“Come to the Public Schools. Learn the Language of America.” So, in six languages, read a large-format poster issued by the city of Cleveland, Ohio, in 1917 (Figure 1). The poster was targeted at poor and working class immigrants from southern and eastern Europe. This “new immigration” played no small part in the rise of new industrial centers across the American Midwest in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. On the eve of World War I, cities like Cleveland and Detroit were not only among the most economically dynamic municipalities in the United States but also among the most ethnically diverse.

That diversity, especially the diversity of the languages the newcomers spoke, appeared to many Americans to be a threat to American social cohesion. Only individuals who could understand and make themselves understood in English, so the argument ran, would be able to land good jobs and develop a sense of belonging that extended beyond their own ethnic communities. That argument took on an increasingly nationalistic tone with the outbreak of World War I. As early as 1915, for instance, Detroit, the Motor City, launched an initiative to help immigrants improve their English. Among the participants in this initiative were companies, industrial associations and chambers of commerce, social welfare organizations, clubs, the military, the press, and — not least of all — children. In schools, at public libraries, on playgrounds, at meetings of groups like the Boy Scouts, and at community organizations like the YMCA, young people were given cards that read “Can Your Mother and Father Speak English Well? Take this card home; it will tell them where to go to learn English.”

Advocates of adult education classes for immigrants throughout the United States were convinced that “there is no better medium than immigrant children for making a message really reach the mother and father. The children were proud of the charge.” Even after immigration fell off during World War I and the imposition of quotas in the 1920s, that approach still seemed promising to municipal authorities in cities with large immigrant communities. In
the late 1930s, for example, the New York City Board of Education issued a poster in English and Yiddish that urged eastern European Jewish immigrants “Learn to speak, read & write the language of your children!” (Figure 2).

Historians typically treat these widely distributed materials as evidence of the strategies proposed for the Americanization of immigrants.4 Setting them in that context certainly makes sense, if for no other reason than their origins. The 1917 poster described above (Figure 1), for example, was produced and distributed by the Americanization Committee of the Cleveland Board of Education. And historians take it as beyond dispute that immigrants were encouraged to learn English as the first step toward becoming “good” Americans and citizens.

In taking that approach to these source materials, however, historians have rarely given thought to the role that contemporaries ascribed to young immigrants as translators of particular forms and bodies of knowledge. The liminal position of immigrant children has certainly been much documented and discussed. Jacob Riis, for example, publicized the plight of immigrant children in the slums of New York’s Lower East Side and called attention to their role as “go-betweens.”5 Since Riis, though, that term has been used mainly to describe the difficulties faced by individuals caught between two cultures.

The history of knowledge opens an entirely different perspective on and approach to this subject. Without downplaying the challenges and conflicts young immigrants faced, this approach treats children and young people as historical actors who, because they were comfortable in multiple cultural contexts, were able to translate between cultures and, what is more, to produce new knowledge. That knowledge was presumably understood by representatives of the host society as an indication of the newcomers’ loyalty to their new nation, but it also served purposes that reached well beyond that for both immigrant communities and the societies in which they lived and had

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to find their way. The history of knowledge sensitizes us to such possibilities.

In the case of the Cleveland initiative, the actors involved seem to have recognized children’s potential as cultural translators. Although the poster described here did not refer specifically to the role of children as intermediaries, its iconography sent a clear message. The parents, apparently uneducated migrants from rural areas, wear old-fashioned clothing. Their sharp, modernly dressed son, like Moses with the tablets of the law, cradles an alphabet chart in his arm and encourages them to acquire new knowledge. Whereas the parents are seemingly passive, the son is dynamic and, in the best sense of the term, knowing. The way he points to the chart suggests the comparison to Moses and makes clear that he knows what needs to be done. The boy embodies socially valuable knowledge. In other words, immigrant children were seen not only as a link between the cultures that first generation immigrants brought with them and “American culture,” as defined at the time; they were also viewed as independent conveyers of a migrant knowledge that was not immediately at the disposal of the host society.

Historians have done little systematic research so far on such iconographies of knowledge or on the knowledge strategies and practices of migrant groups. That is striking, given that migrants only rarely possess cultural capital that is of use in new social settings and often have little opportunity at first to become habituated to their new social surroundings. Acquiring new social knowledge is all the more important when one’s cultural capital has been devalued and one’s habitus is not congruent with what societies or social groups expect. While habitus in Bourdieu’s sense is guiding social interactions as a matter of course, some have to compensate the lack of an appropriate habitus by acquiring social knowledge with great effort. The question for historians of knowledge, then, is whether young migrants were able to play an important role in imparting that knowledge, given

Figure 2: WPA Adult Education Program [and] the Board of Education, City of New York, “Free classes in English! Learn to speak, read & write the language of your children” (New York, 1936-1941), poster in English and Yiddish. Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, Digital ID: ppmsca 05660.
their potential access to bodies of knowledge deemed legitimate in multiple social milieus.

The example of children and adolescents as carriers, cultural translators and creators of a new (migrant) knowledge is, of course, just one of many that points to how deeply “knowledge” has shaped history. Knowledge touches upon almost all spheres of life in all eras and in all regions of the world, and it thus offers a distinctive approach to examining complex historical phenomena. It opens an approach to actors and structures largely beyond the grasp of established lines of inquiry and analytical concepts.

The history of knowledge was long viewed as “an exotic or even eccentric topic,” and just a decade ago it was still criticized as a field with many shortcomings. Since then, however, a very different picture has emerged. In the German-speaking countries as well as in France, Great Britain, and the United States, the history of knowledge now ranks as one of the most dynamic and productive fields of research in history and cultural studies. Research centers and research groups devoted to the history of knowledge are popping up like mushrooms, as are professorships in the field. Knowledge is experiencing a boom — not least in the historical profession.

Such rapid growth in a field of historical research rarely occurs out of the blue. More commonly, it is a reflection of new questions about the past being posed in response to social processes in the present. It is a response to stimulation and ideas from related academic disciplines, and it generally builds on earlier research trends within the field of history itself. The history of knowledge draws on many sources: Bernhard of Chartres’s image of dwarves standing on the shoulders of giants most certainly applies here. The potential of new approaches in historical research can be realized only if historians are aware of their scholarly roots and the contexts they developed in. For that reason, I will use the first part of this essay to sketch some of the factors that had a decisive influence on the development of the history of knowledge as it is conceived today. I will then consider the questions of what the history of knowledge has to add to the research questions and approaches upon which it rests (but also partially calls into question) and what new perspectives and insights it might offer. Some exciting suggestions are provided in the essays that follow in this issue of the Bulletin. Finally, I will close with some thoughts on the appeal of the history of knowledge for the GHI Washington and its partners.
I. Historians’ Discovery — and Rediscovery — of Knowledge

