CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA, SEMINARS

COMING TO TERMS WITH THE PAST IN WEST GERMANY: THE 1960S

Conference at the University of Nebraska at Lincoln, April 19–21, 2001. Conveners: Philipp Gassert (University of Heidelberg) and Alan E. Steinweis (University of Nebraska). Co-sponsored by: Fritz Thyssen Foundation, Cologne; The University of Nebraska at Lincoln. Participants: Pertti Ahonen (University of Sheffield), Lloyd Ambrosius (University of Nebraska), Bernhard Brunner (University of Freiburg), David Cahan (University of Nebraska), Detlev Claussen (University of Hannover), Belinda Davis (Rutgers University), Geoff Eley (University of Michigan), Carole Fink (Ohio State University), Norbert Frei (Ruhr University, Bochum), Elizabeth Heineman (University of Iowa), Jeffrey Herf (University of Maryland), Dagmar Herzog (Michigan State University), Michael Hochgeschwender (University of Tübingen), Konrad H. Jarausch (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; and Center for Contemporary History, Potsdam), Detlef Junker (University of Heidelberg), Habbo Knoch (University of Göttingen), Jürgen Lillteicher (University of Freiburg), Harold Marcuse (University of California at Santa Barbara), Marc von Miquel (Ruhr University, Bochum), Dirk Moses (University of Sydney), Elizabeth Peifer (Troy State University), Axel Schildt (Contemporary History Research Center, Hamburg), Michael Schmidtke (University of Bielefeld), Karen Schönwälder (University of Giessen), Joachim Scholtyseck (University of Bonn), Susanna Schrafstetter (University of Glamorgan), Detlef Siegfried (University of Copenhagen), Sigrid Stöckel (Hannover Medical University), Jeremy Varon (Drew University), Klaus Weinhauer (University of Hamburg), Jonathan Wiesen (Southern Illinois University), Lora Wildenthal (Texas A&M University).

Since the end of World War II each generation of Germans has been confronted by the challenge of working through the implications of the Nazi regime and the Holocaust. Germany's problematic history from 1933 to 1945 had consequences not only for the political system and the international relations of the two postwar German republics but also for national identity, religious faith, education, legal practice, social policy,

gender roles, cultural diversity, and many dimensions of daily life. As West and East Germans created new polities and set out to transform their societies, and as they sought domestic and international legitimacy, their common recent past always informed, and often dominated, debates on the present. Heretofore, serious scholarly attention to the postwar legacy of this past has focused on the 1950s, the decade in which the two German states were established and consolidated. The next frontier in the field is the "tumultuous 1960s," a period usually considered a crucial turning point in postwar history. West German youth rebelled against a culture that many believed had become excessively materialistic. They criticized the politics of West German realignment toward the West and looked critically at their own nation's past and present, pointing to the many continuities that persisted from the Nazi era. These included authoritarianism (not least in the institutions of higher education, in the police forces, and in the legal system), xenophobia, technocracy, and patriarchy. Purging society of these legacies became an urgent priority of the West German New Left.

In recent years the once widespread consensus that the leftist impetus of the late 1960s instigated a sea change in how Germans dealt with the Nazi past has come under scrutiny. Many historians now argue that the public debate took off during the late 1950s and accelerated during the first half of the 1960s. The pivotal events are well known: the anti-Semitic graffiti that appeared on synagogue walls in Cologne and other West German cities around the turn of the year 1959–60, the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem, the Fischer and Jaspers controversies, the Auschwitz trial in Frankfurt, the parliamentary debates about the extension of the statute of limitations, the emergency laws, scandals involving disclosures of Nazi-era activities of high-ranking politicians, the rise of a large-scale extraparliamentary opposition, the resurgence of a neo-Nazi party, and the Six-Day War of 1967. Picking up on some of the contemporary debates of the 1960s, historians are assessing the ambiguities of the transformation that took place during that tumultuous decade. The " '68ers" radicalized the discourse about the Nazi past, but in the process their emphasis on a generic "fascism" also tended to universalize and dehistoricize that past. They may have raised public consciousness about continuities from the Nazi era to the Federal Republic, but their often strident rhetoric and drastic methods may well have been counterproductive inasmuch as they alienated significant segments of the West German population. Moreover, quite apart from the '68ers there were other factors at work that forced West Germans to confront the past; the rise of the neofascist National Democratic Party (NPD), for example, deeply affected the outcome of the debates inside and outside the Federal Parliament (Bundestag). As the Nebraska conference clearly brought out, the chang-

ing atmosphere and the evolving discourse on the Nazi past did not automatically prompt a radical transformation with regard to the politics of the past (*Vergangenheitspolitik*). The 1960s may have witnessed a remarkable change in how the legacies of National Socialism were publicly addressed, but the "crucial decade" was still marked by a remarkable degree of continuity in many areas of *Vergangenheitspolitik*, including, for example, the compensation for stolen ("Aryanized") property and the continuing failures of the legal system to bring some of the worst perpetrators to justice.

Now that the 1960s are on the agenda of historians, the Nebraska conference aimed at providing a first collective overview of research on the *Vergangenheitspolitik* of that era. The presentations focused on achieving a better understanding of the political, social, and cultural forces that shaped the politics of, as well as the discourse about, the Nazi past. As Konrad Jarausch observed in his keynote lecture, such an understanding requires us to set the "critical decade" of the 1960s in the long-term context of postwar German history. Whereas Nazi crimes have been at the center of German discussions about the past for several decades, the legacies of a second dictatorship, that of communist East Germany, have complicated the picture since the early 1990s. Furthermore, the recent political skirmishes over the "youthful radicalism" of German politicians of the '68 or post-'68 generation, most notably Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, have added a third contested layer of history to an already complex discussion. Because of the overwhelming presence of the Nazi era in German debates about the past, it is no accident that the question of how '68ers confronted Nazism is one of the central issues of current controversy about "1968." Did the '68ers contribute to the liberalization and democratization of the Federal Republic by initiating "a freer discussion of the Nazi past," as the protagonists themselves claim? Or did they introduce "new myths through a shallow combination of neo-Marxism and pop-psychology," as their critics argue? Answering these questions requires a better understanding of the general character of the "controversial 1960s." As Jarausch observed, it also requires an assessment of what exactly was remembered and what was forgotten during the immediate postwar years.

The conference's opening panel, chaired by Dagmar Herzog, addressed the issue of how members of German elite groups coped with their own complicity in the crimes of the regime. In his paper Jonathan Wiesen analyzed the strategies of government and business circles in responding to accusations of corporate criminality during National Socialism. Because West German identity had come to depend so heavily on the country's economic prowess (the so-called *Wirtschaftswunder*) during the 1950s, the German economy, once a locus of Nazi crimes, became a

means for securing a new, democratic Germany. During the 1960s, as discussions shifted from abstract totalitarianism to a focus on specific crimes, including those of German industry, memory started to play a more complex role. For one thing, it became more difficult to fend off memories of the Holocaust abroad by mobilizing the anticommunist fears of American politicians. What this rapidly changing environment of the 1960s meant to West German conservatives has received surprisingly little scholarly attention, as Joachim Scholtyseck argued in his paper on "Conservative Intellectuals and the Debate About National Socialism and the Annihilation of Jewry." According to Scholtyseck, conservative thinkers were much more deeply involved in discussions about the meaning of Nazism for Germany's past and present than has been assumed by their critics. The leitmotifs of the conservative view included the "demonism" of Hitler, the dynamics of "mass and power," and the role of secularization and de-Christianization. According to Scholtyseck, many conservatives had become convinced that the Federal Republic was immune to the dangers of extreme nationalism and Nazism, and therefore felt helpless when they were confronted with a changing discourse about the Nazi past during the 1960s.

The panel's third paper, presented by Klaus Weinhauer, dealt with "The Nazi Past and the Modernization of West German Police." Weinhauer placed his paper in the context of historical questions about the continuity of personnel between the Third Reich and the Federal Republic, especially among civil servants. As Weinhauer showed, investigations of policemen who had committed crimes during National Socialism were often blocked or impeded by the culture of camaraderie among police officers. Although politicians and police union functionaries were beginning, in the early 1960s, to question the role of the police during the Third Reich, many policemen saw themselves as victims, having been exploited by an overwhelming regime. Efforts to address their complicity were countered by the heroification and mythologization of the Weimar police. Furthermore, authoritarian leadership ideas among the police were only gradually abandoned during the late 1950s and early 1960s, when technical innovations forced police officers to act more independently. Only the delayed generational change of the mid-1970s resulted in a deep caesura in the personnel structure of the police. In his commentary Norbert Frei underscored the important role that was played by East Germany in breaking down some of the myths of the 1950s, such as the supposed "coercion" of German industry into cooperating with Hitler and the distancing of the "clean" Wehrmacht from the crimes of the SS. During the 1960s the situation of many conservatives became increasingly untenable as continuities between the Third Reich and the Federal Republic became the subject of intensified scrutiny.

The second panel, chaired by David Cahan, examined judicial efforts to deal with crimes committed during the Nazi era. Bernhard Brunner presented a paper on the "Frankreichkomplex," a large-scale criminal investigation by German authorities into Nazi crimes committed in France during World War II. Of the 199 high-ranking perpetrators Brunner identified, 119 theoretically could have been prosecuted after the war (the rest had died or disappeared). Yet after twenty years of investigations only nine were brought to trial, three of whom were punished in the 1980s. This result, Brunner argued, cannot be attributed exclusively to a lack of interest on the part of the West German justice system. A fuller explanation also requires us to consider the legal and political contexts of the prosecution. One major obstacle was posed by the treaties between the three Western Allies and the Federal Republic, the intention of which had been to insulate immediate postwar Allied war crimes prosecutions from the German justice system. Until the 1970s legal interpretations of these treaties impeded investigations of perpetrators who had already been convicted in absentia in France. Brunner observed that the 1960s witnessed a more intensive legal prosecution of Nazi crimes on the one hand, but a more restrictive development with regard to the legal and political framework on the other.

This point was reinforced by Marc von Miquel's paper on the "Debates About the Prosecution of Nazi Crimes." For Miquel "conflict" was the central characteristic of the 1960s. The initiation of large-scale court cases brought the annihilation of European Jewry to the forefront of public debates. This led to a decreasing willingness to permit former perpetrators to integrate into West German society without bringing them to trial. At the same time, however, the 1960s witnessed the high-point of the so-called *Schlußstrich* mentality: Public opinion polls showed that a majority of the West German population was in favor of letting bygones be bygones and of closing the door on further prosecutions. In Miquel's view many Germans were simply unwilling to accept the conclusion that could be drawn from the trials: that the genocidal politics of the Third Reich had not been the actions of a few outsiders but had come from the mainstream of German society. Although a larger amnesty scheme did fail in the Bundestag, the clandestine (and often forgotten) invocation of a minor article in the penal code intended to decriminalize traffic violations led to the termination of pretrial proceedings against former members of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt. In many ways the "normal" legal framework was not suited to the requirements of prosecuting crimes against humanity.

A similar argument was advanced by Jürgen Lillteicher in his presentation about "Compensation for 'Aryanized' Property in West Germany." Any effort to compensate for the loss of property during the Nazi

regime was destined to raise highly complicated legal and political issues. The central paradox was that although after 1945 West Germany became a society that adhered to the rule of law, many of its members had benefited from illegal acts, including the plundering of Jewish and other property before 1945. Although outside (and to a certain degree internal) political pressure led to gradual improvements in the laws governing the return and compensation of lost property, the process was hampered by the extremely legalistic approach taken by bureaucrats and judges. Furthermore, an observable lack of goodwill on the part of the institutions involved in compensation amplified the shortcomings of the civil law code for dealing with the consequences of the war. Lillteicher illustrated his findings with the vivid example of several Holocaust survivors who were required by the courts to demonstrate that their belongings, which had been taken from them at the ramp in Auschwitz, had been brought into the part of Germany that was now the territory of the Federal Republic. Lacking such evidence, the West German courts refused jurisdiction over the cases. Thus, an overtaxed legal system met with the unwillingness of the courts to handle the issues of restitution in a generous way.

The commentator, Jeffrey Herf, reminded the audience that the study of twentieth-century German history has become an international affair and that many of the conclusions drawn from the reign of National Socialism and its aftermath are relevant to other nations. Taking up the general question posed during Jarausch's keynote lecture, Herf characterized the attempt to put the past on trial as one of the most dangerous and difficult tasks for a young democracy. Nation building, rather than justice, was the prevailing value, and the attainment of real justice might well have required a prolongation of the Allied occupation and a postponement of German sovereignty and democracy.

The third panel, devoted to "The Public Sphere," was chaired by Detlef Siegfried. Belinda Davis, in her paper on "New Leftists and West Germany: Violence, Fascism, and the Public Sphere, 1967–1974," began with the observation that between 1965 and 1977 Germans from all political camps regularly "instrumentalized" the past. For New Leftists, state-authorized violence in reaction to demonstrations was interpreted as proof of the continuation of "fascism" in the Federal Republic. From their point of view the silencing of the New Leftist critique of West German society, and the alleged failure to address the issue of fascism, resulted in a large-scale corruption of the public sphere. The second paper, on "Photographs of Nazi Crimes and the West German Public in the 1960s," was presented by Habbo Knoch. Using photographs, Knoch addressed a central question of the politics of memory during the 1960s: How did Germans deal with the contradiction between their self-perception as victims of World War II and Germany's apparent departure

from the norms of Western civilization? According to Knoch, the increasingly frequent display of images of Nazi crimes created visual impressions that did not conform to the prevalent individual and collective memory of Germans as a "community of victims." This "crisis of interpretation" intersected with the breakdown of intergenerational consensus, given that the younger generation did not share painful personal experiences of wartime. The extraparliamentary opposition of the 1960s responded to this cleavage by explaining "Auschwitz" in terms of a fascist, imperialist, and capitalist power structure, of which the students considered themselves to be victims. This interpretation of the past created a "second silence" because it focused on iconic sites such as Auschwitz and on industrialized mass murder rather than on the more typical experiences of the older generation under Nazism. As Knoch argued, the universalization of Nazi crimes may have undercut the self-stylization of Germans as victims, yet it also absolved the older generation of direct, personal responsibility for Nazism.

