Cold War Critiques from Abroad: Beyond a Taxonomy of Anti-Americanism

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Nearly every study of anti-Americanism begins with the caveat that criticism of the United States is legitimate, but it is rare to find satisfactory guidance as to what exactly distinguishes such “legitimate” criticism from expressions of “illegitimate” anti-Americanism. In one of the earliest scholarly treatments of the phenomenon, Ludwig Marcuse referred in passing to an anti-American tradition he called a “noble” one because, in highlighting inconsistencies between American values and practices, “it measures America against the principles of the Declaration of Independence.”¹ In Marcuse’s eyes, criticism of the United States for failing to live up to American core values was legitimate. The mere utterance of a disparaging word should not in itself be enough to establish the speaker as anti-American. Otherwise, as Ronald Pruessen has pointed out, one would have to condemn as anti-American such diverse figures as Sinclair Lewis (the United States is “a force seeking to dominate the earth”), Henry James (“no literature, no novels, no museums, no pictures, no political society”), Aldous Huxley (Americans are satisfied with “existence on the lower animal levels”), and Anthony Eden (“they want to run the world”).²

Yet anti-Americanism exists, and scholars have produced studies solidly based in cultural and intellectual history or sociological research to try to explain its source. The typical investigation of anti-Americanism plays down the political content of foreign complaint while focusing on the symbolic meanings of America to foreigners or offering psychological explanations for critical statements.

Restoring the political to a study of foreign critiques of U.S. foreign policy could help us meet the conceptual and evidentiary challenges of distinguishing foreign criticism from anti-Americanism. This article appraises a variety of approaches to the problem of anti-Americanism, its definition and causes, and then suggests some promising avenues for further investigation, including attention to the purpose of the statement, the position of the speaker in personal biography and domestic political context, and the role of U.S. foreign policy itself in drawing comment from overseas.

Defining anti-Americanism should be a starting point for analysis, but the term is maddeningly flexible. In the hands of different scholars, it can mean negative assessments of aspects of American society, the gen-
eralization of such specific complaints to imply a total rejection of the United States, or more broadly, hostility toward freedom and democracy themselves. Dan Diner warns of the danger of overapplying the term “anti-American” to frustrate any justified opposition to United States policies and the negative aspects of the American way of life, and thus to stigmatize the critics. Two standard studies seem to exemplify this misuse. Paul Hollander does much to stigmatize critics in his five-hundred-page work on the subject, in which he locates everyone from AIDS activists to George Kennan as part of a destructive, anti-American “adversary culture,” undermining the country from within. Although Hollander claims he “did not equate all criticisms of this country with hostility toward the United States, nor did I intend to discredit or dismiss all critiques of the United States with the term ‘anti-Americanism,’” almost anyone who has a thoughtful question to raise about U.S. society or foreign policy seems to fall into his anti-American category. To Hollander, indulging in those particularly American traditions of dissent and the exercise of free speech is often the offending act. He finds negative assessments of American society or foreign policy unrelated to any conditions that might need improving, because criticism originates instead in “an irrational dynamic . . . that springs from the need of human beings to explain and reduce responsibility for the misfortunes in their lives.”

Stephen Haseler’s brief treatment similarly argues that foreign critiques are rooted in “envy” and resentment of America’s “excessive individualism.” Diner hopes to avoid this trap and therefore tries to identify the problem more clearly in a study of German views of the United States. Anti-Americanism is not merely criticism or prejudice as such, he argues, but a collection of “deep-seated and long-lasting ideas, images, and metaphors that assume the character of a comprehensive interpretation.” The romantic tradition is evident in much European complaint about America, that “land without nightingales,” in the frequently-invoked words of Nikolaus Lenau, a cosmopolitan, rootless nation, it lacks a unified ethno-national narrative, and law rather than blood determines who belongs. An unsurprising focus on capitalism and materialism is the strongest but not the only, parallel between anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism, as well as conspiracy theories that blend the two. “Anti-Americanism resembles anti-Semitism structurally (as well as in the selection of metaphors),” writes Diner. “In some respects, anti-Americanism can even be understood as a further stage in the secularized hostility towards Jews. Even though the two phenomena, on account of their different developmental histories, could never be considered identical, they both represent ideologically shaped reactions to modernity.”