Social Developments

Social scientists began discussing the shift from the industrial society to the knowledge society in the 1960s and 1970s. That discussion took on a new dynamic as the internet and digital technologies became omnipresent in society. The once prophesied age of information and the networked world have been reality for many people around the world since at least the turn of the century.8 The political, scientific, and business communities have been searching for ways to meet the complex challenges this development poses for them and society as a whole. The feeling of being witness to and part of a “knowledge revolution” was as widespread as the impression that humankind had never before experienced such far-reaching social and cultural change. Historians, accordingly, have tried to bring a historical perspective to current debates about the knowledge and information society. The result has been a series of studies that have shown how the understanding of what constitutes knowledge has varied over time and from one socio-cultural setting to another. Such studies have made clear that the ways in which knowledge is recognized and acknowledged are changeable and are shaped by a variety of factors. They have made us aware, in short, just how complex but also fluid knowledge has always been.9

Related Disciplines

Recent humanities and social science research offers much stimulation and many points of contact for historians interested in knowledge. Both philosophy and sociology have long traditions of engagement with the social construction of knowledge. Inspired by the work of figures such as Karl Mannheim and Max Scheler, the sociology of knowledge stands as a distinct area of sociological research.10 Although historians have kept their distance, the sociology of knowledge has provided an important stimulus to historical research. The work, for example, of Ludwig Fleck on thought styles and thought collectives, of Pierre Bourdieu on academic disciplines, of Bruno Latour on research cultures, and of Karin Knorr-Cetina on epistemic cultures provide an important epistemological foundation.

9 Peter Burke, A Social History of Knowledge: Volume I: From Gutenberg to Diderot; Volume II: From the Encyclopédie to Wikipedia (Cambridge, 2000 and 2012); Ian McNeely and Lisa Wolverton, Reinventing Knowledge (New York, 2008); »
for the history of knowledge. 11 Michel Foucault’s theories about the development and role of knowledge regimes have also influenced historians, and his ideas about the relationship between power and knowledge have been taken up in many areas of historical research. 12 Similarly, sociological and anthropological studies on the politics of knowledge 13 have inspired historians to pay more attention to knowledge and, in particular (post-)colonial knowledge production.

The current interest in knowledge has extremely diverse roots within the field of history. 14 That is one reason why there are clear differences in what is understood by “the history of knowledge” on the opposite sides of the Atlantic 15 but also within both the European and North American historical professions.

**History of Science**

The best known and most well-established field linked to the history of knowledge is the history of science. Since the 1990s, historians of science, led by researchers in North America, have broadened their scope of inquiry by anchoring scientific activity more firmly in its larger cultural context and by focusing on practices of knowledge production. Although they have raised the profile of their discipline within the historical profession with this cultural turn, 16 many historians of science, like their colleagues in general history, still see the history of science as an independent discipline that is more closely related to fields such as science and technology studies or to mathematics and the natural sciences than to history. 17 Their discipline, they maintain, seeks to illuminate the complex processes by which scientific knowledge advances. For a long time, they concede, the history of science ignored the social context of scientific pursuits and addressed the social relevance and social impact of scientific knowledge at best peripherally. Only recently has the history of

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14 For a good survey of this and other disciplines he categorizes as “knowledge studies,” see: Burke, *What is the History of Knowledge*, 9–14; Speich Chassé and Gugeler, 88–90.

15 Speich Chassé and Gugeler explicitly emphasize — without justifying it — that German-language Wissensgeschichte was not identical with either the French histoire du savoir nor the anglophone history of knowledge. Speich Chassé and Gugeler, 86.

16 In particular, studies in the history of science exploring the practices of knowledge production and the performance of knowledge have drawn the attention of historians in other fields. Among the pioneers in this field were Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, *Leviathan and the Air-Pump. Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life* (Princeton, 1985); Steven Shapin, *A Social History of Truth* (Chicago, 1994); Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, *Objectivity* (Cambridge, MA, 2007; Jörg Rheinberger, *Toward a History of Epistemic Things* (Stanford, 1997).

17 This is also reflected by its classification within university structures and by existing funding streams.

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science actively taken up the questions of how scientific knowledge affects society and, conversely, how social processes influence the production of knowledge in science.\(^1\)

“Science” in this research context almost always means the natural sciences and mathematics. Historians of science interested in knowledge production have only rarely turned their attention to the social sciences and humanities.\(^2\) The historical profession has filled this gap with biographies of historians and systematic studies of the history of historiography. Moreover, historians are giving increased attention to the scientization of the social and the emergence of expert cultures.\(^3\) This work goes beyond analysis of (competing) expertise and takes up the interaction of researchers and their objects, the relationship between researchers and their sponsors or “beneficiaries,”\(^4\) and, increasingly, the question of how actors outside the academic microcosm have influenced research and the social construction of knowledge. The growing interest among both historians and historians of science in spaces of knowledge production outside of academia will undoubtedly foster further intellectual exchange between their disciplines.\(^5\)

The two fields already intersect in at least two other areas: the history of technology and historical epistemology. Historians of technology have long explored the transfer and application of knowledge produced in academia.\(^6\) More recently, they have turned their attention to the tension between socially validated knowledge and the hands-on practical knowledge of, for instance, craftsmen, farmers, skilled workers, and business owners.\(^7\) Questions about transfers of knowledge are also figuring more often in research in business and

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1. The Max Planck Institut für Wissenschaftsgeschichte in Berlin, with which GHI Washington cooperates, has been following this concept very successfully for several years and it now explicitly understands its research as a contribution to the History of Knowledge.

2. If one wishes to submit a suggestion for a panel on research funding in the digital humanities with the American Association for the Advancement of Science, there is no existing category it might fall under. Only “History of Science” is represented, but only because it is not considered part of the humanities.


economic history. But although some business and economic historians have adopted a broader cultural perspective, few have taken their cue directly from the history of knowledge.

The history of science shares an interest in historical epistemology with the history of ideas, intellectual history, the history of concepts (Begriffsgeschichte), and historical semantics. The common denominator here is a concern with concepts like authority, legitimation, and truth; in institutions that validate certain knowledge; and in the rules on which the validation of knowledge is based. Research in this field is implicitly influenced by the belief in the modern idea of progress and thus often rests on the assumption that the scientization of society has been a continuous, unstoppable process. For that reason, it focuses mainly on science, scholarship, and experts. Processes of “de-scientization” and forms of knowledge resilient to external pressure for change rarely figure in this research, nor do forms and bodies of knowledge that, having been deemed irrelevant in the competition with institutionally validated knowledge, survive tenuously on the margins of society.

Global History, Transnational History, Colonial History

The gradual move toward a broader understanding of knowledge in the historical profession can be credited in no small part to the growing interest in global history and transnational history, on the one hand, and, on the other, to increasing attention to colonial and postcolonial history. Both of these trends have relativized Western narratives of progress and have sharpened awareness of the importance of colonial spaces and other points of contact between cultures in the creation of new knowledge.

Historians have turned out a number of studies in recent years exploring the role of cultural brokers, cultural interpreters, and cultural translators, particularly in the production and transfer of knowledge. The spectrum of such actors who were familiar with, if not at home in, at least two knowledge cultures ranged from explorers and colonizers to missionaries and merchants. Surprisingly, settlers and other migrants only rarely figure as intermediaries between knowledge cultures. The field of early modern history has played a decisive...
part in opening the way for a new history of knowledge. While in studies of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, for instance, and areas such as book history and the history of reading, knowledge has long been an important topic, it was the growing influence of global and colonial history that actually spurred research on topics such as local knowledge, tacit knowledge, and the interaction of different knowledge cultures.