The third paper, by Elizabeth Peifer, dealt with "The Public Demonstration of the 1960s: Participatory Democracy or Leftist Fascism?" The debates about public demonstrations, Peifer argued, can be used to help understand how the Nazi past was addressed during the 1960s because many critics saw street demonstrations as a rerun of the mass rallies of a totalitarian past. Emphasizing the ambiguous legacy of the 1960s, Peifer maintained that the public demonstrations contributed to a broadening of democratic practices in Germany. The commentary by Geoff Eley placed the critique of the '68ers in the broader context of postwar liberalization efforts as presented by Jürgen Habermas in his work on the "public sphere" (or "publicness," which Eley suggested as a better translation of *Öffentlichkeit*). As Eley argued, the confrontations of the 1960s may have highlighted some of the weaknesses of the Habermasian project of political reform, yet the liberal project showed a continued vitality even after 1969 when the SPD-led coalition government embarked on a new round of reform.

The conference's second day opened with the fourth panel, which covered "The International Dimension" and which was chaired by Lloyd Ambrosius. In her paper Carole Fink analyzed the complicated relationship between the two states most closely connected with the legacies of the Holocaust, Israel and West Germany. Placing the "special relationship" between Israel and the Federal Republic in the international context, Fink interpreted the Six-Day War as a major turning point in German-Israeli relations. Out of necessity West Germany and Israel had formed a reluctant "special relationship" before 1967. In 1965 the two states had established formal diplomatic relations, and the advent of the Grand Coalition government in fall 1966 had signaled a "more self-

assured, less penitent West Germany." Despite the overwhelming support of the German population during the Six-Day War, especially among the middle generation of thirty-five to fifty-year-olds, the gradual opening of West German foreign policy toward the East and the breakdown of the Cold War consensus transformed the relationship. Automatic support was no longer given to Israel's policy because West German governments tried to "normalize" the country's relationship to the survivor state despite the often expressed "special moral obligation emanating from our past" (Willi Brandt).

Pertti Ahonen's paper, on "The Taming of West German Territorial Revisionism During the 1960s" addressed another legacy of National Socialism that severely limited West Germany's room to maneuver. A new approach vis-à-vis the countries to Germany's east met the fierce resistance of the expellee organizations representing Germans who had fled their homelands after World War II. Although none of the mainstream political parties in the Bundestag supported open territorial revisionism, the Christian Democrats, who enjoyed close links to the expellee lobby, were faced with a serious political problem. Especially in the southern German states the Christian Democrats depended on the votes of Germans who had origins in the former eastern territories of the German Reich. Because of the electoral successes of the neo-Nazi NPD during the second half of the 1960s Christian-Democrat politicians treaded carefully with regard to Eastern policy issues. Therefore, as Ahonen argued, "on tactical and opportunistic grounds" the Christian Democrats gave a new Eastern policy a lower priority than did their Social Democratic and Free Democratic rivals.

The third paper, by Susanna Schrafstetter, focused on nuclear weapons, the central security issue of the Cold War. The renunciation of the development of nuclear weapons by Adenauer in 1954 had been a precondition of West Germany's entry into NATO. This step, however, could also be seen as the last Allied wartime restriction on defeated Germany. Therefore, questions of nuclear strategy were always inextricably linked to the German past. This became clear during the heated debate over the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1967–8. Supporters of the treaty pointed out that Germany had to accept the legacy of defeat, whereas its foes, including many high-ranking Christian-Democrat politicians, saw the treaty as yet another instance in a series of unfair, vindictive measures, such as the Treaty of Versailles and the Morgenthau Plan, that other states sought to impose on Germany. The commentary by Detlef Junker focused on specific issues brought forward by the papers. He emphasized that history was not just an argument thinly veiling other political or strategic purposes. The Munich analogy and other references to the past highlighted the very real limitations and geopolitical challenges politicians

faced during the 1960s. The success of Brandt's *Ostpolitik* during the early 1970s was its grounding in a realistic assessment of West Germany's international environment, something to which German political elites had been oblivious throughout most of the twentieth century.

The fifth panel, chaired by Dirk Moses, focused on what many commentators and historians have considered to be the hallmark of the 1960s: the role of the student movement and the New Left. In recent years historians and political commentators have strongly disagreed about the impact of the student movement on West German discourse on the Nazi past. Whereas some have seen "1968" as a symbolic new founding of the Federal Republic against fascism, others have criticized the protest movement for instrumentalizing and dehistoricizing the Nazi past through fascist theory. In his paper on "The Student Movement and National Socialism" Michael Schmidtke addressed these issues by analyzing the contemporary discourse about fascism and by looking at the use of the past in political education and during the protests against the so-called emergency laws. Schmidtke argued that the original contribution of the student movement lay not so much in initiating public debate over the Nazi past but rather in promoting political and social change through political acts that demanded civil courage, as well as in pedagogical experiments like the *Kinderladen* movement. "Coming to terms" thus was primarily aimed at the overthrow of the "authoritarian character."

In the next paper Jeremy Varon explored the relationship between terrorism and the Nazi past. The Red Army Faction (RAF), in Varon's view, took its cause to such extremes because it wished to compensate for the perceived absence of meaningful resistance to National Socialism between 1933 and 1945. The RAF's armed struggle highlights some of the paradoxes of the New Left in general. RAF members attempted to "purify the nation" and relieve themselves of the burden of the past by refusing to be "good Germans." They would overcome the past by armed resistance. At the same time the RAF also took up the guise of the victims of Nazism. The Stammheim maximum-security prison near Stuttgart, where many of the terrorists were held, was thus equated with Auschwitz. Varon concluded with the observation that by taking up such guises the RAF and other radical groups "risked mirroring qualities they opposed not only in the present but also in the past."

The third paper, by Michael Hochgeschwender, focused on a segment of the "other side" of German society that was deeply affected by "1968" but that is often left out of the story: Catholic student fraternities. While the social and cultural forces that manifested themselves during the 1960s transformed the Catholic milieu in a very profound manner over the long term, the immediate impact of the '68ers was rather limited. Their lifestyle, revolutionary rhetoric, neo-Marxist language, and whole-

sale condemnation of the role of the Catholic Church during the Third Reich led Catholic fraternities to distance themselves from the protest movement. Because the Catholic milieu had some powerful historical myths of its own, such as its resistance against Hitler, the radicalism of the '68ers proved largely counterproductive. Furthermore, Catholics, for decades a minority in the German Reich, did not show any inclination to respond to the New-Left critique of what they finally considered to be "their" state. The commentary by Detlev Claussen drew on Claussen's own scholarly findings as well as on his recollections as a former protagonist of the West German student movement. Placing the protests in the larger framework of German history Claussen attempted to identify both the direct and indirect consequences of "1968." He pointed to the inflated use the term *fascism* to connote evil. Considered in its long-term context, this reductionism, which, he conceded, tended to obscure the specific character of National Socialism, was neither a surprising nor particularly unfortunate development because it prompted a more thorough examination of the Nazi past in the years that followed.

The sixth panel, chaired by Harold Marcuse, dealt with several aspects of social policy (*Sozialpolitik*). Karen Schönwälder presented a paper on "West German Society and Foreigners in the 1960s." She argued that the presence of the past was an important factor in the 1960s response to foreigners in Germany. Analyzing the efforts of the West German Federation of Employer's Associations, Schönwälder asserted that the recruitment of foreign labor during the 1960s was consciously placed in a historical perspective. Employers urged their German employees to develop positive attitudes toward foreign workers and to convey a tolerant image of Germany. Potential negative perceptions abroad therefore were a major determining factor in West German policy toward foreigners. In contrast, efforts to exclude "Afro-Asians" from recruitment as "guest laborers" highlighted the continuity of racist thinking among officials and demonstrated the limits of the shift toward a more self-critical reflection of Germany's past.

In the next paper Sigrid Stöckel argued that in the health care system the primary confrontation with the past did not occur in the 1960s but in the late 1940s and 1950s. Stöckel emphasized the existence of several pasts, not only the Nazi one. Because of the experiences of Weimar and the Third Reich, public health officers in the Federal Republic came under pressure from "free" doctors. Because social medicine was associated with the "state" medicine of the Third Reich, West German developments were retarded in comparison to other countries. Lora Wildenthal's commentary centered on the specific issues brought up by the two papers. As Wildenthal remarked, it remains an important task for historians to dis-

entangle "the cynical from the political" in their efforts to understand how people confronted the past during the 1960s.

Two concluding commentaries by Elizabeth Heineman and Axel Schildt opened the conference's final discussion. Heineman reminded the audience that the 1960s challenge us to continue asking new questions. For example, the impact of gender on everyday life and religion, and the reconfiguration of class and capital remains an important agenda to be studied in the context of West German "coming to terms." Referring to Konrad Jarausch's keynote lecture, Heineman also underscored that our understanding of the 1960s is inevitably based on how we see the 1950s. Finally, developments during the late 1980s make it necessary to place West Germany in comparative perspective with East Germany. Axel Schildt then summarized some of the Nebraska conference's findings. First, new empirical results have come to the fore. Historical inquiry has moved into a critical phase where we can expect to deepen and broaden our knowledge of the 1960s. Second, the conference showed that many open questions remain, especially with respect to *Vergangenheitspolitik* and the impact of the antifascist campaigns of the 1960s on the establishment. Third, we have to look behind the myths that were created by the student movement. Following up on earlier remarks by Detlev Claussen, Schildt argued that it has become increasingly clear that the Nazi past was probably not the main issue of "1968." Fourth, the broadening of the public sphere that took place during the 1960s was a critical feature of the decade. We therefore need more empirical studies on the media, school education, and a host of related fields. Fifth, if "coming to terms" was a main locus of West German history in the 1960s, it has to be related to the social and economic transformation that took place during that same period. The discussion should therefore take place within the larger framework of the "Westernization" of the Federal Republic. Sixth, the 1960s were characterized by a special atmosphere that can be observed in pivotal events, such as the *Spiegel* crisis, and that was present in the theatrical, witty, and sometimes irresponsible slogans of "1968." Last, Schildt identified some issues that were missing and that should be treated in a more a systematic fashion; the generational conflict was of particular importance.

The ensuing discussion reiterated many of the issues that had been on the agenda for the preceding two days. The question of periodization: When did the 1960s begin and when did they end? How important is "1968" as a caesura and as an event? How are the various German pasts and chronologies connected? Where do the 1960s stand with respect to long-term developments in German history, not only with respect to the Third Reich but also going back to the Weimar Republic and earlier? Furthermore, what do we learn from the multiple presences (and

disguises) the Nazi past took during the 1960s in both Germanies, and how do we cope with the "triple burden of history" (National Socialism, communism, and "1968") that seems to be at the core of our own historiographical concerns? How did generational conflict and natural generational transitions influence 1960s discourses as well as *Vergangenheitspolitik*? Finally, how honest and how accurate was the "coming to terms" during the 1960s? We will have to wait a few more years for more conclusive answers to many of the issues that were discussed in Lincoln. Although participants may have raised many more questions than they could probably answer, the Nebraska conference, the first international meeting of its kind that was exclusively devoted to the issue of the Nazi past during the 1960s, turned out to be a stimulating event.

Philipp Gassert
Alan E. Steinweis

Anti-Americanism in the Twentieth Century

Conference at the GHI, July 6–7, 2001. Co-sponsored by the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS). Conveners: Patrice G. Poutrus (GHI/AICGS and Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung, Potsdam) and Ingrid Creppel (George Washington University). Participants: Jan C. Behrends (University of Bielefeld), James W. Caeser (University of Virginia), Arpad von Klimo (Humboldt University, Berlin), Peter Krause, (Europa University, Frankfurt/Oder), Richard Kuisel (State University of New York, Stony Brook, and Georgetown University), Alan Levine (American University), Robert McGeehan (University of London), Gabor Rittersporn (Centre Marc Bloch, Paris/Berlin), Bernd Schäfer (GHI), Christoph Strupp (GHI).

After September 11, it is difficult to write a report about the subject of anti-Americanism in the twentieth century. The horrible pictures of the airplanes hitting the Twin Towers and the subsequent catastrophes have not left my mind. I also believe, however, that if we do not want to be dominated by terrorism we have to remain open to and willing to engage in intellectual controversy. Such is the task of intellectuals in open societies. To avoid any potential misunderstanding, I would like to begin by explaining why I chose anti-Americanism as the subject for this conference.

Although the history of ideas and transatlantic relations are not my own field of research, thinking about communist dictatorship and the mentality of post-communist societies led me directly to it. After the close

of the twentieth century and its bipolar world order, the debate over liberal Western values and their universal validity has gained new relevance. Whereas at the beginning of the twentieth century Western values were represented by states such as Great Britain, France, the United States and the Netherlands, the United States has gradually become *the* representative of Western ideas in public perception. This dominant status of the United States did not remain unchallenged in the discussions of the past century. Sharp criticisms and harsh polemics against "America," whose origins can be traced back to the Romantic Age, were constants of political thought on both the right and left of the political spectrum. These findings allow us to speak of nationalistic, popular, socialist and religious fundamentalist regimes of the twentieth century as embodiments of an anti-liberal and anti-American consensus. Many of these regimes succeeded in legitimizing themselves negatively, through the public rejection and proclaimed overcoming of the ideas of 1776 and 1789. In place of America's model of an "open society," these regimes claimed to have established a more authentic form of society. Blaming of the United States and its allies for failing to establish their own systems is also part of authoritarian discourse.

Using the German case with its many shades of radical anti-Americanism as a point of departure, our conference sought to gain new insights into the phenomenon of anti-Americanism through a comparative perspective. Recognizing the central role that the American-Soviet conflict played in the twentieth century, it seemed useful to explore the ramifications of anti-Americanism on the periphery of this conflict and in their specific historical constellations. We also thought that it would be valuable to examine the issue outside the European context, perhaps in Latin America or the Middle East. Through a comparative perspective, we hoped to be able to sketch the constants and specifics of antiliberalism in the twentieth century.

