Conference at the GHI, September 23-26, 1999. Convener: Thomas Goebel (GHI). Participants: John Abbott (University of Illinois at Chicago), Jane Caplan (Bryn Mawr College), Heide Fehrenbach (Emory University), Karl Christian Führer (University of Oldenburg), Philipp Gassert (GHI), Mark Hampton (Wesleyan College), Christina von Hodenberg (University of Freiburg), Gianni Isola (University of Padova), Peter Jelavich (University of Texas at Austin), Michael Kazin (Georgetown University), Marcus Kreuzer (Villanova University), Cornelia R. Levine (Berkeley, California), Lawrence R. Levine (George Mason University), Robert D. Levy (University of Minnesota), Christof Mauch (GHI), Garth Montgomery (Radford University), Kiran Klaus Patel (Humboldt University of Berlin), Uta Poiger (University of Washington), Jörg Requate (University of Bielefeld), Steven J. Ross (University of Southern California), Adelheid von Saldern (University of Hannover), Axel Schildt (University of Hamburg), Dieter Schott (Technical University of Darmstadt), Renate Schumacher (German Broadcasting Archive), Vanessa R. Schwartz (American University), James Schwoch (Northwestern University), Brian Ward (University of Newcastle Upon Tyne), and Clemens Zimmermann (University of Heidelberg).
There can be no doubt that the mass media have been among the most powerful forces shaping politics, society, and culture in the twentieth century. Starting with the evolution of movies and radio in the early decades of the century and ending with the dramatic rise of the Internet in the second half of the 1990s, the mass media have played a powerful role in the evolution of Western democracies. It seems that each "invention" of a new medium was accompanied by dramatic predictions about its impact on the social fabric and on everyday life. Of course, the contemporary media scene is dominated by television. And indeed, many observers are likely to argue that the introduction of television represented a qualitative leap in the history of the mass media, that the ability to combine sound and pictures and deliver it to virtually every home has revolutionized the role of the media in cultural production, political life, and moral values. However, even a cursory look back at the first half of the twentieth century shows that earlier media "revolutions" often affected political behavior and cultural perceptions in equally powerful ways. Because so much attention has been centered on television, the GHI deemed it particularly interesting to organize a conference that focused on the evolution of mass media in the pretelevision age between 1900 and 1950.
The goal of the conference was to bring together scholars from different countries to systematically compare the effects of such innovations as radio, film, and newspapers on political systems and political cultures under a variety of national settings and political regimes. The contributions focused largely on Germany and the United States, with some analysis of conditions in Italy, France, and Great Britain. Given the time-frame of the conference, the choice of media seemed almost self-evident. Film was an invention of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that by 1910 had evolved into maybe the most popular form of mass entertainment. The radio craze of the 1920s and 1930s included the rapid popularization of a medium that, for the first time, allowed direct media access into the home. The development of newspapers, finally, was also marked by significant popularization with the evolution of the penny press and mass journalism. Different papers analyzed how new media forms were or were not integrated into existing political routines, how they altered conceptions of public life and political behavior, whether they transformed the very definitions of the political that structured political action, and what differences the legal and political organization of new media forms made in their societal impact.
The conference began with Lawrence Levine's keynote address on President Franklin D. Roosevelt's innovative use of radio in his "fireside chats." Over the course of his presidency, FDR skillfully employed the radio to reach a mass audience and to solicit popular support for his often controversial policies. The millions of letters he received in response to his chats testify to their popularity. The talks had a powerful effect on the listeners, who often felt a personal connection over the airwaves. In a time characterized by massive unemployment and economic misery, Roosevelt's ability to relate to the audience provided encouragement to millions of Americans. He did not overuse the medium; altogether, he only gave about thirty chats. But when he did speak to a national audience, it was an event eagerly anticipated by many Americans, who regarded Roosevelt and his talks as beacons of hope during a difficult time. Like no other example from this period, FDR's fireside chats demonstrated the effectiveness of the radio in creating a national community of listeners that could become an important political asset.