In both Europe and North America, colonial and imperial history now play a crucial role amongst the fields that engage most intensively with knowledge as a subject. The literature on the topic is enormous. Prompted by works such as Edward Said’s *Orientalism*, specialists in colonial studies have taken the production of knowledge as a central category of analysis, focusing initially on the tension between knowledge and power. This line of inquiry has undoubtedly made historians more aware of the cultural hierarchies and social inequalities central to understanding knowledge as a historical phenomenon, especially in colonial contexts. Long implicit in such studies, however, was the assumption that knowledge transfer generally meant transfer from Western center to colonial periphery. Only in the last decade or two have scholars developed a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between knowledge and power that centers on the complexities and ambiguities of knowledge production and circulation in contexts of asymmetrical power relationships. This new understanding is reflected in the growing interest in topics such as subversive knowledge practices, the preservation of traditional knowledge, and the incorporation of subaltern knowledge within hegemonic knowledge.

In line with these new approaches, “colonial knowledge” is no longer associated solely with (former) colonies and colonial powers and has taken on a symbolic sense as well. Outside of colonial settings, too, attempts to assert the priority of one body or form of knowledge over another — to distinguish between knowledge and non-knowledge, valid and invalid forms of knowledge — sometimes relied upon the logic and semantics of colonialism. That was the case, for example, in the debates about refinement and self-improvement within Germany’s Jewish communities and in German society at large that accompanied the emancipation of the Jews in the nineteenth century.

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32 Seminal works were written by Bernard Cohn, *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India* (Princeton, 1996); Nicholas Dirks, *Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India* (Princeton, 2001).


Power is thus anything but an obsolete category in the history of knowledge; the appearance of truly source-based studies in global history has, however, broadened our perspective on the interplay of knowledge and other social phenomena beyond power. Knowledge was transferred among many places through many channels in many directions. Diverse forms and bodies of knowledge came into contact, resulting often in both competition and convergence. Recent research in global history has demonstrated, moreover, the important role that transnational networks played as both a medium and a product of knowledge circulation already in the pre-industrial era.36 Whereas scholars once described the interactions of different knowledge orders primarily in terms of “transfer” and “diffusion,” they now often talk about the multiform interconnection of knowledge networks. A central question is how knowledge transcended defined spaces, such as nations — a phenomenon that long predates the internet and the rise of social media. Such research could be the foundation for a new history of knowledge: a history of knowledge that takes as its purview not only the knowledge of the learned distilled into book form but also practical, social or tacit knowledge, that draws not only on texts but also images and objects as source material, and that considers not only knowledge as a “product” but also the actors, practices, and processes involved in creating, disseminating, and transforming knowledge.

This brief overview of the background of and precursors to the history of knowledge is undoubtedly incomplete, but it should suffice to give an idea of how multifaceted the understanding of knowledge that stands at the center of the (new) history of knowledge is.37 In the sections that follow, I will outline some of the questions and approaches historians of knowledge are pursuing and suggest some of the potential insights the history of knowledge has to offer the field of history in general.

II. Actors, Spaces, and Media: What does the new history of knowledge have to offer historical research?

The current boom in interest in the subject of knowledge among historians in Europe38 seems not to have a parallel in North America. Although there is certainly evidence of growing interest in a broader concept of knowledge, the history of knowledge is rarely recognized as a field of study by historians in the United States and Canada. There are many readily evident differences among historians interested in knowledge in regard to the concepts, approaches, and

36 A groundbreaking study was authored by Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley, 1997).

37 A further source not described in detail here is the history of education, which considers itself a special discipline within pedagogy rather than a part of the historical sciences. The social history of (higher) education, as represented by Fritz Ringer, for example, is also significant. Ringer, *Towards a Social History of Knowledge. Collected Essays* (New York/Oxford, 2001); idem, *Fields of Knowledge: French Academic Culture in Comparative Perspective, 1890–1920* (Cambridge, 1992).

38 The Zurich-based “Zentrum für die Geschichte des Wissens” was among the first institutions focusing on the actors and processes involved in the circulation of knowledge. While programmatically embracing a broadly defined understanding of knowledge, its empirical studies still largely focus on traditional expert knowledge or knowledge production in academia and related areas.
methodologies they have adopted. These differences do not fall along a clear-cut European-North American divide but are rather a hallmark of the current surge of interest in knowledge as a historical category. That raises the fundamental question, then, of what exactly we mean when we talk about knowledge and the history of knowledge. Does the history of knowledge constitute a distinct field of inquiry comparable to the history of science or economic history? Does taking knowledge as a subject of inquiry and analysis offer potential for innovation in historical research and new insights into historical processes? What, in short, does the history of knowledge have to offer the discipline of history as a whole?  

What is “knowledge”? As a first step toward answering that long-debated question, historians could point to the fact that knowledge is a historical phenomenon, that is, that knowledge is made by humans and is subject to change. Accordingly, the history of knowledge explores what people in the past understood by the idea of knowledge and what they defined or accepted as knowledge. It is concerned with the interaction of different types and claims to knowledge and the process of negotiation between opposing understandings of knowledge. That the boundary between what is and is not recognized as knowledge has always been fluid is beyond dispute. Likewise, knowledge has always been believed to be distinguished from other ways of perceiving and comprehending the world by certain defining attributes. Knowledge is widely taken to stand for evidence, reliability, and demonstrability as well as for rationality and truth. Reliance on evidence distinguishes knowledge from other forms of comprehension such as belief and feeling. Nonetheless, the boundaries between these forms of comprehending the world are fluid. They are fluid, first, because understandings of what constitutes evidence — and thus knowledge — change over time and vary with place. Secondly, designations and “proofs” of evidence remain subjective even when actors and groups of actors consider them to be objective and true. Consequently, we cannot draw sharp contrasts between knowledge and non-knowledge or between knowledge and belief. Rather, we should analyze the dialectical relationship and interconnections between them.

Taking a cue from Lévi-Strauss’s theory of myth, scholars often understand knowledge as “cooked” — that is, as information that has been ordered and fit into a particular framework of interpretation. This perspective is clearly helpful for preliminary orientation,
provided that we keep in mind that the “raw material” of knowledge is in almost all cases “pre-cooked” and not neutral or completely “objective.” Decisions about what parts of the world surrounding us we are going to measure, what data we are going to collect, and which questions we pose are always subjective decisions made by humans and shaped by particular interests. “Raw” collections of data and information thus clearly reflect the history of the individuals who conceived and arranged for them, who evaluated them and imposed a measure of order on them — and who perhaps in the end shaped them as socially relevant knowledge.