The workshop started with a lecture by Alan Levine on "The Idea of America in European Political Thought, 1492 to Today." Levine divided his presentation into four parts: First Attempts to Explain America: 1492–1580s; America as Nature: Montaigne and the Enlightenment Debate; Reactions to America's Great Political Experiment after the American Revolution; America as Technology. Levine explained that in the eyes of European political theorists, America had gone from the symbol of nature to the symbol of technology, its opposite. America was first blamed for being insufficiently natural, then praised as the epitome of nature and the home of natural rights, then, finally, blamed for losing all touch with the natural human spirit. In these debates, so Levine's final statement, America has served both as Europe's past and as Europe's future, but in

debating America European thinkers were really engaged in a battle for Europe. The stakes were—and are—the fate of modernity.

James W. Caeser followed this up with a lecture on "Forgotten Early-Twentieth-Century German Views of America: Theodor Lessing and Müller Freienfels." Based on these two cases, he sketched the dominant idea of America in European thought that was created at the end of the nineteenth century, when "Americanization" became associated with a spiritually empty project to conquer nature, imposing a sterile understanding of materialism on Western (and world) culture. Caeser argued that this image of America was a forerunner of the current term "globalization," which he sees as a synonym for Americanization.

Jan C. Behrends's presentation "Anti-Americanism as Legitimatory Narrative: German Traditions and Communist Inventions in the Early GDR" showed that anti-Americanism took various shapes during the existence of the GDR. It proved to be a very flexible ideology and was tied to many different ideas: the peace discourse as well as the comparison between the USA and the USSR, which tended to disappear later in the East German state's existence. East German anti-Americanism contained traditional motifs of German anti-Western thought, but also a type of Sovietized anti-Americanism, which used images imported from the Soviet propaganda cosmos. In many ways, the Socialist Unity Party (SED) tried to connect traditional ideas of German political thought with its own ideology. In a way, the SED leadership stuck to a world view that had been adopted in the 1930s. But although this propaganda failed and American culture was just as successful in everyday life in East as in West Germany, Behrends argued that the regime did succeed in installing deep skepticism or even distrust towards American politics and society in large segments of the East German population.

Peter Krause's paper "America as a Model? Images of the United States in the German Press of the 50s and 60s" presented the West German counterpart to Behrends's paper. Examining West German media coverage of issues related to the United States, Krause concentrated on the coverage of two issues, McCarthy and the race riots of the 50s and 60s, in the German news magazine *Der Spiegel*. He argued that German self-identity is mirrored in the way images of the U.S. are presented in public discourse.

The second day began with the Richard Kuisel's lecture "The Gallic Rooster Crows Again: The Paradox of French Anti-Americanism." The principal issue Kuisel addressed was the paradox that even though America and France are more tightly connected than ever before, by both trade and popular culture, the French have expressed harsh criticisms of the U.S., such as the criticism of America's "hyperpower" voiced by high government officials as well as the increasing antipathy voiced in French

opinion polls towards certain aspects of American culture and society. To explain the paradox of anti-Americanism in an Americanized Europe, Kuisel stressed three recurring fundamentals: (1) certain constants, that is, stereotypes, notions of cultural superiority, domestic political infighting; (2) circumstances (The 1990s, for instance, have been much like the 1950s and 1960s, in the sense of the U.S. posing as a superpower and a socio-economic model for Europe); (3) and "real" issues or rivalries, such as trade, competition for global influence, and security issues. In addition to this historical pattern, Kuisel analyzed what is new about the current bout of U.S.-bashing. Here globalization is the most obvious new element. American dominance and triumphalism are perceived as having created a sense of powerlessness that have put a traditional sense of "Frenchness" or identity in jeopardy. The new strain of French anti-Americanism, Kuisel concluded, is a form of retaliation: retaliation against a seemingly omnipotent United States that tries to impose the self-serving process of globalization on France; retaliation against Washington's obstructionist and unreliable hegemony in international politics; and retaliation against America's promotion of its flawed social model, which challenges a traditional construction of Frenchness.

In his talk "Anti-Americanism in Hungary? Functions of Anti-U.S.-Ideology in Hungary after WW I," Arpad von Klimo moved the focus from Western to Eastern Europe. He explained that Hungary was at war with the U.S. twice in the twentieth century. Hungary was characterized by a "Prussian" social structure with a ruling stratum of large landed property owners and a very aggressive and militaristic gentry. Antiliberalism and antimodernism were strong elements in Hungarian political discourse after 1918. But there were always counterbalances to the German orientation. Klimo saw the reasons for this continuing phenomenon in the geo-political location of Hungary in the twentieth century.

Gabor Rittersporn's presentation "Hopeless to be Alike, Impossible Not to Imitate: America in Soviet and Post-Soviet Eyes" showed that hostility towards all the values that America is supposed to embody was not a constant feature of Soviet attitudes vis-à-vis the United States. Anti-Americanism did not permeate every milieu even when it became a permanent fixture of Soviet policy. On the contrary, periods of the most vehement officially sponsored hatred for America saw the emergence of an increasingly sympathetic understanding of the values that the United States was perceived to stand for. If at the beginning this understanding was mainly confined to intellectuals or circles close to them, it became fairly widespread with time. In one way or another, American achievements and norms became the yardstick of everything the Soviet regime managed to accomplish. But the dubious modernity of the USSR left a heavy heritage to post-Soviet Russia. The sympathy toward the United

States that contributed to the collapse of the Soviet system runs the danger of becoming captive to the same dialectics of Enlightenment that had characterized the evolution of Soviet perspectives on America.

At the conference's conclusion, academic discussion gave way to political debate. In his paper "European Unity and Anti-Americanism: Are They Inseparable?" Robert McGeehan argued that, with the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, "Europe" can now experiment with ventures that would present the option of not only separating from but opposing the United States. The only political force strong enough to justify the economic sacrifices necessary to achieve a militarily operational Europe, he suggested, is anti-Americanism. Will European anti-Americanism, liberated from the closet of the Cold War, develop sufficiently to achieve the unity which has so far been frustrated by the necessity of Atlanticism? This threat to NATO is of great concern to the Bush Administration, even as George W. Bush's policies on defense, the environment, and human rights make easy targets for what is emerging as "the ugly European."

Both the style and viewpoint of McGeehan's paper were surprising and made the discussion of the subject difficult and unsatisfactory. The original goal of the workshop was to compare and discuss different cases of anti-Americanism, not to engage in political argument. For a historian, watching a scholarly argument about the past turn into a heated political debate about the present was an exceptional experience that reflected the differences between the academic cultures of history and political science. It became clear that we reached the border between academic analysis and political opinion and that this border is porous. Nevertheless, especially after September 11, it is necessary to distinguish between political interests and fundamental values. Academic analysis can, of course, address both, and the answers should not be limited. That is one of the strengths of open societies. The question about the importance of anti-Americanism in the twentieth century was not answered by this conference, but it is was opened up. This made the event interesting.

Patrice G. Poutrus

A World at Total War: Global Conflict and the Politics of Destruction, 1937–1945

Conference at the Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, Hamburg, August 29 to September 1, 2001. Co-sponsored by GHI Washington, GHI London, Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, and Max-Planck-

Institute for History, Göttingen. Conveners: Roger Chickering (Georgetown University), Stig Förster (University of Bern), Bernd Greiner (Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung). Participants: John Barber (Cambridge), Birgit Beck (Bern), Stephen Broadberry (Warwick), Wilhelm Deist (Freiburg), Michael Fellman (Vancouver), Jürgen Förster (Freiburg), Christian Gerlach (Berlin), Myriam Gessler (Bern), John Gillingham (St. Louis), Mark Harrison (Warwick), Holger Herwig (Calgary), Gerhard Hirschfeld (Stuttgart), Rolf Hobson (Oslo), Sir Michael Howard (Oxford), Fritz Klein (Berlin), Robert Messer (Chicago), Hans Mommsen (Munich), Jörg Nagler (Jena), Hans-Heinrich Nolte (Hannover), Richard Overy (London), Jan Philipp Reemtsma (Hamburg), Daniel Marc Segesser (Bern), Dennis Showalter (Colorado Springs), Jill Stephenson (Edinburgh), Hew Strachan (Glasgow), Christoph Strupp (GHI), Robert Tombs (Cambridge), Martin Vogt (Darmstadt), Gerhard Weinberg (Chapel Hill), Louise Young (New York).

The fifth and final conference in the series on Total War was devoted to the Second World War. Several central problems dominated the discussions at this conference, as they have the previous four. The effort to reach a consensus about the definition of "total war" bore little more fruit this time, even though we confronted a conflict that many instinctively regard as a paradigmatic case. In his opening remarks, Roger Chickering again drew attention to the vexing problems of definition. He suggested that the term "total war" be used historically and limited to the era in which contemporaries themselves employed it, which began in the later phases of the First World War and culminated in 1945. Gerhard Weinberg emphasized the global dimensions of the second of the last century's great conflicts. Hew Strachan noted the radicalization of operations over the course of the war, which reflected, he argued, the salience of racism in the thinking of both sides. Myriam Gessler and Stig Förster then suggested that genocide represented an essential ingredient of total war, and that one might characterize the Second World War as the closest historical approximation of an ideal-type called total war, insofar as the Holocaust approximated "absolute genocide."

The second session explored further the question whether specific modes of combat and operations distinguished total war. Holger Herwig underscored the elements of central command control, limitless aims, and rhetorical extravagance in the German conduct of the Battle of the Atlantic. Jürgen Förster's paper on the German land war likewise found indices of "totality" in the unlimited and uncompromising objectives of the German forces, the lack of restraint with which they pursued these aims, the central control exercised by Hitler, and the degree to which German society mobilized for war. By contrast, in his broad analysis of the Ameri-

can war in two theaters, Dennis Showalter concluded that this country did not fight a total war, insofar as mobilization never reached the extremes that it did in other belligerent countries. Nonetheless, the American effort was not only geared from the outset to global dimensions, but was also conceived as a "mega-war," which, Showalter contended, "changed the world's paradigms" technologically and institutionally for the rest of the twentieth century.

The next session was in some respects the most intriguing, for it suggested specific parameters for measuring the "totality" of war. Mark Harrison and Stephen Broadberry argued that the economic dimension was in any case pivotal. Harrison examined the plight of the Soviet economy during the war and concluded that the mobilization of resources was the single most important factor in deciding the war in favor of the USSR. Broadberry's analysis of the British economy likewise argued that in total war "victory is dependent on the scale of resources that can be mobilized." During the ensuing discussion, the two economists argued further that a national commitment of more than forty percent of all resources to war might well be taken as the threshold of "totality"—a standard which all the belligerents save Italy met during the Second World War. John Gillingham's paper on the American mobilization noted the difficulties of cross-national comparison, but likewise emphasized the place of productive capacities in the war's outcome.

The mobilization of societies was the theme of the following session. Here Jill Stephenson offered a comparative analysis of the war's impact on women in Germany and Great Britain. Her conclusions suggested that even in the wholesale mobilization of women, basic sectorial divisions of class, confession, gender, and region survived in both countries. John Barber's survey of the involvement of Soviet women in the war made clear that in this, as well as other respects, the experience of the USSR represented an extreme case, if the measure of "totality" is the "intensity of destruction and suffering." This argument found support in Hans Mommsen's review of compulsory labor in German society, which emphasized the brutality under which laborers from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe suffered particularly. Mommsen also stressed the paradox that modern total war should have witnessed a reversion to the atavistic institution of slave labor. Bernd Greiner's survey of American society at war highlighted the distinctions between the experience of war on the two sides of the Atlantic. The watchword in North America was "volunteerism," which mitigated sectorial tensions and turned mobilization into a "truly national effort."

To the extent that agreement has emerged on a conceptualization of total war, it has emphasized the blurring of boundaries between combatants and noncombatants. This theme accordingly occupied a prominent

place in our deliberations. Gerhard Hirschfeld's survey of German occupation policies in Europe made clear, however, that the burdens were more "total" in Eastern Europe than Western Europe. In the east, he argued, German policies seemed intent on the "total destruction of the occupied territories" and the remaking of social institutions. The paper by Heinz-Heinrich Nolte lent support to this conclusion, as well as to the proposition that the war reached a pinnacle of brutality in the Soviet Union. Nolte's analysis of partisan warfare in Byelorussia demonstrated how the German effort was directed indiscriminately not only against the indigenous populations of areas controlled by partisans, but also against the natural environment. The casualties of the German war included crops, trees, and the "scorched earth" itself. Two papers then took up the strategic air war. Richard Overy's survey of the war against German cities nodded to the economists, as it argued that strategic bombing was based on materialist premises—the proposition that material destruction was the key to undermining enemy morale. Robert Messer's analysis of the American decision to drop atomic bombs on Japanese targets raised the issue of proportionality, the "morality of killing some innocent people in order to save the lives of others." He also made it clear, though, that despite questions subsequently raised by historians, the American leaders who ordered the bombings were sufficiently committed to a doctrine of total war that they were not troubled by their decision.

Questions of morality, atrocity, and law were featured then in a session on "criminal war." Birgit Beck examined the problem of sexual violence and racism among German troops, noting that the proliferation of unreported cases makes conclusions difficult to document. She argued nonetheless that women became primary targets of sexual violence during this total war, particularly on the eastern front, where incidents were at once racially motivated, far more numerous, and more leniently prosecuted than in France. Christian Gerlach's examination of the German invasion of Hungary in March 1944 dwelt on the themes of underdevelopment and subversion. The German leadership persuaded itself that this was not only a backward land, but also a hothouse for Jewish left-wing agitation. These perceptions justified both the pitiless exploitation of the country's resources and the deportation of its Jewish population. In her paper, Louise Young explored the cultural contexts of Japanese atrocities against the Chinese in occupied Asia. She argued that atrocities began amid counterinsurgency in 1931, but that they rested on long-held Japanese cultural perceptions, which portrayed the Chinese as a primitive people who stood outside the purview of the law. Daniel Segesser's survey of the development of international law represented a fitting conclusion to this session. It underscored the impact of the Second World War in broadening the understanding of war crimes, as well as the Allies'

determination to establish legal and institutional foundations to punish them.

