

COMPARATIVE HISTORY: BUYER BEWARE

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Comparative history has few detractors. Formally, at least, it may have even fewer practitioners. In seminars and lectures historians compare constantly, yet nearly seventy years after Marc Bloch proclaimed the “perfection and general use [of the comparative method,] one of the most pressing needs of present-day historical science,” the vast majority of historical studies still reside comfortably within the parameters of individual nation-states.¹ Despite paeans to the method and conference sessions devoted to its propagation, comparative history has remained a marginal affair in the United States. Unlike gender history or the new cultural history, it is neither fashionable nor, until recently, a matter for controversy.

Comparative histories owe much to national shame. In European history the *Sonderweg* provided the most powerful stimulus to comparative research; more than two-thirds of all comparative studies published between 1970 and 1989 focused on Germany.² In the same years American historians took their own “peculiar institution” as a starting point. Race and slavery furnished the subject matter for most comparative studies until displaced by the welfare state in projects conceived and executed during the Reagan–Bush era. These concerns—together with the social-scientific methods of the 1970s, emblemized by the title of Charles Tilly’s surprisingly slim treatise, *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons*—account for the lion’s share of comparative work.³

Unlike quantitative history, that other darling of the 1970s, comparative history endures today. However, it is a sparsely populated congregation in a land of agnostics. The handful of comparativists who come readily to mind are the exceptions who prove the rule. Despite the paucity of studies there are innumerable methodological treatises on the subject of comparison, most notably from the field of historical sociology.⁴ We have a multiplicity of typologies of comparison. Calls for comparison still issue from all quarters—even as the responses echo back faintly. This siren song of comparison plays in an evangelical key. We comparativists dourly exhort our colleagues to assume ever-larger burdens with the promise of self-improvement in the distant offing. Like the early nineteenth-century British evangelicals, we offer salvation, after enormous labors and unremitting self-scrutiny, to those who will only “row their boat ashore.”

But what is largely missing in these heaps of methodological treatises is any sense of how to tackle this work. Only very infrequently do comparativists openly discuss the disadvantages and the pitfalls of what we do.

There are few realistic appraisals of the problems and costs for historians. There is no primer as to how to proceed. Basic questions remain not simply unanswered, but even unasked. For instance, what sorts of studies are most likely to succeed? What kinds of work should be avoided? Is comparative history compatible with cultural history? In his 1980 article in the *American Historical Review* Raymond Grew sounded a dismal note. Of the five hundred manuscripts submitted to the journal *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, founded in 1958 to further comparative research, the ones most likely to be rejected were actually the comparative pieces.⁵

With friends such as these, who needs enemies? Perhaps it is significant that in the past decade the most stinging criticisms of comparative work have come from historians who themselves work across national boundaries but reject comparison. Michel Espagne has characterized comparison as a relic of structural history, incompatible with the new questions raised by cultural historians and poststructuralist analysis.⁶ He proposes instead a history of cultural transfer: accounts of points of contact, of movements that traveled, of ideas that were exchanged. Along similar lines, Bénédicte Zimmermann, Claude Didry, and Peter Wagner have insisted on the merits of *histoire croisée*, or intersecting histories. Comparative history—they charge—reifies the nation, obscuring the dynamic relations that obtained across national boundaries.⁷

Both cross-national and comparative studies stake their claim to legitimacy on the ability, through multicountry analysis, to see something that a focus on one nation obscures. In that sense they can be animated by similar impulses. Both share a restlessness and chafe at the boundaries of single-nation studies. But comparative and cross-national approaches also have different motivations and can yield very different types of findings. After all, comparative history is concerned fundamentally with differences and similarities, often with questions of causality. Cross-national histories, by contrast, can tell us about transnational circulation, about the history of cultural transfer, about international phenomena, as in Daniel Rodgers's recent book on social work, *Atlantic Crossings*.⁸ And, for that matter, a number of comparative histories (maybe the best) are also cross-national histories, such as Charles Maier's *Recasting Bourgeois Europe*.⁹