How such decisions are made, who makes them, when and why they are made, what consequences they have: those are questions at the center of the history of knowledge. Although it sometimes focuses on such questions at a specific point in time, the history of knowledge typically deals with longer time periods and the co-existence of different knowledge orders. That co-existence can take many forms: knowledge orders might operate independently of one another in parallel, they might be closely interconnected, they might be in self-conscious competition, or they might inadvertently be undermining each other. The history of knowledge is interested in formal and informal knowledge, in knowledge that has been communicated in writing, orally, and through objects. It is interested in knowledge that played an important part in historical processes as well as in previously important knowledge later deemed irrelevant.

Neither English nor German has a plural for the word “knowledge,” yet knowledge has always existed in the plural — in the co-existence of and interplay between different knowledge cultures. The history of knowledge thus does not focus solely on the dominant knowledge culture at any given time but also considers diverse and often not equally powerful actors, media, and forms of knowledge. Knowledge is taken up, transformed, and combined with other knowledge. Traces often remain of where knowledge came from. The basic question behind the history of knowledge is thus not what exactly knowledge is and how it relates to other concepts but rather how, when, and why particular knowledge emerged or disappeared and how bodies of knowledge with different foundations stand in relation to one another.

**The Example of Schoolbooks**

Schoolbooks are rewarding source material for tracking continuity and change in state-sanctioned knowledge as well as in social

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debates on knowledge and relevance. That school books, with their tremendous power to shape young people’s understanding of the world, have a decisive role to play in the education of future citizens has been a matter of faith — and controversy — since the nineteenth century. With their aura of objectivity and special relevance, schoolbooks transmit state-approved and — depending on the political system — socially acceptable knowledge to diverse social groups, including those struggling for recognition and those who mistrust this kind of official knowledge. In periods of social insecurity, especially at times when the established knowledge order has been called into question and new knowledge orders are taking shape, schoolbooks become a topic of political debate. Ultimately, such debates center on the question of what knowledge is to be passed along to the younger generation and thereby inscribed in the nation’s cultural memory. What lines of explanation and interpretation are to be communicated? How is knowledge relevant for the present and the future to be organized? What values are to be the basis for social cohesion?

Like all media intended to influence the “masses,” schoolbooks not only reproduce but also help create social reality and social knowledge. Because of this “double nature,” the knowledge transmitted through schoolbooks reflects relatively stable bodies of knowledge as well as significant shifts in public discourse. One characteristic of this medium is that fundamental innovations are rare, generally arising only in conjunction with social upheavals. Typically, schoolbooks are revised over time to bring them into line with new realities. A schoolbook is a palimpsest. Its content, in both word and image, is periodically reorganized or reframed, new knowledge is set alongside old, and over time the contradictions arising from this juxtaposition of old and new multiply.


That process can be illustrated by an example of knowledge pertaining to Africa — a field of knowledge that was transformed under the impact of decolonization but nonetheless still permeated by old, long-lived ideas and viewpoints. “The world is shrinking,” a [West] German textbook author wrote in 1962. “One hundred years ago, a Negro [Neger] in our midst would be an oddity. Today, it is a matter of course that Indians, Japanese, and Negroes study at our universities. They . . . learn beside us and help us. Conversely, Americans, Russians, and Germans live in Africa or India and are building . . . entire cities there.”45 As evident from the semantics, colonial knowledge lived on below the surface but was confronted by new realities. Thus, the producers of schoolbooks, who as agents of knowledge are neither quite experts nor complete amateurs, fit new information and explanations into existing knowledge orders, or they eliminate knowledge that seems to be no longer appropriate to the times and can thus be allowed to fall out of society’s store of knowledge.46

Kerstin von der Krone explores a similar process in this issue of the Bulletin using the example of nineteenth-century Jewish religious instructional works.

A Spectrum of Forms of Knowledge

Following the cue of cultural historians, who have called the dichotomy high culture/popular culture into question, historians of knowledge are developing a broader understanding of what we should understand by knowledge and analyze as such. Exciting studies have been published not only on science and academically validated expert knowledge but also on popular forms of knowledge based, for example, on experience, tradition, or religion. Nonetheless, programmatic statements about this new approach still outnumber and overshadow attempts to put it into practice. That is a phenomenon familiar from fields of historical research — global history, for example — and it is safe to assume that, as this issue of the Bulletin suggests, source-based studies of popular knowledge are in the works. There is little place for the long-established model of popularization in such research.47 That model rests on the juxtaposition of academically credentialed bearers of expert knowledge and an essentially passive audience of lay consumers.48 By contrast, much recent research recognizes the co-existence of multiple forms and bodies of knowledge, academic and non-academic, and that knowledge can be produced by more or less all social groups.49
A new history of knowledge — which in principle should focus on the *histories* of knowledge — cannot avoid taking a broad spectrum of forms of knowledge into consideration. That spectrum stretches from knowledge acquired through everyday experience to the knowledge of artists, craftspeople, and skilled workers, from administrative and entrepreneurial expertise to the knowledge of academic scholars and scientists. It also encompasses forms of knowledge that influence an individual’s or group’s values and the ways they align and live their lives. All these forms of knowledge and the spaces in which they take shape carry claims to validity that are the product of negotiation. Knowledge production is not a one-way street, and knowledge does not travel a direct path from the ivory towers of academe to society at large. To the contrary, knowledge is in constant motion and moves in many directions.

**The Circulation of Knowledge**

The question of how knowledge circulates — among actors and across national, cultural, institutional, disciplinary, political, and social borders — stands at the center of a history of knowledge that sees “knowledge” as a promising avenue to better understanding societies. How and in which contexts did networks of knowledge take shape? Who made them function? The history of knowledge can be seen as a history of translation: translation in the literal sense of transfer from one language to another and, in a more figurative sense, of transfer between cultures and (re)attribution of cultural importance. Recent research projects demonstrate that knowledge was not simply disseminated as is from Western metropoles to colonial peripheries and nor was it shaped solely by prevailing structures of power. Rather, knowledge is created by the continuous interaction between heterogeneous actors, even if those actors are rarely on equal standing. Historians of knowledge have moved away from the model of diffusion, which rests upon bipolar topographies, toward a notion of more multidirectional transfers between actors and media and complex chains of cultural translation and retranslation.

Because the processes involved in the production, negotiation, and translation of knowledge vary according to time and place, studying knowledge as a historical phenomenon requires an actor- and practice-focused approach. In other words, research in the history of knowledge cannot be confined to the study of texts and images, as has long been the case, or, as in more recent scholarship, of objects. Consider again the example of schoolbooks. To analyze the knowledge


conveyed by schools, we must look beyond the printed page of the schoolbook even if the research question at hand requires taking schoolbooks as the principle source for analysis. It is important to consider not only the content of schoolbooks but also the question of how that content was incorporated and utilized within the processes of knowledge production. Who in Germany, returning to the example cited earlier, was authorized — or, conversely, not authorized — to speak about Africa and to shape German society’s perception of that continent? Were Africans given a voice and an opportunity to speak as experts? If so, who was able to assign or deny them that status? Such questions about concrete particulars point to an important point of interest in the history of knowledge: the question of legitimacy and legitimation, of authority and authenticity, of selection and hierarchy in the ordering of social knowledge.