The final session of the conference was devoted to a roundtable discussion, which was led by Jean-Philipp Reemtsma, Michael Fellman, Sir Michael Howard, Wilhelm Deist, Robert Toombs, and Jörg Nagler. Their presentations and the ensuing discussion touched many of the issues that have guided our considerations of total war throughout the conference series. Several of these issues are worth special mention. Reemtsma emphasized the cultural dimension of the problem, the fact that total war rested on the systematic simplification of distinctions between "us" and "them"—to the point where these contrasts could be portrayed as absolute. Wilhelm Deist offered some cautionary advice about positing an "age of total war." The elements of total war, he argued, have been multiple—their roots have been historically deep, and many of them remain with us (as a glance at events in Africa during the past decade confirms). Robert Tombs suggested that the conceptual disagreements about total war reflect two different approaches to the problem, which he characterized as "nominalist" and "realist" or, drawing on another historiographical debate, "intentionalist" and "functionalist." If the one stressed the professed ambitions of historical actors to wage something akin to total war, the other emphasized the indices or ingredients that defined the phenomenon. Finally, Michael Howard raised some troubling thoughts about the conflict that most have agreed was the most total ever fought. The sheer complexity of the Second World War, Howard observed, undercuts the effort to characterize it as total. The war was a profoundly different phenomenon in Washington and Leningrad, Hamburg and rural Bavaria. "Total war," Howard concluded, "is not all of a piece."

Roger Chickering

JUDGING THE PAST IN UNIFIED GERMANY

Symposium at the GHI, October 3, 2001. Conveners: Robert Gerald Livingston (GHI) and Bernd Schäfer (GHI). Participants: A. James McAdams (University of Notre Dame) and Ann Phillips (United States Agency for International Development).

In his presentation, James Mc Adams argued that, compared to the enormity of the crimes committed by the Third Reich, the wrongdoings of the East German communist government during its forty-year rule pale into

banality. Hence the broad effort since 1990 to deal with the offenses of that regime may seem to be of secondary importance historically. Still, the thoroughness with which German authorities in the 1990s strove to deal with the GDR's record stands in stark contrast to the ambivalence displayed by the West German authorities in the 1950s when it came to the crimes of Hitler's rule. The GDR past has proven to be "masterable," and retrospective justice in united Germany has been a success.

McAdams's presentation focused on two of the ways in which the united Germany tried to come to terms with the past of the German Democratic Republic: the opening of the files of the Ministry of State Security (Stasi) and the investigatory commission of the German Bundestag. In his analysis he concentrated on four propositions that relate historical analysis to retrospective justice. First, the politicians, officials, and judges involved functioned as lay historians who brought their legal and moral categories to bear. Second, only three rule-of-law principles could be applied: guilt must be individualized, retroactive lawmaking is impermissible, and it should not be required of those being judged that they should have been heroes. Third, in the application of these principles, there proved to be considerable room for a flexibility that led to reasoned and careful judgments about what behavior should have been expected under the GDR regime. Fourth, the leaders of unified Germany, in pursuing retrospective justice, were constrained by the historical context. They did not have the option of not involving themselves in its pursuit. The only question was how to do so.

Drawing on her experience as an academic fellow with USAID, Ann Phillips began by pointing out the importance of historical truth in building the foundations of healthy, democratic societies everywhere. Getting at that truth is in itself a healing process, although Mc Adams's presentation had underscored the ambiguity of the process in Germany. Taking issue with McAdams regarding the adequacy of Germany's dealing with Hitler's legacy, Phillips pointed to the GDR's payment of huge reparations to the Soviet Union and to the Federal Republic's acceptance of guilt, its apologies to the victims, and its massive compensation payments. The Germans since 1945 have done a great deal to atone for the crimes of the Third Reich.

Although the German approach to the GDR's past was more multifaceted than that of other countries practicing retrospective justice, there were important shortcomings. First, as a general rule, vetting of civil servants on the basis of Stasi files took place mostly in the new, eastern states. Second, the work of the parliament's investigatory commission was highly politicized. An examination of the eighteen-volume commission report reveals the dominance of West German perspectives, while the views of GDR citizens were solicited only when it was convenient.

Thus the commission criticized the East German Lutheran Church's accommodations to the regime, for example, but did not challenge West Germany's *Deutschlandpolitik* to the same extent. And is it fair, Phillips wondered, to question the complicity of the East German "silent majority?" It should not be forgotten that the communist regime provided opportunities as well as limitations to some of its citizens; the dissidents did not necessarily want to unify with West Germany or adopt its system; and most citizens of all communist countries east of the Oder-Neisse, with the exception of Poland, accommodated to their regimes as well. In sum, the entire elaborate effort to deal with the GDR past has been politicized.

The second commentator, Bernd Schäfer, argued that the whole process of retrospective justice has led to polarizations that have been far uglier than McAdams suggests. To achieve unity among all Germans, it will be necessary to bridge the extremely sharp divisions within eastern Germany that derive not only from the pre-1990 past but also from the pursuit of retrospective justice after unification. In late 1990, those who had been disadvantaged or persecuted by the communist regime had tremendous expectations that all the wrongs of the past would now be righted. But even if there has been a huge gap of expectations in regard to achieving retrospective justice, the process has had an enormous learning effect. A truly informed public debate has ensued, and a huge amount of scholarly literature has been produced. From personal experience in eastern Germany, Schäfer testified to how eager ordinary citizens have been to discuss their GDR history and how shocked they often were when learning about it.

The opening of the Stasi files, Schäfer pointed out, provided a straightforward process for dealing with the communist past. Moreover, the files revealed an immense amount about how the GDR's dictatorial regime functioned—an invaluable lesson for historians on how all similar systems work. The consequences of the public disclosure of some files' contents, however, deserve harsher criticism than McAdams dealt out. The vetting of employees on the basis of the files has also led to inconsistencies and even some arbitrariness. The very same easterners who initially wanted to make a clean sweep of personnel later came to resent the dominance of western Germans in the jobs that opened up in the structures of the east.

Today, eleven years after unification, a degree of normalization has set in with regard to dealing with the GDR past. The period of a continuing stream of new revelations is over now. Passivity now prevails, not the personalized resentments of previous years. Of course, Schäfer concluded, the past is still being used by the PDS and its opponents as an instrument to help mobilize core constituencies. But the hostility of the

PDS and other parties in the East toward West Germans stems from the period since, not before, 1990. Dealing with that postunification period and its consequences rather than the GDR past is obviously the challenge for the political leadership of today's Federal Republic.

Robert Gerald Livingston

THE FEDERAL CHANCELLORY AND GERMAN UNIFICATION

Symposium at the GHI, October 3, 2001. Conveners: Robert Gerald Livingston (GHI) and Bernd Schäfer (GHI). Speaker: Michael Mertes (*Rheinischer Merkur*, Bonn)

More than eleven years ago, in the historic year of 1990, October 3 as "Day of German Unity" crowned West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's political achievements. Soviet leader Michail Gorbachev, who had merely sought to introduce perestroika in the Soviet system to modernize socialism, had unintentionally unleashed a chain of events that culminated in the dissolution of the Soviet bloc in general and the German Democratic Republic in particular. After Poland, Hungary, and the Baltic republics had started on a path of irreversible transformation into pluralist societies, the GDR dug in and preserved its Stalinist pattern of government and society for some time. But since the GDR was the only non-nation state in the Eastern bloc and was permanently challenged by the existence of comparatively affluent West Germany, the regime's stonewalling proved to be difficult and finally impossible in the wake of the Soviet changes. In late 1989, demonstrations on the streets of the GDR not only forced the opening of the borders and the fall of the Berlin Wall, but also soon led to ever increasing calls for German unification. Barely two months after the first major demonstrations in Leipzig and Dresden, the SED regime had basically been eliminated by December 1989.

Driven by these events, the West had to react. In the Federal Republic it was above all Chancellor Helmut Kohl who seized this unique window of opportunity to further German unification. Although he faced domestic political pressure from the SPD opposition and had just survived an internal revolt in the CDU, from November 1989 to October 1990 Kohl rose to the occasion to save his chancellorship and shape German history in the twentieth century. At that time Michael Mertes was leading the Planning and Speech Writing Department of the Federal Chancellery in Bonn, before he became a division head there until 1998. Currently senior

foreign-policy editor of the Bonn weekly *Rheinischer Merkur,* he shared his insights into the decision making processes within the Federal Chancellery in late 1989 and 1990 with a packed audience at the GHI.

In his presentation, Mertes sought to shed some light on hitherto little-noticed details concerning the role of the Federal Chancellery and Helmut Kohl personally during the process of German unification. He began by outlining the structural and staff resources of this center of political power. Here Mertes emphasized the so-called *Chefsachen,* that is, matters to be handled by the chancellor himself, which included the full complex of *Deutschlandpolitik* or German-German relations.

In this respect Helmut Kohl relied on the intra-German policy specialists in the "Working Staff for *Deutschlandpolitik*" and the generalists in the Planning and Speech Writing Department, holding both in a balance that was characterized by certain conceptual tensions. According to Mertes, the generalists like himself had an easier time coping with the unfolding events because they used "Germany" instead of the "GDR" as their mental frame of reference. Their connection with the CDU headquarters and Kohl in his role as party chairman also increased their political weight for the chancellor. Mertes reported that only six people in the chancellery had constant access to Kohl and worked closely with him outside the official hierarchy.

From the West German perspective, the course for unification was set between November 9, 1989 and the first free parliamentary elections in the GDR on March 18, 1990. Of particular importance was the "Ten Point Program" presented by Helmut Kohl to the Bonn Bundestag on November 28, 1989. Right after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Federal Chancellery experienced a "combination of joyful excitement and a feeling of deep uncertainty" about the future course of events. When GDR Prime Minister Hans Modrow proposed a "Vertragsgemeinschaft" between the two German states on November 17, Kohl and his advisers started to work on a program to take up this challenge and simultaneously outdo it. Mertes outlined the various stages of drafts and discussions and the chancellor's central role in defining a confederation as only an intermediate step en route to German unification. The key sections of the Ten Point Program that Kohl himself set down in writing not only opened the supposedly closed chapter of German unity, but also proposed an eastward expansion of the European Union.

Since the Ten Points were not cleared with the Western allies, however, and deliberately did not mention the recognition of the Polish borders because of the CDU/CSU's domestic constituencies, the initial reactions to Kohl's bombshell of November 28 were certainly mixed outside of Germany. In the end, however, Kohl was able to get international and domestic support for the Ten Point Program as well as his announcement

of an Intra-German Monetary Union on February 6, 1990. The latter came one day after the Federal Chancellor, acting in his role as chairman of the CDU, had forged the electoral "Alliance for Germany" in the GDR, thereby paving the road to the CDU's electoral success in the East German election of March 18 and later in the all-German elections of December 2, 1990.

In his comment, Robert Gerald Livingston underscored Mertes's points about Kohl's activity as CDU chairman during the early months of 1990. Sometimes overlooked in historical accounts of German unification is the massive entry of the West German parties onto the GDR political stage, including the creation of the "Alliance for Germany" in early February, which was the key to the CDU's subsequent success not only in the March 1990 elections but in managing the unification process as a whole so successfully. For Kohl and his staff in the Chancellery did not bring Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the FDP's leader, Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister, into the deliberative process that resulted in the Ten Point program of November 28, 1989. In their dealings with the United States, the decisive supporter of unification among foreign countries, Kohl and his chancellery used their links to George Bush's White House to good advantage and did little to counter the distrust of Genscher and "Genscherism" that was rife in the American administration.

Livingston argued that the truly decisive period in accelerating the unification process was the first two to three weeks of January 1990. The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 was followed by a westward exodus of East Germans that imposed great housing and welfare burdens on municipalities in the Federal Republic. After a brief hiatus during Christmas, this outflow began again in early January. The cry of the East German crowds "If the DM doesn't come to us, we will go to it" carried an implied challenge that the Federal Republic had to face. Due to the pleadings of West German politicians at the municipal and state levels who feared the coming influx, the timetable implied in the Ten Points drafted by Mertes and his colleagues was greatly accelerated. In the end, the pace of unification escaped control.

Bernd Schäfer

INDIVIDUALITY AND EARLY MODERN AUTOBIOGRAPHY BEFORE 1750

GHI-sponsored panel at the Annual Conference of the German Studies Association, Washington DC, October 5–8, 2001. Moderator: Vera Lind (GHI). Commentator: Kaspar von Greyerz (Universität Basel). Panelists:

Thomas Max Safley (University of Pennsylvania), Tina Löffelbein (Universität Kiel), and Otto Ulbricht (Universität Kiel).

The rise of individuality in the second half of the eighteenth century is a well-known phenomenon. A new concept of individuality became the center of consciousness, perception, and reason. This transformation gave rise not only to a new culture of letter-writing, but also to autobiography as we know it. Many of the most famous autobiographies, ranging from Jung-Stilling to Goethe's *Dichtung und Wahrheit* belong to this period. As part of the anthropological turn, this development has led to a number of studies based on these autobiographies and other personal documents exploring gender relations, the division of work and, last but not least, individuality.

In contrast to these studies, this panel inquired about the status of individuality in autobiographies *before* the late Enlightenment. Few scholars working with autobiographies written before 1750 have dealt with this broad question. Instead they have investigated such subjects as marriage, attitudes to the body, the culture of groups, and social relationships. A number of studies have touched upon the subject, and although they have not denied traces of individuality they have often considered them negligible and not worthy of intensive study.

There seems to be good reason for this belief. Because society before 1750 was characterized by inequality, hierarchy, (enforced) religious uniformity and community orientation, one might tend to think that this left little room for expressions of the self, or that the repression of individuality was as all-encompassing as the repression that Clifford Geertz observed in Bali, where people were reduced to an impersonal set of roles. The important role of honor in early modern society, for example, suggests this. It is therefore not surprising that many scholars believe that early modern autobiographies reveal a universally depersonalized and public version of the self.

