

MIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND POLISH INTEGRATION IN THE RUHR VALLEY AND NORTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA, 1870–1924

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Introduction

My current research examines Polish migrant communities in the Ruhr and northeastern Pennsylvania in order to explain why distinctive patterns of ethnic minority inclusion and exclusion emerged in Germany and the United States during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Between 1870 and 1914, approximately 300,000 Poles migrated to the Ruhr and 160,000 settled in northeastern Pennsylvania, attracted by employment opportunities in the booming coal industries of each region. Initially, the social origins, outlook, employment patterns and organization of Poles in both regions were quite similar. By the turn of the twentieth century, however, the development of each Polish community began to diverge in reaction to experiences within the political, economic, and cultural environments of their host societies. After World War I, this divergence was reflected by dramatically different integration trajectories. In northeastern Pennsylvania, the vast majority of Poles opted by the mid-1920s to accommodate themselves to American society, though full assimilation would remain a generation away. In contrast, two-thirds of the Polish community in the Ruhr chose to emigrate to France or return to Poland. Meanwhile, the third of the community that remained subsequently integrated into Ruhr society at a comparatively faster rate than the Poles in northeastern Pennsylvania.

By exploring why these differing adaptation patterns emerged, I want to investigate the role of the state, the marketplace, and civil society in defining identities of citizenship and belonging as well as the efforts of excluded actors to redefine the parameters of inclusion over time. Examining Polish migrant communities in both Germany and the United States is particularly useful for this task. Poles were one of the first ethnic groups whose migration occurred within the context of a rising global economy, the solidification of the democratic nation-state, and the emergence of modern mass cultures. Polish adaptation experiences foreshadowed the struggles of many present-day migrant groups in both Germany and the United States and can offer important insights into

contemporary debates over immigration and the dynamics of citizenship within both societies. In this essay, I first wish to briefly address key issues as they pertain to citizenship in Germany and the United States, providing the reader a guide to where I situate my work. I then discuss in depth the broader outlines and conclusions of my ongoing examination of Polish communities in the Ruhr and northeastern Pennsylvania. Finally, I end with a discussion of the insights that the Polish migrant experience can give regarding issues of immigration and integration in contemporary European and American society.

Exploring Issues of Citizenship in Germany and the United States

T. H. Marshall, the proverbial grandfather of citizenship studies, provides a useful starting point for discussing issues of citizenship in the Ruhr and northeastern Pennsylvania. Marshall defined citizenship as “a status that is bestowed on those who are full members of the community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed.” The “rights” of citizenship included a trinity of civil, political and social protections. Civil rights were defined as guarantees of liberty provided most generally by the courts, including the right to free assembly. Political rights encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political power, i.e. to vote and to be represented in a democratic assembly. As we can see, these civil and political rights are intimately tied to the state. Social rights, however, were more broadly conceived and included those rights necessary to live as a “civilized being,” such as the right to education, a degree of economic welfare, and security derived from inclusion within a shared cultural community.¹ Reinhard Bendix has written in a similar vein.²

By explicitly emphasizing the community, as opposed to just the state, scholars such as Marshall and Bendix encourage us to conceive of citizenship in broad terms, including types of citizenship grounded not only in national, but also local, industrial, gendered, and transnational communities.³ As more recent scholarship has highlighted, however, we must also remember that citizenship is as much about exclusion as inclusion. Each redefinition of citizenship rights brings with it new duties and expectations; identities of citizenship become more, not less bounded. This leads, in turn, to the creation of a “citizenship continuum” of full, partial, and non-citizens.⁴ Altogether, the process of becoming “full,” or at least fuller, citizens involves a complex re-negotiation of the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion as well as a balance between group and individual rights.⁵

In considering specific issues of citizenship in Germany and the

United States, I find that dominant interpretations viewing German society as fundamentally “differentialist” and American society as “assimilationist” are inadequate in accounting for the experiences of Poles in the Ruhr and northeastern Pennsylvania. By far the most influential book framing discussions of citizenship in Europe and the United States during the past decade remains Rogers Brubaker’s *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Taken as a whole, Brubaker’s penetrating and insightful analysis is significant, helping us understand how formulations of modern citizenship law were influenced by historic self-understandings of the nation (e.g. civic vs. ethno-cultural) that became crystallized under the increasing pressure of nationalism and immigration in the late nineteenth century. However, I also find that there are drawbacks to his study. Most notably, Brubaker’s focus on legal statutes and state administrative attitudes toward immigration neglects the diverse ways immigrants actually became social citizens in the communities in which they lived. As Yasemin Soysal observed in her analysis of post-1945 immigrants, exclusionary citizenship laws do not necessarily preclude immigrants from attaining a level of social integration in their host society. This is a point borne out, albeit in a different context, by my research.⁶

