THE AMERICAN WAY OF EMPIRE:  
NATIONAL TRADITION AND TRANSATLANTIC  
ADAPTATION IN AMERICA’S SEARCH FOR IMPERIAL  
IDENTITY, 1898–1910

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After victory in the Spanish-American War of 1898, the United States acquired substantial colonial possessions in the Caribbean and the Pacific Ocean. This turn from anticolonial to imperial republic has puzzled students of American history ever since. Coming to terms with empire has been a difficult and sometimes tedious process.

Two main issues still need further clarification: first, the connection between American continental expansion and overseas colonialism and, second, the relationship between American and European approaches to empire and colonialism. So far, historians have provided ambivalent answers to the first and paid little attention to the second issue. Recent studies arguing for continuities between continental and overseas expansion have explicitly emphasized the exceptional character of the American empire; whereas studies placing the American approach to empire within an international discourse on colonialism have tended to minimize the national experience of continental expansion.

This essay explores possible thematic links between the experience of continental expansion and insights derived from the analysis of other colonial powers and suggests that both dimensions were equally important to colonial state building in the American Philippines. Rather than viewing the acquisition of overseas territories as a new departure, Americans projected the experiences gathered in the conquest of the American West and the subsequent defeat of native Americans onto the islands in so many ways that the Indian analogy became a constant reference point for military leaders, administrators, and educators, as well as opponents of empire. This mental reference point attests to the continuities contemporaries themselves attached to the construction of continental and overseas empires.

At the same time, colonial state building did not take place in a purely national context. From the late nineteenth century on, Americans began to analyze and borrow freely from the colonial approaches of other imperial powers. Despite the multitude of interimperial discourses, the British Empire, in particular British rule in Egypt and India, became an
admired, reassuring, and trusted reference point for proponents of empire and served as inspiration for America’s colonial project. In this discourse, Americans did not perceive their imperial venture as unique or exceptional but emphasized interimperial connections. For opponents of empire, this transnational discourse was equally important, as it used the British practice of colonialism as a rallying point for opposition and fostered the connection of the North American critique to European anti-imperialism.

As with all forms of cultural and ideational transfers, the process of mining the nation’s past for precedents and adapting transnational concepts was carried out in a highly selective manner. Some arguments and ideas were appropriated, while others were rejected. Americans borrowed from both the national and international contexts, reconfigured the information and adapted the findings to a new context. The result was neither a carbon copy of the original nor old wine in new bottles, but an amalgam, a hybrid of national tradition and transatlantic adaptation that shaped the American way of empire.

Coming to Terms with Empire: Research Trends

For decades the history of America’s overseas expansion has been one of the most contested areas of historical inquiry. Generations of historians have not only disagreed on the purpose, intent, direction, and driving forces of overseas expansion, but also on the question of whether the United States in the early twentieth century even constituted an empire in the European tradition of imperialism. Dissatisfaction with the state of the field was widespread and as late as 1988, Lloyd Gardner criticized the lingering ambivalence and defensiveness of historians to come to terms with the true nature of the American empire which he described as “the empire that dare not speak its name.”

Fourteen years later, the historiography of American imperialism constitutes a vibrant field of research whose development has profited greatly from new analytical categories and methodological approaches derived from the wider fields of imperial and colonial history and U.S. diplomatic history. Innovative research has introduced historians to the work of literary scholars, anthropologists, and sociologists and broadened a scholarly discourse that for decades had been deeply entrenched in debating the “same old questions”. The “cultural turn” has produced a growing body of literature that examines the cultural foundations and expressions of American expansionism. In this context, scholars have analyzed the role of gender in the colonial enterprise, and studied the colonial functions of museums and tourism, world expositions and colonial literature in the creation of an imperial society.
Despite the introduction of new analytical categories and the opening of new subfields of research, two fundamental interpretative issues for understanding the nature of the American empire remain largely unresolved. The first issue concerns possible connections between continental and overseas expansion. According to older interpretations, which rejected structural continuities of expansion, the acquisition of overseas territories resembled a temporary aberration of U.S. foreign policy. More recent interpretations, however, indicate that an obsession with empire and expansion characterized nineteenth-century American foreign policy. Thus the authors of a recent survey of the historiography of American foreign relations up to 1941 identify empire as a *Leitmotif* for U.S. diplomacy since the early republic and reject the notion that a more traditional form of colonialism occurred only at the end of the nineteenth century. Despite this emerging consensus, continental empire is still absent in most surveys of American imperialism.

