe, and considering the large gaps in migration research, I will first discuss in this essay the intra-European mobility from 1200 to 1800, as well as secular changes in migration patterns in the nineteenth-century Atlantic economies; I will then look at the new migration systems since the 1960s and address the phenomenon of multiculturalism in a European context, using certain developments in Canada and the United States as points of reference. I will argue that the population flow between Europe and North America cannot be adequately understood in terms of the classic one-way transatlantic migration paradigm inspired by the mass migrations of the nineteenth century. Rather, I will emphasize the continuity of geographical mobility as a multidirectional phenomenon in Europe.

## EUROPEAN POPULATION MOBILITY, 1200–1800

Research on migration, like most historical work, implicitly distinguishes between visible, often large-scale, or small but well-publicized, moves ("events") and "everyday" mobility, which is considered normal and thus hardly registered. I will first look at the former.

During the transition from the medieval to the modern period, several voluntary and involuntary mass migrations took place that were to shape political, ethnic, and migration patterns in later centuries up to the present. (1) From the German-language areas, people began to move eastward, first to colonize or conquer, then upon the invitation of local rulers in need of a skilled and commercially active population whose taxes could fill their treasuries. As a result, among the immigrant artisans, burghers, and administrators in central and eastern Europe, a distinct German-language culture

---

[8] After weeks of bombings and arson, neo-Nazis were permitted to parade through Dresden without police interference on October 3, 1992. No legal action was taken, although in Germany, it is illegal to display Nazi emblems in public. *Frankfurter Rundschau*, Oct. 5, 1992, 4, and Oct. 6, 1992, 1. Similarities to the Weimar Republic are obvious. Max Frisch described such developments in "Biedermann und die Brandstifter," *Stücke*, vol. 2, 87–156.

emerged that should not be confused with the national German culture that developed in the late nineteenth century.[9] The Baltic-, Russian-, and Polish-Germans, as well as the Transylvania Saxons,[10] became hyphenated ethnic groups, even though they intended to preserve their pre-migration customs and language.[11] (2) From the mid-1300s until 1492, a large-scale Jewish migration eastward took place.[12] With the Black Death sweeping across Europe, Jews were made scapegoats, and the ensuing pogroms forced them to flee.[13] Some of the Jewish in-migrants in the czarist empire took up agricultural pursuits. But, when the restrictions of 1795 and 1835 confined them to the Pale of Settlement, they, too, formed a separate culture, known after their restriction to villages and small towns in 1882 as the culture of the "shtetl." Both groups, the Germans and the Jews, would migrate westward in secondary moves—first, in the late nineteenth century, to the Americas, and, at present, to Israel and Germany.[14] In addition to these two movements, shifts of poli-

---

[9] A clear distinction between national German culture and central European German-language culture avoids the aggressive and imperialistic tone of many discussions, including scholarly ones, about the impact of German culture on Europe.

[10] The Volga Germans, the so-called Danubian Swabians, and others migrated in a later period; see below.

[11] See Walter Schlesinger, "Die geschichtliche Stellung der mittelalterlichen deutschen Ostbewegung," *Historische Zeitschrift* 183 (1957), 517–542; Walter Kuhn, "Die deutsche Ostsiedlung vom Mittelalter bis zum 18. Jahrhundert," in *Das östliche Deutschland*, ed. by the Göttinger Arbeitskreis (n.p., 1959).

[12] Pogroms began during the First Crusade (1096); the Church Councils of 1179 and 1215 decided upon exclusionary measures; England expelled Jews in 1290; mass pogroms in Germany followed the Great Plague (1349); Jews were expelled from France in 1306 and 1394 and, finally, from Spain and Portugal in 1449 and 1492–1497. Eastward migration of the Jews began during the crusades, and, as of 1264, the Polish rulers granted them privileges (autonomy, freedom of commerce) to promote economic development. With the mass movement that started at the end of the fourteenth century, social conflicts with urban merchants and artisans began to develop, and Jews were forced to live in separate residential areas (ghettos). Martin Gilbert, *Jewish History Atlas* (London, 1969), 29ff.

[13] Spanish Jews migrated to North Africa, Italy, and Turkey and formed the Sephardic group as compared to the eastern European Ashkenazi.

[14] H. H. Ben-Sasson, *A History of the Jewish People* (Cambridge, MA, 1976), 362ff.

tical power and cultural hegemony in the 1500s and 1600s led to the replacement of the nobilities of several eastern central European peoples with in-migrating foreign nobles.[15]

As a result, social stratification in these areas was also ethno-cultural stratification. The nobility, immigrant or native, formed the top cultural tier. It was ethnically different from the German and Jewish middle strata, which were usually urban in character[16] but also served as middlemen in the countryside or lived in agricultural colonies. The rural population, distinguished by separate ethnic roots, religion, and language, formed the lowest tier. Culture, social status, religion, and ethnicity were closely linked with the numerous migration processes.[17]

In the seventeenth century, migration patterns changed. They were influenced by shifts of power between states, rivalries between empires, and religious wars. The devastation of much of central Europe during the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) made subsequent repopulation through in-migration necessary. The westward expansion of the Ottoman Empire since 1526 (battle of Mohács) and its retreat after 1699 caused important population exchanges, leading to checkerboard settlement patterns that still underlie the present wars in the former Yugoslavia and along the southern border of the former Soviet Union. The population shifts resulting from religious-imperial wars were also influenced by mercantilist policies in western and central Europe and by settlement programs in the southeastern and eastern parts of the continent.

---

[15] In some areas, the existing nobility changed its culture according to the ruling center's demands.

[16] For the terms, see Tamar Bergmann, *Produktivierungsmythen und Antisemitismus* (Vienna, 1973), 34; Jacob Lestschinsky, "Die Umsiedlung und Umschichtung des jüdischen Volkes im Laufe des letzten Jahrhunderts," *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv* 30 (1929): 123–156, esp. 124.

[17] Two other movements seem to have had little subsequent impact: the crusades from 1096 to 1270 (last crusade) and 1291 (end of last crusader state); and the Arab expansion into Spain (Reconquista, 1063–1492). On the other hand, the expulsion of the Moriscos from the Iberian Peninsula around 1500, together with the expulsion of the Jews, was of lasting influence. Both involuntary moves deprived the Spanish Kingdom of parts of its economically most active population and thus contributed to the decline of Spain.

The major migratory movements, voluntary and involuntary, developed along the following lines: (1) Similar to the Jews in the previous centuries, religious refugees from one state, such as the Huguenots, Waldensians, Salzburg Protestants, and others, were often welcomed as economic assets by another. (2) Under renewed Habsburg rule, large areas of the Balkans were resettled.[18] Ethnic interaction in rural areas, in combination with urban church, administrative, and commercial languages, led to what Armin Hetzer and I have called a multilingualism of the illiterate. In the nineteenth century, this development was to facilitate communication among labor migrants in the multi-ethnic urban immigrant quarters of the North Atlantic world.[19] (3) Russia's expansion opened the South Russian Plains for settlement. Nobles migrated there with their serfs; from 1763 to the 1820s, Germans, among them many Mennonites, from the overpopulated South followed.[20] With the later abolishment of privileges and the development of nationalism, these settlement patterns led to ethnic tensions, voluntary secondary migrations in the late nineteenth century, and expulsions in the twentieth century.[21] Over the course of generations (1760s–1880s or later), the post-migration cultures of the German immigrants in the czarist and Balkan areas adapted to the surrounding cultures, in spite of the immigrants' efforts to retain their cultural heritage. As a result, a hyphenated German-Russian and German-Danubian culture of rural colonies with ethno-religious dimensions emerged. It was socially

---

[18] Carl Göllner, ed., *Geschichte der Deutschen auf dem Gebiete Rumäniens*, vol. 1: *12. Jh. bis 1848* (Bucharest, 1979); Ernst Wagner, *Geschichte der Siebenbürger Sachsen. Ein Überblick* (3d ed., Innsbruck, 1963); Immo Eberl, ed., *Deutsche Siedlungen in Südosteuropa. Die Donauschwaben* (Stuttgart, 1983).

[19] Dirk Hoerder and Armin Hetzer, "Linguistic Fragmentation or Multilingualism among Labor Migrants in North America," in *The Immigrant Labor Press in North America, 1840s–1970s: An Annotated Bibliography*, 3 vols., ed. by Dirk Hoerder and Christiane Harzig (Westport, CT, 1987), vol. 2, 29–52.

[20] Ingeborg Fleischhauer and Hugo H. Jedig, eds., *Die Deutschen in der UdSSR in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Ein internationaler Beitrag zur Verständigung* (Baden-Baden, 1990); Erik Amburger, *Die Anwerbung ausländischer Fachkräfte für die Wirtschaft Rußlands vom 15. bis ins 19. Jahrhundert* (Wiesbaden, 1968); Fred Koch, *The Volga Germans* (University Park, PA, 1977).

[21] For an overview of the German migrations, see the excellent research collection edited by Klaus J. Bade, *Deutsche im Ausland. Fremde in Deutschland* (Munich, 1992).

different and geographically distant from the earlier urban and noble German-language culture in central Europe. (4) In what is known as the Baltic migration system, Sweden, as the hegemonic power of northern Europe (1650s–1720s), attracted Finnish peasants, German administrators, French investors, and Scottish merchants, as well as mercenaries from all over Europe.[22]

The more regular and less visible everyday migrations involved larger numbers of people. They included rural movements from naturally less productive regions to fertile valleys and subsequent reverse migrations up the hillsides to uncultivated backwoods in response to growing population density. With an increasing intensity of cultivation and a growing demand for seasonal labor, the harvest migrations from the hills to the plains added to the mobility. In addition, male laborers and female domestics[23] migrated from rural areas to urban centers (*Stadtluft*—not yet *Amerika—macht frei*)[24] and a constant circulation of members of the intellectual and commercial elites occurred between cities and towns.[25] On the level of the crafts, an even more intense exchange took place through the migrations of journeymen artisans. Their routes extended from the German territories westward to England and eastward to Constantinople or even Alexandria.[26] The foundation or expansion of towns,

---

[22] Michael Roberts, ed., *Sweden's Age of Greatness, 1637–1718* (London, 1973), 58–131; Claude Nordmann, *Grandeur et liberté de la Suede, 1660–1792* (Paris, 1971), 285–326; S. Montelius, "Recruitment and Conditions of Life of Swedish Ironworkers during the 18th and 19th Centuries," *Scandinavian Economic History Review* 14 (1966): 1–17; Göran Rosander, *Herrarbete* (Uppsala, 1967); Hans Norman and Harald Runblom, "Migration Patterns in the Nordic Countries," in *Labor Migration in the Atlantic Economies: The European and North American Working Classes during the Period of Industrialization*, ed. by Dirk Hoerder (Westport, CT, 1985), 35–68.

[23] Abel Chatelain, "Migrations et domesticité feminine urbaine en France, XVIIIe–XXe siècles," *Revue d'histoire économique et sociale* 4 (1969): 506–528; H. Heulenbroek, "De Duitse dienstmeisjes," *Vrij Nederland*, Nov. 13, 1982, Bijlage 28, 28–47.

[24] Paul M. Hohenberg and Lynn Hollen Lees, *The Making of Urban Europe, 1000–1950* (Cambridge, MA, 1985), chap. 3, esp. 90–98.

[25] Christopher R. Friedrichs, *Urban Society in an Age of War: Nördlingen, 1580–1720* (Princeton, NJ, 1979).

[26] Klaus J. Bade, "Altes Handwerk, Wanderzwang und Gute Policey. Gesellen-wanderung zwischen Zunftökonomie und Gewerbereform," *Vierteljahres-*

whether Gothenburg, St. Petersburg, Livorno, or Marseilles, attracted men and women of many nationalities and professions to these centers of investment. In Gothenburg, from 1603 to 1619, in-migrants were granted seats on the city council, permitting them to promote their own interests—a far cry from the denial of voting rights to migrants in present-day European countries.