There are, however, a number of arguments that call such a view into doubt. It is well-known that interest in the individual increased during the Renaissance, as expressed, for example, in portraiture (and self-portraiture), or in admirable autobiographies like Montaigne's *Essais*. Self-consciousness likewise increased in Reformation Germany, where autobiographies appeared in rapidly growing numbers and are generally regarded as of higher value than those from the following century. Thus some studies concentrating on the sixteenth century have taken the problem of individuality more seriously and have devoted space to discussing the problem.

The question arises as to what is an adequate approach to the problem. It seems questionable that working with such crude dichotomies as

social personhood versus modern individuality, or in somewhat qualified terms, a depersonalized version of the self versus a unique, personal private self, is really helpful. This panel therefore investigated individuality in early modern autobiographies through a more subtle approach, namely, by assuming a certain degree of blending of the conceptions of persona and individual. This implies that one should look for degrees of individuality in the sources rather than full-blown individuality in the modern sense. Due regard to a possible difference where there should be no difference in autobiography, namely between the author, the narrating self, and the hero of the tale, is also helpful. When combined with appropriate attention to the distinction between public and private (some autobiographies were never intended for publication, others were published during the lifetime of their authors), this approach might lead to interesting insights into the question of an evolution of the self (not necessarily a linear one) or its sudden emergence at the end of the eighteenth century.

Thomas Safley presented a paper entitled "Individuality and Autobiography in Early Modern Germany: A Reflection on Merchant 'Ego-Documents.' " Analyzing the unpublished autobiographies of two merchants from late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth-century southwestern Germany, Safley scrutinized the connection between a specific social context, the emergence of autobiographical expression, and the emergence of individuality. These three elements have long been linked, and although the nature of the connection has been questioned, the connection itself has not. The two merchants, Caspar Koch of Memmingen and Matheus Miller of Augsburg, composed chronicles of their lives that differed substantially both in form and content. Though their writings can only be described as autobiographical, they share neither purpose nor intended audiences. Safley concluded that these differences suggest that each autobiographer wrote for individual purposes, but not out of a sense of individuality.

The second paper, "Master Johann Dietz: The Author as His Own Fictional Counterpart," presented by Tina Löffelbein, offered an in-depth analysis of the autobiography of a Baroque barber-surgeon. On first sight, this text appears to be constructed in contemporary stereotypes, in which the author is mainly part of the wider world and his individuality vanishes in the absence of introspection. But Tina Löffelbein showed how to detect the hints Johann Dietz is giving the reader as a proof of his singularity. On the level of content, for example, he repeatedly describes his emotions for the reader. Also, through a close look at Dietz's narrative strategies, Löffelbein revealed a very self-confident author, who turns religious terms (significants)—like the protection of God—into narrative

instruments in order to build up suspense for his story, in which he himself is the hero fighting his way over major obstacles.

In his presentation "The Body, Sixteenth-Century Autobiography, and Individuality," Otto Ulbricht traced individuality in autobiographies by looking at specific themes, in this case remarks about the body and its states during the process of aging. At least in theory, the ailments of the aging process can lead to the realization of the changeability of one's individual character, thus revealing a central characteristic of the modern understanding of individuality. However, it is well-known that sixteenth-century autobiographers tended to present themselves as unchanging figures from childhood to death. Ulbricht stressed that this point serves as a reminder of the many obstacles facing such an investigation. As the authors are not given to introspection and analysis of emotions, it seems important to start with a reduced understanding of individuality. Or to put it another way, lower levels of individuality (like self-consciousness and self-perception) and awareness of one's individual body are detectable in the implicit comments of the authors. Among numerous texts, Otto Ulbricht examined the autobiography of an old pastor who suffered from a kidney stone and was able to isolate traces of individuality in the expressions of pain. The pastor tried to build up familiarity with his illness, which he regarded as an unwelcome guest who dwelt within him and whom he would have to host for the rest of his life. But the pastor was also worried about how much he could complain in his writing. It seemed difficult for him as narrating self to find a balance. On the one hand, he insisted on writing about his pain, but on the other hand, he felt the need to justify why he wrote about it. This debate with himself indicates a deviation from given models—a degree of individuality.

After the commentator Kaspar von Greyerz pointed out the methodological difficulties of the connection between autobiography and individuality, including a critical evaluation of the literature (for example, Charles Taylor's book *Sources of the Self*) a lively discussion with the audience ensued, many of whom were experts on autobiographical writings from different disciplines.

Vera Lind
Otto Ulbricht

Germany in the Cold War Since the 1960s

GHI-sponsored panel at the Annual Conference of the German Studies Association, Washington, DC, October 5–8, 2001. Moderator: David C. Geyer, (Department of State, Historian's Office). Commentator: Raimund

Lammersdorf (GHI). Panelists: Douglas Selvage (Department of State, Historian's Office), Alexandra M. Friedrich (Stiftung Landheim Schondorf), Thomas W. Maulucci, (University of Maryland/University College, Schwäbisch Gmünd).

Revelations from newly accessible archives in Eastern Europe and recently declassified material in U.S. archives as well as from the reshaping of historiographical approaches that emerged after the end of the Cold War have yielded new and exciting results in the history of international relations of both Germanies. The findings of this panel provided new perspectives on the issue of hegemonial relations in a bipolar world and called for a re-assessment of international relations along multilateral and multipolar lines.

The prevailing notion of hegemony is a construct of a Cold War consensus between historians on the left and the right. They attributed to the two main antagonists, the United States and the Soviet Union, quasi-omnipotence. The difference between the political persuasions simply turned on whom to blame for being more abusive of this power. The papers suggested that this hegemonic world view needs to be relativized. Hegemonic power, even in the case of the Soviet Union as an undemocratic and illegitimate hegemon, is never absolute. Client states do not lose agency, and they exert whatever influence or power they have. We would do well to explore their policies as those of more independent actors.

Hegemonic power depends to a large degree on how willing the client power is to withstand pressure and to stake out its room for movement. It also depends on the importance that particular issues have for a client power. In the case of Poland, its traditional mistrust towards the Germanies—never mind that one was a socialist brother country—provided enough pressure to pursue a more self-confident policy. By contrast, West Germany's sensitivity about the recent past called for avoiding militaristic foreign policies and withstanding American demands for German armed participation in the Vietnam War.

A specifically German theme of all papers was West German self-perception versus the view from the outside. It has been a dogma of West German foreign policy that the Nazi past of genocidal imperialism limited its ability to pursue a foreign policy that was as sovereign, that is, as forceful as its relative military and economic power would have allowed for. It seemed necessary and appropriate for the Federal Republic to regain the trust of other nations first. Generally, German policy makers believed that other powers were so distrustful of Germany—even if unfairly so—that it was often enough to assume outside resistance to stop Bonn from wielding its power.

Yet the three papers showed that Germany's room for maneuver was much greater than anybody in Bonn thought. Of course, in case of doubt, the Germans could always be accused of returning to their old aggressive ways. Revanchism was a particularly popular bogeyman set up by the East, whereas the West appeared to be more discreet when raising its individual or collective eyebrows. Yet, overall, the thinking in Washington, Warsaw, and Moscow was far more resigned to accepting Germany's right to pursue its national interests. The foreign policy leadership of the Soviet Union had far fewer doubts about the inevitability of German reunification than generations of West German leaders. In Washington, the successes of Chancellors Erhard and Kiesinger suggest that Germans had more leeway in defending their interests. The outright fear in the Johnson administration about what would happen in Germany if it caused Erhard to fall suggests that the American government believed that the Germans had more options than merely following U.S. leadership.

Douglas Salvage's paper on "The GDR and Poland's Response to Bonn's Ostpolitik" put all this into an even more complex framework as he traced Polish policy towards the two Germanies and the Soviet Union. He argued that Poland's support for Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik was determined more by the inner dynamics of the Warsaw Pact than by Gomulka's desire for improved relations with West Germany. Specifically, the GDR's unwillingness to serve as a buffer state against German unification, along with Moscow's failure to compel it to do so, led Gomulka to make his historic opening to Bonn. Only the utter failure of Gomulka's hard line towards West Germany and within the Soviet bloc led him to seek improved relations with the FRG.

What Salvage's work suggests is that, although it was communist, the Polish government was thinking more in terms of traditional national interests than of Cold War bipolarity. Direct personal confrontations between Gomulka and Ulbricht perfectly exemplified the historical enmity between Poles and Germans, that is, long-standing Polish memories of Prussian and German oppression, and German arrogance and prejudice against allegedly lazy and incompetent Poles, which found its way into the German language in the proverbial *Polenwirtschaft*. Unable to gain Soviet support, Gomulka finally responded to West German overtures, knowing that Moscow would favor improved relations with West Germany despite the fears of East Berlin.

Thus, what has long been perceived as an ideologic monolith turns out to display complex and shifting power dynamics. Poland was not only free to exert pressure, even if unsuccessfully, but the Soviet side obviously understood and acknowledged the Polish motives for objecting to the proposed developments. Salvage's work removes the cover of a

clockwork whose mechanics were far more complicated than those of us who only saw the regular movements on the face could have imagined.

In her paper "Paying for the American Defense Guarantee? The Vietnam War's Influence on the West German-American Offset Negotiations in the late 1960s," Alexandra Friedrich gave an example of how the power of the hegemon depends on the perceptions of the client. The West German government had agreed to purchase its military supplies from American companies in order to offset the considerable American expenses incurred in the defense of Western Europe and because it feared that the United States was about to abandon its European allies in order to concentrate on Vietnam. This mechanism left room for conflict between the two governments both because Germany's military requirements remained far below the desired sums and because of continued American demands for the participation of German troops in the Vietnam War.

Chancellor Erhard was in awe of the Americans and naively believed that he could rely on Johnson's friendship. He was obviously unfamiliar with Truman's adage: "If you want a friend in Washington, get a dog." It appears that the Americans understood Erhard's weakness very well as they bluffed him with repeated threats of troop withdrawals. Erhard's successor, Kiesinger, seemed far less enthralled, was willing to call the bluff, and successfully rejected American claims. Here is a case were personalities really mattered as Kiesinger's more self-confident approach empowered the client state.

To German eyes, the fact that members of the Johnson administration showed no concern about Germany's recent past when they called for a German military contribution to the Vietnam war was quite surprising. Cold War thinking had so far displaced the memory of World War II that the White House harbored no fears about a resurgence of German power politics.

This difference in historical consciousness about Germany's past became very obvious in Tom Maulucci's contribution on "The Question of Bundeswehr Out-of-Area Activities, 1955–1999: From Strategic Necessity to Constitutional Doctrine and Back." Here again we find Johnson and his administration apparently unconcerned about the use of German troops in combat situations, believing, in the words of Dean Rusk, that "it is important that we get some Germans into the field." During the early years, it appears that memories of German World-War-II atrocities, at least in Europe, were still so strong, that the German government quite rightly argued that it would be impolitic to get involved militarily anywhere outside of West German territory. Domestically, Bonn also had to take into account the "count me out" attitude of many Germans during rearmament. At the same time, out-of-area activities were so far beyond the realm of possibilities that there was no need for a theoretical explo-

ration of their constitutionality. When the Social Democrats began participating in the Federal Government, the moral conviction that out-of-area activities were out of question took over. CDU chancellors might have perceived German out-of-area activities as possible embarrassments, but for Brandt and even for Schmidt it was a matter of moral conviction. It was easy to turn this into a constitutional prohibition as the *Grundgesetz* was largely designed as the very antithesis to the aggressive militarism of the Nazi dictatorship.

The intent of the German Founders was to create a new German approach to foreign policy. Constitutionally restricting the Bundeswehr to defensive purposes was meant to prohibit any German government from ever again considering military power as a political tool. After two world wars, von Clausewitz's dictum of war as the continuation of politics by different means was to be stricken from Germany's political testaments. To atone for the evil this nation had brought on so many in the past, West German foreign policy sought to establish the Federal Republic globally as a benign power. The emphasis on multilateralism, international law, and international organizations as the basis for conducting foreign policy was an attempt to further a legalization of the international system, quite in contrast to the traditional power politics of the superpowers. Constitutional prohibitions against out-of-area activities therefore gained considerable weight.

Yet for the United States Clausewitz still rings true. The U.S. can act with impunity, even in violation of international law, because it is not burdened with as disastrous and inhibiting a history as that of the Germans, and, of course, because it has the power to get away with it. Therefore it has no respect for what Henry Kissinger called "essentially legalistic argument[s]" if they stand in the way of what the U.S. perceives as its vital interests.

At the same time, in Germany, resorting to the *Grundgesetz* was a way of keeping the issue out of the public debate. A taboo obviated the need to constantly defend this decision, for example against right-wing militarists who stood to gain legitimacy by supporting American demands for troops. The Schmidt government's constitutional arguments may also have been a polite way of disagreeing with some of the power politics that American administrations were pursuing. By putting up constitutional prohibitions, the Germans were avoiding a situation in which they had to publicly disagree with the United States over fundamental security issues, a situation that might have weakened the Western alliance.

Raimund Lammersdorf

ACROSS THE BRIDGE: GIs IN GERMANY

Film Screening and Discussion at the GHI, October 17, 2001. Co-sponsored by the German-American Center for Visiting Scholars (GACVS). Conveners: Philipp Gassert (University of Heidelberg), Robert P. Grathwol (GACVS/Humboldt Foundation), Donita Moorhus (GACVS/Humboldt Foundation). Host for the GHI: R. Gerald Livingston (GHI).

This event was a pre-release screening of the documentary film "Across the Bridge: GIs in Germany," which is about the relationships between the American military (soldiers, dependents, civilian employees) and the Germans among whom they lived and worked during the half-century of the Cold War. On behalf of the GHI, R. Gerald Livingston welcomed an audience of about 50 guests, who had been invited to view the film and to offer comments and criticism designed to improve the final version. Philipp Gassert discussed his participation in the exploratory meetings of scholars studying the history of the American military in Germany that had been convened by Moorhus and Grathwol as well as his position as a *Zeitzeuge* who had grown up in a small German town that hosted a garrison of American troops from 1952 to 1994. He also described the active research program at the Historisches Seminar at the University of Heidelberg under the direction of Professor Detlef Junker. (For a report on the conference "GIs in Germany" sponsored by GHI in November 2000, see the Spring 2001 *Bulletin* of the GHI, pp. 130–37). Finally, Gassert mentioned the Historisches Seminar's interest in creating an archive of materials related to the American military presence in Germany and appealed to members of the audience who had served in Germany to consider contributing documents and artifacts to such an archive.