Given the real differences of aims and outcomes between the two approaches, cross-national history is not—despite what its advocates claim—likely to render comparison obsolete. As Grew reminds us, comparison in history is not a method entailing a single type of inquiry but a set of approaches and “a kind of attitude”; it is, as George Fredrickson terms it, an “imagination.”¹⁰ However, Espagne is right to point to the sympathies between cross-national and cultural or intellectual history, whereas comparative history, if it has flourished anywhere, has prospered in social

and political fields in subjects such as welfare, labor and class, and, most recently, war.¹¹

This essay began as a set of prefatory remarks to a workshop on “Europe in Comparative and Cross-National Perspective” that I organized with Maura O’Connor of the University of Cincinnati. Co-sponsored by the GHI and the Taft Fund of the University of Cincinnati, the workshop brought together historians who had worked either cross-nationally or comparatively, and asked them to reflect on both the gains—as well as the obstacles and costs—of such research. We chose to invite historians rather than the political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, and literary critics who have made comparison a stock in trade because we wished to discuss our own discipline’s expectations and standards. Our goal is a book that will serve as an introduction to graduate students and scholars who wish to pursue cross-national or comparative projects. In line with the objectives of the conference I begin here with observations about the perils of comparative research for historians, turn next to its pleasures, and conclude with some reflections on the kinds of work most likely to succeed. Because the rewards of comparison have so often been trumpeted, the first section is the longest.

I

Comparative history is a tremendously uncertain business. There are many perils that await the unsuspecting. There is the time needed to master different historiographies. There are archival snafus. What happens, for instance, if the researcher is unable to find comparable sources, given different countries’ archival practices? To take just one example of many: Whereas hospital records are plentiful and easily accessible in Britain, in German archives they are both rare and governed by privacy restrictions. There is the awkwardness of structuring and writing comparative books. Should the countries be treated separately or interwoven within chapters? How many times can “by contrast” or “unlike in France” appear within one volume without overtaxing a reader’s patience? And all of these concerns are overshadowed by the worries of whether anyone will indeed read a comparative study. But let me confine myself only to the conceptual dangers.

Comparative studies can come to grief in a bewildering variety of ways: because the historian cannot substantiate the distinction she is drawing; because comparison does not evoke anything new; because the comparisons that are drawn cannot answer the problems that are posed. As Thomas Welskopp rightly observes, there has been too much work that compares mindlessly, as if comparison were a worthy aim in itself rather than a means to a larger end.¹² Excruciating for the comparativist is the reviewer who states

that he has learned little or nothing about the case he knows best, or worse, that the historian has committed fundamental errors. Faulty conceptualization is not, of course, solely a failing of comparative history, although it is very glaring there, especially when someone picks up a heavy comparative book, requiring languages and historiographies, and wonders why you have gone to so much trouble for so few genuine discoveries. This may explain why comparative studies rely so heavily on paradox as the point of departure.

Most difficult to pull off are those comparisons that take as their object of study apparently analogous phenomena in disparate settings. Three studies—George Fredrickson's *White Supremacy*, Peter Kolchin's *Unfree Labor*, and Shearer Bowman's *Masters and Lords*—demonstrate the problems that dog such topics.¹³ Widely admired by comparativists for their mastery of the form, both Fredrickson and Kolchin have been taken to task by South African and Russian historians for their characterizations of racial distinctions and serfdom, respectively. What appears to the comparativist as neat and revealing juxtapositions seem to the specialist unwarranted liberties with the historical evidence. Similarly, Bowman's comparison of slavery in the American South and serfdom in Prussia in the first half of the nineteenth century suffers from its author's reliance on an outdated portrait of the Junker; German historians seem to have paid little attention to his book. Studies such as these are plagued by very fundamental questions of "comparability." Are the countries under examination too different to yield meaningful contrasts? Does their juxtaposition for the purpose of comparison eliminate the important distinctiveness of each?

