

THE GEOGRAPHY OF GERMANNESS: RECENTERING GERMAN HISTORY IN INTERWAR POLAND

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German minorities in Eastern Europe were among the many nationality issues created by the peace settlements following the First World War. Both Weimar and Nazi claims to take care of German compatriots abroad made the treatment of these minorities a point of international tension. In the 1938 Munich Agreement, the European powers allowed Germany to incorporate the Sudeten German regions in Czechoslovakia. In the following year, Germany's invasion of Poland was backed by claims of Polish repression of the German minority there. Yet who were the Germans in Poland? Germanness, after all, was a slippery concept, and it was contested not just by authorities and scholars in Poland and Germany, but also by German minority leaders themselves. Behind the façade of *völkisch* unity lurked serious divisions that worked to crosscut the political cohesion of the Germans in Poland. This essay examines how the German minority in interwar Poland can provide new perspectives on nationalism and nationalist historiography. First, it questions the narrative of national transformation within the German minority in Poland by focusing on regional particularities in the minority; second, this perspective from the national periphery offers a reexamination of interwar Reich policies and German nationalism; and third, it shows how the use of Polish sources and different approaches can lead to new findings.¹

Interwar Poland was composed of a complicated agglomeration of territories from the German Empire, Austria-Hungary, and the Russian Empire. According to the official Polish census for 1921, there were 1,059,154 Germans in Poland, or 3.9 percent of the total population.² At least initially, most of Poland's German minority did live in those territories that had once belonged to the German Empire, that is in the western Polish regions of Poznania, Pomerelia (including much of West Prussia and often referred to as the "Polish Corridor"), and Upper Silesia. Many, if not most, studies on the Germans in interwar Poland have concentrated on these areas.³ But there were also several hundred thousand Germans who lived in the formerly Russian and Austrian territories,⁴ and by 1939, these Germans made up the majority of Germans in Poland.⁵

Rather than examining the development of regional identities, post-war West German and Polish historians have tended to focus on the

narrative of “national becoming” within the German minority in Poland. According to this view, the diverse Germans in Poland from the three Polish partitions were slowly but surely becoming a unified minority group in the interwar period, what many called a *Volksgruppe*. The narrative of a *Volksgruppe*-in-becoming fulfilled the normative view of many historians who believed in an inherent unity of all Germans: minority leaders needed only to put aside or overcome their regional differences in order to work together against Polish oppression.⁶ Although there had been steady and significant progress toward becoming a *Volksgruppe* in this view, the process was interrupted (but not necessarily ended) by the onset of the Second World War. This interpretation also allowed postwar German historians to lambaste the interwar Polish state for its supposedly clumsy and repressive nationality policies; indeed, the mass migration of Germans from Poland to Germany seemed to foreshadow the mass expulsions of Germans from Poland’s new western territories following the Second World War.⁷ Yet the “silver lining” in the otherwise dark period of Polish rule was that it accelerated the minority’s national transformation. Polish repression was seen as the midwife of growing German nationalism in Poland, and as such it served as the scapegoat for the minority’s Nazification.

Polish historiography after the Second World War also played on this *Volksgruppe* narrative, if for different reasons. Polish historians could point to the apparent homogenization of the minority as proof indeed that the Germans in Poland had become Nazis.⁸ In this view, the German minority did not just lack a sense of loyalty to Poland, but Polish historians could blame local Germans for acting as a “Fifth Column” that carried out diversionary attacks during Hitler’s invasion in September 1939.⁹ Hence, the Polish state had been justified *ex post facto* in its suspicions of the minority and the (reasonable) countermeasures it had taken. It was important in postwar Polish eyes that no Germans could be trusted, for on the one hand, the purported crimes of the German minority in helping the German attackers and occupiers not only legitimated Poland’s annexation of eastern German territories (which Poles referred to as the “recovered lands”) following the Second World War, but the crimes that local Germans committed during the occupation also justified the expulsion of Germans from all territories that had come under Polish control.¹⁰ Thus, both postwar Polish and German historiographies, which usually agreed on little else, converged on the idea of the Germans in Poland having largely become a unitary *Volksgruppe* by 1939. This view is still present in much of the recent scholarly and less politicized literature.¹¹