A bias in perception toward the productive sector of societies and the neglect of the reproductive side and everyday life long relegated another type of migration to obscurity, until the emphasis on women's roles in history since the 1970s led to a change in attitudes. The principle of patrilocality implied that, at the time of marriage, almost all women moved into the households of their husbands' families. While moves within the same parish or village would not normally be classified as migration, moves across parish borders are part of the general population mobility ("micro-mobility"). During periods when marriage became more difficult because of poverty and a lack of land, both prospective partners would migrate to find work for wages elsewhere, alternatively, the male partner alone would leave after the wedding to earn wages in distant labor markets.

Finally, there was out-migration from Europe to newly acquired colonial areas. Merchants, planters, administrators, and soldiers, together with a few settlers, moved southward and eastward (to Africa and Asia); settlers, accompanied by a few merchants, moved northwestward (to North America); and diverse groups moved southwestward into the areas of the destroyed high cultures of Central and South America. So far, the American continents played a major role in migration patterns only for Spain and Portugal. For example, from France, which, in European terminology, "owned" at least half of North America, a mere ten thousand persons migrated to New France/Quebec in the course of a century.

The intra-European migrations before the Age of Enlightenment and Revolution took place between dynastic units rather than nation-states, and the process of settling down did not usually lead to demands for acculturation in a modern sense. Ruling dynasties

---

*schrift für Sozial- and Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 69 (1982): 1–37; William H. Sewell, *Work and Revolution in France* (Cambridge, 1980); Cynthia M. Truant, "Solidarity and Symbolism among journeymen Artisans: The Case of Compagnonnage," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 21 (1979): 214–226.

accumulated conglomerates of peoples; no notion of unified national cultures or citizenship by compact existed. In-migrants became the subjects of the respective ruler and were placed legally and professionally according to the government's administrative and military interests and its commercial and agricultural policies. The newcomers formed colonies in rural regions, ghettos or quarters in urban areas. They usually did not speak the vernacular of the local population, but one of the mercantile (Greek, Italian, or German) or administrative languages (Russian or German). For artisanal migrants, German was the *lingua franca*; in intellectual circles, it was German or Latin, or occasionally French. In order to advance the interests of the receiving state and its economy and to permit the settlers to establish a solid footing, some of the immigrant groups received certain privileges, which set them off from the rest of the population and from other in-migrants. When their special status was revoked in the nineteenth century, either for reasons of rational and simplified administration or out of nationalistic impulses, secondary migrations, often to North or South America, ensued.

Far from being distinguished by populations tied to their places of birth, Europe during the early modern period was characterized by considerable spatial mobility (but, of course, also by serfdom). The nineteenth- and twentieth-century differentiation between European emigration countries and American immigration countries has to be replaced by a distinction between a mosaic of European peoples with a relatively high migratory potential and as yet minuscule streams flowing outward from Europe.[27] The analytical division between migration for productive or commercial purposes and that for reproductive purposes permits the development of a gender-based synthesis of migration characteristics and volume. While the latter usually occurred only once in a woman's lifetime, migrants in search of work or business opportunities, mainly male but also female, might make many moves-seasonal, multidirectional, in stages, and so on. Except for those of religious refugees, these movements—like those of later periods—were attempts to match the supply of labor and skill with the given markets or respond to the

---

[27] Bernard Bailyn, *Voyages to the West: A Passage in the Peopling of America on the Eve of the Revolution* (New York, 1986); D. W. Meinig, *The Shaping of America* (New Haven, CT, 1986).

demand for larger or smaller crops by expansion or contraction of settled areas. Thus, migration was a means to balance scarce resources in the interests of individuals, their families, and larger institutions within the framework of economic constraints and privileges—later called opportunities in a more individualist-minded era.


**MIGRATION IN THE ATLANTIC ECONOMIES:**
**THE SYSTEMS APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF MIGRATION**

With the Age of Reform and Revolution, of Enlightenment and Romanticism, world views and political structures began to change. The economic framework expanded beyond local to regional and supra-regional connections, exchange relations got transformed from labor exchange and barter to those mediated by money. Transportation and long-distance communication underwent almost revolutionary changes. All of these new developments altered migration and acculturation processes. The individualization of life courses was counterbalanced by the homogenization of cultures that characterized the Age of Nationalism.

Among individuals, including the common people, a process of secularization of hope set in. Women and men came to realize that the course of their lives was not necessarily determined by fate but could be actively shaped. How was this to be done? Local political conditions could not be changed—the revolutions east of France all failed—nor could economic forces, marked by the slow penetration of a market economy, be influenced. Thus, people had to migrate to places where they considered living and working conditions to be more favorable. At times, their expectations increased beyond a reasonable level, and the belief in a better world, in a mythical "America" or a Viennese "Eldorado," turned into a secular religion.[28]

The individual moves and the resulting contact with other peoples, as well as the prevailing larger intellectual, spiritual, and social forces, such as the emergence of new middle-class groups, made migrants as well as persisters increasingly aware of the differ-

---

[28] For an analysis of the image of America and of European industrializing centers, see Dirk Hoerder and Horst Rössler, eds., *Distant Magnets: Expectations and Realities in the Immigrant Experience* (New York, 1993).

ences between their particular culture and the cultures of others. Yet, in the 1880s, the Russian, Prussian/German, and Austro-Hungarian imperial authorities began to conduct systematic campaigns to force their respective dominant cultures onto their minority peoples. Across the Atlantic, Americanization campaigns occurred somewhat later and were easier to evade. As a result, members of minority cultures in Europe felt forced to leave, and imperial authorities sometimes encouraged their emigration, so as to rid their countries of those who did not fit into the mold of majority culture. Thus, the parallel existence of various cultures was replaced by a hierarchy characterized by one dominant culture and disadvantaged minority cultures.

Among peasants and the emerging local middle strata, cultural awareness often developed initially with the aid of ethno-culturally different educated persons, the German-speaking central European intelligentsia, including priests and pastors, writers, dramatists, scholars, and reform-minded military officers.[29] To speed up this process of forging a national identity, some of its advocates, either consciously or unconsciously, resorted to invented stories and forged documents. Thus, supposedly original and pure peasant cultures were occasionally made up by scholars or other writers:[30] Ossian's tales in Scotland, the song of Hasan Aga's wife in Dalmatia, the Hanka poems among the Czechs. The old peasant woman from whom the Grimm brothers learned their "German" fairy tales was actually of French Huguenot background and familiar with French fables.[31] In America, Parson Weems's George Washington was a cultural invention,[32] as was Webster's American spelling. Among those peoples whose middle strata (or classes) and/or ruling strata (or classes) were of different ethnic background, the emerging indigenous intelli-

---

[29] Miroslav Hroch, *Die Vorkämpfer der nationalen Bewegung bei den kleinen Völkern Europas. Eine komparative Untersuchung der sozialen Zusammensetzung der patriotischen Gruppen* (Prague, 1968), 16–20.

[30] Eric Hobsbawn and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, 1983); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalsm* (London, 1983; rev. ed. 1991).

[31] Heinz Röllecke, *Die Märchen der Brüder Grimm* (München, 1985).

[32] Mason Locke ("Parson") Weems, *Life of George Washington* (1st ed. 1800; 5th ed. 1805 with "cherry tree" story, and later editions); Emily E. K. Skeel, ed., *Mason Locke Weems: His Works and Ways*, 3 vols. (New York, 1929).

gentsia and bourgeoisie utilized peasant cultures to develop new "national" cultures. These cultures set the new middle classes apart from the powerful nobility and the established urban patriciate, or, in the case of colonial middle classes, from the imperial culture. The climate of opinion pervaded both sides of the Atlantic economies.

The emerging cultural homogeneity among peoples (national consciousness) and its propagation (nationalism); the resulting competition between hegemonic imperial cultures and the submerged cultures of smaller groups of peoples; and, finally, the emergence of nation-states had an immense impact both on migrants and on members of ethnic minorities. No longer were they the subjects of monarchs with special privileges or duties. They were to join a nation, were expected to acculturate, to take sides. Those who did not were ostracized. They were denied access to state-run cultural institutions, such as schools, and, during armed conflicts, were placed in detention camps or expelled. The integration of newcomers and members of minority cultures in the nineteenth century ran counter to the privileged and, above all, separate positions they had held in the preceding centuries.

Among those minority peoples of the empires whose cultures were confined to certain identifiable territories, the new national consciousness and ethnic identity led to demands for self-determination. In North America, only the French-Canadian people of Quebec pursued this struggle. On the other hand, the dispersed cultures of immigrants or migrants who lived within hegemonic cultures began, in a process of growing group interaction, to adapt more and more to the host culture, although in America, the Anglophone culture was modified to some degree by other groups. The dispersed cultures are usually designated "ethnic" cultures as opposed to "national" ones. However, the notion of nation-states, assiduously propagated from the mid-nineteenth century until the 1960s, reflects a restricted view. Eastern central and southeastern European societies distinguish between nationality (political, statewide) and nationalities (cultural, regional, "minorities," or cultural components). In western Europe, the reemergence, in the midtwentieth century, of minority cultures, whether those of the Bretons, Basques, or Sorbs, serves as evidence of the multicultural bases of most of the "nation-states" founded between the 1870s and 1918. The nation-state ideology, however, had kept this cultural heterogeneity submerged for a century.

Since emigration meant a loss of population, it was often opposed by the ruling cultures for economic reasons, as well as by spokespersons of small groups out of concern for their cultural survival. However, emigrants, once out of the reach of imperial authorities, could express their cultural and political interests more easily. The Slovaks in the United States, for example, escaped the impact of the policies of Magyarization, published more Slovak-language periodicals in America than appeared in Slovakia, and secretly supported Slovakian separatist aspirations from abroad. Just as the demands for homogeneous national cultures forced immigrants to acculturate, emigrants could influence cultural developments and state formation in their societies of origin.

Within this economic, political, social, and mental framework, population mobility and the direction of migrations changed in the century between 1815 and 1914. At the beginning of that century, distinct regional migration systems, that is, empirically observable migration flows that follow discernible patterns over time, came into being. Jan Lucassen was able to describe seven different systems: the Dutch or North Sea system; two systems centered on Paris and London, respectively; and four involving areas around the Mediterranean.[33] Migrations in the early 1800s were middle-distance economic migrations, flowing from agrarian areas toward centers of production or commerce that offered job opportunities and cash wages.[34]

After 1815, these intra-European regional migration systems were replaced by two new intercontinental migration systems. In what is known as "agrarian" or "settlement" migration, agriculturists departed in increasing numbers for lands with thinly dispersed populations that could be displaced or annihilated. Impoverished and landless men and women and peasant families living below subsistence level migrated in search of work and cash income. This so-called "labor migration" in pursuit of wage work led them permanently into factories and mines or resulted in a seasonal work pattern

---

[33] Jan Lucassen, *Migrant Labor in Europe, 1600–1900: The Drift to the North Sea* (Beckenham, 1986).

[34] Whether remittances of savings by migrants also influenced economic development remains an open question, since the foreign currency went into consumption rather than planned investment.

that alternated between work on the land in the spring and fall and logging or mining in the winter. A westward-moving migration system extended from the Jewish Pale of Settlement in czarist Russia to the North American continent, with subsidiary streams to South America and further off to Africa and Australia. It is this migration flow that I have called the North Atlantic or Atlantic migration system.[35]

A second, eastward-moving system of intercontinental dimensions developed from the Russian ethnic territories to the South Russian Plains and the Asian Siberian territories. About ten million men and women had moved east by 1910 in this Russo-Siberian system.[36] Both systems, the North Atlantic and the Russo-Siberian, functioned from the end of the Napoleonic wars to the beginning of World War I.[37] For westward migrations, the end of colonial dependency in the Americas, the economic take-off in North America, and the development of an interconnected system of Atlantic economies were of primary importance.[38] The migrants, in turn, cemented existing commercial and industrial ties and created a

---

[35] "Introduction" to Hoerder, ed., *Labor Migration in the Atlantic Economies*, 3–31.