An inherently more difficult problem for comparative history is that of local particularities. In its focus on the national unit, and especially on the state, comparative history has tended to obscure the distinctive histories of regions, to homogenize differences under the rubric of the nation. There are, of course, notable exceptions, studies such as Detlef Lehnert's *Kommunale Politik*, which compares local governance in Berlin and Vienna from 1919 to 1932.¹⁴ But at a time when some call into question the very existence of the nation, much comparative history is characterized by what seems an old-fashioned sensibility. In part, this focus on the nation and the state has been dictated by the topics chosen. When comparison was concerned primarily with institutions such as welfare states, social movements such as feminism or labor, and periods of transformation such as war and revolution, historians almost necessarily sacrificed rich depictions of the local for the larger prize of national patterns; in each case the state was central. As comparative historians grapple with the history of everyday life (and here Laura Lee Downs's *Manufacturing Inequality* offers an excellent example of a comparative history that is also a social history from below), the heterogeneity contained within nations may enter through the back door.¹⁵

The thorniest of the problems that comparative history raises is that of causality. The problem becomes especially acute in bipartite, or two-country, comparisons and most difficult of all in those cases that focus on differences. In attempting to explain why X happened or developed in country A and not in country B, comparative studies tend to place their explanatory weight on a few factors. Put differently, a focus on *why* (in a narrow sense) replaces attention to *how*. My own work offers an example.¹⁶ In tracing why German veterans, who received comparatively generous pensions and the best social services in Europe, turned against the Weimar Republic that favored them, whereas British veterans, neglected by successive governments, proved loyal subjects, it is the role of the public—and voluntarism—that proves crucial. Veterans in both countries suffered shabby treatment at the hands of the state; the critical difference was how they felt about their fellow citizens. Although I note other fundamental differences between interwar Britain and Germany (perhaps most important, the barriers to extraparliamentary action and the war's resolution), they serve principally as context and not as explanation.

In its search for causes my book follows in a time-honored, although to me now not entirely satisfactory, vein. Fredrickson has summarized the prevailing tradition: "For most historians and social scientists, comparative history is a way of isolating the critical factors or independent variables that account for national differences."¹⁷ But is it in fact possible to build arguments by isolating critical factors? And how do historians, who are, after all, not white-coated rationalists operating in a laboratory, disentangle one factor from the other? If we demonstrate that Protestantism was not necessary for the development of capitalism in country A, have we necessarily diminished its significance in country B? What is beyond dispute is that Protestantism cannot, as a rule, entirely explain the development of capitalism writ large. Comparison thus makes a large dent in the "generalizing" explanations of the comparative historical sociologist or political scientist. However, within the individual case the significance of Protestantism cannot be dismissed so easily, nor even can its primacy be cast in doubt.

If similar phenomena have different causes and if divergent outcomes stem from apparently related factors, how do we isolate the critical variables as Fredrickson proposes? Rather than being "a technical instrument . . . capable of giving positive results," as in Bloch's description, comparison may well lead the researcher into deep and murky waters. Sophisticated causal explanations require more than sifting through independent variables. After all, revolution Y and Z may share a precipitating event, which masks deeper—and divergent—underlying explanations. At issue is the interplay *between* different factors, left unaccounted for in Fredrickson's for-

mulation. Variable X may function very differently in countries A and B, depending on the context. In country A, it may be of primary importance, in country B, only of negligible significance.

Every comparativist who seeks explanations for differences eventually confronts the problem of distinguishing the causal from the contextual. The causal is the explanation, while the contextual furnishes the background. Whereas national historians' arguments tend toward the multicausal, drawing on all of the factors that can explain a particular phenomenon, comparativists are often caught in a mono- or bicausal trap. How, after all, can national differences be satisfactorily explained by reference to national differences? Comparative books often begin with a chapter on context before setting out an argument intended to demonstrate that the factors often taken as the self-evident cause of X phenomenon do not suffice to explain what happened—that there was a more powerful force (or forces) at work, revealed by attention to similar or different developments in another country. As might be expected, the weight of the explanation falls on tangibles: movements whose strength can be measured, a class whose predominance is unchallenged, welfare programs whose growth can be charted. Most often, the cultural and ideological context is shorted in favor of such structural elements.

If comparativists still carry the lonely banner of causality, it is, generally speaking, a very particular kind of causal explanation that we offer. The point here is not that comparativists should abandon the search for causes but that we should pursue it more alive to the costs. In his illuminating study of universities in the German Democratic Republic, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, John Connelly explains his solution to the problem: "Political culture is part of the story but also part of the explanation."¹⁸ Connelly's is a frank acknowledgment of the difficulty of distinguishing context from cause: The reader in search of a tidy explanation will not find it. His overriding aim is to demonstrate the variation in East Central Europe.