Robert Grathwol explained how his research, conducted in collaboration with Donita Moorhus, had led to the film project, which was sponsored and funded with a generous grant from the German Information Center. Grathwol emphasized the overwhelming numbers of Americans involved as part of the military presence in Germany—between 12 and 16 million when soldiers, dependents, and civilian support personnel are all counted. The American population in Germany represented every geographic area as well as every ethnic, religious, and social group that constitutes American society. The social and cultural contacts that developed between these Americans and the Germans whom they encountered turned the experience—albeit largely unintentionally—into the largest cultural exchange program in human history. Grathwol indicated that the intended audience for the film was the general public but that, as

historians, he and Moorhus had tried to insure that cinematic considerations did not outweigh historical accuracy in the film's presentation.

The film itself begins with the battle to seize the bridge at Remagen and progresses to the withdrawal of the bulk of American forces in the mid-1990s. The narrative line is carried by the observations of those who lived the experience rather than by an omniscient narrator. Music consonant with the chronology of the story underscores the cross-cultural influences. A lively discussion followed the screening of the film.

Comments ranged from laudatory for all that the film covered in its 52 minutes to critical of some of the issues it left out. Cinematic choices, such as the staging of interviews, occasional rough transitions (both visually and historically), and the multiplicity of focal points attracted commentary. Some observers found the selection of interviewees too heavily weighted towards officers, so that the experience of the enlisted solder received less attention. As co-producers Grathwol and Moorhus acknowledged that the film remained a work in progress. The film's producer-director, Max Lewkowicz, of Rainmaker Productions Inc., in New York City, hopes to use the nearly 200 hours of videotaped interviews and the substantial collection of archival footage that he has acquired to develop a six-hour series for public television.

Robert P. Grathwol
Philipp Gassert

Medieval History Seminar

Seminar at the GHI, October 25–28, 2001. Conveners: Caroline W. Bynum (Columbia University, New York), Johannes Fried (University of Frankfurt), Patrick J. Geary (University of California, Los Angeles), Christof Mauch (GHI), Christoph Strupp (GHI).

In 2001 the German Historical Institute successfully launched a new annual program for German and American doctoral students in medieval history: the Medieval History Seminar. The seminar is based on the format of our well-established Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar for students of modern history. Every year in the fall it will bring together an equal number of doctoral students from both sides of the Atlantic for a weekend of scholarly discussion and exchange.

For the first seminar, proposals from all areas of medieval history were taken into consideration. The conveners selected seven American and nine German students to present their dissertation projects. Over the

summer all students prepared papers of high quality for a conference reader, that was distributed among the participants in advance. Unfortunately, due to the developments after the terror attacks of September 11, only five of the German students and only one of the German mentors were able to come to Washington for the seminar in October.

Although the first Medieval History Seminar thus had to start with a smaller group of participants, it nevertheless managed to create an atmosphere of lively discussion and intensive intellectual exchange. Since the papers had been pre-distributed, there was ample time for questions and arguments in the six panels. Each panel featured two papers, introduced not by the authors themselves but by two of their fellow students acting as commentators. The discussions benefited greatly from the enthusiasm of the participants and the expertise of Professors Caroline W. Bynum, Johannes Fried, and Patrick J. Geary, who had agreed to serve in this year's seminar as senior scholars and moderators. Without claiming to be representative for the discipline as a whole, the papers provided fascinating insight into current research in medieval history in Germany and North America.

The majority of the papers concentrated on aspects of late medieval history. Three projects dealt with earlier periods: Steven Stofferahn presented his work on the political culture of Carolingian exile. He posed a broad range of questions about the nature, function, execution, and the legal and cultural basis of exile in the Middle Ages, as opposed to later periods. It became clear that an analysis of the practice of exile offers valuable insights into Carolingian political culture, the structure of aristocratic relationships, medieval political rituals, and questions of cultural identity in general.

Valerie Garver dealt with the *prudentia*—the knowledge, professional, and intellectual skills—of Carolingian aristocratic women. The high level of social competence they could acquire enabled them to effectively manage essential activities, like the running of a household or monastery, the education of children, and the memorial preservation of the family. *Prudentia* tended to overcome divisions between lay and religious women, but although noble society valued those abilities, they did not necessarily pave the way for a greater public role of medieval women.

Jonathan Lyon's paper concentrated on a different aspect of family history in the Middle Ages. He explored the kinship networks of the noble family Andechs-Meranier. The Andechs-Meraniers held important secular and ecclesiastical positions in southern and central Germany in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries. Lyon argued in favor of a broad understanding of medieval kinship groups and called for historians to pay equal attention to male and female branches of the family. Family

history in the Middle Ages should be more than a history of "counts, margraves, and dukes" alone. The discussion focused on several methodological aspects of Lyon's approach.

Ilse Freudenthaler dealt with the account books of René of Anjou, King of Sicily and Naples, and Duke of Anjou, to shed light on the relationship between the financial capabilities and the representational demands of a king. The account books were an important part of the complex everyday organization of a late medieval court and marked the transition from an oral to a written culture in the late Middle Ages. The theoretical approach Ms. Freudenthaler applied to her main source in her paper was based on modern theories of communication and led to an intense debate, whether account books can be treated as means of communication in this sense.

Several papers dealt with questions of religion and reform in the late Middle Ages. "Drinking, gambling, clamorous late-night songs and music; lewd images of women in private rooms; dissolute behaviour in public": James Mixson's paper opened with a colorful picture of Dominican religious life in the fifteenth century as contemporary critics saw them, before taking a fresh look at the Observant Movement. This movement was a crucial influence in the changes that late medieval orders underwent. Mixson tried to escape the limits of traditional scholarly models of analysis by concentrating on the "proprietarii," who have been commonly held up as perfect evidence of compromised ideals. Based on a careful reading of contemporary sources, he called categories such as "radicalism," "decline" or "reform" into question and situated the Observants in a much broader and more complex pattern of change in late medieval religious life.

June Mecham used the *Dornenkron* prayer books of the Cistercian Convent of Wienhausen in Lower Saxony in the late fifteenth century to enrich our understanding of female spirituality and daily religious life in general. Through their graphic descriptions the narratives of the *Dornenkron* books enabled the nuns to identify with Christ and to appropriate the memory of Christ's Passion as their own. They created a very special form of unity with Christ. Through a detailed analysis of the differences between the books, Mecham aimed at recovering authentic female voices and the spiritual concerns of individual nuns. Several participants in the discussion stressed the importance of gender as a category for a historian's picture of the past.

In his paper on Prague in the age of Charles IV, David Mengel managed to bring together two topics that are seldom discussed in connection with one another: prostitution and religion. His paper served as a fine example of taking a local perspective on religious manifestations. Prague in the later fourteenth century was a flourishing city that was going

through great physical changes. Mengel explained his concept of "religious topography," which allowed him to view together instances of religious dynamism and the city's changing urban structure. This paved the way for a new kind of contextualization of the religious movements of the time.

The revelations of the holy Brigitta of Sweden in the old-Czech translation of Thomas of Štítné served as an example of the Bohemian literature of edification in Pavlína Rychterová's paper. The revelations Brigitta received in the late fourteenth century dealt with a broad range of subjects: the moral decay of Christianity in general and the church in particular, current political events such as the Hundred-Year War, and the rule of the order she founded. They were published after her death in eight volumes. Rychterová's paper concentrated on the reception of these texts in Bohemia, where they were translated and edited by the religious writer Thomas of Štítné and aroused the interest of Emperor Charles IV. and professors at Prague University.

Several other papers also focused on developments in regions or cities. Henning Steinführer examined the process of *Verschriftlichung*—growing literacy—in a number of medium-sized cities of Wettin Saxony between the thirteenth and fifteenth century. The economic development of the region, demographic growth, and a more specialized administration all contributed to this process. His research illuminated the development of medieval municipial institutions as well as the everyday life of the cities.

David Sheffler contributed to the history of medieval education, a difficult subject because of the lack of traditional sources for southern Germany. He focused on the schools of Regensburg and reconstructed the educational landscape of the city through a case study on the murder of the cathedral cannon Conrad von Braunau during a popular school festival in the city in 1357. Beside much detailed information on the operation of two ecclesiastical schools in Regensburg, the paper contained valuable information on the tense relationship between cities and church-run schools in general. Steinführer's and Sheffler's papers both raised the problem of micro-history, which is always vulnerable to criticism of the selection criteria used for the case-study and can be in danger of overstating the importance of single cases.

The last panel featured two papers on medieval historiography. In his discussion of the medieval historiography of the West German city of Münster, Oliver Plessow concentrated on the methodological aspects of his subject. Medieval texts challenge modern historians through their usually complex tradition. This is also true for Plessow's main source, the "Chronicle of Florence of Wevelinghoven," the first history of the bishopric of Münster. Using contemporary theoretical models of "narrativ-

ism" from France and the Anglo-American world (including the work of Roland Barthes and Hayden White), Plessow was able to shed new light on the difficult process of the "contextualization" of medieval texts and the element of construction that is inherent in modern interpretations. This led to a lively debate on the relationship between language and reality in general.

Matthias Maser also dealt with a historiographical topic. His paper on the *Historia Arabum* of Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada took the seminar away from Central Europe to the medieval Spanish peninsula. The book by de Rada represents the only surviving history of the Islamic world in Latin. Maser introduced its author, who was the archbishop of Toledo and a leading representative of the Spanish Reconquista, and his historiographical writings, which circled around the remarkable project of a "Spanish" national history.

The final discussion of the Medieval History Seminar, chaired by Professor Fried, focused on the commonalities and differences between German and American medieval historiography. The papers and discussions as a whole concentrated largely on aspects of medieval culture and social relations. They avoided well-trodden paths of research by using new sources and new theoretical approaches and stayed away from dogmatic discussions and scholarly jargon. The group agreed that international medievalist research during the last decades has been characterized by several important developments, including: increased thematic convergence, a dwindling of the nationalistic dimension of research on the Middle Ages in Germany, and the growing importance of a European dimension in research topics. But the discussions in the seminar also shed light on the important differences between the ways in which topics are approached and discussed on each side of the Atlantic. Participants also stressed the differences in the university systems, which lead to different career paths for German and American medievalists. The seminar certainly reached its goal of bridging the gap between the two scholarly cultures and helping young medievalists establish professional contacts within the community of medievalists, especially in USA.

The Medieval History Seminar was made possible through a generous grant from the German Program for Transatlantic Contacts of the Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie, Bereich ERP-Sondervermögen, administered by the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau in Frankfurt. The second Medieval History Seminar will take place at the Humboldt-University in Berlin in October 2002. If you are interested in participating, please see the Announcements section of this issue for further information and application requirements.

Christoph Strupp

Participants and Their Topics

ILSE FREUDENTHALER, University of Augsburg, "Hofkultur und Repräsentation. Die Rechnungsbücher Renés von Anjou (1409–1480) als serielles Medium"

VALERIE GARVER, University of Virginia at Charlottesville, "*Prudentia* and Carolingian Aristocratic Women"

JONATHAN LYON, University of Notre Dame, "Expanding Kinship Networks: The Broader Family of the Andechs-Meranier"

MATTHIAS MASER, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nürnberg, "Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada und seine 'Historia Arabum'. Historiographische Konzeption und Formen der Darstellung"

JUNE MECHAM, University of Kansas, "Female Piety and Private Prayer: The Dornenkron Prayer Books From the Cistercian Convent of Wienhausen in Lower Saxony, c. 1450–1500"

DAVID C. MENGEL, University of Notre Dame, "From Venice to Jerusalem: Prostitution, Conversion, and the Religious Topography of Emperor Charles IV's Prague"

JAMES D. MIXSON, University of Notre Dame, "Observants, Conventuals, and the Problematic of Reform in the Late-Medieval Religious Life"

OLIVER PLESSOW, Westfälische Wilhelms-University Münster, "Überlegungen zu einer Methodik der Untersuchung mittelalterlicher historiographischer Texte: Das Beispiel der münsterschen Geschichtsschreibung"

PAVLINA RYCHTEROVA, University of Konstanz, "Die *Revelaciones* der heiligen Brigitta von Schweden in der alttschechischen Übersetzung des Thomas von Štítné. Die Erbauungsliteratur in Böhmen, ihr Charakter und ihre Wirkung"

DAVID SHEFFLER, University of Wisconsin at Madison, "Festum Stultorum: The City, the Bishop, and the Schools of Regensburg"

HENNING STEINFÜHRER, University of Leipzig, "Stadt und Schriftlichkeit im wettinischen Sachsen zwischen dem 13. und 15. Jahrhundert"

STEVEN A. STOFFERAHN, Purdue University, "Renegades, Relatives, and Refugees: The Political Culture of Carolingian Exile"

TENTH ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM OF THE FRIENDS OF THE GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE AND AWARD OF THE FRITZ-STERN DISSERTATION PRIZE

Symposium at the GHI, November 9–10, 2001. Convener: Konrad Jarausch (President, Friends of the GHI). Participants: Eva Giloi Bremner (Princeton University), Christof Mauch (GHI), Bernd Schäfer (GHI), Fritz Stern (Columbia University), Jonathan Zatlin (Massachusetts Institute of Technology).

The Friends of the German Historical Institute convened in Washington on November 9–10, 2001, for their tenth symposium, chaired by Professor Konrad Jarausch, President of the Friends. The morning of November 9 featured the presentation of the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prizes, one of the GHI's most joyous occasions, thanks to the Friends, especially when it takes place,as it did this year, in the presence of Professor Fritz Stern. The Prize committee, composed of Professors James Brophy (University of Delaware), Elisabeth Heineman (University of Iowa), and Jonathan Petropoulos (Claremont McKenna College), who chaired the committee, awarded this year's Stern Prizes to Eva Giloi Bremner (Ph.D., Princeton University) and Jonathan Zatlin (Ph.D., University of California at Berkeley).