To support the continuity thesis that interprets overseas expansion as a “logical sequel” to the conquest of the American West some historians have established connections between the fate of native Americans and the fate of indigenous peoples on the periphery of the overseas empire. They have argued that American Indian policy established a pattern of colonialism that served as reference point for dealing with the Philippine Islands. Other have suggested that Americans approached the colonial question in the Philippines as an exercise in self-duplication with the goal of making the islands “more American than America itself.”

Ironically though, this imaginative approach to connecting continental and overseas expansion remains securely locked in a web of exceptionalist logic, as most of its proponents insist that the search for a “usable past” indicated a clear rejection of European modes of colonial control. The application of America’s national experience of conquest to the new colonies, so the argument, resulted from the desire to consciously draw the line between Old and New World approaches to empire.

Thus, while research has demonstrated various continuities in the process of expansion, the underestimation of the international context, the interimperial contacts, and the importance of a transnational web of exchanges in the age of empire has left the national and international dimensions largely unconnected. Instead, this research emphasis has implicitly or explicitly fostered the old *Sonderweg* (exceptionalist) argument that American and European imperialism had little or no resemblance, and that the American empire was in fact unique.

Struggling with exceptionalism, some historians of expansion have long called for internationalizing the American experience, which is the second issue that remains unresolved. To chart the course of the American empire in its relationship with the international context, they have
suggested placing American colonial state building in comparative perspective. As valuable as this methodological approach promises to be, it has so far produced little insights for historians of late nineteenth and early twentieth-century American history.20

By contrast, the multiple attempts to trace the transnational context of American history have produced tantalizing results.21 A number of studies have explored the transatlantic ideational exchanges in the Progressive Era.22 Although specific discussions of empire are absent in the work of Daniel Rogers or James Kloppenberg, their emphasis on the international forces that shaped American history have inspired a new generation of expansion scholars to chart the transnational context of American overseas expansion.23

These studies recognize the power of a horizontal set of circuits in which colonial officials drew from frameworks offered by colonial neighbors and imperial competitors: “Through these circuits moved generations of families, tools of analysis, social policy, military doctrine, and architectural plans. Whole bodies of administrative strategy, ethnographic classification, and scientific knowledge were shared and compared in a consolidating imperial world.”24 As Daniel Rodgers has observed: “From Delhi to London, Leopoldville to Brussels, the imperial world was crisscrossed with appropriations, rivalries, and imitations— sometimes independent of the debates over domestic social politics but often interlaced with these [. . .] This was a system of exchanges in which the Americans were deeply involved.”25

Historical research tracing the involvement of the United States in this transnational context has been most fruitful with regards to American colonial state building in the Philippines. Historians, sociologists, and anthropologists are currently beginning to analyze the multiple layers of the transnational frame of reference in the age of imperialism. In a forthcoming and path-breaking volume entitled Global Perspectives on the U.S. Colonial State in the Philippines, authors examine the multiple interimperial connections within which American colonialism in the Philippines took place.26

These research trends have demonstrated the transnational roots of the American empire and contributed to an undermining of the exceptionalism paradigm. At the same time, the preoccupation with destroying the myth of uniqueness has delegated the impact of national contexts and traditions of expansion to the sidelines. Indeed, “creating an empire is more complicated than borrowing a garden hose from a neighbor.”27 More importantly, the tendency to leave national experiences and traditions out of the picture obscures the need to explain why certain elements were adapted, others rejected, and even others ignored.
In sum, current research on the history of American expansion is producing tantalizing results but the two main interpretative issues, are largely being tackled at the expense of each other with little discernable effort to reconfigure their insights into an interpretative matrix of the American approach to empire.

Transatlantic Adaptations and National Experiences

As Americans were confronted with the task of governing newly acquired territories, they simultaneously studied the British example and searched for a usable national past. The result was an administrative style and approach that combined central elements of British imperial rule with ideological core convictions of territorial expansion and administration.

By the end of the nineteenth century, many Americans still held ambivalent views of Britain’s world-power status. At the same time, however, a strong sense of admiration and support for the British idea and concept of empire steadily gained ground in the United States. In a surge of Anglo-American rapprochement and Anglo-Saxonism, Americans praised the advantages of British rule, the efficiency of its colonial administration, and its enlightened approach to colonial state building.