II

So why should we compare? Front and center, as American exceptionalism and the *Sonderweg* demonstrate, because we do it anyway—and usually badly. There are the normal pleasures of reading widely, of attention to interdisciplinary debates (by no means confined to comparativists), the genuine discipline that comparison imposes on those who tend toward pointilism. For graduate students comparison can provide a first line of defense against obscurantism; it forces one, at an early stage, to answer why the project matters and to engage different historiographies.

Let me offer two principal reasons to compare: First, although not as often as one might wish, comparison provides a counterfactual glimpse that illuminates a path not taken, policies not pursued, which serve to throw a wrench in overdetermined historical narratives. Comparison can return contingency to history. Comparison can lead the historian to ask questions that spark genuinely new interpretations. Bloch's study of enclosure is the most famous (and most oft-cited) example. Peter Baldwin's juxtaposition of the British welfare state with the Scandinavian system (as contrasted to the French and German models) is a marvelous example of revelation-by-association. Susan Pedersen's inquiry into the failure of the British feminists' campaign for family allowances led her to a little-known chapter in the development of the French welfare state: employers' efforts to disaggregate the male wage by offering family allowances to their workers. In my own work the predominance of voluntarism in Britain caused me to wonder what had happened to the German charities that had dominated provision for disabled soldiers in the first years of the Great War. This question, essentially a comparative starting point, opened a story that had gone largely untold: the regulation of charities by state authorities from the last years of the war through the Weimar Republic.

More often, what comparisons illuminate are not hitherto unknown developments but the significance of institutions and phenomena that national historians take for granted. Fredrickson's splendid comparison of South Africa and the American South, *White Supremacy*, did not uncover any smoking guns but served to place the development and the hardening of racial categories in a new and enlightening context. Similarly, Christoph Jahr's recent study of deserters in the British and German armies during the First and Second World Wars demonstrated, through painstakingly compiled empirical evidence, the strange legacy of a British army that was notably out of step with civilian public opinion.¹⁹ In my own case the renowned tradition of British voluntarism proved more than simply a national peculiarity; charities served to check veterans' radicalism by brokering a truce between the grateful public and those who had suffered. Comparison can also modify historiographic excesses. In Connelly's work, the GDR, when compared with the Polish and the Czech cases, appears still more authoritarian than the recent literature on resistance in East Germany would allow.

What sorts of comparisons work best? Those historians who have commented on the subject point to "middle-range" comparisons. According to Grew, "comparison is most enlightening when . . . attention is paid to the intricate relationships between the elements compared and the particular societies in which they are located. . . . The search is for patterns of behavior and circumscribed hypotheses, and it is as likely to result in the recognition

of unexpected connections between aspects of society previously thought to be unrelated as in general theory.²⁰ According to both Grew and Baldwin, studies aimed at this middle range avoid the stratospheric heights of social-scientific abstraction.²¹ Less clear from their descriptions is what might constitute too microscopic a topic. What, for instance, might a comparative microhistory reveal? Johannes Dillinger's reflections on the differences between American spiritualism and German sectarianism, as viewed through the cases of the New York Fox sisters and a late eighteenth-century Württemberg ghost sect, indicate the promise of a comparative microhistorical approach.²²

Least likely to go wrong are those topics that begin from a point of relation, those that seemed to contemporaries themselves inherently comparative. When you work on these kinds of topics, you uncover a rich international discussion that itself revolves around similarities and differences. This is what Nancy Green calls the "interactive comparative method" in her insightful book about the garment industries in Paris and New York, *Ready-to-Wear and Ready-to-Work*.²³ There are many fine examples of this type of comparison, among them Charlotte Tacke's excellent study of monuments in nineteenth-century France and the German states, and along similar lines, Michael Jeismann's account of French and German images of the enemy.²⁴ The comparativist thus has the opportunity to say something not merely about the national contexts but about a wider phenomenon. Here, comparison has the potential for demonstrating something that historians do not already know without casting events, classes, or statistics adrift from their social moorings.

Along these same lines, we should not hold doggedly to the nation as the principal unit of comparison. As Heinz-Gerhard Haupt has suggested, we should also seek out other "entities of comparison."²⁵ The problem of homogenizing the differences within nations is a real one and should be taken seriously. Studies of cities, studies of regions, more local comparisons of institutions: All of these are potentially lower-risk strategies that preserve particularities. An elegant and short example of this genre is the historical sociologist Howard Kimeldorf's *Reds or Rackets*, a study of why and how longshoremen in New York got tied up with the Mob while their counterparts in San Francisco became communists.²⁶ Seen from this vantage point all history is—at base—comparative, although often not explicitly so.