A capacity audience enjoyed the presentation "Ich kaufe mir den Kaiser! Royal Relics and the Culture of Display in Nineteenth-Century Prussia" by Eva Giloi Bremner. In the words of the prize citation, Bremner's work presented a "highly creative combination of institutional history, the history of consumption, and the study of high and popular culture." This was followed by Jonathan Zatlin's no less fascinating paper on "The Currency of Socialism: Money in the German Democratic Republic and German Unification, 1971–1989," a "financial history" as well as "a very serious and fundamental intervention into the social science of money." Questions from the floor concluded the morning program.

In the afternoon, Dr. Bernd Schäfer, Research Fellow at the GHI, made a convincing case for reclaiming historiography from the spin of contemporary political actors in his presentation on "Triangular Diplomacy Reconsidered: New Sources and American Foreign Policy, 1969–76." The archival paper trail of those years, combined with the careful evaluation of personal memoirs, promises to yield new insights and a fuller understanding of this still highly disputed subject.

The Friends convened again on Saturday to review programs and activities of the past year and plan for the coming year. Dr. Christof Mauch, and the Institute's fellows and staff are deeply grateful for the continued guidance and support provided by the Friends.

Malve Burns

Global Hollywood: Rethinking the National, Transnationality, and Globalization

Conference at the University of Victoria, British Columbia, November 29–December 1, 2001. Conveners: Heide Fehrenbach (Northern Illinois University), Christof Mauch (GHI), Thomas Saunders (University of Victoria). Co-sponsored by the History Department, the Dean of Humanities, and the Vice-President of the University of Victoria, British Columbia. Participants: Nora Alter (University of Florida), Charles Ambler (University of Texas, El Paso), Matthew Bernstein (Emory University), Barton Byg (University of Massachusetts), Sumita Chakravarty (New School University, New York), Anne Ciecko (University of Massachusetts), Seth Fein (Yale University), Victoria de Grazia (Columbia University), Sheldon Hsiao-Peng Lu (University of Pittsburgh), Richard Maltby (Flinders University, Australia), Michael Raine (Yale University), Martin Roberts (New York University), Philip Rosen (Brown University), Vanessa Ruth Schwartz (University of Southern California, Los Angeles), Ruth Vasey (Flinders University, Australia) and Denise Youngblood (University of Vermont).

In our more and more globalized world, films have taken on an increasingly transnational character. Films are often produced in multinational cooperation, and the same movie may be played to audiences all around the globe. The Western, for example, was invented by Americans, but the Europeans tried to imitate the genre and its commercial success with their own (Euro)Westerns. Kung-Fu movies are popular in every continent of the world, and Dakar has joined Cannes, Berlin, and New York on the film festival circuit.

Throughout the twentieth century, Hollywood occupied a very strong position that extended well beyond the Western world. Hollywood films, aesthetics, genres, stars, and production models set trends in the United States as well as abroad. Despite Hollywood's wide-reaching hegemony, however, culturally and nationally defined film industries have always played and continue to play an important role.

At the end of November 2001, a group of scholars from the fields of film studies, cultural studies, history, and literature came together in Victoria, British Columbia, to explore the various ways that "Hollywood"—as industry, institution, and icon—has figured in the articulation of local, regional, national, and transnational cinemas. In taking a global perspective and broad temporal sweep, the conference sought to foster

dialogue on the comparative study of Hollywood's influence and to encourage sensitivity to the evolution of that influence and the world's engagement with it. One goal of the conference was to extend and refine our understanding of the relationship between cinema and identity in a global setting by exploring Hollywood film production as well as the range and evolution of meanings attributed to American cinematic culture. Another goal was to discuss the strategies employed by various groups to locate their "own" cinemas in localized form.

The conference, hosted by film historian Thomas Saunders, was opened on Thursday evening by Andrew Rippin, Dean of Humanities at the University of Victoria, and Christof Mauch. Rippin and Mauch both emphasized the relevance of the conference topic—not least in light of the terrorist attacks of September 11, which had caused a postponement of the conference, which, in turn, prevented several participants from attending. Through TV and media reporting, the terrible acts of violence had become a constitutive part of the global imagination while at the same time reflecting resistance to American cultural engagement.

The first paper delivered the following morning—Phil Rosen's "Reformulating Hollywood as Global Cinema"—focused on globalization in historical perspective and the film-theoretical concept of cinematic classicism. Rosen argued that it was precisely the long-term aspect of Hollywood's international success that allowed so many to align it with the general designation of classical cinema. He suggested that the 1910s and 1920s were formative both industrially and textually for Hollywood's global ambitions. The commercial and military consequences of World War I were of decisive importance for Hollywood, opening the way for it to take advantage of the communications and transportation infrastructure of the British Empire. It was between the 1870s and 1920s—during the third or "take-off" phase in Roland Robertson's model of globalization—that cinema was invented and films began to be distributed worldwide. The organization of Hollywood's global distribution network and the establishment of "classical cinematic codes" should therefore not be seen as something radically new but as developments that date back to beginnings of capitalist modernity.

In his paper on Chinese and American cinema, Sheldon H. Lu discussed the transnational character and unprecedented Western success of the Chinese-language feature film *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon* (directed by the Chinese-Taiwanese-American director Ang Lee). Lu argued that the longstanding fragmentation of the Chinese nation state shaped the history of transnational cinema in China. While mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong had separate cinematic traditions for many years, the 1980s saw a trend toward co-production and collaboration

across national and regional borders—both among the three Chinese cinemas and between those cinemas and other film industries. It was only after the end of the Cold War, however, that joint productions increased on an unprecedented scale. Transnationalism, "flexible production," "flexible citizenship," the cross-border movement of people and ideas, and the mixing of genres culminated, as Lu argued, in *Crouching Tiger*, thereby creating new commercial possibilities for global entertainment. Lu pointed out that flexible filmmaking in transnational cinema must not be confused with other categories of border-crossing filmmaking. Cinemas such as "exilic cinema," "diasporic cinema," and "postcolonial ethnic cinema" imply a sense of displacement or alienation, Lu argued, whereas transnational movies such as *Crouching Tiger* provide "enormous thrills and pleasures to worldwide audiences." At the same time, "reception gaps" between East and West continue to exist. While *Couching Tiger* achieved unprecedented box-office successes in the United States and Great Britain, audiences in mainland China and Hong Kong found it unspectacular, familiar, and, at times, quite implausible.

In her paper on "Hollywood in Bollywood," Sumita S. Chakravarty examined the nature of Hollywood's influence on Bombay cinema—the world's largest film industry. Chakravarty's paper, summarized in her absence by Heide Fehrenbach, pointed out that Indian cinema was distinguished from the outset by its difference from its American counterpart and that this difference was the key to survival and success. Through repetition and redundancy, through song, dance and elements of melodrama, Bollywood cinema carved out a niche in the non-Western world. At the same time, it made use of star glamour and formulas for success similar to those employed in Hollywood. The national and the global were not mutually exclusive in Bollywood. To explain the (world)wide appeal of Indian movies outside of India, Chakravarty invoked Veit Erlmann's concept of the market-driven "global imagination." She insisted that a truly global analysis should not position the Third World as a mere hunting-ground for Western capital in search of profits, but see it rather as "a site of negotiations of the local and the global." The reason for the global success of Bollywood's aesthetics can only be described as a combination of film as market driven product and the film star's body as a site of mobile identifications. The Raj character in the old Raj Kapoor film *Shri 420* is an example of such mobility—a hero suspended between the industrial and the pre-industrial, between cynic and clown.

In his paper on the Mexican and U.S. film industries in the "Golden Age," Seth Fein demonstrated how cinema crossed the U.S.-Mexican border and transformed cultural frontist representations between the 1930s and 1950s. He pointed out that one of the major factors of Mexican cin-

ema's wartime development was the direct intervention of the United States government in Mexican film production through the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA). The "Golden Age" of Mexican cinema, despite the national myths that underlie so much of Mexico's official history, must be understood as a metonym for the Hollywood style—a "derivative and repetitive commercial genre, marketed internationally through a story system, produced in privately owned studios." Furthermore, Fein argued, an understanding of the transnational, hybrid history of cinematic practices may help in understanding the history of transnationalism and hybridity that lies beyond the screen.

In her paper "Popular Cinema and the Invention of the Asian Blockbuster," Anne Ciecko explored the box-office success of three fin-de-siecle Asian films: *Jose Rizal* (Philippines, 1998), *Nang Nak* (Thailand, 1999), and *Shiri* (South Korea, 1999). Each of these films broke local box-office records previously held by Hollywood's *Titanic*. Ciecko argued that the success of each of these films was based on a combination of the manipulation of familiar stories or characters (such as folk-narratives or local stars), the development of spectacle-driven and expanded-scale entertainment, and a marketing strategy that employed Hollywood for favorable contrast. While the future of local feature film-making and film-going in the Philippines, Thailand, and South Korea is obviously subject to many economic and political factors, Ciecko argued that the landmark significance of local productions in South East Asia and its capabilities of "blowing the Hollywood ship out of the water" should not be underestimated.

In a paper titled "Shadows and Unreal Things," Charles Ambler analyzed the persistent appeal of American movies among African audiences. He discussed the ways in which white Africans had often cut films beyond recognition according to race categorization and in order to remove any seemingly offensive scenes or images. He also examined the longstanding myths about early audiences' encounters with films and the supposed perplexity of the "natives" when confronted with modern technology.

Vanessa Schwartz' presentation on "Hollywood on the Riviera" shifted the focus of the conference to the culture of European film festivals as an alternative to Hollywood's domination. Schwartz argued that the Cannes festival, which emerged as a major European cultural event in 1946, was not only grounded in specifically French or European traditions but also implied a cosmopolitan outlook. The key to the success of Cannes was, according to Schwartz, "precisely that it promoted itself as chic, hip and cosmopolitan as opposed to national." Although the Americans never believed they were adequately represented in Cannes, the festival organizers allowed additional films to be shown outside the competition. This move guaranteed Hollywood box-office success and high

visibility in a European setting. At the same time, by promoting cosmopolitan stars such as Omar Sharif (who lacked national specificity), Cannes became a vital institution for international film beyond the reach of American hegemony.

Like Vanessa Schwartz, Barton Byg focused on alternatives to Hollywood. In his paper "We All Live in Inceville," Byg discussed East German *Indianerfilme*. (Because Byg could not attend, his paper was presented by Heide Fehrenbach.) Byg pointed out that although they imitated Hollywood conventions, the German Democratic Republic's Westerns were unique in a number of ways. They were genre hits in a country where that could not be expected; they replicated an American convention without awaking the cultural watchdogs; and they conveyed "official" Marxist ideology by way of expressing solidarity with Native Americans, the victims of U.S. imperialism. GDR Westerns were the only European movies that presented the genre from the point of view of the Indians. Byg saw the success of the *Indianerfilme* as a result of their providing sanctioned access to pleasures that were otherwise taboo. He emphasized, however, that it is best to interpret these films "less as an anomaly than as a uniquely popular expression of international cultural practices using fantasies of Indian culture and history which have some connection—albeit indirect—to reality on various levels."

Richard Maltby interpreted the Western and its success in the United States as a product of the myth of Anglo-conformity. It was ironic, he argues, that Westerns were also used to promote the idea that Hollywood belonged to the world rather than to the United States alone. The worldwide success of classic Hollywood movies (especially Westerns) can only be explained, according to Maltby, as a result of the deliberate adoption of strategies of semantic indeterminacy and ambiguity. In search of markets, Hollywood exported its consumer product, that is, its movies, to the least differentiated audience, which in turn guaranteed the largest profit. Thus, "the Western provided a neat metaphor for the process of consumerism being identified with Americanism." Maltby argued, in sum, that no artifact, even if it is highly charged with ideology, can avoid reinterpretation.

Maltby's argument was echoed by Ruth Vasey, who pointed out that the Hollywood film industry managed to design a line of products that were deliberately fashioned to be attractive in a variety of viewing situations. Nonetheless, Hollywood should be seen as the national cinema of the U.S.: even as it aims its products towards a globalized market, Hollywood has been unable to offer audiences around the world representations of their own mores and cultural landscapes on screen.

In his paper on "Hollywood, Pop and Americanization," Michael Raine discussed the reinvention of Japanese cinema in the 1950s. Raine

pointed out that the history of Japanese cinema was international before it was national. The first films shown in Japan were produced abroad, and the first Japanese efforts at film-making also depended on foreign equipment and advisors. Moreover, the spread of cinema as a vital element of Japanese mass culture depended on vernacular modifications of industrial and textual practices developed by Hollywood studios in the 1910s. In the 1950s, the Golden Age of Japanese cinema, film gave Japan a chance to explain itself to the outside world. Taking the genre of the "three girls" film, which was inspired by the Hollywood musical and U.S. pop music, as a case study, Raine discussed the struggle to create a "modernist" film culture in Japan based on personal expression, individual text, and reflective critique. The "Japaneseness" of these films, according to Raine, is to be seen as "differential rather than essential, and almost never without a Western—specifically, a Hollywood—intertext."

While historians of the Hollywood film industry have often emphasized the cultural diversity of international audiences, Matthew Bernstein reminded the conference of the cultural and ideological diversity within the United States itself. In his study of Lamar Trotti, a Southerner in Hollywood, Bernstein discussed Trotti's vision of the South, particularly in the interwar period. As a screenwriter, Trotti sought to demonstrate that the South was a civilized place and that North and South had more in common than they realized. His engagement came partly in response to Universal studio's big-budget production of *Uncle Tom's Cabin* in 1927, which had the potential to insult the South. Trotti played a crucial role in providing Hollywood with insight into the South and in creating films that Southerners could applaud.

Papers submitted by two other participants who were unable to attend—Nora Alter ("Producing an Alternative: Hans Richter"), and Denise Youngblood ("The Cosmopolitan and the Patriot: The Brothers Mikhalkov-Konchalovskii and Russian Cinema")—rounded out the material for discussion at the conference.