Specifically, taking a snapshot of the position of Poles in the Ruhr and northeastern Pennsylvania in 1914, one would see that Ruhr Poles, who as Prussian subjects always possessed German citizenship, enjoyed significantly more civil, political, and economic rights than the still often un-naturalized Polish immigrants of the northeastern Pennsylvanian region. Yet, integration nevertheless proved more extensive in Pennsylvania over the long term, a development that highlights the need to move beyond systems of citizenship analysis grounded exclusively in the relationship of the individual or group to the state. Clearly the state matters since it most often helps define the parameters of citizenship by enacting and enforcing laws regarding civil and voting rights, economic liberties and, since the rise of the welfare state, levels of social entitlements. However, it is necessary to remember that citizenship can and does take many forms, both in the past and today. Ultimately, I find that Polish integration in the Ruhr and northeastern Pennsylvania was dependent, first and foremost, on the ability of Poles to become part of the cultural community and attain the status of social citizens within their host societies.

Migration and Integration in the Ruhr and Northeastern Pennsylvania

In struggling to become full citizens within their host societies, the challenges Poles faced were severe. Cast as an internal “other,” Poles were a

personified filter through which German and American national identities became further refined in an imperial, post-(re)unification age and, as a consequence, Poles experienced significant levels of ethnic discrimination and hostility due to their growing presence. Within the workplace, a culturally split labor market developed in which German and American workers sought to defend a privileged position in the mining complex by propagating racially framed identities contrasting the professional, skilled "Teutonic" and "Anglo-Saxon" worker with the physically strong but mentally weak "Pollack" or "Slav."⁷ In broader society, attitudes toward Poles were often worse. By the 1890s, the Catholic Church in both the Ruhr and northeastern Pennsylvania was confronted with a rapidly growing, populist Polish Catholicism that threatened both its hierarchical authority and the recent gains made by the Church in proving itself to be a loyal institution within German and American Protestant society. As a consequence, both hierarchies sought to restrict Polish spiritual activity, limiting the availability of Polish priests, Polish-language church services, and in the United States the formation of ethnic parishes, in a misguided attempt to bring Poles to heel.⁸ In an age of expanding mass media, Polish migrants were portrayed in popular literature as a "wild" race, a dormant army ready to rise up in violence, while academic studies "scientifically" showed how Poles threatened to retard the superior advances and progress of German and American civilization.⁹

Meanwhile, local, regional, and national officials in both Germany and the United States, facing mounting public pressure to find a solution to the "Polish question," focused on developing measures designed, if not in intent then in practice, to exclude Poles from the national community. In the Ruhr, government officials sought to suppress what was considered an irredentist Polish nationalism and compel the assimilation of Poles into German society by tailoring many anti-Polish policies already in force in the Prussian East to local conditions, willfully neglectful of the fact that those same policies were at least partially responsible for bringing Poles into the western German heartland in the first place. From the 1890s onwards, Poles were subject to growing restrictions on their right of association and assembly as well as their use of the Polish language in public and in religious instruction. Polish activities were closely observed and catalogued by the police.¹⁰

In northeastern Pennsylvania, direct intervention in the day-to-day affairs of Poles was much less severe. Nevertheless, government actions and rhetoric toward Poles could often be more exclusionary in aim. Beginning in the late 1890s, administrative measures were passed on the local level that made it increasingly difficult for Poles to obtain citizenship.¹¹ Even more threatening were the various government studies, culminating in the 1911 United States Senate Immigration Commission re-

ports, that drew sharp contrasts between the moral and racial qualities of “old” (e.g. Northwestern European) versus “new” (e.g. Eastern and Southern European) immigrants. With specific reference to northeastern Pennsylvania, the Commission found that the arrival of Poles and their interaction with the “native element” caused a laundry list of “evil effects...of a social and moral character,” including “a lowering of the average intelligence, restraint, sensitivity, orderliness, and efficiency of the community.”¹² Altogether, such state-sponsored examinations legitimized popular beliefs that Poles were inferior and gave direct impetus to immigration restriction efforts that later culminated in the passage of the National Origins Act of 1924.

Despite such overt hostility, Poles persevered in their adopted societies and ultimately thrived during the pre-World War I period. In order to overcome discrimination and isolation, challenge their subordinate position in the social hierarchy, and make themselves subjects of their own history, Poles initially turned inward and focused on building their collective ethnic strength. Over a period of five decades, Poles established vibrant cultural communities, sustained by familial and extended kinship networks, Catholicism and the local parish, and a diverse array of informal and formal Polish institutions. The self-actualization derived through participation in ethnic life went far in forging a common ethno-national identity among diverse groups of Poles who prior to migrating possessed largely local or at best regional identities. At the same time, the Polish communities in the Ruhr and northeastern Pennsylvania were never closed subcultures or “parallel societies.” On the contrary, the increased ethnic awareness that occurred as a result of participation in Polish community life and institutions actually aided the adaptation process by providing needed stability and, more importantly, the means for Poles to become actors on the public stage. This is especially true from the 1890s onwards.