The *Volksgruppe* narrative can be explained in part because the previous history of the Germans in Poland has focused on the role of the

metropolises, and this perspective from the top down often underplays differences within the minority.¹² Recentring the story of German nationalism in Poland from the metropolises to the periphery allows a different picture. No doubt, it is impossible to understand the politics of the German minority in Poland without examining the role of the German and Polish states in shaping the overall setting for German activists to operate. As Rogers Brubaker has argued in his study of nationalism involving the Germans in interwar Poland, one must take minority actors more seriously, for they form a “single, interdependent relational nexus” with the Polish “nationalizing” host state and the German “external national homeland” state.¹³ It is thus important to treat minority actors as central, independent subjects who were not simply subordinate to Polish repression or Reich manipulation. Centralized policies, whether from Berlin or Warsaw, often produced conflict rather than cohesion within the minority. Moreover, the confusion of jurisdictions and competencies within the Reich tended to give “client” minority leaders considerable influence over their “patrons,” thereby allowing German activists in Poland to formulate and to pursue their own agendas.

At the same time, the diversity of voices within the German minority must be given more attention as well. Due to their stronger ties with the Reich, the views of German minority leaders in western Poland dominated and were often taken to stand for the position of the German minority as a whole. Going beyond the “center” of the minority in Prussian Poland and focusing on Germans living in other regions, however, would show that German minority leaders could not agree on what their short- and long-term goals were. Forced from three disparate empires into one “successor” state, regional German leaders discovered and created differences between themselves, and they continually navigated politically between national cohesion and regional particularisms. The salience of regional cleavages was one of the reasons that German activists in Poland failed to form a unified political organization, despite their own pronouncements for political unity and the intermittent encouragement of certain Reich German offices. Unity, after all, had to be balanced with issues of power. At the same time, strong nationalization processes within the minority resulted from this often-vigorous intraethnic competition. There is thus a need to consider multiple imaginations of Germanness within the minority—and without.

The second point of this essay is to argue that a study of regional cleavages within the minority allows for a reexamination of nationalisms and nationalist policies in the Reich. Such an approach enables a better understanding of why certain views on the German minority prevailed. Minority politics, while not subject to Reich whims, closely interplayed with the policies of the German state, and these had inadvertently deep-

ened regional cleavages among ethnic Germans in Poland. Especially important in this process was the widespread desire in Germany to regain the territories it had lost to Poland after the First World War and to support the ethnic Germans who lived there. Although the German state provided aid to the Polish Germans, it did not care equally. Even within the borders of Poland, Reich officials differentiated Germans according to their value to Germany's geopolitical goals. As will be discussed below, these views were also related to perceptions of hierarchical Germanness within the minority. Moreover, this differentiation in care for ethnic Germans was glaringly apparent. During the Weimar Republic, substantial subsidies flowed to the Germans in Poland. Yet these funds were not appropriated equally among the regions. Germans who used to be Reich citizens, i.e. those in the formerly Prussian territories, received considerably more aid than Germans in formerly Austrian or Russian Poland. One loan program supported by Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann in the mid-1920s allocated 21.5 million marks to be distributed to the Germans in Poland. Yet over 95 percent of the funds were to go to the Germans in western Poland, although they made up somewhat more than half of the minority.¹⁴ Not surprisingly, the coincidence of revisionist claims with regional cleavages fostered jealousies and animosity between the "diaspora" Germans of the former Russian and Austrian territories and the "borderland" Germans in areas ceded by the German Reich.¹⁵

Looking at the motivation, intent, and effect of such differentiated Reich policies can provide a reexamination of nationalism at the metropolises. For example, historians have noted the rapid rise of *völkisch* nationalism during and after the First World War, what has been referred to as the "völkisch turn."¹⁶ Indeed, the considerable sums for "Germandom policy" (*Deutschumpolitik*) might appear concurrent with a greater *völkisch* interest in Germans outside of Germany's borders. It is important, however, not to over-ethnicize this financial support for minorities abroad. Even those offices devoted to retaining German culture and influence abroad, such as the Deutsche Stiftung (which was affiliated with the Foreign Ministry), were not committed to an egalitarian brotherhood of Germans regardless of their state of residence. Rather, Reich officials acted out of a mix of concerns that were informed by a geography of Germanness. There was a greater sense of obligation for former Reich citizens stranded in Poland, who enjoyed a kind of "residual citizenship" and had special claims on the German state. Prewar membership in clubs, pensions, and unions had created ties and mutual obligations that continued in the interwar period across the new borders. While it was important that these former citizens were somehow "German," Weimar's official revisionist policies had little to do with the currents of *völkisch* thought that saw the minorities as important in themselves for their

intrinsic racial qualities. Nor was aid to the Germans in western Poland merely an instrument of territorial revisionism, but it was based in large part on the state's residual obligations to former citizens. Hence, the Weimar Republic's lopsided support for the Germans in western Poland reveal the political and social resilience of the borders of 1914. Such etatist and civic bases of Germanness persisted long after the First World War ended and competed with other ideologies, including *völkisch* thought. A hierarchy of Germanness became discernible, with some Germans being somehow more "German" and more deserving of aid from the Reich.