[36] Donald W. Treadgold, *The Great Siberian Migration: Government and Peasant in Resettlement from Emancipation to the First World War* (Princeton, NJ, 1957).

[37] The Russo-Siberian system continued to function into the 1930s and even after the Second World War. However, the territorial and population changes caused by the two wars changed the western boundaries of the system, and governmental regulation influenced migration to such a degree that I prefer not to speak of a simple continuity.

[38] Ralph Davis, *The Rise of the Atlantic Economies* (London, 1973; repr. 1982), 202 (quote), 289 passim; Brinley Thomas, *Migration and Economic Growth: A Study of Great Britain and the Atlantic Economy* (Cambridge, 1954); Frank Thistlethwaite, "Migration from Europe Overseas," XIe Congrès International des Sciences Historiques, *Rapports*, vol. 5 (Uppsala, 1960); David K. Fieldhouse, *Die Kolonialreiche seit dem 18. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt/M., 1965); John Horace Parry, *The Age of Reconnaissance, Discovery, Exploitation and Settlement 1500–1650* (London, 1963); C. Verlinden, *Les Origines de la Civilisation Atlantiques* (Neuchâtel, 1966); James D. Tracy, *The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350–1750* (Cambridge, 1990); Peggy K. Liss, *Atlantic Empires: The Network of Trade and Revolutions, 1713–1826* (Baltimore, 1983).

hemispheric society in which villages separated by an ocean were part of a network of relationships (mental maps).[39]

Two frontier societies, the North American West and the Siberian East, provided opportunities. Migrant workers constructed transcontinental railroads in both regions. Agriculture, oil drilling, and mining were pushed ever further, without regard to the fate of earlier inhabitants. Similar developments occurred on the Argentinian, Brazilian, and Australian frontiers, as Walter Nugent has pointed out.[40] Until the 1840s, migrants attracted by comparatively cheap land accounted for an important part of the westward migration; for example, they alone constituted one-third of the immigrants to the United States. However, beginning with the 1870s, labor migration of unskilled workers predominated. Walter F. Willcox and Imre Ferenczi have called this latter phenomenon the "proletarian mass migration,"[41] however, I prefer the term "labor migration," since most of the migrants were not industrial workers but came from agrarian classes. Members of the emerging national working classes and agrarian surplus populations weighed their options for jobs or followed myths about opportunities in the Atlantic economies extending from the Dnieper to the Rocky Mountains. For labor migrants, the two continents were comprised of segmented and partly internationalized labor markets.[42] Subjectively, there was no inter-

---

[39] *Les migrations internationales de la fin du XVIIIe siècle à nos jours* (Paris, 1980); Ira Glazier and Luigi de Rosa, eds., *Migration across Time and Nations: Population Mobility in Historical Context* (New York, 1986).

[40] Walter Nugent, "Frontiers and Empires in the Late 19th Century," in *Religion, Ideology and Nationalism in Europe and America* (Jerusalem, 1986), 263–275.

[41] Willcox and Ferenczi, *International Migrations*, vol. 1, 81ff.

[42] Peter Doeringer and Michael Piore, *Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis* (Lexington, MA, 1971); Clark Kerr, *Markets and Other Essays* (Berkeley, CA, 1977); Michael J. Piore, *Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor and Industrial Societies* (New York, 1979); F. C. Valkenburg and A. M. C. Vissers, "Segmentation of the Labour Market: The Theory of the Dual Labour Market—The Case of the Netherlands," *Netherlands Journal of Sociology* 16 (1980): 155–170; Randy Hodson and Robert L. Kaufmann, "Economic Dualism: A Critical Review," *American Sociological Review* 47 (1982): 727–739; Edna Bonacich, "A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: The Split Labor Market," *American Sociological Review* 37 (1972): 547–559; John B. Christiansen, "The Split Labor Market Theory and Filipino Exclusion: 1927–1934," *Phylon* 40 (1979): 66–74.

national proletariat, only internationally mobile segments of the national working classes.

To understand and analyze these movements, the nineteenth-century Atlantic world may be conceptualized as a hemispheric area of empires and nations that attempted to regulate migration flows either by fortifying borders with anti-emigration laws or by attracting migrants (political view). It may also be understood as a system of economies with industrial and mercantile core areas, consisting of regions and urban islands in which factory production was growing and of overpopulated and underdeveloped peripheral regions (economic perspective). Population flows developed between areas that lacked the means of subsistence and those regions offering jobs (demographic aspect). Labor markets that accepted unskilled persons even without knowledge of the local language were the destinations (labor market approach). Men and women moved, sometimes with their children, from village communities or urban neighborhoods to distant cities or mining regions and reconstructed their particular way of life in what would become the ethnic community or ghetto (socio-cultural aspect). The combined analysis of all these elements of the migration and acculturation process has been called a systems approach by James H. Jackson, Jr., and Leslie Page Moch.[43] This approach demands the full knowledge of the migrants' society of origin and of the receiving society, as well as of their experiences during the move.[44]

The highly complex set of objective factors is mediated by family strategies and individual life-course planning before the actual decision to migrate is taken. In the systems approach, these influences constitute the family and individual, or subjective, aspect. For example, the division of agricultural land frequently reduced single plots to below-subsistence levels. In other cases, women, experiencing the impact of international trade flows, began to realize that their home production could no longer compete with the cheap imported

---

[43] James H. Jackson, Jr., and Leslie Page Moch, "Migration and the Social History of Modern Europe," *Historical Methods* 22 (1989): 27–36.

[44] Given that most research on migration and acculturation is done by scholars who have experience in only one of the two cultures, I have attempted to overcome this problem in the work of the Labor Migration Project by providing for the cooperation of scholars from both the cultures of origin and the receiving cultures.

cloth being sold at village stores. At about the same time, jobs for men often became more scarce due to worldwide changes in agriculture. The resulting cash crisis caused family members to migrate for work and bread—*cerca di lavoro, za chlebom.* Decisions to leave were in many instances related to the death of a parent or the remarriage of a surviving parent; in other words, departures were easier at a time when family relations needed to be rearranged.[45]

By 1900, the existence of dispersed migrant cultures was by no means peculiar to North America. However, the pluralist receiving societies of North America have often been contrasted with the labor-importing, but supposedly monocultural, nation-states of Europe. Immigration countries did accept some—if only a few—aspects of the migrants' cultures. The more or less uniform hegemonic culture became multicultural, the melting-pot ideology notwithstanding. Other states prevented acculturation by forcing migrants to leave after a specified period of time. The debate, conducted in both Europe and North America, about the uniformity of national culture versus the modern concept of multiculturalism has to be recast in the framework of a broad spectrum and a long history of multinational or multi-ethnic living patterns. Austria-Hungary, for example, was a state of many peoples (*Vielvölkerstaat*) with one administrative language and hegemonic culture until 1867, and thereafter with two, the Austrian-German and the Magyar.[46] The Ottoman Empire, in a time of different mentalities and economic structures, accepted the diversity of its peoples but taxed them differently and developed a non-ethnic administrative class.[47] In most of northeastern, east-central, and southeastern Europe, different cultural groups had lived side by side for centuries. But with the emergence of national consciousness, nationalism, and, finally, aggressive national chauvinism, cultural pluralism seemed no longer tolerable, and minorities as well as in-migrants were subjected to

---

[45] I am grateful to Donna Gabaccia for pointing out these connections.

[46] Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch, eds., *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1913*, 5 vols. to date (Vienna, 1973– ), esp. vol. 5: *Die Völker des Reiches.*

[47] Kemal H. Karpat, *The Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization in the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge, 1976), 48ff ; id., *An Inquiry into the Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman State: From Social Estates to Classes, From Millets to Nations* (Princeton, NJ, 1973).

pressures to acculturate. Is the ideology of a national culture but an aberration from more complex patterns of interaction?

In Europe, the labor-importing core countries of Germany, Switzerland, France, and Great Britain drew from the peripheral areas in eastern and southern Europe; England also attracted workers from its Irish colony. From the 1880s to the 1920s, France was an immigration country with a population of 1.2 million in-migrants in a total of about 38 million.[48] The immigrants in France consisted of Italians (28.9 percent), Poles and Belgians (19.8 percent each), Spaniards (16 percent), Russians, Czechs, and several other groups.[49] On the eve of World War I, Germany had a foreign population of 1.5 million.[50] In none of the European countries, with the exception of Switzerland, did the percentage of foreign people in the population reach North American proportions. However, the migrants were there, and they were visible.

The intra-European migratory movements to industrializing areas and "islands" brought about patterns of living and cultural interaction or separation that were similar to those in North America. In Vienna, there were Czech in-migrants, Greek merchants, and Croatian courtiers. Paris had its Jewish quarter, a declining colony of German journeymen artisans and skilled workers, and a growing population of Italian unskilled workers. Berlin and the Ruhr district housed groups of Poles and Masurians as well as German-speaking Silesians, whose accent marked them as outsiders.[51] In Budapest, announcements of labor organization meetings were published in four or five languages; in Germany, Polish-language and Italian-

---

[48] Abel Chatelain, *Les migrants temporaires en France de 1800 à 1914*, 2 vols. (Lille, 1976); Peter Clark, "Migration in England during the late Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries," *Past and Present* 83 (1979): 57–90. See also the bibliographic references in Hoerder, ed., *Labor Migration in the Atlantic Economies*, 449–465.

[49] Willcox and Ferenczi, *International Migrations*, 201–236.

[50] Klaus J. Bade, *Vom Auswanderungsland zum Einwanderungsland? Deutschland 1880–1980* (Berlin, 1983), 29–51.

[51] For a summary of the literature, see Inge Blank, "The Acculturation of East Central European Labor Migrants: London, Paris, Vienna and the Ruhr Basin," forthcoming in *Roots of the Transplanted*, *2* vols., ed. by Dirk Hoerder, Inge Blank, and Horst Rössler (New York, 1993).

language labor periodicals appeared.[52] In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the population of most central and western European cities consisted of more than 50 percent of in-migrants, and the national averages of people living in places other than their birthplace were in the range of 40 percent. However, contrary to the situation in North America, most of the migrants in western Europe belonged to a cultural group similar to that of the receiving locality.

In order to understand why the paradigm of a one-way migratory flow to North America is wrong even for the nineteenth century, when transatlantic migratory connections were at their peak, the volume of internal and intra-European migration has to be compared to that of intercontinental moves. In 1910, 95 percent of the Austro-Hungarian migration was internal; only 5 percent of the migrants left for the United States.[53] Similarly, looking at the mobility of labor in the United States, it becomes quite clear that the transatlantic inflow is only one wave in a sequence of several: until the early 1800s, the forced migration of Africans and the arrival of indentured servants; in the 1820s and 1830s, the short-distance moves of women into textile factories; after the 1840s, the European in-migration, followed by internal South-North migrations of black people and moves from rural areas to the cities beginning in the 1910s; and, finally, a further migration of women in the 1930s. In the United States, too, internal migration surpassed immigration in volume.

**A VILLAGE WOMAN'S EXPERIENCE IN THE ATLANTIC ECONOMIES**

The complex migration and acculturation processes of the North Atlantic migration system may be illustrated in their entirety by one Italian village and by the experience of one migrating woman, who fortunately left behind an autobiography.[54] Rosa, a foundling baby

---

[52] Laszlo Katus, "Ethnic Groups in Budapest" (draft manuscript, Labor Migration Project, 1991).

[53] Heinz Fassmann, "Emigration, Immigration and Internal Migration in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 1910," forthcoming in Hoerder et al., eds., *Roots of the Transplanted*, vol. 1.