The fireside chats were an example of the positive role radio could play in a democratic society, but they also illustrate the keen interest governments in all Western democracies had in all new forms of mass media. Although the number of independent radio stations in the United States had sharply decreased by the 1930s, a relative lack of government control allowed for greater diversity in radio programming. Brian Ward's paper dealt with the pivotal role of radio in the rise of the Civil Rights movement in the 1940s and 1950s. Black activists used their access to radio stations, almost always owned and operated by whites, to further the cause of black emancipation all across the American South. Although overt political action was often impossible, many radio personalities found ingenious ways to foster black pride and self-consciousness, to raise awareness of racial inequalities, and to sow the seeds of an emerging Civil Rights movement. In this instance, a commercialized medium was made into an agent of cultural and political change.
No more striking contrast can be found than the role of radio in Nazi Germany. Even before the Nazis came to power in 1933, German radio had found itself under much closer government control than radio in America. Although regionally decentralized and not subject to direct state control, radio in Germany had been regarded from the outset as a medium that needed to be carefully controlled by government authorities. Private radio stations did not exist, and the various supervisory boards ensured that German radio pursued a clear educational agenda that lent itself readily to conservative causes (Renate Schumacher). In the years before 1933 one can observe a clear increase in the number of programs that dealt with nationalistic and völkisch themes. As part of the changing intellectual and cultural landscape of Germany during the Great Depression, these radio programs demonstrated the growing appeal of National Socialist ideology and helped pave the way for the Nazi takeover of power (Adelheid von Saldern).
Once in power, the Nazis, especially Propaganda Minister Josef Goebbels, identified the radio as the medium central to their success in indoctrinating and manipulating the German population. The rapidly growing availability of radio sets multiplied the national radio audience, and the Nazis placed great confidence in their ability to mold public opinion with the help of an ideologically streamlined set of programs and radio personalities. In his paper, Philipp Gassert traced the career of Hans Fritzsche, one of the most well- known radio personalities of the Third Reich. It was during World War II, when he hosted Germany's most important radio news program, that Fritzsche's influence peaked. Using the many letters written to Fritzsche during this time, Gassert illustrated the relationship between the Nazi broadcaster and his audience. Although some reveal a growing disenchantment with the Nazi regime amidst the deteriorating conditions of the war, others illustrate the hold that Nazi propaganda continued to have among the German population. If the radio did not always live up to the expectations of the Nazis as an instrument of mass propaganda and manipulation, it certainly acted as a powerful force in spreading the Nazi message.
The Nazis also had a strong interest in motion pictures as a propaganda tool. That was true for urban centers, already well equipped with numerous cinemas, but even more so for rural areas often without access to theaters. Clemens Zimmermann described the media policies of the Third Reich in relation to the rural countryside. The Nazis founded a special service designed to show movies in rural areas where no cinemas existed. As a result, millions of peasants gained access to a previously largely unavailable entertainment. Many of the movies shown were the standard comedies produced throughout the 1930s and 1940s. Others reflected more closely Nazi ideology. As with most forms of Nazi propaganda, audiences proved to be far more interested in entertainment than in explicit ideological messages. Within academic circles, an intense debate developed in the 1930s concerning mass-media theories and ways to reach the audience (Garth Montgomery). Yet even under the conditions of a regime that controlled all forms of mass media, the ability to shape public beliefs and induce behavior conforming to Nazi expectations remained mixed. There existed a persistent gap between the Nazi belief in the power of mass media to manipulate audience behavior and the actual performance of Nazi-controlled movies, television, and newspapers. Given the frequent conflicts within and between Nazi organizations themselves, which sometimes spilled over into the media (Kiran Klaus Patel), the less than stellar results of Nazi media activities are even less surprising.