Knowledge as a Category of Historical Analysis

The history of knowledge, to offer a provisional definition, is a form of social and cultural history that takes “knowledge” as a phenomenon that touches on almost every sphere of human life, and it uses knowledge as a lens to take a new look at familiar historical developments and sources. Philipp Sarasin has suggested a somewhat different point of departure. He proposes replacing “society” with “knowledge” — surprisingly, he says nothing about “culture” as a central category of historical study — and sees potential for the history of knowledge to become the primary focus of historical research. By contrast, I see “knowledge” as an extremely interesting subject of historical investigation and as a category that promises to enrich our understanding of historical processes. Although I would stop short of declaring a new “turn” in history, I think the potential of knowledge as an analytical category can hardly be overstated.

There are at least three aspects of knowledge that make it a promising analytical category. First, the history of knowledge compels historians to rethink the complex relationship between structure and agency. Knowledge circulates and does not always pay attention to borders. That does not mean, however, that a particular body of knowledge circulates unhindered and detached from historical context or throughout all parts of the world or with the same social consequences everywhere. The widespread interest in transnationalism notwithstanding, we should not forget that the actors and media involved in the circulation of knowledge do run up against boundaries, and not just in the metaphoric sense. Practices such as politically

52 Cf. the dissertation project by Lars Müller, which is part of a DFG-funded project titled “Afrikawissen. Diskurse und Praktiken der Schulbuchentwicklung in Deutschland und England seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg.” http://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/262099283

53 See Sarasin. Also see the special issue of Geschichte und Gesellschaft “Wissensgeschichte als Gesellschaftsgeschichte,” ed. Wolfgang Kaschuba, GG 33 (2009), no. 4.

motivated censorship, the imposition of secrecy, and state regulation of schoolbooks testify to that point. Rebekka Habermas and Alexandra Przyrembel are therefore undoubtedly correct in warning against assuming a one-dimensional image of globalization and in reminding us that much knowledge remains locally anchored, whether because communications networks were deliberately disrupted or were too thinly populated to be effective. Knowledge does not move on its own volition, hovering over all structures and actors. Even when distilled into text form, knowledge remains a social phenomenon. Knowledge cannot simply send itself through the mail or board an airplane. It moves through individuals and social groups. Their decisions and actions determine whether and how knowledge is produced, received, negotiated, transferred and translated. For that reason, the history of knowledge, building on social and cultural history, brings together structure and agency in an intellectually stimulating way: indeed, that is the challenge it faces.

Second, a history of knowledge that takes an expansive view extending beyond the space of scientific knowledge heightens our awareness of the complexity of knowledge production and of the many different spaces in which knowledge is created, certified, or made canonical as well as questioned, withdrawn and de-legitimized. The history of knowledge might thus be better able than, for instance, intellectual history to address actors who encountered insurmountable opposition and whose efforts ended in failure. Focusing on knowledge allows a sharper view of what gets lost in history — of what was suppressed as subversive or dismissed as irrelevant or deemed obsolete and thereafter forgotten. The history of knowledge, in other words, reminds us of the open-endedness of history and brings history’s losers back to light, as Anna Echterhölter’s essay in this issue of the Bulletin demonstrates. Failed or abandoned projects, whether in the social sphere or the realm of science, can be much more clearly understood when examined from the standpoint of knowledge. The history of knowledge sharpens our awareness not only of power and cultural hegemony but also of non-conformist and countercultural practices, counter-narratives, and knowledge that only briefly exercised powerful influence.

Third, knowledge has never been solely a force for emancipation. It has, though, always been linked to change and transformation. The history of knowledge can thus sharpen our perspective on dynamic moments in the unfolding of historical processes and can make

\[55 \text{ Habermas and Przyrembel, 13.}\]
visible such moments in periods of apparent stagnation. Conversely, it also sheds light on how traditional and experience-based knowledge can become a resource in times of wide-reaching social change — a resource that might as easily bolster resilience as facilitate adaptation or transformation in response to change. That dialectic is the focus of an international project on Jewish history now underway at the GHI Washington. Taking a cue from the history of knowledge, a group of scholars from the fields of Jewish studies, musicology, cultural studies, and history is analyzing a broad array of educational and knowledge media to explore how appeals to tradition facilitated openness to innovation among German Jews in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.56

The essays in this issue of the Bulletin also point to the double character of knowledge: knowledge could become a transformative power as well as a powerful resource for coming to terms with fundamental change and transformation. That suggests two promising approaches — both illustrated in this Bulletin — to knowledge in history: change in knowledge and, on the other hand, change through knowledge.

**Spaces and Media**

Just as important as actors in the history of knowledge are physical and social spaces. Those spaces include institutions and organizations, networks, and geographic spaces (e.g., the Atlantic57 and the Pacific, which modern means of communication and transportation transformed into transregional arenas for the circulation of knowledge). Technological or entrepreneurial know-how figures in such spaces as much as scientific or social knowledge does. One form of social knowledge of particular interest to the GHI is migrant knowledge. To date, there has been little overlap or cross-pollination between migration history and the history of knowledge. The GHI, which has actively supported research in migration history since its founding, wants to bring these two fields into dialogue by focusing on migrant knowledge and on migrants as agents of knowledge.

What migrant knowledge about the United States, for example, circulated in the Atlantic and Pacific worlds? How and why did migrant knowledge change over time? How did it differ from region to region? How did such knowledge figure in individuals’ decisions to migrate or to stay put? What knowledge did migrants produce in the process of relocating and translating social and cultural phenomena? How did factors such as age, gender, religion, and ethnicity figure in the

56  http://innovation-through-tradition.ghi-dc.org/the-project/

production of migrant knowledge? How did distance — both spatial and emotional — influence migrant knowledge?

Just as spaces of knowledge can be created, they can also be abandoned or destroyed. And just as they can be viewed from a transnational or transregional perspective, they can also be considered on the microhistorical level. Local gathering places and social spaces — clubs, Masonic lodges, and coffee houses, for instance, or bars and taverns — also function as knowledge arenas. So, too, did political spaces (parties and interest groups, for example), religious spaces (pilgrimage sites, houses of worship), spaces for mobilization (union halls, social movements), and educational spaces (schools, public libraries, museums). Such spaces both influenced and created knowledge about the world.

The circulation of knowledge within and, in particular, between such spaces generally required appropriate media. Whether a pamphlet or a sermon, a book or a television newscast, an object in a museum or a Twitter post: the logic of media plays an important part in shaping the knowledge they communicate. That is evident in the GHI’s above-mentioned project on Jewish educational media. Kerstin von der Krone’s essay in this issue of the Bulletin outlines her preliminary findings on textbooks for religious instruction, a late eighteenth-century innovation in Jewish education. She points to the different ways religion influenced knowledge production in other areas and examines how religion itself incorporates knowledge production. Religion, she shows, could provide justification or a context for the acquisition of new non-religious knowledge, values, and cultural practices. At the same time, new Jewish educational media systematized and transformed traditional Jewish knowledge. Such an interplay between religious life and knowledge production was by no means limited solely to the Jews of Germany.