By recentering our attention on those peripheralized within the German minority in Poland, it is possible to see the complicated contingency of national belonging and self-understanding. The aforementioned "residual citizenship" did not just affect policies at the German Foreign Ministry and Prussian Interior Ministry, but it also existed in the minds of those former German citizens who were now in Poland. Differentiated Reich policies both reflected and fostered imaginations of a variegated Germanness within the minority. By stressing their legal, political, and social connections to Germany, the former *Staatsvolk* in western Poland could resist coming to terms with their new status as *Auslandsdeutsche*. In turn, this "residual citizenship" of the western Polish Germans complicated their cooperation with those Germans elsewhere who never had a connection with the German state and who were more or less resigned to remaining in Poland. While German minority leaders could not control the purse strings of funds coming from the Reich, they did contribute to shaping the hierarchy of Germanness in Poland. By tarring other German groups with the brush of cultural contamination, regional German activists in Poland could influence the overall political direction of the minority.

An important example involved the city of Łódź in formerly Russian Poland. Once a great textile manufacturing center, the city also counted some sixty thousand Germans, which represented the largest concentration of Germans in Poland. The Germans in Łódź were hence the greatest potential challenge to the dominance of the formerly Prussian Germans in western Poland. German activists in Łódź, who largely saw themselves destined for a life outside Germany, appeared especially threatening because they adopted a reconciliatory attitude toward the Polish state. Western Polish German leaders found out early on that working with their purported cousins in Łódź could be more of a liability than a benefit.¹⁷ Such political differences within the minority were difficult to reconcile, and they were often attributed to other, more nefarious causes. Reich officials and German activists commonly portrayed the Łódź Germans as somehow too Polish, too Jewish, and too un-German.¹⁸ This stereotype could be summed up as the "Lodzer Mensch," a preexisting

stereotype of Łódź's entrepreneurs as being cosmopolitan and preoccupied with business matters. The ascription of anti-Polish and anti-Semitic qualities upon the broader section of Łódź's Germans helped to give order to vague and shifting notions of Germanness. At the same time, German activists in Poland internalized and exploited the myth of the "Lodzer Mensch" to support the concept of hierarchical Germanness, with Germans living further east portrayed as somehow less German and less reliable in national matters.¹⁹ While the former Reich Germans took the dominant position in the minority, the "Lodzer Mensch" stereotype confirmed the subordinate role (and inherent danger) of the central and eastern Polish Germans.

Yet during the 1930s, the tenuousness of this constructed Germanness became clear as the confluence of demographic, political, and ideological changes began to undermine the established hierarchy. German scholars began to see the Germans in the eastern regions of Poland more favorably, in part due to their higher birth rates and their purported steadfastness in the face of Polish repression. Their alleged toughness stood in stark contrast to the apparently weak-willed Poznanian and Pomerelian Germans who had left in droves for Germany in the 1920s. Yet this higher appraisal was also due to the vigorous leadership of German activists in central and formerly Austrian Poland. The ability of previously peripheralized leaders to mobilize the rhetoric of National Socialism undermined the position of the Germans in western Poland. At the same time, the increasing calls within the minority for political unification only exacerbated intraethnic and regional tensions. The National Socialist tenets of an egalitarian German community, the new *Volksgemeinschaft*, helped to induce unrealistically high expectations of national solidarity and empowered those Germans who had long been seen as somehow less German, especially in central and eastern Poland. In practice, it unleashed a power struggle that fractured the minority even further.