In the workplace, Poles informally organized themselves during the 1890s to assert their rights, both as ethnics and as workers. These actions culminated in the 1897 Lattimer and 1899 Herne strikes, when thousands of ethnic Poles engaged in large-scale work stoppages to protest intolerable workplace conditions and native discrimination. Although these two strikes ended in failure, the experiences gained by such labor protests would later propel Poles to organize into formal trade unions such as the United Mine Workers of America (UMW) in northeastern Pennsylvania and the *Zjednoczenie Zawodowe Polskie* (ZZP) in the Ruhr. After the turn of the century, these institutions enabled Poles to successfully begin to redress the economic and cultural disparities under which they labored and, more importantly in terms of integration, acquire a strong and influential voice in working-class affairs.¹³ Similarly, within the confes-

sional sphere, Poles rallied their ethnic communities from the early 1890s on to protest assaults on their religious practices and traditions. Through such mobilization, Poles ultimately gained greater acceptance within the wider Catholic community. This can be seen in the Ruhr, where Poles were able to begin obtaining equal representation on many church councils and executive boards between 1904 and 1912, as well as in northeastern Pennsylvania, where the number of Polish ethnic parishes rapidly increased after 1900, from thirteen to forty-one.¹⁴

Perhaps the most notable example of ethnic mobilization as a means to integration occurred with the growth of Polish ethnic associations. The extent of Polish associational activity in both regions was impressive. For example, in the Ruhr there were over 1,000 Polish associations, or one for every 300 Poles. The types of associations ranged from apolitical rosary societies, choral groups, football and hunting clubs, and the ubiquitous *Taubenvereine* (pigeon-keeping associations) to politically active voting associations, socialist societies, and nationalistic, paramilitary *Sokol* (Falcon) organizations. In northeastern Pennsylvania the types and rates of organization were similar.¹⁵ Although Polish associations were, by and large, ethnically exclusive, and in this respect did promote a degree of separation, they usually modeled themselves after existing native institutions—the *Sokols*, for example, were modeled after the German *Turner* (gymnastic) movements—and through their activities taught Poles invaluable lessons in the organizational practices and democratic customs of their host societies. Moreover, as the associational movement matured, it grew increasingly diverse, secular, and politically active on a wide range of issues. While preserving ethnicity remained a constant goal of such associations, regardless of political orientation, many simultaneously advanced other interests based on class, confession, and gender, thereby loosening over time the exclusive grip of the ethnic group over the individual.

Taken together, I find that the experience of migration, living in the culturally diverse milieus of the Ruhr and northeastern Pennsylvania, and mobilizing large numbers of their community significantly broadened Polish outlook. By the eve of World War I, Poles in both regions possessed identities that were highly pluralistic and transnational in character, influenced by homeland and host societies, yet also distinct from both.¹⁶ Moreover, the formation of such identities was important for aiding the process of Polish integration because they enabled Poles in both regions to establish significant points of contact with natives while simultaneously preserving and enhancing ethnic awareness. Nevertheless, transnational identities could only advance integration as long as they did not conflict with the demands of citizenship within their host societies.

Prior to 1914, this was less of an issue. German and American political culture, for all of their many flaws in this period, nevertheless allowed Polish migrants in both the Ruhr and northeastern Pennsylvania to carve out an independent, transnational social space within which Poles could maintain close links to their homeland and assert their national identity while simultaneously participating in the public life of their host societies. After World War I, however, political conditions in both countries changed dramatically. Between 1918 and 1924, Poles were confronted with a significantly more intense, integral German and American nationalism that transcended social class. This was driven by the war, its aftermath, and the growing hysteria over potential internal enemies. In this atmosphere, anything less than conformity and the embrace of a clear national identity was suspect. Maintaining a transnational identity was no longer feasible. Poles had to choose whether they were German, American, or Polish.

Comparatively, the Polish position in northeastern Pennsylvania was far more stable after World War I than in the Ruhr given Germany's wartime defeat, the weakness of the Weimar social order, and the radicalization of politics on the left and the right within German society. Confronted with the need to decide whether to retain German citizenship or opt for Polish, a majority of Poles in the Ruhr chose the latter and decided to leave by 1924, returning to Poland or migrating to France. The 100,000-strong ethnic Polish community that remained was, in subsequent years, largely unable to maintain ethnic cohesion and steadily dissolved into German society.¹⁷ By contrast, the vast majority of Poles in northeastern Pennsylvania decided to remain. Nevertheless, they too faced significant challenges during the interwar period. With victory against an external enemy secured, American society looked inward to fight perceived threats from labor radicals, Bolsheviks, and immigrants at home.¹⁸ Groups and individuals with origins in Eastern Europe, including Poles, were viewed with particular suspicion. Within this reactionary atmosphere, Poles needed to become Polish-Americans in order to participate in larger society. Though able to preserve ethnic culture to a much greater extent than their counterparts in the Ruhr, which as a consequence delayed full integration until after World War II, Poles increasingly expressed their ethnicity through a new language of "100 percent Americanism."¹⁹