Finally, we ought, both as comparativists and as the patient audience that they hector, to lower our expectations of what the "method" can achieve. In 1928 Marc Bloch described the comparative method thus: "The historical specialist asks for a method which is a technical instrument, generally used, easily manageable, and capable of giving positive results. . . . The comparative method is precisely such an instrument."²⁷ This faith in com-

parison has been shown in the last seventy-odd years to have been misplaced. Rather than chasing the divine revelations that comparisons grant on occasion, we might content ourselves with smart juxtapositions, with parallel histories that shed light on cross-national phenomena. Comparison was, in Bloch's words, "a powerful magic wand" that allowed historians to see beyond local conditions to develop more comprehensive explanations.²⁸ Looking back over the literature and my own experiences, we should be on guard—lest Bloch's "magic wand" become, like the trick in some modern-day evangelical conjuring act, a poisonous snake.

Notes

My thanks to Maura O'Connor and the participants in the GHI-Taft workshop, "Europe in Cross-National and Comparative Perspective," especially Peter Baldwin, Nancy Green, Susan Grayzel, and Michael Miller. I am grateful to Becky Conekin, Peter Mandler, Susan Pedersen, Vanessa Schwartz, and Adam Tooze for their suggestions on this piece.

¹ Marc Bloch, "Pour une histoire comparée des sociétés européennes," paper delivered at the Sixth International Congress of Historical Sciences held in Oslo in 1928 and printed in *Revue de synthèse historique* 46 (1928): 15–50; Marc Bloch, "Toward a Comparative History of European Societies," in Frederic C. Lane, ed., *Enterprise and Secular Change: Readings in Economic History* (London, 1953), 494–5.

² Jürgen Kocka and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, *Geschichte und Vergleich: Ansätze und Ergebnisse international vergleichender Geschichtsschreibung* (Frankfurt am Main, 1996).

³ Charles Tilly, *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons* (New York, 1984).

⁴ Among others, see Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, "The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 22 (1980): 174–97; Antoon van den Braembussche, "Historical Explanation and Comparative Method: Towards a Theory of the History of Society," *History and Theory* 28 (1989): 1–24.

⁵ Raymond Grew, "The Case for Comparing Histories," *American Historical Review* 85, no. 4 (Oct. 1980): 773.

⁶ Michel Espagne, "Sur les limites du comparatisme en histoire culturelle," *Genèses* 17 (Sept. 1994): 102–21; Michel Espagne, *Les transferts culturels franco-allemands* (Paris, 1999); see also Wolfgang Schmale, *Historische Komparatistik und Kulturtransfer* (Bochum, 1998).

⁷ Bénédicte Zimmermann, Claude Didry, and Peter Wagner, *Le travail et la nation: Histoire croisée de la France et de l'Allemagne* (Paris, 1999), 4.

⁸ Daniel T. Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age* (Cambridge, Mass., 1998).

⁹ Charles Maier, *Recasting Bourgeois Europe* (Princeton, N.J., 1975).

¹⁰ Grew, "The Case," 776–7; George M. Fredrickson, *The Comparative Imagination: On the History of Racism, Nationalism, and Social Movements* (Berkeley, Calif., 1997).

¹¹ Examples include Susan Pedersen, *Family, Dependence, and the Origins of the Welfare State: Britain and France, 1914–1945* (Cambridge, 1993); Peter Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State, 1875–1975* (Cambridge, 1990); Peter Baldwin, *Contagion and the State, 1830–1930* (New York, 1999); Gerhard A. Ritter, *Der Sozialstaat: Entstehung und Entwicklung im internationalen Vergleich* (Munich, 1991); Alisa Klaus, *Every Child a Lion: The*