By the late 1930s, German minority organizations had solidified largely along regional lines. The formerly Prussian regions were represented by the Deutsche Vereinigung in Poznanian and Pomerelia and the Volksbund in East Upper Silesia.²⁰ The Deutscher Volksverband arose in what had been the Russian-controlled Congress Kingdom of Poland, and the Jungdeutsche Partei based itself in formerly Austrian Silesia. Importantly, the Jungdeutsche Partei had largely failed in its attempt to expand to other Polish regions. Far from overcoming old political borders and growing together into a homogeneous *Volksgruppe*, German activists became increasingly conscious of their regional distinctions and interests. At the same time, one should not see the hardening of regional lines as a lack of nationalism, for the interplay of regionality and nationality was not a zero-sum game, as recent scholarship has shown.²¹ German minor-

ity leaders on the periphery consistently deployed notions of Germanness and community for particular ends.

The third point of this essay is that new questions based on sources in Poland have made it possible to come to this interpretation of German minority history in Poland. The persistence of the *Volksgruppe* narrative is in part due to the nature of the sources available. Reich officials were often not only geographically far away when reporting on the minority, but were also loaded with Reich German baggage in their viewpoints and priorities. Even Reich officials serving in Poland had limited access to what Germans were doing, and they were often deceived and subjected to various interests. It was difficult for consular officials to filter through competing loyalties and claims. Minority-generated sources also give a skewed view. Tensions seldom came to light in the official correspondence of minority leaders, or they were couched in terms that did not question the essential unity of the *Volk*. Minority leaders who lived under the threat of house searches often kept few records (and much of what was written was destroyed during the war). Moreover, German activists often felt compelled to display national solidarity, which was as much a show for themselves as for the funding agencies in the Reich.

While also sown with their own inconsistencies and political agendas, Polish administrative and police reports provide greater detail regarding the political life of the Germans in Poland. Polish police informants were able to infiltrate German organizations with ease, in part because German parties were often lax in their membership criteria, and in part because the Polish police were able to take advantage of the deep divides within the minority. Polish informants listened intently to the considerable grumbling of minority activists, who often disparaged the Germans from other territories quite freely at their meetings.²²

Polish reports show that instead of collaborating to build a *Volksgemeinschaft*, as minority-generated materials tend to suggest, the regional leaders were actively working against one another to protect the interests of their regional fiefdoms.²³ One Polish administrative report reveals that during a political rally in Łódź, a German activist noted that Germans in formerly Russian Poland did not enjoy a good reputation in the Reich and in the other Polish territories.²⁴ At the same time, such statements show how alleged regional resentments and self-perceptions could be formulated and deployed to mobilize the German groups in Poland. In short, Polish sources enable a retelling of the *Volksgruppe* narrative by providing a dense archival base for new research questions. The wealth of information left by local Polish administration and police offers the historian the ability to counter-read the proclamations made by German minority leaders and to assess how Germans acted beyond their nationalist pronouncements.

To conclude, recentring the narrative of the German minority in Poland undermines the teleology of German national development in interwar Poland. It also enables a reassessment of nationalism and policy-making at the metropolises. Germanness was hierarchical but also malleable, and Germanness was constructed not just at the center, but at the peripheries of Germandom as well. Because the Germans in western Poland always had one foot out of the minority door, their political goals were very different from those of the Germans in formerly Austrian and Russian territories, which fostered considerable tension between German minority leaders. Although no unified political organization was formed, the intense intraethnic conflict along regionalized lines also culminated in minority radicalization, which had dire consequences for their Polish and Jewish neighbors in the Second World War.²⁵

Notes

¹ This essay is based on the author's dissertation: Winson W. Chu, "German Political Organizations and Regional Particularisms in Interwar Poland (1918–1939)" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2006).

² Richard Blanke, *Orphans of Versailles: The Germans in Western Poland, 1918–1939* (Lexington, 1993), 32. This figure did not yet include the some 330,000 Germans who would be added to Poland after the division of Upper Silesia in 1922. Blanke, *Orphans of Versailles*, 30–31.

³ See Martin Broszat, "JDP und DV in Posen-Pomerellen," *Gutachten des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte* 1 (1958): 404–7; Norbert Friedrich Krekeler, *Revisionsanspruch und geheime Ostpolitik der Weimarer Republik: Die Subventionierung der deutschen Minderheit in Polen* (Stuttgart, 1973); Wolfgang Kessler, "Die Deutsche Bevölkerung Pommerellens und Großpolens nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg (1919–1929)," in *Hermann Rauschnig: Die Abwanderung der Deutschen aus Westpreußen und Posen nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg*, ed. Wolfgang Kessler (Essen, 1988).