The picture is not entirely one-sided, of course. Thinkers on the Left such as Karl Kautsky and Wilhelm Liebknecht celebrated the American
potential for social equality or praised the U.S. Constitution, while those on the Right lauded the nation's central role in combating radical political movements, sometimes cast in terms of defending the West against the East. But Left and Right often cast America as a materialistic Mammon, an inhuman Moloch whose machinery would crush spiritual or communal values, the exemplar and exporter of all that was wrong with the modern world. The Left further worried about the power of finance capital, the Taylorist regimentation of the proletariat, and military adventurism abroad. The Right abhorred what it saw as the tendency toward social leveling, a mass culture that appealed to common tastes, an emasculated male population lacking a martial tradition and controlled by women who had lost their femininity; above all, rampant racial mixing in a country whose vulgar music (jazz) was black and whose economic power (Wall Street) was, naturally, in Jewish hands. Most important, to the apprehensive critics, America represented the likely future for their own societies, a source of hope when positive aspects were stressed, but a nightmare for those who saw American society taking the shape of their own fears, as shown in figure 1.

Figure 1. America as a concept: images from left and right
Determining when these and related metaphors and images represent mere rhetorical devices deployed in the service of constructive criticism, and when they are “comprehensive” indictments intended to be destructive, however, is a tricky business. It is the rare author who, like Rolf Winter and Alfred Mechtersheimer, openly acknowledges his own anti-Americanism.\(^{13}\) Drawing on the same stock of metaphors and images can produce “an expression of ideology and hostility,” but it can also serve what Diner—more sincerely than Hollander—welcomes as a “critique of excesses in the United States that are truly worthy of criticism, of problems in the political culture, of social structures and economic conduct.”\(^{14}\) Writing and understanding history requires “remembering the bloody sides of American history,” not avoiding them, he says, but just as crucial is “rejecting their instrumentalization for the purpose of defaming the United States.”\(^{15}\) Criticism, then, is welcome, but the instrumentalization of negative aspects of U.S. society to “defame” it is not.

Defamation is an interesting concept. Under American law, it is a difficult charge to prove because plaintiffs must show not only that the defamatory statement is false, but that it was made with full knowledge of its falsity. Diner is not calling for a jury trial of alleged anti-Americans, but this concept does point the way toward a possible analytical approach that considers both the source and the truth value of the statement in question. An example should help make this clearer.

One can find most of these themes contained in a succinct and frequently cited observation by Max Horkheimer from 1967, which offers a glimpse of the debate he would soon have with Herbert Marcuse over criticism of the United States in the context of the Vietnam War:

America, regardless of its motives, saved Europe from complete enslavement. The response today from everywhere, not only in Germany, has been widespread and profound hostility towards America. There has been a great deal of puzzling over the origin of this. Resentment, envy, but also the errors made by the American government and its citizens, all play a role. It is especially startling to notice that everywhere where one finds anti-Americanism, anti-Semitism also flourishes. The general malaise caused by cultural decline seeks a scapegoat, and for the aforementioned and other reasons, it finds the Americans and, in America itself, once again the Jews, who supposedly rule America.\(^{16}\)

Despite this analysis, Horkheimer himself provides a perfect example of the ambiguity involved in trying to distinguish anti-Americanism from legitimate criticism of the United States. He knew the country well: he sought refuge from Nazism there and, after the war, retained a part-time
position at the University of Chicago for a decade. Although he cast himself as a defender of the United States against its critics, not all of his remarks were favorable, as when he attacked McCarthyist excesses in unusually strong language: “A few years ago it was dangerous in America to show sympathy for its recent ally Russia. Today the mere suspicion of being ‘neutral’ means economic ruin. And that just confirms the irresistible historical tendency making America resemble terroristic Russia.”17 By casting the issue in these terms, rather than, for example, deploring the American Right-wing, or calling for adherence to America’s core democratic values of freedom of speech and due process, Horkheimer defined the problem as so generalized as to affect all of American society, with the United States as a totality “irresistibly” moving toward a copy of the Soviet system. These words appear to represent a broad condemnation (and a rather sloppy comparison) that, in its seemingly “comprehensive” rejection of America, sounds like a statement that Horkheimer surely would have attacked had it been voiced by a student protester in the streets of Frankfurt.