On the whole, the differing adaptation patterns after World War I highlight how integration levels were ultimately dependent upon Poles becoming fuller citizens within their host societies over the long term. If we recall Marshall, citizenship encompasses a trinity of political, civic, and social rights. Comparatively, Poles in the Ruhr, as Prussian citizens, possessed more political and civil rights than their counterparts in north-

eastern Pennsylvania, who only slowly naturalized and became legal citizens. When it came to social rights, however, which I define to include not only economic protections, but also even more importantly those broader cultural rights necessary to live as a civilized and equal human being, the reverse was true. Specifically, while Poles in the Ruhr had better access to state-sponsored welfare and educational opportunities, they did not enjoy the same degree of security derived from inclusion within a shared cultural community as Poles in northeastern Pennsylvania. This was because of underlying, interconnected structural differences between the two regions in the organization of industry and markets, the role of the state in economic and cultural affairs, and the relative strength of civil society in the pre-World War I period. These disparities later manifested themselves under the burden of wartime and postwar dislocation.

To elaborate, I find that in order to build a shared cultural community, one in which Polish migrants could maintain ethnic culture while embracing a larger sense of membership in the host society in which they lived, Poles needed to become active participants in the public sphere. Often, this meant having the ability to engage in social conflicts within the bounds of civil society as Poles, workers, Catholics, or men and women. Through such conflicts, Poles could come into direct contact with native members of local society, thereby fostering what Jürgen Habermas once described as a “self-transformation” in outlook. Over time, the “exchange with the other” produced by conflict could gradually help to politically integrate Poles as citizens into the communities in which they lived.²⁰ In both regions, specific conflicts emerged within the workplace and larger society, such as labor strikes, battles for ethnic rights within the Catholic Church, or struggles over ethnic associations, all of which supported the process of Polish integration. At the same time, in northeastern Pennsylvania there were fewer structural constraints placed on Polish participation as public figures in civil society than in the Ruhr. As a result, more extensive integration patterns evolved in northeastern Pennsylvania over the long term.

This development can be seen in the workplace, where differences in industrial organization as well as the actions of the state in the Ruhr placed greater limits on the intensity of social conflict and subsequent integration levels. In the Ruhr, longstanding corporatist traditions that were grounded in German culture and emphasized the mutual obligations between employers and employees constrained the level of labor conflict. The Ruhr miners’ *Knappschaft* pension fund, the existence of a more conciliatory Christian *Gewerkverein* trade union as a counterbalance to the socialist *Alter Verband*, and the “status” that the occupation of miner traditionally held in the Ruhr, all bear witness to this corporatist

heritage.²¹ Reinforcing these traditions was the marketplace. As can be seen by workplace statistics for the period between 1903 and 1914, the cost of labor in the Ruhr was high; approximately 58 percent of every ton of coal sold at market in the Ruhr went to cover labor costs. Because extracted coal was used both for industry and domestic purposes, there was a year-round demand for workers. Together, these factors encouraged employers to provide mine workers with comparatively high levels of employer-sponsored welfare, such as company housing, work facilities, and other benefits in lieu of better wages. The lower wages together with the various welfare measures had the added benefit of giving employers greater coercive control over their workforce, thereby serving to inhibit the outbreak of labor conflicts.²²

By contrast, in northeastern Pennsylvania, there were no longstanding corporatist traditions influencing the organization of the work environment. Instead, the main regulator was the marketplace. Within this arena, the cost of labor relative to the market price of coal was significantly lower than the Ruhr, approximately 25 percent of every ton of coal sold. Further, coal production was geared to satisfying the demands of a highly seasonal (September to March) domestic home-heating market, meaning that coal miners often worked on average 209 days a year, compared to 310 in the Ruhr. Nevertheless, when miners in northeastern Pennsylvania worked, they produced nearly three times more coal on an average day than their counterparts in the Ruhr. Combining such factors resulted in comparatively high wages being paid to Pennsylvania workers, though workplace safety standards were lower given the more intense work regime, and there were noticeably fewer employer-sponsored welfare benefits and less job security. Within such an environment, labor relations were more volatile, workers militant, and strikes violent and lengthy.²³ Whereas in the Ruhr, the 1905 strike, the longest in the pre-World War I period, lasted less than a month, in northeastern Pennsylvania two large-scale work stoppages occurred in 1900 and 1902 that lasted one and a half and six months, respectively. Altogether, for Polish workers in northeastern Pennsylvania, the experience of engaging in multi-month struggles with workers of other backgrounds and ethnicities went far in forging a common class identity that could promote integration. While inter-ethnic solidarities also coalesced due to strikes in the Ruhr, their limited intensity and duration resulted in bonds that were less substantial by comparison.²⁴