Origins of Maternal and Infant Health Policy in the United States and France, 1890–1920 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1993); Seth Koven and Sonya Michel, “Womanly Duties: Maternalist Politics and the Origins of Welfare States in France, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States, 1880–1920,” *American Historical Review* 95 (1990): 1076–108; Michael Geyer, “Ein Vorbote des Wohlfahrtsstaates: Die Kriegsoferversorgung in Frankreich, Deutschland und Grossbritannien nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg,” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 9 (1983): 230–77; Stefan Berger, *The British Labour Party and the German Social Democrats, 1900–1931* (Oxford, 1994); John N. Horne, *Labour at War: France and Britain, 1914–1918* (Oxford, 1991); John Breuilly, *Labour and Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century Europe: Essays in Comparative History* (Manchester, 1992); Christiane Eisenberg, *Deutsche und englische Gewerkschaften: Entstehung und Entwicklung bis 1878 im Vergleich* (Göttingen, 1986); Jürgen Kocka, *Bürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert*, 3 vols. (Munich, 1988); Susan Grayzel, *Women’s Identities at War: Gender, Motherhood, and Politics in Britain and France During the First World War* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1999); Jay Winter and Jean-Louis Robert, *Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, Berlin, 1914–1919* (Cambridge, 1997).

¹² Thomas Welskopp, “Stolpersteine auf dem Königsweg: Methodenkritische Anmerkungen zum internationalen Vergleich in der Gesellschaftsgeschichte,” *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 35 (1995): 339–67; Werner Daum, “Fallobst oder Steinschlag: Einleitende Überlegungen zum historischen Vergleich,” in Helga Schnabel-Schüle, ed., *Vergleichende Perspektiven—Perspektiven des Vergleichs: Studien zur europäischen Geschichte von der Spätantike bis ins 20. Jahrhundert* (Mainz, 1998), 1–21.

¹³ Shearer Davis Bowman, *Masters & Lords: Mid-Nineteenth-Century U.S. Planters and Prussian Junkers* (New York, 1993); George M. Fredrickson, *White Supremacy: A Comparative Study in American and South African History* (New York, 1981); George M. Fredrickson, *Black Liberation: A Comparative History of Black Ideologies in the United States and South Africa* (New York, 1995); Peter Kolchin, *Unfree Labor: American Slavery and Russian Serfdom* (Cambridge, 1987).

¹⁴ Detlef Lehnert, *Kommunale Politik: Parteiensystem und Interessenkonflikte in Berlin und Wien 1919–1932* (Berlin, 1991).

¹⁵ Laura Lee Downs, *Manufacturing Inequality: Gender Division in the French and British Metal-working Industries, 1914–1939* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1995).

¹⁶ Deborah Cohen, *The War Come Home: Disabled Veterans in Britain and Germany, 1914–1939* (Berkeley, Calif., 2001).

¹⁷ George M. Fredrickson, “From Exceptionalism to Variability: Recent Developments in Cross-National Comparative History,” *Journal of American History* 82, no. 2 (Sept. 1995): 587.

¹⁸ John Connelly, *Captive University: The Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish Higher Education, 1945–1956* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2000), 283.

¹⁹ Christoph Jahr, *Gewöhnliche Soldaten: Desertion und Deserteure im deutschen und britischen Heer 1914–1918* (Göttingen, 1998).

²⁰ Grew, “The Case,” 773.

²¹ Baldwin, *Politics of Social Solidarity*, 39.

²² Johannes Dillinger, “American Spiritualism and German Sectarianism: A Comparative Study of the Societal Construction of Ghost Beliefs,” *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute* 28 (spring 2001): 55–73.

²³ Nancy Green, *Ready-to-Wear and Ready-to-Work: A Century of Industry and Immigrants in Paris* (Durham, N.C., 1997).

²⁴ Charlotte Tacke, *Denkmal im sozialen Raum: Nationale Symbole in Deutschland und Frankreich im 19. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 1995); Michael Jeismann, *Das Vaterland der Feinde. Studien zum nationalen Feindbegriff und Selbstverständnis in Deutschland und Frankreich 1792–1918* (Stuttgart, 1992).

²⁵ Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, "Die international vergleichende Geschichtswissenschaft: Ein Relikt der Strukturgeschichte?" unpublished paper, German Historical Institute, 2000.

²⁶ Howard Kimeldorf, *Reds or Rackets? The Making of Radical and Conservative Unions on the Waterfront* (Berkeley, Calif., 1988).

²⁷ Bloch, "Toward a Comparative History," 495.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 501.