Further complicating his stance, Horkheimer at times expressed sentiments about America’s and Americans’ cultural poverty squarely in line with romantic traditions of America-bashing he, like Diner and other scholars, considered illegitimate, not to say dangerous. Consider his comments on “Culture in the U.S.A.”:

1. Small talk and jokes are typical for every party. Serious topics are immediately derailed.
2. Moreover everyone complains about everyone else.
3. American civilization cannot bring forth anything new. It has no depth. Thought is powerless.
4. That does not mean that it presents nothing new as a civilization. But the newness is over. (Needs further elaboration.)
5. Why is thought powerless? Because it does not serve specific interests. In the United States only that may prosper which is directly aimed at furthering interests.
6. Enormous personal achievements of a technical character are typical. Example: the professor’s wife who runs a household with two children and still manages to practice piano four hours a day.18

These are acute observations of a social critic who lived in exile in a society different from his own. The fact that some of these comments arguably echo the complaints of German romantic nationalists as well as anti-capitalists should not automatically delegitimize Horkheimer as a commentator, or lead us to fix upon him an anti-American label. Not only would that be a pointless exercise; in this case it would be an absurdity.
Horkheimer cannot be called anti-American, because he took a strong stance defending the United States against its critics at the height of the Vietnam War (even as he privately acknowledged it to be a “dirty war”). His comparison of America to “terroristic Russia” was not meant as an equivalence of the two societies or a whitewash of the Gulag, but rather reflected his view that political systems in the modern era are cursed by an instrumental rationality that places ends above means, inevitably producing victims and suffering in what he and Theodor W. Adorno called the “dialectics of Enlightenment.” All-or-nothing categories like “anti-American” do not leave room for a sensitive observer of a country to which he was grateful and whose faults he noted with sorrow.

One could name other ambiguous figures. Jean-Paul Sartre famously complained that “America has rabies,” but his critiques of America were inspired by writers in the United States such as John Dos Passos, Upton Sinclair, Herbert Marcuse, C. Wright Mills, and Michael Harrington. He also loved jazz, Poe, Faulkner, and Hemingway, and named his magazine Temps Modernes after Charlie Chaplin’s film Modern Times. His own answer to the question was unequivocal: “I am not anti-American.” Sartre cannot be easily packaged either.

Martin Walser, too, was capable of attacking U.S. policy in Vietnam and ridiculing West Germans’ excessive philo-Americanism in Tintenfisch (1969), then a few years later writing a Whitmanesque tribute containing these lines:

Think of it, one can become an American. Europe is, I believe, a funereal culture that overestimates itself.

Could my homesickness for America be homesickness for a future?

Examining brief statements in isolation from Horkheimer, Sartre, Walser, or anyone else, for that matter, would not seem to be a sufficient guide to whether one may characterize them as anti-American, nor a useful way of understanding the points they are trying to make about the United States. The existing scholarship on the phenomenon would guide us along two possible avenues of investigation: first, to consider the purpose of the statement, its intended “instrumentalization” (Diner); and second, to focus on the position of the speaker, including personal biographies, activity and aims in the domestic political arena, and so on.

**Purpose of the Statement**

Gesine Schwan, in a study of postwar West German attitudes, noted that the charge of anti-Americanism was often used, especially beginning in the late 1970s, as a way to discredit one’s opponents in intra-German political conflicts. This practice is hardly limited to Germany. “All mod-
ernizing societies comprise factions within their intelligentsia that struggle with one another to impose an authoritative interpretation of political and cultural reality on their respective public spheres,” explains A. Dirk Moses. “In this rivalry for cultural capital—prestige and influence—they deploy an ensemble of rhetorical devices to discredit the opposition and enhance their own position in the public-intellectual field.”

Whereas in the American culture wars the most common rhetorical clubs have been the charge of “political correctness” (in political discourse and the mass media) or “revisionism” (in the academy), accusations of anti-Americanism have served the same purpose in West Germany, especially against the Left. Schwan therefore sought to maintain a strict divide between defining certain expressions or opinions as “criticism” and assigning others to an “anti-” position only on the principle that the latter must represent “a basic, normative rejection” of the core concept of America as understood by the speaker.