[54] The following section is based on Marie Ets Hall, ed., *Rosa: The Life of an Italian Immigrant* (Minneapolis, 1970).

from Milan, was left with foster parents in a nearby village. When she was old enough to work outside the home, her mother placed her in a silk factory in another village (short-distance labor migration of women before marriage, mobilization of a female labor force; compare, e.g., the New England textile mill "girls").[55] In this case, the migration was a "natural," if involuntary, way of life for young girls in the village. This pattern occurred in regions with extreme poverty. In their teens, children were sent away from home to make it on their own, with the expectation that they would never return.[56] The young men from Rosa's village went to France for seasonal or pluriannual work (medium-distance labor migration).[57] Others, including married men, traveled to North America to work in iron mines in Missouri (long-distance temporary labor migration of the unskilled). Some of these men married before their departure and took their wives with them, giving as a reason that "the men ... need a woman to do their washing and cooking" (migration into marriage and unpaid service work).[58] In one case, skilled female silk workers, accompanied by a male foreman, went to Japan (long-distance migration of experts).[59]

This one Italian village was thus tied, through internationalized labor markets, to local, intra-European, transatlantic, and worldwide migration patterns. Most of the migrants were unskilled, but the young silk workers received on-the-job training in nearby factories. Other Italian villages produced a constant surplus of skilled labor. Craftsmen would migrate with their sons and, in the process, train them—as in the case of the migrating Italian masons, plasterers, and

---

[55] Ibid., 88. Rosa had been working in a factory in the home town since the age of seven (ibid., 76). Thomas Dublin, *Women at Work: The Transformation of Work and Community in Lowell Mass., 1826–1860* (New York, 1979) and Philip S. Foner, ed., *The Factory Girls* (Urbana, IL, 1977).

[56] In the rural areas near Vienna, children were sent to the city by their parents, with the understanding that they would never return to burden their families. Young female domestics in Vienna have described their experiences there. Swabian shepherd boys (*Hütejungen*) were hired out annually to peasants in Tyrol. The sending away of children who could not be fed is the subject of the German fairy tale, *Hänsel and Gretel.*

[57] Hall, *Rosa*, 122.

[58] Ibid., 84.

[59] Ibid., 120–121.

tilers.[60] For crafts that were not part of the training traditions of Italian villages, a surplus of skilled workers was available from other European countries: Swiss dairymen (and unskilled soldiers, including a guard for the Vatican), German cabinetmakers, Dutch drainage experts, Gypsy knife-grinders, and Slovak tinkers. In the nineteenth century, geographic mobilization of unskilled rural labor also resulted from work on internal improvement projects, which frequently entailed huge earthworks. The building of an infrastructure, for example, created a sudden demand for a large labor force. While experts and skilled workers were brought in from the outside, the digging, shoveling, and carting was done by local men, who earned cash wages, some for the first time in their lives. Once a specific project was finished, many of them became migrant laborers who continued to work with their crews on other railroad, river-regulation, or canal-building projects.[61]

This was the experience of the men in Rosa's village. She herself knew more of the larger world, since her foster father had been a sailor who had gone as far away as America. He was the informational link that permitted a cautious look outward. Internally, however, Rosa had practically no ties to other social strata or living patterns.[62] Her foster mother's small restaurant in a backyard was separated from the dwellings of the rich in front of the same house by a chasm so insurmountable that one did not even dare to look at them. To be "rich" in Rosa's village meant that one could afford to put rice and perhaps even a little meat into one's soup.[63] The world of the village was cut off from the urban world, and its people stood apart even from lower-class urbanites. When roadworkers from Milan came into the village, the local men and women were afraid to talk to them, since the city people had a much higher rank in the social hierarchy.[64]

Rosa's life was not to continue in these surroundings. Her foster mother married her to a man whom she did not want and who soon left for Missouri. A few years later Rosa was asked to join the next

---

[60] Ercole Sori, *L'emigrazione italiana dall'unità alla seconda guerra mondiale* (Bologna, 1979), 19–47.

[61] Terry Coleman, *The Railway Navvies* (London, 1965).

[62] Hall, *Rosa*, 21, 41, 42.

[63] Ibid., 26, 113, 118, 124, 141.

[64] Ibid., 17–18.

group of men that went to America to work in the Missouri mines (sequential family migration). Leaving her infant son behind, she went with the peasant men, most of whom had never been away from home. They were accompanied by a woman and her children who was to rejoin her husband in America after a long separation; another woman who was going to marry a man whom she had last seen at the age of seven; and a third who was to marry someone who even came from a different region and whom she did not know at all. Marriage provided the ticket to a New World.[65] The migration for reproductive purposes, formerly to the next parish or town, now spanned entire continents and included so-called mail-order brides, which are comparable to picture brides in Japanese migration to the United States.[66]

After their arrival in Missouri, there was a big welcoming party for Rosa and her group. The next morning, the men took up their work in the mines, and Rosa began to cook for twelve of them. Since no support system tied over new arrivals for weeks or months, they had to enter the work process immediately (economics of survival) and to reconstitute family or neighborly relationships without delay (transfer of traditional gender roles). No readjustment of traditional roles or well-considered change could take place. Internationalized labor markets brought forth internationalized communities.

For the men, the transformation was swift and dramatic: they went from tilling the soil to working underground. For Rosa, it was equally unsettling. There was to be coffee, the drink of the rich that she had never before prepared, for breakfast. Her Lombardo food had to be southernized or "Italianized" because of the various regional origins of the men. Before lunch, on her shopping rounds, she had to deal with German-speaking farmers and English-speaking storekeepers. The postmaster and his wife were friendly to her—which was unimaginable in Italy, where such an exalted position demanded the highest deference.[67] For Rosa and the men, the initial adaptation took place in less than twenty-four hours. After the

---

[65] Ibid., 153–165.

[66] Suzanne Sinke, "The International Marriage Market: A Theoretical Essay," in *Cultural Transfer: German Migrations in a Comparative Perspective*, ed. by Dirk Hoerder and Jörg Nagler (New York, 1993, forthcoming).

[67] Hall, *Rosa*, 172–175.

welcoming party and one night's sleep, they had to function in the new society. Does this suggest the existence of an everyday culture that permits a continuity of household work, simple wage work, or even skilled wage work, regardless of the surrounding language, social structures, and political system? I tend to emphasize the continuities between the two ends of the voyage, between the productive and reproductive work spheres. However, other studies—including the research carried out within the Labor Migration Project at the University of Bremen on the comparative acculturation of German, Irish, Swedish, and Polish women in Chicago around 1900—have come to a different conclusion: The initial adaptation—in that case, of rural women to Chicago's urban environment—means an irreparable loss of a large part of former everyday practices. Only after this loss does a creative process of acculturation begin, whereby the surviving practices of the old culture become integrated with those of the new.[68]

Rosa accepted her new position as boardinghouse keeper. She changed money for the men, who could not even do simple accounting, and she kept a few odd pennies for herself each time. She thus became a kind of entrepreneur, but only secretly, since her husband would not permit her any independent income. After several years, she traveled back to Italy to bring back her son. On the trip, she helped a man who could not undertake the journey himself. He had become ill and wanted to die at home (return migration and shifting of social costs onto the society of origin). Back in her home village, Rosa no longer showed deference to bank clerks—a major transgression; and she added rice to her soup—another offense, in fact, almost a sin according to local opinion. In her view, however, America made the poor smart.[69] For people like herself, simple and uneducated but acculturated men and women, a permanent return to their places of origin would have implied a new acculturation, a third socialization after childhood and migration, as well as new struggles to change the old ways to conform to their new habits.

---

[68] Christiane Harzig, research coordinator, "The Role of Women in the Process of Acculturation: German, Irish, Swedish and Polish Women in Chicago around 1900" (forthcoming as *Peasant Maid—City Women* [working title], ed. by id., Ithaca, NY, 1994).

[69] Hall, *Rosa*, 185–195, 198.

That is why those who returned were not well liked by established village elites.[70]

Once back in the United States, Rosa had to flee from her abusive husband. Upon the counsel of a friend, she and her (by now) two sons went to Chicago. She had the address of acquaintances of friends, but she did not know how to get to their place from the station. The first compatriot she met was a Toscano, certainly a member of a different tribe and, in her opinion, one that was not always honest. But he introduced her to other Lombardos, who then showed her to the family that she hoped would shelter her.[71] A network of migrants from the same regions permitted travel in foreign and at times hostile environments in a way that road signs do for more modern generations.

Rosa went to North America. In Union, Missouri, and Chicago, she experienced what I call an international migrants' culture—a culture, that is, in which a person functions immediately in a different cultural world, without having had time for intentional and planned adjustments. It is not a culture linked by an international class consciousness, nor one in which migrants from a variety of ethnic groups support each other. Rather, it consists of organizing everyday living patterns within internationalized segments of the labor market and within households, both with the support of communities of people who speak the same language and come from the same locality. By contrast, a supranational or international mentality is found among cosmopolitan members of the middle classes and internationalist-minded activists of the labor movement.[72]

Rosa's experience, which was in no way unique, took place in communities separated by an ocean but bound together by personal relations. Small, local communities were part of an economic world system. The men and women in Rosa's village of origin felt the impact of the development of commercial grain crops by emigrants

---

[70] For a review of the (sparse) literature on return migration, see the forthcoming books by Mark Wyman, *Round Trip to America* (Ithaca, NY, 1994) and Neil Shumsky, "The Silver Saddle: Return Migration from the United States, 1870–1930" (manuscript, 1992).

[71] Hall, *Rosa*, 200–202.

[72] I have explored this topic for labor migrants in *"Struggle a Hard Battle"—Essays on Working-class Immigrants* (DeKalb, IL, 1986) and in *Roots of the Transplanted.*

living in North America, Argentina, and Australia. The resulting drop in world prices for these products brought about an agrarian crisis in the areas of origin, including northern Italy. Furthermore, better trade and transport systems caused competition from Chinese and Japanese silks and Asian rice. All of these effects hit the underemployed small producers of Northern Italy at about the same time. Within four decades (1876–1915), fourteen million Italians left their home country, some permanently, some in transatlantic seasonal migrations. Not all were as resourceful as Rosa.[73]

**CHANGING PATTERNS OF MIGRATION FROM 1918 TO THE 1940s AND THE NEW MIGRATION SYSTEMS SINCE THE 1950s**

After 1918, both the intra-European and transatlantic migrations changed in quantity and direction. The United States enforced its racist quota system, and stagnating economies provided few incentives to migrate. Aside from a post-war peak of migration to the United States, the volume remained low in the 1920s. During the Depression of the 1930s, there were some years when more people left the United States than arrived there. (Canada, however, continued to have a positive migration balance.) The resulting shift of social costs to the countries of origin needs further attention; in fact, the economics of migration constitutes a research field full of unanswered questions. The cycle begins when young people are raised, schooled, and trained in a comparatively less-developed society. Before they start paying taxes and thus contribute their share to defraying the social expenditures of their society, they move away and give their economic and financial support to a different, more developed society. In times of economic crisis, sickness, or old age, they return to and again demand support from their society of origin. Does migration then entail, as some authors suggest, a kind of developmental aid from less developed countries to more developed ones?

---

[73] Anna Maria Martellone, "Italian Mass Emigration to the United States, 1876–1930: A Historical Survey," *Perspectives in American History*, n.s., 1 (1984): 379–423; Gianfausto Rosoli, "Italian Migration to European Countries from Political Unification to World War I," in Hoerder, ed., *Labor Migration in the Atlantic Economies*, 95–116.

During the inter-war years, the migration connections between Europe and North America weakened considerably. In the decade after World War II, another temporary wave of migration from Europe to North America could be observed. After both world wars, vast population shifts of expellees and refugees occurred in Europe. At one time, people had moved across borders; in 1918 and 1945, though, borders were moved across people, who in turn fled from the new ethno-political realities.