At the beginning of the early twentieth century, Great Britain was firmly established in the American worldview as the most enlightened imperial power. This process had been fostered by a conceptual differentiation between “negative” and “positive” forms of imperial control. “Negative” imperialism was characterized by conquest, the mere desire for profit, and the resulting exploitation of the indigenous population. “Positive” imperialism aimed at creating order out of chaos and placed great emphasis on fostering the development and civilizing “uplift” of the colonized. This distinction and the accompanying re-interpretation of British rule in India enabled Americans to openly praise the accomplishments of the British empire.

Considering the close affinity between the United States and Britain and the tightly knit exchange network of goods, people, and information crossing the Atlantic, it should not be surprising that Americans faced with the task of colonial state building mined the British empire for insights on effective approaches to colonial administration and other matters of colonial rule.

Soon after the peace treaty with Spain had been signed in December of 1898, leading members of the McKinley administration, such as Secretary of State John Hay and Secretary of War Elihu Root, emphasized the need for information from other colonial powers and recommended a decision-making process based on intensive interimperial discourse.
government initiated a fact-finding commission, launched research programs, collaborated with the academic community and enabled its administrators to frequently visit the colonies of other powers in South and Southeast Asia.

In December of 1899, Root, the chief architect of America’s colonial policy in the Philippines, wrote to a friend: “The first thing I did after my appointment was to make out a list of a great number of books which cover in detail both the practice and the principles of many forms of colonial government under the English law, and I am giving them all the time I can take from my active duties.”32 The secretary collected a library of reference in his office, mostly with British texts on colonial law and administration. He considered the systematic evaluation of the activities of other colonial powers an essential guide to American decision-making. He supported an international approach to the American colonial project, but also emphasized the importance of balancing outside input with national traditions. According to Root it was necessary: “To take the lesson we could get from the colonial policy of other countries, especially Great Britain, and to apply it to the peculiar situation arising from the fundamental principles of our own government, which lead to certain necessary conclusions which don’t exist in Great Britain or Holland, notwithstanding the spirit of liberty and freedom in both those countries.”33 This flexible approach resembles what theorists of cultural transfer have described as appropriation and rejection. Information is borrowed freely from the experience of others, reconfigured, and applied to the national context.

Secretary Root shared the predisposition of learning from the experiences of other colonial powers with other members of the administration and even president himself. In 1899 William McKinley had instructed the First Philippine Commission, a fact-finding commission under the direction of Jacob Gould Schurman, president of Cornell University, to gather and organize information on the Philippines in preparation for colonial government. Instructed by McKinley, Hay, and Root, the members also compiled substantial information on other colonial powers and commissioned research reports such as “Administration of British Colonies in the Orient” by Montague Kirkwood, a British lawyer who served as an advisor in colonial matters for the Japanese administration of Taiwan. Such reports provided information on the administrative, judicial, social, and military conditions of British rule in India, Burma, Ceylon, the Federated Malay States, and the Straits Settlements. Much of this data was included in the four-volume Report of the Philippine Commission to the President officially presented on January 21, 1900.34

The government also initiated a massive research program through the Library of Congress and a number of government departments.35 The
results were impressive. For example, the Department of the Treasury reported on *The Colonial Systems of the World*. Under the directorship of O.P. Austin, the Department’s Bureau of Statistics amassed information on the world’s 125 colonies, protectorates, and dependencies. The widely distributed report (more than 10,000 copies were printed) delivered a comprehensive interpretative framework for the analysis of the “present governmental conditions in the colonies of the world” and enabled Americans to situate their own colonial project within the international context.36 In conclusion, the report emphasized the significance of the British model: “The most acceptable and therefore most successful of the colonial systems are those in which the largest liberty of self-government is given to the people. The British colonial system, which has by far outgrown that of any other nation, gives, wherever practicable, a large degree of self-government to the colonies.”37

During this period of intense search for colonial models, universities, professional organizations, and scholarly journals placed themselves at the service of empire and helped to chart the nation’s course through analysis of other colonial approaches, most notably through British concepts of colonialism.38 The nation’s universities established courses in comparative colonial administration and economy relying heavily on British expertise39. But Americans also launched their own research programs. One of the most prolific proponents of field research in tropical colonies was Alleyne Ireland, the University of Chicago’s Colonial Commissioner. Ireland was a frequent speaker at national and international conferences on colonialism, a prolific writer, and advisor to the government. He was an ardent proponent of transplanting British colonial methods to America’s new overseas territories.40