After the end of World War II, the democratization of German mass media was among the more pressing issues faced by the occupying powers. As demonstrated by James Schwoch, the fate of postwar German television became an object in the global telecommunications strategy of the United States. The allocation of frequencies in Europe and control over the airwaves were discussed at a number of postwar conferences that pitted American against Soviet conceptions. The Americans clearly pursued an agenda that combined concerns over denazification and democratization in West Germany with a project of global telecommunications hegemony. Within the parameters set by American policies and goals, however, West Germany would soon reclaim a large portion of autonomy in regard to media policies.
Indeed, the media sphere in West Germany soon became an example of the successful liberalization of the public sphere. Slowly, but with growing speed in the late 1950s and early 1960s, radio, television, and newspapers became increasingly independent of government control and increasingly critical of government policies. A new generation of journalists evolved that began to seriously grapple with the implications of National Socialism for Germany's identity in the postwar era (Christina von Hodenberg). The strong educational impulse of German television and radio programming allowed for the development of a number of public affairs shows that revitalized German political debates. Over time, the mass media became one of the more powerful agents forcing Germans to seriously confront their own past.
This newfound independence of West German media stood in marked contrast to conditions in postwar Italy. Here, at least with radio, government control continued to be stronger. The domestic political situation, marked by the conflicts between the Christian Democrats, in control of radio programming, and the Communists raised the stakes and made it much more difficult to carve out an independent role for radio. At least until the late 1950s radio broadcasts were characterized by a clear conservative bias toward government policies (Gianni Isola). The differences between Italy and Germany in the immediate postwar era underscore the successful liberalization of the media in Germany.
Many of the papers presented showed how ineffective media strategies often were even under conditions of total government control. Technological advancements did not necessarily equal greater success in manipulating the public. And the advent of television did not automatically revolutionize political campaigning. As shown by Marcus Kreuzer, some of the key ingredients of modern political campaigns that are often portrayed as a direct result of television - most notably the idea of politics as a strategic game, the personalization of politics, and the weakening of party organizations - antedated the introduction of television, at least in France and Germany. In these two countries, conservative parties developed a new style of political campaigning and behavior between 1890 and 1940 that incorporated all these elements. The competitive pressures of an electoral mass market were responsible for their development, not a technological determinism. Another example of this trend can be found in the practice of direct democracy in California in the decades before World War II (Thomas Goebel). This state, a trailblazer in the development of initiative and referendum elections, pioneered the evolution of political consultants, the use of scientific public opinion polls, the use of methods drawn from commercial advertising in political campaigns, and other hallmarks of modern campaign methods. In a state where parties were traditionally weak and played virtually no role in initiative campaigns, political actors developed new tools and techniques even without the benefit of a technological innovation such as television.
Other papers presented at the conference focused on various aspects of the mass media between 1900 and 1950. Steven Ross showed the significant role played by silent films produced by labor unions and other labor activists during the first two decades of the twentieth century. These movies represented an often forgotten strand of critical filmmaking that was later eclipsed by Hollywood and the rise of the studio system. Jörg Requate compared the political aspirations of large newspaper owners in Germany, the United States, and Great Britain. Although some enjoyed a modicum of success, most failed in their attempts to translate their powerful role in the mass media into real political power. John Abbott looked at the important role of the German Catholic press in rural Bavaria in the early decades of the century. In charting a difficult course between social and economic modernization and Catholic beliefs, they played a crucial role in establishing a rural public sphere.
Taken together, the contributions to the conference "Before Television" offered a broad array of perspectives on the role of the mass media in Western Europe and the United States between 1900 and 1950. They focused on a sometimes overlooked period in the history of the evolution of mass media. Dazzled by the power of television, some observers have been blind to the important media revolutions of the first half of the century. The history of the mass media is a vital part of the history of the twentieth century. As the first conference hosted by the GHI exclusively devoted to this history, the event provided a stimulating venue for scholars from various countries to bring their collective perspectives to bear on a crucial element of modern life.
Thomas Goebel