Beginning with the 1950s, after three decades of stagnation, the North Atlantic migration system, with its extensions to South America and to colonial areas worldwide, ceased to function.[74] In its place, two separate continental systems involving South-North migrations came into existence. In Europe's capitalist countries, migrants moved from the Mediterranean Basin—first from its northern shore, then also from the Arab countries on its southern shore—to western, western-central, and northern Europe.[75] Some later migration also occurred among the socialist countries. In North America, migrants from Mexico and the Caribbean moved to industrial centers in the United States and Canada. Migration across the Pacific to North America intensified and surpassed European in-migration.[76] In addition, colonial migrations reversed directions. The former European colonial powers of France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands received refugees and immigrants from their erstwhile colonies, while the United States became the destination of Puerto Ricans and Filipinos.[77]

---

[74] See Dirk Hoerder, "Migration in the Atlantic Economies: Regional European Origins and Worldwide Expansion" (unpubl. paper, University of Bremen, rev. June 1990).

[75] Ayse Kudat and Yilmaz Özkan, eds., *Internationale Konferenz über Gastarbeiter*, 2 vols. (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, 1975, mimeographed); Jochen Blaschke and Kurt Greussing, eds., *"Dritte Welt" in Europa. Probleme der Arbeitsmigration* (Frankfurt/M., 1980).

[76] Alejandro Portes and Rubén G. Rumbaut, *Immigrant America. A Portrait* (Berkeley, CA, 1990); Roger Daniels, *Coming to America: A History of Immigration and Ethnicity in American Life* (New York, 1990), chaps. 14–16.

[77] Jean Anglade, *La vie quotidien des immigrés en France de 1919 à nos jours* (Paris, 1976); Colin Holmes, *John Bull's Islan: Immigration and British Society, 1871–1971* (London, 1988); Jan Lucassen and Rinus Penninx, *Nieuwkomers. Immigranten en hunne nakomelingen in Nederland, 1550–1985*(Amsterdam, 1985).

Whether these two South-North migration systems will continue to function in the 1990s is a matter of conjecture, at least in the European case.[78] In recent years, a new outward movement from eastern Europe has begun, reaching mainly western Europe, but also Israel (Jews) and the United States (Poles). The question whether this migration is the beginning of a new pattern cannot yet be answered.[79]

## THE 1990S: AN IMMIGRANT PROBLEM OR A PROBLEM OF RACIST ATTITUDES AMONG THE WELL-FED?

In North America, immigrants and refugees are admitted within the limits set by the governments. In the European Community, as a result of the so-called Schengen Agreement of 1985, the liberalization of the movement across the internal borders of the EC-member states is to go hand in hand with a tightening of their external borders against further in-migration. However, the Geneva Convention of 1951 requires that certain refugees be admitted, and, within quota limits, governments have agreed to accept other refugee categories as so-called *Kontingentflüchtlinge.* Due to four factors, the number of refugees is fast increasing: the rapid population growth in developing countries[80] and its decline (in western Europe) or stagnation (in North America) in the industrialized northern hemisphere; the increasing number of wars and civil wars; natural and man-made ecological disasters;[81] and growing poverty in many of the least-

---

[78] Hartmut Reichow, "Zukünftige Wanderungsbewegungen und ihre Ursachen," in Beate Winkler, ed., *Zukunftsangst Einwanderung* (Munich, 1992), 45–60.

[79] In western Europe, fears are voiced that twenty million eastern Europeans and one million North Africans will "inundate" the western part of the continent and sweep away the existing societies.

[80] The total world population will reach an estimated six billion by 1998. To gain control over population growth rates, the United Nations calls for a massive program to provide women in developing countries with education, employment, and family planning information. In the 1992 *Annual Report* of the United Nations Population Fund, women are called the world's "wasted assets."

[81] According to estimates by the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees, one billion people of a total world population of about 5.3 billion were on the move away from ecological disaster areas in 1990.

developed countries. A new mass migration is starting; annually, two million people worldwide migrate to richer countries. No border controls can deal with the causes of migration. In order to reduce the migration-inducing disparities, radical measures, including peacekeeping missions, will have to be taken, which will change the international distribution of wealth and will protect the environment.

As to the distribution of wealth, the international terms of trade continue to favor the developed nations over the less- and least-developed. According to the *1992 Human Development Report* of the United Nations, the richest 20 percent of the world population accounts for 82.7 percent of the global gross domestic product. The richest nations are almost sixty times wealthier than the poorest 20 percent, a gap that has doubled since 1960. The World Bank estimates that trade restrictions imposed by the rich countries reduce the gross national products of developing countries by more than the amount they receive in developmental aid. In addition, there is presently a net capital transfer from the poor to the rich nations.[82] As a group of concerned citizens has pointed out: "Every two minutes fifty-five human beings die of hunger while DM 1.000 [about $670] in interest payments are transferred to the rich northern hemisphere."[83] As long as this imbalance is not corrected, migration pressures will increase. Individuals—who add up to masses—will try to improve their own and their children's lives. A migrant from southern Italy who went to the United States eighty years ago commented that it would have been dishonest to his own family had he not taken advantage of the better resources and job opportunities there.[84]

Ecological disasters, many of which have their origins in the Industrialized countries, are well publicized. As was unctuously stated

---

[82] Dieter Nohlen and Franz Nuscheler, *Handbuch der Dritten Welt*, 1 vol. to date (Bonn, 1992–). The United Nations, *1992 Human Development Report*, as quoted in *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), April 29, 1992.

[83] Statement of a group of monks and nuns in support of their demand to release LDCs from their debt load. Quoted in the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, Oct. 10, 1992, 19. The daily figures would amount to 40,000 deaths and half a million dollars in interest payments. According to *"Brot für die Welt,"* an ecumenical aid organization, 1.2 billion people worldwide are suffering from hunger or malnutrition.

[84] Quoted in Martellone, "Italian Mass Emigration," 410.

at the World Ecology Conference in Brazil in the summer of 1992, an immediate change in ecological policies is urgently needed.[85]

Calls for preventive measures concerning the third major cause of refugee movements, wars and civil wars, create a political dilemma. Should United Nations peacekeeping forces intervene in such crises? If so, in whose interest should they intervene—for example, on behalf of the Kuwaitis or the oil-consuming countries? In the case of civil wars, such as in the former Yugoslavia, who is to apply for UN help, and who is to determine the justice of each side's claims? E. O. Czempiel, a German political scientist, recently suggested a redefinition of national sovereignty, which, he argues, is an absolutist principle. He advocates early nonviolent intervention ("soft power") in the internal affairs of states threatened by civil violence. It has to be added that this policy would imply non-proliferation agreements for any type of weaponry—another profound change, both in North-South trade patterns and in internal production patterns in those countries "threatened" by in-migration.[86]

The political aspects of the inequalities that lie behind contemporary population movements may be understood with the help of concepts borrowed from *The Culture of Contentment*, in which economist John Kenneth Galbraith argues that Western democracies remain unconcerned about poverty in their midst, that they are democracies of the well-fed and contented only. This concept, in my opinion, may also be applied worldwide. The distribution of wealth and the resulting migration flows are determined by principles of free trade, by treaties and agreements imposed by the wealthy western democracies to serve their own interests. Concern for poverty in this global society is lacking; developmental aid has declined in recent years.

After looking at the causes for the new mass migrations, I will now consider the situation of migrants in Europe and North America and the attitudes toward them. Within the European Community, a resident population of about twelve million labor migrants

---

[85] Statement by the director of the Swedish association for aid to developing countries. *Frankfurter Rundschau*, Oct. 26, 1992.

[86] Ernst-Otto Czempiel, "Frieden schaffen—mit Waffen?" *Der Spiegel*, no. 37 (1992): 46–48.

("guest workers") is registered. In addition, there are illegal migrants, emigrants, and refugees from former colonies, as well as political refugees from other countries. No longer visible are most of those who were expelled after World War II, an impressive feat of integration. However, several thousands of displaced persons who could not or would not return to their home countries in the East still remain without citizenship.[87] Only recently have large numbers of refugees from economic disaster areas and societies ravaged by civil war begun to arrive. In Germany, the arrival of ethnic Germans also causes major tensions.

In France, the refugees of the Algerian war for independence form a permanent, only partly integrated, minority with a distinctive youth culture (*boeurs*). In Great Britain and the Netherlands, attempts have been made to integrate the people who arrive as a consequence of the dissolution of the former colonial empires. As to the "guest workers" in Germany, more than 70 percent of these labor migrants have resided in the country for a decade or more but are refused citizenship. Some of those who came immediately after the first recruitment agreements in 1955 now have children and grandchildren. In fact, one-third of these so-called foreigners were born in Germany or grew up there. Recent changes in the regulations are meant to provide easier access to German citizenship for these hyphenated Germans. But, given the discrimination that has taken place over decades and the lack of provisions for dual citizenship, the new law has not yet brought about major improvements in administrative integration.[88]

Recent refugees from poor countries are usually refused entry and are derisively called "economic refugees." However, their alleged base materialistic aims are not without historical precedent. Perhaps 95 percent of the fifty million European emigrants of the previous century and a half fled from unsatisfactory economic conditions. Other terms also indicate the problematic status of in-migrants in

---

[87] In Germany, for instance, they are denied citizenship and have thus become stateless persons.

[88] Ausländergesetz, 1991. For critical comments, see Helmut Rittstieg, "Control of Immigration," (unpubl. paper, Universität Hamburg, 1991); Dirk Hoerder, "Memorandum betr. Zuwanderungsgesetzgebung, Aug. 1992" (Bremen, 1992, mimeographed; published in slightly abbreviated form in the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, Dec. 22, 1992).

Europe. The "guest worker" system, for example, perpetuates the nineteenth-century notion of a rotating labor force, while, in reality, these men, women, and children are labor migrants, in the same way as those Europeans who went to the United States and Canada at the turn of the century. In North America, racial attitudes toward African-American people demonstrate that integration has not worked for this group. The minorities in the southwestern United States and in Quebec do not feel that they receive equal treatment, while the policies toward refugees from Haiti scorn any human rights declarations.

Hostile attitudes toward newcomers stem from social, cultural, and racial prejudices. In the receiving societies, scarce resources and gaps in social security and entitlement programs have created a sense of unfairness among the strata of residents who are the worst off, those who—according to Galbraith—are not disenfranchised but bereft of political influence.[89] In Germany, not only union leaders and economists, but also chambers of commerce and organizations of industry favor immigration, even though employers have to pay union wages to newcomers and cannot take advantage of cheap labor.[90] Many workers and parts of the general public, on the other hand, are opposed to it.[91] While the poorer groups of society are justified in voicing their economic grievances, the cause of their difficulties is structural and policy-related.[92]

The elaborate social security systems in Europe and Canada have shown a considerable number of gaps during the recent years of economic stagnation and high unemployment. Young people who can

---

[89] Compare the resistance to the racial integration of school districts in the United States, especially of those in the white suburbs.

[90] This provision has been changed recently for the contract workers from eastern Europe.

[91] Roland Tichy, journalist for the *Wirtschaftswoche*, a weekly for businessmen, in his book *Ausländer rein! Warum es kein "Ausländerproblem" gibt* (Munich, 1990), summarizes the argument for immigration. The conservative government, however, has not accepted this position.

[92] According to the Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut fir Wirtschaftsforschung, German blue-collar workers pay 4 percent of their monthly income for the consequences of reunification, and white-collar employees pay 3.5 percent, whereas professionals, businessmen, and civil servants contribute only 1.7 percent. *Weser-Kurier*, Oct. 20, 1992.

no longer access the system express anti-foreigner sentiments;[93] they are supported by older generations who, after the war, had to start all over from nothing, cannot accept that newcomers from "alien" cultures receive more help than they themselves did forty years ago. Furthermore, most social security systems are based on the principle of individual contributions to insurance funds and have waiting periods before benefits accrue. However, out of humanitarian considerations—and, in the case of the eastern European ethnic Germans, by political fiat—entitlement rights are granted immediately to in-migrants. The resulting anger of the members of society paying into the system does not find an outlet in political action that would try to correct the structural inadequacies. Instead, like the Jews throughout history, the recent in-migrants are blamed for structural economic problems and the shortcomings of social policies.