Within larger society, differences in the role assumed by the state in directing minority policy also had an important influence on the extent to which Poles could become full actors in their local communities. Responding to public pressure emanating from within middle class society, state officials in the Ruhr took a leading role in dealing with the Polish

question. However, the heavy-handedness of the Germanization policies, while ostensibly designed to accelerate the melting of the Polish minority into the majority, produced an ethnic backlash as Poles engaged in an intense conflict with the government to protect their rights as citizens. Although this conflict was important for making Poles more active participants in society, the fact that it occurred directly with the state also had certain negative implications in terms of integration trajectories. First, Poles found it increasingly difficult to conceive of themselves as Prussians of Polish descent, thereby strengthening the hand of the strongly nationalist, non-integrationist element within the Polish community. Second, to preserve ethnic rights, Poles were increasingly reliant upon the Prussian courts. While the courts often sided with Poles to the dismay of many state officials, a dependency existed that left the community in a more precarious position should the political environment change, such as occurred after World War I. Third, since Poles spent a significant amount of time fighting the state bureaucracy, there was less effort from within the Polish community to confront and attempt to change anti-Polish attitudes originating from within German middle-class society.²⁵

By contrast, in northeastern Pennsylvania, the government at various levels rarely interfered in the daily activities of Poles. Despite growing restrictionist sentiment within government circles, the state stood more in the background as issues of Americanization and immigration reform were debated within middle-class society. This enabled Poles to be able to better identify themselves with government institutions and imagine that they could be both loyal Poles and Americans. Further, Poles responded to the efforts designed to either Americanize or exclude them from society altogether by directly challenging middle-class conceptions of the "Pole." For example, in the first decade of the twentieth century, Polish ethnic associations undertook a lively public campaign designed to educate society about Polish contributions to American democracy.²⁶ Such direct Polish participation in the public debate about immigration helped to promote splits in middle-class opinion. A strong and vocal faction developed within the middle-class Progressive movement that advocated greater efforts to reach common ground with the immigrant Polish population. Although this outreach, organized through institutions such as the YMCA, could often be contemptuous of ethnic culture, it was nevertheless important in promoting better mutual understanding between Poles and natives in northeastern Pennsylvania, a step that was never undertaken in the Ruhr. Moreover, the direct contact with native society further expanded Polish outlook, thereby weakening the exclusive hold of ethnicity over the individual.²⁷

In addition to the differing role of the state vis-à-vis migrant minorities, there were also clear economic disparities in levels of social welfare,

taxation, and property ownership that influenced integration outcomes. Perhaps most notably, by the eve of World War I, at least 13 percent of Poles owned their own homes in northeastern Pennsylvania, while in the Ruhr less than 2 percent did. The reasons for this vary. In the Ruhr, Poles often had the benefit of company housing. Meanwhile, in northeastern Pennsylvania, the lack of company housing, the comparatively inexpensive land values, and the lower tax rates combined to spur Poles to acquire property. Similarly, the number of Poles who owned small businesses, most often saloons, was generally higher in northeastern Pennsylvania than in the Ruhr.²⁸ Furthermore, all Poles in northeastern Pennsylvania held in common another type of property, namely the local parish. Unlike in the Ruhr, where Polish Catholics joined existing German territorial parishes, Poles in northeastern Pennsylvania had the right to form their own ethnic parishes, often with ethnic elementary schools attached.²⁹ The richly endowed, majestic churches that arose represented a sizable investment by Poles in their local community and were in many ways a declaration of their intention to stay in the region. By acquiring property and building visible, public monuments such as churches, Poles in northeastern Pennsylvania were also conforming to a typically American pattern of settlement that contributed over time to making Poles appear less foreign in the eyes of natives.

Immigration Past, Present, and Future?

Exploring why Polish integration patterns differed during the pre-World War I and immediate postwar era is useful for yielding insight into contemporary immigration issues. Although exact comparisons between the past and present can never be drawn, I believe that Polish experiences in the Ruhr and northeastern Pennsylvania can offer important insights into what factors may aid or hinder minority integration into contemporary European and American society. Specifically, I first find that integration should not be viewed as an end in itself, but as a drawn-out process, involving a complex series of cultural and economic negotiations between migrants and their host societies. In this process, migrants must become similar in some, though not all, respects to a reference community that itself is constantly changing under the influence of immigration.

Such a definition of integration is not without controversy. In Germany, as in many other continental European states, a decades-long self-identity as a non-immigration country has encouraged the view that integration is synonymous with outright assimilation into a core national culture or *Leitkultur*. Correspondingly, the granting of full political and economic rights through naturalization represents the logical end to this integration process. While a counter-discourse emphasizing a more plu-

realistic understanding of “Germanness” exists, enabling citizenship reforms such as those undertaken in 1999, the sense that cultural assimilation is a necessary precursor to political and economic integration remains strong. Meanwhile, within contemporary American and British society, the opposing view that political and economic integration, achieved through more liberal citizenship regimes and less-regulated markets, eventually will lead to cultural integration into an increasingly multi-cultural society is being fundamentally challenged in the wake of September 11 and the more recent London bombings. Nevertheless, my research supports the idea that integration is a process involving multi-layered cultural and socio-economic negotiations between immigrants and their receiving societies in which successful cultural adaptation flows from the ability of immigrants to gain political and economic rights in a timely and transparent manner.