Peter Krause developed this idea into a clear formula for distinguishing legitimate criticism of the United States from the always implicitly illegitimate anti-Americanism. In a study of German press coverage of the 1983 invasion of Grenada and the 1991 Gulf War, he offers this litmus test: “The criticism should not be so encompassing and far-reaching as to suggest that the conditions and actions held up for scrutiny and criticized are necessary outcomes of American traditions and values or the American social system itself.” Anti-Americans judge and reject America “as a totality,” interpreting individual negative aspects as “immutable characteristics of the United States.” Mere criticism of individual policies, on the other hand, is legitimate.

Applying this formula to German news coverage of the invasion of Grenada, Krause reaches a number of surprising conclusions. When a writer in Stern castigated the “fairy tales” recounted by the White House and the Pentagon and accused President Ronald Reagan of having no regard for democracy, human rights, or the truth, Krause judged this not to be anti-American because the accusations were directed at the U.S. government and particularly at Reagan himself, not at the “totality of all Americans.” Nor did the Stern writer claim that lying was an American trait. On the other hand, an article appearing in the same magazine that analyzed American foreign policy as the outcome of historical developments is placed in the anti-American category. The author of this article, Klaus Liedtke, traced an American sense of mission back to the Puritan settlers and attributed an important impulse for U.S. military interventions since 1898 to an effort to further the interests of American business. “The anti-Americanism here lies in Liedtke’s claim of detecting a tradition of imperialism in the United States that goes back to the Puritans,” writes Krause, because Liedtke presents the Puritan messianic tradition
as “an existential characteristic,...a historically developed trait of the United States” that goes well beyond any transient administration in Washington.27

This formula has the appeal of simplicity. In determining whether a given text or statement is anti-American, we need not consider the background or position of the speaker or even the accuracy of the comment; we need only assess to what extent the criticism is directed against a narrow group of government officials, or against what is perceived as an enduring American characteristic.

However, this approach is ultimately too schematic. Under the formula, no rhetorical attack against the president of the United States or his administration, no matter how severe, can be called anti-American unless the attack is broadened to include every American. Where Stern suggested that President George Bush Sr. attacked Iraq in order to erase his image as a “wimp,” that charge is not labeled anti-American, because the insult was aimed “solely at the president as an individual... but not against America or the political system of the United States itself.”28 A different reading of the charge is possible. An American political system that functioned so as to permit a president to launch a war, with Congressional support, in order to improve his masculine image would itself clearly be unworthy. The “wimp” interpretation thus can be understood to contain an anti-American element. Comparably, an article in the tageszeitung comparing the invasion of Grenada to the far bloodier Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and denouncing the “American aggressor” is not anti-American, according to Krause, “because the description ‘aggressor’ here is not meant to be an attribute of the United States itself, but refers rather to a concrete action judged by the taz as an act of aggression.”29 This assessment, too, is open to debate, but one need not resolve it in order to see the flaw in the formula. One can imagine the freedom a writer genuinely hostile to the United States would enjoy under Krause’s rules, sitting down to compose a vicious screed that, as long as it did not condemn the entire population of the country at once, could not be deemed to be anti-American.

If that standard seems too permissive, Krause’s evaluation of Liedtke’s historical analysis is too strict. It renders the kind of scholarship well-established among American diplomatic historians for at least four decades illegitimate because it identifies long-term causes behind foreign policy, rather than attributing events merely to transient actors at the highest levels of government.30 Krause similarly faults a Stern article by the American writer Norman Birnbaum that attributed Bush’s intervention in the Gulf to America’s “unquenchable thirst for oil.”31 This is anti-Americanism, we are told, because “if this ‘thirst for oil’ truly is unquenchable, then the United States will continue forever to wage wars
to satisfy this demand, and therefore war would be a necessary outcome of the economic structure of the United States—clearly an anti-American position. But that iron chain of logic is Krause’s, not Birnbaum’s. Assuming that the “unquenchable thirst” is not a figure of speech (writers use colorful or metaphorical language about the United States at their peril here), Birnbaum no doubt expects that the U.S., perhaps under different leadership, would be able to reduce its oil consumption, or find access to energy supplies on fair terms without resorting to war. If he believed in the fatal inevitability of resource wars as the only possible future for the United States and was himself committed to a fundamentally anti-American stance, Birnbaum presumably would not have devoted a lifetime to teaching at leading universities in five countries, advising members of Congress and the National Security Council, working for major presidential candidates, and writing in favor of social reform.