Religious Knowledge

It is above all studies on the premodern era that have illustrated how religious institutions, who have often been seen as opponents of new knowledge, have functioned as producers and disseminators of knowledge that also penetrated secular spaces of knowledge production. That was not only a matter of supporting — or opposing — particular scientists and scholars.58 Research on religion and knowledge production shows the difficulty — indeed, perhaps the impossibility — of drawing a clear distinction between knowledge

58 Grayber, Flubacher, Senn, 10f.
and belief, whether in the context of the scientization of religion since the Enlightenment and the Haskalah or of fundamental changes in lifestyle and mentality. Religion is, to varying degrees, a matter of both faith and knowledge. In the premodern era, religion structured everyday life for most people and the communities into which they were born. In the modern era, too, religion’s reach has extended into nearly all aspects of social life, even if its claim to all-encompassing authority has weakened. Knowledge, like religion, transcends the boundaries within society and thus the boundaries between fields of scholarly research that in practice often have little contact with one another.

Religious knowledge might be regarded as legitimating and legitimated knowledge or as irrelevant or harmful knowledge. Since at least the Enlightenment, those two views have coexisted, often in conflict, but, as researchers have long assumed, more often closely entangled. It is well known, for example, that Protestant clergymen played a decisive role in learned societies during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and used their pulpits to inform congregants on matters such as hygiene, bee-keeping, and the use of fertilizer. By contrast, we still know little about the interconnection between the de-legitimation of “superseded” religious knowledge, on the one hand, and the call for “pure” and “purified” religious traditions and knowledge on the other hand. It is perhaps precisely that interconnection that made it possible for religious groups who saw their existence threatened by social change to create new knowledge from seemingly contradictory elements — new knowledge that helped them in developing strategies for survival and/or for innovation. Churches, synagogues, mosques, and missionary outposts are not only places of religious communication and community-building. They are also places of knowledge production — through the written and spoken word as well as through ritual, images, music, and objects — that historians must take seriously, not least because they were often sites where different, sometimes competing or even conflicting knowledge systems came into contact.

Knowledge Spaces and Regimes in Transformation: The Example of German Jewry

Even the most ardent advocates of reform among German-speaking Jews in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries regularly called for a body of knowledge that, in one way or another, drew on the Jewish law (Halakhah) and diasporic religious tradition. Fostering
change and innovation on the one hand and referring to a core of Judaism that had been “obscured” for centuries on the other were two sides of one coin. At the same time, religion in the form of Talmudic Judaism declined dramatically in value, both socially and culturally, even within the Jewish world. Talmudic Judaism and the scholarship upon which it drew suffered a loss of legitimacy as both increasingly came into conflict with a new type of expert knowledge. In the wake of the Haskalah — the Jewish Enlightenment — ever more Jews in German states took advantage of the room for maneuver opened by emancipation. Some affluent Jews who were active as private scholars — for example, Bernhard Beer of Dresden — addressed themselves to bodies of knowledge beyond traditional Jewish religious learning and created a new form of Jewish scholarship that was rightly understood as a challenge to traditional rabbinic authority. Others — in the long run, the majority of those interested in creating and disseminating a new body of Jewish knowledge — took advantage of the opening of German universities to the Jews to acquire an academic education that extended far beyond previous notions of Jewish learning. That knowledge often came into conflict with the established Ashkenazi knowledge regime. In such clashes, defenders of orthodoxy and advocates of reform alike often turned to the state for support. Because of the autonomy Jewish communities had had during the early modern era, Jews and Jewish life were foreign to many German civil servants. Consequently, the state now began collecting administratively pertinent data on Jewish life. That data was strongly shaped, however, by civil servants’ decisions about which parties in the internal Jewish debate could provide access to politically applicable and legitimate (and legitimizing) Jewish knowledge.

One example of the striking coexistence of and conflict between opposing knowledge regimes is the debate over circumcision (Brit Mila). At first glance, that debate seems to reflect the scientization of Judaism. Closer examination reveals, however, that more than...
religious or theological expert knowledge was at stake. The circumcision debate was also a clash between medical expertise and Talmudic authority. It was a struggle over new hierarchies and the claims to authority for bodies of knowledge that rested on entirely different structures and legitimations. The catalyst in this struggle was the opening of the universities, which made it possible for Jews to acquire academic credentials in fields beyond religious scholarship. A new type of Jewish expert came into being who self-confidently laid claim, within the Jewish community, to speak on what had previously been deemed exclusively religious matters. In the circumcision debate, the new experts were mostly doctors — such as Dr. Adolph Arnhold of Dessau — who used their university medical training and understanding of hygiene to challenge the experience-based knowledge of lay performers of ritual circumcisions (Mohelim). In 1846, following a family tragedy, Arnhold first approached a major gathering of rabbis taking place in Breslau 1846 and followed up by issuing a 104-page text (see Figure 4) addressed to both rabbis and, at the urging of the leaders of the Dessau Jewish community, state sanitation officials. The text left no doubt that the conflict over a central religious ritual was at the same time a conflict over knowledge and reputation. That conflict was part of the process of medicalization and of the hygiene discourse promoted by civil servants and the emergent group of university-educated doctors who were eager to set themselves apart from traditional healers and religiously legitimated lay practitioners. Citing their expert knowledge, and perhaps hoping to secure a new source of income, university-trained Jewish doctors claimed sole authority to pronounce upon all matters, even centuries-old religious rituals, that touched on medicine. Their new style of knowledge was a form of cultural capital that they wanted — and often could — transform into economic and social capital.

Such aspects of ostensibly religious controversies are difficult to discern without the lens of the history of knowledge. Using that lens, we can see the dynamic between knowledge and legitimation, on the one hand, and power and influence unfolding even in small communities on the other. Spaces of knowledge are not created solely by the state and powerful social groups. Underprivileged groups also create such spaces and use them as resources for influence and reputation. And the producers or translators of knowledge generally make every effort to win recognition and respect for that knowledge.

For that reason, the modern state and academically credentialed experts deemed it necessary to draw new borders of knowledge. They
sought to reinforce their authority against the claims of bearers of traditional knowledge such as folk healers, herbalists, and *mohel-lim*. Similarly, the new experts and their public-sector supporters distanced themselves from non-institutionalized places and spaces of knowledge production, for example Jewish *chederim* (private religious classes) and *Winkelschulen* (small privately run schools). Those spaces were gradually replaced by authorized spaces such as public schools, which offered a state-regulated curriculum and were subject to regular state inspection, universities, and laboratories. Wherever the state and experts defined hegemonic knowledge and gave it their certification, they inevitably labeled other forms and means of acquiring knowledge as inferior, illegitimate, or irrelevant.