Second, in attempting to move the integration process forward, the state must embrace a cautious, limited, and judicious approach to minority integration policy and recognize that integration, as the historian Klaus Bade once remarked, cannot be “regulated like street traffic.”³⁰ Policies adopted to actively promote cultural integration, either negatively by restricting ethnic cultural rights or positively by granting immigrant groups wide-reaching autonomy, often accomplish the opposite of their stated intention, leading to the establishment of hierarchies of privileged and disadvantaged minorities as well as resentment among the native population. Moreover, the state must be willing to tolerate a degree of social conflict within the bounds of civil society, since this exchange ultimately helps to break down mental barriers separating ethnic and social classes.

This is not to say that the state should abrogate its responsibilities in the matter of immigrant integration altogether. Obviously, the state needs to set certain guidelines with regard to expectations that immigrants adhere to certain fundamental Western values such as respect for democratic practices and, in our present age, the rights of women. Moreover, the state must foster a sufficiently secure environment within which integration can happen. The post-World War I situation of Poles in the Ruhr provides an excellent example of what occurs when a government refuses to fulfill its obligations to protect minority rights against the tyranny of the majority. Overall, I find that governments on both sides of the Atlantic can aid the integration process significantly by striving to act as a good-faith regulator ensuring that the proper social environment exists through which migrants can succeed on their own. The reality is that in the foreseeable future, there will be continued high levels of immigration from Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America, be it legal or illegal, due to the simple fact that populations in Western countries are

aging while the demand for labor is increasing. As a consequence, governments should focus on ensuring that once immigrants arrive, they have sufficient opportunity to eventually become economic stakeholders in their adopted society through such things as home ownership, small business development, and other types of financial investment. While a secure economic base does not ensure integration, it certainly makes it more likely.

Finally, my research stresses that in order for integration to occur, it is necessary for migrants to be politically active participants within the public sphere of their adopted societies. The experiences of Poles in northeastern Pennsylvania, and to a lesser extent the Ruhr, show that the ability of migrants to cross ethnic divides, engage in social conflicts, and make contacts with natives was vital for broadening Polish identities and promoting social integration on their own terms. Unfortunately, present-day levels of communication between migrants and natives in many Western countries are weak and the difficulties in overcoming cultural barriers seemingly insurmountable. The recent outbreak of violence in France provides just one of the more unfortunate examples of how incomplete migrant integration, especially those from the second and third generation, remains. Ultimately, in order to begin to bridge the cultural chasm separating present-day immigrants from their host societies, I find that there must be an increase in volunteeristic, grass-roots activities within the bounds of civil society on both sides of the ethnic divide. Only by building a shared cultural community can immigrants begin to feel that they can become full citizens in the societies in which they live.

Notes

¹ T.H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class* (Cambridge, 1950), 11, 28–29.

² Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-building and Citizenship: Studies of our Changing Social Order* (Berkeley, 1977).

³ This is a point also advanced by gender scholars in considering issues of citizenship. See, for example, Nira Yuval-Davis, "Women, Citizenship and Difference," *Feminist Review* 57 (1997): 5. Also in the same issue, Ruth Lister, "Citizenship: Towards a Feminist Synthesis."

⁴ Niklas Luhmann, "Inklusion und Exklusion," in Helmut Berding, ed., *Nationales Bewusstsein und kollektive Identität: Studien zur Entwicklung des kollektiven Bewusstseins in der Neuzeit* (Frankfurt, 1994), 15–45; Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Harvard, 1992), chap. 1; Lister, "Citizenship," 36.

⁵ For a critical, more philosophical treatment of the difficulty in balancing group versus individual rights, see Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (Oxford, 1995).

⁶ Yasemin Soysal, *The Limits of Citizenship* (Chicago, 1994). Soysal argues that present-day immigrants are able to attain membership within a community despite the lack of formal citizenship due, in particular, to the increasing belief in the West that equates human rights with the rights of citizenship. In essence, we are entering a new era of "post-national

membership" that provides immigrants the same protections as those enjoyed by actual citizens.

⁷ In many ways, my examination confirms and builds upon the findings of previous whiteness studies such as David Roediger's *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class* (New York, 1991) and Noel Ignatiev's *How the Irish Became White* (New York, 1995).

⁸ In the Ruhr, for example, the archbishops of Münster, Paderborn, and Düsseldorf issued a set of declarations in 1904 that prohibited baptismal, marriage, and funeral services in Polish and, perhaps most inflammatory, ordered that "Polish children shall be prepared for the holy sacrament [of communion] only in German." See Hauptstaatsarchiv Düsseldorf (hereafter HSTAD) LA Essen 101 – Rep. RPD to LR Essen, Aug. 25, 1904.