Concern is also voiced about the loss of the integrity and uniformity of national cultures. The ideological nature of this nationalism has been discussed above.[94] Still, the maintenance of cultural identity is a legitimate concern, and the underlying causes of this uneasiness have to be explored: socio-economic dislocations produced by Reaganomics, cultural separatism in Canada, and the attempt to forge one European identity out of many regional ones. These changes provoke fears, as the reactions to the Maastricht Treaty and to German unification demonstrate.

The reasons for the present anti-foreigner attitudes are, on the one hand, the projection of structural problems onto the newcomers and, on the other hand, pure and simple nativism, chauvinism, and racism. This view is supported by the new anti-Semitism. The teaching of friendship and understanding among peoples (*Völkerverständigung*) in the post-World War II era and the research on the nature of prejudice have left us with some insights, but it seems that neither has improved attitudes.

---

[93] "Deutschland von Rechts," thematic issue of *Wochenschau* 42 (Nov./ Dec. 1991): 211–256.

[94] As Wolfgang Mommsen, the president of the Association of German Historians, noted at the 1992 Historikertag in Hannover: "Das Deutsche Reich war schon seit 1880 ein Einwanderungsland und hat gleichwohl sein kulturelles Profil nicht verloren" (The German Empire has been an immigration country since 1880 and has not lost its cultural identity in the process.) Quoted in *Die Zeit*, Oct. 2, 1992, 2.

The recent violence against foreigners in Europe cannot be dismissed as a series of isolated incidents. Right-wing movements have emerged in several European states, although most observers of the political scene, except for those on the left, long considered a reemergence of Nazi mentalities unlikely. In Germany, for example, a recent opinion poll showed that one-third of young people between the ages of 16 and 24 are hostile to foreigners, and that approximately fifty thousand are ready to commit crimes of violence against immigrant men, women, and children. These statistics have been disregarded, and activities clearly attributable to a right-wing fringe have been considered to be of no relevance. From January to October 1992, 1,600 incidents of violence against foreigners involving eleven deaths were officially registered in Germany. As Hans Magnus Enzensberger bitterly noted: "The police have to be reminded that—strictly speaking—the burning of children is illegal."[95] Only a small number of criminal prosecutions have resulted, and little political action has been taken to counter the violence. Psychologists and lawyers consider this virtual legitimization of violence by the political elite worse than the incidents themselves.[96]

The rejection of immigration in Europe, and particularly in Germany, is to some degree paradoxical. If one includes the post-World War II refugees, some of which are descendants of the central European German-language culture, about one quarter of the population of the Federal Republic consists of in-migrants. Furthermore, the "resident guest workers" throughout Europe were in the process of acculturating and were offered opportunities for integration by their respective host societies until the wave of immigrants began to arrive in 1989: Albanian refugees in Italy; illegal North Africans in Spain, Italy, and France; and eastern Europeans, legal and illegal. Skin color became a reason for rejection. In Germany, above all, the mass arrival of ethnic Germans—"foreigners with a German passport"—has set back efforts to grant rights to the children of guest

---

[95] H. M. Enzensberger, quoted in the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, Oct. 27, 1992, 8.

[96] "Jeder Dritte fremdenfeindlich," *Frankfurter Rundschau*, Sept. 30, 1992, 1; statement of the Berufsverband Deutscher Psychologen, ibid., Oct. 16, 1992, 18.

workers—"Germans with a foreign passport" (Klaus Bade).[97] While sociologists and historians agree that migrants need, above all, time—two or three generations—to acculturate, the resident populations, too, may need time to open up and change their ingrained ways. Without in any way belittling the dangers of right-wing extremism or excusing the support for it among conservative parties, it may be argued that the present expectations of tolerance may demand too much from the resident populations, as their attitudes toward the Treaty of Maastricht suggest.

More important, a further change in the general patterns of interaction between receiving societies and newcomers has recast integration and acculturation into new forms. The refugees no longer enter industrializing societies in which demand for labor outstrips supply; they look for access to wealthy consumer societies with elaborate social security systems. While some argue on humanitarian grounds for the integration of the newcomers into this system, other "dues-paying" members reject the ensuing reallocation of their contributions. In the age of nation-states, newcomers were expected to join a homogenized culture and work their way up. In an age of closed social security systems (in Europe and in Canada) and nearly universal union wages, the receiving societies, while granting full membership to wealthy in-migrants or to those with special skills and university training, provide no way for impoverished newcomers to find a modest niche and improve their situation through work, the use of family ties, and the support of ethnic groups. The contented—to borrow again from Galbraith—neither share nor care. From the top down, politics and policies in many European states have contributed to turning hopeful in-migrants into a despised underclass. From the bottom up, racist and anti-foreigner attitudes contribute to the plight of in-migrants in ways that are reminiscent of Nazi pogroms against the Jews.

Notwithstanding popular demands for immigration restrictions, the reproductive behavior of western and northern Europeans actually makes an in-migration of younger people imperative. Otherwise, as projections of a population decline indicate, the size of the resident population of working age will be too small to support the

---

[97] Bade also uses the terms, "einheimische Ausländer—fremde Deutsche" (German-born foreigners—alien Germans). *Deutsche im Ausland*, 393–410.

pension payments for the older segments of society. Whenever this aspect is mentioned the tone becomes demagogical: The large Turkish labor migrant families in Germany allegedly thrive on governmental child-support payments (Bundeszentrale fur politische Bildung), and the Federal Republic may have a Turkish chancellor by the year 2040 (*Bild-Zeitung*). Yet, when the large ethnic German families from eastern Europe began to arrive, the government changed its line immediately. It maintained that the children of these families would not consume "our" child support allowances but, on the contrary, would guarantee the future pension payments of the present older generation. Furthermore, the estimation that, in fifty years, Germany's population would consist of a mere forty million Germans but of twenty million "foreigners" (Turks) assumes that the high reproduction rates of Turkish families will be sustained over several generations. All historical evidence, as well as studies of migrants in present-day Turkish immigrant quarters in Istanbul, indicates that such an assumption is wrong. In any event, the prospective Turkish chancellor would not be a Turkish person but a third-generation Turkish-German.[98]

## EUROPE AS A *VIELVÖLKERSTAAT* WITH MINORITIES AND IMMIGRANTS

The twelve states of the European Community, as well as the United States and Canada, encompass a variety of cultures that belie a classification as monocultural nations. Joel Garreau has argued that North America consists of nine cultural areas.[99] The Canadian provinces are culturally diverse. The United Kingdom consists of the cultures of England, Scotland, Wales, (Northern) Ireland, and, separately, the Channel Islands. Belgium comprises two cultures. France has its

---

[98] *Ausländer*, Informationen zur politischen Bildung, No. 201; population projections of the Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, Materialien 4/1982, Nürnberg, and "Migration und Bevölkerung im neuen Europa," Papers for Session 3 of Deutscher Soziologentag, Düsseldorf, Sept. 28–Oct. 2, 1992. Wolfgang Klauder, "Deutschland im Jahr 2030," in Bade, *Deutsche im Ausland*, 455–464; press reports and governmental statements on Aussiedler, 1989–1992; Karpat, *The Gecekondu*, 27.

[99] Joel Garreau, *The Nine Nations of North America* (New York, 1981).

various regions as well as the autonomy-minded areas of Basque and Brittany. Since the Age of Reform, the pluralism of cultures has been endangered by administrative centralism, and a future united Europe is subject to bureaucratic standardization. With the advent of capitalism, it became jeopardized by the economic penetration of mass-produced consumer goods. Mass production consumption patterns, such as those found in contemporary North America, pose a threat to local customs, local economic life, and the survival of regional cultural differences. Particularist communities, self-defined by cultural cohesion, are being asked to shed their distinctive characteristics to assume a vaguely defined European identity. Special status is not easily attained, as the former Germans from the East and the Quebecois realize.[100]

In the 1950s, the vision of a Europe without borders attracted many. *Völkerfreundschaft* and uninhibited travel (the concept of uninhibited migration never seems to have entered the discussions) were intended to further cultural exchange and interaction on the basis of mutual respect for cultural differences. But the friendship among peoples remained abstract; freedom of travel became mass tourism. Attitudes of cultural superiority remain alive, and "homo touristicus" from the rich countries jets to cheap-labor beaches. Still, some continue to cherish the vision.

In the 1960s, minority peoples began to demand recognition of their cultures. Scots asked for devolution, Bretons for cultural autonomy, Basques for political independence. Sicilians and Sardinians never considered themselves part of Italian culture. Corsicans seek self-rule from France, while, in North America, Chicanos, blacks, Quebecois, and Inuits demand self-determination. Some observers suggest that what we are witnessing is the end of nation-states and their replacement by a new regionalism.[101]

Some nations are more accessible to outsiders than others. Ever since their Revolution, the French have based their nationality on the voluntary acceptance of the nation's governing institutions. In-

---

[100] Dirk Hoerder, "The United States and Europe: Nation-Building in a Comparative Perspective," unpubl. paper delivered at the Milan Group in Early United States History, June 1988.

[101] Paul Robert Magocsi, "The End of the Nation-State? The Revolutions of 1989 and the Future of Europe" (unpublished paper, Toronto, 1992).

migrants may join the *contrat social* and, as citizens (not as ethnic French), may become part of the nation.[102] British citizenship was granted to persons born in the Commonwealth countries, whatever their skin color or everyday customs—until they began to migrate in large numbers to England, that is. The German concept of nationality, in contrast, is based on an atavistic bloodline principle, on a person's birth into the national group (*Volk*). Hereditary and contractual concepts of nationhood obviously have different implications. Nations whose identity rests on the bloodline principle cannot, by definition, accept acculturation or declarations of intent as bases for joining them. But the vision of a *Vielvölkerstaat*, a state of many peoples, assumes easy access to citizenship that is based on an equality of cultures. It does not imply a cultural relativism.

The immigrants' cultural development after arrival in another country may take several forms and depends on the reasons for migrating in the first place. Refugees who leave their homelands involuntarily and who harbor hopes for an eventual return will follow a different pattern of acculturation than labor migrants. The latter come to earn a living, and they accept those norms of the receiving society that will help them achieve their goals. Immigrants arriving with the intention of staying permanently in the new society will, in an ideal-typical model, be ready to come to terms with all of its customs and institutions. The adherence to pre-migration cultures by newcomers in the receiving country has been a major issue in the discussions about the presumed dangers of immigration, multiculturalism, and cultural pluralism.

Several types of immigrant and ethnic cultures may be distinguished: ghetto, clientele, invented, hyphenated, and symbolic. Migrants want respect for their cultural baggage. If the receiving society rejects this source of their security, the migrants withdraw into ghetto cultures. For example, Polish workers in the Ruhr district at the turn of the century were ready to become an integral part of German society, as Christoph Klessmann and others have shown. But when they were prohibited from using the Polish language in public, they formed separate Polish-language organizations.[103]

---

[102] Dominique Schnapper, *La France de l'integration. Sociologie de la nation en 1990* (Paris, 1991), 33–37.