**Delegitimated, Ignored, and Lost Knowledge**

As knowledge increasingly became organized by academic disciplines, not only marginalized actors but also their knowledge gradually fell into obscurity. Although historians are aware of this form of forgetting, they have generally not given it much thought. The history of knowledge offers an opportunity to take a closer look. Indeed, it poses the question directly: Why was certain knowledge ignored, devalued, or suppressed? What were the consequences of the disappearance of such knowledge? Why were some bodies of knowledge lost while others took on new meaning? What sort of social negotiations lay behind those processes? What were the consequences — political, social, cultural, and economic — of the lack of knowledge or the absence of particular knowledge? Such questions point to the fact that “non-knowledge” — whether uninformedness or ignorance — is less a lack of knowledge than a socially produced and maintained phenomenon. Robert Proctor, for example, has examined the discourse on the connection between smoking and cancer and has shown the connection between the expert knowledge deployed by the tobacco industry’s lobbyists and the body of knowledge political decision-makers drew upon.63 “Non-knowledge” frequently is an intentional phenomenon, as historical research on subjects such as climate change has demonstrated. Knowledge and non-knowledge alike are produced by humans and influenced by humans’ myriad, often competing interests.64 That point is of direct bearing on the question of how knowledge has informed politics and how knowledge becomes a political space.

It is also important to recognize that access to knowledge has historically not depended solely on expertise. Who a person was — whether


64 Apart from a series of anthropological studies on the topic, the cultural preconditions of ignorance and processes of social negotiation of knowledge and non-knowledge have been studied by Robert Proctor and Londa Schiebiger, eds., *Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance* (Stanford, 2008).
a person was a man or a woman, rich or poor, English or Indian, Christian or Jew — could be decisive. As Anindita Nag’s lecture “Measuring Human Needs: Statistics, Humanitarianism, and the Politics of Famine in Modern India,” delivered in the GHI lecture series on the history of knowledge in spring 2016, made clear, the history of knowledge has to take gender, class, race, and religion into consideration, especially if it aims to illuminate the social boundaries of the production and recognition of knowledge. Taking the example of Florence Nightingale, Nag showed the simultaneous working of the processes of accepting and rejecting knowledge. Recognition of the validity of Nightingale’s compilations of public health data on India was influenced as much by her status as a woman, even if a very prominent woman, as by the fact that she was working at far remove from her subject. Because of her health, she could not collect data on location herself and thus had to depend on local informants. That practice initially met with acceptance, but over time the imperial bureaucracy increasingly cast doubt on the reliability of Nightingale’s data. By the end of the nineteenth century, imperial officials assumed that only Western experts collecting data on location could produce reliable knowledge about public health in India. Nag’s lecture resonates with Peter Burke’s argument that the impact of location, placement, and geography cannot be underestimated.66

To understand how colonial governance and colonial knowledge were enriched — or constrained — by local knowledge, Nag made clear, it is necessary to examine the spatial distribution of knowledge. The constantly changing tension between different categories of knowledge — official and unofficial, for instance, local and national, traditional and new, imperial and native — is one of the most fascinating aspects of the new history of knowledge. Gramsci’s concept of cultural hegemony suggests that it would be rewarding not only to trace the course of “progress” in the history of knowledge but also to examine which actors, bodies of knowledge, and spaces were consciously denied legitimacy. Only if we learn what fell out of the canon of knowledge deemed relevant at a particular point in time can we explain change in knowledge cultures and regimes. The dialectic between knowledge and society must be taken into account here. In her Bulletin contribution, for example, Anna Echterhölter approaches the history of statistics by focusing on the social use of statistics; a more traditional history of science approach would be to trace the development of statistics as an academic discipline. Taking the example of Friedrich August Lueder, a professor of statistics at


66 Burke, What Is the History of Knowledge?
Göttingen, Echterhölter illustrates how the history of knowledge opens a perspective on once important individuals and ideas now deemed to have had little if any lasting influence.

Asking who in a given society is authorized to produce a certain type of knowledge, especially official knowledge, is thus an extremely promising line of inquiry. As knowledge production was increasingly professionalized and subject to academic validation in the modern era, non-experts saw their room for maneuver shrink, which ultimately resulted in their being overlooked by historians. Once-important producers of knowledge and cultural translators emerge from obscurity only when we frame our research questions explicitly with the history of knowledge in mind. We must turn our attention directly to actors who were marginalized over time, such as women and indigenous peoples, as well as to bodies of knowledge that were produced by recognized actors — missionaries, diplomats, and spies, for example — but that ended up not serving their intended purpose and not having a significant influence on decision makers.

The Visual, Material, and Emotional Dimensions of Knowledge

The visual, material, and emotional dimensions of knowledge raise a host of questions, some of which the essays in this Bulletin address directly. What forms or bodies of knowledge gain visibility? What roles have media representations of knowledge or of objects as conveyors or preservers of knowledge played? What status do different forms of documentation — material, visual, and oral — have in the process of knowledge production or in the communication of knowledge? In her aforementioned GHI lecture Anindita Nag touched on this very question. Her research on Florence Nightingale’s work on famines in India suggests a further question that I think could be very fruitful: How can the history of knowledge, the history of emotions, and visual history be brought into dialogue? Florence Nightingale, for example, initially tried to persuade British imperial officials of the necessity of a change in policy by presenting them with “objective” statistical data on famines in India. Later, however, she relied increasingly on emotionally stirring images of starving Indians. Knowledge with a supposedly rational foundation was displaced by emotionally charged photographs. Making suffering tangible and subjective struck Nightingale as a more promising approach than relying on generalized knowledge on the subject. At first glance, emotion seems to stand opposed to knowledge’s

67 Glenn Penny, Objects of Culture. Ethnology and Ethnographic Museums in Imperial Germany (Chapel Hill, 2002); Habermas and Przyrembel, 20.
appearance of rationality. But emotion, often along with chance, can be decisive in determining which knowledge is produced or wanted in a particular context.

III. The History of Knowledge at the GHI

For the GHI, knowledge is of interest as a research focal point for four reasons. First, it is a field with great potential for scholarly innovation. Second, it offers exciting possibilities for cooperation among the different subfields of history and the integration of disparate research findings. Third, it can provide the basis for transnational perspectives on German and North American history. Fourth, it could play an important part in the debate on the potential and limits of digital history.

Potential for Innovation

The history of knowledge is a dynamic field. It is a field where researchers are pursuing many promising approaches but also where many questions and proposed methodologies have yet to be taken up. There is still a noticeable gap between the programmatic agenda of a broadly conceived history of knowledge as outlined here and the realization of that agenda in actual research projects. Disappointingly, most of the studies in modern and contemporary history that have been put forward under the “history of knowledge” label are still based on a rather narrow, expert-oriented conception of knowledge. Specialists in modern and contemporary history have only just begun to take up some of the creative approaches developed by their colleagues in early modern history and the history of colonialism. From this angle, one could be disappointed, but also — as the GHI does — see the history of knowledge as an open field that welcomes innovative thinking about research questions and topics. It thus offers the GHI a chance to take the measure of a wide range of approaches in the history of knowledge, to spotlight new research, and to inspire studies that realize the potential of the history of knowledge. By facilitating dialogue between European and North American scholars, the GHI hopes to be able to help define a dynamic, rapidly developing research field.