⁹ For examples of this type of literature, see Clara Viebig, *Das schlaffende Heer* (Berlin, 1910), which went through 26 editions between 1903 and 1910; Madison Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race; or The Racial Basis of European History* (New York, 1916). For specific studies on the Ruhr and northeastern Pennsylvania, see Joh. Victor Bredt, *Die Polenfrage im Ruhrkohlengebiet: Eine wirtschaftspolitische Studie* (Leipzig, 1909) and Frank Warne, *The Slav Invasion and the Mine Workers* (Philadelphia, 1904).

¹⁰ The basis for these policies was laid out in an administrative directive by the Minister-President of Westphalia Heinrich Konrad von Studt in 1896. See HSTAD RD Präs. 867 – Rep. OPW, Oct. 31, 1896. Von Studt, who became *Oberpräsident* (Minister-President) of the Province of Westphalia in 1889, first dealt with the Polish question in the Prussian East as a *Landrath* (County Manager) in Posen, a *Regierungspräsident* (District President) in Königsberg, and an Undersecretary in the Interior Ministry in Berlin. Perhaps the best example of the government's attempts to limit the growth of Polish organizations was the new *Reichsvereinsgesetz* (Association Law) of 1908. This law forced the use of the German language in all publicly-held, "open" Polish meetings in the Ruhr except for those related to political elections.

¹¹ Peter Roberts, *Anthracite Coal Communities* (New York, 1904), 44–45; "Immigrants in Industries: Anthracite Coal Mining," *Reports of the Immigration Commission*, vol. 16 (Washington, 1911), 641, 695.

¹² "Immigrants in Industries: Anthracite Coal Mining," *Reports of the Immigration Commission*, vol. 16, 671–672, 675.

¹³ John Kulczycki, *The Foreign Worker and the German Labor Movement: Xenophobia and Solidarity in the Coal Fields of the Ruhr, 1871–1914* (Providence, R.I., 1994); Perry Blatz, *Democratic Miners: Work and Labor Relations in the Anthracite Coal Industry, 1875–1925* (Albany, NY, 1994).

¹⁴ Staatsarchiv Münster (hereafter STAM) RA 6037 – 1904 Statistics of the Regierungs-Präsident Arnsberg; STAM RA 5758 – 1912 Statistics of the Regierungs-Präsident Arnsberg; AMMA-Diocese of Scranton, *Scranton Diocesan Directory* (1990). For a history of Polish Catholic struggles in the Ruhr in the decade before World War I, see Brian McCook, "Divided Hearts: The Struggle between National Identity and Confessional Loyalty Among Polish Catholics in the Ruhr, 1904–1914" *Polish Review* 47, no. 1 (2002): 67–96.

¹⁵ STAM OP 5758 – Rep. RPM to OPW, "Zahlenmässige Angabe," 27 Mar. 1913; Roberts, *Anthracite Coal Communities*, 259.

¹⁶ The emergence of transnational identities can be seen in the way Poles came to view themselves over time and in the changing relationship Polish migrants had to the homeland society they left behind. Having absorbed western ways and practices, Poles in both regions came to consider themselves more culturally and politically advanced than their "backward" countrymen who remained under the undue influence of a morally bankrupt and ineffectual elite in partitioned Poland. As Stanislaus Wachowiak, a Polish activist in the Ruhr noted in 1916, "when the migration [of Poles] began, a political awareness among the lower classes in the homeland was quite small. The majority vegetated there without at all

being concerned with political matters. The migrants were completely un-schooled politically. The changed environment, the active trade-union life, the presence of ethnic associations, all of this forced the Polish workers in the West to politically orient themselves." See Stanislaus Wachowiak, *Die Polen in Rheinland-Westfalen* (Leipzig, 1916), 82.

¹⁷ The history of the Polish community in the Ruhr after 1924 is chronicled in the following works: Christoph Klessmann, *Polnische Bergarbeiter im Ruhrgebiet, 1870–1945* (Göttingen, 1978); Valentina-Maria Stefanski, *Zum Prozess der Emanzipation und Integration von Aussen-seitern* (Dortmund, 1984); Ralf Karl Oenning, *Du da Mitti, polnische Farben: Sozialisations-erfahrungen von Polen im Ruhrgebiet 1918 bis 1939* (Münster, 1991); Susanne Peters-Schildgen, *'Schmelztiegel' Ruhrgebiet: Die Geschichte der Zuwanderung am Beispiel Herne bis 1945* (Essen, 1997).

¹⁸ The growing post-war hysteria and xenophobia in the United States helped fuel the political repression of the "Red Scare" period (1919–1920) and the subsequent passage of immigration restrictions in 1921 and 1924. For further insight into anti-immigrant feeling and legislation in the post-World War I period, see Robert Zeidel, *Immigrants, Progressives, and Exclusion Politics: The Dillingham Commission, 1900–1927* (DeKalb, IL, 2004).