In a stimulating wrap-up commentary, Martin Roberts criticized the fact that historical evidence had been privileged over ethnographic evidence throughout the conference. He pointed out that anecdotes were sometimes of great importance in understanding the (deterritorialized) transnational contact zones that films constitute. Roberts also suggested that a non-metropolitan theory of the global was needed; and he described the power of Hollywood as discursive rather than ideological. Above and beyond that, Roberts triggered a discussion about the role of the media in America's current war on terrorism, about the iconicity of the movie theatre in Afghanistan (when it becomes a target for resistance), and about how media consumption (TV, videogames etc.) is depicted in the media as a signifier of normality.

A second commentary, forwarded to the conference by Victoria de Grazia, elaborated on and challenged the idea of Hollywood's discursive power. De Grazia pointed out that Hollywood, like other global businesses such as McDonalds, was willing to appropriate and hybridize any product in the name of profit. While this argument suggests that there is indeed so much semantic malleability that one might assume the dominance of discursive power, de Grazia reminded the conference of those key moments in the twentieth century when the American state had sought to align imagery with the exercise of power—particularly in times of emergency and war, including the current war on terrorism. In those moments, the "American image machine" notoriously moves from discursive construction to ideological use and exercises exceptional power.

The final discussion lasted for two and a half hours and was at times heated, especially when it came to questions of methodology. Among the many topics discussed was the character of the Hollywood empire: should it be described as an empire of trade or an empire of state? Should one define it as imperial or global? And, finally, is global imagination at all possible?

Christof Mauch

Suicide in Early Modern Europe

Conference at the German Historical Institute, November 30–December 1, 2001. Conveners: Vera Lind (GHI) and Jeffrey Watt (University of Mississippi). Participants: Donna Andrew (University of Guelph), Machiel Bosman (Amsterdam), Jim Boyden (Tulane University), Elizabeth Dickenson (University of Texas), Craig Koslofsky (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign), David Lederer (National University of Ireland), Jeffrey Merrick (University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee), Paul Seaver (Stanford University).

The history of suicide is a fairly new topic of historical research, but has become increasingly important in the past decade as a way to understand broader cultural and social issues as well as long-term changes in mentality. Almost forty years ago, the English historian Peter Laslett wrote in his famous study *The World We Have Lost* that increased knowledge of the history of suicide would provide a sensitive index of the relationship between personal discipline and social survival, and would so illuminate the society of our ancestors. This conference brought together new research on the history of suicide from different European countries. The

papers concentrated on the early modern period, during which significant changes in attitudes toward suicide took place. Far into the seventeenth century, Europeans tended to identify suicide with demonic temptation, but by the eighteenth century the devil disappeared and gave way to an interpretation that has remained dominant until today: Suicide is generally understood as the expression of a physical and/or mental illness. The conference participants tried to explain this change from different perspectives, since the phenomenon of suicide involves cultural, political, legal, medical, social, sexual, religious, and intellectual aspects. They discussed the legal dimension of suicide as well as the relationship to political culture. Cases of prominent suicides from several countries were analyzed. Statistical evidence, questions of gender differences, and psychological approaches also contributed to a broad debate on the history of suicide.

David Lederer presented the first paper, on the cultural history of self-sacrifice in Hungary, a country that has one of the highest rates of reported suicides in the world. In trying to explain this high rate, Lederer suggested that during centuries of war and oppression, Hungarians cultivated a resilient tradition of self-sacrifice that became part of their cultural identity. Although historical records of suicide cases are lacking, he reported that there is an abundant number of legendary cases that employ a wide definition of suicide and martyrdom. This explanation is supported by the fact that the Hungarian suicide rate has dropped rapidly since the country regained independence and stability.

Machiel Bosman concentrated on the juridical aspects of early modern suicide in Amsterdam. On the basis of judicial proceedings from 1532 onwards, he identified three stages of decriminalizing suicide from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century: In the sixteenth century, suicides generally did not appear before a court. Instead, authorities were more likely to punish only the suicides of criminals. A century later, suicides were tried in the courts, but the laws were not enforced, and a quiet burial was the norm. In the eighteenth century, only criminals were prosecuted for killing themselves, and this was done by exposing their dead bodies in public in order to deter others. Bosman argued that neither the Reformation nor the Enlightenment influenced the decriminalization of suicide in Amsterdam. He found that denying burial to suicides had more to do with a code of honor than with religious concerns, and the process of decriminalization started long before the Enlightenment.

Donna Andrew presented a paper entitled "The Suicide of Sir Samuel Romilly: Apotheosis or Outrage?" Romilly was a member of the English Parliament, a prominent lawyer, and a crusader for the abolition of the slave trade, as well as the reform of criminal law. His suicide in 1818 received a lot of attention and evoked a broad public debate. Andrew

investigated this debate to find out more on early nineteenth-century attitudes toward suicide and came to the conclusion that the public could not decide whether Romilly's death represented sin or sacrifice. The majority mourned him as a model policy-maker, self-made business entrepreneur, and family man. In order to understand his suicide, they drew a connection between his family values and public achievements, and came to the conclusion that his extraordinary efforts had taken their toll on his physical and emotional well-being. His suicide could therefore be seen as the result of an illness. Romilly thus evoked the image of a warrior fallen in battle—a victim of the sacrifices he had to make. Others, however, criticized his death, mostly on religious grounds. They condemned his lack of Christian submission, insufficient faith, pride, and what they saw as an act of cowardice. Besides the debate over sacrifice or sin, other contemporary themes emerging from the discussion on Romilly's death were the question of the necessity of inquest juries and operations, and the recognition of a social bias in verdicts, visible through the leniency with which Romilly was treated due to his prestige.

Vera Lind presented a paper on the early modern psychological experience of suicidal thoughts and suicide attempts. By searching for the cultural codes reflected in the internal perceptions, she explored the way suicides experienced their body and mind, how they articulated their feelings, how they connected specific sensations to the wish to end their lives, and their perceptions of suicide. Lind argued that although suicide had been decriminalized, suicidal feelings remained an unspeakable, unthinkable taboo throughout the early modern period. Bodily signs and feelings were experienced within the culturally constructed stereotypes of melancholy, but were not connected to the wish to die. Instead, people who survived their suicide attempts later described themselves as passively enduring some external, forceful feeling that overcame them, thus allowing them to escape responsibility for what then happened. However, the way they identified these outside forces changed during the eighteenth century. Whereas diabolical temptations dominated in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, illness and personal problems increasingly became the causes by the mid-eighteenth century. Lind concluded that the perceptional taboo of the suicidal act also shows that there was a more or less conscious awareness of its religious, social, and legal consequences. The cases in which suicides did not describe themselves as being driven by outside forces that they passively endured were suicides connected to religious melancholy and to the phenomenon of murder committed out of suicidal thoughts.

In his paper entitled "Suicide and the Secularization of the Body in Early Modern Saxony," Craig Koslofsky analyzed an administrative dispute between civil and church authorities over the burial of the body of

a suicide between 1702 and 1706 in Leipzig. This micro-historical approach not only allowed him to show how attitudes towards suicide were expressed, but also how church and city politics worked in this context. The dispute highlighted suicide in popular belief and in church law at a time when ideas about suicide started to become increasingly secularized. Although the burial of suicides had become the responsibility of local administration by the end of the sixteenth century, ultimately the Saxon consistory won the dispute and reclaimed authority over the bodies of suicides. Koslofsky concluded that the secularization of ideas about suicide led only indirectly to a secularization of authority over the body of a suicide.

Jeffrey Merrick discussed how a social history of suicide in late eighteenth-century Paris could be written by picking the year 1775 as a case study. After evaluating different types of sources for their usefulness, Merrick settled on the reports of the forty-eight police commissioners in Paris who were responsible for the investigation of sudden and suspicious deaths. Some of the most interesting observations Merrick gleaned from his analysis of twenty suicide cases in these reports concern the social networks operating and the collective attitudes of the time. Acquaintances of the dead overwhelmingly blamed their suicides on physical or mental disorders, and did not refer to sin or crime. Also, when talking to the police, witnesses generally toned down or even manipulated their stories in order to avoid posthumous prosecution.

Paul Seaver investigated the reactions towards suicides in seventeenth-century London, especially the reasons offered to explain why people killed themselves. Although both the church and state at this time still considered suicide a terrible crime and sin, Seaver concluded that the treatment of suicide cases "points to the new and powerful role London as a metropolis was coming to play in English society and culture." The big city as a center for communication, the exchange of ideas, book production, and the formation of opinions became a leader in new attitudes and cultural change during this century.

Jim Boyden and Emily Dickenson co-authored a paper on ambiguous attitudes toward suicide in early modern Spain. They took the example of a women committing suicide at the beginning of the sixteenth century to illustrate some of the important points of Spanish perceptions. Like other European countries at the time, the Spanish church and state unanimously condemned suicide. Suicides were denied a proper burial, and their families were deprived of property and prohibited from taking up high-profile careers. However, due to the influence of Jewish traditions and the important role of honor in Spain, social attitudes towards suicides were more complex. There were some cases in which honorable suicide

was openly admired, and others in which people pitied the actions of the victim if he or she were infused by insanity.

Jeffrey Watt used the Republic of Geneva in the eighteenth century as a case study of the incidence of and attitudes toward suicide in relation to changing religious perceptions. He paid special attention to whether a typically modern gender difference existed, in which men consistently kill themselves in greater numbers than women. The archival sources for Geneva are especially rich, and the criminal records for suicide cases combined with a death registry that recorded every single death in Geneva provide an almost complete picture of the number of suicides in addition to details on the circumstances. Watt's evidence suggests that the Enlightenment had little to do with secularization of suicide but furthered a change in mentality that was already under way. The desacralization of Genevan society at the beginning of the eighteenth century affected every level of society, men and women alike, and dissociated killing oneself from demonic possession. Mental and physical illness were cited as the most common motives for suicide by the end of the century. Watt observed a striking gender difference and suggested that the higher number of male suicides was due to a greater vulnerability to a wider range of motives as religious deterrents declined, although men were no less religious than women. As further evidence, he also cited the fact that the majority of female suicides were viewed as the expression of an illness whereas only half of all male suicides were attributed to poor health. Political and economic crises may have been more immediately responsible for the explosion of suicide numbers as well as the growing gender gap, but the development of a more secular mentality was the most decisive factor for changing attitudes towards suicide.

All in all, the conference highlighted the latest research in a field that is still developing. The papers showed that research on suicide can dramatically improve our understanding of early modern societies, especially when it comes to explaining long-term changes in mentality in different levels of society. Additionally, it became clear that suicide must be understood as a cultural phenomenon. A publication of the papers in an essay collection is currently in preparation. The beautiful warm weather at the beginning of December ensured that the success of the conference was not entirely a scholarly one. In fact, the atmosphere was so enjoyable that the group irritated some fellow restaurant guests one night, who eavesdropped on the continuing lively discussion and were left slightly stunned when they found out that this happy group had come together for a suicide conference. It should also be noted that the conference began and ended with the same number of participants.

Vera Lind

The German Mission to Afghanistan 1915–1916

Symposium at the GHI, January 29, 2002. Convener: Christoph Mauch (GHI). Speaker: Thomas L. Hughes (GHI). Commentator: Hans-Ulrich Seidt (Cultural Attaché, German Embassy).

In December 2001, German troops were sent to Afghanistan on a peacekeeping mission. On the day of their arrival, the German Ambassador to the United States, Wolfgang Ischinger, was asked how the German troops were received in Kabul. "With the warmest possible enthusiasm," he reported. "We were reminded at once that Germany had been Afghanistan's unique and constantly reliable friend all through the twentieth century." It was no accident that after the liberation from the Taliban regime the different Afghan sections chose the Petersberg, an international meeting place near Bonn, as the venue for a crucial conference that drew up the road map to peace in Afghanistan.

Thomas Hughes's lecture focused on the origins of the close relationship between Germany and Afghanistan. He analyzed the political background and the geostrategic framework of the German mission to Kabul in 1915–1916. Right in the middle of World War I, Afghanistan was the goal of a German mission, led by a Bavarian officer, Oscar Niedermayer, and a Prussian diplomat, Werner-Otto von Hentig. They were acting as secret emissaries of the Kaiser, trying to convince the ruler of Afghanistan, Emir Habibullah, to launch an attack against British India. They brought with them two Indian revolutionaries, Mohammed Barakatullah and Kumar Mahendrah Pratap, who claimed to represent a provisional government of India in Kabul, planning to overthrow British rule over the entire subcontinent.

But the Germans and their allies did not succeed. Hughes explained in detail how the Emir kept close ties with the British masters of India. Disappointed, the German agents left Kabul in the spring of 1916 and, after adventurous travels, returned to Berlin via different routes. However, their months in Kabul laid the groundwork for far-reaching developments. One of these was the third Afghan War of 1919, which began shortly after the assassination of Emir Habibullah, plotted by the very same group in the Afghan leadership that had supported the Germans in 1915–1916. Another consequence was the growing self-confidence of the Afghan people vis-à-vis the British Raj in India. The arrival of the German mission in Kabul had clearly demonstrated the slow but steady decline of the British Empire. Fierce in their independence, the Afghans were now looking for friends abroad—and found them in Berlin. During the Weimar Republic, German engineers and teachers came to Kabul. Before

World War II, the Afghan army was equipped by Germany. And during the Cold War, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic were competitors in Afghanistan, thus doubling the impact of economic aid and ideological influence. As a result, Germany owns two embassy compounds in Kabul today.

After the lecture, comments and questions focused on the continuity of German foreign policy and the German-Afghan relationship. The lively debate addressed both context and consequences of the German mission during World War I. It became clear, that after the visit of von Hentig and Niedermayer, all nation-building efforts in Afghanistan were influenced by the close contacts between Afghanistan and Germany. Both countries were intertwined in a unique way that helped to develop mutual respect and understanding. Against this background, the UN talks on Afghanistan on the Petersberg in November and December 2001 were another step on a long road. It will hopefully lead to peace, stability, and prosperity in a country that has suffered terribly since the Soviet invasion in 1979.

Hans-Ulrich Seidt