[103] Christoph Klessmann, "Polish Miners in the Ruhr District: Their Social Situation and Trade Union Activity," in Hoerder, ed., *Labor Migration*

Similarly, the present rejection of migrants' cultures in some countries forces them to strengthen the ties with members of their own group. Thus, acculturation is retarded, and offers for integration are turned down. On the other hand, if respect for immigrant cultures is coupled with financial support, a clientele culture may develop. Canada's policy of multiculturalism, for instance, emphasized the retention of culture rather than the active participation in the new society, as it had originally been intended.[104] In this kind of system, financial support from outside the ethnic groups keeps their organizations and activities alive. Ethnic cultures, some scholars maintain, may also be invented cultures. This argument implies that the in-migrants consciously create a new culture for themselves.[105] However, I would argue that most migrants initially adapt unthinkingly to the new society, because they immediately have to function in the economy and to earn a living (economy of survival). They later acculturate consciously or unconsciously, without intentionally and rationally inventing their own ethnic culture.

In immigration countries, acculturation leads to the emergence of hyphenated cultures; in countries that lack an immigration policy, not even the term exists. In the latter, Italian-Germans, Jewish-English, and Spanish-French remain, respectively, Italian foreign laborers (*ausländische Arbeitnehmer*) in Germany, Jews in Great Britain, and Spanish seasonal workers in France. Once members of hyphenated groups have become fully assimilated, traces of their ancestry are reduced to symbolic culture. Signs of belonging to a particular group remain, but the everyday practice of specific customs is a thing of the past.

The creation of ethnic culture is a process that comes about through the interaction among various ethnic groups, on the one

---

*in the Atlantic Economies*, 253–256. These ethnic Poles came from the part of Poland annexed by Prussia in the late eighteenth century; they had become German citizens upon the foundation of the German Empire in 1871.

[104] Sociologist and policy adviser Jean Burnet as interviewed by Carol Bujeau, "Ethnic Pluralism in Canada: Can It Work." *ICCS Contact* 9, no. 2 (Autumn 1990): 10–15.

[105] Werner Sollors, ed., *The Invention of Ethnicity* (New York, 1989); Kathleen Neils Conzen et al., "The Invention of Ethnicity: A Perspective from the USA," paper presented at the International Congress of Historical Sciences, Madrid, Aug. 1990.

hand, and between ethnic groups and the hegemonic society, on the other; it is also generated by the struggle between social strata in the hegemonic society and in response to economic changes. Ethnic culture is, moreover, a response to how immigrants are seen by the resident population, how they are viewed by other ethnic groups, and how they themselves wish to be perceived. In periods of accelerated socio-economic change, some groups within a given cultural entity—whether a whole nation or a minority—use the opportunities presented by this transformation to push developments in certain directions and thereby contribute to the "invention" of an ethnic culture. However, in my view, cultural change is at best the outcome of semi-intentional action involving many groups in society with diverse objectives. In short, it is the result of collective activity rather than a planned product.

The process of cultural change may be illustrated by the story of eastern European labor migrants in the United States at the turn of the century.[106] For their spiritual needs, they established parishes to follow their old-world beliefs, preferably headed by ministers or priests from the old country. In their societies of origin, it was the wealthy and educated who had the exclusive right to determine the character of institutions. For the immigrants, the process of self-creation of institutional structures resulted in a more effective Americanization than any rhetoric about free institutions might have achieved. Since the immigrants who created the parishes interacted with neighboring ethnic groups and wanted to demonstrate their achievements, the churches they built were large. My colleagues and I have termed this phenomenon the "peacock effect" of church building. Thus, the attempt to replicate institutions from the Old World became a response to the conditions of the new society. The same pattern can be observed in the building of mosques by Islamic immigrants in today's Europe and, conversely, in the destruction of Bosnian mosques by orthodox Serbs.

Cultural re-creation may be conceptualized as a continuity between two cultures. The process begins even before departure. Prospective migrants live in a culture that is familiar to them, an

---

[106] "Conflict and Cooperation: East European Ethnic Groups in Cleveland, 1880–1920," a research project coordinated by A. Walaszek, N. Birnbaum, and myself at the University of Bremen.

experienced culture; they intend to move to a culture about which they have some information, a reported culture. When they actually depart, a mental stop occurs. Their culture of origin remains frozen in time. All memories of it will be from this point in time. After migration, the roles of the two cultures are reversed: the culture of origin turns into the reported one, and that of the receiving society becomes the experienced one. This experience is a constant process of interaction of the migrants' customs, their self-perception, and the way they want to be seen with the hegemonic society and other ethnic cultures. In this complex relationship, the experienced culture may become a perceived one (i.e. different from the unconsciously practiced one)—a self-deception about the retention, for example, of old values, which eventually will be corrected through further interaction.[107]

This process of interaction, of acculturation, is an extensive one; the result of old-world socialization, a whole way of life, has to be changed. Historians have usually assumed that, in a simplified model, cultural change occurs over three generations. Why, then, is there so much pressure today on in-migrants to acculturate quickly? Is it that, compared to the turn of the century, most social developments occur that much faster? Has a mentality of "human engineering" developed?[108] Historical research shows that, in the past, an ethnic community often was not established in order to withdraw from the new society, but to serve as a material and emotional base from which to enter it. Politicians—whether Americanizers of the early 1900s or Germanizers of the present—have not understood this conclusion.

Multiculturalism may take the form of separate, parallel, existence of various cultures, when people remain in ethnic quarters or, as in a unified Europe, within traditional boundaries. This is usually

---

[107] An example of this phenomenon is the call from the ethnic community to teach the "mother tongue" (that of the "fatherland") to the second-generation children. However, once such classes are established, none of the parents send their children to attend them. The need for language retention was perceived, but it no longer corresponded to actual needs and the state of acculturation.

[108] Psychologists have suggested that the pace of human adaption is bound to generational processes of socialization. The pace cannot keep up with intellectually engineered social, economic, and political change.

not a situation characterized as separate but equal—rather, it is as separate and unequal as John Porter has shown for Canada in his *Vertical Mosaic.*[109] Societies today, no matter what their size or character, will have to offer roads out of ethnic quarters and into the mainstream, out of peripheral positions into equal ones. However, mainstream life reduces the cohesion of localism, and equality implies the renunciation of (cherished) peculiarities. Multiculturalism may also take the form of an easy mixing of people of different cultures. The model minorities in the United States may be an example for this—although they are now being accused of overachievement, as were the Jews in Europe a century ago. Multicultural living patterns demand respect for different cultures without casting them into a pure or original (i.e. static or even ossified) premigration form.

In multicultural societies, the advocacy of a retention of traditional cultures may present problems that merit further scrutiny. For instance, some ethnic cultures relegate women to inferior positions. Should such stratification be accepted in the name of cultural self-determination? What if the women themselves accept and adhere to their position? In another example, in several Western cultures the right of parents to determine the course of their children's education has been strengthened to the detriment of the decision-making powers of teachers and school boards. What if immigrant parents oppose a liberal education, since it may alienate their children from the old culture? As pointed out before, multicultural attitudes do not imply cultural relativism. Goals do have to be decided upon, values have to be discussed and implemented.

The many peoples of Europe and North America, whether in hegemonic or minority positions, whether temporary migrants, de-facto immigrants, or third-generation foreigners, need new strategies to achieve multiculturalism. They might not share Crèvecoeur's joyful expectation of new men (and women), but they could aim at a multifaceted interaction of cultures in an emerging European *Vielvölkerstaat.* "The dignity of human beings"—not that of Germans, English, or Americans—"is inviolable."[110] The many movements

---

[109] John Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada* (Toronto, 1965), chap. 3.

[110] Art. 1, German Basic Law and theme of the mass demonstration against hate, violence, and terror, Berlin, Nov. 8, 1992.

for regional autonomy may recast nation-states into federations of cultures.

European societies of the early 1990s have incorporated cultural aspects from many guestworker communities and ethnic groups into their own. By the late 1980s, ethnic literature, symbolic folklore, and international cuisines had become so prevalent that in-migrants expected that the granting of political rights and dual citizenship was but a matter of time. Economic recession, new hierarchies between East and West in Germany, and the immense increase of in-migration have caused a setback. But skinheads will not stem migration flows, nor will conservative political programs keep people from cultural interaction. Some regard migration and acculturation as a threat. Whatever the point of view, both migration and acculturation have provided challenges for centuries and have brought forth ever newer syntheses. Europe needs a new vision of a multicultural federation of peoples, minority groups, and immigrants.

## P.S.: A LITERARY VIEW ON CULTURAL INTERACTION IN EUROPE

HARRAS:... *Denken Sie doch—was kann da nicht alles vorgekommen sein in einer alten Familie. Vom Rhein—noch dazu. Vom Rhein. Von der großen Völkermühle. Von der Kelter Europas! .... stellen Sie sich doch mal Ihre Ahnenreihe vor—seit Christi Geburt. Da war ein römischer Feldhauptmann, ein schwarzer Kerl, braun wie ne reife Olive, der hat einem blonden Mädchen Latein beigebracht. Und dann kam ein jüdischer Gewürzhändler in die Familie, das war ein ernster Mensch, der ist noch vor der Heirat Christ geworden und hat die katholische Haustradition begründet.—Und dann kam ein griechischer Arzt dazu, oder ein keltischer Legionär, ein Graubündner Landsknecht, ein schwedischer Reiter, ein Soldat Napoleons, ein desertierter Kosak, ein Schwarzwälder Flözer, ein wandernder Müllerbursch vom Elsaß, ein dicker Schiffer aus Holland, ein Magyar, ein Pandur, ein Offizier aus Wien, ein französischer Schauspieler, ein böhmischer Musikant—das hat alles am Rhein gelebt, gerauft, gesoffen und gesungen und Kinder gezeugt—und der Goethe, der kam aus demselben Topf, und der Beethoven, und der Gutenberg und der Matthias Grünewald, .... Es waren die Besten, mein Lieber! ... Und warum? Weil sich die Völker vermischt haben. Vermischt—wie die Wasser aus Quellen und Bächen und Flüssen, damit sie zu einem, großen, lebendigen Strom zusammenrinnen.*
(Carl Zuckmayer, *Des Teufels General*, 1st ed. 1945; cited from S. Fischer, Schulausgabe 1961).

# Comment

*Donna Gabaccia*

Dirk Hoerder has written this impressive paper in the midst of massive new migrations—migrations that many Germans and western Europeans apparently regard as unprecedented and terrifying. Hoerder's purpose is to alert his fellow countrymen, and especially the policymakers among them, to a long history of migration, acculturation, and ethnic interactions in their home countries and regions. Germany today may not consider itself a land of immigration, but Hoerder convincingly demonstrates that it, along with all of Europe, generally has confronted migrations and their accompanying cultural contacts repeatedly over the past centuries. By examining the contemporary migration crisis from a comparative and historical perspective, Hoerder seeks to temper the hysterical edge that too often creeps into contemporary discussions. At the same time, however, he wants also to challenge Europeans to handle this latest round of migrations more knowledgeably and perhaps more humanely than their predecessors did in the past.

Hoerder's paper emphasizes the many connections and parallels between the better-known, America-bound migrations of the nineteenth century and the migrations into, out of, and within the nations that today form the European Community. Rather than viewing ethnic conflict as unique to each time and place, he seeks commonalities. In doing so, he suggests that Europeans might learn from the debates and public policies of the more self-consciously pluralistic nations—the United States, Canada, Argentina—which were formed during the nineteenth-century migrations. To simplify somewhat, he urges Europeans to examine the histories of immigration countries for lessons and guidance. As his own reading of their histories show, however, one can equally draw some cautionary tales on the difficulties of multiculturalism from all of these nations.

I am not sure whether Hoerder intended to do so, but his paper can be seen equally as a challenge to Americans in the United States to reconsider their own historical myths about migration, acculturation, and ethnic interaction. It is not only Germans or Europeans

who might benefit from confronting the past comparatively and broadly. In my comment, I would like to focus on what the United States, and Americans, can learn from a comparable exercise.