¹⁹ For a history of Polish-Americans in the 1920s and 1930s, see James Pula, *Polish Americans: An Ethnic Community* (New York, 1995).

²⁰ For an elaboration, see Jürgen Habermas, "Anerkennungskämpfe im demokratischen Rechtsstaat," in Charles Taylor, *Multikulturalismus und die Politik der Anerkennung* (Frankfurt, 1993), 175–176.

²¹ Standard works on the history of Ruhr miners include: Klaus Tenfelde, *Sozialgeschichte der Bergarbeiterschaft an der Ruhr im 19. Jahrhundert* (Bonn, 1977); Franz-Josef Brüggemeier, *Leben vor Ort: Ruhrbergleute und Ruhrbergbau* (Munich, 1983).

²² Brüggemeier, *Leben vor Ort*, 278; Klessmann, *Polnische Bergarbeiter*, 263–265; M.J. Koch, *Die Bergarbeiterbewegung im Ruhrgebiet zur Zeit Wilhelm II* (Düsseldorf, 1954), 148–150; Carl Ludwig Holtfrerich, *Quantitative Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Ruhrkohlenbergbaus im 19. Jahrhundert* (Dortmund, 1973), 22–24, 51–56.

²³ Jett Lauck, *Comparison of Earnings and Wage Rates in the Anthracite and Bituminous Mines of Pennsylvania* (Washington, 1920), 13, 15; Lauck, *Irregularity of Employment in the Anthracite Industry* (Washington, 1920), 8, 23; Lauck, *Wholesale and Retail Prices of Anthracite Coal 1913 to 1920* (Washington, 1920), 3; *Report of the Department of Mines of Pennsylvania, Part I Anthracite—1919–1920* (Harrisburg, PA, 1921), 25-Table 6, 59-Table 20; *Report of the Department of Mines of Pennsylvania, Part I Anthracite—1914* (Harrisburg, PA, 1915), 72-Table 13, 89-Table L; *Report of the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission*, 25; Eliot Jones, *The Anthracite Coal Combination in the United States* (Cambridge, MA, 1914), 156–157.

²⁴ For more information on these various strike actions in the Ruhr and northeastern Pennsylvania, see Victor Greene, *The Slavic Community on Strike: Immigrant Labor in Pennsylvania Anthracite* (South Bend, IN, 1968); Blatz, *Democratic Miners*; Brüggemeier, *Leben vor Ort*; Kulczycki, *The Foreign Worker*.

²⁵ The recourse to using the courts to protect ethnic rights was common throughout the period under examination. In the wake of the 1908 *Reichsvereinsgesetz* (Association Law), which restricted the use of Polish in public meetings, appeals to the courts increased. A series of court decisions in Essen, however, highlights the many ways Poles were able to circumvent the enforcement of this law. See, for example, court decisions handed down between 1908 and 1909 in HSTAD LA Essen 101 as well as HSTAD RD 16029.

²⁶ Perhaps best known in this regard was the successful 1910 campaign to erect public monuments in Washington, DC to Casimir Pulaski and Thaddeus Kosciuszko, Polish officers who fought under Washington in the American War of Independence and in wars against the partitioning powers in Poland. By undertaking this campaign, Poles sought to inform the American public of Polish contributions to the cause of democracy and Poland's historic ties to the United States.

²⁷ For examples of this more liberal strain of thought within the Progressive movement, see "Statement of the International Committee of Young Men's Christian Associations," 14 Oct. 1910, in United States Senate, *Reports of the Immigration Commission*, vol. 41 (Washington, 1911), 85–87; Emily Balch, *Our Slavic Fellow Citizens* (New York, 1910); Roberts, *Anthracite Coal Communities*.

²⁸ *Reports of the U.S. Senate Immigration Commission*, vol. 16, "Immigrants in Industries – Part 19: Anthracite Coal Mining, 639; Roberts, *Anthracite Coal Communities*, 135, 222–233; STAM OP 5758 – Rep. RPM to OPW, "Zahlenmässige Angabe," March 27, 1913; Brüggemeier, *Leben vor Ort*, 282.

²⁹ The right to form ethnic parishes was not without controversy. During the late nineteenth century, a "modernist" view came into ascendance within the Irish-dominated church hierarchy that viewed ethnic parishes, as opposed to territorial, as an impediment to their broader goal of using the church to Americanize immigrants. German and Polish immigrants proved most vocal in opposing the Americanization programs of the Irish hierarchy, promoting instead a belief in a pluralistic church, best encapsulated by the slogan "Language Saves Faith." For further information on this conflict, see Jay Dolan, *American Catholic Experience: A History from Colonial Times to the Present* (New York, 1985), 294–320.

³⁰ *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 16 Jan. 2002.