Potential for Integration and Cooperation

The history of knowledge is not linked to a particular time period or region of the world, and it has potential connections to most every other subdiscipline of history. It encourages collaboration with scholars in other fields. Because myriad factors are at work in the
production and circulation of knowledge, the analytical category “knowledge” has the potential to serve as an integrative link between history’s many fields and branches. It can offer new perspectives on central questions not only in intellectual history and the history of science but also in social, cultural, and political history as well as in (post)colonial history and the history of gender. Moreover, it is also readily applicable to new fields and approaches such as visual history and the history of material culture, which in turn creates possibilities for opening new dialogues with researchers in disciplines ranging from literary and religious studies to sociology and anthropology.

With that goal in mind, the GHI has been collaborating with the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science (Berlin) since 2015. The two institutions jointly organized the lecture series “Measuring Risk and Need,” which was held at the GHI in the spring of 2016, and they are now organizing two workshops for the coming year. “Observing the Everyday” will explore journalism and knowledge production in the modern era, while “Beyond Data” will analyze knowledge production in different bureaucracies (governmental, commercial, and scientific).

The new history of knowledge is an almost ideal programmatic “banner” for raising the GHI’s profile without jeopardizing its self-definition and role as a forum for transatlantic scholarly dialogue. Critics might complain that, as a category, knowledge cannot be defined clearly and unambiguously, and that it can be understood only in terms of the understanding of actors at any given point in the past and thus seems to be nearly ubiquitous. Indeed, we must reflect critically on the potential insights to be gained through the history of knowledge and be alert that we do not take the analytical sharpness of the category of knowledge as a given. At the same time, it is exactly the openness of the concept of knowledge that offers unique opportunities to bring diverse research institutions into conversation and to create new spaces for cooperation. If we do not limit our understanding of knowledge to science and scholarship, knowledge promises to be a fruitful and inclusive focus for historical research.

Transnational Perspective

Knowledge moves through people and institutions. Despite myriad attempts at suppression and censorship, knowledge rarely respects national borders. The GHI’s new focus on knowledge production and circulation thus bolsters its longstanding commitment to research on transnational, transregional, and global history. The GHI’s program...
of conferences and workshops attests to the broad spectrum of topics that a history of knowledge perspective can recontextualize and open to new insights. For example, the conference “Restricting Knowledge: Channeling Security Information in Recent History,” which the GHI is organizing with the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the University of Gießen, will explore spaces of knowledge and non-knowledge through which security information is channeled. “The Dynamics of Missionary Knowledge” will take a long-term, transregional perspective and focus on the entanglements of missionary knowledge with other bodies of knowledge. The question of how knowledge of the future was produced and discussed will stand at the center of the conference “German Past Futures in the Twentieth Century,” a collaborative venture of scholars from the GHI, the Free University of Berlin, and the San Diego and Irvine campuses of the University of California.70

The collaboration with San Diego and Irvine is part of a broader GHI initiative to expand its cooperation with scholars in the western United States and Canada. The GHI is preparing to open a West Coast branch office at the University of California, Berkeley. The new office will facilitate cooperation between German and North American scholars and strengthen the GHI’s presence in a region with a rich research landscape. In addition to programs in all the fields where the GHI is active, “GHI West” will also have a special research focus on “Migration and Knowledge.” We are interested above all in the questions of how knowledge is created in the process of migration and how that knowledge is translated into different social groups and societies. Historians of knowledge have thus far focused primarily on knowledge about migration as mainly produced by the state, science, and society and the ways that knowledge was brought to bear in politics and policy. The GHI wants to expand this research agenda by looking at migrants as knowledge actors. One particularly promising line of inquiry, as the example given at the outset of this essay suggests, might be the role of children and teenagers as knowledge agents in the migration process. While historians of education have examined how immigrant children were taught, and historians of migration have addressed their social and cultural situation, we want to consider young immigrants as creators of knowledge in their own right. Because of their grounding in multiple cultures, immigrant children had the potential to translate traditional and foreign knowledge, especially social knowledge, across cultural and generational boundaries. In many cases, they might have been able to transcend their

70 Conference at the German Historical Institute Washington (GHI), February 23–25, 2017. Conveners: Arnd Bauerkmper (Freie Universität Berlin), Frank Biess (University of California, San Diego), Kai Evers (University of California, Irvine), Anne Schenderlein (GHI).
marginal social position and become the producers of new, socially important knowledge.\textsuperscript{71} There has been little work on this subject and, to my knowledge, none from a transregional or comparative perspective. The GHI thus intends as a first step to build an international network — not least through its tandem and long-term fellowship programs — to facilitate scholarly exchange at the intersection of the histories of knowledge, migration, and childhood. We hope thereby to contribute to the definition of a new research field.

\textit{Digital History}

From the outset, the history of knowledge has been concerned with the history of archives, libraries, and museums. It has explored the ways knowledge has been preserved and how the methods of knowledge preservation have changed. Historians of knowledge are interested, for instance, in how storage practices and technologies shape approaches to scholarship and understandings of the past.\textsuperscript{72} They are interested in deconstructing claims to authenticity by uncovering the ways in which sites of knowledge storage embody particular knowledge orders and the structures of power that shape such orders. Digitalization is shifting these parameters, but certainly not because digitalization guarantees greater authenticity. If nothing else, the priorities that determine what is digitalized, which often have little to do with scholarly considerations, and externally imposed search algorithms mitigate against any sort of gain in authenticity. Nonetheless, digitalization and new technologies offer the possibility of new approaches to organizing and utilizing traditional source materials and to presenting research findings visually. Historians might be able to discern connections that the traditional archival ordering of source materials tend to obscure. The potential gains in understanding that might come with the harnessing of digital technologies — and the potential costs historical research might have to pay\textsuperscript{73} — that is clearly a central issue now facing our profession.

To encourage debate, the GHI will organize an annual conference in digital history. The inaugural conference, “Creating Spatial Historical Knowledge,” was held in October 2016.\textsuperscript{74} With these conferences and its other initiatives in digital history, the GHI hopes to create a space for discussion that will profit not only from the GHI’s transatlantic reputation but also from the GHI’s new focus on knowledge orders and their history.

This space for discussion will be broadened by the history of knowledge as the GHI conceives it. We do not consider the history of


\textsuperscript{72} For example, Geoffrey C. Bowker, \textit{Memory Practices in the Sciences} (Cambridge, 2005).

\textsuperscript{73} Putnam and Lässig, “We Need to Talk.”

\textsuperscript{74} “Creating Spatial Historical Knowledge: New Approaches, Opportunities and Epistemological Implications of Mapping History Digitally,” International workshop and conference at the German Historical Institute Washington October 20–22, 2016. Conveners: Simone Lässig (GHI) and Matthew Hiebert (GHI); organized in collaboration with the Roy Rosenzweig Center for History and New Media and Digital Humanities at Berkeley.
knowledge to be a substitute for social or cultural history. The history of knowledge does not emphasize knowledge instead of society but rather seeks to analyze and comprehend knowledge in society and knowledge in culture. Approaching society and culture in all their complexity, the history of knowledge will broaden and deepen our understanding of how humans have created knowledge over the course of the past.

Translated by David B. Lazar

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