Finally, the American search for colonial expertise was not limited to reports and research projects. It involved frequent visits and inspection tours to the possessions of other colonial powers in Asia. As Paul Kramer has observed: “Soon enough, American colonial officials took their place in a network of imperial policy tours and exchanges with colonial officials from the American Philippines, Dutch Java and the East Indies, and the British Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States.”41

Visits were not only limited to neighboring colonies but sometimes involved travel halfway around the world. Many of the high-ranking administrators and military governors discussed their questions with famous British proconsuls such as Lord Cromer, who had represented the empire in Egypt for 28 years, Alfred Milner who played an important role in Egypt and was later High Commissioner for South Africa, and Sir Harry Johnson who had administered the Uganda Protectorates.42

Although Americans were attracted to British conceptions of empire and colonial rule and spent a great deal of time and effort studying its
applicability, they did not simply copy what they found. The British experience of empire provided an intellectual framework within which Americans could discuss their own ideas about colonial rule. The insights from inter-imperial exchanges were pitted against the nation’s core values and earlier experiences of continental expansion.

From the very beginning, those charged with developing an administrative approach made it clear that they would consider an adaptation only within certain parameters. Elihu Root’s statement was instructive as he emphasized that it was important “to take the lessons we could get from the colonial policy of other countries, especially Great Britain” but also argued that the application of insights derived from this procedure would need to be adapted “to the peculiar situation arising from arising from the fundamental principles of our own government.”

In search of guidance, Americans mined the nation’s past for a durable basis for a colonial policy in accordance with established precedents and tradition. The inherent assumption that American colonial state building in the Philippines did not symbolize an aberration but a logical progression was pervaded by a sense of continuity between continental and overseas expansion. Many agreed that the problem of governing territory was as old as the Union itself.

Commentators emphasized the evolutionary nature of the American system of progression from territory to statehood as exemplified by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and the administration of the Louisiana Territory. Territories would pass through a state of preparation in which the inhabitants would be trained for self-government. It was this sense of progression that inspired the tendency to differentiate between American and British approaches to colonial administration. While London focussed on the development of colonial infrastructures, Americans would focus on the preparation of the colonized for self-government and eventual independence.

This “graduation” doctrine did not suggest a loosening of control over the Philippines, for example; on the contrary, it required, in the tradition of the approach to the Louisiana Territory, a stern hand at the helm to spread the benefits of social uplift and civilization. To achieve this degree of control over the Philippine Islands the United States fought one of the bloodiest and most costly colonial wars ever. Between February 1899 and July 1902, more than 130,000 American soldiers fought against a Filipino independence movement. The fighting killed at least 4,200 and wounded more than 3,500 U.S. soldiers, one of the highest loss-rates in American military history. On the Filipino side, at least 20,000 soldiers (one fourth of Aguinaldo’s troops) died, and anywhere between 250,000 and 750,000 civilians were killed. Large portions of the islands were devastated in a war that continued well up to World War
One even after President Roosevelt had officially declared an end to the fighting on July 4th, 1902.48

The American approach to the war in the distant islands and the heated home-front debate on the legitimacy of Washington’s campaign were shaped by Indian analogies and frequent reference to the British experience with colonial warfare in general, and in the South African War in particular. The Indian analogies were often invoked by officers and troops who had a remarkably high exposure to Indian warfare in the American west.49 The military leadership and administration officials in Washington evoked Indian analogies in their characterization of the enemy, their justification for the total warfare conducted in the islands, and their discussions of policy measures designed to pacify the islands.50

The anti-imperialists employed the Indian analogies as well and used concern about the treatment of the indigenous population as a rallying point for opposition to America’s engagement in the islands.51 Frequently reported massacres and the continuous escalation of the war, particularly in Samar, Batangas, and later Mindanao, served as a focal point for fundamental opposition to America’s course of empire.

In addition to the extensive use of Indian analogies, Americans also looked to the British empire for insights into effective colonial military policy. The Pax Britannica not only inspired naval planners such as Alfred Thayer Mahan, but also captured the imagination of those in the army who were in charge of militarily securing the American empire. Their discussions filled the pages of the professional journals and fostered the adaptation of many pragmatic insights gained from the British experience of policing the empire: from military health policies to the introduction of native support troops.52