⁴ The territories that had belonged to the Russian Empire included Volhynia and the Congress Kingdom of Poland, whose main city was Łódź. The formerly Habsburg territories included Austrian Silesia (centered on the towns of Bielsko/Bielitz and Cieszyn/Teschen) and western Galicia, centered on Lwów/Lemberg.

⁵ Blanke, *Orphans of Versailles*, 3.

⁶ One of the most notable proponents of the thesis that the German minority had transformed into a *Volksgruppe* was Richard Breyer, who grew up in central Poland and later became director of the Herder-Institut in Marburg. See Richard Breyer, *Das Deutsche Reich und Polen 1932–1937: Außenpolitik und Volksgruppenfragen* (Würzburg, 1955), especially 49–51, 227–236, 255–256. The *Volksgruppe*-in-becoming narrative continued to have a strong resonance long after the Second World War among German expellees from interwar Poland. Germans from Poznań and central Poland (which had been part of the former Reichsgau "Wartheland" during the war) were joined in one expellee organization, the *Landsmannschaft Weichsel-Warthe*. LWW-affiliated scholarship has perpetuated old tropes of interwar minority unity by focusing on similarities rather than on differences. Because the LWW did not make any territorial claims, Jutta Faehndrich has ranked it as moderate within the expellee political landscape. See Jutta Faehndrich, "Erinnerungskultur und Umgang mit Vertreibung in Heimatbüchern deutschsprachiger Vertriebener," *Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung* 52, no. 2 (2003): 191–229.

⁷ Erich Keyser, "Der Deutschtumsverlust in Westpreußen 1918–1939," *Ostdeutsche Wissenschaft* 8 (1961): 63–79; Gotthold Rhode, "Das Deutschtum in Posen und Pommerellen in der

Zeit der Weimarer Republik," in *Die deutschen Ostgebiete zur Zeit der Weimarer Republik*, 88–132 (Cologne/Graz, 1966); Walther Threde & Peter Nasarski, eds., *Polen und sein preußischer Streifen, 1919–1939: Die deutsche Volksgruppe in Posen und Pommerellen* (Berlin/Bonn, 1983); Hugo Rasmus, *Pommerellen-Westpreußen 1919–1939* (Munich, 1989).

⁸ Mirosław Cygański, *Mniejszość niemiecka w Polsce centralnej w latach 1919–1939*, (Łódź, 1962), 50.

⁹ See Andrzej Leśniewski, ed., *Irredentism and Provocation: A Contribution to the History of the German Minority in Poland* (Poznań, 1960); Mirosław Cygański, *Mniejszość niemiecka w Polsce centralnej w latach 1919–1939*, (Łódź, 1962), 50, 149–150; Karol Grünberg, *Niemcy i ich organizacje polityczne w Polsce międzywojennej* (Warsaw, 1970); Marian Drożdowski, "The National Minorities in Poland 1918–1939," *Acta Poloniae historica* 22 (1970): 226–51.

¹⁰ See especially: Cygański, *Mniejszość niemiecka w Polsce centralnej*, 147–150.

¹¹ For recent examples of the *Volksgruppe* narrative, see Marian Wojciechowski, "Die deutsche Minderheit in Polen (1920–1939)," in *Deutsche und Polen zwischen den Kriegen. Minderheitenstatus und "Volkstumskampf" im Grenzgebiet: Amtliche Berichterstattung aus beiden Ländern 1920–1939*, ed. Rudolf Jaworski and Marian Wojciechowski (Munich, 1997), 1–26, here 4; Jörg K. Hoensch, *Geschichte Polens* (Stuttgart, 1998), 274–275.

¹² Mathias Niendorf, *Minderheiten an der Grenze: Deutsche und Polen in den Kreisen Flatow (Złotów) und Zempelburg (Sepolno Krajeńskie) 1900–1939* (Wiesbaden, 1997), 12: "So liegen zahlreiche Studien zu den Intentionen und Entscheidungsprozessen staatlicher Minderheitenpolitik in Berlin und Warschau vor. Was jedoch fehlt, sind Arbeiten, die deren Tragweite in der Praxis nachgehen, ihre Durchsetzung oder auch Nichtdurchsetzung vor Ort untersuchen."

¹³ Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge, 1996), 58.

¹⁴ Norbert Friedrich Krekeler, *Revisionsanspruch und geheime Ostpolitik der Weimarer Republik: Die Subventionierung der deutschen Minderheit in Polen* (Stuttgart, 1973), 93.