First, Hoerder's paper reminds us of the ordinariness and normalcy of migration. The people of the United States are not uniquely mobile; the population of this country is not unique in having been formed from successive waves of migration and ethnic interaction. Pointing to the similarities between internal and international migrants, Hoerder presses Americans to consider what is unexceptional and actually quite typical about its history as a nation. Ours is not the only nation of immigrants, nor the only nation that regards its history of ethnic interaction as central to its national character. One of the advantages of comparison, therefore, is to reveal the shakiness of some national truisms; most notably, our tendency to see immigrant success stories of "rags to riches" as the key to our national greatness. Similarly, our view of the United States as a powerful beacon of freedom that was almost irresistible to the oppressed of the nineteenth century appears in a new light when we recognize that substantial proportions of the immigrants who had arrived on our shores subsequently turned around and went home again. Indeed, as Hoerder shows us, many more probably never intended to stay here in the first place.

Hoerder's paper provides just as many possibilities for thinking about the relationship among the notions of ethnicity, citizenship, and national identity in the United States or in Canada as in Europe. It is certainly true that the United States, unlike Germany, has allowed and even expected foreigners to choose citizenship through naturalization, and that it has done so without requiring evidence of thorough acculturation. (Naturalization in the United States instead requires statements of political loyalty to the principles of the Constitution, among them respect for private property and republican government. While tolerating cultural diversity, one could argue that naturalization places identifiable limits on diversity among citizens.)

It is also true that the United States, unlike Germany, accepts (within some limits) that place of birth rather than "blood" determines citizenship. But, just as Germany denied being a nation of immigration in the face of successive waves of in-migration—from the East, southern Europe, and Turkey—the United States held, for a long time, significant proportions of its own native-born, minority

populations in a kind of citizenship limbo. Slaves, as we know, were no more than "three-fifths of a man" in counts that determined legislative representation; emancipated African Americans—and women, as well as Spanish-speaking persons in the Southwest—could claim citizenship without acquiring the full range of political rights of adult white men. Only recently have scholars and activists noted how long and how successfully the United States denied the cultural diversity of its citizenry by limiting the political power of the culturally diverse. Just as Hoerder urges Germans to contemplate the history of Germany's migrations, so, too, can Americans in the United States still profitably contemplate their ambivalence about the political activism of multi-ethnic citizens. In Germany, citizens worry that a Turkish German might become chancellor in the year 2040. As late as 1960, an amazing number of Americans in this country still questioned the loyalties of the Catholic presidential candidate John F. Kennedy.

Finally, the United States can both take some comfort in and learn much from recognizing that ours is not the only society that is currently racked by debates on inclusion/exclusion and multiculturalism. We have alternatively applauded and rejected the Eurocentric nature of our society and culture. Viewed from the broad perspective of Hoerder's paper, however, it is the Amerocentric nature of current debates on multiculturalism that seem most striking. In the United States, the discussion of multiculturalism has been about race as a biological construction and the origin of cultural difference. While not uncontroversial in contemporary politics, religion and language currently seem less salient foundations for ethnic group formation and for the ethnic boundaries of American pluralism. Clearly, religion and language remain important fonts of ethnic identity in contemporary Europe and Canada. We all might learn a great deal from understanding why their passions have waned somewhat in the United States, leaving race as the dominant focus of debates on multiculturalism in this country.

Even the most cursory view of contemporary Europe shows us how differently culture and cultural pluralism can be construed elsewhere. Hoerder advances our opportunities for understanding the full range of pluralism with his typologies of pluralist societies: those organized around ghettos, vertical mosaics, and hyphenated or symbolic ethnicities of the United States. In the United States, we tend to see hyphenation, cultural pluralism, and assimilation ("American-

ization") as the main alternatives to multi-ethnic experiments. Hoerder's larger perspective pushes us to recognize other options as forms of pluralism. I doubt whether the United States cares to emulate the Ottoman Empire, but we ought—at the very least—to contemplate and understand the costs and benefits of other models, from Austria's *Vielvölkerstaat* to Switzerland's unique combination of inclusive and exclusive principles. Only by doing that can we identify the costs and benefits of our own history of choices on this issue.

Taking each form of multiculturalism seriously allows Americans in the United States, along with our European colleagues, to think about how we, too, can "do it better" over the next twenty years. Our history as a pluralistic nation with a distinctive national identity is not over. The continued arrival of half a million new immigrants and refugees each year, together with the continued challenge of political inclusion and cultural legitimacy for native-born American minorities, makes old myths about migration and ethnic interaction as risky here as on the other side of the Atlantic.

# Migration toward a New World Order
## A Comment

*James Oliver Horton*

Professor Hoerder's paper is both provocative and prophetic. Taking as a point of departure the growing concern over the hostile, often violent, reaction of many Europeans to the inter- and intra-continental movement of those perceived as less desirable immigrants, he considers the alarming consequences of global economic inequality and its attendant social and political disruption. Placing the latest migratory pattern into historical context and distinguishing significant nuances of mobility type, Hoerder sets out the relatively benign reception of migrant groups by pre-twentieth-century host cultures. Although there may be some reason to question the generality of such developments as the "multilingualism of the illiterate," as a point of comparison for contemporary multicultural concerns, his point is well taken.

Perhaps the key issue here was one of space, which allowed for settlement based on ethnicity either in pre-modern rural colonies or in urban ghettos. The dynamics of the degree of population mobility, its origins, and its destinations are, of course, shaped by the geographic and economic possibilities. The rise of industrialization and its accompanying labor needs facilitated the establishment of a migration that called for not only a geographical move but also an adjustment from a stable, land-based to an insecure, wage-based socio-economic foundation. This pattern built upon already established notions of enlightenment that empowered individuals to believe that they could influence their future through, among other things, migration toward a place of greater opportunity.

This historical migration and patterns of acculturation created the multi-ethnic living conditions that, in turn, have given rise to contemporary European notions of multiculturalism. North America, with its greater numbers and proportions of immigrants, is most visible in this regard, but the impact of immigration and acculturation is great and, in some ways, more complex in Europe. Hoerder's analysis of the effects of living abroad on European villagers

returning from an American experience is insightful, as is his observation about the discomfort that their partly "Americanized ideas" brought to village elites. One is changed by the experience of migration, however brief.

Although the early sections of the paper provide an important backdrop, I find the treatment of the post-World War II and present-day migration patterns and concerns most compelling. Starting with the observation that immigrants who supply needed labor to wealthy industrial countries often do so at the expense of their poorer native countries, which nurture and educate them in childhood and support those who return in old age, Hoerder explains the transfer of wealth and advantage to the have nations from the have-nots. The juxtaposition of the perception of non-white immigration as a threat to the German culture and economy with that of a more positive view of the in-migration of eastern European "ethnic Germans" is instructive, both about nativism and about racism.

I am reminded of similar arguments and situations in the United States during the last three centuries. Most of us know about the nativist tradition in American history that gave rise to the Alien and Sedition Acts in the late eighteenth century, which were aimed primarily at the French; or the anti-Irish, anti-Catholic Know-Nothing (American party) of the mid-nineteenth century; or the policies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that excluded or severely restricted Chinese, Korean, and Japanese immigrants. Fewer of us are aware of the laws in states like Indiana, Illinois, and Oregon that prohibited free African-American migration and settlement, or of those in states like Ohio that allowed black settlement only after the posting of a cash bond guaranteeing good conduct and self-support. There are striking similarities between the anxieties and resultant actions of those who feared the migration of southern blacks to midwestern cities in nineteenth-century America and the anti-foreigner reactions in late twentieth-century Germany. In Cincinnati as in Rostock, the rationalization was very much the same: worries over job competition, an expected strain on social services (even though there were few such services in nineteenth-century America), and a more diffuse concern about despoiling the cultural and racial character of the region. Black Americans who migrated to the urban North during the twentieth century—like Rosa, the Italian villager who immigrated to Missouri—faced the

need for immediate adjustment, despite the similarity of language, to their new environment—an environment that was very different in assumptions, expectations, and demands from that which they had left behind in the deep, rural South. Unlike Rosa, the perfection of language provided little advantage, but the migration surely changed black Southerners, as most found on their first return trip "home."

Europeans see America as a country with great experience in dealing with a multicultural society, and, of course, that is true. However, the truth of history is often determined by the perceptions of those who lived it as much as by its reality. Until very recently, most Americans denied the multicultural nature of their society. Ethnic or cultural difference was seen as a momentary thing, quickly lost in the flow of society's mainstream, blended beyond recognition in the American melting pot. Perhaps a few people in small, midwestern towns might be excused for their parochial vision of the nation, but it surely took a strong act of will not to see ethnic diversity in early twentieth-century New York City or a homogenous southern culture. Yet, in the textbooks of American public schools, in the popular culture of middle America, and in the mind's eye of the majority of America's people, the nation was represented by Hollywood cowboys and the stars of family television shows, such as "Ozzie and Harriet" and "Leave It to Beaver." It took the shock of the civil rights movement in the 1950s and the radicalism of the counterculture of the 1960s to set the nation's mythology on the road to historical reality.

Not that we as a nation have yet completely convinced ourselves of our diversity, but I believe that recent political events indicate a greater degree of acceptance. When Bill Clinton, in his first public speech after his election to the U.S. presidency, spoke of cultural diversity as America's greatest strength, he set a tone that may facilitate a move in that direction. Hoerder has indicated that this has yet to occur in Germany or elsewhere in Europe. In this regard, the United States is unlike many nations of that continent. Birth in America grants citizenship as it does in few other countries. As Hoerder indicated, Germany is willing to take in guest workers but is not willing to grant automatic citizenship rights to their children born on German soil. The different conceptions of citizenship illustrated therein symbolizes the disparate impacts of multiculturalism in the respective countries.

Ironically, for all America's difficulties in coming to grips with its own diverse population, Europe looks to America to point the way in addressing the multicultural issue, and there are things that we as Americans can contribute. We have not been able to provide equal opportunity for all Americans, but we do have a system of law that works to curb inequalities in the protection of property and person. We do have anti-discrimination laws that, however imperfectly enforced, do discourage blatant racial discrimination in hiring, housing, education, and the like. I am not saying that we Americans have abolished racial or ethnic discrimination, but we have taken a few important steps in that direction.

As Germany struggles to cope with the rise of right-wing violence in the post-cold war era, it would do well to focus its energies on making and, most of all, enforcing laws that protect people and their property. I have heard in Germany as I have in the United States the admonition that morality cannot be legislated, that law cannot force people to love one another or to be enthusiastic about sharing the same society. Without debating that point, which I think is debatable, it is certain that laws and their energetic enforcement can protect foreigners from being attacked and killed in downtown Dresden or beaten to death in their apartments in London. If the law cannot make my neighbor like me, let it at least stop him from threatening my family and burning my home.

The issue of law and its enforcement becomes more difficult as it applies to chaotic situations in independent nation-states that threaten to displace whole populations and send them across borders into neighboring nations that are fearful and ill-prepared to deal with increasing numbers of refugees. Hoerder is quite right that these situations must be stabilized, but, as he said, there is no structure in place that could do so unless such service is requested—and then, only with difficulty.

Hoerder's paper does not offer a solution to this problem, but it does state the problem clearly. It is important for Americans who are dealing with multiculturalism as if it were a temporary condition—a fashion on college campuses until the next fad comes along—to understand that, although the world may no longer be embroiled in a cold war as we have traditionally known it, there is a conflict underway almost as dangerous. The inequality of nations, the fear of foreign cultures, the internal unrest that inevitably leads to external migration: these are the potential flash points of a world

in which Europe stands at a strategic location and in which America bears a peculiar responsibility. The end of the cold war has signaled the need to rethink the relationships that exist among nations and regions and to consider new obligations within a world community. This reappraisal is necessitated by the increasing interdependence of nations that we ignore at our peril. In the final analysis, we are more than ever a global society, and our alternative to cooperation is ensured mutual destruction. As Benjamin Franklin admonished his feuding revolutionary compatriots, "we must hang together or we will [most assuredly] hang separately."