Under Krause’s strict schema, to say that the Second Gulf War was provoked by Bush’s son for the sake of his friends in the oil industry would not be anti-American, since such a claim would be directed only at a small group of people, but to say that the war was intended to secure long-term access to oil supplies essential for the United States economy would be. Thus if analysts and scholars are to escape the label of anti-American, apparently they must avoid looking at structural factors altogether and return to the “great men in history” approach last in vogue in the 1950s. Something more is needed if we are to avoid a conceptual straitjacket.

Position of the Speaker

Knowing a little about Horkheimer or Birnbaum seems to help steer one away from a too-hasty and inaccurate accusation of anti-Americanism. In the same way, Johannes Heesch’s study of Helmut Schmidt’s evolving position toward the United States concluded that Schmidt’s fundamental Atlanticist commitment to cooperation with Washington made it impossible to qualify his critical statements as anti-American, even though if the same remarks had been made by someone else, they might have been so. Schmidt’s political biography apparently granted him a safe margin for making critical remarks even though “in content they are constructed comparably to the virulent conservative anti-Americanism that emerged from the wartime defeat and re-education in the postwar years.” If he was personally immune to charges of right-wing anti-Americanism, so, too, he could not be accused of left-wing anti-Americanism, even though Heesch found Schmidt’s complaint about the “astonishing simplicity” of Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy to have “provided aid and comfort to anti-American currents in the peace movement.” Presumably someone
lacking Schmidt’s bona fides who made identical remarks would be assigned to the anti-American category.

This may be too heavy a burden of explanatory weight for a personal biography to bear. Is it wise to make the analysis of an utterance so dependent on the speaker, thirty years after literary theory announced “the death of the author,” and given that texts take on a life and impact of their own once they are produced? Moreover, many working diplomatic historians today would question whether a uniformly celebratory assessment of United States foreign policy is automatically more accurate than a critical one. One might wonder what actually delivered more fodder for anti-American sentiment in the European peace movement of the early 1980s: Schmidt’s criticism of Reagan, or Reagan’s own policies, which seemed to many to increase the chance of war, and on balance certainly do seem to have been characterized by a high degree of simplicity. One may compare, for example, the level of complexity inherent in the nuances of realpolitik and détente to the more straightforward concept of an “evil empire.” Biography may be useful in understanding the position of the speaker, but it cannot on its own substitute for an analysis of the statement.

Impact of United States Foreign Policy

This leads us to a third, neglected avenue of exploration: examining the content of the criticism itself. To take another example from Horkheimer: One could choose to read either a defense or an attack into a single paragraph of his from 1966 that begins with the statement “America . . . is the most hated country because everyone envies it,” and ends by predicting America’s likely demise because, in addition to the perils of rising nationalism and anti-Semitism, its “foreign policy is grounded in lies.” Instead of focusing on the first sentence and placing Horkheimer in the camp of those who dismiss criticism of America as rooted in human neurosis, or brandishing the last phrase in order to accuse him of attacking the United States, we could depersonalize the exercise somewhat and assess the veracity of his observation about a “foreign policy . . . grounded in lies,” at a moment when Lyndon Johnson was rapidly increasing the number of U.S. troops sent to Vietnam on the basis of a congressional resolution passed in response to an alleged incident in the Gulf of Tonkin that never took place. It is not clear how comprehensive Horkheimer meant his criticism to be, but it cannot be judged defamatory if it was true.

That U.S. foreign policy has an important impact on foreign opinion seems only logical, but it is a factor often absent from studies of anti-Americanism that emphasize continuity in imagery, prejudice, and psy-
chology among foreigners (often working from the implicit if hardly empirical assumption that an unqualified embrace of America is more legitimate or accurate than a critical view). Given a consistent cultural context, enduring structures of prejudice, and the symbolic meanings of America that have been with us for more than a century, how do we account for temporal variations in foreign opinion of the United States? It seems possible that some critical foreigners are prompted to speak out not only by certain established tropes or irrational resentments that are always with them, but also in response to U.S. actions.