¹⁵ Hans Steinacher, the leader of the Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland (one of the largest organizations devoted to helping Germans abroad), described how German activists in the Jungdeutsche Partei, a pro-National Socialist organization based in formerly Austrian Silesia, felt like "pariahs" in view of the privileges enjoyed by the "aristocrats" in formerly Prussian territories. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, ed., *Hans Steinacher. Bundesleiter des VDA 1933–1937: Erinnerungen und Dokumente* (Boppard, 1970), 528–29; Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, *Nationalsozialistische Außenpolitik, 1933–1938* (Frankfurt am Main, 1968), footnote 48.

¹⁶ Gregor Thum, "Mythische Landschaften. Das Bild vom 'deutschen Osten' und die Zäsuren des 20. Jahrhunderts," in *Traumland Osten: Deutsche Bilder vom östlichen Europa im 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Gregor Thum, (Göttingen, 2007), 181–211, here 190.

¹⁷ Tensions between German regions were apparent already at the first Congress of the Germans in Poland in 1921. See German Passport Agency in Łódź (Drubba) to German Foreign Ministry, 14 September 1921, Auswärtiges Amt-Politisches Archiv, Abt. IV Po, Politik 25 Polen, vol. 7 (R82187), 38–44.

¹⁸ Report by the German Consulate in Łódź (Luckwald) to the German Foreign Ministry, "Inhalt: Lodzer Deutschtum," dated 14 March 1928, in Auswärtiges Amt-Politisches Archiv, Abt. IV Politik 25 Polen, vol. 24, 191–194; also found as copy for Regierungsrat Erich Krahrmer-Möllenberg, in Bundesarchiv Berlin, R8043, Film Sign. 62660, 14.

¹⁹ A reference by a Łódź German activist to being perceived as "auch-Deutsche" can be found in Jungdeutsche Partei für Polen, "Rede von Pg. Dr. Günzel, Lodz," *Reden und Berichte vom Parteitag 1934* (Bielsko, 1934), 23–30, here 30, Bundesarchiv Koblenz, R57-Neu, 1093 (Nr. 21).

²⁰ East Upper Silesia, which had been allocated to Poland in 1922, enjoyed international minority protection for fifteen years. Prussia had acquired Silesia in a war against Austria,

so unlike Poznań and Pomerelia, East Upper Silesia had not been part of the Prussian partition of Poland. During the interwar period, the Volksbund was the largest German organization in East Upper Silesia, and it jealously protected its particular interests vis-à-vis the other regional German organizations.

²¹ Celia Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat* (Berkeley, 1990); Charlotte Tacke, *Denkmal im sozialen Raum: Nationale Symbole in Deutschland und Frankreich im 19. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 1995); Alon Confino, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871–1918* (Chapel Hill, 1997); Abigail Green, *Fatherlands: State-Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (New York and Cambridge, 2001); Nancy R. Reagin, "Recent Work on German National Identity: Regional? Imperial? Gendered? Imaginary?" *Central European History* 37, no. 2 (2004): 273–289; Siegfried Weichlein, *Nation und Region: Integrationsprozesse im Bismarckreich* (Düsseldorf, 2004); Michael B. Klein, *Zwischen Reich und Region: Identitätsstrukturen im Deutschen Kaiserreich (1871–1918)* (Stuttgart, 2005).

²² A report by Polish authorities in Łódź revealed that Germans in Poznań and Pomerelia often expressed their contempt toward German Upper Silesians by derisively calling them "Galician Germans." Social-Political Department of the Voivodeship of Łódź, monthly report, no. 12 for 1 to 31 December 1935, dated 9 January 1936, Archiwum Państwowe Łódź, Urząd Wojewódzki Łódzki, sign. 2507 L (microfilm no. L-12757).

²³ Nationalities Department of the Polish Interior Ministry, *Sprawozdanie życia mniejszości narodowych za II kwartał 1936 r.* (Warsaw, 1936), Archiwum Akt Nowych, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych File 2348, Mikrofilm Nr. B 18553, 70.

²⁴ Social-Political Department of the Voivodeship of Łódź, monthly report no. 1 for 1–31 January 1935, Archiwum Państwowe Łódź, Urząd Wojewódzki Łódzki, sign. 2507 L (microfilm no. L-12757).

²⁵ Doris L. Bergen, "The Nazi Concept of 'Volksdeutsche' and the Exacerbation of Anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe, 1939–45," *Journal of Contemporary History* 29, no. 4 (1994): 569–582, here 572.