Finally, the simultaneous blunders of British troops in South Africa and the U.S. Army in the service of empire resulted in an intensive Anglo-American discourse on improving the professionalism of the armed forces.53 During this close collaboration on military reform, American military officers were sent to Britain and to South Africa, to analyze through firsthand observation, and British military theorists such as Spencer Wilkinson’s The Brain of the Army (1890) were widely read in the United States.54 On a more popular level, this discourse and the common war experience produced a widely held sense of common destiny which left a deep imprint even in popular culture.55 Not surprisingly, Elbridge Brooks, the famous author of juvenile literature, concluded his popular With Lawton and Robert (1900), in which an American youth volunteers in the Philippine War and then fights for Britain in the Boer War, with the theme of imperial ‘brotherhood’: “the Stars and Stripes in the Philippines, and the Union Jack in South Africa, are advancing the interests of humanity and civilization.”56
Conclusions

In addition to thematic clusters such as administration and war, the dual influences of national experience and insights derived from interimperial dialogue shaped many other issues such as urban planning, colonial education, and other forms of colonial representation. In each case, Americans argumentatively connected the process of continental expansion to the challenges of colonial state building in the overseas possessions. Simultaneously, the international context of colonialism, specifically the example of the British empire, offered numerous useful reference points for America’s colonial planners. Neither one, however, exclusively determined the contours of Washington’s approach to colonial rule. It was the mix of transatlantic adaptation and national experience that shaped the American way of empire.

Notes

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5 For research trends in this field see Diplomatic History and for the panorama of methodological innovation still: Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, eds., Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
6 For an important overview of the state of research see: Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease, eds., *Cultures of United States Imperialism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993).


13 For a most recent example, see the otherwise excellent: Frank Ninkovich, *The United States and Imperialism* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2001).


16 Sandra Gioia Treadway, “Terra Incognita: The Philippine Islands and the Establishment of American Colonial Policy, 1898–1904” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1978); Stanley Karnow and Glenn A. May have argued that American colonial state building in the


21 For example: The Nation and Beyond. Transnational Perspectives on United States History, a special issue of the Journal of American History 86, no 3 (December 1999).


30 This observation was made by: John M. Coski, “The Triple Mandate. The Concept of Trusteeship and American Imperialism, 1898–1934” (Ph.D. dissertation, College of William and Mary, 1987), 60–62.

31 Many Americans now argued that Britain’s brutal suppression of the Sepoy Mutiny in India, 1857/58, was a watershed in London’s administration of the subcontinent, after which enlightened, selfless, and impartial civil servants were trusted with the administration and the East India Company abolished; for the impact of British actions in India on American anti-imperialists: Alan Raucher, “American Anti-Imperialists and the Pro-India Movement, 1900–1932,” *Pacific Historical Review* 43 (1974): 83–110.

32 Letter Root to Samuel L. Parish, December 1, 1899, Elihu Root Papers, LC Manuscript Division.


35 The Library of Congress became an initial clearing house for information on other colonial systems and information on America’s colonial possessions. On request by Henry Cabot Lodge, chairman of the Senate Committee on the Philippines, it compiled extensive bibli-


37 Ibid., 1407.


42 We have, for example, detailed descriptions of at least five meetings between W. Cameron Forbes, Governor General of the Philippines and Lord Cromer in London. Descriptions are to be found in Forbes’ excellent diaries: i.e. *Journals of W. Cameron Forbes, First Series*, Vol. III, January 1909 [there is only one long entry for the month] LC Manuscript Division; First Series, Vol. V, June 1, 1912; First Series Vol. V, November 17, 1913; Second Series, Vol. I, April 17, 1915.


45 The search for a “usable” past is described in: Treadway, “Terra Incognita,” 14–46.


49 Twenty-six of thirty generals in command during the Philippine-American War and all four military commanders in the islands between 1898 and 1904 (Merritt, Otis, MacArthur, Chaffee) had been socialized in the Indian wars; Williams, “United States Indian Policy and the Debate over Philippine Annexation”, 828; Russell Roth argued: “from 1899 through 1917, many of the officers and men of America’s post-Civil War Indian-fighting Army were involved in yet another armed conflict. This time, however, rather than Kiowas, Comanches, Sioux, or Apaches, they were battling Tagalogs, Ilocans, Visayans, Moros, and Mandayans”, Muddy Glory: America’s ‘Indian Wars’ in the Philippines 1899–1935 (West Hanover, MA: The Christopher Publishing House, 1981), 15.


52 On health policies, see: Mary C. Gillett, The Army Medical Department, 1865–1917 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1995), particularly chapters 8 and 11; on native troops: U.S. Department of War, Adjutant General’s Office, Military Information Division,