Consider changes in West German public opinion during the Cold War as measured in surveys. Asked if they generally “like the Americans,” West Germans replied with remarkable consistency over a thirty-year period from the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s: year in and year out, about half of those polled said yes. Responding to a question about “your overall opinion of the United States,” however, German views fluctuated widely over the years, reaching highs over 80 percent and lows below 35 percent. Gebhard Schweigler argues that this shows that the German public generally distinguishes between Americans as a people and the policies of the American government.37 This distinction has further implications, as shown in figure 2.

The contrast between the two trends in figure 2 is crucial. If foreign views of the United States were rooted only in envy of American wealth and power, or emerged from a collective cultural memory of negative
images and metaphors, the favorable rating would not be expected to change so much from year to year, since American wealth and power have remained at impressive levels since the Second World War and the stock images of the United States appearing in German writing also have shown remarkable consistency over the past century.38 If an unfavorable opinion of the United States were the same as anti-Americanism, those surveyed would presumably express dislike in equal portions for Americans and America. Instead, Schweigler points out that in a context of a steady emotional response to “the Americans,” the temporal variations in German opinion of the United States closely track developments in U.S. foreign policy. The favorable rating peaks in the early 1960s, when President John F. Kennedy made clear his commitment to West Germany and took his famous trip to Berlin. Beginning in 1965 there is a precipitous decline that accelerates after 1968 as the legitimacy of the U.S. war effort in Vietnam came more and more into question. A low point comes in the early 1970s, the era of Watergate and revelations about CIA covert actions, including assassination attempts, in the Third World. The election of Jimmy Carter, who promised to restore morality and respect for human rights to the U.S. government, coincides with a revival of favorable German opinion toward the United States, but then Ronald Reagan’s confrontational stance toward the Soviet Union, and his advisers’ loose talk about limited nuclear war, seem to precipitate another rapid decline.39

Here is promising support for an approach that restores the political to the investigation of foreign views of the United States. Cultural analyses are essential for providing context, but do not explain temporal variations. Biographical attention to individuals can be helpful in suggesting motives, but ultimately is insufficient. What is needed is a combined approach that considers the position of the speaker, the symbolic meaning of the United States in his or her home culture and domestic political conflicts, and—and this is the aspect usually missing—the substance of the critique. Each of those tasks is challenging, and especially the last will not be an exercise comparable to laboratory work. There is no unitary historiographical consensus to use as a gauge. But that is not to say that there are no standards for evaluation.

It may be that looking back at European opinion of the United States in the second half of the twentieth century we see a fairly widespread, “soft” cultural anti-Americanism, a storehouse of negative stereotypes and associations that come readily to hand when one wishes to criticize the country, and a marginal, “hard” anti-American fringe that takes its rhetoric literally and is dangerous beyond its numbers because of the ease with which certain metaphors and concepts can flow between the two groups. Identifying and distinguishing among these aspects will continue
to be an important focus for research. To go beyond a general taxonomy of a phenomenon that waxes and wanes, however, we will need to restore the crucial element of the political, in order to account for critiques of the United States that are linked to how the U.S. makes its presence felt abroad.

Notes


5 Hollander, Anti-Americanism, 410.


7 Diner, America in the Eyes of the Germans, viii.


9 Diner, America in the Eyes of the Germans, 20.


12 This is also the conclusion reached by Richard F. Kuisel in his study of attitudes in France, Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993).


16 Max Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 14 (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1988), 408.
21 Kuisel, *Seducing the French*.
30 See, for example, the summaries of various schools of analysis in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (NY: Cambridge UP, 1991).
32 Krause, 266.
33 Heesch, “Antikommunismus, Pro-Amerikanismus und Amerikakritik,” 246.
34 Heesch, “Antikommunismus, Pro-Amerikanismus und Amerikakritik,” 239.
36 Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften* 14: 364. Along with “nationalism” and “anti-Semitism,” Horkheimer also worried here about growing “inflation” in the United States—a combination that must have seemed especially alarming to someone who had lived through the Weimar Republic.